—

having regard to the European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016,

—

having regard to Article 284(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB), in particular Articles 3 and 15 thereof,

—

having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

—

having regard to the report of the High-Level Group on Own Resources (Monti report),

—

having regard to the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP),

—

having regard to the ECB Economic Bulletin article entitled ‘MFI lending rates: pass-through in the time of non-standard monetary policy’ (Issue 1/2017),

—

having regard to the 2017 European Economic and Social Committee report on European industry and monetary policy,

—

having regard to the Transparency International report entitled ‘Two sides of the same coin? Independence and accountability of the European Central Bank’,

—

having regard to the ECB’s explainer page entitled ‘What is money?’,

—

having regard to the ECB’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) agreement published on 19 June 2017,

—

having regard to Commission recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (1);

—

having regard to Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro (2);

—

having regard to Article 128(1) of the TFEU, on the legal tender character of the euro;

—

having regard to the speech of 6 April 2017 by the President of the ECB,

—

having regard to Article 127(5) of the TFEU,

—

having regard to Article 127(2) of the TFEU,

—

having regard to the ECB’s feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on the ECB Annual Report for 2015 (3),

—

having regard to Rule 132(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A8-0383/2017),

A.

whereas at its meeting of 9 and 10 March 2016, the ECB Governing Council adopted further measures to achieve the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting the economy through monetary policy, by: 1) a reduction in its key interest rates and a lower deposit facility rate of -0,4 %; 2) an increase in monthly purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) to EUR 80 billion; 3) the inclusion of a new corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) in the APP for purchasing investment-grade euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporations established in the euro area; and 4) a new series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) with a maturity of four years;

B.

whereas at its meeting of 7 and 8 December 2016, the ECB Governing Council decided to extend the horizon of the APP at a lowered monthly pace (from EUR 80 billion to EUR 60 billion), from April 2017 to December 2017, or beyond if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim;

C.

whereas the members of the ECB Executive Board have consistently emphasised the importance of implementing productivity-enhancing reforms in the euro area, as well as growth-friendly fiscal policies, within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact;

D.

whereas, according to the Eurosystem macroeconomic projection of September 2017, annual inflation in the euro area as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is expected to be 1,5 % in 2017, 1,2 % in 2018 and 1,5 % in 2019;

E.

whereas the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is to maintain price stability, defined by the ECB’s Governing Council as a year-on-year increase in HICP for the euro area of below but close to 2 % over the medium term; whereas the ECB’s forecasts have been significantly below its medium-term inflation target in each of the four years since 2013, and the ECB now forecasts that inflation will not reach the target level before 2020;

F.

whereas the ECB considers that the weak inflation dynamic is the result of, among other factors, subdued wage growth and low energy prices;

G.

whereas Article 127(5) of the TFEU requires the ESCB to help maintain financial stability;

H.

whereas in 2016 the ECB’s net profit stood at EUR 1,19 billion compared with EUR 1,08 billion in 2015;

I.

whereas higher net interest income earned on securities held for monetary policy purposes, including the APP and US dollar portfolios, is the main contributor to this net profit;

J.

whereas growth and unemployment rates remain geographically uneven to a significant degree, causing dangerous fragility for the economy and endangering sound development;

K.

whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;

L.

whereas a growing number of FinTech firms have a significant potential in terms of the widening of financial inclusion in the euro area, also increasing the need for supervision and monitoring on the micro- and macro-prudential levels;

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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 30 November 2016 entitled ‘Accelerating Clean Energy Innovation’ (COM(2016)0763),

—

having regard to the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ratified by the European Union on 4 October 2016,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 15 September 2015 entitled ‘Towards an Integrated Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan: Accelerating the European Energy System Transformation’ (C(2015)6317),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 25 February 2015 entitled ‘A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’ (COM(2015)0080), and to its resolution of 15 December 2015 entitled ‘Towards a European Energy Union’ (1),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 15 December 2011 entitled ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’ (COM(2011)0885), and to its resolution of 14 March 2013 on the Energy Roadmap 2050, a future with energy (2),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2010 entitled ‘Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (COM(2010)2020),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 30 November 2016 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Governance of the Energy Union (COM(2016)0759), and in particular the ‘research, innovation and competitiveness’ dimension of the Energy Union therein, most notably Article 22 on ‘Integrated reporting on research, innovation and competitiveness’,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) (3),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2017 entitled ‘Strengthening Innovation in Europe’s Regions: Strategies for resilient, inclusive and sustainable growth’ (COM(2017)0376),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 22 November 2016 entitled ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ (COM(2016)0733),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the opinions of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on Transport and Tourism and the Committee on Regional Development (A8-0005/2018),

A.

whereas research, development and innovation constitute a distinct dimension of the EU’s Energy Union, with energy R&D&I being key drivers of the Union’s industrial leadership, its global competitiveness, its sustainable growth, job creation, as well as the overall energy security of Member States and the Union, by reducing dependence on energy imports and fostering an efficient and sustainable use of all energy sources;

B.

whereas the EU remains a global leader in high-value, low-emission energy innovation, including in energy efficiency, renewables and in emerging clean technologies, giving the EU a solid basis to make a further leap in clean energy research and innovation, including in development of batteries for e-mobility and energy storage; whereas ambitious, targeted climate and energy policies, particularly through the 2030 climate and energy framework, as well as the energy roadmap 2050, have been key drivers of this leadership; whereas, in this context, the Paris Agreement substantially increased the level of global ambition and of signatories’ concrete commitments on climate change mitigation; whereas the EU must further remain ambitious in its policies and instruments in order to send the right investment signals and not lose its global leading market position in clean energy research and innovation;

