16.12.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 306/56

1.1

There is now a renewed interest in nuclear energy, for economic reasons and as a result of the need to diversify energy supplies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

1.2

An extremely high level of safety and exemplary transparency are prerequisites for the existence and development of nuclear power.

1.3

In this context, the Committee welcomes the directive, judging that it has a considerable technical and strategic interest for the safety of the population, those working in the nuclear industry and the environment, whilst giving the Member States the freedom to choose whether or not to use this type of energy.

1.4

The EESC appreciates that nuclear energy will also be developed outside the borders of the European Union, sometimes in countries where the technological and risk management culture is less advanced than in the Member States. In view of this, the Committee would like the EU to play a proactive role and to have the capability to make proposals on nuclear safety issues beyond its borders, as it does in relation to the ‘climate package’.

1.5

Nuclear safety must be ‘a worldwide public good’, since a nuclear accident can have an impact on populations and the environment at a great distance from the state where it occurs. In this regard, by making compliance with the fundamental safety principles approved by all IAEA states mandatory, which is the objective of the directive, the EU will put itself in the position of being able to export its ‘safety model’ beyond its borders.

1.6

The Committee considers that the focus on obliging Member States to establish totally independent national safety authorities, making licence holders fully responsible and ensuring that information on these issues is transparent, is the best approach, and therefore wishes this aspect of the directive to be retained and for the approach to remain based on a very high level of responsibility.

1.7

The EESC is particularly interested in the question of building, maintaining and developing skills in the Member States, particularly those which have little or no experience with nuclear energy. These Member States must address this question without delay, in particular by developing the necessary training opportunities. In addition, the EESC suggests that consideration be given to European certification of competence in the field of nuclear power, and that training relates to the technical management as well as to the health aspects of nuclear accidents.

1.8

The Committee stresses that safety is also a question of industrial culture and behaviour; it is not solely a matter of drawing up regulations and restrictions.

2.1

The nuclear industry developed considerably in the EU following the fuel crisis in 1973 and the need to harmonise safety practices soon became apparent.

2.2

The Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 on the technological problems of nuclear safety (1) gave the Commission a role as a catalyst in initiatives taken at international level in the field of nuclear safety.

2.3

A second Council Resolution was adopted in 1992 (2), in which the Council reaffirmed the intentions of the 1975 Resolution and invited Member States to continue and intensify their efforts towards the harmonisation of safety issues. In its ruling of 10 December 2002 in Case C-29/99, the European Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's remit to legislate in the field of nuclear safety.

2.4

On 30 January 2003, under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission proposed a directive on the safety of nuclear facilities (3), on which the Committee issued an opinion (4).

2.5

In the absence of a majority, the Council did not adopt this directive, but the consultation process continued with the creation of the Council Working Party on Nuclear Safety in 2004.

2.6

The Commission now intends to give fresh impetus and consideration to the implementation of a Community framework for nuclear safety.

3.1

The general objective of the proposal is to achieve, maintain and continuously improve nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the regulatory bodies. Its scope of application is the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned. The right of each Member State to decide to use nuclear energy or not is recognised and fully respected.

3.2

The approach of the directive on nuclear safety is to introduce Community regulations incorporating a set of principles already included in the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety, that has been accepted by all the Member States and to supplement them with additional safety requirements for new nuclear power reactors.

3.3

The aim is therefore to render binding the internationally endorsed nuclear safety principles (IAEA, CSN, WENRA…), which are currently applied on a voluntary basis.

4.1

Energy from nuclear fission currently represents around 14,6 % of the primary energy consumed in the European Union and 31 % of the electricity generated. For the Member States which have recourse to it (fifteen (5) of the twenty-seven) it is the energy source with the least fluctuation in prices and one of the lowest production rates of CO2. However, the use of nuclear power is controversial even in some countries which use it and still more so in the Member States which have not made it a part of their energy mix, for fear, in particular, of the radio-active pollution that could result from possible safety breaches and the management of nuclear waste.

4.2

In accordance with the perspectives contained in the Committee's opinion on The issues involved in using nuclear power in electricity generation  (6), there is now a renewed interest in nuclear energy, both for economic reasons and due to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (policies on combating climate change). Within the EU, some Member States which had decided to abandon nuclear power are now reconsidering their decisions.

4.3

If the revival of nuclear power is to be accepted by the public, the highest possible level of safety must be guaranteed.

4.4

This ‘worldwide’ renewal of interest raises the issue of nuclear safety in new ways, in particular in relation to organisation and monitoring. Nuclear safety must be ‘a worldwide public good’ and therefore, the response also needs to be ‘worldwide’ since the risks of nuclear power are not confined within the borders of the states using this technology.

4.5

The European Union can play a pivotal role in moving towards this objective, in view of the use of nuclear power within its territory and its industrial know-how. The European Union can set an example, as it does in the area of climate change, starting by taking steps to unify its own regulations and safety organisations internally and by identifying and overcoming the obstacles to doing so.

