1.

These requests for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) in Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17 concern the interpretation of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95/EU ( 2 ) and its validity in the light of Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 78(1) TFEU.

2.

In Case C‑391/16, the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court, Czech Republic) questions the Court as to the validity of Article 14(4) and (6) of that directive in the light of both those provisions and Article 6(3) TEU.

3.

The requests have been made in proceedings concerning the validity of decisions whereby the national asylum authorities refused to grant refugee status and subsidiary protection status to X (Case C‑77/17) under the Belgian legislation transposing Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/95 and withdrew the refugee status previously granted to X (Case C‑78/17) and M (Case C‑391/16) under the provisions of national law (Belgian and Czech respectively) transposing Article 14(4) of that directive.

4.

Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95, in essence, allows a Member State to revoke the status granted to a refugee and to refuse to grant refugee status where the refugee in question represents a danger to the security or the community of that Member State. Article 14(6) sets out the minimum rights to which the refugee must nevertheless be entitled for as long as he remains in that Member State.

5.

By the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring courts are, in essence, seeking to ascertain whether those provisions disregard the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ( 3 ) (‘the Geneva Convention’) and are therefore invalid in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU, which state that the common asylum policy must comply with that convention.

6.

Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention defines a ‘refugee’ as any person who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence …, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’. ( 4 )

7.

Article 1C of that convention provides:

‘This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:

8.

Article 1F of that convention provides:

‘The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

9.

Article 33 of that convention provides:

‘1.   No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2.   The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.’

10.

Under Article 42(1) of the Geneva Convention, ‘at the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36-46 inclusive’.

11.

Article 2 of Directive 2011/95 is worded as follows:

‘For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply:

…

…’

12.

Article 11 of that directive, entitled ‘Cessation’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘A third-country national or a stateless person shall cease to be a refugee if he or she:

13.

Article 12 of that directive, entitled ‘Exclusion’, provides, in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘A third-country national or a stateless person is excluded from being a refugee where there are serious reasons for considering that:

14.

Under Article 13 of the same directive, ‘Member States shall grant refugee status to a third-country national or a stateless person who qualifies as a refugee in accordance with Chapters II and III’.

15.

Article 14 of Directive 2011/95 provides:

‘1.   Concerning applications for international protection filed after the entry into force of Directive 2004/83/EC, [ ( 5 )] Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of a third-country national or a stateless person granted by a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body if he or she has ceased to be a refugee in accordance with Article 11.

…

3.   Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of a third-country national or a stateless person if, after he or she has been granted refugee status, it is established by the Member State concerned that:

4.   Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the status granted to a refugee by a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, when:

5.   In situations described in paragraph 4, Member States may decide not to grant status to a refugee, where such a decision has not yet been taken.

6.   Persons to whom paragraphs 4 or 5 apply are entitled to rights set out in or similar to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention in so far as they are present in the Member State.’

16.

Article 20(1) of that directive, which is in Chapter VII, entitled ‘Content of international protection’, provides that ‘this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the rights laid down in the Geneva Convention’.

17.

In accordance with Article 21 of that directive:

‘1.   Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations.

2.   Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when:

3.   Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the residence permit of (or to) a refugee to whom paragraph 2 applies.’

18.

Article 48/3(1) of the loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (Law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals) (‘the Belgian Law on foreign nationals’), ( 6 ) in the version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings in Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, provides that ‘refugee status shall be granted to foreign nationals who satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 1 of the [Geneva Convention]’.

19.

Article 48/4(1) of that Law sets out the conditions under which subsidiary protection status is to be granted.

20.

According to the second paragraph of Article 52/4 of that Law, ‘the Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons) [(‘the CGRA’)] may refuse to grant refugee status where the foreign national constitutes a danger to the community, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious offence, or where there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to national security. In such cases [the CGRA] shall give an opinion as to whether a removal order is compatible with Articles 48/3 and 48/4.’

21.

Article 55/3/1 of that law provides:

‘§ 1.   [The CGRA] may withdraw refugee status where a foreign national, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious offence, represents a danger to the community or where there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to national security.

…

§ 3.   Where he withdraws refugee status pursuant to paragraph 1 …, [the CGRA] shall give an opinion, in his decision, as to whether a removal order is compatible with Articles 48/3 and 48/4.’

22.

The grounds referred to in Article 55/3/1(1) of the Belgian Law on foreign nationals also entail, under Article 55/4(2) of that Law, exclusion from subsidiary protection status.

23.

Article 2(6) of the zákon č. 325/1999 Sb., o azylu (Law No 325/1999 on asylum) (‘the Czech Law on asylum’), in the version in force at the time of the relevant facts in Case C‑391/16, defines a refugee for the purposes of that Law (azylant) as ‘a foreign national who has been granted the right to asylum under the present Law for the duration of the validity of the decision granting the right to asylum’.

24.

Under Article 12(b) of that Law, the right to asylum is to be granted to a foreign national if it is established that he has legitimate reasons to fear persecution on account of one of the reasons set out in Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention.

25.

In accordance with Article 17(1)(i) of that Law, the right to asylum is to be revoked ‘if there are legitimate grounds to consider that the refugee represents a danger to the security of the State’. Article 17(1)(j) of that same Law provides that the right to asylum is to be revoked ‘if the refugee has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and therefore represents a danger to the security of the State’. In accordance with Article 15a of the Czech Law on asylum, those grounds make it impossible for subsidiary protection to be granted.

26.

According to the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court), an azylant is entitled to qualitatively greater advantages than a ‘mere’ refugee who satisfies the conditions set out in Article 1A of the Geneva Convention. A refugee whose status is revoked ceases to be an azylant and, therefore, ceases to benefit from those advantages.

27.

