This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 92003E003192
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3192/03 by Roberta Angelilli (UEN) to the Commission. Eurostat: clarification of President Prodi's powers of intervention.
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3192/03 by Roberta Angelilli (UEN) to the Commission. Eurostat: clarification of President Prodi's powers of intervention.
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3192/03 by Roberta Angelilli (UEN) to the Commission. Eurostat: clarification of President Prodi's powers of intervention.
OJ C 78E, 27.3.2004, pp. 237–238
(ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)
|
27.3.2004 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
CE 78/237 |
(2004/C 78 E/0240)
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3192/03
by Roberta Angelilli (UEN) to the Commission
(28 October 2003)
Subject: Eurostat: clarification of President Prodi's powers of intervention
The statements made by former Eurostat Director-General Yves Franchet about the recent events which revealed serious irregularities in the running of Eurostat contracts suggest that Commissioners Solbes, Kinnock and Schreyer were to blame since they were aware of possible cases of fraud.
Mr Franchet claims to have informed the Commissioners and President Prodi of his suspicions of maladministration within the Statistical Office in September 2002. In any case, at the hearing before the Conference of Presidents on 25 September 2003, Mr Prodi stated that he was informed of the seriousness of the situation in May 2003.
The affair is now being investigated by OLAF, the French courts and the Commission itself with a view to obtaining reliable evidence and establishing who was responsible.
Under new Article 217(4) of the Treaty of Nice, the power to ask a Commissioner to resign lies with the President of the Commission.
Quite apart from their actual responsibility which remains to be proven, the conduct of the above-mentioned Commissioners has been called into question, at least in terms of ‘maladministration’ and ‘negligence’, as defined in the ‘First report on allegations regarding fraud’ submitted by the EP's Committee of Independent Experts on 15 March 1999 at the time of the Santer scandal.
Following that scandal, the Santer Commission considered it politically appropriate to resign as a body on the sole grounds that it was suspected of irregularities.
In view of the above:
|
1. |
does the Commission not consider that President Prodi should, with reference to the present Eurostat case, take action against the relevant Commissioners in accordance with Article 217? |
|
2. |
does the failure to take such action not constitute an infringement of the moral duties arising from Article 213(2) of the Treaty and incumbent upon all Members of the Commission? |
|
3. |
should the decision merely to replace Eurostat's Director-General in July 2003 not be deemed insufficient to preserve the EU's image and integrity? |
Answer given by Mr Prodi on behalf of the Commission
(19 December 2003)
|
1. |
When addressing the Conference of Presidents and the members of the Committee on Budgetary Control (Cocobu) of the European Parliament on 25 September last, the President of the Commission stated that he had at his disposal the necessary instruments under Article 217 of the Nice Treaty to make an individual Commissioner assume political responsibility should that be necessary. He also explained at some length why, in the light of the evidence available, he could see no reason for asking any Member of the Commission to resign. |
|
2. |
The moral obligations for Members of the Commission expressly referred to in Article 213 as quoted by the Honourable Member require them to perform their duties in complete independence and in the general interest of the Community, to neither seek nor take instructions, not to engage in any other occupation and to behave with integrity and discretion. It would not appear that any Member of the Commission failed to respect any of these obligations in the Eurostat affair. It is clear in the Eurostat affair that, as soon as the Commission received the information which previously had not reached that level, important decisions were taken to put right the malfunctioning. At the same time, and in addition, the analysis of information flows and mechanisms in force was pursued in depth in order to strengthen vertical and horizontal communication and to achieve greater transparency in a tighter internal control environment. |
|
3. |
The Commission has done more than just replace the Director-General of Eurostat; the measures taken to reorganise Eurostat are much more far-reaching and complex than simply replacing the Director-General, and they were spelled out by the President of the Commission on 18 November 2003 when addressing Cocobu and the plenary session. The Director-General of Eurostat has indeed been replaced. All the posts of operational Directors have been made vacant and advertised both inside and outside the institution. The post of Resources Director has been filled by transfer. The organisation chart has been completely reviewed in order to take back some tasks that had been outsourced. Priorities have been re-set, with the focus being placed on Eurostat's core business. Finally, there has been a large degree of mobility at Unit Head level. Reorganisation has thus been on a very large scale in a bid to speed up the change in culture in Eurostat. The Commission President has also presented to Parliament the broad lines of the plan of action which should be adopted shortly by the Commission. |