EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 6.6.2025

SWD(2025) 147 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament

{COM(2025) 287 final}

Table of contents

1.    Introduction    

2.    Participation in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament    

2.1.    Turnout    

2.2.    Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens, and supporting electoral rights    

2.3.    Participation of specific groups    

2.3.1.    Introduction    

2.3.2.    Young people    

2.3.3.    Women    

2.3.4.    Persons with disabilities    

2.3.5.    Mobile EU citizens and EU citizens residing in third countries    

2.3.6.    Other groups    

3.    Cooperation in support of free, fair and resilient elections    

4.    Protecting the integrity and resilience of the electoral process    

4.1.    Preparedness, monitoring and response    

4.2.    Foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation    

4.3.    Use of AI    

4.4.    Data protection    

4.5.    Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience    

4.6.    Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign    

4.6.1.    Fair campaigning    

4.6.2.    Funding of the election campaign    

4.7.    Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives    

5.    European dimension and the exercise of EU electoral rights    

5.1.    The European dimension    

5.2.    Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law    

5.2.1.    Introduction    

5.2.2.    Electoral Act    

5.2.3.    Electoral rights    

5.2.4.    Prevention of multiple voting    

5.2.5.    Oversight by the Commission and evolution of relevant EU case-law    

5.3.    Publication of results (officials and polls)    

6.    Election observation    

1.Introduction 

This Commission Staff Working Document accompanies the Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, detailing its findings, following the same structure.

The elections to the European Parliament, which take place every five years, are among the world’s largest democratic exercises.

Between 6 and 9 June 2024, European Union (‘EU’) citizens directly elected 720 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from around 18 400 candidates 1  with approximately 180 million votes cast across the EU, of nearly 360 million eligible voters 2 . The turnout (50.74%) closely mirrored that of the 2019 elections. 

The 2024 elections were organised amidst major transformations being faced by democracies in the EU and beyond. Election campaigns have moved significantly to the online sphere with social media playing an increasingly important role. As highlighted in the Commission’s European Democracy Action Plan 3 , this has brought new opportunities for direct interactions between political actors and voters. It can encourage democratic engagement and is also particularly effective in terms of involving young people in the democratic life. At the same time, the prevalence of campaigning online has also resulted in the need to mitigate specific risks. There is a higher need to address challenges such as those posed by cyber-threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation or by the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, than before. In this context, citizens show a high level of concern about various forms of interference in elections, including through disinformation, cyber attacks or the covert influence of foreign countries.

The main responsibilities regarding elections are for the Member States. It is their competence and responsibility to lay down the specific conditions for the conduct and organisation of elections, in accordance with their national legislation, international obligations and applicable EU law, and their authorities and courts have primary responsibility for exercising oversight and ensuring compliance with the relevant rules. For elections to the European Parliament, certain common principles and procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act 6 and the rules enabling mobile EU citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the European Parliament in their country of residence.

EU action in support of free and fair elections offers important added value. Since 2019, as part of a broader effort to promote and strengthen democracy, the EU has reinforced its support to Member States in this field. Initiatives such as those under the 2020 European Democracy Action Plan 7 , the 2021 package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections in the EU 8 , and the 2023 Defence of Democracy package 9 provide new tools to reinforce the resilience of democracies and elections in the EU.

As part of this work, the December 2023 Commission Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections (hereafter, ‘the 2023 Recommendation on elections’) 12 , provides an important blueprint to support the preparations for and conduct of elections. It is addressed to Member States, European and national political parties, political foundations, and campaign organisations in the context of preparation for elections in the EU, including the 2024 elections to the European Parliament.

The Recommendation on elections includes measures (1) supporting voter turnout and inclusive participation, (2) encouraging election integrity and fair campaigning, (3) on transparency for affiliations and political advertising, (4) promoting election observation, (5) protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats, (6) protecting election-related information, (7) regarding funding from third countries of political parties, political foundations, electoral campaigns and candidates, (8) promoting easy access to electoral rights for elections to the European Parliament, (9) enhancing the European nature of the elections to the European Parliament, (10) addressing the risk of multiple voting in the elections to the European Parliament, and (11) strengthening election networks and electoral cooperation.

The EU toolbox also includes several legislative and regulatory measures which are relevant in the electoral context, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) 13 and its Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes 14 , the Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising 15 or the Artificial Intelligence Act 16 .

Preparations for the 2024 elections to the European Parliament saw unprecedented cooperation between the Member States, EU institutions and stakeholders. On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the EU activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements in information-sharing mode in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 European elections 17 , which aided the exchange of information among Member States and EU institutions.

The European Cooperation Network on Elections 18  (ECNE), a network supported by the Commission and consisting of national contact points appointed by Member States, held a wide range of thematic sessions on free, fair and resilient elections, sharing best practices and information, with the participation of the European Parliament. Cooperation between ECNE and other EU networks took place, as well as engagement with a broad range of stakeholders including elections observers. In addition, a wide range of initiatives and cooperation structures were activated with new ones being set up to tackle threats such as FIMI, disinformation, cybersecurity threats or other issues affecting the integrity of elections. This includes for example the ad hoc Working Group in the European Board of Digital Services under the DSA, or the dedicated Taskforce of the European Digital Media Observatory, as well as the Expert group on electoral matters 19 .

The European Parliament actively supported the smooth conduct of the 2024 elections, with a communication strategy aimed at supporting and complementing Member States actions and providing a European perspective to the elections. The European Parliament also took specific measures to combat disinformation, taking an approach focusing on proactive communication, resilience-building, situational awareness and rapid response, ensuring a secure information environment for all EU citizens.

In its Conclusions on democratic resilience and safeguarding electoral processes from all forms of foreign interference 20 in May 2024, the Council invited the Commission to thoroughly analyse the lessons to be learned from the 2024 elections to the European Parliament 21 . In June 2024, the Council also approved Council Conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed democratic debate 22 .

This Staff Working Document accompanies the Report on the conduct of the 2024 elections. It follows the same structure and adds further information on the findings contained in the Report. Both documents are based on a wide variety of sources including:

-a call for evidence published in 2024 23 ;

-responses to Commission surveys returned by Member States 24 and European and national political parties 25 ;

-exchanges with Member States in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections 26 and other relevant expert groups such as the Expert group on electoral matters (E00617), and the Network and Information Systems (‘NIS’) group;

-feedback from the signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures taken around the 2024 European Parliament elections;

-Eurobarometer and other surveys including the post-election survey published by the European Parliament 27 , and other relevant studies;

-direct feedback from citizens including via Europe Direct Contact Centre and Your Europe Advice;

-reports from election observers, civil society, and bodies such as the European Digital Media Observatory, the High-Level Group on gender mainstreaming, the Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, the European Institute for Gender Equality and the European Data Protection Board.

2.Participation in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament 

2.1.Turnout

Observations

In the June 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the overall turnout remained stable at 50.74%, confirming the positive trend of the 2019 elections 28 . 

Figure 1: Overall turnout results 1979 to 2024

Source: European Commission (based on the 2024 European election results as published by the European Parliament)

There were however substantial differences between Member States, ranging from 89.01% in Belgium 29 to 21.35% in Croatia. Turnout increased in 15 Member States 30 , with double-digit increases on the 2019 figures in Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, and significant increases in countries where turnout was previously low, such as Czechia, the Netherlands and Portugal. Meanwhile, turnout decreased in 11 Member States 31 , including by double digits in Greece, Spain and Lithuania. There were also significant decreases in Denmark, Italy, Poland and Croatia.

Figure 2: Overall turnout results 1979 to 2024

Source: European Commission (based on the 2024 European election results as published by the European Parliament)

Several circumstances may explain the changes observed, although it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions.

One element that has an impact is whether the elections to the European Parliament are held alongside other elections. For example, in Hungary, which saw an increase in turnout of +16.10%, elections to the European Parliament were held alongside local elections. This merged election agenda seemed to have boosted participation significantly 32 . In Greece, Spain, and Lithuania, where turnout decreased compared to 2019, the 2024 elections to the European Parliament were not held alongside other elections, whereas this had been the case for the 2019 elections 33 . At the same time, this correlation does not always hold: in Italy, a decrease in turnout of -6.19 percentage points can be noted, while local elections 34  were held concurrently with the 2024 European elections, a similar setup to the 2019 elections 35 . Overall, research shows that there is indeed a significant rise in turnout for almost all countries with parallel electoral events, with a few exceptions 36 . 

Three months before the elections, the European Parliament’s spring 2024 Eurobarometer survey 37  had found that 60% of Europeans expressed an interest in the 2024 elections. This represented an increase of +11 percentage points compared to the survey of spring 2019, ahead of the previous elections to the European Parliament. This increase in interest applied to all Member States (see figure below). Europeans also indicated they were very much aware of the importance of the elections in the ongoing geopolitical context, with more than eight in ten (81%) agreeing that it makes voting even more important. Most Europeans agreed that ‘voting is important to keep democracy strong’ (86%) and that ‘voting is important to ensure a better future for the next generations’ (84%). However, this overall increased interest in the elections to the European Parliament was not reflected in a significantly higher turnout compared to 2019. In addition, interest in the European Parliament elections has evolved differently across Member States since 2019.

Figure 3: Evolution of EU citizens’ interest in the European Parliament elections 2019-2024

Source: European Parliament Spring 2024 Survey: Use your vote - Countdown to the European elections

The European Parliament’s post-election survey 38 , held in June and July 2024, showed that the main topics eventually motivating EU citizens to vote were rising prices and the cost of living (42%), followed by the general economic situation (41%). For a third of voters (34%) the international situation was a topic that encouraged them to vote, while a similar proportion mentioned defending democracy and the rule of law (32%).

In that same survey, more than one in two EU citizens (56%) consider that their voice counts in the EU, which represents an increase of +8 percentage points compared to spring 2024. A similar, while slightly lower, increase was seen in 2019, with figures rising from 49% to 56% in the months leading up to the elections. Pro-EU attitudes translate directly into voting in the elections to the European Parliament: 67% of people with a positive image of the EU voted, compared to 42% with a neutral image and 36% with a negative image.

Voting in the elections to the European Parliament also seems to have become a democratic habit for many: asked why they voted, 46% of voters say they always do, while 42% say it is their duty as citizens. 20% say they want to support the political party they feel close to. The decision on whom to vote for in the 2024 European elections was based mainly on how close the proposals of the parties were to the ideas and values held by voters. Proposals on European issues were the most frequent reason, given by 47% (+4 percentage points since 2019) of the voters.

The two main reasons for not voting in the 2024 European elections are a lack of trust or dissatisfaction with politics in general (21%, 1 percentage point decrease since 2019) and a lack of interest in politics (20%, 2 percentage point increase since 2019). Other reasons include the belief that voting has no consequences or does not change anything (17%, 3 percentage point increase since 2019). This means that genuine political engagement reasons may explain non-participation.

Figure 4: Main reasons to vote in the 2024 elections compared to the 2019 elections

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Households’ financial situation poses differences in turnout in the European elections, with the socio-economic divide widening since 2019 39 . Those who encounter difficulties paying bills most of the time (35%, 3 percentage points less than in 2019) are much less likely to have voted than those who never or almost never do (57%, 3 percentage points more than in 2019). Another factor influencing turnout is the level of education: 59% of voters who finished their formal education at the age of 20 or older voted in the elections, while the turnout was 49% for those who finished at the age of 16-19, and 44% for those who finished at the age of 15 or younger 40 . On 21 March 2024, Member States discussed about drivers for political participation, including turnout in elections, in a thematic session of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. According to research presented by Professor Kasper Møller Hansen during the session 41 , social aspects may affect voting behaviour and turnout more than cost or ease of voting 42 .

Measures taken by Member States and political parties to increase turnout in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament

Many Member States reported that they had taken a wide range of measures to facilitate voter and candidate registration, with a large majority providing a dedicated website 43 . For example, Ireland's reported that, while the 31 electoral registers are run by the respective local authorities, there is a single website where the electorate could register to vote or check or update their details in less than three minutes. Hungary reported to have sent postal notices to all voters which contained QR codes leading to a dedicated website, to make electronic administration easier. All election offices also had a hotline to answer telephone and e-mail enquiries. Germany also provided an online tool to facilitate candidate registration.

When it comes to complementary voting methods, France reported that citizens were able to register their delegate for proxy voting completely online, without presenting themselves physically before a competent authority, for the first time. Portugal allowed for the first time voters to vote in any polling station set up in Portugal or abroad, independently from their place of residence in Portugal. Italy, for the first time, introduced new rules allowing students domiciled in a municipality outside their region of residence to vote in the municipality of temporary residence, or in the commune capital of the Region, under certain circumstances. Sweden reported that advance voting is possible both from within the country on various locations in every municipality and through mobile voting clerks (from day 18 before election day), as from abroad (from day 24 before election day). Postal voting from abroad starts 45 days before election day. Other Member States such as Latvia, Malta, Lithuania and Estonia reported that they also provided for advance voting under certain circumstances. In Slovenia, voters can vote at specific polling stations outside their district of permanent residence or sometimes even at home, under certain requirements. In Latvia, voters have the opportunity to vote at any polling station without registration in advance. In Luxembourg, every voter can use postal voting without any justification and free of charge. Estonia provides for electronic voting (i-voting). Czechia reported that voters can apply for a voter’s absentee card (the voter applies to the municipal authority in his/her place of residence and then can vote at any polling station) or they can vote by mobile ballot box on request due to any serious reasons (e.g. at home or hospital). In Bulgaria, voters can cast their vote either by paper ballot or by machine (in all polling stations with at least 300 registered voters).

