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having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 44 thereof,

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having regard to the action plan entitled ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (EPF) (1),

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises,

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having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government of 11 March 2022,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March and of 30 and 31 May 2022,

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having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022 (2),

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having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

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having regard to the Wales Summit Declaration adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting of 5 September 2014, and in particular to the measures making the NATO Response Force (NRF) more responsive and capable,

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having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022, and in particular to the new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at this Summit,

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having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016 and 10 July 2018, and to the 74 proposals for common action endorsed by EU Member States and NATO Allies,

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having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022,

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having regard to the results of the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) of 15 November 2022,

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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0077/2023),

A.

whereas since 2003 the EU has acquired extensive experience in deploying military operations and civilian missions to promote peace, security, stability and progress in Europe and in the world, gained in 19 completed and 18 ongoing missions; whereas these common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations and missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the Member States, United Nations, NATO, other international organisations and third countries; whereas many EU Member States are also key contributors to UN-led missions and operations; whereas the simultaneous presence of several actors, missions and operations in a single conflict area underlines the importance of coordination and the division of labour for improving coherence and effectiveness;

B.

whereas the geopolitical landscape in Europe has changed dramatically after the outbreak of war on European soil; whereas the global security situation has worsened and whereas the Union needs to be more responsive and credible in addressing crises; whereas the EU has been striving for over 20 years to become an effective security actor and encourages cooperation of EU Member States through a variety of structures and instruments, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) in order to improve capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective solutions for European defence; whereas the results and effectiveness of these instruments are still rather limited; whereas 61 PESCO projects have been launched since 2017 without achieving any tangible results;

C.

whereas Sweden and Finland jointly submitted their applications to join NATO on 18 May 2022; whereas NATO Allies signed the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5 July 2022;

D.

whereas Europe is a pillar of peace and stability in the world, a role which requires the strong support of the European citizens; whereas, in this context, the need has arisen to counter hostile disinformation campaigns and to proactively communicate the purpose and objectives of EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC) deployments to European citizens, the local populations of host countries and the international community;

E.

whereas the EU RDC is a key component for the European Union’s strategic autonomy and should significantly improve our security and defence capacities for acting outside EU territory; whereas the creation of the EU RDC should generate new security synergies and strengthen operational capabilities, including also in relations with our partners;

F.

whereas CSDP missions and operations regularly depend on good operationalisation of the EU’s integrated approach, on the effective performance of international partners’ missions, reliable cooperation, timely information-sharing, as well as on sincere host nation institutional and societal support, ownership, respect for international human rights law, international humanitarian law and democratic and transparency standard, as well as on the political will of the Member States to guarantee sufficient personnel and financial resources; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the successful implementation of a CSDP mission’s mandate and ultimately lead to the withdrawal of EU-led forces; whereas mandates should set clearly defined objectives for EU missions and operations, including a timetable for their achievement, as well as a comprehensive exit strategy;

G.

whereas in light of recent experiences in the Sahel region, there is a need to learn lessons and put the security interests of the local population at the heart of a genuine human security approach;

H.

whereas the premature termination of CSDP missions can leave host nations and their authorities in a weak position to protect their populations, thereby creating power vacuums that can be exploited by other state and non-state actors, including terrorists and extremists, including those sponsored by our global competitors;

I.

whereas the European Union and its Member States should strive for coordination with like-minded partners when preparing, conducting and sustaining CSDP missions and operations; whereas the Union should be capable of rapidly deploying multinational, multidimensional and modular forces, swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required in coordination with like-minded partners but without depending on third-party support;

J.

whereas CSDP missions are undertaken using human resources and capabilities provided by the Member States and depend on the sufficient provision of forces and equipment; whereas Member States frequently fail to provide sufficient forces and equipment to CSDP missions, thus compromising the effectiveness of the mission; whereas Member States’ capabilities are used for national purposes and for their contributions to collective defence and to missions abroad; whereas candidate and association countries have also contributed to CSDP missions;

