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Document 62011CN0290
Case C-290/11 P: Appeal brought on 9 June 2011 by Comap SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2011 in Case T-377/06 Comap v Commission
Case C-290/11 P: Appeal brought on 9 June 2011 by Comap SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2011 in Case T-377/06 Comap v Commission
Case C-290/11 P: Appeal brought on 9 June 2011 by Comap SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2011 in Case T-377/06 Comap v Commission
IO C 252, 27.8.2011, p. 18–18
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
27.8.2011 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 252/18 |
Appeal brought on 9 June 2011 by Comap SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2011 in Case T-377/06 Comap v Commission
(Case C-290/11 P)
2011/C 252/32
Language of the case: French
Parties
Appellant: Comap SA (represented by: A. Wachsmann and S. de Guigné, avocats)
Other party to the proceedings: European Commission
Form of order sought
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Principally,
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in the alternative,
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in any event, order the European Commission to pay all the costs, including those incurred by Comap SA before the General Court. |
Pleas in law and main arguments
The appellant raises four pleas in law in support of its appeal.
By its first plea, Comap alleges infringement of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal since the review carried out by the General Court of the decision of the Commission, an institution which fulfils the functions both of inquiry and sanction, was limited to the manifest errors in law and of fact, without the unlimited power of review having been used on the basis of a full re-examination of the facts of the case and, in particular, the evidence adduced.
By its second plea, the appellant complains that the General Court applied to it too restrictive an understanding of the notion of ‘public distancing’ which disregards the requirements of the principle of strict interpretation of criminal law, enshrined in Article 7(1) of the ECHR, which provides that the criminal law may not be applied broadly to the detriment of the defendant. That understanding also infringes the principle that the benefit of the doubt must be given to the undertaking to which the decision is addressed and which is necessary having regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence.
By its third plea, Comap alleges distortion of a number of pieces of evidence which led to an incorrect legal qualification of certain bilateral contacts between the appellant and one of its competitors after the Commission inspections.
By its fourth and last plea, finally, the appellant complains that the General Court failed to fulfil its duty to state reasons in that it took the view that the Commission had established Comap’s participation to the requisite legal standard in a single and continuous infringement after March 2001.