As regards voting hours and days: in most Member States 44 , the polling stations were opened at least until 8:00 pm. In Czechia the polling stations were opened on 7 and 8 June,  while Italy opened them on 8 and 9 June.  Compared to 2019 elections, voting hours on the day of the elections remained the same in all Member States.

2.2.Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens, and supporting electoral rights 

National authorities, the European Parliament and the Commission, other EU institutions, bodies and agencies, as well as other stakeholders including civil society organisations, took a wide range of initiatives to inform, engage and communicate ahead of the 2024 elections.

Efforts at EU level

The European Parliament’s campaign sought to provide a European perspective to the elections and showing democracy in action.

The main and final phase of the campaign centred on the call for action: ‘Use your vote, or others will decide for you’. The dedicated ‘one-stop-shop’ website for the 2024 elections 45 (EE24 website) provided comprehensive information covering organisation and voting processes in the Member States. It was organised in close cooperation with the Commission.

The Commission also approached the 2024 elections as a communication priority. Recognising the shared interest in a resilient democracy and the common responsibility for the EU’s democratic legitimacy, it complemented and supported the European Parliament’s communication efforts as part of a joint interinstitutional effort.

The Commission communicated with impact both on the proactive and the defensive side. Extensive communication on the concrete results and benefits of its work for citizens during the previous mandate supported awareness of what was at stake. The Commission complemented these efforts by providing factual information to citizens about the elections, their electoral rights and the importance of voting. In this context, it activated its networks and different groups of multipliers and helped to grow the European Parliament’s ‘together.eu for democracy’-community. Young and first-time voters were an important target audience for EU-level activities, as were ‘mobile EU citizens’ (EU citizens who have moved to another Member State to work, live or study). The Commission also supported massively and amplified the European Parliament’s ‘Use your vote’-campaign through all its channels. Communication activities of the Commission also focused on preventing and tackling FIMI, including disinformation, as explained further in Section 4.2.

The dissemination of information was also supported by promoting the ‘Guide to EU citizenship’ 46 . Eight Member States also explicitly reported having used the Guide in their national communication efforts 47 .

The Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as an ‘elections helpline’ for the 2024 elections at EU level. Between September 2023 and June 2024, the EDCC replied to 2 797 questions related to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament: 1 580 by webform, 975 by phone and 242 by chat. The EDCC was open during the election days (6 to 9 June, 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. CET). During the election days, the EDCC replied to 377 European elections related questions, mostly about electoral rights and formalities, perceived missing information from Member States and perceived obstacles/incidents preventing citizens from voting during the election days, alleged electoral fraud, security threats and other matters related to the elections (such as, voting systems). More information about the content of the questions is included in Section 5.1.4.

Figure 5 European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between September 2023 and June 2024 per channel

Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Communication

The Commission used available funding to support national authorities and civil society organisations in implementing projects to encourage EU citizens to get involved in the democratic process, including under the 2021-2027 Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme.

Through the two CERV strands managed by the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), ‘Union Values’ and ‘Citizen’s engagement and participation’, the programme provides pathways for citizens to become engaged in the democratic life of their communities. Between 2021 and 2024, these two CERV strands allocated EUR 26.5 million to finance 46 projects aimed at encouraging European citizens to get involved in the democratic process and promoting and enhancing the exercise of EU citizenship rights.

Under the ‘Citizen’s engagement and participation’ strand, the Commission has given the possibility to people and civil society organisations to take part in and contribute to the EU's democratic and civic life. During these years, many activities have looked in particular at the European Parliament elections of 2024, and at innovative approaches and tools to help citizens make their voices heard and publicly exchange views on all areas of EU action, including via digital tools (e-democracy).

With regards to the actions involving local authorities (mostly Network of Towns actions), the Commission has promoted exchanges between people of different countries, with the aim to give them the opportunity to broaden their perspective and develop a sense of European belonging and identity. While maintaining a bottom-up approach, the programme has also provided an opportunity to focus on EU priorities, notably contribute to increasing the turnout and inclusive candidacy at the European Parliament elections.

Under the ‘Union Values’ strand, the aim has been to encourage and facilitate active and inclusive participation in building a more democratic EU, as well as raising awareness on rights and values through support to civil society organisations.

Under this strand, the Commission has set up 4-year framework partnership agreements with European networks, civil society organisations active at EU level and European think tanks whose statutory aims are to protect and promote Union values. It has also provided grants to support the annual work programmes of the organisations which have signed framework partnership agreements active in the area citizens’ engagement.

Measures reported by Member States

The Member States also engaged in communication activities. In response to the survey launched by the Commission, most Member States reported having made efforts to support turnout, including via numerous communication and awareness-raising activities. A large majority of Member States reported to have carried out awareness raising initiatives and/or information campaigns to increase election accessibility and political engagement 52 . Some also organised debates 53 . For example, Germany organised a ‘Use your voice’ campaign to provide information on how to vote, accompanied by specific communication activities on the electoral process and debunking of disinformation. Luxembourg also launched a wide ‘I can vote’ campaign and developed a communication kit for municipalities and associations. Ireland reported to have carried out a comprehensive six-week campaign to inform and engage the public about the elections, including advertising across traditional and social media channels. This was complimented by a programme of public engagement and events with community groups to encourage voter registration, including minority groups, young voters in schools and universities, older voters in community groups and those living in traditionally low electoral turnout areas. Hungary produced different film and radio spots. In Slovenia, a dedicated campaign on the elections and the 20th anniversary took place. Slovakia launched an extensive information campaign through municipal and city offices, official social media platforms, television, and radio. The Netherlands provided communication materials to interest groups and municipalities, taking into account a wide spectrum of accessibility including on low literacy, mental disability or dementia. Malta undertook different campaigns on traditional and social media about different aspects of the electoral process, including on the new voting document delivery system. Other Member States stick to purely informing about the organisation of elections as their legislation does not allow them to promote political participation. Czechia used QR codes on their printed materials leading to the electoral website, where information could be found in easy-to-read format and also videos in Czech sign language.

Member States authorities further supported citizens’ participation by providing helplines. For example, Austria established a hotline and call centre. In Sweden, a voter customer service received over 8 000 contacts via phone, website and social media. In Hungary, an election helpline was reached more than 100 000 times. In the context of ECNE and supported by the Commission, an overview of election helplines was prepared for the EDCC to ensure for better coordination, complementarity of the services and streamline the service to the citizens for the appropriate support.

Member States’ efforts to communicate to specific groups are further explained in Section 2.3.

2.3.Participation of specific groups

2.3.1.Introduction

The inclusion of all groups is an essential element of healthy democracies The Commission report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament 54 had underlined, among others, that there is still progress to be made on inclusiveness and democratic participation in elections of younger people, women, citizens residing in a Member State other than their own (‘mobile EU citizens’), persons with disabilities, and other groups.

2.3.2.Young people 

Introduction

One out of 6 people in the EU is aged between 15 and 29 years old, representing 73.6 million people 55 . In the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, it was estimated that there were almost 21 million eligible ‘first-time voters’ (persons who have reached voting age since the last European elections in 2019), with the highest number of eligible voters expected in Germany (5.1 million persons), France (4 million) and Italy (2.8 million). The highest shares of first-time voters were expected in Belgium, France and Germany with 9.7%, 8.0% and 7.9% of all eligible voters, respectively 56 .

Young people may experience particular challenges to exercise their electoral rights. For example, limited access to postal or electronic voting options might be a barrier particularly for students studying abroad or from rural areas. High costs associated with sending ballots or traveling to vote might also discourage in particular young people from participating. The timing of elections, which often coincides with exam sessions, can also make it more difficult for students to vote 57 .

In most Member States, citizens can vote in the elections to the European Parliament from the age of 18. The 2024 elections saw more Member States lowering the voting age and allowing citizens to vote from 16 years old (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria) 58 . One country (Greece) gives citizens the right to vote from 17 years old 59 .

Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), ‘ Voting age for European elections ’, May 2023, updated in August 2023.

There are also differences in the minimum age to stand as a candidate, with most Member States requiring candidates to be 18 years old. In some countries it is 21 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), 23 (Romania) or 25 (Italy and Greece) 60 .

Observations

Before the elections, more than 6 in 10 (64%) young EU citizens (15-30) had expressed their intention to vote in the upcoming European elections, while 13% indicated they would not vote – despite being eligible 61 . Among the reasons why young people did not intend to vote in the 2024 European elections, the first three related to a lack of interest in, or distrust of, the political system in general (around 19%). Among those with no intention to vote in elections, 16% did not believe the EU deals with young people’s problems or said that they did not like any political groups or candidate, while around 14% were not aware of the elections. 10% of young people declared they did not vote because they did not understand the role of the EU, while 7% did not intend to take part in the elections because they oppose to the EU.

Figure 6: Reasons not to vote in 2024 European elections, by age groups, EU average, 2024 (prior to the elections)

Source: Eurobarometer on Youth and Democracy, 2024, VOLUME B. Q14 What are your reasons for not planning to vote or being unsure about voting in the European elections? (15-18; 19-24; 25-30) [MULTIPLE ANSWERS]. Notes: Data are ordered by decreasing number of young people (15-30) not intending to vote in the next European elections. Data extracted on 13.05.2024.

According to the European Parliament’s post-election survey 62 , only 36% of those aged 15-24 (if eligible), and 46% of those aged 25-39 actually voted in the 2024 elections.

This represents a decrease of 6 percentage points since 2019, partially offsetting the 14 percentage points increase between 2014 and 2019. Indeed, in the 2019 elections to the European parliament, both Europe’s young and first-time voters drove turnout figures up.

Figure 7: Turnout by age group

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Age remains a determining factor in voter turnout, with older people still more likely to vote than young people: 51% of those aged 40-54, and 58% of citizens aged 55 and over voted 64 .

Age is also the main socio-demographic difference in when EU citizens decided to vote 65 : older respondents mostly say that they always vote. This is lower among younger people (84% of those aged 55 or over, falling to 58% of those aged under 25). Close to three in ten voters below 25 say they decided to vote a few weeks or months before the day of the elections (28% compared with 12% of those aged 55 or over), and 14% on the day of the elections or a few days before (compared with 4%).

In the February 2025 Youth survey, young people who declared they had voted in the 2024 elections were asked why they voted for the party or candidate they chose 66 . The most common reason for having voted for a specific party or candidate was that their ideas aligned with the respondent's views (selected by 30% of respondents). The second most-mentioned reason is the belief that the chosen party or candidate can change things, selected by 25% of respondents. About one in six respondents say they voted for a party or candidate because they heard or read positive things about them (17%); similar shares are found for having voted strategically to avoid the electoral success of another party (16%) and the party or candidate prioritizes matters important to young people (16%). Smaller shares mention that they usually vote for the chosen party or candidate (13%), they liked the party or candidate's electoral campaign on social media (13%), they disliked all other parties or candidates (12%), or people they trust were supporting the party or candidate (12%).

Young people who declared that they did not vote in the 2024 European elections were also asked about their main reasons for not having voted. The most common reasons are other commitments (16%) and not having enough information to make a choice (16%), followed by not finding any relatable candidate or political party that represented their views (15%) and a general distrust or dissatisfaction with politicians and politics (15%). Slightly fewer non-voters mention technical or procedural issues, such as not registering on time (12%). One in ten respondents (10%) think that their vote would not have changed anything. Less common reasons for not having voted include not knowing there were European Elections in June 2024 (7%), not understanding the role of the European Parliament (6%), and the fact that none of their friends voted, so they did not feel like it mattered (6%). Opposition to the EU as reason for non-participation in the elections is mentioned by only 4% of non-voters.

In terms of representation (elected candidates) young people (under the age of 40) remain underrepresented in EU decision-making following the 2024 elections. They hold only 19.17% of the seats in the new European Parliament with 138 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This number has decreased: in 2019, MEPs under the age of 40 held 21% of the seats 67 .

Five Member States have no elected MEPs under 35 (Belgium, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg and Romania). Eight Member States have only one MEP under 35 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, and Lithuania) 68 . Average age of MEPs per Member State ranges from 40.5 years to 62 69 . The share of seats for young people also differs between the different political groups, with some allocated only 4.79% of their seats to young people while others allocated 20.75% 70 .

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

15 of the 25 Member States that replied to the Commission survey indicated that they had placed a specific emphasis on young people or first-time voters when it came to promoting easy access to the exercise of electoral rights 72 . For example, Croatia worked on educating high school pupils as young voters about what they need to know to participate in elections. Malta undertook specific activities to inform first-time voters.

Political parties also took measures to support turnout by young people. They sought innovative ways to engage these groups through tailored social media strategies and youth-centred initiatives. European political parties have made extensive use of social platforms to reach young audiences 73 . One party even enlisted young influencers to more effectively engage with first-time voters and young people 74 . Some parties reported tailoring their social media strategies to specific demographics: TikTok and Instagram for younger audiences, and Facebook for older age groups 75 . Young people and first-time voters also appeared to be high on the agenda for national political parties. Of almost 60 national parties that replied to the survey, around 57% explicitly reported that they hadaddressed young people or first-time voters in the run-up to the elections 76 . One notable practice was to specifically focus on topics that concern young people such as minimum wage or housing 77 , and providing explanations about the elections to first-time voters 78 or hosting special events 79 . Additionally, some parties made an effort to address young people by translating election manifestos in shorter versions 80 . Further efforts included a range of strategies such as creating music and video content that appealed to young audiences, targeted advertising campaigns, and even partnering with influencers to connect with younger demographics and promote their party's message effectively.

