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Document 62021CN0288
Case C-288/21 P: Appeal brought on 5 May 2021 by Universität Koblenz-Landau against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 February 2021 in Case T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v European Education and Culture Executive Agency
Case C-288/21 P: Appeal brought on 5 May 2021 by Universität Koblenz-Landau against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 February 2021 in Case T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v European Education and Culture Executive Agency
Case C-288/21 P: Appeal brought on 5 May 2021 by Universität Koblenz-Landau against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 February 2021 in Case T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v European Education and Culture Executive Agency
OJ C 278, 12.7.2021, p. 34–35
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
12.7.2021 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 278/34 |
Appeal brought on 5 May 2021 by Universität Koblenz-Landau against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 February 2021 in Case T-108/18, Universität Koblenz-Landau v European Education and Culture Executive Agency
(Case C-288/21 P)
(2021/C 278/48)
Language of the case: German
Parties
Appellant: Universität Koblenz-Landau (represented by: C. von der Lühe, Rechtsanwalt, R. Di Prato, Rechtsanwältin)
Other party to the proceedings: European Education and Culture Executive Agency
Form of order sought
The appellant claims that the Court should:
— |
set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 24 February 2021 in Case T-108/18 and declare that the claims for repayment asserted against the appellant by decision of the respondent of 21 December 2017 (No OF/2016/0720) and of 7 February 2018 (No OF/2016/0720) do not exist; |
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in the alternative, set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union referred to above and refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union; |
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order the respondent to bear the costs of the proceedings. |
Grounds of appeal and main arguments
In support of the appeal, the appellant raises three grounds of appeal.
1. |
First ground of appeal: Objection of a procedural nature regarding the failure to reopen the oral part of the procedure The appellant contends that new facts alleged by the applicant, which only became known to it after the end of the oral part of the procedure and which it could not have brought into the proceedings until that time, invalidated the arguments on which the contested decision is based in material respects, as that decision is based on facts that have not been confirmed by the findings of the national criminal investigation body. Furthermore, the applicant’s request for the reopening of the oral part of the procedure because of hitherto unknown new facts, which are of legal importance to the outcome of the dispute in that they are capable of influencing it in the applicant’s favour, was rejected on the basis of an error of assessment. |
2. |
Second ground of appeal: Misinterpretation of the scope of the principle of the right to a fair hearing The General Court disregarded the fact that the defendant made a decision on the appropriate use of funds to the detriment of the applicant due to the fact that, without fault on the part of the applicant, it was objectively impossible on the date of the contested decision of the defendant for the documents proving appropriate use of funds to be submitted. |
3. |
Third ground of appeal: Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and misinterpretation of the scope of the principle of proportionality The General Court did not, or did not without making an error of law, assess the legitimate expectations on the part of the applicant as a result of the defendant’s written confirmation of the proper implementation of the funded projects at issue. The General Court did not establish that a material deviation subsequently came to light in respect of the facts on which the statement of the defendant confirming the correct use of funds is based, only such a deviation being capable of calling into question an initially positive assessment of the implementation processes and the suitability thereof. Lastly, the failure to clarify in full the indications of a possible deviation in the facts using all of the sources of information available to the defendant and the General Court, before the most drastic of all possible measures was taken by the defendant (in this case the full recovery of all funds approved and granted), was incompatible with the principle of proportionality. |