19.2.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/96

—

having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas in its resolution of 23 May 2013 on ‘future legislative proposals on EMU: response to the Commission communication’ (1), Parliament takes the view that formal ex ante coordination of economic policy reforms at EU level should be: (i) strengthened on the basis of the Community method, (ii) aligned with the instruments of the European Semester for economic policy coordination, and (iii) designed in conjunction with new solidarity- and incentive-based instruments;

B.

whereas mechanisms to be put in place for ex ante coordination should apply to all euro area Member States and be open to all Member States of the Union;

C.

whereas in its aforementioned resolution of 23 May 2013, Parliament takes the view that any proposed new Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, be based on the Community method and provide for proper scrutiny by Parliament; whereas Parliament points out that such a mechanism should be funded by means of a new facility triggered and governed under the Community method as an integral part of the EU budget, but over and above the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) ceilings, so as to ensure that Parliament is fully involved; whereas it agrees with the Commission that CCIs are the first building blocks of a genuine fiscal capacity that supports solidarity and the implementation of sustainable, growth-enhancing structural reforms;

D.

whereas the Commission should put forward proposals immediately, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, to transpose into secondary legislation the commitments made by the Heads of State or Government on 28 June 2012 in relation to a ‘growth and job compact’;

E.

whereas in its aforementioned resolution of 23 May 2013 Parliament stresses the need for the adoption, under the European Semester, of a convergence code based on the Europe 2020 strategy and including a social pillar;

1.

Finds the overwhelming general lack of ambition being demonstrated by the Council in its response to the crisis to be of very great concern; is worried, furthermore, about the negative influence that national electoral cycles are having on the Union’s ability to take autonomous decisions; deplores the further postponing of all decisions on the future architecture of the EMU; likewise deplores the fact that the European Council has twice delayed its anticipated decisions on the future of the EMU and that it may do so once again at the next summit;

2.

Is deeply concerned that democratic accountability in the EMU (the fourth building block) has not so far been tackled properly in the Council’s deliberations; considers this entirely deplorable;

3.

Reiterates once again that any further initiative for a deep and genuine EMU based on stability, sustainable growth, solidarity and democracy must imperatively be established in accordance with the Community method; emphasises that the European institutions are required to practise sincere mutual cooperation; reminds the European Council that it does not have any Treaty-based prerogative of legislative initiative and that it must stop instructing the Commission on the form and/or content of any further legislative initiative and bypassing the Commission’s coordinating, executive and management roles as laid down in the Treaties;

4.

Warns the European Council, in this connection, not to interfere unduly in the European Semester process, and to ensure that the agreed procedures are followed;

5.

Reiterates that it cannot accept any further intergovernmental elements in relation to the EMU and that it will take all necessary and appropriate action within its prerogatives if such warnings are not heeded; recalls that the ‘fiscal compact’ should be integrated into EU law within five years at the latest, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, as stipulated in Article 16 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU;

6.

Recalls its fundamental position that the strengthened EMU should not divide the EU but, on the contrary, establish deeper integration and stronger governance, which should be open to all non-euro Member States on a voluntary basis;

7.

Reminds the Commission that it has the sole right of legislative initiative; is therefore perplexed as to why the Commission has not yet presented legislative texts based on the proposals contained in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ (COM(2012)0777) and the Commission declaration annexed to the ‘Two-Pack’ regulations; believes that if the Commission does not take such an initiative as a matter of urgency, it will be neglecting its political and Treaty-based responsibilities;

8.

Calls on the Commission to bring forward, under the European Semester, a proposal to adopt a convergence code based on the Europe 2020 strategy and establishing a strong social pillar; insists that National Implementation Programmes must ensure that the convergence code is implemented by all Member States, supported by an incentive-based mechanism;

9.

Recalls that Parliament’s priority is to ensure that any new financial instrument linked to the Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) is an integral part of the EU budget and is fully subject to the ordinary budgetary procedure;

10.

Underlines the fact that the currency of the Union is the euro, that its parliament is the European Parliament and that the future architecture of the EMU must recognise that Parliament is the seat of accountability at Union level; demands that whenever new competences are transferred to, or created at, Union level or new Union institutions established, a corresponding degree of democratic control by, and accountability to, Parliament be ensured;

11.

Reiterates its repeated demands that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) be integrated into the Community acquis so that it can be managed in accordance with the Community method, and that it be made accountable to Parliament; asks the Commission to put forward a proposal to that end; reminds the Eurogroup that Parliament has received written assurances that the ESM will be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament;

12.

Recalls that EU participation in the ‘troika’ system should be subject to democratic scrutiny by, and accountability to, Parliament;

13.

Is extremely worried about the delays in setting up the Banking Union and the practical modalities of direct banking recapitalisation by the ESM; is, in particular, alarmed by the ongoing fragmentation of the EU banking system; emphasises that a robust and ambitious Banking Union is a key component of a deeper and genuine EMU, and a key policy on which Parliament has been insisting for more than three years, in particular since the adoption of its positions on the European Banking Authority regulation;

14.

Insists that at the spring European Council the President of Parliament should present Parliament’s views on the annual growth survey; takes the view that an interinstitutional agreement should be negotiated in order to involve Parliament in the approval of the annual growth survey and of the economic policy and employment guidelines;

15.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council and the Commission.