C.

whereas progress in energy efficiency and renewable energy-based innovations and R&D are key to the EU’s future competitiveness, including Europe’s industry; whereas the EU will become ‘the world number one in renewables’ only through the deployment of cost-effective innovations and intensified R&D efforts in this specific sector; whereas implementation of the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle needs to be underpinned by a robust innovation policy at European level, notably related to system integration;

D.

whereas a fully functioning and competitive internal energy market, with an appropriate regulatory framework and infrastructure, is essential for further stimulating R&D&I and maximising the market uptake of new clean technologies across all EU regions by providing economies of scale and regulatory and investment certainty, thereby enabling the Union to reap the full potential of technology-neutral energy innovation that fosters efficiency, a low-emission and sustainable use of energy sources and decentralised generation, storage and transport solutions and technologies;

E.

whereas innovation in clean energy should also contribute to providing an affordable energy supply to European consumers by helping them enjoy lower energy tariffs and more control over their energy consumption and production and offering them products and services that consume less energy;

F.

whereas the energy policy and financing instruments of the EU and its Member States, including relevant public investments, should be designed to take full advantage of accelerating technical developments, and should primarily focus on a gradual transition to clean, highly efficient, low-emission energy systems; whereas, due to market, technological or scientific uncertainty, funding from the private sector is often either insufficient or unavailable; whereas the EU needs to send strong and consistent signals and create incentives, in order to provide investor certainty and boost private investment in clean energy innovation, R&D and deployment;

G.

whereas innovation is driven first and foremost by innovators and market demand; whereas the Commission should focus its efforts primarily on creating an enabling framework for innovators, ranging from simplifying access to research financing to turning knowledge into commercially viable products; whereas partnerships between researchers and relevant industrial partners can be helpful in this context;

H.

whereas energy subsidies affect market prices, masking the true costs of energy from different sources and the true cost of energy-related technologies, thus negatively impacting the conditions for research and investment in clean energy innovation, as well as its eventual deployment; whereas, while the use of subsidies should be progressively phased out this use should, in the meantime, be limited to temporary instruments aimed at creating a level playing field and a competitive market facilitating the uptake of new clean technologies, especially in the areas of energy efficiency and renewables;

I.

whereas the life-cycle assessment (LCA) of greenhouse gas emissions from energy sources, distribution networks and technologies should be taken as a reference when addressing concrete policies and incentives at EU level aimed at fostering clean, low-emission, energy-efficient solutions and technologies, including the sustainable sourcing of raw materials and minerals; whereas focus should be put on those clean energy innovations that have direct relevance to citizens and prosumers, allowing their participation in the energy transition and making the transition itself more affordable;

J.

whereas energy-related research and innovation was recognised as a priority area under FP7 and Horizon 2020, and should continue to be one under FP9, given the Union’s commitments within the Energy Union and under the Paris Agreement, so as to leverage public and private R&D funding more effectively, and to help lower the investment risks of most prospective innovation in clean energy, particularly in energy efficiency and renewables;

K.

whereas the transport sector represents one third of the EU’s energy consumption, holds enormous potential for energy efficiency and carbon emissions reduction, and should therefore play a vital role in the transition towards new energy solutions and to a low-carbon society;

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—

having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

—

having regard to Articles 10, 19, 21 and 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to the right to petition enshrined in Articles 20 and 227 of the TFEU and Article 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR),

—

having regard to Articles 21 and 22 of the EUCFR,

—

having regard to the preamble to the TEU,

—

having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Protocol No 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (1) (Racial Equality Directive),

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (2) (Equal Treatment in Employment Directive),

—

having regard to Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (3) (Free Movement Directive),

—

having regard to the judgment of the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 3 February 2017 in Case T-646/13 — Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Commission (4),

—

having regard to its resolutions on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union,

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2005 on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 September 2013 on endangered European languages and linguistic diversity in the European Union (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2014 entitled ‘EU Citizenship Report 2013. EU citizens: your rights, your future’ (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2016 on the activities of the Committee on Petitions 2015 (8),

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2017 entitled ‘Fundamental rights aspects in Roma integration in the EU: fighting anti-Gypsyism’ (9),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 December 2017 entitled ‘EU Citizenship Report 2017: Strengthening citizens’ rights in a Union of democratic change’ (10),

—

having regard to the study of April 2017 commissioned by Policy Department C of the European Parliament at the request of the Committee on Petitions entitled ‘Discrimination(s) as emerging from the petitions received’,

—

having regard to the study of August 2017 commissioned by Policy Department C of the European Parliament at the request of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive EU protection system for minorities’,

—

having regard to the study of May 2017 commissioned by Policy Department B of the European Parliament at the request of the Committee on Culture and Education entitled ‘Minority Languages and Education: Best Practices and Pitfalls’,

—

having regard to the public hearing organised by the Committee on Petitions of 4 May 2017 entitled ‘Fighting against discrimination of EU citizens in the EU Member States and protection of minorities’ (11),

—

having regard to Rule 216(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Committee on Petitions has received several petitions raising concerns about various practices that discriminate against EU citizens belonging to minorities and has organised a hearing on the different issues raised;

