1.1.

The illicit proliferation of SALW and of other conventional weapons and ammunition is a major factor undermining State stability and exacerbating conflicts, which poses a serious threat to peace and security. As stated in the EU Strategy to Combat the Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Their Ammunition (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), illicit weapons and ammunition contribute to a worsening of terrorism and organised crime, and are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts, as well as in the collapse of State structures. Recent findings from the iTrace project in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other complex conflicts close to the Union's external borders, confirm the EU SALW Strategy's assertions.

The activities conducted under Decision (CFSP) 2015/1908 established iTrace, a global conflict weapon monitoring initiative. It operates in 27 conflict-affected states, including in Africa, the Middle East, South and East Asia, and latterly Latin America. iTrace is the world's largest public repository of diverted conventional weapons to support States in their efforts to detect and address diversion in line with commitments pursuant to Article 11 of the Arms Trade Treaty (‘ATT’) and Criterion 7 of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (3). iTrace provides precise reporting on supplies of weapons and ammunition flowing to armed insurgent and terrorist forces that pose a threat to Union security, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Daesh or Islamic State; it alerts Member State export control authorities confidentially, and rapidly, about post-export diversion risks; it provides critical, real time information to Union Delegations and Member State diplomatic missions in conflict-affected regions on arms trafficking and conflict dynamics; and mainstreams awareness of arms control and counter-diversion measures through high frequency, high impact global media engagement.

1.2.

This Decision therefore aims to continue and enhance the work of the project under Decision (CFSP) 2015/1908 by further providing Union policy makers, arms control experts and arms export control officers with systematically compiled, relevant information, which will support them with in developing effective, evidence-based strategies against the diversion and illicit spread of conventional weapons and their ammunition in order to improve international and regional security. It will thus continue to support them to combine a successful reactive strategy with adequate preventive action to tackle illegal supply and demand, and to ensure effective conventional arms control in third countries.

1.3.

(a)

provide concrete information on the trafficking of SALW and of other conventional weapons required to monitor more effectively the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in SALW;

(b)

strengthen the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument;

(c)

expose major routes and entities involved in the diversion of conventional weapons and ammunition into conflict-affected regions or to international terrorist organisations and provide evidence of groups and individuals engaged in illicit trade, in support of national legal proceedings;

(d)

enhance cooperation between relevant UN organs, missions and other international organisations, in the field of tracing SALW and other conventional weapons, and of providing information directly in support of existing monitoring mechanisms, including INTERPOL's Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), which is complementary to iTrace and with which coordination will be ensured;

(e)

provide relevant information to identify priority areas for international cooperation and assistance to combat effectively the diversion and trafficking of SALW and of other conventional weapons and ammunition, such as funding for projects with regard to stockpile security or border management;

(f)

offer a mechanism to assist in monitoring implementation of the ATT, specifically to detect the diversion of transferred conventional weapons as well as to assist governments in appraising the risk of diversion prior to the export of conventional arms, specifically the risk of diversion within the recipient country or re-export under undesirable conditions; and

(g)

provide tailored support to Member States to assist in diversion risk assessment and mitigation.

(a)

populate further the iTrace information management system that will ensure long-term collection and analysis of illicit conventional weapons data;

(b)

provide conventional arms control policy makers and experts with a tool to define more effective strategies and priority areas for assistance and cooperation (for example, by identifying sub-regional or regional cooperation, coordination and information-sharing mechanisms that need to be established or strengthened, by identifying insecure national stockpiles, inadequate inventory management, illegal transfer routes, weak border controls, and insufficient law enforcement capacities);

(c)

contain the in-built flexibility to generate policy relevant information, regardless of rapidly changing policy requirements;

(d)

increase substantially the efficacy of international arms monitoring organisations and individuals by providing an information sharing mechanism of continually expanding scope; and

(e)

build sustainable national capacity in conflict-affected States to identify and trace illicit weapons and engage more effectively in international arms control and law enforcement processes.

(a)

an introduction to weapon data collection, with reference to specific cases;

(b)

basic weapon identification and effective weapon documentation techniques;

(c)

evidence collection standard operating procedures and the evidentiary chain of custody;

(d)

the requirements of long-range, regional, and international investigations;

(e)

the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument;

(f)

international weapon tracing and weapon tracing systems (notably Interpol and Europol);

(g)

the use of ‘big data’ and trend analysis; and

(h)

avenues for technical assistance (international) and law enforcement intervention.

(a)

encourage national authorities to grant greater access to iTrace field investigation teams—responding to repeated calls for iTrace teams to provide technical assistance and joint investigation capacity, and equating to increased iTrace data.

(b)

provide concrete capacity assistance to national governments that, while suffering the impacts of weapon diversion, lack the tools to identify and report on diverted conflict weapons—this is often a precursor to more effective domestic weapon management and, as such, supports implementation of the ATT, ITI, and PoA and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) programming and liaison with international law enforcement bodies, including Interpol (iARMS) and Europol.

(c)

support enhanced dialogue—notably identifying key stakeholders for other Union-supported initiatives (e.g. Union Mission relations with host governments) and kick-starting initiatives, such as PSSM programming (e.g. Union-supported stockpile management projects).

