EUR-Lex Access to European Union law

Back to EUR-Lex homepage

This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website

Document 02020D1999-20211213

Consolidated text: Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/1999/2021-12-13

02020D1999 — EN — 13.12.2021 — 004.002


This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document

►B

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/1999

of 7 December 2020

concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses

(OJ L 410I 7.12.2020, p. 13)

Amended by:

 

 

Official Journal

  No

page

date

►M1

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/372 of 2 March 2021

  L 71I

6

2.3.2021

►M2

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/481 of 22 March 2021

  L 99I

25

22.3.2021

►M3

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/2160 of 6 December 2021

  L 436

40

7.12.2021

►M4

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021

  L 445I

17

13.12.2021


Corrected by:

►C1

Corrigendum, OJ L 035, 17.2.2022, p.  21 (2021/2160)




▼B

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/1999

of 7 December 2020

concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses



Article 1

1.  

This Decision establishes a framework for targeted restrictive measures to address serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide. It applies to:

(a) 

genocide;

(b) 

crimes against humanity;

(c) 

the following serious human rights violations or abuses:

(i) 

torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

(ii) 

slavery,

(iii) 

extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings,

(iv) 

enforced disappearance of persons,

(v) 

arbitrary arrests or detentions;

(d) 

other human rights violations or abuses, including but not limited to the following, in so far as those violations or abuses are widespread, systematic or are otherwise of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU:

(i) 

trafficking in human beings, as well as abuses of human rights by migrant smugglers as referred to in this Article,

(ii) 

sexual and gender-based violence,

(iii) 

violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,

(iv) 

violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression,

(v) 

violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief.

2.  

For the purpose of applying paragraph 1, regard should be had to customary international law and widely accepted instruments of international law, such as:

(a) 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(b) 

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

(c) 

the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;

(d) 

the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

(e) 

the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

(f) 

the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;

(g) 

the Convention on the Rights of the Child;

(h) 

the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances;

(i) 

the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

(j) 

the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;

(k) 

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

(l) 

the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

3.  

For the purposes of this Decision, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies may include:

(a) 

State actors;

(b) 

other actors exercising effective control or authority over a territory;

(c) 

other non-State actors.

4.  

When establishing or amending the list set out in the Annex with regard to other non-State actors under point (c) of paragraph 3, the Council shall take into account in particular the following specific elements:

(a) 

the objectives of the common foreign and security policy as set out in Article 21 TEU; and

(b) 

the gravity and/or impact of the abuses.

Article 2

1.  

Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:

(a) 

natural persons who are responsible for acts set out in Article 1(1);

(b) 

natural persons who provide financial, technical, or material support for, or are otherwise involved in, acts set out in Article 1(1), including by planning, directing, ordering, assisting, preparing, facilitating, or encouraging such acts;

(c) 

natural persons who are associated with the persons covered by points (a) and (b);

as listed in the Annex.

2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3.  

Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation under international law, namely:

(a) 

as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;

(b) 

as a host country of an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;

(c) 

under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or

(d) 

pursuant to the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran Pact) concluded by the Holy See (Vatican City State) and Italy.

4.  
Paragraph 3 shall be considered to apply also in cases where a Member State is host country of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
5.  
The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.
6.  
Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings or meetings promoted or hosted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of restrictive measures, including the ending of serious human rights violations and abuses and the furthering of human rights.
7.  
Member States may also grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process.
8.  
A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 6 or 7 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council members raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
9.  
Where, pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 6, 7 or 8, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through its territory of persons listed in the Annex, the authorisation shall be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons directly concerned thereby.

Article 3

1.  

All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by:

(a) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, who are responsible for acts set out in Article 1(1);

(b) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, who provide financial, technical, or material support for or are otherwise involved in acts set out in Article 1(1), including by planning, directing, ordering, assisting, preparing, facilitating, or encouraging such acts;

(c) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, who are associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies covered by points (a) and (b);

as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2.  
No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.
3.  