B.

whereas there is a strong link between minority rights and the principle of the rule of law; whereas Article 2 of the TEU expressly mentions the rights of persons belonging to minorities and whereas these rights deserve to be accorded the same treatment as the other rights enshrined in the Treaties;

C.

whereas Article 10 of the TFEU stipulates that ‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’;

D.

whereas while international agreements provide a solid framework for minority rights, there is still considerable room for improvement in the way in which the protection of minority rights is put into practice in the EU;

E.

whereas every person in the EU has an equal right and duty to become a full, active and integrated member of society;

F.

whereas upholding minority rights is an essential requirement for candidate countries as laid down in the Copenhagen criteria;

G.

whereas discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin is cited as the most common form of discrimination and whereas discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation has increased significantly according to the most recent Eurobarometer survey on discrimination (12);

H.

whereas the Commission’s proposal for an Equal Treatment Directive (COM(2008)0426) covers a large number of areas, such as education, social protection, and access to and supply of goods and services;

I.

whereas petitions received by the Committee on Petitions in the field of discrimination in relation to minority rights should be examined thoroughly in order to understand the concerns raised by citizens and propose solutions;

J.

whereas several petitions show that minorities encounter discrimination in the exercise of their fundamental rights, and whereas this raises concerns regarding the future of minority communities, in particular in the light of activities that pollute the environment;

K.

whereas the protection and strengthening of cultural heritage related to national minorities in the Member States — a key component of the cultural identity of communities, groups and individuals — plays a crucial role in social cohesion;

L.

whereas Member States have a clear responsibility to take corrective measures against practices that discriminate against members of the Roma community, in particular in their dealings with regional and national administrative authorities;

M.

whereas petitioners are concerned about the lack of a comprehensive EU response and protection when it comes to their linguistic and other minority rights, which are enshrined in the EUCFR and the general principles of EU law, as stated by the CJEU;

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—

having regard to Articles 8 and 9 of the Victim’s Rights Directive (2012/29/EU) of 25 October 2012 (1) on the obligatory provision of support services to victims of violence, including those of FGM,

—

having regard to Articles 11 and 21 of the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) of 26 June 2013 (2) which specifically mentions victims of FGM amongst vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure,

—

having regard to Article 20 of the Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) of 13 December 2011 (3), where FGM as a serious form of psychological, physical or sexual violence is included as a ground to be taken into consideration for international protection,

—

having regard to its resolution of 6 February 2014 on the Commission communication entitled ‘Towards the elimination of female genital mutilation’ (4),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2012 on ending female genital mutilation (5), which called for an end to FGM worldwide through prevention, protection measures and legislation,

—

having regard to the EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of June 2014 on preventing and combating all forms of violence against women and girls, including female genital mutilation,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of March 2010 on eradication of violence against women in the EU,

—

having regard to the Commission Communication of 25 November 2013 entitled ‘Towards the elimination of female genital mutilation’ (COM(2013)0833),

—

having regard to the Joint Statement of 6 February 2013 on the International Day against Female Genital Mutilation, in which the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative and five Commissioners confirmed the EU’s commitment to combatting FGM in its external relations,

—

having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, in particular Objective 14(b),

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular target 5.3 on eliminating all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation,

—

having regard to the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020,

—

having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality report of 2013 on ‘Female genital mutilation in the European Union and Croatia’,

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 2014 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2017 (6) on EU accession to the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

—

having regard to the Declaration of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers of September 2017 on the need to intensify the efforts to prevent and combat female genital mutilation and forced marriage in Europe,

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 20 December 2012 on ‘Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of female genital mutilations’ (A/RES/67/146),

—

having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

—

having regard to the EU-UN Spotlight Initiative of 2017 on eliminating violence against women and girls,

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on zero tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) (O-000003/2018 — B8-0005/2018),

—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

—

having regard to Rules 128(5) and 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development explicitly calls for the elimination of female genital mutilation alongside harmful practices under Goal 5 ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’;

B.

whereas FGM is a practice underlined for special attention within Objective 14 ‘Promoting gender equality, women’s rights, empowerment and participation of women and girls’ of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019;

C.

whereas the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 (GAP II) under Thematic Priority B: ‘Physical and Psychological Integrity’ includes as an indicator the percentage of girls and women aged 15-49 years who have undergone FGM;

D.

whereas, as a detrimental practice of a transnational nature, FGM is now recognised as a global issue, with the 2030 Agenda on UN sustainable development goals identifying it as a harmful practice which is to be eliminated by the year 2030;

E.

whereas UNICEF’s 2016 statistical report states that a minimum of 200 million girls and women worldwide have undergone FGM, but the exact figure remains unknown;

F.

whereas FGM — still being traditionally practised in certain parts of the African continent but also in parts of the Middle East, Asia and Oceania — also poses a problem in the European Union, with severe consequences for the women and girls affected;

G.

whereas, although uneven, there has been progress over the past three decades, with the prevalence rates dropping by some 30 %; whereas this progress could nevertheless be offset by population growth, meaning that a greater number of girls and women will undergo the procedure;

H.

whereas local communities are often the greatest single influence on the decision by parents to cut their female children or by women choosing to undergo FGM;

I.

whereas although there is no religious requirement to perform FGM, a strong presence of religion in many practicing communities makes it necessary for religious and other leaders to be engaged in the movement against FGM;

J.

