(3)

In respect of cereals the system should be modified to ensure competitiveness and market orientation for the sector while keeping the role of intervention as a safety net in case of market disruptions and facilitating farmers' response to market conditions. The Council Conclusions on the reform of the intervention system for maize provided for a review of the whole cereals intervention system in the context of the Health Check, based on an analysis which indicated a certain risk for additional barley intervention if prices were low. The present outlook for cereals has however since changed significantly, and is characterised by a favourable world market price environment driven by expanding world demand and low global cereal stocks. Within this context, setting intervention levels to zero for other feed grains in the same time frame as the maize reform would allow for intervention without having negative implications for the cereals market as a whole. The outlook for the cereals sector also applies for durum wheat, meaning that buying into intervention could be abolished since it has lost its relevance with market prices always significantly above the intervention price. Since intervention for cereals is to be a safety net rather than an element which influences price formation, the differences in harvesting periods across Member States, which effectively start the marketing campaigns, are not longer relevant since the system will no longer provide for prices reflecting intervention levels plus monthly increments. In the interests of simplification the dates for cereals intervention should therefore be harmonised across the Community .

(3)

In respect of cereals the system should be modified to ensure competitiveness and market orientation for the sector while keeping the role of intervention as a safety net in case of market disruptions and facilitating farmers' response to market conditions. The Council Conclusions on the reform of the intervention system for maize provided for a review of the whole cereals intervention system in the context of the Health Check, based on an analysis which indicated a certain risk for additional barley intervention if prices were low. The present outlook for cereals has however since changed significantly, and is characterised by a favourable world market price environment driven by expanding world demand and low global cereal stocks. Within this context, setting intervention levels to zero for other feed grains in the same time frame as the maize reform would allow for intervention without having negative implications for the cereals market as a whole. The outlook for the cereals sector also applies for durum wheat, meaning that buying into intervention could be abolished since it has lost its relevance with market prices always significantly above the intervention price. Since intervention for cereals is to be a safety net, intervention should only take place during the last three months of the marketing year .

(4)

Since the 2003 reform, the competitiveness of the rice sector has increased, with stable production, falling stocks in the view of increasing demand both in the Community and on the world market, with the expected price significantly above the intervention price. Therefore providing for buying into intervention for rice is no longer necessary and so should be abolished .

(4)

Since the 2003 reform, the competitiveness of the rice sector has increased, with stable production, falling stocks in the view of increasing demand both in the Community and on the world market, with the expected price significantly above the intervention price. Intervention should nevertheless be maintained as a safety net .

(6)

The abolition of intervention for these products may safely be carried out in 2009 since the current market situation and perspectives suggest that intervention would not, in any case, be applicable for them in 2009.

(6)

The abolition of intervention for rice and pigmeat may safely be carried out in 2009 since the current market situation and perspectives suggest that intervention would not, in any case, be applicable for them in 2009.

(8a)

(10)

(12)

Disposal aids for butter for pastry and ice cream and for direct consumption have been reduced in line with the reduction of the intervention price for butter as from 2004 and have consequently been zero before tenders were suspended due to the favourable market situation. Disposal aid schemes are no longer needed to support the market at intervention price level and should therefore be abolished .

(12)

Disposal aids for butter for pastry and ice cream and for direct consumption have been reduced in line with the reduction of the intervention price for butter as from 2004 and have consequently been zero before tenders were suspended due to the favourable market situation.

(13)

As was the case in the common agricultural policy reform of 2003, to enhance the competitiveness of Community agriculture and to promote more market-oriented and sustainable agriculture, it is necessary to continue the shift from production support to producer support by abolishing the existing aids in Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (single CMO Regulation) for dried fodder , flax, hemp and potato starch and integrating support for these products into the system of decoupled income support for each farm. As was the case for the 2003 CAP reform, while decoupling aid paid to farmers will leave the actual amounts paid unchanged, it will significantly increase the effectiveness of the income aid.

(13)

As was the case in the common agricultural policy reform of 2003, to enhance the competitiveness of Community agriculture and to promote more market-oriented and sustainable agriculture, it is necessary to continue the shift from production support to producer support by abolishing the existing aids in Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (single CMO Regulation) for flax, hemp and potato starch and integrating support for these products into the system of decoupled income support for each farm. As was the case for the 2003 CAP reform, while decoupling aid paid to farmers will leave the actual amounts paid unchanged, it will significantly increase the effectiveness of the income aid.

(14)

The Council decided in 2000 to phase out the aid for short flax and hemp fibre. This decision was implemented with effect from the 2009/2010 marketing year by the amendments made to the single CMO by Regulation (EC) No 247/2008, as was the phasing out of the additional processing aid for processors of flax grown in traditional areas. Aid for long flax fibre should be decoupled. However in order to allow the industry to adapt, half of the shift to the single payment scheme should take place in 2011 and the remaining part in 2013.

(14)

The Council decided in 2000 to phase out the aid for short flax and hemp fibre. This decision was implemented with effect from the 2009/2010 marketing year by the amendments made to the single CMO by Regulation (EC) No 247/2008, as was the phasing out of the additional processing aid for processors of flax grown in traditional areas. Aid for long flax fibre should be decoupled. However in order to allow the industry to adapt, the shift to the single payment scheme should take place by 2013 at the latest .

