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Document 02017R1770-20221214
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
02017R1770 — EN — 14.12.2022 — 008.001
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COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2017/1770 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 251 29.9.2017, p. 1) |
Amended by:
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Official Journal |
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No |
page |
date |
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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019 |
L 182 |
33 |
8.7.2019 |
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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/8 of 7 January 2020 |
L 4I |
1 |
8.1.2020 |
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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/116 of 27 January 2020 |
L 22 |
25 |
28.1.2020 |
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L 446 |
1 |
14.12.2021 |
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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/156 of 4 February 2022 |
L 25I |
1 |
4.2.2022 |
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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/595 of 11 April 2022 |
L 114 |
60 |
12.4.2022 |
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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/2179 of 8 November 2022 |
L 288 |
1 |
9.11.2022 |
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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/2436 of 12 December 2022 |
L 319 |
8 |
13.12.2022 |
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Corrected by:
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2017/1770
of 28 September 2017
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
Article 1
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:
a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;
a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;
a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;
a counterclaim;
a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;
‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for that purpose ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;
‘competent authorities’ refers to the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;
‘economic resources’ means assets of any kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;
‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or any other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;
‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of any kind, including, but not limited to:
cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
publicly-traded and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;
interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;
credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale; and
documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;
‘Sanctions Committee’ means the Committee of the Security Council established pursuant to paragraph 9 of United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 2374 (2017);
‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.
Article 2
Article 2a
Annex I shall include natural and legal persons, entities and bodies identified by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee as:
engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the ‘Agreement’);
taking actions that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;
acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of, or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified under points (a) or (b), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms, as well as the trafficking in cultural property;
involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defence forces;
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of Experts;
international security presences, including the Force Conjointe des Etats du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), European Union Missions and French forces;
obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women or children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
using or recruiting children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali; or
knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions.
Article 2b
Annex Ia shall include the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies designated by the Council on any of the following grounds:
being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged, directly or indirectly, in the actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as those actions or policies referred to in Article 2a, paragraph 1; or
obstructing or undermining the successful completion of Mali’s political transition, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or
being associated with natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b).
Article 3
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:
necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural persons listed in Annex I or Annex Ia, and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees or reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources; and
where the authorisation concerns a person, entity or body listed in Annex I and provided that the competent authority of the Member State concerned has notified the Sanctions Committee of that determination and its intention to grant an authorisation, and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within 5 working days of such notification.
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that:
where the authorisation concerns a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I such determination has been notified to the Sanctions Committee by the competent authority of the Member State concerned and that the determination has been approved by that Committee; and
where the authorisation concerns a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex Ia, the Member State concerned has notified other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks prior to granting the authorisation.
Article 3a
Article 3b
Article 4
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources for natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I or Annex Ia, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources for natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I or Annex Ia, if the following conditions are met:
the funds or economic resources are the subject of:
for a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I, a judicial, administrative or arbitral decision established prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2a was included in Annex I, or of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien rendered prior to that date;
for a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex Ia, an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2b was included in Annex Ia, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by a decision referred to in point (a) or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
the decision or lien is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I or Annex Ia;
recognising the decision or lien is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned; and
for a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I, the Sanctions Committee has been notified by the Member State of the decision or lien.
Article 5
By way of derogation from Article 2(1) and provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I or Annex Ia is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in Annex I or Annex Ia, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the competent authority concerned has determined that:
the funds or economic resources shall be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I or Annex Ia; and,
the payment is not in breach of Article 2(2).
Article 6
Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
interest or other earnings on those accounts;
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 has been included in Annex I or Annex Ia; or
payments due to a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex Ia under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the EU or enforceable in the Member State concerned,
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments are frozen in accordance with Article 2.
Article 7
Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:
supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and shall transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and
cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of this information.
Article 8
It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 2.
Article 9
Article 10
No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I or Annex Ia;
any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).
Article 11
The Commission and Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation in particular information:
in respect of funds frozen under Article 2 and authorisations granted under Articles 3, 4 and 5;
in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.