By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

(a) 

necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for food, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) 

intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) 

intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

(d) 

necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or

(e) 

to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph.

4.  

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

(a) 

the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 was listed in the Annex, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

(b) 

the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

(c) 

the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in the Annex; and

(d) 

recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph.

5.  
Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in the Annex from making a payment due under a contract or agreement entered into, or an obligation that arose, prior to the date on which such natural or legal person, entity or body was listed therein, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, received by a natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1.
6.  

Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

(a) 

interest or other earnings on those accounts;

(b) 

payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2; or

(c) 

payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the Union or enforceable in the Member State concerned, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.

Article 4

1.  
By way of derogation from Article 3(1) and (2), the competent authorities in the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations.
2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this Article within four weeks of the authorisation.

Article 5

1.  
The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or from the High Representative, shall establish and amend the list set out in the Annex.
2.  
The Council shall communicate the decisions referred to in paragraph 1, including the grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing that natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3.  
Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly.

Article 6

1.  
The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Articles 2 and 3.
2.  
The Annex shall contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include: names; place and date of registration; registration number; and place of business.

Article 7

1.  

The Council and the High Representative shall process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Decision, in particular:

(a) 

as regards the Council, for preparing and making amendments to the Annex;

(b) 

as regards the High Representative, for preparing amendments to the Annex.

2.  
The Council and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, and to criminal convictions or security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of the Annex.
3.  
For the purposes of this Decision, the Council and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of point (8) of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 ), in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Article 8

No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond or of guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a) 

designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex;

(b) 

any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

Article 9

In order to maximise the impact of the measures set out in this Decision, the Union shall encourage third States to adopt restrictive measures similar to those provided for in this Decision.

▼M3

Article 10

This Decision shall apply until 8 December 2023 and shall be kept under constant review. The measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 shall apply as regards the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies listed in the Annex until 8 December 2022.

▼B

Article 11

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.




ANNEX

List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 2 and 3

A. 

Natural persons

▼M1



 

►M2  Names (Transliteration into Latin script) ◄

►M2  Names ◄

Identifying information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

1.

Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOV

Aлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ

Position(s): Director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)

DOB: 27.1.1964

POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Alexander Kalashnikov has been the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) since 8 October 2019. In that position, he oversees all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.

In the case of Alexei Navalny, while Mr Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020-January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction had been found arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport. Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny.

2 March 2021

2.

Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKIN

Алексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИН

Position(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation

DOB: 27.8.1953

POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the ‘Committee’) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.

Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating their members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.

2 March 2021

3.

Igor Viktorovich KRASNOV

Игорь Викторович КРАСНОВ

Position(s): Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation

DOB: 24.12.1975

POB: Arkhangelsk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Igor Krasnov has been Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation since 22 January 2020, and is the former Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. In his position as Prosecutor General, he supervises the Prosecutor’s Offices in the Russian Federation, the Special Prosecutor’s Offices and the Military Prosecutor’s Office. In his capacity as Prosecutor General, he is responsible for serious human rights violations, including the arbitrary detentions of protesters, and for widespread and systematic repression of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and freedom of opinion and expression.

Ahead of the 23 January 2021 protests, the Prosecutor General’s Office warned that participants would be held responsible. Moreover, the Prosecutor General’s Office demanded that the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor) restrict access to opposition websites and social network accounts that contained information on planned gatherings of Alexei Navalny’s supporters. On 29 January 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office once again demanded that Roskomnadzor restrict access to opposition websites and social network accounts, this time ahead of the pro-Navalny protests on 30 and 31 January 2021. Warnings were sent to internet companies (Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, Google, Mail.ru Group). The Prosecutor General’s Office also announced that those taking part in the demonstrations would be prosecuted.