whereas, in order to devise an appropriate eradication strategy, this practice must always be examined in the local context;

K.

whereas FGM is often non-dissociable from other gender inequality issues and appears as only one of many violations against women’s rights such as: lack of access to education for girls, including comprehensive sex education; lack of work or employment for women; the inability to own or inherit property; forced or early child marriage; sexual and physical violence; and lack of quality healthcare, including sexual and reproductive health and rights services;

L.

whereas FGM shares the premise of control over women’s bodies with other forms of gender-based violence and violates a woman’s right to health, security and bodily integrity and, in some cases, even her right to life;

M.

whereas, while prevention represents a more desirable pathway to abandonment of FGM than prosecution given that offenders, aiders and abetters are frequently the parents of a victim, there is an evident need to also remove obstacles to the prosecution of FGM cases, while taking into account the best interests of the child;

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—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular its resolutions of 13 June 2013 on the rule of law in Russia (1), 13 March 2014 on Russia: sentencing of demonstrators involved in the Bolotnaya Square events (2), 23 October 2014 on the closing-down of the NGO ‘Memorial’ (winner of the 2009 Sakharov Prize) in Russia (3), of 12 March 2015 on the murder of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and the state of democracy in Russia (4), of 24 November 2016 on case of Ildar Dadin, prisoner of conscience in Russia (5) and of 6 April 2017 on Russia, the arrest of Alexei Navalny and other protestors (6),

—

having regard to the statement by the Chairs of Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Human Rights of 12 January 2018 calling for the immediate release of human rights defender Oyub Titiev,

—

having regard to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to which the Russian Federation is a party,

—

having regard to the EU statement of 19 January 2018 on human rights violations concerning the Memorial Human Rights Centre in Russia and the statement by the EEAS Spokesperson of 11 January 2018 on the detention of the Director of the Memorial Human Rights Centre in the Chechen Republic, Mr Oyub Titiev,

—

having regard to the visit by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture to the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation in November-December 2017,

—

having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

—

having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998,

—

having regard to the existing Agreement on partnership and cooperation (PCA) establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part and to the suspended negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement,

—

having regard to the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation considered by the UN Human Rights Committee at its 3136th and 3137th meetings, held on 16 and 17 March 2015,

—

having regard to the European Council Guidelines of 24 June 2013 to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons,

—

having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Russian Federation, as a full member of the Council of Europe and a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; whereas Russia has the obligation and the means to investigate the crimes carried out by the Chechen authorities; whereas the Russian Federation has ratified 11 out of the 18 international human rights treaties;

B.

whereas Oyub Titiev, the Chechnya office director at the 2009 Sakharov Prize-winning human rights organisation, the Memorial Human Rights Centre (commonly known as Memorial), was arrested on 9 January 2018 by Chechen police and charged with drug possession; whereas these charges have been denied by Mr Titiev and denounced as fabricated by NGOs and other human rights defenders;

C.

whereas on 25 January 2018 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision of the Shalinsky City Court to remand Oyub Titiev in custody for two months;

D.

whereas the criminal law of the Russian Federation has been amended and a new Article 212.1 has been introduced, under which a person may be charged in the event of violation of the law on public assemblies, notwithstanding the fact that this amendment restricts the freedom of speech and assembly;

E.

whereas Russian authorities show a tendency towards disrespecting the right of free assembly and detained more than 1 000 demonstrating citizens in the City of Moscow alone and numerous more in several other cities of the Russian Federation after the peaceful demonstrations held on 26 March 2017;

F.

whereas the number of political prisoners in the country has significantly increased in recent years, amounting to 102 persons in 2016, according to the Memorial Human Rights Centre;

G.

whereas the NGO law of 2012 has severely restricted NGOs’ ability to work independently and to operate in an effective manner; whereas, under this law, Memorial has been designated a ‘foreign agent’ by the Russian Ministry of Justice;

H.

whereas Yuri Dmitriev, a Memorial historian, was part of the team that found a mass grave of more than 9 000 people at Sandarmokh, many of them members of the Soviet intelligentsia; whereas, in recent years, Memorial has become the last remaining independent human rights organisation that continues to operate in the Republic of Chechnya; whereas it is very likely that the attacks on human rights defenders in the Chechen Republic, including the fabricated criminal charges against Oyub Titiev and arson attacks in neighbouring republics, were orchestrated in retaliation against Memorial for exposing and seeking justice for human rights violations in Chechnya;

I.

whereas Parliament awarded the 2009 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the Memorial human rights group;

J.

whereas in the Economist Democracy Index 2017, Russia ranks 135th out of 167 countries, which marks a significant decline in comparison with the country’s ranking as 102nd in 2006;

K.

whereas there is a high level of concern regarding the human rights abuses of LGBTI people in Chechnya; whereas the Russian Federation is a signatory to several international human rights treaties and, as member of the Council of Europe, to the European Convention on Human Rights, and thus has the duty to ensure the safety of all persons who may be at risk; whereas the EU has repeatedly offered additional assistance and expertise to help Russia to modernise and abide by its constitutional and legal order, in line with Council of Europe standards; whereas Russia has the obligation and the means to investigate the crimes carried out by the Chechen authorities; whereas homosexuality was decriminalised in the Russian Federation in 1993;

