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Document 52014IP0209
European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on an anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and strategic implications (2013/2170(INI))
European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on an anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and strategic implications (2013/2170(INI))
European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on an anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and strategic implications (2013/2170(INI))
OJ C 378, 9.11.2017, pp. 79–80
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
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9.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 378/79 |
P7_TA(2014)0209
Anti-missile shield for Europe
European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on an anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and strategic implications (2013/2170(INI))
(2017/C 378/09)
The European Parliament,
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having regard to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
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having regard to Articles 24 and 42(2) TEU, Articles 122 and 196 TFEU and Declaration 37 on Article 222 TFEU, |
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having regard to the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008, |
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having regard to the European Union Internal Security Strategy, endorsed by the European Council on 25-26 March 2010, |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2013 on the Common Security and Defence Policy, |
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having regard to the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon on 19-20 November 2010, |
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having regard to the Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, |
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having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0109/2014), |
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whereas the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of ballistic missiles to which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its European allies must be able to respond effectively; |
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whereas defence against ballistic or other types of missile attacks can constitute a positive development in European security in the context of a rapid international security dynamic, with several state and non-state actors developing missile technologies and various chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) capabilities with the potential to reach European territory; |
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whereas NATO is developing a BMD capability to pursue its core task of collective defence, aiming to provide full coverage and protection to all European populations, territories and forces which are members of NATO against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles; |
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whereas the essential contribution of the United States to BMD is confirmation of its commitment to NATO and the security of Europe and Europe’s allies, and highlights the importance of the transatlantic bond, with equipment already in place in Romania and more expected to be placed in Poland in the near future; |
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whereas the Common Security and Defence Policy will be developed in full complementarity with NATO, under the agreed framework for the EU-NATO strategic partnership, as confirmed by the European Council on 19 December 2013; |
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Argues that as BMD technologies develop and are implemented, new dynamics are brought about in European security, resulting in a need for the Member States to take into account the implications of BMD for their security; |
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Recalls that NATO BMD measures are developed and constructed to defend its member states from potential ballistic missile attacks; calls on the Vice-President/High Representative to pursue a strategic partnership with NATO, taking account of the issue of BMD, which should lead to the provision of full coverage and protection for all EU Member States, thus avoiding a situation in which the security afforded to them would be in anyway differentiated; |
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Welcomes the achievement of interim NATO BMD capability, which will provide maximum coverage within the means available to defend populations, territories and forces across southern European NATO member states against a ballistic missile attack; welcomes, also, the aim to provide full coverage and protection for European NATO member states by the end of the decade; |
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Stresses that EU initiatives, such as Pooling & Sharing, may prove helpful in strengthening cooperation between Member States in the areas of BMD and in carrying out joint research and development work; notes that, in the long term, such cooperation could also lead to the further consolidation of the European defence industry; |
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Calls on the European External Action Service, the Commission, the European Defence Agency and the Council to include BMD issues in future security strategies, studies and white papers; |
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Stresses that, due to the financial crisis and budget cuts, not enough resources are being used to maintain sufficient defence capabilities, thereby leading to a reduction in the EU’s military capabilities and industrial capacity; |
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Stresses that the NATO BMD plan is in no way aimed at Russia and that NATO is prepared to cooperate with Russia based on the assumption of cooperation between two independent missile defence systems — NATO’s BMD and that of Russia; highlights the fact that while effective cooperation with Russia could bring measurable benefits, it must be pursued on the basis of full reciprocity and transparency, as increasing mutual trust is vital for the gradual development of such cooperation; notes, in this connection, that moving Russian missiles closer to NATO and EU borders is counterproductive; |
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Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the parliaments of the Member States, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary-General of NATO. |