The Prosecutor General’s Office supported the request by the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) to convert the suspended sentence imposed on Alexei Navalny in a case of alleged fraud to a prison sentence. Despite the fact that his conviction in that case had been found arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018, Alexei Navalny was arrested upon his arrival at Moscow airport on 17 January 2021.

2 March 2021

▼M3

4.

Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOV

Виктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВ

Position(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)

DOB: 27.1.1954

POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and therefore Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.

2.3.2021

 

 

 

 

Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors.

 

5.

ZHU Hailun

朱海仑 (Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Member of the 13th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (in session from 2018 to 2023) representing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the National People’s Congress Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee (since 19 March 2018)

Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR (2016 to 2019). Former Deputy Head of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the XUAR, a regional legislative body (2019 to 5 February 2021 but still active until at least March 2021). Member of the 13th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (in session from 2018 to 2023) representing the XUAR. Member of the National People’s Congress Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee since 19 March 2018.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

DOB: January 1958

POB: Lianshui, Jiangsu (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (2016 to 2019), Zhu Hailun was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. Zhu Hailun has been described as the ‘architect’ of this programme. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

As Deputy Head of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the XUAR (2019 to 5 February 2021), Zhu Hailun continued to exercise a decisive influence in the XUAR where the large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities continues.

 

▼M2

6.

WANG Junzheng

王君正 (Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian Group

DOB: May 1963

POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since April 2020, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC since May 2020. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (February 2019 to September 2020). Wang Junzheng also holds other senior posts in the XPCC.

The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In this position, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

 

 

 

 

 

He is also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.

As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (February 2019 to September 2020), Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.

 

7.

WANG Mingshan

王明山 (Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR

DOB: January 1964

POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR since September 2020. Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR since September 2020, Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

 

 

 

 

 

As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform’ (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed ‘potentially threatening’ to be sent to detention camps.

In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.

 

8.

CHEN Mingguo

陈明国

(Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government

DOB: October 1966

POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform’ (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed ‘potentially threatening’ to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.

 

▼M3

9.

JONG Kyong-thaek (a.k.a. CHO’NG Kyo’ng-t’aek)

정경택 (Korean spelling)

Position(s): Minister of State Security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

DOB: between 1.1.1961 and 31.12.1963

Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Gender: male

Jong Kyong-thaek is the Minister of State Security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2017. The Ministry of State Security of the DPRK is one of the leading institutions in charge of implementing the repressive security policies of the DPRK, with a focus on identifying and suppressing political dissent, the inflow of ‘subversive’ information from abroad, and any other conduct considered a serious political threat to the political system and its leadership.

As Head of the Ministry of State Security, Jong Kyong-thaek is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread forced labour and sexual violence against women.

22.3.2021

10.

RI Yong Gil (a.k.a. RI Yong Gi, RI Yo’ng-kil, YI Yo’ng-kil)

리영길 (Korean spelling)

Position(s): Minister of National Defence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

DOB: 1955

Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Gender: male

Ri Yong Gil is the Minister of National Defence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He was the Minister of Social Security from January 2021 until June or July 2021. He was Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) between 2018 and January 2021.

As Minister of National Defence, Ri Yong Gil is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, including by members of the Military Security Command and other KPA units.

The Ministry of Social Security of the DPRK (formerly known as the Ministry of People’s Security or Ministry of Public Security) and the Military Security Command are leading institutions in charge of implementing the repressive security policies of the DPRK, including interrogation and punishment of people ‘illegally’ fleeing the DPRK. In particular, the Ministry of Social Security is in charge of running prison camps and short-term labour detention centres through its Correctional Bureau, where prisoners/detainees are subject to deliberate starvation and other inhuman treatment.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As former Head of the Ministry of Social Security, Ri Yong Gil is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread forced labour and sexual violence against women.

As former Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, Ri Yong Gil is also responsible for the widespread serious human rights violations committed by the KPA.

 

▼M3 —————

▼M3

12.