K.

whereas for collective defence, many Member States coordinate their efforts and employ their forces within the NATO framework; whereas many Member States also contribute to missions outside the EU within the CSDP framework;

L.

whereas building capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts, the organisation and structure of forces, regular individual, collective and multinational training, adequate logistics, defence materiel development, procurement and life-cycle management, military leadership development, staff recruitment and development, defence infrastructures, installations and facilities, interoperability and standardisation;

M.

whereas common procurement initiatives are critical for ensuring the EU’s strategic autonomy in a currently volatile regional and international environment;

N.

whereas Member States should address capability shortfalls in strategic enablers and commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps by 2025, in particular those linked to the EU RDC;

O.

whereas exercises should be adapted to the current threat landscape and possible EU RDC deployment scenarios; whereas based on the single set of forces principle, converging training and certification standards can improve the interoperability of available EU Member State forces; whereas joint training for civil and military officials in the EU RDC requires the progressive adaptation of the teaching and training provided by the European Security and Defence College, established by Joint Action 2008/550/CFDP;

P.

whereas the Strategic Compass was adopted on 21 March 2022, very shortly after Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine began, and sets out EU-level action in many of these areas;

Q.

whereas when adopting the Strategic Compass, Member States agreed that they must collectively be able to respond to imminent threats or to react rapidly to a crisis outside the Union at any stage of the conflict cycle and to develop a rapid deployment capability which would allow the EU to rapidly deploy a modular force, including land, air and maritime components, as well as the necessary strategic assets;

R.

whereas the Strategic Compass proposes ‘significantly enhancing and harnessing the full potential of EU funding instruments, in particular the European Defence Fund, as key to strengthen our defence capabilities and also equip Member States’ forces to face the future battlefields’;

S.

whereas the European Defence Fund (EDF) is an EU instrument which has already been deployed, is designed to improve military capabilities and includes strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial base;

T.

whereas the EDF and the EPF have already been used; whereas the EDF is an instrument designed to improve military capabilities while the EPF is designed foster operational support, cooperation and burden-sharing abroad;

U.

whereas the proposed European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and European defence investment programme (EDIP) regulations should facilitate common procurement involving EU Member States in a truly cooperative spirit, thus enhancing interoperability between national armed forces;

V.

whereas a re-evaluation and appropriate increase of the EPF budget to ensure the proper and timely financing of the EU RDC under any conceivable scenario is absolutely vital; whereas these funding increases should take into account the need to co-finance military support for Ukraine, and therefore be increased so that the EPF’s budget can cover the costs for its scheduled activities and EU RDC operating expenditure; whereas more than 50 % of the original budget for the EPF for 2021-2027 has already been spent;

W.

whereas consideration should be given to what types of expenditure related to the Rapid Deployment Capacity can be financed from the EU budget under Article 44 TEU;

X.

whereas the EU RDC is essential for CSDP as it is the only military capability on stand-by for possible operations and contributes to enhancing the effectiveness of Member States’ armed forces;

Y.

whereas the Battlegroup Concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability, as well as the transformation of armed forces for rapid deployment and their modernisation;

Z.

whereas problems related to decision-making and political will have structurally hampered the deployment of EU battlegroups since their creation in 2007 and as a result they have never been used;

AA.

whereas in general, Member States have not mobilised sufficient political will over the years to make important instruments such as battlegroups a reliable and well-functioning capability;

AB.

whereas in cases when EU battlegroups have not been deployed, individual EU Member States have instead occasionally acted outside the EU framework, either on their own or with other EU or non-EU states, inevitably constraining, if not undermining, the EU’s stated aspiration for ‘integration’ of policy tools, institutions and actors in pursuit of common interests and values, including also in foreign policy; whereas in these cases Parliament has not therefore been able to exercise either formal or informal democratic oversight;

AC.

whereas the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle for battlegroup funding provides no incentive for Member States contributing troops to actually deploy them when on stand-by; whereas this has been an underlying reason for Member States’ unwillingness to contribute troops;

