2.12.2011   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 351/69

A.

whereas the authors of the Maastricht Treaty had not foreseen the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis inside the euro area,

B.

whereas the spreads of sovereign debt issued by Member States of the euro area widened more rapidly during autumn 2009,

C.

whereas the situation in the sovereign debt market for certain Member States worsened considerably during spring 2010 and reached a critical stage in May 2010,

D.

whereas there have been developments in the sovereign debt markets that need to be better understood,

E.

whereas European Union financial assistance for the purposes of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 shall, according to Article 2.2 of the regulation, be limited to the margin available under the own resources ceiling for payment appropriations; whereas Article 3.5 provides that the Commission and the beneficiary Member States shall conclude a memorandum of understanding, detailing the economic policy conditions attached to Union financial assistance, which the Commission shall communicate to Parliament and the Council,

F.

whereas, on 7 June 2010, the euro area Member States – in line with the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9-10 May 2010 – established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) as a limited liability company (société anonyme) under Luxembourg law, with euro area Member States providing guarantees for EFSF issuance up to a total of EUR 440 billion on a pro-rata basis,

1.

Welcomes the recent actions taken at EU level and at national level to safeguard the stability of the euro; regrets that European policymakers did not take decisive action earlier, despite the steady worsening of the financial crisis;

2.

Stresses, however, that these actions are merely of a temporary nature and that real progress will have to be made on fiscal and structural polices in the individual Member States, and on establishing a new, stronger framework for economic governance, geared to preventing future occurrences of similar crises, as well as increasing growth potential and sustainable macroeconomic rebalancing in the EU;

3.

Considers that the current crises cannot be resolved in the long run by simply pouring new debt into highly indebted countries;

4.

Takes the view that all Member States, in particular those that are part of the economic and monetary union (EMU), should, when developing their economic policies, take into account both the effects of those policies domestically and their implications for the Union, in particular the EMU Member States. Considers that economic policies are a matter of common concern and should be coordinated within the Council in accordance with the procedures in the Treaty;

5.

Believes that, notwithstanding Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 and Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002, the rules governing the special purpose vehicle (SPV) should provide for the possibility of countries not in the euro area opting in to the SPV facility;

6.

Takes note of Commission communication COM(2010)0250 on reinforcing economic policy coordination as an important contribution to stronger economic policy coordination in the EU; considers that legislative proposals on enhanced economic surveillance should include new secondary legislation on the basis of Article 121(6) of the Treaty; considers that the future surveillance framework should aim to achieve sustainable public finances and economic growth, competitiveness, social cohesion and a lessening of trade imbalances;

7.

Considers that, when establishing new EU instruments and procedures, account needs to be taken of the respective roles of the European institutions, including the legislative and budgetary role of Parliament and the independent role of the ECB in decision making on monetary policy;

8.

Asks the Commission to provide an assessment of the impact of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, in particular on the EU budget and other EU financial instruments and loans by the EIB;

9.

Asks the Commission to provide an assessment of the impact of the European Financial Stability Facility, in particular on the functioning of the euro bond markets and their spreads; asks the Commission to assess, in addition, the practicability and accountability of the decision-making procedure for this special purpose vehicle (SPV), with a view to a longer-term solution;

10.

Asks for more detail about how the coordination between the EFSF and the IMF will work, including whether the allocation between funds will be determined on a parallel basis maintaining the 2:1 ratio; whether the interest rate will be coordinated with the IMF rate in any way, presuming that the IMF rate will be fixed according to standard practice; what the projected interest rate will be, over and above German bunds, and whether it is likely to be around 1 %; asks whether the IMF and EFSF loans will rank pari passu, as this would automatically give the EFSF the privilege of non-inclusion in any restructuring of borrowers’ obligations – as otherwise the EFSF would, in effect, have first-loss exposure;

11.

Asks if any measures are envisaged to ensure equal treatment; notes, for instance, in this regard that the interest rate for the EFSF appears different from the package agreed for Greece because EFSF borrowers will pay the net all-in cost to the SPV for raising the funds; asks, furthermore, how fairness can be assured for non-EMU members if the EFSF operates only after the EUR 60 billion facility has been used up;

12.

Observes that the sovereign debt in the euro area does not necessarily have zero nominal credit risk as presumed by the Capital Requirements Directive and that current developments have increased the credit risk of long-term debt issued by Member States; takes the view that the European Banking Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board should address this problem;

13.

Notes that the Capital Requirements Directive has zero risk weighting for sovereign bonds;

14.

Asks the ECB to give a detailed explanation of its recent decisions to buy government bonds on the secondary market, and considers that the ECB should prepare an exit strategy with a clear timetable for ceasing this practice;

15.

Believes that a longer-term solution requires tackling the problem of internal imbalances and unsustainable debt and, therefore, the structural roots of the current crisis; considers that such a longer-term vision involves correcting internal macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area and the EU, and hence tackling substantial differences of competitiveness between Member States;

16.

Takes the view that a stronger EU framework for economic governance should encompass a permanent EU sovereign debt crisis-resolution mechanism, such as a European Monetary Fund, a coordinated approach for macroeconomic rebalancing, and enhanced synergies between the EU budget and Member States’ budgets, complementing sustainable fiscal consolidation;

17.

Takes note that, despite the potentially significant impact of this mechanism on the EU budget, Parliament is given no role in the decision-making process, as the facility has been established by Council regulation under Article 122(2) TFEU; deems it necessary to ensure that Parliament, as budgetary authority, is involved in an issue with such potentially far-reaching budgetary consequences;

18.

Invites the Commission to undertake an independent feasibility study by the end of 2010 on the question of innovative financing instruments, such as the joint issuance of Eurobonds as a means of reducing spreads and increasing liquidity in euro-dominated debt markets;

19.

Observes that the issuance of Eurobonds for EU-relevant infrastructure could be consistent with adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact;

20.

Asks the Commission to analyse a range of options for a long-term system to prevent and resolve potential sovereign debt problems in an efficient and sustainable way, while reaping the full benefit of the single currency; considers that this analysis should take account of the fact that the credit risk of government bonds may differ between Member States and may need to be better reflected in credit institutions’ capital ratios;

21.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European Council, the President of the Euro Group and the ECB.