Abderrahim AL-KANI (a.k.a. Abdul-Rahim AL-KANI, Abd-al-Rahim AL-KANI)

►C1  عبد الرحيم الكاني (Arabic spelling) ◄

Position(s): member of the Kaniyat Militia

DOB: 7.9.1997

Nationality: Libyan

Passport number: PH3854LY

ID number: 119970331820

Gender: male

Abderrahim Al-Kani is a key member of the Kaniyat Militia and brother of the Head of the Kaniyat Militia, Mohammed Khalifa Al-Khani (deceased in July 2021). The Kaniyat Militia exercised control of the Libyan town of Tarhuna between 2015 and June 2020.

Abderrahim Al-Kani is in charge of internal security for the Kaniyat Militia. In that capacity, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Libya, in particular extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of persons between 2015 and June 2020 in Tarhuna.

Abderrahim Al-Kani and the Kaniyat Militia fled Tarhuna in early June 2020 to eastern Libya. After that, several mass graves attributed to the Kaniyat Militia were discovered in Tarhuna.

22.3.2021

13.

Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV)

Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling)

Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic

DOB: 1.12.1980 or 1.12.1984

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018.

In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.

According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees.

22.3.2021

14.

Abuzaid (Abuzayed) Dzhandarovich VISMURADOV

Абузайд Джандарович ВИСМУРАДОВ (Russian spelling)

Position(s): Former Commander of the Special Rapid-Response Unit (SOBR) Team ‘Terek’, Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic, unofficial bodyguard of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov

DOB: 24.12.1975

Former Commander of the Special Rapid-Response Unit (SOBR) Team ‘Terek’. Since 23 March 2020, Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic. Unofficial bodyguard of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov.

Abuzaid Vismuradov was the Commander of the SOBR detachment ‘Terek’ from March 2012 until March 2020. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

POB: Akhmat-Yurt/Khosi-Yurt, former Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), now Chechen Republic (Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Abuzaid Vismuradov and the ‘Terek’ unit previously under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial and arbitrary killings and executions.

According to numerous witnesses, Abuzaid Vismuradov personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees. He is a close associate of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Head of the Chechen Republic, who has been conducting a campaign of repression against his political opponents for many years.

 

▼M2

15.

Gabriel Moses LOKUJO

-

Position(s): Major General of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF)

Nationality: South Sudanese

Gender: male

Major General of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF).

Gabriel Moses Lokujo is responsible for serious human rights violation in South Sudan, in particular extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

In May 2020, three officers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) were abducted and executed on the orders of Major General Lokujo.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

Major General Lokujo defected in September 2020 from the SPLA-IO to the SSPDF and is responsible for the ensuing clashes in and around the Moroto Training Center in southern Central Equatoria. As a consequence, several deaths and injuries were reported on both sides during the last quarter of 2020, and civilians were also displaced, especially in the Kajo-Keji area of Central Equatoria State. Major General Lokujo’s forces remained in the area where several further clashes have been reported and the safety and security of the civilian communities continue to be in jeopardy.

 

▼M4

16.

Dimitriy (Dimitry, Dmitri, Dmitry) Valerievich UTKIN

Дмитрий Валерьевич Уткин

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Founder and commander of the Wagner Group

Rank: Lieutenant colonel (reserve)

Callsign: Vagner, Wagner

Wagner Group ID: M-0209

DOB: 1.6.1970 or 11.6.1970

POB: Asbest, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Address: Pskov, Russian Federation

Gender: male

Dimitriy Utkin, a former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer, is the founder of the Wagner Group and responsible for coordinating and planning operations for the deployment of Wagner Group mercenaries across various countries.

In his commanding position within the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the group, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

This includes the torturing to death of a Syrian deserter by four members of the Wagner Group in June 2017 in the governorate of Homs, Syria. According to a former member of the Wagner Group, Dimitriy Utkin personally ordered the torturing to death of the deserter as well as the filming of the act.

13.12.2021

17.