(a)

the deployment of qualified weapon experts to conduct in-field analysis of illicit SALW and other conventional weapons, ammunition and related materiel recovered from conflict-affected states;

(b)

the analysis, review and verification of documented evidence on illicit SALW and other illicit conventional weapons, ammunition and their users, including, inter alia, photographs of weapons, their component parts and internal and external markings, packaging, associated shipping documentation and the results of field investigations (users, suppliers and transfer routes);

(c)

the review and verification of additional recent evidence on illicit SALW and of other conventional weapons and ammunition gathered by organisations other than CAR, including reports by UN sanctions monitoring groups, civil society organisations, and the international news media;

(d)

the uploading of all collected and reviewed evidence onto the iTrace information management system and online mapping portal;

(e)

the identification and support of local partners to ensure sustained data collection in support of iTrace throughout the duration of the proposed Action and beyond;

(f)

the continued liaison with national governments to pre-define national points of contact, and a coordination mechanism, in order to clarify the scope of CAR's investigations, and alleviate possible conflicts of interest, in advance of its investigations.

(a)

document, in situ, the physical evidence of diverted or trafficked conventional weapons and ammunition in conflict-affected regions;

(b)

verify and develop illicit trafficking cases from evidence gathered by CAR, by organisations with standing information-sharing agreements with CAR, and, as appropriate, other organisations, on diverted or trafficked conventional weapons and ammunition across all regions;

(c)

provide concrete visual evidence of diverted or trafficked conventional weapons and ammunition, including photographs of items, serial numbers, factory marks, boxes, packing lists, shipping documents, and end user certification;

(d)

generate textual accounts of illicit activity, including trafficking routes, actors involved in diversion or illicit transfer and assessments of contributing factors (including ineffective stockpile management and security and deliberate, state-orchestrated illicit supply networks);

(e)

upload the aforementioned evidence into the iTrace information management system and online mapping portal for full public dissemination and to Member States through secure desktop and mobile platforms.

(a)

providing detailed data and evidence on documented diversion to arms export licencing authorities

(b)

Supporting or providing, on official request by Member State national arms export licencing authorities, post-shipment or post-delivery verification capacity to Member States.

(a)

iTrace teams sent on repeat visits to relevant authorities in Member State capitals to brief on counter-diversion issues, and report on international investigations;

(b)

A 24-hour helpdesk to provide instant advice on counter-diversion or potentially negative press allegations arising from unverified third party reporting;

(c)

The bespoke development for Member State export licencing authorities of online dashboards, which will stream secured data from the iTrace system—‘red flagging’ parties with a history of diverting weapons, profiling high-risk destinations, and reporting, in real time, diversion of domestically manufactured weapons; and

(d)

The support or provision, on official request by Member State national arms exports licensing authorities, of post-delivery end use checks (verification) to Member States by iTrace field investigation teams.

(a)

assist Member State arms export licensing authorities, on their request in identifying post-export diversion;

(b)

supply information in support of full diversion risk analysis by Member State arms export licensing authorities (in line with the ATT and Common Position 2008/944/CFSP) prior to granting export licences;

(c)

provide Member State arms export licensing authorities with post-shipment verification capacity on their demand;

(d)

support Member State arms control policy makers with real-time information on diversion and trafficking trends in support of national engagement in international policy processes; and

(e)

assist Member State national law enforcement agencies in support of criminal investigations, where applicable and on their request.

(a)

iTrace project staff presentations to relevant international conferences dealing with the illicit trade in conventional weapons in all its aspects. Staff presentations will be designed to showcase iTrace, with an emphasis on 1) its concrete benefits for assisting in monitoring the implementation of the UN Programme of Action, the ATT, and other relevant international instruments; 2) its utility in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation; and 3) its utility as a risk assessment profiling mechanism for arms export licensing authorities;

(b)

iTrace project staff presentations to national governments and peacekeeping operations. Staff presentations will be designed to showcase iTrace to relevant mission departments, to encourage and develop formal information-sharing agreements capable of generating information that can be uploaded into the iTrace system, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation.

(a)

demonstrate the utility of iTrace and the concept of documenting, compiling and sharing data on diversion to national and international policy makers working to implement conventional arms control and arms export control agreements (UN Programme of Action, ATT, and other relevant international instruments) and evaluate their implementation;

(b)

provide relevant information to assist policy makers and conventional arms control experts in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and devising effective counter-diversion strategies;

(c)

provide arms export licencing authorities with in-depth information on iTrace and its risk assessment utility, in addition to providing an avenue for further feedback and system enhancement;

(d)

facilitate information-sharing among national governments and UN peacekeeping operations, including data processing and analysis using the iTrace system;

(e)

facilitate the networking by an expanding group of conventional arms control experts involved in conducting in situ investigations into the diversion and trafficking of conventional weapons and ammunition;

(f)

raise the public profile of conventional weapons and ammunition tracing as a means to assist in monitoring the implementation of the UN Programme of Action, the ITI, the ATT and other international and regional arms control and arms export control instruments.

(a)

produce up to 10 reports, each profiling a separate issue of international concern;

(b)

ensure the distribution of iTrace policy reports to all Member States;

(c)

devise a targeted outreach strategy to ensure maximum global coverage;

(d)

sustain the visibility of the Action in the policy arena and international news media by, inter alia, presenting illicit weapon information of topical concern; providing policy relevant analysis in support of on-going arms control processes and tailoring reports to provide maximum international news media interest.