X has stated that he is an Ivorian national and a member of the Bété ethnic group. He arrived in Belgium in July 2003, when he was 12 years old. X was accompanying his father who, at that time, was close to the former President, Laurent Gbagbo, and a diplomat in the Embassy of Côte d’Ivoire in Brussels.

28.

In 2010 X was sentenced by the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of First Instance, Belgium) to 30 months’ imprisonment for intentional assault and battery, possession of a bladed weapon without proper reason and possession of a prohibited weapon. In 2011 the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of Appeal, Belgium) sentenced him to 4 years’ imprisonment for rape of a minor aged over 14 years and under 16 years.

29.

In 2013 X made a first application for asylum, which he subsequently withdrew. In 2015 he made a second application for asylum, in support of which he submitted that he feared persecution on account of the fact that his father and members of his family were closely linked to the former Ivorian regime and the former President, Laurent Gbagbo.

30.

By decision of 19 August 2016, the CGRA refused to grant him refugee status, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 52/4 of the Belgian Law on foreign nationals. The CGRA considered that, in the light of the particularly serious nature of the offences he had committed and as they were repeat offences, X constituted a danger to the community for the purposes of that provision. For the same reasons, the CGRA excluded X from subsidiary protection under Article 55/4(2) of that Law. Moreover, the CGRA issued an opinion under Article 52/4 of that Law, in accordance with which, in the light of his fears of persecution, X could not be refouled to Côte d’Ivoire since such a measure would be incompatible with Articles 48/3 and 48/4 of the same Law.

31.

X brought an action against that decision before the referring court. That court notes that the second paragraph of Article 52/4 of the Belgian Law on foreign nationals transposes Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/95 into Belgian law. It asks whether those provisions are valid in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU.

32.

That court emphasises, in essence, that Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/95 stipulates, as a ground for refusing to grant refugee status, the danger to the security or the community of a Member State. However, that ground is not provided for in the grounds for exclusion listed exhaustively in Article 1F of the Geneva Convention or in any other provision of that convention. Article 14(5) of that directive establishes, as grounds for refusal, the situations referred to in Articles 32 and 33 of that convention, although those articles do not govern the determination of refugee status but rather the expulsion of refugees. The question therefore arises as to whether, contrary to the Geneva Convention, Article 14(5) of that directive introduces a new form of exclusion from refugee status which is not provided for in that convention.

33.

The referring court notes that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a particularly critical opinion with respect to Article 14(4) to (6) of Directive 2004/83 ( 7 ) (which was succeeded by Directive 2011/95). The relevant passage of that opinion is worded as follows: ( 8 )

‘Article 14(4) of [Directive 2004/83] runs the risk of introducing substantive modifications to the exclusion clauses of [the Geneva Convention], by adding the provision of Article 33(2) of [that convention] (exceptions to the non-refoulement principle) as a basis for exclusion from refugee status. Under [that convention], the exclusion clauses and the exception to the non-refoulement principle serve different purposes. The rationale of Article 1F which exhaustively enumerates the grounds for exclusion based on the conduct of the applicant is twofold. Firstly, certain acts are so grave that they render their perpetrators undeserving of international protection. Secondly, the refugee framework should not stand in the way of serious criminals facing justice. By contrast, Article 33(2) deals with the treatment of refugees and defines the circumstances under which they could nonetheless be refouled. It aims at protecting the safety of the country of refuge or of the community. The provision hinges on the assessment that the refugee in question is a danger to the national security of the country or, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, poses a danger to the community. Article 33(2) was not, however, conceived as a ground for terminating refugee status … Assimilating the exceptions to the non-refoulement principle permitted under Article 33(2) to the exclusion clauses of Article 1 F would therefore be incompatible with [the Geneva Convention]. Moreover, it may lead to a wrong interpretation of both … provisions [of that convention].

“Status granted to a refugee” is therefore understood to refer to the asylum (“status”) granted by the State rather than refugee status in the sense of Article 1A (2) of [the Geneva Convention] … States are therefore nonetheless obliged to grant the rights of [that convention] which do not require lawful residence and which do not foresee exceptions for as long as the refugee remains within the jurisdiction of the State concerned.’

34.

In those circumstances, the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

35.

According to statements by X, he is a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and was born between 1986 and 1990. In 1997 he was abducted from his mother, taken to the Kokolo military camp (Congo) and, subsequently, trained in Goma (Congo), where he was drugged, mistreated and sent to participate in military operations. In 2000 X joined his father in Belgium, where, in 2006, he made an application for asylum. By decision of 21 February 2007, the CGRA recognised him as a refugee.

36.

In 2010 X was sentenced by the Cour d’assises de Bruxelles (Brussels Assize Court, Belgium) to 25 years’ imprisonment for robbery offences in which a deliberate homicide was committed. X had also committed a number of offences of robbery and assault in Belgium before he was recognised as a refugee.

37.

By decision of 4 May 2016, the CGRA withdrew his refugee status, pursuant to Article 55/3/1 of the Belgian Law on foreign nationals. The CGRA considered that, in the light of the particularly serious nature of the offences recorded by the Cour d’assises de Bruxelles (Brussels Assize Court) and his criminal past, X constituted a danger to the community for the purposes of that provision — which transposes Article 14(4) of Directive 2011/95. Moreover, the CGRA issued an opinion which stated that the removal of X was compatible with Articles 48/3 and 48/4 of that Law in so far as the fears of persecution on the ground that he had deserted the Congolese army that he had raised in 2007 were no longer relevant.

38.

X brought an action against that decision before the referring court. For the same reasons as those set out in Case C‑77/17, that court asks whether Article 14(4) of Directive 2011/95 is valid in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU.

39.

In those circumstances, the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

40.