Article 12
Article 13
Article 13a
The Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Regulation. These tasks include:
as regards the Council, preparing and making amendments to Annex I and Ia;
as regards the High Representative, preparing amendments to Annex I and Ia;
as regards the Commission:
adding the contents of Annex I and Ia to the electronic, consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial sanctions and to the interactive sanctions map, both publicly available;
processing information on the impact of the measures provided for in this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.
Article 14
Article 15
This Regulation shall apply:
within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;
on board of any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;
to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.
Article 16
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
ANNEX I
List of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2a
1. AHMED AG ALBACHAR (alias: Intahmadou Ag Albachar)
Designation: President of the Humanitarian Commission of the Bureau Regional d’Administration et Gestion de Kidal
Date of birth: 31 Dec. 1963
Place of birth: Tin-Essako, Kidal region, Mali
Nationality: Mali
National identification no: 1 63 08 4 01 001 005E
Address: Quartier Aliou, Kidal, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Ahmed Ag Albachar is a prominent businessman and, since early 2018, a special advisor to the Governor of Kidal region. An influential member of the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), belonging to the Ifoghas Tuareg community, Ahmed Ag Albachar also mediates relations between the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and Ansar Dine (QDe.135). Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Additional information
Ahmed Ag Albachar is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement; and paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 2374 (2017) for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali.
In January Ag Albachar uses his influence to control and choose which humanitarian and development projects take place in the Kidal region, who implements them, where and when. No humanitarian action can be undertaken without his knowledge and approval. As self-proclaimed president of the humanitarian commission, Ag Albachar is in charge of granting residence and work permits of aid workers in exchange for money or services. The commission also controls which companies and individuals can participate in bids for projects that NGOs advertise in Kidal, granting Ag Albachar the power to manipulate humanitarian action in the region and choose those who work for NGOs. Aid distributions can only be conducted under his oversight, thereby influencing who benefits from the distributions.
Additionally, Albachar uses unemployed youths to intimidate and extort NGOs, severely hindering their work. The humanitarian community at large works in fear in Kidal, but especially national staff who are more vulnerable.
Ahmed Ag Albachar is also the co-owner of Timitrine Voyage transport company; one of the few transport companies that NGOs are authorised to use in Kidal. Ag Albachar, together with a dozen of other transport companies owned by a small clique of influential Ifoghas Tuareg notables, usurps a significant share of humanitarian aid in Kidal. Moreover, the monopoly position maintained by Ag Albachar, renders aid delivery in certain communities more difficult than others.
Albachar is manipulating humanitarian aid to fulfil his personal interests and the political interests of the HCUA by exercising terror, threatening NGOs and controlling their operations, all of which results in obstruction and hindrance of aid affecting beneficiaries in need in the region of Kidal. Therefore, Ahmed Ag Albachar obstructs the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali.
His actions also violate article 49 of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali that commits parties to respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence which guide humanitarian action, to prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends, and to facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel. Therefore, Albachar obstructs or threatens the implementation of the Agreement.
2. HOUKA HOUKA AG ALHOUSSEINI (alias: a) Mohamed Ibn Alhousseyni b) Muhammad Ibn Al-Husayn c) Houka Houka)
Title: Cadi
Date of birth: a) 1 Jan. 1962 b) 1 Jan. 1963 c) 1 Jan. 1964
Place of birth: Ariaw, Tombouctou region, Mali
Nationality: Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini was appointed by Iyad Ag Ghaly (QDi.316) as the Cadi of Timbuktu in April 2012 after the establishment of the jihadist caliphate in northern Mali.
Houka Houka used to work closely with the Hesbah, the Islamic police headed by Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, jailed at the Detention Centre of the International Criminal Court in The Hague since September 2016. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Additional information
Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
After the French forces intervention in January 2013, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini was arrested on 17 January 2014 but subsequently released by Malian authorities on 15 August 2014, a liberation denounced by human rights organisations.
Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini has been since based in Ariaw, in the area of Zouéra, a village located west of Timbuktu (Essakane commune), on the bank of the lake Faguibine going towards the Mauritanian border. On 27 September 2017, he was officially reinstated here as a teacher by the Governor of Timbuktu, Koina Ag Ahmadou, this after lobbying by sanctioned individual Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamidoune (MLi.003), leader of the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad (CPA), listed on 20 December 2018 by the Security Council Committee on Mali for reasons including actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement. Mohamed Ousmane founded in 2017 and presided a broader alliance of splinter groups, the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME). During its founding convention, the CME openly threatened in an official statement the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The CME has been also involved in obstructions delaying the implementation of the Agreement, by pressuring the Malian government and the international community with the aim to impose the CME in the different mechanisms established by the Agreement.
Houka Houka and Mohamed Ousmane have been instrumental to each others’ rise, the latter facilitating meetings with government officials, and the first playing a key role in the expansion of Ousmane’s influence over the region of Timbuktu. Houka Houka has participated in most of the community gatherings organized by Mohamed Ousmane since 2017, contributing to Ousmane’s notoriety and credibility in the region, as well as to the founding ceremony of the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME) to which he gave his public blessing.
The area of influence of Houka Houka has recently expanded further east, to the Ber region (stronghold of the Bérabich Arabs located 50 kilometres east of Timbuktu), and northern Timbuktu. Even though he is not from a lineage of Cadis and that he started only in 2012, Houka Houka was able to extend his authority as a Cadi and his capacity to maintain public security in certain areas by using Al-Furqan assets and the fear that this terrorist organisation instigates in the Timbuktu region through complex attacks against international and Malian defence and security forces and targeted assassinations.
Therefore, through his support for Mohamed Ousmane and his obstruction of the Agreement, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini threatens its implementation, as well as the peace, security, and stability in Mali at large.
3. MAHRI SIDI AMAR BEN DAHA (alias: a) Yoro Ould Daha b) Yoro Ould Daya c) Sidi Amar Ould Daha d) Yoro)
Designation: Deputy chief of staff of the regional coordination of the Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination (MOC) in Gao
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1978
Place of birth: Djebock, Mali
Nationality: Mali
National identification no: 11262/1547
Address: Golf Rue 708 Door 345, Gao, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019, 14 Jan. 2020, 5 Oct. 2022)
Other information: Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha is a leader of the Lehmar Arab community of Gao and military chief of staff of the pro-governmental wing of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), associated to the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme) coalition. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze). Reportedly deceased in February 2020.
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Additional information
Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
Ben Daha was a high-ranking officer of the Islamic police operating in Gao when the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134) controlled the town from June 2012 to January 2013. Ben Daha currently is deputy chief of staff of the regional coordination of the Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination (MOC) in Gao.
On 12 November 2018, the Plateforme in Bamako declared not to participate in forthcoming regional consultations, scheduled to be held from 13 to 17 November in accordance with the March 2018 roadmap agreed upon by all parties to the Peace and reconciliation Agreement in March 2018. The next day, in Gao, a coordination meeting was held by the military chief of staff of the Ganda Koy component of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR)-Plateforme, with representatives the MAA-Plateforme, to prevent the consultations to take place. The blockade was coordinated with Plateforme leadership in Bamako, the MAA-Plateforme, as well as Member of Parliament Mohamed Ould Mataly.
From 14 to 18 November 2018, dozens of MAA-Plateforme combatants together with those of the CMFPR factions obstructed the holding of regional consultations. Operating under the instruction and with the participation of Ben Daha, at least six pick-up truck vehicles from the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA-Plateforme) were positioned in front of the Gao governorate and its vicinity. Two MOC vehicles attributed to MAA-Plateforme were also observed at the scene.
On 17 November 2018, an incident took place between armed elements blocking access to the governorate and a FAMa patrol passing by the area, but was diffused before it could escalate and constitute a cease-fire violation. On 18 November 2018, a total of twelve vehicles and armed elements lifted the blockade of the governorate following a latest round of negotiations with the governor of Gao.
On 30 November 2018, Ben Daha organised an inter-Arab meeting in Tinfanda to discuss security and administrative restructuring. The meeting also included sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001) whom Ben Daha supports and defends.