2.3.3.Women

Introduction

In its Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 81 the Commission committed to apply equal opportunities to women and achieve gender balance in decision-making and in politics. In the 2024 Report on Gender Equality in the EU 82 , the Commission recalled the need for an equal participation of women and men in political decision-making positions to better reflect the composition of society and strengthen democracy in the EU.

Observations

The participation of women as voters in the 2024 European elections fell slightly compared to the elections in 2019 (by one percentage point). The gender gap in turnout remained stable at 3 percentage points 83 .

Figure 8: Turnout men/women

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

According to the European Parliament’s post-election survey 84 , there are some differences regarding the main reasons why women and men decided to vote in the 2024 European elections. More women declared having voted because they always vote (47% of women, compared to 45% of men) or because this is their duty as a citizen (43% of women, compared to 41% of men). Conversely, more men declared that the main reason for voting was that they are in favour of the EU (18% of men, compared to 15% of women) or because they are very interested in European affairs (10% of men, compared to 8% of women). 85  

While female representation in the European Parliament has more than doubled since the first direct elections in 1979, in 2024 the share of women decreased by 0.9 percentage points, compared to the 2019 elections 86 . This is the first time that the representation of women in the European Parliament has fallen. Women make up only 38.5 % of all MEPs 87 .

Figure 9: Evolution of women MEPs in the European Parliament

Source: European Institute for Gender Equality

Furthermore, there remain major differences between Member States in terms of elected female MEPs.

Only Finland, France and Sweden elected more women than men with 9 of 15, 41 out of 81 and 13 out of 21 MEPs, respectively. This represents an increase compared to 2019 where only Finland and Sweden elected more women than men. In 2024, ten Member States elected at least 40% of each gender (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain). In eight Member States women account for less than 30% of elected MEPs (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Romania). As in 2019, all MEPs from Cyprus are men.

Figure 10: Female MEPs, 2024

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Five out of the 10 lead candidates put forward by European political parties were women. However, election observers 88 have pointed out that generally only around 30% of total candidates for the elections were women.

Finally, as also explained in Sections 4.7 below, female politicians also reportedly faced an acute risk of harassment, abuse, and disinformation campaigns online in the context of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament 89 . In the run-up to the elections, a rise in online gender-based disinformation about female EU leaders and candidates was observed 90 .

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

In response to a Commission survey, Member States shared insights on gender equality in the conduct of the 2024 elections. The responses revealed significant variations in efforts to promote gender equality across Member States.

Several Member States have adopted legislative mandates to support gender representation, with notable examples like Greece and Spain, where laws require at least 40% representation of each gender on candidate lists. Italy and Portugal also have implemented stringent measures, including Italy's requirement for gender alternation on lists and voters needing to choose candidates of different genders. Currently, 11 Member States have laid down quotas in their national legislation (10 of those Member States also had legislative quotas applicable for the elections to the European Parliament)  91  and some go further, alternating women and men on candidate lists (‘zipped lists’) 92 . In addition to alternating women and men on candidate lists and using other types of gender quotas, some Member States continue to link the allocation of public funding for political parties to the promotion of political participation of women for example in Finland, Ireland and Italy. These are good practices that were highlighted in the 2023 Recommendation on elections as referred above.

Data collection, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms vary greatly across Member States. For instance, Denmark and Luxembourg have well-established systems for tracking progress through data-driven reports and statistical monitoring.

When it comes to gender balance in electoral management bodies, progress remains limited across most Member States. Although some, like Denmark and Finland encourage balance through quotas or statistical monitoring, many Member States do not promote gender parity in these roles. Notably, Latvia reports 77% of local election commission leadership positions being held by women. Emerging efforts were also reported by countries like Czechia, where a national Gender Equality Strategy (2021–2030) includes measures to enhance women's political participation. Similarly, Slovakia highlighted a historic record of women candidates and elected representatives.

The High-Level Group on gender mainstreaming (E01240) 93 and the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 94  also reported on measures implemented in the Member States to promote women’s participation in the 2024 European Parliament elections and their impact. In Bulgaria, a series of public political debates were organised to discuss specific challenges women encounter in participating in elections at the individual, party and system level, with the participation of female candidates for the European elections from leading political parties. In Cyprus, the Office of the Commissioner for Gender Equality organised an event in collaboration with civil society to promote the Cypriot female candidates for the 2024 European Parliament elections. In Ireland, state funding is provided to encourage and support women to run as candidates in elections by providing training and mentoring support. 95 In France, political parties are obliged to present an equal number of men and women for regional, municipal, senatorial and European elections in order to have their lists registered. In Hungary, gender quotas on candidate lists in elections apply so that there are no less than 40% of candidates of each sex. Lithuania provided funding for NGOs to encourage women to get involved and participate in political life and elections, as well as to reduce stereotypes related to gender in political activity through educational, informational, analytical and advocacy activities. In Finland, the Council for Gender Equality carried out a social media campaign highlighting the importance of the European Parliament and the EU for gender, and the National Council of Women of Finland together with the Coalition of Finnish Women’s Associations organised a panel discussion Europe at the Crossroads on 15 May 2024. In Latvia, two NGOs held pre-election debates for candidates on various issues of women's rights. In Greece, the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Family organises awareness-raising campaigns to support and empower women candidates as well as seminars for female candidates and elected officials.

At the same time, in response to a survey, the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men also reported on specific challenges women encountered in participating in the 2024 European Parliament elections. In Bulgaria, the Council for Electronic Media identified that, in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the male-female ratio varied 95-69% men, 5-31% women for the 7 most influential radio and television programmes.

In response to a Commission questionnaire on supporting gender equality in the context of the 2024 European elections, European political parties outlined internal policies on gender balance, such as encouraging gender balance on electoral lists as outlined in their party manifestos 96 , appointing the youngest-ever Spitzenkandidatin (female lead candidate) to demonstrate a commitment to promoting gender balance on electoral lists, or by having a ‘Women’s Forum’ 97 . In another European political party, the governing body is required to follow statutes that ensure gender balance and geographical diversity within the party’s leadership 98 . Additionally, gender balance was promoted in electoral lists through quotas and rules mandating that at least one co-chair or candidate must be held by a woman 99 . One party took no specific measures beyond encouraging gender balance on electoral lists in accordance with national laws 100 . Another did not report any efforts to promote gender equality in governing bodies, electoral lists, or internal party structures at all 101 .

A similar trend can also be observed at national party level where some national parties reported having very ambitious internal gender policies in place for their electoral lists, governing bodies, or both, while others indicated having taken no measures at all 102 . For instance, one party ensured balance in electoral lists and governing bodies in accordance with party statutes 103 . Another national respondent followed gender quotas for electoral lists and governing bodies 104 , or promoted gender balance through programs designed to empower women 105 . One response to the survey showed a very high level of inclusiveness, where rules for the governing body following e.g. a “40/60 principle” also accounted for non-binary candidates 106 . Several respondents reportedly achieved gender balance through parity on both the electoral lists and in governing bodies 107 . One other example of special measures to achieve gender equality within the governing body included having a special seat for women’s organizations 108 , or ensuring that 50% of the positions in governing bodies, such as presidents, were held by women 109 . Some national parties focused on gender equality on the electoral list, for example through parity. However, they focused less on gender equality in the governing bodies 110 . Additionally, it was reported by one national party that gender specific policies had little impact on gender equality in practice 111 .

In Slovenia, four political parties signed a memorandum to use zipped systems in electoral lists, and three other parties used such zipped systems despite not signing the memorandum, and all parties put a woman in at least the second place on the list 112 .

2.3.4.Persons with disabilities 

Introduction

More than 100 million people in the EU have some form of a disability 113 . In March 2021, the Commission’s 2021-2030 Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  114 announced several actions to foster participation in elections of persons with disabilities, such as working with Member States in the European Cooperation Network on Elections to support full electoral participation and accessibility of the European elections, discussing inclusive candidate practices in the framework of the high-level on elections announced by the European Democracy Action Plan, and preparing a guide of good electoral practice addressing participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral processes. The following actions were taken in follow-up to the Strategy:

·Member States took different steps to support the electoral rights of persons with a disability which were, among others, supported by dedicated discussion and close cooperation with the European Cooperation Network on Elections 115 . Member States shared within the framework of this network practices promoting electoral participation of citizens with disabilities, including in the context of the preparation of election reforms, optimisation of postal voting and Braille ballots, specific training for election officials, and use of generative artificial intelligence to increase accessibility of electoral information.

·At a meeting of the European Cooperation Network on Elections on 12 June 2023, the European Parliament presented its communication plans for the European elections, including as regards persons with disabilities.

·During the same meeting, the European Disability Forum presented the EU-funded project ‘Disability Rights in European Elections’ aiming to increasing political participation of persons with disabilities through mobilisation and awareness raising.

·During the high-level event on elections held on 23 and 24 October 2023 116 , a session was dedicated to measures fostering inclusive political representation of different groups, including persons with disabilities. The European Disability Forum presented the different barriers that persons with disabilities face when exercising their election rights, including in terms of insufficient funding for ensuring disability-inclusive elections. Member States, such as Spain, Austria and Czechia expounded on their constant efforts to remove all obstacles regarding the right to vote, including providing accessible information on election in different formats and modes, specific training for election officials and accessible Braille ballots. Finland presented its practices in engaging different groups, including persons with disabilities, to participate in society and politics. A further session addressed best practices for ensuring electoral rights for persons with disabilities, such as providing accessible communication and facilities.

·On 6 December 2023, the Commission published the guide on good electoral practices for persons with disabilities 117 , as part of a larger package of measures fostering EU citizenship 118 . In the preparation of the guide, the Commission relied on targeted exchanges among the membership of the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the support of a dedicated subgroup of the same network. A vast majority of Member States sent contributions to a survey launched by the Commission on electoral frameworks and practices addressing participation in elections of persons with disabilities. A network of academics supporting the Commission in its work on EU citizenship also contributed with a targeted study on the participation of citizens with disabilities in elections 119 . The Commission actively sought to involve stakeholders, including through ad-hoc consultations of all actors active on the topic of electoral rights of persons with disabilities. The Guide reflects various measures taken by Member States to address the obstacles faced by citizens with disabilities when interacting with the electoral environment, including election materials, facilities, and procedures. It aims to support efforts to ensure that citizens with disabilities can exercise their electoral rights effectively.

Findings and monitoring of election accessibility

Election observers reported that participation by persons with disabilities improved in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, thanks to alternative voting measures, better polling station accessibility and ballot readability for example 120 . However, they noted that it still varies between Member States. Election observers indicated that some Member States, including Luxembourg, improved their legislation to require polling station accessibility and facilitate participation by providing free transport or other services. However, accessibility remains an issue, especially in Cyprus, Malta or Romania 121 . In addition, several Member States (i.e. France, Belgium, Cyprus and Malta) do not provide any alternative to vote in-person for persons with disabilities who cannot physically visit polling stations on election day 122 .

As regards persons with disabilities being elected, underrepresentation still persists in 2024. While official figures are not available, it seems that there are three MEPs with disabilities in the new European Parliament (compared to seven MEPs with disabilities in the previous Parliament) 123 . Civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders working on disability-related issues continue to call for accessible electoral procedures and more candidates with disabilities, including by referring to Article 29 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to which the EU and all its Member States are parties 124 . 

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

Most Member States took specific measures to support participation in elections by persons with disabilities. In doing so, 20 of the 25 responding Member States explicitly stated that that responded to the Commission’s survey explicitly stated they had made use of the Commission’s guide addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process 125 .

A wide range of national good practices can be highlighted in this regard. Austria improved the ballot paper by adding a bevel on one side for persons with visual impairments, to be used together with a template, and ensured suitable guidance for blind persons. In addition, a template with Braille lettering for signing the affidavit for postal ballots was introduced. Furthermore, new legislation ensured that in every building where polling stations are located, at least one has to be fully accessible for people with disabilities. Belgium put in place free adapted transport service for persons with disabilities to get to the polling stations and enabled persons with disabilities to act as election officials. It also piloted the use of Braille ballots in two electoral cantons. Slovenia 126 and Czechia passed legislation enabling all persons with disabilities to vote, regardless of their legal capacity. Slovenia’s new rules were already applicable for the 2024 European Parliament elections, Czechia’s rules will be applicable as of January 2026. Czechia also published information in accessible format, advised municipalities to place the polling station, if possible, in accessible buildings and publish this information, and spread information through relevant representative organisations, among other measures. Greece made available online a specially adapted ballot and ensured full accessibility of official election information. Spain extended accessible signage on elections 127  to all the capital cities of the Autonomous Communities, and to the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla. It also supported election officials with disabilities by making provision in its legislation for the use of free magnetic induction loop service for deaf or hearing-impaired people who use hearing aids (both holders and stand-in). Blind or severely visually impaired persons were provided with the necessary tools and mechanisms to enable them to carry out their duties with due autonomy. Estonia developed a checklist for the accessibility of polling stations and trained polling staff on the needs of voters with disabilities. In France, polling stations must be accessible to all types of disability; they must have at least one polling booth that is accessible to people in wheelchairs; the ballot box must be accessible and the president of the polling station must take all necessary measures to facilitate independent voting by persons with disabilities. French Electoral Code also obliges candidates to ensure campaigns’ accessibility. Croatia made specific efforts to train and guide its election officials on how to ensure the accessibility of the voting process, and made available election information through more than one sensory channel. 

Hungary supported the accessibility of election information and political advertising broadcast on audio-visual media services and provided Braille templates for voters with visual impairments. Germany indicated polling station accessibility on voter notifications and ensured that blind and visually impaired voters were able to use free ballot paper templates provided by associations for the blind, allowing them to vote independently. These templates included tactile markings and audio instructions, ensuring secrecy and accessibility in the voting process. For orientation purposes, the upper right corners of all ballot papers were punched or cut off and the upper right corner of the ballot paper template was also cut off.