According to statements made by M, he was born in Grozny in Chechnya and fought alongside the former Chechen President during the first Chechen war. After that war, he left the army and did not fight in the second Chechen war. M has stated that he feared both the Russians and the supporters of Ramzan Kadyrov and that the latter had tried to kill him and had put him in a ‘filtration camp’ where he was mutilated and beaten. Many members of his family have been killed.

41.

Having considered that those fears were well founded, by decision of 21 April 2006, the Ministerstvo vnitra (Ministry of the Interior, Czech Republic) granted M the right to asylum.

42.

In 2004 M was found guilty of aggravated robbery and was given a custodial sentence of 3 years by a judgment of the Městský soud v Brně (Brno City Court, Czech Republic). Following his conditional release, M committed aggravated robbery and extortion offences, which were considered to be particularly dangerous repeat offences. In 2007 that court gave M a custodial sentence of 9 years for those offences, to be served in a high security detention centre.

43.

In the light of those circumstances, by decision of 29 April 2014, the Ministry of the Interior held that M had been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and represented a danger to the security of the State and its citizens. On that basis, in accordance with Article 17(1)(j) of the Czech Law on asylum, that authority revoked M’s right to asylum and, under Article 15a of that Law, considered that he was not eligible for subsidiary protection.

44.

M brought an action against that decision before the Městský soud v Praze (Prague City Court, Czech Republic). In his application, M submitted, in particular, that Article 17(1)(i) and (j) of the Czech Law on asylum — which transposes Article 14(4) of Directive 2011/95 — infringed the Czech Republic’s international commitments. According to M, this was because that provision introduced grounds for the revocation of international protection which were not stipulated in the exhaustive list of grounds set out in Article 1C of the Geneva Convention. Article 42(1) of that convention does not allow reservations to be made to that provision.

45.

Since that action was dismissed, M lodged an appeal on a point of law before the referring court.

46.

In that context, that court asks, inter alia, whether Article 14(4) and (6) of Directive 2011/95 is in line with the Geneva Convention, since a failure to comply with that convention would render those provisions invalid in the light of Article 18 of the Charter, Article 78(1) TFEU and the general principles of EU law enshrined in Article 6(3) TEU.

47.

In particular, the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) refers to a document in which the UNHCR commented on the European Commission’s proposal which led to the adoption of Directive 2011/95. ( 9 ) In that document, in particular, the UNHCR reiterated the doubts it had expressed as to the compatibility of Article 14(4) to (6) of Directive 2004/83 with Article 1F of the Geneva Convention. ( 10 ) The referring court notes that those doubts are shared by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ( 11 ) the International Association of Refugee Law Judges ( 12 ) and the Ombudsman of the Czech Republic.

48.

However, that court notes that the validity of Article 14(4) and (6) of Directive 2011/95 is also the subject of opinions to the contrary. Those opinions are based on the view that the objective of that directive is to ensure higher standards of protection in relation to the grounds for granting international protection and the content of that protection, in order to ensure the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and respect for the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). Article 14(4) and (6) of that directive is said to confer on persons falling within its scope greater protection than that under the Geneva Convention. Under Article 33(2) of that convention, those persons could be refouled to a country where they would be at risk of persecution. After having left the country of asylum, they are no longer entitled to the benefits of that convention. By contrast, Article 14(4) of Directive 2011/95, read in conjunction with Article 14(6) thereof, does not allow the persons concerned to be refouled or to be denied the minimum standard of rights provided for in the Geneva Convention.

49.

In that context, the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Is Article 14(4) and (6) of [Directive 2011/95] invalid on the grounds that it infringes Article 18 of [the Charter], Article 78(1) [TFEU] and the general principles of EU law under Article 6(3) [TEU]?’

50.

By decision of 17 March 2017, the President of the Court ordered that Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17 be joined for the purposes of the written procedure, the oral procedure and the judgment.

51.

In those cases, the applicants in the main proceedings, the Belgian, Czech, German, French, Hungarian and United Kingdom Governments and the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission lodged written observations before the Court.

52.

In Case C‑391/16, the Czech, Belgian, French, Netherlands and United Kingdom Governments and the Parliament, the Council and the Commission lodged written observations before the Court.

53.

By decision of the President of the Court of 17 January 2018, Cases C‑77/17, C‑78/17 and C‑391/16 were joined for the purposes of the oral procedure and the judgment.

54.

X (in Case C‑77/17), X (in Case C‑78/17), M, the Belgian, Czech and United Kingdom Governments, and the Parliament, the Council and the Commission participated at the hearing on 6 March 2018.

55.

The powers to revoke and to refuse to grant refugee status provided for in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 may be exercised when there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present, or when he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State.

56.

These circumstances correspond to those in which the exception to the principle of non-refoulement set out in Article 21(2) of Directive 2011/95 ( 13 ) applies, the wording of which, in essence, reproduces that of Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention. ( 14 ) Under those provisions, when such circumstances arise, Member States may derogate from the principle that a refugee may not be removed to territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

57.

However, as specified in Article 21(2) of that directive, Member States are authorised to implement that option only ‘where not prohibited by [their] international obligations’. Developments in the field of human rights protection since the Geneva Convention was adopted mean that the obligations of the Member States under EU law and international law now largely offset the exception to the principle of non-refoulement.

58.

In that regard, Article 19(2) of the Charter provides that ‘no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Like Article 4 of the Charter, which prohibits torture and the infliction of such punishment or treatment, ( 15 ) no derogations may be made to that provision.

59.

As is apparent from the explanations relating to the Charter, ( 16 ) Article 19(2) was inserted into the Charter for the purposes of incorporating the case-law developed by the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) concerning the prohibition, which is absolute in nature, of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR, to which Article 4 of the Charter corresponds. ( 17 ) According to the settled case-law of the ECtHR, Article 3 of the ECHR precludes, without any possibility of derogation, Contracting States from removing, expelling or extraditing a foreign national if there are substantial grounds for believing that he faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment prohibited by that provision in the country of destination. ( 18 )

60.