Therefore, through effectively blocking discussions on key provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement related to the reform of the territorial structure of northern Mali, Ben Daha has obstructed the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. In addition, Ben Daha supports an individual identified as threatening the implementation of the Agreement through his involvement in ceasefire violations and organised criminal activity.
4. MOHAMED BEN AHMED MAHRI (alias: a) Mohammed Rougi b) Mohamed Ould Ahmed Deya c) Mohamed Ould Mahri Ahmed Daya d) Mohamed Rougie e) Mohamed Rouggy f) Mohamed Rouji)
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1979
Place of birth: Tabankort, Mali
Nationality: Mali
Passport no: a) AA00272627 b) AA0263957 c) AA0344148, issued on 21 March 2019 (date of expiration: 20 March 2024)
Address: Bamako, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019, 14 Jan. 2020, 5 Oct. 2022)
Other information: Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri is a businessman from the Arab Lehmar community in Gao region who previously collaborated with the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Additional information
Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017) for acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 2374 (2017), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property.
Between December 2017 and April 2018, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri commanded a trafficking operation of over 10 tons of Moroccan cannabis, moved in cooling trucks through Mauretania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. In the night of 13 to 14 June 2018 a quarter of the shipment was confiscated in Niamey, while a rival group had allegedly stolen the remaining three quarters during the night of 12 and 13 April 2018.
In December 2017, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri was in Niamey with a Malian national to prepare the operation. The latter was arrested in Niamey after he had flown in from Morocco with two Moroccan and two Algerian Nationals on 15 and 16 April 2018 to try and recuperate stolen cannabis. Three of his associates were also arrested, including a Moroccan national, who had been sentenced in Morocco in 2014 to five months imprisonment for drug trafficking.
Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri commands trafficking of cannabis resin to Niger straight through northern Mali, making use of convoys led by members of the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs allies (GATIA), including sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001). Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri compensates Asriw for the use of these convoys. These convoys frequently generate clashes with competitors associated with the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA).
Using his financial gains made in narcotics trafficking, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri lends his support to terrorist armed groups, notably the sanctioned entity Al-Mourabitoun (QDe.141), attempting to bribe officials to release arrested combatants and facilitating fighters to integrate in the Mouvement Arabe pour l’Azawad (MAA) Plateforme.
Therefore, through the proceeds from organised crime, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri supports an individual identified under paragraph 8(b) of resolution 2374 (2017) as threatening the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in addition to a terrorist group designated under resolution 1267.
5. MOHAMED OULD MATALY
Designation: Member of Parliament
Date of birth: 1958
Nationality: Mali
Passport no: a) D9011156, b) AA0260156, issued on 3 August 2018 (date of expiration: 2 August 2023)
Address: a) Golf Rue 708 Door 345, Gao, Mali b) Almoustarat, Gao, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019, 14 Jan. 2020, 5 Oct. 2022)
Other information: Mohamed Ould Mataly is the former Mayor of Bourem and current Member of Parliament for Bourem’s constituency, part of the Rassamblement pour le Mali (RPM, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s political party). He is from the Lehmar Arab community and an influential member of the pro-governmental wing of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), associated to the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme) coalition. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Additional information
Mohamed Ould Mataly is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
On 12 November 2018, the Plateforme in Bamako declared not to participate in forthcoming regional consultations, scheduled to be held from 13 to 17 November in accordance with the March 2018 roadmap agreed upon by all parties to the Peace and reconciliation Agreement in March 2018. The next day, in Gao, a coordination meeting was held by the military chief of staff of the Ganda Koy component of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR)-Plateforme, with representatives the MAA-Plateforme, to prevent the consultations to take place. The blockade was coordinated with Plateforme leadership in Bamako, the MAA-Plateforme, as well as Member of Parliament Mohamed Ould Mataly.
His close associate Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha, alias Yoro Ould Daha, who resides in his property in Gao, participated in the blockade of the venue of the consultation at the Governor’s office during this period.
Furthermore, on 12 July 2016 Ould Mataly was also one of the instigators of demonstrations hostile to the implementation of the Agreement.