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having regard to its previous resolutions on Egypt, in particular that of 10 March 2016 on Egypt, notably the case of Giulio Regeni (1), that of 17 December 2015 on Ibrahim Halawa, potentially facing the death penalty (2) and that of 15 January 2015 on the situation in Egypt (3); to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on executions in Kuwait and Bahrain (4) and of 8 October 2015 on the death penalty (5); and to its resolution of 7 October 2010 on the World day against the death penalty (6),

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having regard to the EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, on Torture, on Freedom of Expression and on Human Rights Defenders,

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having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Egypt of August 2013 and February 2014,

—

having regard to the EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 2001, which entered into force in 2004, strengthened by the Action Plan of 2007; having regard also to the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020, adopted on 25 July 2017, and to the joint statement issued following the EU-Egypt Association Council,

—

having regard to the joint declaration of 10 October 2017 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (VP/HR), Federica Mogherini, and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe on the European and World Day against the Death Penalty,

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having regard to the joint statement of 26 January 2018 by UN experts including Nils Melzer, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, urging the Egyptian authorities to halt imminent executions,

—

having regard to the Constitution of Egypt, and notably Article 93 thereof (the binding character of international human rights law),

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having regard to the United Nations Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those facing the Death Penalty,

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having regard to the African Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance, which prohibit military trials of civilians under all circumstances,

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having regard to the final declaration adopted by the 6th World Congress against the Death Penalty, held in Oslo from 21 to 23 June 2016,

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having regard to the new EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights, which aims to place the protection and surveillance of human rights at the heart of all EU policies,

—

having regard to Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and to Protocols 6 and 13 thereto,

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having regard to the six resolutions of the UN General Assembly in favour of adopting a moratorium on the death penalty,

—

having regard to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which have been ratified by Egypt,

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Egypt is party, and in particular to its Article 18 and the second optional protocol on the death penalty, as well as its Article 14,

—

having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the death penalty is the ultimate inhuman and degrading punishment, which violates the right to life as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; whereas the European Union has a strong and principled position against the death penalty and in favour of a universal moratorium on capital punishment with a view to its global abolition, as one of the key objectives of its human rights policy;

B.

whereas since January 2014 at least 2 116 individuals have reportedly been sentenced to death in Egypt; whereas no death sentences were approved under former Presidents Mohamed Morsi and Adli Mansour; whereas at least 81 executions have been carried out since 1 January 2014;

C.

whereas, reportedly, in 2017 Egyptian courts handed down at least 186 death sentences and 16 people were executed; whereas in recent weeks and since the end of December 2017 there has been an alarming increase; whereas all recent executions were carried out without prior notification of the victims or their families; whereas 24 other Egyptians currently appear to be in danger of imminent execution, having exhausted all appeal processes;

D.

whereas at least 891 people are currently on trial or awaiting trial in Egypt on charges that could carry a death sentence; whereas at least 38 individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of their alleged offences have been tried alongside adult co-defendants on charges that carry the death penalty; whereas courts have recommended initial death sentences for at least seven such individuals; whereas the imposition and execution of the death penalty against persons who were aged under 18 when the crime was committed is a violation of international law, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as Article 111 of Egypt’s Child Law; whereas Egypt is a party to numerous international conventions on political and civil rights, torture, the rights of children and juveniles, and justice;

E.

whereas the Military Code has a larger number of offences punishable by death than its civilian counterpart, and Egyptian legislation has gradually expanded military jurisdiction; whereas the number of civilians sentenced to death in Egypt’s military courts leapt from 60 in 2016 to at least 112 in 2017; whereas at least 23 Egyptians were executed in recent months, including 22 civilians sentenced by military courts that are far from meeting standards for a fair trial; whereas in total, at least 15 000 civilians, including dozens of children, were reportedly referred to military prosecutors between October 2014 and September 2017;

F.

whereas reportedly a worrying number of the testimonies and confessions used in trials, including military trials, were obtained after the accused were reportedly forcefully disappeared and tortured or ill-treated; whereas the fight against torture is a long-standing human rights priority of the EU and a common objective for the UN Convention Against Torture, which has been signed by Egypt;

G.

whereas all recent and imminent executions are reportedly the result of trials that failed to uphold fair trial and due process rights; whereas the UN Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those facing the Death Penalty strictly prohibit the application of the death penalty following unfair trials; whereas multiple UN human rights experts have repeatedly called on Egypt to halt all pending executions following allegations of unfair trials;

H.

whereas it is important that all necessary measures are taken to ensure that trials take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Egypt is a State party; whereas in cases of capital punishment trials must meet the highest standards of fairness and due process;

I.

whereas on 29 November 2017 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights urged the Egyptian government to immediately suspend death sentences in five different cases; whereas, nonetheless, the defendants in one of these, the Kafr el-Sheikh case, were executed on 2 January 2018;

J.

whereas Egypt has gone through several difficult challenges since the 2011 revolution and the international community is supporting the country in addressing its economic, political and security challenges;

K.

whereas serious security challenges exist within Egypt, particularly in Sinai, where terrorist groups have staged attacks on security forces; whereas a number of devastating terrorist attacks have occurred within Egypt, including the recent attack on a Sufi mosque that killed 311 civilians and injured at least 128 others; whereas on 9 April 2017 twin suicide bombings took place at St. George’s church in Tanta and St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox cathedral, killing at least 47 people;

L.

