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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Progress report on establishing appropriate relations between the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA)
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Progress report on establishing appropriate relations between the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA)
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Progress report on establishing appropriate relations between the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA)
/* COM/2014/056 final */
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Progress report on establishing appropriate relations between the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA) /* COM/2014/056 final */
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Progress report on establishing
appropriate relations between the European Union and the European Space Agency
(ESA) 1. Political context The relations between the European Union
and the European Space Agency (ESA) have been the subject of longstanding political
discussions, one practical result of which has been the EU/ESA Framework
Agreement[1]
in force since May 2004. The Lisbon Treaty[2]
has given a new impetus to these discussions by strengthening the political
dimension of space matters in the EU and providing that the EU “shall establish
any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency”. The European Commission has addressed this issue in two subsequent
communications. In its April 2011 communication “Towards a space strategy
for the EU that benefits its citizens”[3]
the Commission expressed the view that ESA “should continue to develop
into an organisation with an intergovernmental and an EU dimension in which
military and civil programmes can coexist”, and should “pursue closer
ties with the EU and, according to need, will continue to have management
structures geared solely towards EU programmes”. And in the communication
on “Establishing appropriate relations between the EU and ESA”[4] adopted
by the Commission in November 2012, it is stated that “The need for greater
operational efficiency, symmetry in defence and security matters, political
coordination and accountability can only be resolved, in the long term, through
the rapprochement of ESA towards the European Union. The Commission considers
that a clear target date should be set between 2020 and 2025 for this long term
objective”. The Council of the EU in its conclusions of
18 February 2013[5]
recognised that there may be a need to “review and enhance the functioning
of the relationship between the EU and ESA in view of the changed political
context, the increasing role of the EU in the space domain, competitiveness
challenges faced by the space sector and the growing importance of space
activities for society”. The Council also recognised that "the
Framework Agreement and its governance elements may, in its present form no
longer provide the most appropriate framework with which to ensure an efficient
and effective European space policy that fully utilises in a coherent manner
the respective competencies of both the EU and ESA." The Council invited
“the European Commission to work together with the Director General of ESA and
in close cooperation with the respective EU and ESA Member States… to ensure
coherence, convergence and complementarity with a view to preparing common
proposals on the further evolution of EU/ESA relations on the basis of common
analysis, for decision by the respective bodies by 2014”[6]. The growing financial involvement of the EU
in space activities further strengthens the case for attention to the evolution
of the EU/ESA relations. In the new Multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-2020,
the EU is devoting close to €12bn to large-scale European space programmes such
as Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus, and to space research activities under
Horizon 2020. This represents more than a doubling of the investment compared
to the previous financial planning period, reflecting the growing importance
which the EU attaches to space activities in addressing the economic and
societal challenges facing the Union and its Member States. The EU currently delegates a large part
(about 75%) of its budget for space to ESA. As a consequence, the EU is the largest
contributor to ESA and a major institutional source of funding for space
activities in Europe. The amount of EU budget delegated to ESA in the next
seven-year period will exceed the individual contributions of all ESA Member
States. The funds managed by ESA provided by the EU
are subject to the EU Financial Regulation. From the Commission’s perspective,
which retains the overall political responsibility for the delivery of EU space
programmes, there is a need for mechanisms that will guarantee that activities
entrusted to ESA deliver the expected results and are being conducted and
managed in the most efficient, effective and accountable manner, strictly
following EU rules and procedures, in an "EU-like" environment. This
view has been endorsed by the co-legislator in the new Galileo Regulation[7]. As pointed out in the
November 2012 communication, the European Commission seeks to establish such
relations with ESA that can deliver “greater operational efficiency,
symmetry in defence and security matters, political coordination and
accountability[8]”.
For its part, ESA has started reflections
about the further evolution of the Agency. As stated in the political
declaration[9]
adopted by the ESA Council at Ministerial level on 20 November 2012, this
evolution should take full benefit of and encompass, among others, the “EU
competence in space, in accommodating the consequences in ESA’s operation and
thus providing efficient management of EU funded programmes under EU rules”.