Therefore, through effectively blocking discussions on key provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement related to the reform of the territorial structure of northern Mali, Ould Mataly has obstructed and caused delays to the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.
Lastly, Ould Mataly has pleaded for the release of members of his community captured in counter-terrorist operations. Through his involvement in organised crime and association with terrorist armed groups, Mohamed Ould Mataly threatens the implementation of the Agreement.
ANNEX Ia
List of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2b
|
|
Name |
Identifying information |
Reasons |
Date of listing |
|
1. |
DIAW, Malick |
Place of birth: Ségou Date of birth: 2.12.1979 Nationality: Malian Passport number: B0722922 valid until 13.8.2018 Gender: male Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Colonel |
Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the 18 August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Koné. Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since December 2020. The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the ‘missions’ enshrined in the Transition Charter of 1 October 2020 (‘Transition Charter’) and that should have been completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. |
4.2.2022 |
|
2. |
WAGUÉ, Ismaël |
Place of birth: Bamako Date of birth: 2.3.1975 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023 Gender: male Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Colonel-Major |
Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw. On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité national pour le salut du people, CNSP). Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (Cadre Stratégique Permanent, CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Comité de suivi de l’accord, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation has obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which is one of the ‘missions’ of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter. ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, as well as for obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. |
4.2.2022 |
|
3. |
MAÏGA, Choguel |
Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali Date of birth: 31.12.1958 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued Gender: male Position: Prime Minister |
As Prime Minister since June 2021, Choguel Maïga leads the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of 24 May 2021. Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in June 2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (Assises nationales de la refondation, ANR) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022. As announced by Choguel Maïga himself, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter. ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. In his position as Prime Minister, Choguel Maïga is directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter, and he is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities. |
4.2.2022 |
|
4. |
MAÏGA, Ibrahim Ikassa |
Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali Date of birth: 5.2.1971 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali Gender: male Position: Minister of Refoundation |
Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin - Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita. As Minister of Refoundation since June 2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (Assises nationales de la Refondation, ANR announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022. As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter. ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities. |
4.2.2022 |
|
5. |
DIARRA, Adama Ben (a.k.a. Ben Le Cerveau) |
Place of birth: Kati, Mali Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued Gender: male Position: Member of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali) |
Adama Ben Diarra, known as Camarade Ben Le Cerveau, is one of the young leaders of the M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 Juin - Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita. Adama Ben Diarra is also the leader of Yéréwolo, which is the main organisation supporting the Transition Authorities, and a member of the National Transition Council (CNT) since 3 December 2021. The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the ‘missions’ enshrined in the Transition Charter and that were supposed to be completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organisation of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter. Adama Ben Diarra has been actively advocating for and supporting the prolongation of the political transition of Mali during political rallies and on social networks, stating that the five-year extension of the transition period decided by the Transition Authorities following the National Consultations for Refoundation (Assises nationales de la Refondation, ANR) was a deep aspiration of the Malian people. Contrary to the timetable of reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government, as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022. As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter. ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Adama Ben Diarra) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Adama Ben Diarra is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities. |
4.2.2022 |
ANNEX II
Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the Commission
BELGIUM
https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions
BULGARIA
https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions
CZECHIA
www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html
DENMARK
http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/
GERMANY
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html
ESTONIA
https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid
IRELAND
https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/
GREECE
http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html
SPAIN
https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx
FRANCE
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/
CROATIA
https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955
ITALY
https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/
CYPRUS
https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/
LATVIA
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539
LITHUANIA
http://www.urm.lt/sanctions
LUXEMBOURG
https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html
HUNGARY
https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato
MALTA
https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx
NETHERLANDS
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties
AUSTRIA
https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/
POLAND
https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe
https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions
PORTUGAL
https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas
ROMANIA
http://www.mae.ro/node/1548
SLOVENIA
http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi
SLOVAKIA
https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu
FINLAND
https://um.fi/pakotteet
SWEDEN
https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner
Address for notifications to the European Commission:
European Commission
Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA)
Rue de Spa 2
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium
E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu
( 1 ) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).