That prohibition is also derived from the international obligations of the Member States under the International Covenant on Civil Rights and Political Rights ( 19 ) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ( 20 ) adopted under the auspices of the United Nations.

61.

It follows from the foregoing that, where the refoulement of a refugee poses a serious risk that he may be subject to the death penalty or treatment prohibited by Article 4 of the Charter, Article 3 of the ECHR and the other international obligations mentioned in point 60 above, the power to derogate from the principle of non-refoulement laid down in Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention and Article 21(2) of Directive 2011/95 now represents only a theoretical possibility for Member States as its practical implementation is now prohibited in the name of the protection of fundamental rights. ( 21 )

62.

As has been highlighted by the Czech, German, Netherlands and United Kingdom Governments, and by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 is specifically intended to govern the situation of refugees who, despite the fact that they fall under one of the situations covered by the exception to the principle of non-refoulement, are not refouled on the ground, in particular, that their refoulement would infringe the obligations incumbent on the Member States under the Charter, the ECHR and other instruments of international law. Where they use the options provided for in those provisions, the Member States are therefore required, under Article 14(6), to ensure that those refugees are entitled to the rights enshrined in certain provisions of the Geneva Convention.

63.

Article 18 of the Charter provides that ‘the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention’. Under Article 78(1) TFEU, the common policy on asylum ‘must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention’.

64.

Those provisions of primary law, by means of which the authors of the Treaties sought to require that the EU institutions, and the Member States when they implement EU law, act in full compliance with the Geneva Convention, reflect the specific status of that convention in EU law. Although, unlike its Member States, the European Union is not bound by that convention vis-à-vis third States which are party to it, ( 22 ) the EU institutions must respect that convention under EU law. ( 23 )

65.

Likewise, recitals 4, 23 and 24 of Directive 2011/95 state that the Geneva Convention provides the ‘cornerstone’ of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees and that the provisions of that directive have been adopted to guide the competent authorities of the Member States in the application of that convention on the basis of common concepts and criteria. Recital 3 of that directive adds that, drawing on the conclusions of the Tampere European Council, the EU legislature intended to ensure that the European asylum system, which that directive helps to define, is based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, a number of provisions of Directive 2011/95 refer to provisions of that convention ( 24 ) or reproduce the content thereof. ( 25 )

66.

In those circumstances, the Court has repeatedly held that the provisions of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted in the light of the general scheme and purpose of that directive, and in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention and the other relevant treaties referred to in Article 78(1) TFEU. As is apparent from recital 16 thereof, that directive must also be interpreted in a manner consistent with the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter. ( 26 )

67.

Furthermore, according to settled case-law, an EU measure must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity and in conformity with primary law as a whole. ( 27 ) It follows from this principle of interpretation, applied in conjunction with the principle set out in point 66 above, that the provisions of Directive 2011/95 must, as far as possible, be read in such a manner that they respect the Geneva Convention and, therefore, comply with Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU. It is only if such an interpretation in conformity with primary law is not possible that the Court would be able to find that a provision of that directive is invalid in the light of those provisions of primary law.

68.

Where the Court is called upon to interpret a provision of secondary law or to examine the validity of that provision in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU, it falls to it, as was emphasised by the Parliament at the hearing, to determine whether that provision of secondary law offers refugees a level of protection that is at least equivalent to that accorded to them by the Geneva Convention.

69.

In that context, in the performance of its duties under Article 267 TFEU, the Court is inevitably required at the outset to determine the content of the requirements inherent in complying with that convention. Such a determination may require it to carry out assessments which go beyond a mere overview of the wording of the provisions of the Geneva Convention and therefore lead to that convention being interpreted indirectly. That conclusion does not in any way call into question the fact that the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret that convention directly. ( 28 )

70.

It is from that perspective that the Court was called upon, in the judgments in Bolbol ( 29 ) and Abed El Karem El Kott and Others, ( 30 ) to interpret Article 1D of the Geneva Convention — to which Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95 expressly refers — in order to interpret that provision of secondary law under Article 267 TFEU. In the light of that reference, the Court could not, after all, perform that task without determining at the outset the requirements arising from Article 1D of that convention.

71.

To me, this reasoning implies that, whenever the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation or the validity of a provision of secondary law involves clarifying the requirements of the Geneva Convention, the Court may, if need be, interpret that convention for the purposes of providing such clarification. ( 31 )

72.

From that perspective, the examination of the questions referred by the national courts will include, within the limits of what is necessary, such interpretations of the Geneva Convention. ( 32 ) In accordance with the principles set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ( 33 ) those interpretations will be in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Geneva Convention in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The UNHCR’s interpretative notes will be given special attention in that regard. Although they are not binding on the Contracting States, they are points of interpretation which have a particular ‘persuasive … force’. ( 34 )

73.

In the present case, I consider, for the reasons set out below, that Article 14(4) to (6) of Directive 2011/95 lends itself to an interpretation which supports the conclusion that it complies with Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU.

74.

By the first and second questions raised in Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17 and by the question referred in Case C‑391/16, the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) and the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) seek, in essence, to ascertain whether Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 infringes Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU, ( 35 ) on the ground that it introduces grounds for cessation and exclusion that are not provided for in Articles 1C and 1F of the Geneva Convention — the content of which is reproduced in Articles 11 and 12 of that directive. As is apparent from the orders for reference, the doubts that those courts have in that regard are mainly based on the concerns expressed by the UNHCR regarding the compatibility of those provisions with the Geneva Convention. ( 36 )

75.