4.6

4.6.1

The Committee agrees with the Commission's new in approach, which, in order to obtain a wider consensus, makes the Member States and their national regulators fully responsible. There are differences between the Member States in terms of history, organisation and practice and an approach which focuses on obliging them to respect the common rules drawn up within the IAEA, establish genuinely independent regulators and make licence holders fully responsible and allow them no possibility of delegating their responsibility, is certainly the one which all the various parties currently find the most acceptable and which is best able to guarantee the safety of nuclear installations.

4.6.2

The Committee also feels that the directive represents a step forward in terms of improving safety. There will be a need for sustained and ongoing reflection in order to understand and take account of the changes, additions or modifications that may need to be made to reflect developments in contexts, techniques and organisational approaches.

4.6.3

The Committee welcomes the fact that, both in the main provisions and in Article 5 of the draft directive, the text under consideration focuses specifically on the need for transparent and reliable information for the population, in connection with the decision-making process. To that effect, the Aarhus Convention (7) on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters could be a reference for civil society players.

4.6.4

Moving beyond this and the substance of the draft directive itself, it will be necessary to take account of and internalise the fact that safety is not solely a matter of rigorous addition of technical and industrial regulations. It is also to do with a culture, i.e. a collection of practices which make safety a central concern and, above and beyond the requisite compliance with procedures, also incite continual exploration into ways of increasing safety and identifying both internal and external factors which might undermine it. This culture cannot be built in a day and must be shared by industrialists, operators and regulators as much as by political decision-makers, if it is to be fully effective.

4.7

Moves to improve safety may run up against limitations in relation to electronuclear technologies, stemming from a lack of experience and know-how and from a poorly adapted scientific and technological environment. A major effort will therefore have to be made in relation to training (8). Intra-European exchanges of theoretical and practical knowledge could be organised and support measures put in place to respond more effectively, particularly in relation to the requirements on training and human resources, set out in Articles 4, 7 and 9. European certification for training, qualifications and skills in nuclear power and nuclear safety must be developed.

4.8

The European Nuclear Energy Forum initiated by the Commission and supported by the March 2007 European Council brings together high level representatives from public authorities, Members of the European Parliament, representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, and representatives of electricity producers, the nuclear industry, consumers, finance, and civil society. It provides a framework for expertise and discussion on the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy. In January 2009 it issued a number of proposals and comments (9) on the draft directive and the Committee believes that, in view of their quality and their importance in terms of acceptance from citizens and their representatives, these should be drawn on.

5.3.1

Definition (1) ‘nuclear installation’: the Committee suggests that the term ‘radioactive waste’ be added after ‘spent fuel storage facility’ to read, ‘spent fuel and radioactive waste storage facility’.

5.3.2

Definition (8) ‘regulatory body’: the Committee urges the Commission to adhere strictly to the definition set out in the IAEA Safety Glossary published in 2007: ‘An authority or a system of authorities designated by the government of a State as having legal authority for conducting the regulatory process, including issuing authorisations, and thereby regulating nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.’

5.3.3

Definition (10) ‘new power reactors’: the Committee would prefer a reference to installations built following the implementation of the directive. Developments that occur at the beginning of the construction process can be taken into account by licence holders. On the other hand, post-construction changes will be more difficult to make if the installation was not designed and built to do so. The existence of certain specific cases of power stations whose construction has been halted and needs to be resumed leads the Committee to suggest the following wording: ‘ “new power reactors”, nuclear reactors whose construction is authorised (or whose construction is resumed after a break of at least 5 years) following the directive’s entry into force’.

5.4.1

The Committee suggests that this article should begin by defining the framework, which is the general aspect of safety, and then the responsibility for enacting it. It also proposes that reference to the withdrawal of authorisation in the event of breaches of the safety rules be made in this article, since it is part of the general framework and strengthens the authority of the regulatory body. Consequently, there would no longer be a need for a specific article on this topic (Article 8). The Committee draws attention to the fact that the Commission has the power to check how the directive has been transposed and can if necessary launch an infringement proceeding against any Member State which has not complied with the principles of the directive.

5.4.2

Article 3 would then be worded as follows:

5.5.1

The Committee attaches great importance to the independence of the regulatory body and would prefer the following wording: ‘Member States shall guarantee that the regulatory body, whose sole objective is safety, is effectively independent of all bodies whose task is to promote or operate nuclear installations. It must be free from any influence that may affect its regulatory duties.’ The reference to ‘bodies that justify societal benefits of nuclear power’ adds nothing to the idea of promoting nuclear installations and, if this reference is maintained, bodies that campaign against the use of nuclear power would also need to be mentioned.

6.1

The objective of the Appendix to the directive is:

6.2

It incorporates six principles:

6.2.1

Member States shall ensure that responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the licence;

6.2.2

Responsibility and management for safety must be established at the highest levels of the enterprise;

6.2.3

Safety assessments shall be carried out from the beginning of the construction of a nuclear installation and throughout its lifetime;

6.2.4

Member States shall ensure that nuclear installations are optimised to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved;

6.2.5

Member States, without exception, shall ensure that all practical efforts are made to prevent and mitigate nuclear incidents and accidents;

6.2.6

Member States, without exception, shall ensure that arrangements are made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear accidents in accordance with Directive 96/29.