The ESA Member States have mandated the Director-General of ESA “to work with
the European Commission in order to provide a common analysis of the situation
of the European space sector and a common vision on its evolution aiming at
building up coherence, convergence and complementarity among the different
actors”. It is against this background that the
Commission has conducted a preliminary assessment of four options for the evolution
of the EU-ESA relations and their likely impact in terms of costs, benefits and
institutional and legal implications. This report presents the current status
of reflections within the Commission and possible next steps. The report is the
first stage in continuing open and transparent processes of analyses and
reflection, and of discussions with Member States and with the Director-General
of ESA, which should lead towards coherent and shared conclusions between the
EU, ESA and Member States towards the end of 2014, early 2015. Much of the preliminary
assessment presented in this progress report builds on the results of an
external technical study[10],
which has provided some useful elements of analysis. The Commission services have maintained
contacts with the Director-General of ESA in order to ensure coordination and coherence
of the analyses and options considered on both sides, even though the starting
points and assessment criteria might be different for each organisation. During
this preparatory phase the Commission has also maintained a dialogue with
representatives of the Member States at expert level through its Space Policy
Expert Group. 2. The structural issues to
be addressed The Commission’s communication of November
2012 identified five structural issues in the EU/ESA relations, which have provided
the starting point for the analysis. These issues included the differences in
financial rules, the asymmetric membership, the asymmetry in security and
defence matters, the absence of mechanisms for policy coordination and the
missing layer of political accountability within ESA vis-à-vis the European
Parliament. The analysis conducted by the external consultant has demonstrated that
these issues lead to inefficiencies which vary in intensity and impact. For
example: ·
The mismatch of financial rules and different
procedures increases the lead time to decision-making. This could add cost to
the programmes and impact the overall system delivery, particularly when
activities are on a critical path[11].
For example, the current procurement approach creates a need for multiple validation
steps (to correct shortcomings or complement and improve the files as needed)
which could generate longer decision times. ·
According to the external consultant’s report, the
membership asymmetry is assessed as less problematic in the experience to date
but could nevertheless pose issues in the future. For example, risks may arise
from the limited leverage on non-EU Member States to impose duty of loyalty to
the EU programmes in which they participate. This could potentially lead to
sensitive technologies being sold to third countries. Furthermore, important
decisions concerning the future of EU programmes (such as launches of
satellites or transfer of ownership of assets) could potentially be blocked by
non-EU member states, because of different voting rules in the ESA intergovernmental
system. ·
The asymmetry in security and defence matters
could generate issues too. The potential sale of sensitive technology to third
countries could pose strategic security issues for the EU. The handling of EU classified
data may increase the level of complexity of programme management at ESA. For
certain security sensitive functions ESA may be required to recruit only EU
nationals with the necessary level of security accreditation. ·
The lack of policy coordination mechanisms means
that programmes are not necessarily aligned to support the larger policy
objectives of the Union. ESA industrial policy objectives may diverge from EU
service provision objectives. The mechanisms envisaged in the existing EU/ESA
framework agreement are not perceived as an effective tool for such coordination.
The current framework does not foresee explicit mechanisms for concerted
decision-making. Policies are thus coordinated only on programme level, through
mechanisms which need to be agreed upon programme per programme in a time-consuming
manner. This absence of specific mechanisms for policy coordination could
result in delays in launch of programmes. ·
The issue of political and financial
accountability vis-à-vis the European Parliament is essential given the amount of
EU funding being handled by ESA and its prominent role in the implementation of
the programmes. As the institution responsible for the implementation of the
budget under Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, the European Commission is fully accountable before the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union for any delays or cost
overruns incurred in the EU flagship programmes, while ESA operationally
manages these programmes on its behalf through delegation agreements. Since the
Commission bears the final project risk, this reduces the incentive for ESA to
deliver the programmes on time, on target cost and focussed on policy and user
objectives. On co-funded programmes, the EU has had only limited impact on technical
decisions made by ESA. If the initial phases of a space programme are funded
by ESA only, it may be difficult for the Commission in later stages of the
programme to ensure that EU funds are used to implement its policies. The analysis of these limitations provides
the necessary rationale for the configuration of the options presented below. 3. Outline of the identified
options In the November 2012 communication the European
Commission outlined four options for further evolution of the EU-ESA relations
towards an ultimate goal of rapprochement. While these options do not present
an exhaustive list, they are the ones which the Commission identified as most
pragmatic and feasible in addressing the structural limitations in the current
EU-ESA relationship. The same options are being assessed by the
Director-General of ESA, which ensures the necessity level of coherence between
the two parallel processes. The four options are incremental, going from an
option that would envisage improvements without changes in the current legal
framework of EU/ESA relations, to an option where ESA would cease to exist as
an intergovernmental organisation to become an EU agency. 3.1. Option 1: No change
(baseline) The situation remains unchanged under the
terms of the existing EU/ESA Framework Agreement. The EU and ESA remain two
separate entities without efficient mechanisms to ensure greater coherence or
coordination. The EU will co-fund some space programmes with ESA and/or
entirely fund others, for which the execution will be delegated to ESA.