Stanislav Evgenievitch DYCHKO

Станислав Евгеньевич Дычко

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Mercenary of the Wagner Group

DOB: 1990

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Stanislav Dychko, a former employee of the Stavropol police, is a mercenary of the Wagner Group.

Alongside three other mercenaries of the Wagner Group, he took part in the torturing to death of a Syrian deserter in June 2017 in the governorate of Homs, Syria.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses in Syria.

13.12.2021

18.

Valery (Valeriy) Nikolaevich ZAKHAROV

Валерий Николаевич Захаров

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Security counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR)

Wagner Group ID: M-5658

DOB: 12.1.1970

POB: Leningrad, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Valery Zakharov, a former member of the Russian state security (FSB), is the security counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR). He is a key figure in the Wagner Group’s command structure and keeps close links with the Russian authorities.

Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR, which include extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

This includes the murder of three Russian journalists in 2018, the security of whom was under the responsibility of Valery Zakharov.

13.12.2021

▼B

B. 

Legal persons, entities and bodies

▼M2



 

Name (Transliteration into Latin script)

Name

Identifying information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

1.

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Security Bureau

新疆生产建设兵团公安局

(Chinese spelling)

Address: 106 Guangming Road, Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China

Telephone: +86 991 598 8114

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Public Security Bureau is in charge of implementing all policies of the XPCC relating to security matters, including the management of detention centres. The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As the organisation in charge of security policies within the XPCC, the XPCC Public Security Bureau is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Muslim ethnic minorities.

As part of the aforementioned programme, the XPCC uses Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields. As the organisation in charge of security policies within the XPCC, the XPCC Public Security Bureau is responsible for the systematic use of forced labour.

 

2.

Central Public Prosecutor’s Office (a.k.a. Office of the Prosecutor of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK))

조선민주주의인민공화국 중앙검찰소 (Korean spelling)

 

The Central Public Prosecutor’s Office is an institution which oversees all criminal proceedings in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including investigation, interrogation, pre-trial detention and trial.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

The Central Public Prosecutor’s Office is used to prosecute and punish persons for political wrongdoing in fundamentally unfair trials. It also carries institutional responsibility for serious human rights violations in ordinary prisons and interrogation detention centres by failing to enforce the rights of pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. In close cooperation with the Ministries of State Security and of Social Security, it bears responsibility for and provides legitimacy to serious human rights violations committed by the DPRK security apparatus, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearances of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions.

 

3.

Kaniyat Militia (f.k.a. 7th Brigade, Tarhuna 7th Brigade, Tarhuna Brigade) (a.k.a. 9th Brigade, Al-Kani Militia, Al-Kaniyat, Kani Brigade, Kaniat, Kaniyat, Kanyat)

مليشيا كانيات (Arabic spelling)

 

The Kaniyat Militia is a Libyan armed militia, which exercised control in the Libyan town of Tarhuna between 2015 and June 2020. Mass graves attributed to the Kaniyat Militia were discovered in Tarhuna after the militia fled to eastern Libya in June 2020. The Kaniyat Militia is responsible for serious human rights abuses, in particular extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances of persons.

22.3.2021

4.

National Security Office (a.k.a. National Security Agency) of the Government of Eritrea

-

Headed by Major General Abraha Kassa

The National Security Office (a.k.a. National Security Agency) of the Government of Eritrea is headed by Major General Abraha Kassa and is under the supervision of the Office of the President. The National Security Office is organised into six offices, each of which is divided into three sections responsible for intelligence, arrests and interrogations, respectively. The National Security Office is responsible for serious human rights violations in Eritrea, in particular arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances of persons and torture committed by its agents.

22.3.2021

▼M4

5.

Wagner Group a.k.a. Vagner Group

Группа Вагнера

(Russian spelling)

 

The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. It is led by Dimitriy Utkin and financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. Through the setting-up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.

The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

13.12.2021



( 1 ) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

Top