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Document 62015CN0281

Case C-281/15: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht München (Germany) lodged on 11 June 2015 — Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch

OJ C 294, 7.9.2015, p. 29–30 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

7.9.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 294/29


Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht München (Germany) lodged on 11 June 2015 — Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch

(Case C-281/15)

(2015/C 294/36)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht München

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Soha Sahyouni

Defendant: Raja Mamisch

Questions referred

1.

Does the scope of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 (1) of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (OJ 2010 L 343, p. 10), as defined in Article 1 of that regulation, also include ‘private divorce’, in this instance one pronounced before a religious court in Syria on the basis of sharia?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

(a)

In the case of an examination as to whether a divorce is eligible for recognition in national territory, must Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 also be applied?

(b)

If the answer to Question 2(a) is in the affirmative:

(1)

Is account to be taken in the abstract of a comparison showing that, while the law of the forum grants access to divorce to the other spouse too, that divorce is, on account of the other spouse’s sex, subject to different procedural and substantive conditions than access for the first spouse,

or

(2)

Does the validity of that rule depend on whether the application of the foreign law, which is discriminatory in the abstract, also discriminates in the particular case in question?

(c)

If the answer to Question (b)(2) is in the affirmative:

Does the fact that the spouse discriminated against consents to the divorce — including by duly accepting compensation — itself constitute a ground for not applying that rule?


(1)  OJ 2010 L 343, p. 10.


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