This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 62015CN0193
Case C-193/15 P: Appeal brought on 27 April 2015 by Tarif Akhras against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 12 February 2015 in Case T-579/11: Tarif Akhras v Council of the European Union
Case C-193/15 P: Appeal brought on 27 April 2015 by Tarif Akhras against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 12 February 2015 in Case T-579/11: Tarif Akhras v Council of the European Union
Case C-193/15 P: Appeal brought on 27 April 2015 by Tarif Akhras against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 12 February 2015 in Case T-579/11: Tarif Akhras v Council of the European Union
IO C 205, 22.6.2015, p. 24–25
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
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22.6.2015 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 205/24 |
Appeal brought on 27 April 2015 by Tarif Akhras against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 12 February 2015 in Case T-579/11: Tarif Akhras v Council of the European Union
(Case C-193/15 P)
(2015/C 205/32)
Language of the case: English
Parties
Appellant: Tarif Akhras (represented by: S. Millar, S. Ashley, Solicitors, D. Wyatt QC, R. Blakeley, Barrister)
Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission
Form of order sought
The appellant claims that the Court should:
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Set aside in part the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 12 February 2015 in Case T-579/11 Tarif Akhras v Council of the European Union; |
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Annul the measures contested in Case T-579/11 dated 23 March 2012 and later insofar as they apply to the Appellant; |
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Order the Council to pay the costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceedings before the General Court. |
Pleas in law and main arguments
In support of its appeal, the Appellant invokes two grounds.
First, the General Court erred in law in holding that the Council was entitled to apply a presumption that the Appellant benefitted from and/or supported the regime, and the General Court failed to apply the correct test, viz., whether the established facts amounted to a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that the Appellant benefitted from and/or supported the regime.
Second, the General Court erred in law in that it distorted the evidence relevant to the question whether the Appellant benefitted from and/or supported the regime, which, had it not been so distorted, demonstrated that the Appellant did not support or benefit from the regime.
Had the General Court not applied the presumption, and/or had it applied the correct test, and/or had it not distorted the evidence referred to above, it would have annulled the measures contested in Case T-579/11 dated 23 March 2012 and later.