Ireland put in place visual aids like photographs and emblems on ballots, large-print ballot displays, and ballot paper templates for visually impaired voters. It also conducted extensive outreach, including in cooperation with disability organisations. Malta supported persons with visual impairments by providing Braille templates, as well as a playback listening devices and implemented priority queues for persons with disabilities (within a specific time bracket). Luxembourg facilitated transportation of persons with disabilities to the polling stations, made use of tactile templates to ensure independent voting, organised targeted political sessions for voters encountering difficulties in understanding political programmes and took additional steps to improve the legibility of ballot papers.

The Netherlands organised a webinar and a workshop on accessible elections for election officials. It provided accessible voting documents and subsidised various initiatives to disseminate accessible information about which facilities can be found in polling stations to make voting more accessible for persons with disabilities (waarismijnstemlokaal.nl), to organise livestreams for persons with hearing impairments with information on the European Parliament elections and to help municipalities recruit persons with intellectual disabilities as polling officials and support them doing this work.

Portugal took specific measures to follow up on the Commission’s guide of good electoral practices for persons with disabilities, including by raising awareness, improving accessibility of election information in cooperation with disability organisations, and using Braille matrices and enlarged printouts. Romania conducted a comprehensive assessment of the accessibility of the voting process with the consultation of disability organisations and provided election information in accessible formats and modes. Slovakia provided sound recordings of candidate lists for the persons with hearing impairments and supported the accessibility of political debates, including by using sign language. Sweden produced information materials regarding when, where and how to vote in different forms of media and languages, for example videos in sign language, “easy to read Swedish”, and Braille.

Regarding measures taken by political parties to increase participation in elections of persons with disabilities, about 26% of the almost 60 national political parties that replied to a Commission’s questionnaire indicated that they had taken such specific measures for the 2024 European Parliament elections. 128  These measures included adding subtitles to campaign materials for individuals with hearing impairments, distributing accessible campaign materials, creating resources for the persons with visual impairments, hosting events in accessible venues, and using sign language during events. Only one party explicitly mentioned having candidates with disabilities 129 , while another reported lacking data on this aspect. 130

In this regard, the European Disability Forum conducted tests on the accessibility of websites of seven European Political Parties ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, finding that they are vastly inaccessible to users with disabilities, with some components even reversing default accessibility measures 131 .

2.3.5.Mobile EU citizens and EU citizens residing in third countries

Introduction

Mobile EU citizens (EU citizens who have moved to another Member State to work, live or study) have the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament in their Member State of residence under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State, in line with EU law 132 . Under national electoral rules and procedures, mobile EU citizens can also choose to vote in their Member State of origin 133 . The number of mobile EU citizens on 1 January 2023 was 14 million 134 . It is not known how many of them are eligible to vote or to stand as candidates.

In addition, there are around 25-30 million EU citizens residing in third countries, outside the European Union, who have the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, according to national electoral procedures. This opportunity, if provided by national law, allows them to participate in the democratic processes of their home Member State, maintaining their involvement with the EU despite being geographically distant.

Observations

Turnout among mobile EU citizens in the 2024 elections appears to have remained lower than that of nationals. The availability of relevant data varies greatly between Member States. Data received from Member States shows that the registration of mobile EU citizens in the Member States of residence remains low across the EU from 0.28% of registrations in Latvia to 22.03% in France. There also positive signs, however. For example, in Luxembourg, despite the proportion of mobile EU citizens registering to vote in the elections only being around 17.82% for 2024, this is the highest number ever recorded in Luxembourg. This figure has consistently increased since 1994, when it was just 7.4%.

Most Member States do not collect data on the turnout of mobile EU citizens who registered to vote. Where data are available, turnout of mobile EU citizens ranges from one third to two thirds of those who registered: 27.2% in Finland, 40.1% in Lithuania, and 59.63% in Czechia 135 .

Table 1: Number of national and non-national (mobile) EU citizen voters on the electoral roll, 2024 European elections

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024

On the basis of data available, 135 mobile EU citizens exercised their right to stand as a candidate in the elections in 15 Member States. The overall number of mobile EU citizens candidates would be roughly consistent compared to 168 candidates in 2019 and 170 in 2014, as mobile EU citizens continue to represent approximately 1% of the total number of candidates that stood in the elections. A notable change from 2019 is the reduction in the number of Member States where mobile EU citizens stood as candidates, decreasing from 21 Member States in 2019 to 15 in 2024, due to the absence of mobile EU candidates for these elections in Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania and Portugal.

In certain Member States, while the overall number of candidates increased compared to 2019, a drop is observed for mobile EU citizens candidates (Germany, France, Latvia). In other Member States, the number remained stable (Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia). Conversely, other Member States experienced an increase in mobile EU citizens standing as candidates (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria).

Two MEPs were elected (one in France and one in The Netherlands). This could be considered consistent compared to 2019, when three MEPs were elected in France and two in the United Kingdom.

Table 2: national and non-national (‘mobile’) EU citizens candidates in EP elections 2024

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024

Measures reported by Member States

20 Member States 138 conducted targeted information campaigns to increase awareness of electoral rights and obligations among mobile EU citizens. Member States also used a variety of languages to communicate with mobile EU citizens, including English, the official language of the country, and other languages such as French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Finland provided information in 17 languages, while Sweden provided information in 41 languages, both Member States including non-EU languages such as Arabic, Russian, Somali, Northern Sami, Inari Sami, Skolt Sami, Albanian, Chinese, Karelian, Sorani, Turkish, Vietnamese.

Ireland and Malta published information leaflets on the electoral process, which were made available in multiple languages, organized events and meetings with mobile EU citizens and partnered with organizations to provide them with information on the electoral process.

Some Member States 139  have digital supports and online platforms to provide information and facilitate the registration of mobile EU citizens and offer ‘online self-check’ tools and portals for registration and information access where citizens can verify their electoral registration status and receive updates 140 .

Direct communication with eligible voters through individual letters or emails is used in half of the Member States 141 about their registration status and how to register or deregister, where relevant. As explained in Section 2.2, Ministries and electoral commissions provide support via email, telephone, and municipal offices to assist citizens with queries related to registration and voting procedures.

Electoral observers 142 in particular highlighted Belgium’s dedicated elections website 143 that took into account mobile EU citizens and provided information in all EU official languages.

Several Member States took measures to support local authorities in informing mobile EU citizens about their rights and the procedures of registration on electoral rolls. Various ministries and departments provided guidelines, handbooks, circulars, and digital materials to assist municipalities. Training for local officials, hotlines for queries, and templates for registration were also offered. Online registration options and federal or ministerial support for technical and organizational questions were available in some instances, alongside written or digital guidance provided through government websites.

In the Netherlands, municipalities handle the registration of mobile EU citizens wishing to vote, guided by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Ministry provided a registration form (Y 32 form), translations in several languages, and advised municipalities to actively inform citizens. They also developed flyers and web text examples. All information was shared with municipalities and made publicly available online.

In Ireland, significant electoral reforms have led to rolling or continuous registration, replacing annual canvassing. The Department supported local authorities with workshops and made administrative process improvements to handle the expected increase in European Parliament election applications.

In Italy, the Central Directorate for Electoral Services has issued circulars addressed to the municipalities for the dissemination of information on the arrangements for access to voting by particular categories of voters, including mobile EU citizens; some of these circulars and other information to facilitate voting were published on the Ministry’s website, in particular in the form of FAQs.

EU citizens residing in third countries

Concerning EU citizens abroad, all Member States 144  that allow their citizens to vote from third countries have reported measures to inform them about how and where they can exercise their right to vote. These measures include the creation of dedicated official resources 145 like Electoral Commission’s websites, social media pages and press releases providing information on registration and voting procedures with information available in multiple languages. Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies played a crucial role, disseminating information through their official platforms 146 .

Various media campaigns, including TV spots 147 , radio programs 148 , and social media initiatives, have also been deployed to ensure timely communication to voters abroad of all necessary information, including on when and how to register.

Personalized letters 149  or emails 150 have been sent to citizens abroad to inform them of their voting rights and/or registration status. In Spain, electoral reforms concluded in 2022 have ensured that electoral documentation is now sent automatically to registered citizens abroad without the need for an application. In Austria, legal obligations require municipalities to notify citizens listed in electoral register about postal voting options immediately following election announcements.

Information on electoral processes and procedures in third countries has also been shared through diaspora organizations to reach wider audiences 151 . Sweden highlighted the cooperation with Swedish Armed Forces to ensure that material was distributed to soldiers as well as contacts with shipping companies to reach voters on board vessels on foreign water.

Dual nationals

EU citizens can be nationals of more than one Member State, one or all of which may use compulsory voting for the European Parliament elections. Where a Member State of nationality of a dual national imposes an obligation to vote, they may be prevented from voting in the other Member State of nationality even if they wish so, and even if they reside there. Currently, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece and Luxembourg have laws which require citizens to vote and punish the failure to vote without a valid excuse. The specific conditions and penalties vary.

2.3.6.Other groups

The EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025 152 points out the Commission’s intention to work with European political parties, the European Cooperation Network on Elections and civil society to improve participation of groups susceptible to marginalisation, such as people with a racial or ethnic background. As highlighted in the 2020-2030 EU Roma Strategic framework 153 , the participation of Roma people to the political life should be encouraged in Member States, in particular some with a significant Roma population, including their registration as candidates and voters. During the high-level event on elections held on 23 and 24 October 2023 154 , a session was dedicated to measures fostering inclusive political representation of different groups, which addressed the participation of Roma people in particular.

Measures were implemented in some Member States to foster electoral inclusion and representation among underrepresented groups including minorities. Slovenia and Sweden reported offering ballots and other electoral materials in minority languages. Ireland reported having introduced targeted communication measures to specific groups (such as traveller communities) to support and encourage to register to vote (e.g., Ireland’s national Migrant Integration Strategy).

About 14% of the almost 60 national political parties that replied to a Commission’s questionnaire on the 2024 elections, indicated that they had candidates from national minorities 155 . While the specific minorities were mostly not detailed, two parties mentioned a Roma candidate 156 .

In the absence of official data, civil society organisations have published their own analyses. They have reported on challenges faced by specific groups, including on the basis of demographic background or geographical location, such as people with a minority racial or ethnic background. For example, the civil society organization Election-Watch.EU reported that, during the previous mandate, the European Parliament included 4 out of 705 members of Roma origin (0,5% in total) from Spain, Germany, Hungary and Slovakia. Of the eight known Roma candidates to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, none was elected 157 .

3.Cooperation in support of free, fair and resilient elections 

The Commission has actively supported Member States’ authorities by organising regular meetings of the European Cooperation Network on Elections since early 2019. ECNE consists of national contact points appointed by Member States to represent their national networks on elections and serve as a liaison point between national and European levels of coordination.

All Member States have appointed contact points for ECNE. The contact points vary across Member States in terms of the functions of nominated individuals or bodies, and can include (representatives of) electoral authorities, ministries of the Interior, Justice, Public administration, or the State Chancellery. Many representatives have remained the same for several years, which has helped build relations and foster collaboration also beyond the meetings of the Network.

The Network has organised more than 25 meetings since 2019.

ECNE discussions were held in close cooperation with other relevant structures such as the Rapid Alert System 158 , in relation to FIMI, and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) in relation to the issues within its remit 159 . The European Data Protection Board also participated in meetings on issues related to the application of EU data protection law in the electoral context.

Interactions were also fostered with international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In the lead-up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the work of the European Cooperation Network on Elections intensified. In October 2023, the Commission organized a High-Level Event on Elections with the membership of the Network. In November 2023, the Network took part in a joint tabletop exercise on cyber security of elections (see Section 4.5).    

In addition to regular meetings, in the run-up to the elections eight thematic sessions were organised in the framework of the Network, including on inclusive participation and communication, countering disinformation and ensuring cyber security, the smooth organisation of voting for different groups of voters, and candidate safety.

Cooperation between Member States’ authorities was facilitated among others through a collaborative space, a mapping of the roles and responsibilities of different EU networks and bodies that support the organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the European Parliament and contact lists to support operational exchanges during elections.

In December 2023, the Commission presented a Guide of good electoral practices in Member States addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process (see also above in Section 2.3.4), and a Compendium of e-voting and other ICT practices in December 2023 (see also further below in Section 4.5). Both tools were prepared in close cooperation with the Network.

Several Member States 160  reported having taken into account the 2023 Recommendation in the context of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. For instance, 2 months before the elections, in Croatia, the National Election Cooperation Network (NECN) established on February 2019 161 held a meeting to ensure its full compliance with the 2023 Commission’s Recommendation.

Elections networks are formally established in 10 Member States 162 . 12 Member States indicated that Digital Services Coordinators had been integrated to their elections network or consulted in the context of the 2024 elections 163 . A broad majority of Member States noted their engagement with stakeholders such as researchers and academia, elections observer, media platforms 164 .

The final report of Election-Watch.EU 165  notes that ECNE has become a valuable forum for facilitating contacts between Member States, mutual learning, and inspiring improvements, with national representatives increasingly coordinating and exchanging on good electoral practices.

4.Protecting the integrity and resilience of the electoral process

4.1.Preparedness, monitoring and response

Leading up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the Commission and other EU institutions launched several key actions to strengthen the EU’s preparedness and ability to respond to challenges to the integrity of the electoral process, in close collaboration and coordination with Member States and different entities such as the media, fact-checkers and civil society organisations. This effort allowed those involved to share insights, exchange experiences and best practices and coordinate responses to FIMI and disinformation, as well as cyberattacks, the inappropriate use of AI and other threats.

