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having regard to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

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having regard to the TFEU, and in particular Article 16, Article 82(1) and Article 87(2) thereof,

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having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), and in particular Articles 7, 8, 47 and 52 thereof,

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (1),

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having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (2) (Law Enforcement Directive),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (3) (EUDPR), and in particular Article 42(1) thereof,

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and2009/968/JHA (4),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (5),

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having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (‘the EPPO’) (6),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) (7),

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having regard to Opinion 8/2021 of the European Data Protection Supervisor of 25 May 2021 on the Recommendation for a Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a cooperation agreement between the EU and Interpol,

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having regard the study of its Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of February 2022 entitled ‘Ensuring the rights of EU citizens against politically motivated Red Notices’,

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having regard to Interpol’s Rules on the Processing of Data,

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having regard to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s resolutions 2161 (2017) on abusive recourse to the Interpol system: the need for more stringent legal safeguards and 2315 (2019) on Interpol reform and extradition proceedings: building trust by fighting abuse,

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA (8),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816 (9),

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having regard to Rules 114(4) and 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0200/2022),

A.

whereas present-day terrorism and serious and organised crime are dynamic, complex, innovative, globalised, mobile and often transnational phenomena, requiring a robust response and more effective, coordinated EU cooperation with international law enforcement authorities and bodies such as the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol); whereas the Commission’s 2020 EU Security Union strategy calls on the Member States to step up multilateral cooperation and coordination between the EU and Interpol, as this is essential to enhancing cooperation and information exchange; whereas Parliament’s resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU Security Union strategy (10) stresses the need for stronger cooperation between the Member States and for better coordination at EU level between all actors;

B.

whereas effective international cooperation, in full respect of fundamental rights, is an important component of effective law enforcement and judicial cooperation, especially on types of crime involving the processing and sharing of personal data; whereas the legality of processing personal data is governed by the Union data protection acquis, and whereas that also applies to bilateral agreements with key partners who play an important role in obtaining information and potential evidence from beyond the EU;

C.

whereas Interpol is the world’s largest international criminal police organisation and has an important role to play all over the world; whereas Interpol is based on inter-governmental cooperation; whereas in December 2021, the Council adopted a negotiating mandate for the Commission to enter into negotiations, with the expectation of concluding by the end of 2022, on an international agreement on behalf of the EU seeking reinforced cooperation with Interpol, including access to Interpol’s databases and the strengthening of operational cooperation; whereas it is paramount to ensure that the final agreement puts in place robust measures to guarantee compliance with the principles relating to the processing of personal data, as set out in the Union data protection acquis, as well as the correctness of the personal data received through such cooperation, and to ensure that all future cooperation and exchange of personal data respect fundamental rights, including the right to data protection and privacy;

D.

whereas the EU and Interpol already have long-standing cooperation in a range of law enforcement-related areas through the operational implementation of the EU policy cycle / EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats) and by supporting the activities of Member States in cooperation with EU agencies, such as the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, and the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, on the basis of agreements or working arrangements; whereas on 5 November 2001, Europol and Interpol signed an operational agreement followed by a memorandum of understanding allowing the transfer of personal data through their respective liaison officers; whereas on 27 May 2009 Frontex signed a working agreement with Interpol establishing a framework for cooperation with the objective of facilitating the prevention, detection and combating of cross-border crime and improving border security to combat illegal immigration, people smuggling and trafficking in human beings;

E.

whereas individual EU Member States, in their capacity as Interpol member countries, can directly access Interpol’s 19 databases, which include potentially valuable information on individuals, stolen property, weapons and threats; whereas these databases contain millions of records with information that could directly help to combat serious and organised crime and terrorism; whereas Frontex, Eurojust and the EPPO currently do not have any access to these databases, in line with their mandates — either directly or on a ‘hit/no hit’ basis — due to the lack of an agreement with Interpol, which is required for this purpose under Interpol’s rules on the processing of data;

F.

whereas current cooperation between the EU and Interpol is already close in the area of counterterrorism; whereas it should be stepped up and extended to new areas; whereas procedures should be improved, accelerated and streamlined to address a series of indispensable operational needs in order to facilitate swift access to information related to serious and organised crime and terrorism and to implement existing Union legal acts;

G.

whereas the EU is the largest donor of funds to Interpol, which are mainly assigned to information exchanges in the field of law enforcement, but also include border management cooperation and capacity building activities, and to projects and programmes targeting a range of terrorism and serious crime activities; whereas this gives the EU an important role to play in improving the functioning of Interpol, and in particular, its transparency and accountability;

H.

whereas the new agreement should establish a modern and coherent framework for the cooperation of EU bodies and agencies with Interpol, based on the already existing modes of cooperation; whereas the agreement should be in compliance with the general requirements of the Charter, the applicable Union data protection acquis, namely the EUDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive, the specific data protection requirements and safeguards laid down in the basic acts establishing the EU bodies, agencies and IT systems and the relevant Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) jurisprudence and fundamental rights standards;

I.