I propose that those questions be answered in the negative, in so far as the application by a Member State of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95, unlike the application of a ground for cessation or exclusion, does not have the effect of depriving the individual concerned of his or her status as a refugee. The significance of that distinction lies in the fact that retaining that status means that that individual not only has the right to protection by the UNHCR ( 37 ) and any other State party to the Geneva Convention if he or she leaves that Member State, but is also, for as long as he or she remains in that Member State, entitled to the rights that that convention guarantees for all refugees, irrespective of the legality of their residence (I will come back to this). ( 38 )

76.

As regards Article 14(4) of Directive 2011/95, this conclusion follows from its very wording. As the German Government has submitted, the use of the terms ‘status granted to a refugee’ (emphasis added) indicates that the application of that provision is without prejudice to the person concerned being a refugee. Moreover, although the French version of Article 14(5) uses the expression ‘statut de réfugié’ (refugee status), most of the other language versions use wording which corresponds to ‘not to grant status to a refugee’. ( 39 )

77.

According to settled case-law, where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part. ( 40 ) In the present case, a systematic and teleological interpretation of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 leads me to consider that the application of those provisions does not amount to the cessation of or the exclusion from being a refugee.

78.

In the first place, it is apparent from the general scheme of that directive that the conditions for being a refugee, on the one hand, and the grant or withdrawal of refugee status, on the other, are two distinct concepts.

79.

As stated in recital 21 of Directive 2011/95, a person is a refugee simply where he qualifies as such, irrespective of any recognition by a Member State. The conditions to be satisfied form the subject matter of Chapter III of that directive, entitled ‘Qualification for being a refugee’. They correspond to those set out in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.

80.

Chapter III includes Articles 11 and 12 of Directive 2011/95, concerning cessation and exclusion, the content of which reproduces Articles 1C and 1F of the Geneva Convention. Those provisions lay down the situations in which a third-country national or a stateless person is not entitled to be a refugee and, consequently, is excluded from the scope of the international protection under that directive and that convention. ( 41 )

81.

Those scenarios do not cover situations, such as those at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, in which a refugee constitutes a danger to the community of the country of refuge because he has committed a particularly serious non-political crime in that country. ( 42 ) The grounds for exclusion were introduced not with the aim of protecting the security or the community of the country of refuge from the present danger that a refugee may pose, but with the aim of maintaining the integrity of the system for the international protection of refugees and of preventing the benefit of that protection from enabling those who have committed certain serious crimes to escape criminal liability. ( 43 )

82.

Those situations, however, fall within the scope of the exception to the principle of non-refoulement and Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95. That provision is in a separate chapter, namely Chapter IV of that directive, entitled ‘Refugee status’.

83.

The distinction between being a refugee and the status granted to a refugee is highlighted still further by Article 14(1) and (3) of Directive 2011/95. Those provisions lay down the obligation to revoke the refugee status granted to persons who are not, or are no longer, refugees, in particular in the case of one of the grounds for cessation set out in Article 11 of that directive or where those persons are or should have been excluded from being refugees in accordance with Article 12 thereof. The cessation of or the exclusion from being a refugee and the resulting revocation of refugee status cannot, therefore, be reduced to a single concept.

84.

In the second place, attainment of the objectives of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 also presupposes that, as long as a person qualifies as a refugee, he shall continue to be a refugee and this will not be affected by the revocation of the status granted to him or by the refusal to grant such status.

85.

The grounds for cessation of and exclusion from being a refugee are listed exhaustively in Articles 1C to 1F of the Geneva Convention ( 44 ) — provisions in respect of which the Contracting States are not authorised to make reservations under Article 42(1) of that convention. Therefore, the introduction of additional grounds for cessation or exclusion in Directive 2011/95 would have undermined the objective of that directive, which is to ensure the full implementation of that convention.

86.

In that connection, it is emblematic that Article 17 of Directive 2011/95 allows a third-country national or a stateless person to be ‘excluded’ from being eligible for subsidiary protection for the same reasons as those set out in Article 14(4) and (5) of that directive. Since subsidiary protection does not fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention, the EU legislature was free to determine the circle of beneficiaries in the directive on the basis of independent criteria. However, the legislature opted for a different approach with regard to refugees in order to ensure that that directive is compatible with the Geneva Convention. ( 45 )

87.

While the foregoing considerations indicate that Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 is not comparable to the grounds for cessation of and exclusion from being a refugee, they do not fully clarify the scope and the actual effects of those provisions. This issue is, in essence, the subject of the third, fourth and fifth questions raised in Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17.

88.

By its third, fourth and fifth questions, the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) asks whether, in the event that the Court answers the first questions raised in Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17 as I have recommended above, Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 should then be interpreted as introducing grounds for withdrawing and refusing refugee status that are not provided for in the Geneva Convention and, accordingly, are invalid (questions 3 and 4), or whether those provisions should be interpreted differently to make it possible to ensure that they comply with primary EU law (question 5). It is also necessary to examine these questions in order to give a decision on the question referred by the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court).

89.

With a view to answering those questions, I consider it necessary to examine further the meaning to be ascribed to the terms ‘status granted to a refugee’ and to grant ‘status to a refugee’ contained in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 respectively. ( 46 ) If the ‘status’ which may be revoked or refused under those provisions is not equivalent to that of being a refugee, what is its true meaning?

90.

Article 2(e) of Directive 2011/95, which has no corresponding provision in the Geneva Convention, defines ‘refugee status’ as ‘the recognition by a Member State … as a refugee’. Read in the light of recital 21 of that directive, those terms appear to designate the — declaratory — act whereby a Member State recognises that an applicant for asylum is a refugee, since that act occurs after a procedure to verify whether that applicant qualifies as a refugee. ( 47 )

91.