On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the EU activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements in information-sharing mode in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament 166 . Under the coordination of the Commission, this facilitated the exchange of information among Member States and EU institutions.

Monitoring and response were ensured also through the Commission’s Network against Disinformation (NaD), in association with the Parliament and EEAS, including through a specific subgroup ensuring swift exchange of information and response.

The Vice-President of the Commission responsible for values and transparency visited several Member States to support preparedness for the 2024 elections as part of a Democracy Tour 167 .

Member States had continued to come together in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections to discuss practical solutions to a wide range of threats. One of the operational tools that the Commission has made available to support Member States’ authorities in building their capacity to detect and react appropriately to threats in the context of elections is the joint election resilience mechanism 168 . That mechanism supports exchanges among Member State experts, which several Member States used in the run-up to the elections.

The European Parliament also stepped up its activities in this area and strengthened networks both internally and with other EU institutions, Member State authorities and external partners. For example, in December 2023, the European Parliament hosted an elections-themed meeting of the Rapid Alert System, with the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the Council Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats (ERCHT). In November 2023, the European parliament hosted a three-day conference “Fact-checking and beyond“, organised in collaboration with pan-European fact-checking organisations European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). EU institutions and fact-checkers from across the EU and beyond exchanged views on how to counter disinformation ahead of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. The EE24 website included a section dedicated to integrity, providing practical tips.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) 169 is a horizontal regulatory framework which seeks to ensure a safe digital space for recipients of intermediary services, while ensuring that fundamental rights are respected. It does so by imposing obligations on providers of intermediary services in the Union and by taking a tiered approach to the regulation of such services. Obligations apply asymmetrically, with the strictest due diligence obligations applying to providers of very large online platforms (‘VLOPs’) and of very large online search engines (‘VLOSEs’) 170 . This includes assessing and mitigating systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning or use made of their designated services related to civic discourse and electoral processes, including through disinformation, intentional and, oftentimes, coordinated manipulation and use of their services or tactics involving artificially generated content. It has been a critical step in ensuring that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs uphold higher standards of transparency and accountability on their services, as it requires them to adopt a risk-based approach, conduct yearly risk assessments and independent audits and address illegal and harmful content and behaviour on their services, including disinformation. In connection to the Digital Services Act, specific actions were taken for election preparedness 171 .

In this regard, the Commission issued guidelines on recommended risk mitigation measures providers of VLOPs) and VLOSEs should take to mitigate systemic risks related to elections 172 . As a follow-up to these guidelines, the Commission organised a stress test in the form of a tabletop exercise to prepare providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs, civil society organisations, Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) from the Member States and other stakeholders for information manipulation scenarios, and exercise coordinated responses within the framework of the DSA.

At the time of the elections to the European Parliament, the Commission had also initiated formal proceedings under the DSA against Meta and X for matters related to platforms manipulation, coordinated inauthentic behaviour and deceptive advertisements used to disseminate disinformation campaigns 173 . The Commission also sent several Requests for Information (RFIs) to designated providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs about election risk mitigation measures and disinformation 174 .

During the first meeting of the European Board for Digital Services (EBDS) on 19 February 2024, an ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Elections’ was established, with the aim of gathering expertise of DSCs and competent authorities on electoral issues at the national level falling within the scope of the DSA. The Working Group on Elections has proven to be a successful collaborative effort by the Commission and DSCs to engage in dialogue, learn of country- and context-specific challenges and support efforts to curb systemic risks to civic discourse and electoral processes 175 .

The Code of Practice on Disinformation, the first worldwide industry-led framework in the digital field and source of industry best practices to limit the spread of online disinformation, also played a key role in supporting preparedness for the elections. It constitutes a comprehensive multistakeholder framework established through consensus among online platforms, fact-checkers, researchers, civil society organisations (CSOs), advertisers and other specialised players. The Code sets out detailed commitments by major online platforms and other players (ad industry, factcheckers, CSOs, smaller platforms etc) to addresses online disinformation from key angles: demonetisation, transparency of political advertising, integrity of services, empowering users, researchers and factcheckers.

Under the Code, online platforms signatories (Meta, TikTok, Google and Microsoft) made a series of commitments to tackle disinformation including in the context of elections. Signatories have implemented a series of actions to ensure preparedness during the electoral period, including enhanced cooperation with other civil society and factcheckers signatories.

The signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation committed to collaborate during special situations such as elections and, as foreseen in the Code, set up a Rapid Response System (RRS) for elections in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The system ensured a streamlined exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms to ensure rapid and effective cooperation between them ahead and during the election period. This collaborative initiative allowed non-platform signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies.

Signatories of the Code also published – ahead of and after the European elections – reporting on the measures put in place to reduce the spread of disinformation in relation to the European elections, based on the Code’s commitments.

The Code also comes with a solid monitoring framework and since 13 February 2025 when the Commission issued its positive assessment (following a formal request by its signatories), it is under the DSA regulatory framework, offering pertinent risk mitigation measures to its signatories in the context of their legal obligations under the DSA.

The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), which is an independent network of fact-checkers, researchers and media literacy practitioners covering all EU Member States set up a Taskforce dedicated to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament to monitor the European information space during the electoral period 176 . The Task Force played an important role in exposing disinformation during the elections. EDMO issued daily briefs, weekly insights, early warnings and targeted investigations during the electoral period. It also ran a dedicated EU-wide media literacy campaign #BeElectionsSmart, to raise awareness about the risks of disinformation around the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. It also provided training series for journalists and other stakeholders dedicated to election integrity.

In April 2024, a new Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising entered partially into application. The regulation will make it easier for citizens to recognise political advertisements, understand who is behind them and know whether they have received a targeted advertisement, so that they are better placed to make informed choices. It will also ensure that online targeting and ad delivery of political advertising are subject to strengthened requirements, which will limit abusive use of personal data to potentially manipulate voters. All online political advertisements will be available in a European repository of online political advertisements. Sponsoring political advertising from outside the EU will be prohibited three months before elections.

While most of the provisions of the new Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising 177 will take effect as of 10 October 2025, within the scope of application of this Regulation, Article 3 (definitions) and Article 5 (provision of political advertising services in the Union), paragraph 1 were already applicable during the elections to the European Parliament, ensuring in particular that political advertisement services would not be restricted to a ‘European political party’ or a political group in the European Parliament, solely on the basis of its place of establishment.

A series of actions were taken by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Rapid Alert System (RAS) coordinated by the EEAS, supported cooperation across Member States, including during the elections to the European Parliament. Updates were regularly provided to the European Cooperation Network on Elections, which provides a wider scope for cooperation regarding issues related to electoral processes.

Finally, in 2022 the Council had adopted the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence 178 , which features an EU Hybrid Toolbox bringing together all the relevant instruments to tackle hybrid threats to elections, including the FIMI Toolbox 179 .

4.2.Foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation 

Introduction and preparedness at EU level

The Commission, the Parliament and the EEAS, closely monitored the foreign information manipulation and interference and disinformation threats before and during the elections and coordinated responses, actively intervening to support a fair electoral space. The activation of the IPCR arrangements contributed to ensuring swift situational awareness updates and to detect and counter FIMI.

The three institutions have cooperated in the setting of the Tripartite, consisting of a series of coordination meetings to share situational awareness and inform each other about counter-disinformation activities during the elections.

As of 8 April 2024, the EDMO Taskforce dedicated to the 2024 European elections 183  issued daily and weekly briefs describing disinformation narratives being spread in the EU, with the inputs of its 14 regional hubs (covering 100% of the EU) 184 . It conducted in-depth investigations, for example by analysing election-related risks based on 1000 fact-checking articles published in the context of past elections 185 , and another uncovering FIMI operations such as the Pravda network 186 .

Providers of online platforms reported under the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures taken to protect the integrity of electoral processes based on the Code’s commitments, and under the DSA’s transparency database 187 on the number of content moderation decisions taken.  Platforms have multiple policies, which are reflected in their terms and conditions, to mitigate risks for electoral processes and civic discourse. In addition, these policies can differ per platform, depending on the specificities of their service. Therefore, a precise comparison cross-service on the scale of disinformation spread is difficult to make. The reports from signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation show that the cooperation under the Code was seen as successful by all actors involved. 

The EUvsDisinfo website 188 and social media, run by EEAS and supported by their situational analysis capability and strategic communication, reported regularly about attempts of election interference by Russia and its proxies.

A dedicated series of articles 189 and social media products were published in the months leading up to the elections to analyse, expose and pre-bunk Kremlin/ Russian state-affiliated actors’ deceptive narratives as well as tactics, techniques and procedures. The Russian malign activity focused on creating or stimulating splits and division in societies by spreading false information or flooding the information space with inauthentic content. Other tactics include smearing political leaders, sowing distrust and undermining public authorities 190 . This outreach helped raise public awareness including among journalists, academia and civil society.

Observations

While there was an increase in the volume of information manipulation around the elections 191 , no large-scale disinformation or information manipulation incident or campaign was detected during elections days.

According to EDMO’s estimates, EU-related disinformation increased from 5% in January to 15% in May 2024 192 . 

According to the EDMO, the main disinformation narratives about the EU encountered on social media platforms were:

·False stories questioning election integrity. 193  

·False narratives alleging the escalation of the war in Ukraine and direct involvement of EU countries in the conflict. 194

·Recurring false narratives on climate change.

·False content portraying migrants as “seizing power” in the EU.

Disinformation questioning election integrity suggested that EU voting procedures were unfair or raising fears about rigged elections, manipulated outcomes and invalid ballots. There were significant disinformation stories aimed at reducing participation in the elections or pushing citizens towards practices that would invalidate their votes. For example, in Italy, false claims circulated regarding how low voter turnout could trigger a withdrawal from the EU. In Germany, false stories suggested that voting in the EU elections could be considered a crime or that ballots with holes or corners cut are invalid when in fact these were put in place to help blind and visually impaired citizens to vote. In Bulgaria, social media, websites and traditional media were used to spread disinformation around fake polls.

Disinformation also targeted political figures and parties. False narratives portrayed the Slovak opposition leader as a foreign agent, alleging his involvement in planning a coup. In Spain, false allegations were made that Volt, a registered political party since 2019, was a fake and was created to divert votes from the political party Vox 195 .

Disinformation also deployed general anti-EU narratives, political hate and other deceitful narratives. Russian narratives on social media in Germany 196 , France 197 , Italy 198 , and Poland 199 aimed to discredit Western governments and criticized support for Ukraine, while also trying to boost support for far-right political parties in the EU. In the Netherlands, messages on social media falsely alleged how the EU’s Green Deal was destroying Europe’s food supply 200 . Further disinformation to discredit the EU has been circulating in the Baltic States, claiming falsely that the EU mandated the immediate adoption of electric cars, banning repairs of older vehicles and prohibiting the use of firewood for heating 201 . Other well know narratives were re-tailored specifically for the elections to build false stories around EU policies 202 .

·EDMO’s reporting showed that most narratives have cross-border spillovers. It also shows that they are often adapted to the specific national contexts. This matches the experiences of Member States as reported in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, where they informed of measures to taken to protect the information environment around the 2024 European elections and described disinformation narratives identified during the electoral period.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Special Election Assessment Mission found that disinformation, especially online and in social networks, including the use of deep fake videos discrediting politicians, was used across Member States, often in connection with negative campaigning and reportedly as foreign interference. 203

·Beyond online platforms, the automated clustering of articles from a list of websites repeatedly found by fact-checkers to be publishing disinformation shows that the main topics covered by such websites are similar to those covered by disinformation narratives on social media. The peak in the production of articles on such websites was found to have happened in the period from two weeks ahead of the ballots until election days. This is an indication of efforts to influence the elections. The same pattern was recognised in the case of national elections in some of the Member States in 2023 204 .

A handful of major Kremlin-linked operations that remained active during the elections period have been exposed by the EEAS.

According to the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats 205 , the EEAS detected 42 incidents linked to Russian FIMI activity around the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, which escalated in the weeks leading up to the vote, peaking between 6 and 9 June, and continuing well beyond that. The pattern used was not new: setting up the FIMI infrastructure well in advance, attacks on the democratic process, cyber-enabled interference, a surge in activity just before the vote, and post-election efforts to undermine trust in the results.

According to internal documents assessed in an extensive FBI affidavit as well as by a consortium of independent media outlets 206 , the Russian Social Design Agency (‘SDA’) is responsible for a range of Kremlin led information interference operations around the world, including in EU countries. Operations Doppelganger, Matryochka, Overload, and Portal Kombat share characteristics of SDA’s strategies, though the exact boundaries between operations is at present unclear.

Doppelganger 207 activities targeting the European Parliament elections were detected in France, Germany, Poland, Italy and Spain. This was the most notorious case of FIMI in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The EEASinvestigation found that 7 legitimate media outlets were impersonated, while 47 other inauthentic news outlets were used to promote FIMI about the elections 208 . Thousands of inauthentic accounts on X and Facebook were used to drive traffic to over 100 articles that mentioned the elections. Over 1 200 posts were discovered on X during June 2024 that appear to follow the sharing pattern associated with Doppelganger 209 . The focus of the posts was to cease support for Ukraine, discredit Western governments and political parties, and to generate fear around the decline of the West. Those posts generated over 4 million views.

Another Russian campaign named Operation Matrioska attempted to manipulate fact-checkers globally, creating numerous social media accounts and sending fake emails to distract media and fact-checkers from real disinformation. The campaign operated since at least August 2023 210 . 