whereas there has been an ongoing state of emergency in Egypt, in place since April 2017 and extended for three months from 13 January 2018, introduced, according to the state media, to help tackle the ‘dangers and funding of terrorism’ and undermining fundamental freedoms and granting the President and those acting on his behalf the power to refer civilians to State Security Emergency Courts for the duration of the three-month period;

M.

whereas the overall human rights situation continues to deteriorate in Egypt; whereas the crackdown on terrorism has been used as justification by the Egyptian authorities to conduct a large-scale repression;

N.

whereas the Counter-terrorism Law enacted in 2015 imposes the death penalty on anyone found guilty of setting up or leading a terrorist group, under a broad definition of terrorism that includes ‘infringing the public order, endangering the safety, interests, or security of society, obstructing provisions of the constitution and law, or harming national unity, social peace, or national security’, and thus putting any civilian, including human rights defenders, at risk of being labelled a terrorist and being sentenced to death;

O.

whereas Egyptian human rights defenders documenting and denouncing death sentences, torture and enforced disappearance have been subject to targeted repressive measures, such as the closure of the El Nadeem Centre in 2017 and the attempt by the Egyptian authorities to shut down the Cairo office of the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF); whereas Egypt opened a legal front against NGOs last year with a law requiring state security agencies to approve their funding, foreign or domestic, thus virtually banning them; whereas on 5 April 2018 Egypt’s highest court of appeal will rule on the so-called ‘foreign funding’ case involving international NGOs;

P.

whereas the new 2017-2020 EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities adopted in July 2017 are guided by a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and constitute a renewed framework for political engagement and enhanced cooperation, including on security, judicial reform and counter-terrorism, on a basis of due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas the Subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy of the Association Agreement between Egypt and the European Union held its fifth session in Cairo on 10 and 11 January 2018, addressing cooperation in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

Q.

whereas the EU is Egypt’s first economic partner and its main source of foreign investment; whereas EU bilateral assistance to Egypt under the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2017-2020 amounts to around EUR 500 million; whereas on 21 August 2013 the Foreign Affairs Council tasked the High Representative to review EU assistance to Egypt; whereas the Council decided that the EU’s cooperation with Egypt would be readjusted in accordance with developments on the ground;

R.

whereas companies based in several EU Member States have continued to export surveillance and military equipment to Egypt;

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having regard to its previous resolutions on Haiti,

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having regard to the Joint Statement of 12 June 2017 on the occasion of the World Day Against Child Labour by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for Development,

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council annual report which highlights human rights advances and challenges in Haiti in 2017,

—

having regard to the ACP-EU migration action study of 20 July 2017 on the trafficking of human beings in Haiti,

—

having regard to Haiti’s implementation report considered by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on 15 January 2016,

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having regard to the UNHCR Universal Periodic Review of Haiti of 31 October-11 November 2016,

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having regard to the UN Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

—

having regard to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,

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having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

—

having regard to the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, in particular article 1(d) thereof, of 7 September 1956,

—

having regard to International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour and ILO Convention 138 on the minimum age for employment,

—

having regard to the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly of December 2017 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,

—

having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

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having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

—

having regard to the UN Declaration of Human Rights,

—

having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas Haiti is one of the world’s poorest countries with severe corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of healthcare, low levels of education and historical political instability being the main sources of its crippling poverty;

B.

whereas the use of children as domestic workers, often referred to by the creole term ‘Restavek’, is systematic throughout Haiti and exists mainly due to the harsh economic conditions and cultural attitudes towards children;

C.

whereas Restavek is a form of domestic trafficking and modern-day slavery affecting approximately 400 000 children in Haiti, 60 % of whom are girls; whereas many Haitian children do not have birth certificates and are at risk of trafficking and abuse; whereas, according to UNICEF, exposure of children to violence and abuse, including corporal punishment and gender-based violence, is a substantial problem; whereas one in four women and one in five men are victims of sexual abuse before the age of 18; whereas 85 % of children aged 2 to 14 are victims of violent discipline at home, 79 % are victims of corporal punishment and 16 % suffer from extreme corporal punishment; whereas an estimated 30 000 children live in approximately 750 mostly privately-run and financed orphanages;

D.

whereas the Restavek children are typically born into poor rural families who have few or no means of raising income and will sell a child to another family in exchange for food or money;

E.

whereas the Government of Haiti has made some efforts to address the exploitation of Restavek children, such as the adoption of a comprehensive law to combat human trafficking, measures to identify and assist children in domestic servitude, and awareness raising; whereas it is the obligation of the state to support parents so that they can fulfil their responsibilities;

F.

whereas many Haitian children receive insufficient education and schooling; whereas according to UNICEF 18 % of children aged 6 to 11 in Haiti do not attend primary school; whereas approximately one-half of all Haitians aged 15 and over are illiterate, as 85 % of schools are run by private entities and are prohibitively expensive for low-income families; whereas Hurricane Matthew significantly impacted access to education, damaging 1 633 out of 1 991 schools in the hardest-hit areas;

G.

whereas more than 175 000 people, including tens of thousands of children, displaced in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew in October 2016, are still living in extremely precarious and unsafe conditions; whereas the 2010 earthquake claimed more than 220 000 lives and displaced some 800 000 children, resulting in many being forced into slavery;

H.

whereas Haiti is a source, transit and destination country for forced labour and the trafficking of children; whereas the Restavek phenomenon also has an international dimension, with many Haitian children being trafficked to the neighbouring Dominican Republic;

I.

