1.A

Must Article 6(1) TEU and Article 5(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in order to guarantee the right to a fair trial for defendants who do not speak the language of the proceedings, a Member State must create a register of properly qualified independent translators and interpreters or — failing that — ensure by some other means that it is possible to control the quality of language interpretation in court proceedings?

1.B

If the previous question is answered in the affirmative and if, in the specific case, since the language interpretation is not of adequate quality, it is not possible to establish whether the defendant has been informed of the subject matter of the charge or indictment against him, must Article 6(1) TEU and Articles 4(5) and 6(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU (2) be interpreted as meaning that, in those circumstances, the proceedings cannot continue in his absence?

2.A

Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that that principle is breached where the president of the National Office of the Judiciary, who is responsible for the central administration of the courts and who is appointed by the parliament, the only body to which he or she is accountable and which may remove him or her from office, fills the post of president of a court — a president who, inter alia, has powers in relation to organisation of the allocation of cases, commencement of disciplinary procedures against judges, and assessment of judges — by means of a direct temporary nomination, circumventing the applications procedure and constantly disregarding the opinion of the competent self-governance bodies of judges?

2.B

If the previous question is answered in the affirmative and if the court hearing the specific case has reasonable grounds to fear that that case is being unduly prejudiced as a result of the president’s judicial and administrative activities, must the principle of judicial independence be interpreted as meaning that a fair trial is not guaranteed in that case?

3.A

Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a situation in which, since 1 September 2018 — unlike the practice followed in previous decades — Hungarian judges receive by law lower remuneration than prosecutors of the equivalent category who have the same grade and the same length of service, and in which, in view of the country’s economic situation, judges’ salaries are generally not commensurate with the importance of the functions they perform, particularly in the light of the practice of discretionary bonuses applied by holders of high level posts?

3.B

If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, must the principle of judicial independence be interpreted as meaning that, in such circumstances, the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed?

4.A

Must Article 267 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national practice whereby the court of last instance, in proceedings to harmonise the case-law of the Member State, declares as unlawful a decision by which a lower court makes a request for a preliminary ruling without interfering with the legal effects of the decision in question?

4.B

If question 4.A is answered in the affirmative, must Article 267 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the referring court must disregard contrary decisions of the courts of last instance and positions of principle adopted in the interest of harmonising the law?

4.C

If question 4.A is answered in the negative, in that case, can the suspended criminal proceedings be reopened given that the preliminary ruling proceedings are pending?

5.

Must the principle of judicial independence, established in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice, read in the light of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that that principle precludes disciplinary proceedings being brought against a judge for having made a request for a preliminary ruling?