The Counter Disinformation Network 211 reported, among other cases a pro-Russian disinformation campaign “Operation Overload”, targeting fact-checkers, newsrooms, and researchers worldwide, aiming to deplete their resources and encourage them to amplify false narratives. The actors operate through a coordinated email campaign, an ecosystem of popular Russia-aligned websites, and networks of Telegram channels and inauthentic accounts on X. They also reported violations of bans on Russian media entities and individuals, which were accessible on TikTok: early June 2024 at least 29 TikTok channels of Russian media entities banned by the EU or posing as such, were accessible to EU audiences, including the official Spanish-language account of Russia Today with 2.9 million followers.

Measures reported by Member States

Member States also took various measures to protect the information environment around the 2024 elections to the European Parliament from disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference.

In response to the Commission survey, 15 Member States reported that they had taken measures to support or facilitate the transmission of swift messages and responses to protect the information environment (such as message pre-bunking or debunking information manipulation and disinformation) 212 . 14 Member States reported that the had provided specific support for independent media and factchecking organisations 213 , while 13 developed training for election or other relevant authorities 214 . 10 Member States reported specifically to have made use of tools such as actions contained in the FIMI toolbox or the Rapid Alert System 215 . Regular meetings and information sharing with Member States were organised within the Rapid Alert System before and during the election period.

Some examples of measures taken are as follows: Austria raised public awareness, held awareness classes and security briefings, set up a network against disinformation and organised a tabletop exercise regarding the interministerial cooperation in cases of election related disinformation. In order to guarantee proper coordination and preparedness among the different departments involved in the detection, analysis and response to disinformation campaigns, Spain put in place a special coordination plan in the framework of the Standing Committee against disinformation, which was integrated in the national election network for the security of elections. The Plan led to a joint risk analysis report, a protocol for information exchange and periodical reports on the evaluation of threats that were shared among the departments involved. Ireland published a Framework on Online Electoral Process information, Political Advertising and Deceptive AI Content 216 . The Framework was developed in response to concerns and evidence from a range of international bodies and actors including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Affairs and the European Digital Media Observatory regarding the potential for disinformation, deceptive use of artificial intelligence and other online activity to compromise the integrity of electoral processes and undermine democratic values and principles. The Netherlands developed a reactive approach, also based on analysis of media early reports and fact checkers’ reports on possible disinformation about the electoral process. In Portugal, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) has signed a collaboration protocol with ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon, through its MediaLab CIES-ISCTE research project, for the monitoring and screening of political disinformation in the context of the electoral campaign. In Slovenia authorities organised training with public officials on disinformation. There is a task force dedicated to counter disinformation and FIMI. Anti-disinformation campaign under slogan “stop the disinformation, read, think, check” was launched as well as awareness-raising campaign on 20th EU accession anniversary.

Media literacy

To support people navigating the information space around the elections, a specific emphasis was placed on measures aimed at improving societal resilience and preparedness. This included support for digital and media literacy and critical thinking.

On media literacy, it can also be noted that the EU-funded projects (EACEA open call for cross-border media literacy projects) and the Media Literacy Expert Group met to discuss the European elections 222 . The meeting was very successful in mobilizing the media literacy community ahead of the European elections, inform about relevant EU initiatives, as well as exchanging best practices from Member States in preparing for elections.

4.3.Use of AI 

 Introduction

The 2024 elections also brought AI increasingly into focus. Artificial intelligence has the potential to improve the efficiency, precision, and openness of election processes by positively changing voter interaction and the administration of elections. AI-driven solutions, like interactive virtual assistants, can deliver tailored communication, offering up-to-the-minute details about polling sites, candidates’ policies, and how to vote, thus making the voting process easier for the public to navigate. In addition, AI can help optimise the management of electoral data by enabling the precise gathering, storage, and evaluation of large datasets, helping election authorities make better decisions, swiftly recognize patterns, and minimize human error. AI can also improve election security by strengthening cybersecurity defences, spotting irregularities, and uncovering possible fraudulent activity, thereby protecting the integrity of electoral systems 223 . 

However, AI also presents challenges, notably in the context of disinformation and FIMI, and the use of generative AI. When misused, AI-based tools can be used to undermine electoral integrity, erode trust in democratic processes and polarize entire societies. Sometimes these attempts to deceive consist of flooding the information space with an abundance of false and misleading information, all with the aim of hijacking the public debate. Often top politicians and leaders are targeted by information manipulation campaigns.

Observations

In the weeks before the vote, the amount of fact-checked disinformation containing AI-generated content detected by EDMO remained constant, at around 4% of the overall amount of fact-checked disinformation (5% during the months before) 224 . AI was used both as a tool for disinformation and FIMI, and part of the domestic political communication.

Civil society, researchers, and fact-checkers uncovered at least 131 instances of undeclared generative AI content during the election campaign especially from parties at national level (i.e. five different political parties in France, Belgium, and Italy) 225 .

With limited exceptions, highly-manipulative ‘deepfakes’ were not prominent during the 2024 elections. Instead, AI was used to produce ‘shallowfakes’, combining out-of-context captions with images of politicians or events, and ‘cheapfakes’, with rather obvious manipulation of video and image 226 . EDMO points to a case where a deepfake audio was used to target a political leader, demonstrating how easily and cheaply false information can be spread to discredit candidates and undermine the integrity of the entire election process 227 .

A satirical video featuring Chancellor Olaf Scholz was created with deep fake technology by activist group the Centre for Political Beauty (ZPS). In the video, Scholz appears to announce a ban on the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party at the Federal Constitutional Court on the fifth anniversary of the death of Walter Lübcke. The video was part of a wider campaign by ZPS that includes a website collecting "incriminating information" about the AfD and an installation outside the chancellery in Berlin. This has prompted the German government to consider legal action and review its approach to deepfake technology 228 .

In the context of FIMI, AI was used in influence operations from Russia, including Doppelganger 229 . In a report published on May 30, OpenAI, the company that owns ChatGPT, disclosed that its AI tools were exploited by state actors from Russia, China, Iran, and Israel in covert online influence campaigns. However, the campaigns struggled to gain significant traction, according to OpenAI 230 . This marked the first disclosure by a major AI company of its tools being used in FIMI operations, highlighting concerns about AI’s role in online disinformation 231 . 

Another risk AI poses to elections is using generative AI, particularly in large search engines. These systems can discourage users from checking original sources, instead promoting AI-generated responses that may contain errors or biases. This limits access to reliable, fact-checked information, a key component of informed decision-making 232 .

An experiment by Correctiv – an investigative and fact-checking organization part of the EDMO network – revealed that three of the most used chatbots (Google Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, and ChatGPT) fail to provide accurate answers to political questions, especially about the upcoming EU elections. The chatbots either fabricate information, recommend non-existent Telegram channels, or provide incorrect details about candidates. For instance, none of them correctly identified the German front-runners for the EU elections, and in some cases, they even suggested content from far-right sources.

Preparedness and EU legislation

Europe is leading the way in making AI safer and more trustworthy, while ambitiously addressing the risks posed by its misuse. Important new legislative tools in this regard, including the AI Act 233 and the Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising were not yet, however, fully in application for the 2024 elections.

At the same time, providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines (VLOSEs) are already subject to a clear obligation to assess and mitigate systemic risks to electoral processes and civic discourse, including when linked to the spread of manipulated content. In this context, the DSA Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes therefore also recommend mitigation measures linked to generative AI that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs should take. This includes recommendations in the area of watermarking, labelling AI-generated content, but also testing such systems and the input data and sources used to generate content. In view of the elections, the Commission sent requests for information on generative AI risks to six Very Large Online Platforms and two Very Large Online Search Engines 234 .

In addition, the Permanent Taskforce of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, composed of representatives of signatories, the European Regulators' Group for Audiovisual Media Services, EDMO and the EEAS, includes a specific AI subgroup for signatories to reflect on and address the challenges raised by AI in the context of disinformation, including in the context of elections.

To support the identification of AI related issues, the EDMO Task Force was assisted by a pool of AI experts to swiftly detect and expose deceptive or misleading AI-generated content.

The European Cooperation Network on elections also tackled the topic of AI in the context of disinformation in a plenary session on 27 September 2023. Member States highlighted the future of threats emerging in the cyber and information areas and discussed the benefits, threats, and risks of AI. They also discussed the possibility of promoting voter turnout with AI and using machine learning to predict different voter patterns. Additionally, AI can simplify voter registration processes, and AI powered language translation can help reduce language barriers and improve accessibility of elections for voters with disabilities.

In addition, the 2023 Recommendation on elections encouraged political parties to adopt campaign pledges and codes of conduct on election integrity, which should encompass in particular the pledge to refrain from manipulative behaviour, in particular producing, using or disseminating falsified, fabricated, doxed or stolen data or material, including deep fakes generated by AI systems. Political parties should also provide information about the use of AI systems in election campaigns. The Recommendation also led to a joint Code of Conduct for political parties (see Section 4.6.1). The AI Act, whose provisions will apply as of August 2026 235 , aims to ensure trustworthy development and use of AI in the EU. It categorises AI systems by risk levels: minimal risk systems face no obligations, specific transparency risk systems (like chatbots) must disclose their nature, and high-risk systems (like those used in recruitment) must comply with strict requirements. Unacceptable risk systems, such as those manipulating behaviour or enabling social scoring, are banned. The use of generative AI and deep fakes is regulated by the AI Act, including as regards labelling by the content creator, and risk management obligations. 

The Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (most of its provisions will take effect as of 10 October 2025) will ensure that all political advertising is labelled as such and that additional information is provided with the ad or from it (e.g., with a link) about the sponsor, the money used for the ad and its sources, and, where relevant, the linked elections, referendum, legislative or regulatory process, and the use of targeting and ad-delivery techniques, including the use of AI systems in the targeting.

Measures reported by political parties

In the Commission survey for political parties, only a few respondents mentioned that they had refrained from using AI-generated content 236 , labelled it accordingly 237 , or even shared a specific code of conduct for AI and social media platforms like TikTok 238 . Most national respondents did not provide details on their use of such new technologies.

4.4.Data protection

Introduction

The 2024 elections were the second European elections to which the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 239 applied. In 2018, the Commission had published specific guidance 240 on the application of EU data protection law in the electoral context which remained relevant for the 2024 elections 241 . In this context, the national data protection authorities (DPAs) were called on to make full use of their strengthened powers to address possible infringements, in particular those relating to the micro-targeting of voters.

Observations and measures taken by data protection authorities

In the context of the 2024 elections, the European Data Protection Board, composed of Member States’ data protection authorities (DPAs), sent questions by DG Justice and Consumer Protection, inquiring about the DPAs' involvement in national election networks, specific measures taken to ensure compliance with data protection rules, potential infringements identified, and any engagement with social media platforms or other actors, particularly regarding the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence in the electoral context. Fourteen DPAs responded 242 .

They reported varying levels of involvement in election-related activities as enforcers of the GDPR.

While some DPAs were indeed involved in the work of national election networks, other DPAs reported limited to no involvement in that work 243 . 

Various DPAs took proactive measures to address data protection issues and ensure compliance with data protection rules in the electoral process. Belgium’s Data Protection Authority 244  issued recommendations on the provision of copies of voters’ registers to political parties and candidates for the purposes of carrying out electoral advertising activities by mail. It also issued info notes on data processing in the context of electoral communication, and two opinions (no 160/2023, no 61/2024) on relevant draft legislation. Croatia’s Personal Data Protection Agency 245 promoted compliance with data protection rules by issuing recommendations on the processing of personal data during the electoral campaign. In Cyprus, the Commissioner for Personal Data Protection 246 issued instructions to the Ministry of Interior and candidates before the elections and conducted audits on election day to monitor compliance. In France, the CNIL 247 engaged in several meetings with political parties to raise awareness about data protection. It sent letters to top candidates, party leaders and service providers to remind them of their responsibilities and updated its guidelines for political communication. The CNIL also updated its guidelines on political canvassing and examined the impact of AI on electoral processes through a detailed study. The Irish Data Protection Commission provided guidance for campaigners on canvassing and elections. In Luxembourg, the CNDP 248 updated its electoral campaign guidelines and raised awareness about data protection as well as fair and free elections. Malta’s Office of the Information and Data Protection Commissioner 249  published guidance on data protection for political campaigns. In Poland, the Personal Data Protection Office 250 reviewed an amendment to the Election Code and updated its election data protection guide. Other DPAs reported no specific measures to monitor compliance with data protection rules in the context of the 2024 elections 251 .

Several DPAs conducted investigations based on information on suspected non-compliance reported to them and on complaints submitted under Article 77 GDPR 252 .

Most DPAs had limited or no engagement with social media platforms or other actors in this context 253 . In France, no major engagement with social media platforms was reported, though the DPA worked with the Audiovisual and Digital Regulation Authority (Arcom) to ensure that the major online platforms and major search engines comply with relevant obligations. The Irish DPA reported no specific social media engagement related to elections. At the same time, it reported significant ongoing engagement with many of the leading social media and internet platforms as EU Lead Supervisory Authority on a broad range of matters concerning those entities’ compliance with the GDPR. In Spain, there was significant engagement with social media platforms, in particular to prevent potential data misuse and AI-driven targeting practices.

