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The applicant claims in that regard that the Commission’s investigation is vitiated by serious and manifest omissions, first and foremost of a procedural nature, in particular: (A) shortcomings that occurred before the final commitments were submitted, consisting in a failure to prepare, when faced with several serious candidates interested in the package of measures, a transparent and non-discriminatory procedure capable of guaranteeing that the best candidate would be selected, and in incorrectly accepting a ‘fix-it-first’ preventive remedy proposed too late in the procedure; and (B) shortcomings in the inquiry that took place after the final commitments were submitted, in particular the failure to assess certain aspects of those commitments (for example with regard to the roaming agreement) and the lack of adequate further examination regarding the suitability of the proposed acquirer, shortcomings rendered more obvious by the lack of market testing.

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The applicant claims in that regard that the Commission, in particular, did not concern itself with verifying whether the new MNO had (whether on the retail market or on the wholesale market) operating capacity, economic conditions and incentives at its disposal that were at least equivalent, as a whole, to those of H3G, which in its early years was operating within a rapidly-expanding market. In addition, the Commission should have taken into consideration the effect produced on competitive dynamics by the one-sidedness of the termination rate available to H3G, which gave it a significant advantage with respect to other MNOs.

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The applicant claims in that regard that the comparison with H3G’s frequency holdings pre-merger in itself raises serious doubts regarding the adequacy of the proposed spectrum allocation. In addition, the Commission relied on future, uncertain events, such as the participation of the new MNO in the future calls for tenders, without however taking into account the high costs connected with the impending renewal and refarming of the transferred frequencies. The Commission accepted the transfer of an inadequate number of sites, relying on uncertain agreements with the tower companies. Lastly, the transitional agreement concluded with the notifying parties, which has a structure based on capacity, strongly reduces the incentive to invest.

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The applicant claims in that regard that the Commission disregarded the fact that network coverage and quality are of comparable importance, and that it should not have confined itself to a static analysis of the preferences of a very biased sample of users in the ‘low spender’ category. In addition, the Commission disregarded the prospective importance of the merger, which is decisive for a new entrant, which requires additional bargaining levers compared with an established operator (such as H3G). The selection of an acquirer capable of addressing the converging demand would have ensured greater effectiveness and sustainability of the commitments over time.

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The applicant claims in that regard that, in order to be able to act in a truly aggressive way and ‘break’ the collusive equilibrium, the new entrant would have to be able to act independently of other MNOs. However, the formula selected for the making available of resources (roaming agreements and the national multi-operator core network (MOCN)) creates a close dependence between the new MNO and the JV for a protracted period. The contested decision is further vitiated by a failure to carry out a proper inquiry as regards the compatibility of the roaming contracts/national MOCN with Article 101 TFEU.

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The applicant claims in that regard that, in particular, the Commission erred in its reconstruction of the counter-factual scenario and in not requiring any specific measure, relying exclusively on the assurance that Iliad will have an incentive to offer such services notwithstanding (i) the lack of measures to that effect and (ii) that operator’s experience in France. On the contrary, the commitments encourage the new MNO to target and acquire specifically and solely the clientele of mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs).

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The applicant claims in that regard that the Commission accepted Iliad as a suitable acquirer without taking into consideration the risks to the effectiveness of the commitments inherent in the entry of an operator with its characteristics and without adequate guarantees having been provided in the commitments, in particular with regard to network coverage/quality.