(1a)

Unfortunately, neither the Commission (Eurostat)'s warning, issued as long ago as 2004, nor the Commission’s initiatives in this area, set out in its communication of 22 December 2004 entitled ‘Towards a European governance strategy for fiscal statistics’ (2), led to reforms by the Council of the governance framework for financial statistics, which were overdue even then. Had timely action been taken, the errors in reporting the relevant data on public deficit could have been identified much sooner and the resulting crisis could at least have been contained. It is therefore of critical importance that the Commission (Eurostat) receive an appropriate competence framework, adequate staffing and as much independence as possible.

(1b)

The Commission should assess and draw conclusions about how the collection and evaluation of financial statistics from Member States was conducted in the past. Those conclusions should be reported to the European Parliament.

(3)

The revised governance framework for fiscal statistics has overall functioned well and, in general, has produced a satisfactory outcome in terms of reporting of relevant fiscal data on government deficit and debt . In particular, the Member States have predominantly demonstrated a solid record of co-operation in good faith and an operational ability to report fiscal data of high quality.

(3)

While the revised governance framework for fiscal statistics has overall functioned well and, in general, has produced a satisfactory outcome in terms of reporting of relevant fiscal data on government deficit and debt , and most Member States have demonstrated a solid record of co-operation in good faith and an operational ability to report fiscal data of high quality , previous opportunities should have been taken to enhance the quality and scope of data provided to the Commission (Eurostat) .

(4)

However, recent developments have also clearly demonstrated that the current governance framework for fiscal statistics still does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of incorrect or inaccurate data being deliberately notified to the Commission.

(4)

However, recent developments in the Union have also clearly demonstrated that the current governance framework for fiscal statistics still does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of incorrect or inaccurate data being deliberately notified to the Commission.

(4a)

The reliability of statistics made available by the Commission (Eurostat) at Union level directly depends on the reliability of statistical data collected by Member States at national level.

(4b)

Ensuring institutional independence of all national statutory statistical bodies is crucial to avoid any undue pressure on them from their respective governments.

(5)

In this connection, the Commission (Eurostat) should have additional rights of access to a widened scope of information for the needs of data quality assessment.

(5)

In this connection, the Commission (Eurostat) should have additional rights of access to a widened scope of information for the needs of data quality assessment. It is essential that the data received from the Member States is shared in due time with the European Central Bank's Directorate General for Statistics.

(5a)

The comparability of economic data requires a uniform methodology. The Commission should therefore promote the harmonisation of statistical data collection.

(6)

In carrying out monitoring visits to a Member State whose statistical information is under scrutiny the Commission (Eurostat) should be entitled to have access to the accounts of government entities at central, state, local and social security levels, including the provision of underlying detailed accounting information, relevant statistical surveys and questionnaires and further related information, respecting the legislation on data protection as well as statistical confidentiality.

(6)

In carrying out monitoring visits to a Member State whose statistical information is under scrutiny the Commission (Eurostat) should be entitled to have access to the accounts of government entities at central, state, local and social security levels, including the provision of underlying detailed accounting information, relevant statistical surveys and questionnaires and further related information, including off-balance sheet transactions, respecting the legislation on data protection as well as statistical confidentiality.

(6a)

To enable the Commission (Eurostat) to fulfil its extended supervisory duties responsibly, an increase in qualified staff in the relevant departments is needed. The additional outlay for staff and costs should be covered by budget and staff transfers within the Commission.

(7)

Public accounts of individual general government units, as well as of public units classified outside general government sector, should be the main object of the controls, and the public accounts should be assessed in terms of their statistical use.

(7)

Public accounts of individual general government units, as well as of public units classified outside general government sector, should be the main object of the controls, and the public accounts should be assessed in terms of their statistical use. Both mid-term analysis and multiannual frameworks should be used to assist budgetary evaluation.

(8a)

The Member States should provide the Commission (Eurostat) with all statistical and budgetary information on the basis of a standardised and internationally accepted method of accounting.

(8b)

The Commission should consider elaborating sanctions within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact in relation to the submission of misrepresented macro-economic statistics by Member States. The Commission should consider enforcing such sanctions against Member States that falsify the macroeconomic statistics relating to their budget deficit and government debt.

(-1)

In Article 2, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   “Planned government deficit and government debt level figures” means the figures established for the current year by the Member States. They shall be the most recent official forecasts, taking into account the most recent budgetary decisions and economic developments and prospects and monthly and quarterly outturns. They shall be produced in as short a time as possible before the reporting deadline.’

(a)

data from national accounts ;

(b)

inventories ;

(c)

excessive deficit procedure (EDP) notification tables ;

(d)

additional questionnaires and clarifications related to EDP notifications ;

(e)

information from the General Audit Office, Ministry of Finance or relevant regional authority on the execution of the Member State's national and regional budgets;

(f)

the accounts of extra-budgetary bodies or non-profit organisations and similar bodies that are part of the general government sector in national accounts;

(g)

exhaustive information on any type of off-balance sheet body;

(h)

the accounts of social security funds; and

(i)

local government surveys .

(5a)

In Article 16, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   Member States shall ensure that the actual data reported to the Commission (Eurostat) are provided in accordance with the principles established by Articles 2 and 12 of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics (3) . In this regard, the responsibility of the national statistical authorities is to ensure the compliance of reported data with Article 1 of this Regulation and the underlying ESA 95 accounting rules. Member States shall ensure that the national statistical authorities are provided with access to all relevant information necessary to perform this task.