(15)

The dried fodder regime was reformed in 2003, when part of the aid was given to producers and decoupled. In the context of the overall orientation of the Health Check towards more market orientation, and the present outlook in feed markets, the transition to full decoupling for the entire sector should therefore be completed by decoupling the remaining aid to the industry.

(15)

The dried fodder regime was reformed in 2003, when part of the aid was given to producers and decoupled. In the context of the overall orientation of the Health Check towards more market orientation, and the present outlook in feed markets, the transition to full decoupling for the entire sector should therefore be completed, by 2013 at the latest , by decoupling the remaining aid to the industry.

(17)

(18)

(19)

Producer organisations can serve a useful role in grouping supply in sectors where there is an imbalance in concentration of producers and purchasers. Member States should therefore be able to recognise producer organisations in all sectors.

(19)

While crop insurance or mutual funds can contribute to corrective risk management, this can be very costly in economic and social terms. Parallel efforts should therefore be made to develop preventive risk management instruments . Producer organisations and interbranch organisations can serve an important role in this preventive risk management, particularly by grouping supply in sectors where there is an imbalance in concentration of producers and purchasers or by improving knowledge of the markets . Member States should therefore be able to recognise producer organisations and professional organisations in all sectors.

(–1)

3.

By way of derogation from paragraph 2(a), it shall be permitted to market from the Azores to the rest of the Community the following maximum quantities of sugar (code NC 1701) during the following years:

—

2008 : 3 000 tonnes,

—

2009 : 2 285 tonnes,

—

2010 : 1 570 tonnes,

—

2011 : 855 tonnes,

(–1a)

1.

During the period referred to in Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001, the C sugar referred to in Article 13 of that Regulation, exported pursuant to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2670/81 of 14 September 1981 laying down detailed implementing rules in respect of sugar production in excess of the quota and introduced to be consumed in Madeira and the Canary Islands in the form of white sugar under code NC 1701 and to be refined and consumed in the Azores as raw sugar under code NC 1701 12 10 and/or NC 1701 11 10, shall benefit, under the conditions of this Regulation, from the exemption regime relating to import duties within the limit of the supply estimates referred to in Article 2 of this Regulation.

(1)

(2)

(a)

(i)

‘ (a)

common wheat, barley, maize and sorghum ;’

(ii)

(b)

(a)

for cereals, from 1 November to 31 May;

(a)

for cereals, from 1 March to 31 May;

(da)

(ba)

2.

Public intervention for common wheat may be suspended by the Commission, without the assistance of the Committee referred to in Article 195(1) , if the price for wheat with a minimum protein content of 11 % ‘Rouen delivered’ is higher than the reference price.

2.

Public intervention for common wheat may be suspended by the Commission if the price for wheat with a minimum protein content of 11 % ‘Rouen delivered’ is higher than the reference price.

4)

1.

2.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

3.

4a)

(iia)

(5)

(6)

(a)

(i)

(ca)

(cb)

(ii)

(b)

7.

1.

2.

(8)

(11)

(a)

1.

(14a)

5 a.

(14b)

3 a.

17.

18a.

1.

The amount of processing aid provided for in Article 91 shall be fixed for long flax fibre :

1.

The amount of processing aid provided for in Article 91 shall be fixed:

(a)

EUR 200 for the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 marketing years; and

(a)

for long flax fibre, EUR 160 per tonne for the 2009/2010 to 2012/2013 marketing years;

(b)

EUR 100 for the 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 marketing years;

(b)

for short flax fibre and hemp fibre containing not more than 7,5 % impurities and shives, EUR 90 per tonne for the 2009/2010 to 2012/2013 marketing years.

(a)

(b)

(20a)

1a.

A maximum guaranteed quantity of 147 265 tonnes for each of the marketing years 2009/2010 to 2012/2013 shall be established for short flax fibre and hemp fibre in respect of which aid may be granted. That quantity shall be apportioned among certain Member States as national guaranteed quantities in accordance with point A. II. of Annex XI.

(20b)

(a)

(b)

1.

A premium of EUR 22,25 per tonne of starch produced shall be paid for the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 marketing years to undertakings producing potato starch for the quantity of potato starch up to the quota limit referred to in Article 84a(2), provided that they have paid to potato producers a minimum price for all the potatoes necessary to produce starch up to that quota limit.

1.

A premium of EUR 22,25 per tonne of starch produced shall be paid for the 2009/2010 to 2012/2013 marketing years to undertakings producing potato starch for the quantity of potato starch up to the quota limit referred to in Article 84a(2), provided that they have paid to potato producers a minimum price for all the potatoes necessary to produce starch up to that quota limit.

(22)

29a.

(30a)

In Article 162(1)(a), point (i) is deleted  (2).

(30b)

In Article 162(1)(a), point (ii) is deleted  (2).

(31a)

3.

Member States which reduce their sugar quota by more than 50 % of the sugar quota laid down on 20 February 2006 in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 may grant temporary state aid up to the 2013/2014 marketing year .

(5)

before 30 June 2011 to the European Parliament and Council on the conditions for smoothly phasing out the milk quota system, including, in particular, possible further increases in quotas or possible reductions in the superlevy .

(5)

before 31 December 2010 to the European Parliament and Council on the state of the milk market. The report shall also analyse the effectiveness of the Member States' management systems in relation to the liberalisation of the quota scheme. Where appropriate the report shall be accompanied by suitable proposals .