whereas the recent electoral and political impasse following the 2016 presidential election severely hampered Haiti’s ability to pass key items of legislation and a national budget to tackle urgent social and economic challenges;

J.

whereas impunity in Haiti has been fuelled by a lack of accountability of officials, and in particular the lack of systematic investigations into the use of force and widespread illegal or arbitrary arrests by the police; whereas Haiti ranks 159th out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s corruption index;

K.

whereas Haiti is ranked 163rd in the UNDP Human Development Index and is in continuous need of humanitarian and development aid;

L.

whereas in September 2017 the Haitian parliament approved a national budget for the year 2018 that raises taxes disproportionately from an already impoverished population, which led to violent demonstrations and riots in the capital, Port-au-Prince; whereas the Minister for the Economy and Finances, Mr Patrick Salomon, presented a budget which, for instance, prioritises the cleaning of government institutions over public health programmes;

M.

whereas the EU has allocated EUR 420 million to Haiti under the 11th European Development Fund, with particular emphasis being placed on child nutrition and on education to support child development;

N.

whereas in 2017 the EU launched a call for proposals under the French title of ‘La promotion des droits des enfants et la protection des enfants victimes d’exploitation, discrimination, violence et abandon’ whose main priority was to return imprisoned children to their biological families or to place them in care families;

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having regard to Articles 15, 126, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol No 5 on the statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

—

having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan for 2017-2019, published on the EIB website,

—

having regard to the 2016 Activity Report of the EIB,

—

having regard to the 2016 Financial Report and the 2016 Statistical Report of the EIB,

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having regard to the Evaluation of the Functioning of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) of the EIB of September 2016,

—

having regard to the Agreement concluded on 2 May 2017 by the European Parliament and the EIB in respect of the information to be exchanged under Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013 — the European Fund for Strategic Investments (1),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/2396 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2017 amending Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) 2015/1017 as regards the extension of the duration of the European Fund for Strategic Investments as well as the introduction of technical enhancements for that Fund and the European Investment Advisory Hub (2),

—

having regard to the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No 466/2014/EU granting an EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under financing operations supporting investment projects outside the Union (COM(2016)0583),

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having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 establishing a Guarantee Fund for external actions (COM(2016)0582),

—

having regard to the EIB Economic Resilience Initiative,

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 September 2017 establishing the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guarantee Fund (3),

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having regard to the first EFSD Strategic Board meeting held in Brussels on 28 September 2017,

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having regard to the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth held in Gothenburg on 17 November 2017 and to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

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having regard to the EIB Group Strategy on Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowerment,

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having regard to the report on the implementation of the EIB’s Transparency Policy in 2015 and the EIB’s 2016 Corporate Governance Report,

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having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Handbook,

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having regard to the ongoing revision of the EIB Complaints Mechanism — Principles, Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure of 2010,

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having regard to the EIB policy towards weakly regulated, non-transparent and uncooperative jurisdictions (NCJ Policy) of 15 December 2010 and the addendum thereto of 8 April 2014,

—

having regard to the EIB’s approval of the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the EU of 4 October 2016,

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

—

having regard to President Juncker’s State of the Union speech delivered on 13 September 2017 at Parliament’s plenary session in Strasbourg,

—

having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the opinions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Regional Development (A8-0013/2018),

A.

whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) is considered to be the ‘financial arm of the EU’ and the key institution in sustaining public and private investments within the EU, while also playing an important role outside the EU through its external lending activities;

B.

whereas the EIB Group financial activities include both lending own resources and fulfilling the various mandates granted to it with the support of the EU budget and third parties such as the EU Member States;

C.

whereas continuous attention should be focused on the development of best practices related to the EIB Group’s performance policy and management, governance and transparency;

D.

whereas the EIB maintained a solid financial standing in 2016 in accordance with the forecast for that year, with a net annual surplus of EUR 2,8 billion;

E.

whereas the EIB should continue to strengthen its efforts to expand its loan activities effectively by providing technical assistance and advisory support, especially in regions with low levels of investment, in order to address regional discrepancies, while reducing administrative burdens for applicants;

F.

whereas the EIB, as the institution responsible for the management of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), should maintain the pursuit of a high-quality, geographically balanced asset portfolio, with long-term economic benefits that generate quality jobs, and should make this its main priority across the whole EU territory;

G.

whereas the European Investment Fund (EIF) should play a key role in complementing the EIB’s interventions, as the EU’s specialist vehicle for venture capital and guarantees aimed primarily at supporting SMEs and thus leading to further European integration and economic, social and territorial cohesion;

H.

whereas safeguards against fraud, including tax fraud and money laundering, and risks of financing terrorism are contained in the EIB Group contractual provisions included in the contracts signed by the EIB Group and its counterparties; whereas the EIB Group should require that its counterparties comply with all applicable legislation; whereas additional contractual provisions addressing specific transparency and integrity issues should be imposed by the EIB Group on the basis of due diligence results;

I.

whereas the EIB Group is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration, economic and social cohesion and regional development through dedicated investment instruments such as loans, equities, guarantees, risk-sharing facilities and advisory services;

J.

whereas the EIB Group should maintain a high credit standing as a fundamental asset of its business model and a high-quality, solid asset portfolio with sound investment projects under the EFSI and all financial instruments in its portfolio;

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—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Turkey, in particular that of 27 October 2016 on the situation of journalists in Turkey (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2017 on the 2016 Commission Report on Turkey (2),