Programmes will be developed on the basis of specific agreements which will be
negotiated phase-by-phase, making use of the general tools available in the EU
financial regulations. Policy and mission objectives will be set by the EU and
ESA according to their own institutional frameworks. 3.2. Option 2: Improved
cooperation under the ‘status quo’ The EU and ESA
remain two separate entities but the interface between
them is adapted, based on amendments to the existing EU/ESA Framework Agreement
and an improvement of delegation agreements. Policy and mission objectives will
be set jointly by the EU and ESA, and coordination would be ensured through the
development of a new framework agreement. This agreement would be adopted by
the ESA Council and the EU Council, with the consent of the European
Parliament. In programme execution, ESA would continue to develop internally
the capabilities to master the nuances between the two financial regimes (EU
and ESA) and work on a progressive alignment of its accounting, internal
control and audit procedures with the corresponding EU rules. The new agreement
would contain specific mechanisms for coordination. 3.3. Option 3: Establishing a
programmatic structure solely dedicated to the management of EU programmes
(i.e. “EU pillar”) There is no pre-existing definition of this
ESA/“EU pillar”. However, it follows from the Commission communications that
this pillar should be a step towards “greater operational efficiency,
symmetry in defence and security matters, political coordination and
accountability[12]”
and create “an EU-like environment”[13]. A pragmatic approach has been taken in
defining this option, starting with the problems which it is meant to solve in
order to define its ideal contours and then examine the legal instrument
necessary to implement it. It is considered essential that the “EU pillar” is designed
to operate with EU rules. This would allow addressing the issue of misalignment
of financial rules. Within the “EU pillar”, which would operate as an “EU-like”
environment, issues of membership asymmetry would not arise. The “EU pillar” would be “hosted” within
ESA, also physically within ESA premises, and could share certain services
common to the ”EU pillar” and ESA intergovernmental. The creation of an ”EU pillar” within ESA
would not affect the functioning of the remaining departments of the intergovernmental
ESA as it exists today. This option would necessitate a more in-depth analysis
of the legal and institutional aspects, in particular with regard to political
accountability and discharge procedures. Finally, the pragmatic approach
described above will have to be implemented in full compliance with the applicable
financial rules and in particular the budgetary principles enshrined in the Financial
Regulation[14]. 3.4. Option 4: ESA becomes an
EU agency while preserving some of its intergovernmental features In this option ESA becomes an agency of the
EU. This European Union space agency would maintain certain structures to
facilitate intergovernmental cooperation (i.e. optional programmes, different
from EU programmes, funded directly by Member States outside the EU budget). The
agency would have an EU legal basis and be governed according to EU rules. 4. Comparison of the options The four outlined options address the
limitations in the current EU-ESA relations to a different degree and present
different advantages and disadvantages. The efforts needed to implement
each one of the options would vary significantly as well. The options have been assessed from two main
perspectives: (i) their “effectiveness”, which is understood as the ability to
address the structural issues and operational inefficiencies currently
identified, and the savings generated in terms of personnel costs and impact on
decision-making lead time; and (ii) the “costs” associated with the options,
which is assessed from the perspective of ease to implement the required legal
adaptations and the expected speed of implementation. On this basis the options
have been ranked. A qualitative analysis of the ability of
the options to resolve the identified structural limitations shows that Option
1 cannot address any of the limitations at structural level; Option 2 addresses
some of them, but only to a limited degree; while Option 3 and 4 solve these
limitations to the largest extent (fully solved in option 4 and almost fully
solved in option 3). In particular: ·
The mismatch of financial rules is tackled
almost entirely in option 4 and option 3. Option 2 alleviates the misalignment
to a large extent, but offers slightly less confidence in the application of
financial procedures which are equivalent to the ones applied by the EU. ·
The membership asymmetry is tackled to a large
extent by ESA as an EU agency and by the ESA/“EU pillar”. Improved cooperation
under the status quo solves this obstacle to a much lesser extent. ·
Asymmetry in security and defence matters is
alleviated to an equally large extent by option 3 and 4, and solved to a
limited extent by option 2. The threat of sale of sensitive technology remains
an issue in all options, although leverage on Member States is higher in option
3 and 4. ·
The absence of mechanisms for policy
coordination is tackled almost entirely in option 4, and to some extent in
options 3 and 2. Policy coordination and alignment of industrial policy
objectives will increase with a rapprochement between ESA and the EU. Concerted
decision making is expected to remain an issue unless ESA becomes an EU agency. The options can further generate positive
impacts (benefits) in terms of cost-savings resulting from potential reduction
in decision-making lead time for programmes implementation and from
optimisations in staff levels at the Commission and ESA. With regard to the legal adaptations that
would be necessary to implement the different options, the analysis leads to
the conclusions that Option 2 would be relatively easy to implement. Option 2
would require either amendments to the current EU/ESA Framework Agreement, or a
new agreement. The Commission is of the view that option 3 would require an EU legislative
act which should contain, inter alia, the definition of the “EU pillar” tasks,
structure and financial requirements, subject to a detailed quantitative
cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the complex institutional and legal
implications of this option, possibly including modifications to the ESA legal
framework. Option 4 appears to be more complex. In
this option ESA would cease to exist as an intergovernmental organisation,
followed by the creation of an EU Agency. Staff regulation (including
transitional provisions) and financial regulation of the new agency should be
adopted. This option is also seen as the least feasible one as it implies a
heavy implementation process and requires political consensus which may be
difficult to reach in the foreseeable future. Based on a combination of the various
assessment criteria, the figure below provides a preliminary map of the options
in terms of trade-off between “cost” and “effectiveness”. Since the contemplated
options are not mutually exclusive, multiple options could be considered
depending on the timeframe adopted. Figure: Preliminary cost-effectiveness
ranking of options Source: Roland Berger Strategy Consultants,
“Evolution of EU-ESA relations: cost/benefit assessment of options”
It is important to note that the recent ESA
report “Status of ESA/EU relations – Scenarios assessment” submitted to the ESA
Council of 19th December 2013 as part of the on-going follow-up to
the political declaration adopted by the ESA Council meeting at Ministerial
level on 20 November 2012, presents as the most promising evolution scenarios a
so-called “Improved Status quo” and an “EU Chamber”, which seem close to
options 2 and 3 described in this report. According to ESA’s report the
“Improved Status quo” would be implemented in the short-term through specific
programme driven Agreements based on existing legal structures on the EU (e.g.
Regulations) and on ESA (e.g. Convention) sides… In the medium-term this
scenario could entail either a revision of the Framework Agreement or the
conclusion of a new cooperation agreement”. The report states that “The ‘EU
Chamber’ would be a dedicated, self-standing structure added to the current
legal structure of ESA which remains unchanged…This scenario would imply that
underneath the overall ESA roof, two parallel ‘Chambers’ would co-exist: an
intergovernmental one and an EU one.” The report also presents a third scenario
– “EU Agency” – as an option that would depend on a long-term vision beyond
2020, on which there is as yet no consensus amongst ESA Member States. 5. Conclusion and next steps The elements of analysis presented above seek
to offer an insight into the various options and their ability to reduce
structural issues and bring improvements to the current set-up of EU-ESA
relations. These elements are however not, at this stage, sufficient to justify
a conclusive choice among the options. According to the external study, “the
creation of a dedicated entity within ESA …offers, in the medium term, the best
compromise between expected effectiveness and ease of implementation”. The Commission
sees merits in this option, which needs to be further analysed and discussed
with ESA in order to fully assess its legal, technical and human resource
implications. The advantage of this option is that it would preserve the
intergovernmental ESA structure, while creating an adequate framework to manage
the financial resources brought by the EU. While option 3 may be a better response to
dealing with the structural issues in the EU/ESA relations, option 2 (the
revision of the existing Framework Agreement) should be considered alongside
with option 3. It should also be underlined that, as the
November 2012 Communication points out, the delegation agreements have
contributed to the rapprochement between the EU and ESA and can further
contribute to the improvement of the operational efficiency and the working
relationship between the EU and ESA as regards the latter’s involvement in the
implementation of Galileo and Copernicus. Options 2 and 3 should therefore be
considered in the light of improvements in the EU/ESA working arrangements that
may be achieved through such delegation agreements. The Commission considers that the selected
way forward should bring added value to the benefit of both organisations, EU
and ESA, and avoid a blurring of responsibilities. The chosen solution should
be pragmatic and avoid a “big-bang” approach, but at the same time provide a
solid and sustainable (legal) basis on which these relations can evolve in the
long-term, looking at 2020 and beyond, in full compliance with applicable
financial rules and in particular the budgetary principles enshrined in the
Financial Regulation. The impact on on-going programmes should be carefully
assessed in order to reduce any potential risk of disruption. The present paper constitutes a step in the
Commission’s response to Council invitation (formulated in its conclusions of
February 2013) to prepare proposals on the further evolution of EU/ESA
relations. On the basis of this initial assessment, the European Commission
will intensify discussions with Member States and with the Director-General of
ESA with a view to further refine the regulatory and technical analyses of the
options in order to arrive to coherent proposals by the Commission on one side,
and the Director-General of ESA on the other, for a convergent approach defining
the future framework of relations between both organisations. ESA is expected to take a decision about
the evolution of the Agency during its Council meeting at ministerial level in
December 2014. On the EU side, the present paper seeks to
feed the discussion in Council with a view to obtaining political orientation
for the next steps to be taken in close collaboration with the Director-General
of ESA. Depending on the outcome of these discussions, the on-going dialogue
with ESA and subject to further internal analysis of the options, the
Commission may come forward with concrete proposals reshaping the current framework
of EU-ESA relations towards the end of 2014, early 2015. The paper does not prejudge any future
proposals by the Commission which will be based on, and accompanied by a
full-fledged impact assessment further detailing and quantifying the impacts of
at least Options 2 and 3. In particular, additional work is necessary to
assess the options in terms of effectiveness of policy coordination and
implementation, as well as the impact of the combined EU and ESA action on the
overall EU political objectives (e.g. strategic importance of space for Europe, contribution of space activities to societal challenges and competitiveness of the
EU space industry). Analysis should also include elements of foresight
regarding long-term technological, industrial and economic developments, as
well as potential global developments which could have an influence on the EU
relations with ESA. [1] OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p.64 [2] Art. 189 TFEU [3] COM(2011)152 of 4 April 2011 [4] COM(2012)671 of 14 November 2012 [5] ST6571/13 [6] In a written statement to the Council conclusions,
the European Commission wished to clarify that it “considers that the use of
the term ‘common’ before ‘proposals’ conveys a notion that is not correct from
a legal and institutional standpoint. In exercising its right of initiative,
the Commission will determine the most adequate manner to ensure close
cooperation with the Director-General of the European Space Agency (ESA) and
with the EU Member States during the preparation of its proposals for future
appropriate relations between the EU and ESA”. [7] For example, in referring to the delegation agreement
to be concluded by the Union with ESA for the deployment phase of the Galileo
programme, recital 30 of the Regulation states that “In order for the
Commission to exercise its power of control fully, the delegation agreement
should include the general conditions for managing the funds entrusted to the
European Space Agency. Concerning activities exclusively financed by the Union,
these conditions must ensure a degree of control comparable to that required if
the European Space Agency was an Agency of the Union.” (Regulation No
1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation
and exploitation of the European satellite navigation systems; OJ L 247,
20.12.2013) [8] Towards the European Parliament [9] Political declaration towards the European Space
Agency that best serves Europe, ESA/C-M/CCXXXIV/Res. 4 (final) of 20 November
2012 [10] Evolution of EU-ESA relations: Cost/benefit assessment
of options, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, November 2013. [11] Past analyses conducted for the GNSS programmes
demonstrate that one day of delay on the critical path equals a cost of roughly
€1m. [12] To the European Parliament [13] The notion of an “EU pillar” within ESA has been part
of the Commission’s reflections on its relations with ESA as a step towards the
long-term objective of rapprochement. In its communication of April 2011, the
Commission stated that ESA “will continue to have management structures
geared solely towards EU programmes”. In the communication of November
2012, the Commission further states that, in working towards the long-term
objective of rapprochement, ESA could “Make the necessary structural
adaptations (financial and internal decision-making) to ensure that activities
delegated to ESA by the Commission are managed within an EU-like environment
(e.g. through a dedicated directorate managing EU programmes within ESA)”.
This option is also being examined by ESA in the context of the reflection on its
possible future evolution (a reflection launched at the ESA Council at
Ministerial level of November 2012). [14] Regulation No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union; OJ L 298, 26.10.2012 (see Part I, Title II).