That act entails, in principle, granting all of the rights referred to in Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95 (subject to the limitations laid down therein). ( 48 ) As the Commission emphasised at the hearing, being a refugee and the grant of such rights necessarily go hand in hand outside the context of the application of Article 14(4) and (5) of that directive. Under Article 20(2) of that directive, Member States must grant recognised refugees all of those rights, whereas a person who has not (yet) been recognised as being a refugee is not entitled to such rights. ( 49 ) Similarly, the application of one of the grounds for cessation or exclusion set out in Articles 11 and 12 of Directive 2011/95 to a person who has previously been recognised as being a refugee gives rise, under Article 14(1) and (3) of that directive, to the expiry or the invalidity of that recognition and the loss of the rights stemming from it.

92.

That intrinsic link between recognition as a refugee and the grant of such rights might explain why the definition of ‘refugee status’ in Article 2(e) of that directive refers only to the recognition as a refugee and does not mention the subsequent grant of rights that that recognition brings.

93.

By contrast, Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 introduces a disconnection between being a refugee and the grant of those rights. Whilst retaining the status of being a refugee, the persons to whom those provisions are applied are not, or are no longer, entitled to the rights set out in Chapter VII of that directive.

94.

The terms ‘status granted to a refugee’ and to grant ‘status to a refugee’ used in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95, respectively, must be interpreted in the light of those considerations. In my view, in that context, those terms have a more restrictive meaning than that set out in Article 2(e) of that directive. ( 50 ) They refer only to the grant of the rights set out in Chapter VII of that directive, ( 51 ) without, however, undermining the recognition of the persons concerned as refugees.

95.

That, in my view, is the only interpretation that enables the internal coherence of that directive and the effectiveness of its provisions to be maintained.

96.

In the first place, the interpretation that the expression to grant ‘status to a refugee’ encompasses the actual recognition of the status of being a refugee seems, to me, to be incompatible with the wording and scheme of Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/95. I note, in that regard, that that provision applies to refugees who have not yet been granted any status. Thus, it does cover a ‘refugee’, as defined in Article 2(d) of that directive, but does not cover an ‘applicant’ within the meaning of Article 2(i) of that directive. Moreover, Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/95 applies to persons whose status of being a refugee has been verified and recognised accordingly by the host Member State.

97.

It follows, as has been emphasised by the Belgian and French Governments, that that provision cannot be interpreted as allowing the Member States to refuse to examine an application for asylum lodged with them, in compliance with the procedural guarantees provided for in Directive 2013/32, and to recognise, where appropriate, that the applicant is a refugee. I would add, in that connection, that Article 11(1) of that directive provides that any decision on the application for asylum is to be given to the person concerned in writing. As the Commission stated at the hearing, the person whose status is revoked must be able to demonstrate his specific situation in the event of administrative controls, which means that a document must be issued confirming that he is a refugee. ( 52 )

98.

In the second place, Article 14(4) of Directive 2011/95 applies by definition to refugees who have already been recognised as such. As explained above, the application of that provision does not entail the loss of that status. In those circumstances, the interpretation that the ‘status granted to a refugee’ within the meaning of that provision refers to both the recognition as a refugee and the grant of the rights stemming from that status would be wholly illogical. Like the applicant in the main proceedings in Case C‑77/17, I fail to see the sense in revoking that recognition without calling into question its subject matter — namely whether the person concerned is a refugee. ( 53 )

99.

In the same vein, the UNHCR has stated that the grounds for invalidating a decision recognising refugee status within the meaning of the Geneva Convention do not include grounds which involve the loss of protection against refoulement pursuant to Article 33(2) of that convention — which correspond to the grounds for the revocation of and refusal to grant refugee status provided for in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95. ( 54 )

100.

In the third place, I note that, on account of being refugees, the refugees against whom a Member State applies Article 14(4) or (5) of that directive continue to be entitled to the rights provided for in the Geneva Convention, to which Article 14(6) refers. The recognition by a Member State of entitlement to those rights, in order to allow them to be exercised, presupposes recognition as a refugee, without which the person concerned is not entitled to those rights. In other words, whilst recognition as a refugee does not result in all of the rights set out in Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95 being granted, the grant of rights linked to being a refugee implies that that status has been recognised.

101.

Furthermore, my proposed interpretation addresses the concerns raised by the UNHCR by also endorsing the interpretation that it has itself advocated on several occasions. According to the UNHCR, to prevent the possibilities provided for in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 from being interpreted in the Member States as introducing new grounds for cessation and exclusion, contrary to the Geneva Convention, ‘“status granted to a refugee” is therefore understood to refer to the asylum (“status”) granted by the State rather than … status [designating in that context the condition of being a refugee] in the sense of Article [1A of that convention] …’. ( 55 )

102.

Therefore, I consider that the terms ‘status granted to a refugee’ and to grant ‘status to a refugee’ within the meaning of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 refer only to entitlement to the rights provided for in Chapter VII of that directive, ( 56 ) without prejudice to the rights which must be granted to the refugees concerned under the Geneva Convention. ( 57 )

103.

I now turn to the question regarding the validity of those provisions, as interpreted and read in conjunction with Article 14(6) — which must first be interpreted in order to answer that question — in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU.

104.

As has been argued by the Belgian Government and the Parliament, Directive 2011/95 is an independent instrument belonging to the EU legal order which is not intended formally to transpose the Geneva Convention. From that perspective, although it does specify that the provisions in that chapter are to be without prejudice to the rights laid down in that convention, ( 58 ) Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95 lays down a series of rights, some of which are not guaranteed by the Geneva Convention, whereas others correspond to those provided for in that convention.

105.

Accordingly, on the one hand, as has been noted by the United Kingdom Government, certain provisions of Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95 require that Member States grant to refugees rights which have no equivalent in the Geneva Convention, such as the right to a residence permit, to recognition of qualifications, to healthcare and to access to integration facilities. ( 59 )

106.