Measures taken by political parties

A survey conducted among national political parties to assess how they ensured compliance with data protection rules in the context of the elections provided only limited insights. A number of national parties have declared their compliance with the GDPR, but they did not provide further specifics in the questionnaire on how they are implementing it in practice 254 . Although detailed reports on data protection measures from national parties were limited, several national parties report that they had adopted comprehensive data protection strategies, employed a dedicated data protection officer for campaign activities, implemented specific technical security measures such as encryption, developed a data delivery process or reviewed data breach incident response plans 255 . One party highlighted their data protection plan, which includes information and consent forms, secure data processing, staff training, and cooperation with data protection authorities 256 . 

4.5.Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience 

Introduction and preparedness at EU level

Voter registration databases, e-voting systems and other information systems used to manage electoral operations such as the counting, auditing, and displaying of election results, and post-election reporting to certify and validate results, could be at risk of cyberattack. The physical security of polling stations and counting places, and facilities, assets and systems for the printing, transportation and storage of ballots and other relevant election materials, such as specifically secured ballot boxes or stamps must also be ensured.

Several networks for cyber and hybrid action have been set up to address these risks (e.g. the NIS Cooperation Group, the Joint Mechanism for Electoral Resilience, the Computer Security Incident Response Team Network, and the EU Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network).

The Commission worked with Member State authorities to manage such risks also in the context of the 2024 elections.

The Commission, with the support of the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and in cooperation with the European Parliament, organised a tabletop exercise on cybersecurity involving the membership of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. The exercise was funded by the Commission through the joint electoral resilience mechanism. It sought to test and support preparedness of Member States against cyberattacks and hybrid threats, including in the framework of information manipulation and disinformation campaigns.

Also following up on the 2023 Recommendation on elections and the tabletop exercise is the update of the Compendium on the Cybersecurity of Election Technology by the Network and Information System (NIS) Cooperation Group supported by the Commission, ECNE and ENISA. It lays out recommendations to Member States, steps to take and useful guidance in managing potential cyber incidents throughout the election processes. Amongst the proposed measures are best practices on information sharing, awareness raising and trainings together with risk management, cybersecurity support for campaigns, parties and candidates, as well e-voting technology.

In addition, as part of the measures announced in the European Democracy Action Plan, the Commission also presented a Compendium of e-voting and other information and communication technology practices. This Compendium was developed in cooperation with Member States in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the Council of Europe. The compendium highlighted the importance of robust measures addressing cyber risks, such as hack-and-leak operations to gain access to voter information and interfere with the electoral process, or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, preventing voters from accessing connected online voting services and websites.

The European Cooperation Network on Elections frequently discussed cybersecurity risks in its works. The Commission provided a mapping on the roles and responsibilities of different networks and bodies supporting the organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the European Parliament, to facilitate cooperation of different authorities and networks in Member States and at EU level, ensuring that authorities and networks were aware of each other and could, where necessary, contact each other in the course of carrying out their tasks.

The NIS Cooperation Group, the Computer Security Incident Response Team Network, and the EU Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network also strengthened their cooperation ahead of the elections. Cyber-preparedness exercises were organised with Member States and European institutions. An inter-institutional Cyber Crisis Task Force, involving Commission services, EEAS, ENISA, Europol and CERT-EU was also set up.

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

Some Member States protect physical election infrastructure by restricting access to certain facilities to accredited personnel, sealing off certain areas from public access, conducting regular assessments and setting up contingency plans for the interruption of voting, increasing security and surveillance of polling stations. For instance, in some cases extra voting locations are set up as back up for physical election-related infrastructure issues. Specific training and cooperation with police are also in focus.

Some Member States identified as critical entities public and private stakeholders, such as telecommunications providers, energy suppliers, cloud services, police authorities, cybersecurity teams, regulators, government IT and cybersecurity organisations. Measures to enhance resilience include multi-entity collaboration, audits, evaluations, and workflow definitions with precise response times. One Member State reported that evaluation, auditing, and testing are periodic, phased, and adapted based on lessons learned from previous elections.

Most Member States reported that they had carried out or updated risk assessments of the infrastructure and took measures to ensure a high level of security. Almost all Member States reported that they had conducted test crisis managements and contingency plans, offered support and training to all relevant stakeholders.

Several Member States reported that they had cooperated with private entities to ensure a high level of cybersecurity 257 , while a majority noted that the authority responsible for cyber security had been involved in their national electoral network. Portugal indicated that creation of a permanent an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) dedicated to elections cybersecurity was being discussed. Ireland reported its collaboration with the European Centre of Excellence of Coutering Hybrid Threats.

Many Member States also made efforts to increase awareness of the online safety of political parties, candidates and elections officials 258 .

Member States also reported on the extent to which they took specific measures described in the revised Compendium on the Cybersecurity of Election Technology and the Compendium of e-voting and other information and communication technology practices. A large majority of Member States reported to have ensured effective testing and auditing (24 out of 25 replying Member States), ensuring that elections officials receive appropriate training (20 Member States), and relying on secure digital identification (16 Member States). Other common measures to protect election-related infrastructure and ensure cyber resilience included using state of the art ICT (15 Member States), including cybersecurity requirements in procurement and outsourcing contracts (14 Member States) or ensuring that no state, region or municipality is in a situation of long-term electoral dependency on a specific private provider (9 Member States).

While not directly related to the elections, it is also relevant to mention Operation Endgame 259 . This operation, coordinated from Europol’s headquarters between 27 and 29 May 2024, targeted droppers including, IcedID, SystemBC, Pikabot, Smokeloader, Bumblebee and Trickbot. The actions focused on disrupting criminal services through arresting High Value Targets, taking down the criminal infrastructures and freezing illegal proceeds. This approach had a global impact on the dropper ecosystem. The malware, whose infrastructure was taken down during the action days, facilitated attacks with ransomware and other malicious software. Following the action days, eight fugitives linked to these criminal activities, wanted by Germany, were added to Europe’s Most Wanted list on 30 May 2024. The individuals are wanted for their involvement in serious cybercrime activities.

This was the largest ever operation against botnets, which play a major role in the deployment of ransomware. The operation, initiated and led by France, Germany and the Netherlands was also supported by Eurojust and involved Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland and Ukraine also supported the operation with different actions, such as arrests, interviewing suspects, searches, and seizures or takedowns of servers and domains. The operation was also supported by a number of private partners at national and international level including Bitdefender, Cryptolaemus, Sekoia, Shadowserver, Team Cymru, Prodaft, Proofpoint, NFIR, Computest, Northwave, Fox-IT, HaveIBeenPwned, Spamhaus, DIVD, abuse.ch and Zscaler.

The survey addressed to European and national political parties reveals that national political parties across Member States have taken different approaches to addressing cybersecurity risks during their campaigns in the 2024 European Parliament elections. These approaches vary in terms of efforts and precautions taken.

Among all national political parties surveyed, about half reported that they had taken cybersecurity measures of some sort. Of these, almost 30% had adopted more advanced practices such as risk assessments, training, and penetration testing.

Some parties took significant steps to secure their digital infrastructure. For example, one party implemented two-factor authentication (2FA), introduced a secure password manager, and conducted a post-election penetration test 260 . The party also received assistance from IT companies and GDPR advisors, encountering no cyber incidents. Another party maintained regular briefings with the national parliament’s IT department and security services and regularly modernized its IT infrastructure. It also migrated their servers to a high-security location before the European Parliament election and optimized its firewall, utilizing external service providers to monitor IT security. It reported no significant cyber incidents either 261 . Another surveyed party also implemented comparably extensive cybersecurity measures including vulnerability analysis, threat assessment, log file monitoring, patch management, regular backups, firewalls, VPNs, cybersecurity training, and prevention strategies such as antivirus software, spam filters, encryption, Cloudflare usage, secure passwords, and SSL/TLS certificates. 262 Another implemented cybersecurity protocols, risk assessments, and provided unspecified training, with no cyber incidents reported 263 . One surveyed party had proactively conducted a comprehensive risk assessment, provided cybersecurity training, implemented secure communication tools, and collaborated with experts for penetration testing 264 . Reportedly, it faced several unsuccessful hacking attempts. IT teams were assigned by one party to prevent cyberattacks and it introduced internal rules for online safety, with no incidents reported 265 . Another party participated in events organized by the national Security and Intelligence Service and maintained contact with the agency during the campaign, though no other specific cybersecurity steps were reported 266 .

In contrast, for or some national parties, including smaller parties, cybersecurity efforts were expressly limited. One party did not report any specific cybersecurity measures but acknowledged general warnings from the national Federal Electoral Authority about hacking risks 267 . Another party expressed limited concern over cybersecurity threats, believing that its exposure to cyberattacks was limited to “state entities and social networks” 268 . Some national parties from different EU countries did not report on cyber measures at all in this questionnaire 269 .

Compared to national political parties, European political parties reported a higher level of cybersecurity preparedness. Among the European political parties surveyed, around 83% implemented advanced cybersecurity measures.

Observations

In the last report on the conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, it was reported that distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the websites of public authorities offering advice about the elections were observed in a number of Member States, but at the same time that detection and recovery were very prompt.

Such attacks continued during the 2024 elections in a few Member States. At the same time, mitigation and contingency measures were in place to prevent impact on the conduct on elections. In Bulgaria, two DDoS attacks against state private cloud infrastructures were neutralised during election days. Czechia experienced three cyber-attacks during elections, although not directed to election infrastructure. In Spain, DDoS against regional parliament webpages were detected. Also, airport websites were concerned. The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service published a report indicating that Russian hacktivists had launched DDoS attacks against websites of political parties and public transport companies in the Netherlands, among other things, in an attempt to make it difficult for Dutch people to vote in the European elections 270 .

On 1 March 2024 a false dispatch was published twice on the Polish Press Agency’s website regarding a "partial mobilization" allegedly announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk. It was quickly established that this was not true, and that the publication was the result of a cyberattack on the servers of the largest state news agency 271 .

This illustrates how much of the malicious cyber activity had minimal impact and emphasized the need for clear and consistent public communications among EU entities and Member States, in order to avoid low impact incidents like DDOS being exploited for propaganda or disinformation purposes.

4.6.Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign

4.6.1.Fair campaigning

Based on this recommendation, on 8 April 2024, all European political parties signed the Code of Conduct for the 2024 European Parliament elections at a ceremony hosted by the Commission.  272 The Code was also signed by a limited number of national political parties.

The Code of Conduct promotes core values such as transparency, fairness, and truthfulness in communication, while actively countering disinformation and AI-driven manipulation. For example, signatories commit to ensuring an ethical and transparent use of campaign tools and technologies, including AI, by avoiding misleading content, such as falsified data, while clearly labelling AI-generated content. The Code also sets ethical standards for both online and offline campaign activities, enhancing public trust by improving cybersecurity and providing better access to campaign information. Parties are encouraged to promote these commitments within their ranks, with the Code available online for public monitoring and accountability.

Measures reported by political parties

European and national political parties reportedly also adopted diverse approaches to integrity and fair campaigning, with varying levels of adherence to the Code of Conduct and other campaign-related pledges.

European political parties have implemented various measures to comply with the Code of Conduct and its campaign standards 273 . Notable good practices include: raising awareness through internal briefings and promoting the code to member and aspiring parties; translating commitments into internal rules, reviewing them with the general assembly, and publishing them in user-friendly formats; organizing post-election reviews and discussions between parties; and being open to mutual discussions and recommendations with other political groups 274 . Three European political parties reported publishing information on their websites about online political advertising, including details on usage, spending amounts, and funding sources 275 . 

At the same time, as indicated in Section 4.3 on Artificial Intelligence above, there were some instances of using non-watermarked AI images going against the commitments made on the basis of the Code.

In a reply to the dedicated survey, one national party confirmed full adherence to the Code of Conduct and introduced additional pledges focused on transparency in financing, equal representation, responsible communication, protection of personal data, and youth engagement 276 . It also conducted post-election reviews, including internal assessments and feedback collection. Another party also explicitly confirmed their adherence to the Code but had not yet conducted a post-election review 277 . Moreover, it signed the Luxembourg Election Treaty, ensuring that the pledge was circulated internally among staff, politicians, and candidates. Certain parties took an even more active role in establishing their ethical guidelines. For instance, one created and monitored a "Commitment to Tolerance" and conducted a post-election review. Another carried out an internal post-election analysis but did not adopt formal pledges 278 . Finally, some parties gave unclear responses regarding their adherence to the Code. Although they did not appear to follow it, one party had their own ethics commission and candidate’s charter, reflecting a proactive stance on integrity and fairness 279 . Moreover, another decided not to follow the Code 280 . Meanwhile, others adhered to its own code of conduct, focusing on “decency and national pride” 281 .

Furthermore, out of almost 60 national parties surveyed, 16 confirmed that they had publicly provided information on their use of political advertising ahead of the 2024 elections to the European parliament (around 32%). This included details, oftentimes in form of a weblink, on the amounts spent on political advertising and the sources of funding used 282 .

Political Capital, one of the main members of EDMO’s Hungarian hub (HDMO), published new research 283  analysing pre-election campaign spending on Meta and Google ads in Hungary. The study points to concerns about political pluralism on Meta and Google’s services due to highly asymmetric spending on political ads in Hungary. The pro-government camp spent EUR 4.3 million on Meta and Google ads (EUR 2.0 million spent by Fidesz and its politicians and EUR 2.3 million spent by third party proxies), while all 14 opposition parties and their proxies spent less than a fifth of that, EUR 839,000.

Measures reported by Member States

For their part, Member States adopted a variety of approaches to support election integrity and fair campaigning in preparation for the elections.