whereas the agreement should respond to operational needs, taking into account the latest developments in combating terrorism and cross-border, transnational, serious and organised crime; whereas the agreement provides the legal basis for the exchange of operational information, including personal data, and access to relevant Interpol databases by Union bodies and agencies in line with their mandates, under the condition that the agreement is legally binding and enforceable against all parties and that it includes all the necessary data protection safeguards;

J.

whereas no fundamental rights impact assessment on the Commission Recommendation has been carried out;

K.

whereas the adoption of the Union legal framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the area of justice and home affairs in May 2019 led to exploratory talks between the EU and Interpol on the need to enter into a cooperation agreement; whereas an advanced and shared data infrastructure is currently in place in the EU for police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration, as well as borders and visas; whereas this infrastructure, and the IT systems and EU databases that constitute it, allows for limited and highly regulated information sharing with third countries or international organisations;

L.

whereas the new agreement should govern cooperation between Interpol and Europol, the EPPO, Eurojust and Frontex and provide direct access by these bodies, agencies and Member States for purposes strictly linked to the performance of their tasks, as regulated in their respective basic acts to two of Interpol’s databases — the Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) and Travel Document Associated With Notices (TDAWN) databases via the European Search Portal (ESP), in compliance with EU data protection requirements and in full respect of fundamental rights;

M.

whereas according to the Interpol constitution, Interpol is obliged not to assist or aid member countries that act in violation of international human rights law;

N.

whereas governmental, international and non-governmental organisations continue to report abuses by some member countries of Interpol’s notice and diffusion system in order to persecute political opponents, national human rights defenders, lawyers, civil society activists and journalists, in violation of international standards on human rights and Interpol’s own rules; whereas according to reports by the Commission and civil society organisations, Interpol has reformed and strengthened its red notices review processes, as well as its support systems for National Central Bureaus in member countries, reformed the setup and functioning of the Commission for the Control of Files, which enforces its complaints mechanism, appointed a data protection officer and implemented a learning and knowledge-sharing programme; whereas despite those reforms, serious concerns remain related to possible abuses of the Interpol system that impact fundamental rights, as recent reports still emphasise the need for more legal safeguards, more transparency and better implementation of reforms; whereas there are significant challenges with the mechanisms to update information regarding red notices and diffusions, as they sometimes remain in effect in the national databases despite having been updated and removed by the General Secretariat of Interpol; whereas both written sources and interviews with governmental and non-governmental organisations suggest that Interpol’s vetting process remains inconsistent;

O.

whereas Article 3 of Interpol’s constitution prohibits any intervention or activity of political, military, religious or racial character; whereas abuses in high profile cases in multiple member countries of Interpol have still been observed in recent years; whereas politically motivated extraditions are often triggered by the abusive issuing of a red notice or ‘wanted person diffusion’ through Interpol; whereas scarce information is made available by Interpol on the manner in which it reviews red notices, its administrative ability to do so and the outcomes of these reviews, leading to a lack of transparency as regards how Interpol works towards effectively countering politically motivated red notices; whereas member countries and other international organisations have little access to information about the overall handling of red notices and diffusions; whereas no information is available on the countries making the requests for such notices, how many requests are accepted and refused, the grounds for refusal, which countries perform better or worse in terms of acceptance or refusal of requests and the development of these practices over time; whereas this makes it impossible to evaluate the quality of the General Secretariat of Interpol’s vetting process, the work of the National Central Bureaus or the quality of the requests submitted by countries;

P.

whereas Parliament, in its resolution of 16 September 2021 on the case of human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor in the United Arab Emirates (11), expressed deep concern about the candidacy and appointment as Interpol’s president of the General Inspector of the Ministry of Interior of the United Arab Emirates, Major General Ahmed Nasser Al Raisi, and called on the members of Interpol’s General Assembly, and in particular the EU Member States, to duly examine the allegations of human rights abuses levelled against him; whereas on 11 May 2022, investigations into claims of torture were opened against Interpol’s president in France;

Q.

whereas cooperation between the European Union and Interpol is underpinned by trust in Interpol’s system and internal processes; whereas trust in Interpol’s system of red notices and diffusions relies on the prevention and swift tackling of misuse of Interpol notices by countries seeking to use Interpol systems for political and repressive ends; whereas, Interpol must ensure that the personal data processed internally through its systems complies with human rights and the rule of law;

R.

whereas numerous authoritarian countries still remain member countries of Interpol; whereas in recent years authoritarian regimes have been successful in politically abusing the system of red notices and diffusions, persecuting individuals outside of their jurisdictions and subjecting them to real, practical, and invasive restrictions on their lives and fundamental rights;

S.

whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a direct threat to international law enforcement cooperation and its continued access to Interpol’s databases is a threat to the integrity of the EU’s cooperation with Interpol; whereas Russia is responsible for a very large number of red notices and diffusions worldwide and is responsible for circulating most politically motivated red notices, including against EU citizens — such as the Lithuanian judges, prosecutors and investigators looking into the events in Vilnius on 13 January 1991; whereas besides Russia, other countries have also used the system of red notices to politically target their citizens;

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