There is little doubt, in my mind, that, in so far as the provisions of Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95 guarantee rights which are separate from and independent of the Geneva Convention, without disregarding the requirements for compliance with that convention, the EU legislature could have also determined, by means of other independent provisions, the circumstances in which a refugee may be denied those rights.

107.

On the other hand, Chapter VII of that directive includes rights which are also laid down in the Geneva Convention. These are, in particular, the right to the issue of travel documents, ( 60 ) to freedom of movement ( 61 ) and to access to employment, ( 62 ) housing ( 63 ) and social assistance. ( 64 )

108.

In my view, Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 also does not infringe Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU in so far as it makes it possible to deprive a refugee of the rights listed in point 107 above when he or she represents a danger to the security or the community of a Member State, although the Geneva Convention does not provide expressly for that possibility.

109.

I note, in that regard, that, under the Geneva Convention, those rights must be granted only to refugees lawfully staying in the territory of a Contracting State — unlike other rights provided for by that convention, which must be granted to any refugee present on that territory. ( 65 ) That convention does not define the concept of lawful stay. In a note on interpretation, the UNHCR considered that the criterion of lawfulness contained in that concept refers normally to respect for the rules of the national law of the Contracting States regarding the conditions for admission and residence, since the Geneva Convention does not govern such conditions. ( 66 )

110.

In the present case, the application by a Member State of Article 14(4) or (5) of Directive 2011/95 has the consequence of, inter alia, depriving the refugee concerned of the residence permit to which he would normally be entitled under Article 24(1) of that directive. In my view, that Member State may, without infringing its obligations under the Geneva Convention, take the view that that refugee is not, or is no longer, lawfully staying in its territory in accordance with that convention and, accordingly, deprive that refugee of the rights provided for by that convention to which entitlement depends on that stay being lawful. ( 67 )

111.

As the governments and institutions which submitted observations to the Court have stated, that approach is compatible with the scheme and the objectives of the Geneva Convention. Articles 32 and 33 of that convention authorise, under certain conditions, the expulsion and the refoulement of a refugee who represents a danger to the security or the community of the country of refuge. Although the authors of the Geneva Convention thus intended to take account of the interests of the Contracting States in preserving public order and public security by allowing such drastic measures, that convention cannot be interpreted as prohibiting them, of itself, from taking the view that such a refugee is not or is no longer lawfully staying in their territory and, therefore, is not or is no longer entitled to the rights which, under that convention, are reserved for refugees whose stay is lawful.

112.

However, after having made use of the options provided for in Article 14(4) or (5) of Directive 2011/95, Member States are still required to ensure that the refugees in question are afforded the rights to which all refugees are entitled under the Geneva Convention, irrespective of the lawfulness of their stay. Those rights concern non-discrimination (Article 3), the freedom of religion (Article 4), the protection of movable and immovable property (Article 13), access to courts (Article 16), rationing (Article 20), access to public education (Article 22), administrative assistance (Article 25), the issue of identity papers (Article 27), the absence of discrimination in tax matters (Article 29), the absence of penalties on account of illegal entry or stay (Article 31) and protection from expulsion (Article 32) and refoulement (Article 33). ( 68 )

113.

From that perspective, the UNHCR has noted that, when the Member States implement those options, they are ‘nonetheless obliged to grant the rights of [the Geneva Convention] which do not require lawful residence and which do not foresee exceptions for as long as the refugee remains within the jurisdiction of the State concerned’. ( 69 ) Recently, the UNHCR has, in essence, reiterated that position once more in its comments on the draft regulation intended to replace Directive 2011/95. ( 70 )

114.

Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95 must be read in the light of those considerations. That provision states that refugees who have been subject to a revocation of or a refusal to grant refugee status under Article 14(4) and (5) continue, as long as they are present in the territory of a Member State, to be entitled to ‘rights set out in or similar to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention’.

115.

The applicants in the three cases in the main proceedings have questioned the validity of Article 14(6) of that directive on the ground that that provision does not mention, in the list of rights set out therein, the rights provided for by Articles 13, 20, 25, 27 and 29 of the Geneva Convention.

116.

In accordance with the principles set out in points 66 and 67 of this Opinion, it must be examined whether it is possible to interpret Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95 in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention, so that it remains valid in the light of primary law and the attainment of its objective of the full application of that convention is ensured.

117.

Those principles would require that provision to be interpreted in such a way that it is not without prejudice to the obligation of the Member States, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, to ensure entitlement to all of the rights which, under that convention, must be accorded to all refugees present on the territory of a Member State, irrespective of the lawfulness of their stay.

118.

In my view, the key to a consistent interpretation of that kind lies in the words ‘or similar [rights]’ used in Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95.

119.

The scope and the meaning of those words are not specified in that directive or in the travaux préparatoires preceding its adoption or that of Directive 2004/83. Nor do those travaux préparatoires provide further clarification as to the reasons why the legislature did not set out all of the relevant rights from the Geneva Convention in the list in Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95.

120.

In those circumstances, examination of the wording of that provision in the light of the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part, as the case-law requires, ( 71 ) leads me to conclude that it must be interpreted as meaning that the words ‘or similar [rights]’ refer to the rights provided for by the Geneva Convention which the Member States must ensure are accorded to refugees who have been the subject of the application of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 in addition, and not as an alternative, to those specifically listed in Article 14(6).

121.

As regards the wording of Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95, I would point out that, as the Court has already held in other contexts, the conjunction ‘or’ may, linguistically, have an alternative or a cumulative sense. It must, therefore, be read in the context in which it is used and in the light of the purposes of the measure in question. ( 72 )

122.