In response to a Commission questionnaire, some Member States reported that they had robust legislative provisions to ensure election integrity and fair campaigning. For example, in Greece, national legislation codifies standards aligned with international guidelines, ensuring compliance by political parties and campaign organizations. Similarly, Italy reported to have several laws governing electoral propaganda, equal media access, and public administration and communication in place. Luxembourg stands out with a gentleman’s agreement signed by several political parties to conduct fair campaigns. In another example, Croatia also highlights adherence to integrity pledges and data protection regulations for digital campaigning, reinforcing democratic principles. Voluntary ethical codes are also observed in some Member States. For instance, Slovakia reported that a voluntary ethical code for electoral campaigning is available online, offering guidance to participants despite its lack of association with official authorities.

4.6.2.Funding of the election campaign

The integrity of elections is dependent on many factors, including transparency in party financing, which helps to maintain trust, prevent undue influence, and ensure accountability, particularly regarding donations from third countries or undisclosed sources.

Situation in Member States

The rules and frameworks on political funding are rather diverse among the Member States. Several Member States have adopted or are considering measures to increase transparency and oversight for political party financing, also with a view to supporting democratic accountability and prevent foreign interference 284 . For instance, Germany has adopted new political party financing rules, regulating party sponsoring and hidden party campaign finance by other persons. In Denmark, a new law on public financing of political parties has entered into force, and a proposal for increased transparency for private financing of political parties is pending. In Slovenia, new rules should lead to more frequent audits of the largest political parties and of a larger proportion of state funding. In Czechia, a reform strengthened the office supervising political parties financing, with further reforms to close gaps on the funding of presidential candidates and eligible donors being contemplated.

Funding from third countries

Some Member States have reported that they allow donations from natural persons from third countries, with limits in certain cases. Others allow funding from third countries for both natural and legal persons, but under specific conditions. Several others such as the Netherlands, Romania and Poland have introduced or are considering funding’s bans from third countries altogether.

For instance, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg allow political parties and candidates to be funded by way of donations by individuals from third countries.

In Denmark, funding from third countries is allowed, except for funding from physical and legal persons that are on a public prohibition list. 285 .

Austria bans donations from entities from third countries exceeding 500 EUR. Cyprus also prohibits donations to a party exceeding 5 000 EUR from third countries.

Other Member States, such as Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy or Spain, have introduced specific exceptions related to the donors 286 and the type of support 287 .

Political parties

Rules applying to European political parties and their affiliated foundations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 1141/2014, which is currently under revision, in particular to clarify the funding provisions (see Section 5.2).

In the survey for national political parties, it can be observed that the issue of funding from third countries was approached with caution, with rather few parties conducting thorough risk assessments to prevent inappropriate or unwanted donations 288 .

Some parties reported strict compliance with national rules, including a ban on foreign donations above a certain threshold and the requirement to report all donations exceeding €150 to the national Court of Audit 289 . Several other parties also reported conducting risk assessments regarding third country donations but did not identify significant threats 290 . However, many other national parties reported that they had taken no action in this area at all 291 .

4.7.Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives

Introduction

Politicians and political candidates can face undue pressures and threats to their security, which has negative spill-over effect on inclusive democratic representation. Ensuring their safety emerged as a topic of discussion during the 2024 elections.

Findings

In their replies to the Commission survey, several European (about 67%) and national (about 36%) political parties 292  reported that they were aware of incidents of harassment and violence, both online and offline, with women candidates and minorities being more frequently targeted, proportionately. Around 41% of the national parties surveyed had put in place measures to prevent or combat online violence or threats against candidates. Examples of some measures against violence include social media monitoring, content moderation, specific guidelines, police reporting, as well as education of candidates on preventative measures. 

The European Green Party reported accounts of physical violence towards their politicians in Germany during the election period, as well as digital violence, such as smear campaigns or attempts to deplatform 293 . They also reported that violence, physical and digital, towards politicians is increasing, especially towards women candidates and ethnic minorities. The Party of European Socialists reported that one of their candidates for the European Parliament, was physically attacked while campaigning in Dresden, and just days later, a female Senator was also attacked. The European Free Alliance reported that their members and candidates frequently receive harassment, insults and occasionally violence, usually based on their belonging to a national minority and their advocacy of minority interests. They also reported harassing comments online including sexist or ageist comments directed towards one of their female candidates.

At national level, online violence against candidates was also reported 294 , including notably against women and ethnic minorities, as well as instances of physical threats and violence 295 . For instance, an Austrian party reported a smear campaign against a female leading candidate which spread across social media and e-mail channels. In Belgium, a leading female candidate’s car was damaged by unknown perpetrators. A national Czech party reported that candidates were frequently targeted by online abuse via social media, with women being proportionately more affected. In Finland, a national party reported 3-4 instances of physical threats against female candidates; with frequent but underreported online violence as well. A Swedish party reported having a ‘security action plan’ in place. In Slovenia, a top candidate was physically attacked by a man after a local event, leaving the candidate slightly injured. 

Reports by electoral observers 296  also highlight alarming incidents of violence, harassment, and intimidation in several Member States, creating a hostile environment for those who seek public office. For example: 

·On 12 May 2024, in Ireland, a Councillor and her husband were assaulted by an individual probing her immigration stance during their campaign activities in West Dublin.

·On 17 May 2024, a Fine Gael candidate faced harassment and racist abuse while posting election posters, forcing him to remove them.

·On 20 May 2024 in Lisbon, a confrontation involving the Ergue-te party was documented on video and corroborated by ODIHR SEAM interlocutors.

·On 8 June 2024, the Prime Minister of Denmark was victim of an attack.

Reports by electoral observers also note that political polarisation, mis- and disinformation, and specific incidents of harassment and violence contributed to an ‘antagonistic environment’ for politicians and candidates, media outlets, and journalists in Member States, most significantly targeting women, LGBTI, and immigrant communities 297 . Election-Watch.EU further notices that “acts of violence against politicians in some Member States were a pronounced sign of a growing societal polarisation, compounded by fears of a wider political rift and concerns about foreign interference” 298 .

The Global Information Index also observed 299 that female politicians in Europe face a disproportionate amount of gendered disinformation, next to harassment and hate, particularly during elections. These attacks often involve misogynistic, racist, and xenophobic narratives aimed at undermining women's credibility and discouraging their participation in politics. Prominent figures like Ursula von der Leyen are frequent targets, with narratives questioning their competence and legitimacy.

The OSCE/ODIHR election assessment also highlights the violence against women in the campaign to be an issue and recommended that “Violence against women in the campaign should be recognised by political parties and institutions as a barrier to women’s active political participation. Consideration should be given to introducing or strengthening existing proactive and preventive measures against such actions” 300 .

5.European dimension and the exercise of EU electoral rights

5.1.The European dimension

The outcome of elections to the European Parliament has direct implications for citizens. It has an impact for instance on how policies are shaped and what laws are passed at European level and implemented across the EU. Citizens need to know what is at stake at European level if they are to make informed choices. However, the political debate and campaign for the 2024 elections in the Member States remained dominated by national and local issues, with the link to the European level being less well discussed and understood.

The European Parliament actively promoted the European dimension of the elections by organising an election night, providing the media with real-time updates on turnout and composition of the Parliament.

Promoting the European dimension of the elections strengthens the link between citizens and the European institutions and therefore the democratic legitimacy of European decision-making.

Regulation (EU) 1141/2014 establishes a specific legal, financial and regulatory system for European political parties and European political foundations. In 2021 the Commission proposed a recast of this Regulation with amendments to facilitate European political parties’ interactions with their national member parties and across borders, increase transparency, in particular in relation to political advertisement and donations, cut excessive administrative burden and increase the financial viability of European political parties and foundations. This proposal remains under negotiation.

Member States apply a range of timeframes for the announcement of candidates and campaigning timelines for the European Parliament elections. For example, in Germany, Portugal, and Sweden, campaigning can begin more than nine months before election day, offering extended periods for political engagement. In Finland, campaigning starts between six and nine months before the elections, while in countries such as Belgium, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia, campaigns typically begin three to six months ahead. In a majority of countries 301 , the announcement of candidates and the start of campaigning was only permitted within three months of the elections.

Several Member States have taken steps to enhance transparency regarding affiliations between national and European political parties. For instance, Italy facilitates public access to this information through its Central Directorate for Electoral Services, publishing detailed instructions referencing EU rules and ensuring that affiliations are indicated on ballots. Similarly, Lithuania highlights these affiliations on ballots and encourages public awareness efforts. Affiliations were indicated on ballots in four Member States 302 , while in seven Member States 303 such information is disseminated by the relevant authorities on institutional websites.

No measures were taken by any Member States to facilitate the conduct of cross-border campaigns by actors at Union level (such as European political parties) or multi-national political parties in the context of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. Four Member States 304 underlined that such measures were not of competence of national authorities, who should maintain a neutral role and respect the principle of autonomy of political parties. In Slovenia and Estonia, during electoral campaigns, only national parties and candidates can participate to the campaign; support (including financial one) from foreign persons or entities, including European political parties, is not allowed.

In response to the Commission survey, many national political parties across all political spectrums reported that they had publicly declared their European political party affiliations before the start of the European electoral campaign.

One national political party not only proactively declared its affiliation with a European political party but also prominently displayed their logo on their website and materials, while keeping members informed through multiple channels about the EU elections 305 . In addition, another national political party boosted members' knowledge through numerous training sessions and launched a dedicated campaign to emphasize the European dimension of the elections 306 . 

Many surveyed parties publicly acknowledged their European political affiliation particularly through social media, email, brochures, and educational sessions to inform and engage members 307 . Meanwhile, another national political party published the European Political Party’s Manifesto on its website, and parties conducted ongoing training and online sessions for members, and even showcased a Ukrainian artist and a foreign EU Minister in their campaign to increase visibility of the European dimension 308 . Another national party held election congresses to educate its members, and prioritized EU issues in its manifesto 309 .

However, not all the national parties surveyed chose to emphasize the European dimension. Several parties did not use European party logos on their materials, and it occurred that some parties did not disclose any European political party affiliation at all 310 . 

Campaign obstacles were reported across various Member States, primarily affecting smaller, less established parties. These challenges often impacted minority-focused or niche groups that struggle with media access and visibility compared to larger mainstream parties. Some smaller national parties reported media access issues or encountered "media incorrectness" 311 . Other parties reportedly faced delays in social network ad approvals, while others reported media blockades and allegedly falsified statistics by specific media outlets in the run-up to the elections 312 . One national party faced obstacles by not being given time to present on media broadcasting 313 . Additionally, small parties noted that it was particularly difficult to campaign due to lack of media attention and exclusion from electoral debates 314 . One national party noted that they had been prohibited from campaigning in a third language, namely Russian 315 and another reported that their candidates were even subjected to plainclothes police checks 316 .

5.2.Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law

5.2.1.Introduction 

The elections to the European Parliament are unique. The Member States, each with their national campaigns, national lists and distinctive rules and traditions, contribute to a collective result, with elected MEPs representing all EU citizens.

It is the competence and the responsibility of the Member States to lay down the specific conditions for the conduct of elections, subject to the respect of certain basic principles, such as those laid down in Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union, and their international commitments. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the competent national administrative and judicial authorities to ensure compliance with applicable law and relevant international standards.

Certain common principles and procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act and the rules enabling mobile EU citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the European Parliament in their country of residence.

5.2.2.Electoral Act

As regards the elections to the European Parliament, national electoral procedures must comply with the principles set out in the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (1976 Electoral Act)  317 , annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976. Under Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act, elections must be by direct universal suffrage and shall be free and secret. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 8 of the 1976 Electoral Act, subject to the provisions of the 1976 Electoral Act, the electoral procedure is to be governed in each Member State by its national provisions. These national provisions, which may if appropriate take account of the specific situation in the Member States, must not affect the essentially proportional nature of the voting system.

Under the special legislative procedure envisaged by Article 223 of the TFEU, it is up to the European Parliament to draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary for the election of its members by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States. The Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which would act based on a majority of its component Members, would lay down the necessary provisions. These provisions would enter into force following their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The Commission does not have a formal role in this process.

In 2015, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the reform of the EU’s electoral law, suggesting certain targeted amendments to enhance the democratic dimension of the European elections and the legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making process. On 7 June 2018, the Council approved a draft decision amending the Electoral Act (Council Decision 2018/994). Ratification of this decision has advanced but is not yet concluded.

On 3 May 2022 the European Parliament adopted its proposal for a new Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, aiming at repealing the existing Electoral Act 318 . It proposes a comprehensive reform and extension of the electoral rules laid down at EU level for the organisation of the elections to the European Parliament, including a European constituency to allow for the election of an additional 28 MEPs from EU-wide lists (in addition to the national lists). The proposal also includes provisions on common campaigning rules, administrative deadlines, a single Election Day on 9 May, common voting and candidacy periods, compulsory access to postal voting and support for other methods, provisions to strengthen the participation of citizens with disabilities and to promote gender equality in the candidates standing for elections, and other measures. Discussions on this proposal did not progress in the Council.

5.2.3.Electoral rights

EU electoral rights include the rights provided to all citizens under the Treaties to participate in the democratic life of the Union, and to elect the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.

They also include the rights provided to EU citizens which exercise their right to move freely to another Member State, to vote and stand in the European elections in their Member State of residence. These rights are enshrined in the Treaties and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and are elaborated in the 1976 Electoral Act, Directive 93/109/EC and the relevant case law of the Court of Justice. 

The 2021 package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections, adopted by the Commission, included two legislative proposals to recast the Directives on the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections by EU citizens residing in a Member State other than their country of origin 319 . These initiatives aim to update, clarify and strengthen the existing rules in order to address the difficulties faced by mobile EU citizens, and to ensure broad and inclusive participation in elections to the European Parliament, support mobile EU citizens in the exercise of their rights and protect the integrity of elections.