AD.

whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Council have formally recognised lack of common funding for battlegroups as ‘the most significant obstacle’; whereas evidence and previous examples suggest that it appeared to be much easier to come to a decision if there are no additional costs for nations involved;

AE.

whereas each time the use of battlegroups has been discussed but not agreed, a negative precedent that undermines the spirit of solidarity and cooperation has been reinforced;

AF.

whereas the early years of the battlegroups were marked by declining momentum for the CSDP, particularly due to defence cuts after the 2008 financial crisis;

AG.

whereas there has been relatively limited actual convergence among Member States on threat priorities faced by the European Union and the need to be able to rapidly respond to them; whereas the Strategic Compass makes considerable progress on this through the common threat analysis;

AH.

whereas a comprehensive approach is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable results in enhancing security and stability in conflict areas; whereas the EU’s integrated approach provides for the coherent use of different instruments at different stages of conflicts; whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations;

AI.

whereas NATO remains the key institutional framework for Euro-Atlantic security;

AJ.

whereas the European Union urgently needs to assume more responsibility for its own security by acting in its neighbourhood and beyond; whereas to achieve this end, the EU must improve its own security and defence capabilities in order to ensure its strategic autonomy as well as its ability to safeguard its own values and interests;

AK.

whereas on 14 November 2022 the Council adopted conclusions on women, peace and security (WPS), where paragraphs 7 and 14 explicitly highlight the importance of meaningful leadership by women throughout full conflict cycles and the implementation of the WPS agenda in CSDP missions and operations;

AL.

whereas joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination, determine the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation;

AM.

whereas the Strategic Compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing EU-level actions, in particular for transforming the EU battlegroup system, establishing a more agile and flexible EU RDC, building on substantially modified EU battlegroups and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific CSDP tasks to a group of Member States within the Union framework in accordance with Article 42(5) and Article 44 TEU;

AN.

whereas as the EU RDC is a key deliverable of the Strategic Compass, it should therefore be implemented as a matter of urgency and given the necessary level of urgency by EU Member States; whereas in order to be fully operational, the EU RDC should overcome the obstacles encountered by battlegroups in the past and not repeat the same mistakes;

AO.

whereas, as stated in the Strategic Compass, the EU RDC should be based on pre-defined operational scenarios as well as practical field experience in employing the EU RDC and should take account, inter alia, of the guidelines in the Strategic Compass;

AP.

whereas Article 44 TEU has never been used, and is imprecise in terms of how it would work in practice;

AQ.

whereas Article 44 TEU provides for possibilities to react within an EU framework to different crises in a more rapid and flexible manner with the aim of safeguarding the Union’s values and interests: whereas after the Council (representing 27 Member States) has decided to create a group of Member States under Article 44 TEU, Member States in this group can exercise their decision-making autonomy and veto any further Council decisions;

AR.

whereas the possible implementation of Article 44 TEU, as well as the creation and operation of the EU RDC, should be considered key aspects of the CSDP on which the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) needs to regularly consult Parliament;

AS.

whereas, in line with Article 41 TEU and building on the experience of the European security and defence college, the administrative expenditure for the EU RDC should be charged to the Union budget except for expenditure that is covered by EPF, while still allowing for the possibility for participating Member States to make free-of-charge contributions to the EU RDC;

AT.

whereas the Petersberg tasks comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation tasks;

AU.

whereas the scope of common costs for EU RDC for missions outside the Union should therefore be extended; whereas, in those regards, it could be necessary to update EU secondary law or to propose new Union acts, to reflect all of the foregoing;

AV.

whereas in line with the Strategic Compass, the MPCC is the preferred command and control structure for the EU RDC at the military-strategic level and should reach its full operational capability as soon as possible, in line with the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, which set 2020 deadline as the deadline for this;

AW.

whereas the relevant Union acts should be updated to reflect all of the foregoing;