In the present case, in my view, the context and the purpose of Directive 2011/95 require that a cumulative sense be attributed to that conjunction. I have already established that, in adopting that directive, the EU legislature sought to ensure the full application of the Geneva Convention in the Member States. Therefore, the intention of the EU legislature was certainly not to deny the refugees referred to in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 the benefit of the rights that must be accorded to them by the Member States under that convention. That objective was reaffirmed in the observations submitted to the Court by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. ( 73 )

123.

To attribute an alternative sense to the conjunction ‘or’ in Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95 would be irreconcilable with an objective of that kind, since it would imply that the Member States could freely grant the refugees in question either the rights set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention, or other rights of similar scope. That outcome would clearly infringe that convention, which requires that the rights set out therein must be guaranteed, and therefore granting rights which are ‘similar’ to those rights would not suffice.

124.

In the light of the objective pursued by Directive 2011/95 of the full application of the Geneva Convention, the terms ‘or similar [rights]’ refer rather, in my view, to rights in addition to those to which Article 14(6) of that directive expressly refers, which that convention stipulates are to be granted to any refugee present in the territory of a Contracting State.

125.

That interpretation is supported by the fact that none of the governments which have submitted observations to the Court, with the exception of the United Kingdom Government, has mentioned the need to deprive those persons of some of those rights. On the contrary, at the hearing, the Belgian and Czech Governments submitted that the function of Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95 was primarily to remind Member States of their international obligations in a non-exhaustive manner.

126.

In that regard, I note, in particular, that the right to the issue of identity papers, set out in Article 27 of the Geneva Convention, is also a prerequisite for the exercise of the rights provided for by that convention which are expressly listed in Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95. ( 74 ) The exercise of those rights would be impeded if the refugee concerned was not issued identity papers, which, moreover, could also serve as proof of his status as a refugee. ( 75 )

127.

The failure to supplement the list provided for in Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95 by not referring in it to Articles 13, 20, 25, 27 and 29 of the Geneva Convention may, in my view, also be explained by the fact that, as has been argued by the Belgian and the Netherlands Governments and by the Parliament and the Council, those articles may be the subject of reservations under Article 42(1) of that convention. That provision allows Contracting States, at the time of signature, ratification or accession to the Geneva Convention, to make reservations to provisions of that convention ‘other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36-46 inclusive’.

128.

The intention of the EU legislature was therefore to remind Member States of their relevant obligations under the Geneva Convention to which no reservations may be made, namely Articles 3, 4, 16 and 33, ( 76 ) while also requiring them to grant the refugees concerned the rights set out in Articles 22 and 31 of that convention in the light of the particular importance that the EU legal order attaches to those rights. ( 77 ) Articles 13, 20, 25, 27 and 29 of that convention, by contrast, have not been expressly mentioned in so far as the Member States may make reservations to them, ( 78 ) since Directive 2011/95 does not affect the obligation of the Member States to ensure the rights provided for in those articles where they have not expressed such reservations.

129.

This explanation must be understood in the light of the minimal nature of the level of protection required under Article 14(6) of that directive. Since Article 14(4) and (5) merely establishes options, in any event, it is still open to the Member States to grant those refugees, in respect of whom they have those options, rights which extend beyond the lower limit provided for in Article 14(6). More generally, Article 3 of Directive 2011/95, read in the light of recital 12 thereof, allows the Member States to provide for more favourable standards relating in particular to the content of international protection, in so far as they are compatible with that directive.

130.

In the light of those considerations, I take the view that Article 14(6) of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State which makes use of the options provided for in Article 14(4) or (5) is obliged to grant the refugee concerned, in addition to the rights set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention, the other rights that that convention guarantees for all refugees present on the territory of a Contracting State, namely the rights provided for in Articles 13, 20, 25, 27 and 29 of that convention, provided that that Member State has not made any reservations to them under Article 42(1) of that convention.

131.

Therefore, I consider that Article 14(4), (5) and (6) of Directive 2011/95, read together, as interpreted in the manner proposed in this Opinion, does not infringe Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU.

132.

For the sake of completeness, I would point out that the foregoing conclusion solely concerns the validity of Article 14(4) to (6) of Directive 2011/95, in so far as it introduces the possibility for the Member States to deprive certain refugees of the rights provided for in Chapter VII of that directive, in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU. It is only on the validity in abstracto of that possibility in the light of those provisions that the Court is asked to give a ruling in the context of the present references for a preliminary ruling and, therefore, this is what the observations submitted to the Court concerned.

133.

That conclusion is without prejudice to the assessment, on a case-by-case basis, of whether the exercise by a Member State of the options provided for in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 is compatible with certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.

134.

Three examples come to mind in that regard. First, in the event that, as a result of exercising those options, a Member State were to deny a refugee access to certain medical treatment, such denial could infringe Article 35 of the Charter (concerning the right to health), or even, to the extent that it endangers the life of that refugee, or exposes him to inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 2(1) (concerning the right to life) or Article 4 of the Charter. ( 79 ) Secondly, in the event that a Member State decides to expel the refugee in question to a safe third country prepared to admit him to its territory, ( 80 ) that Member State should verify whether such a measure is compatible with the right to respect for private and family life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter. ( 81 ) Thirdly, although Article 15 of the Charter, concerning the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work, applies only to the nationals of third countries ‘who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States’, it cannot be ruled out, in particular, that the refusal to allow a refugee to enter the labour market after his release from prison, even though he cannot be removed to a third country and must therefore remain indefinitely in the Member State of refuge, may, depending on the circumstances, infringe Article 7 of the Charter. According to the case-law of the ECtHR, Article 8 of the ECHR, to which Article 7 of the Charter corresponds, encompasses the social identity and the personal, social and economic relationships which constitute the private life of any human being. ( 82 )

135.

Having regard to all of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) in Cases C‑77/17 and C‑78/17 and by the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court, Czech Republic) in Case C‑391/16 as follows: