This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 62018CN0449
Case C-449/18 P: Appeal brought on 6 July 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14 Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO — J.M.-E.V. e hijos
Case C-449/18 P: Appeal brought on 6 July 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14 Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO — J.M.-E.V. e hijos
Case C-449/18 P: Appeal brought on 6 July 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14 Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO — J.M.-E.V. e hijos
OJ C 392, 29.10.2018, p. 3–4
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
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29.10.2018 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 392/3 |
Appeal brought on 6 July 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14 Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO — J.M.-E.V. e hijos
(Case C-449/18 P)
(2018/C 392/06)
Language of the case: Spanish
Parties
Appellant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas, acting as Agent)
Other parties to the proceedings: Lionel Andrés Messi Cuccittini and J.M.-E.V. e hijos, S.R.L.
Form of order sought
The appellant submits that the Court should:
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Set aside the judgment under appeal; |
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Order the applicant before the General Court to pay the costs. |
Grounds of appeal and main arguments
EUIPO submits that the judgment under appeal ought to be set aside in so far as the General Court has infringed Article 8(1)(b) of European Trade Mark Regulation, on the following grounds:
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The General Court has erred in law in examining the conceptual similarity between the signs, since it takes into account only the perception of a significant part of the relevant public and fails to establish the relevance of the remainder of the relevant public, for whom the conceptual difference between the marks fails to counteract their visual or phonetic similarity. |
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Accordingly, the General Court has erred in law by discounting the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the basis of the conceptual perception that a ‘significant part’ of the public has of the marks at issue, rather than assessing whether such a likelihood of confusion exists in a non-negligible part of the relevant public, as required by case-law. |