1.

Must Articles 34 and 36 of the Brussels I regulation (1) and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a financial penalty imposed for harm caused to the reputation of a sports club by the publication of a story in a newspaper can manifestly infringe freedom of expression and therefore constitute a ground for refusing to recognise and enforce a judgment?

2.

In the event of an affirmative answer, must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the court in which enforcement is sought may find that the penalty is disproportionate only where the damages have been categorised as punitive either by the court of origin or by the court in which enforcement is sought and not where they have been awarded as compensation for non-material damage?

3.

Must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the court in which enforcement is sought may take account only of the deterrent effect of the penalty in the light of the resources of the person on whom the penalty is imposed, or may it have regard to other factors such as the seriousness of the wrong or the extent of the harm?

4.

Can the deterrent effect in the light of the resources of the newspaper in itself form a ground for refusing to recognise and enforce a judgment due to a manifest infringement of the fundamental principle of freedom of the press?

5.

Must the deterrent effect be understood as meaning that the financial stability of the newspaper is threatened or may it simply refer to an intimidating effect?

6.

Must the deterrent effect on the newspaper publishing house and on a journalist as an individual be assessed in the same way?

7.

Is the general economic situation of the print media a relevant factor when assessing whether, beyond the newspaper in question, the penalty is likely to have an intimidating effect on the media overall?