—

having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative, Federica Mogherini and the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, of 2 February 2018 on the latest developments in Turkey, of 14 July 2017 a year after the coup attempt in Turkey, and of 13 March 2017 on the Venice Commission’s opinion on the amendments to the Constitution of Turkey and recent events,

—

having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 8 June 2017 on the reported detention of the head of Amnesty International in Turkey, Taner Kiliç, of 8 July 2017 on the detention of human rights defenders on the island of Büyükada in Turkey, and of 26 October 2017 on ongoing human rights cases in Turkey,

—

having regard to the EU-Turkey High Level Political Dialogue of 25 July 2017,

—

having regard to the written observations by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights submitted to the European Court of Human Rights of 2 November 2017 concerning a group of twelve applications relating to the freedom of expression and right to liberty and security of parliamentarians in Turkey and of 10 October 2017 concerning a group of ten applications relating to the freedom of expression and right to liberty of journalists in Turkey,

—

having regard to Resolution 2156 (2017) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey,

—

having regard to the fact that the EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights, values which also apply to all EU candidate countries,

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Turkey is a state party,

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

—

having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas Parliament strongly condemned the attempted coup of 15 July 2016; whereas on 18 January 2018 the Turkish Parliament extended the state of emergency in Turkey for another three months; whereas the state of emergency is currently being used to silence dissent and goes far beyond any legitimate measures to combat threats to national security; whereas under international law, emergency measures must be necessary and proportionate in scope and duration;

B.

whereas Turkey is an important partner of the EU and is expected as a candidate country to uphold the highest standards of democracy, including respect for human rights, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and the universal right to a fair trial;

C.

whereas 148 signatories of the ‘Academics for Peace’ petition are facing indictments for disseminating ‘terrorist propaganda’ and await court hearings in May 2018;

D.

whereas, according to the European Federation of Journalists, following the attempted coup, 148 journalists remain in prison; whereas the crackdown on political dissent through social media continues; whereas 449 people were detained for posting comments on social media that were critical of the Turkish Government’s military intervention in the Syrian enclave of Afrin; whereas, according to Amnesty International, the Turkish authorities have shut down hundreds of civil society organisations and closed down the offices of more than 160 broadcasters, newspapers, magazines, publishers and distribution companies;

E.

whereas the Turkish authorities have dismissed 107 000 people from their professions since July 2016; whereas the ‘Commission of Inquiry for State of Emergency Practices’ set up upon the recommendation of the Council of Europe has received 104 789 applications as of 18 January 2018 and has so far issued decisions only in 3 110 cases, which have not been made public;

F.

whereas recent years have seen the extension of executive control over the judiciary and prosecution, the widespread arrest, dismissal and arbitrary transfer of judges and prosecutors, and persistent attacks against lawyers;

G.

whereas according to data provided by the Human Rights Association (HRA), in the first 11 months of 2017 a total of 2 278 people encountered torture and ill-treatment;

H.

whereas the situation in the south-east of the country remains extremely worrying; whereas an estimated 2 500 people have been reportedly killed in the context of security operations and an estimated half a million people have become displaced since July 2015; whereas 68 Kurdish mayors remain imprisoned;

I.

whereas among those journalists detained are, for example, the German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel, the academic and columnist Mehmet Altan, the journalist Şahin Alpay; as well as numerous journalists and staffers from the daily Cumhuriyet, including Ahmet Şık;

J.

whereas, in the aftermath of the lifting of the parliamentary immunities of a large number of MPs, many opposition MPs have faced judicial proceedings and detention; whereas 10 MPs remain detained, including HDP co-chairs Figen Yüksekdağ and Selahattin Demirtaş, who was not allowed to appear in court for security reasons, and CHP MP Enis Berberoğlu, and six MPs have been stripped of their parliamentary mandate, including the Sakharov Prize laureate Leyla Zana, following a vote in the Turkish Parliament;

K.

whereas in July 2017 the Turkish authorities arrested 10 human rights activists (the ‘Istanbul Ten’), who were later released on bail; whereas the Istanbul court overturned its own decision to release Taner Kılıç, the president of Amnesty International Turkey, on 1 February 2018, keeping him detained for the duration of his trial;

L.

whereas one of Turkey’s leading civil society leaders, Osman Kavala, was arrested on 18 October 2017, and has been held in prison ever since on the accusation that he ‘attempted to overthrow the government’ by supporting the Gezi Park protests in December 2013;

M.

whereas on 19 November 2017 the Ankara Governor’s Office decided to impose an indefinite ban on any event organised by LGBTI organisations;

N.

whereas despite the fact that the Turkish Constitution provides for the freedom of belief, worship, and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and prohibits discrimination on religious grounds, religious minorities still face verbal and physical attacks, stigmatisation and social pressure at school and in public life, discrimination and problems regarding the ability to legally establish a place of worship;

O.

whereas, in view of the situation in Turkey as regards democracy, the rule of law, human rights and press freedom, Turkey’s pre-accession funds have been cut by EUR 105 million compared to the Commission’s initial proposal for the 2018 EU budget, with a further EUR 70 million held in reserve until the country makes ‘measurable sufficient improvements’ in these fields;

P.

whereas Parliament called, in November 2016, for the accession process with Turkey to be frozen and, in July 2017, for it to be suspended if the constitutional changes were implemented unchanged;

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