Table of contents

1.Introduction

1.1    Purpose and scope of the evaluation    

2.What was the expected outcome of the intervention?

2.1    Description of the intervention and its objectives    

2.1.1    Problems that the intervention aimed to address    

2.1.2    General and specific objectives of the intervention    

2.1.3    The intervention logic    

2.2    Points of comparison    

3.How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period?

3.1    Evolution of the market of products subject to the Regulation    

3.2    Current state of play    

3.2.1    Organisation of market surveillance at the national level    

3.2.2    Penalty regimes and other sanctions    

4.Evaluation findings (analytical part)

4.1    To what extent was the intervention successful and why?    

4.1.1    Effectiveness    

4.1.2    Efficiency    

4.1.3    Coherence    

4.2    How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?    

4.3    Is the intervention still relevant?    

4.3.1    General relevance of MSR objectives    

4.3.2    To what extent do the issues addressed by the Regulation continue to require action at the EU-level?    

4.3.3    Is the MSR sufficiently adaptable to new challenges and developments?    

5.What are the conclusions and lessons learned?

5.1    Conclusions    

5.2    Lessons learned    

Annex I. Procedural information

Annex II. Methodology and analytical models used

Annex III. Evaluation matrix

Annex IV. Overview of benefits and costs

Annex V. Stakeholders consultation (synopsis report)

Annex VI. Other figures and tables

Glossary

1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

Article 42 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of products (the MSR) 1 requires the European Commission to evaluate this regulation by 31 December 2026.

This Staff Working Document present the findings of that evaluation. It assesses the extent to which the MSR achieved its objectives and remains fit for purpose, building on the findings of the Evaluation of Article 4 2 and drawing on a support study carried out by an external contractor. This evaluation is framed by the Commission's Single Market Strategy 3 that has identified outdated harmonised product rules and lack of product compliance among the Terrible Ten barriers hindering the effective functioning of the Single Market. It informs the preparation of the European Product Act, a legislative package planned for adoption in Q3 2026 that will revise rules on market surveillance and on conformity assessment of products 4 in one act and revise the rules on standardisation 5 in another act.

The objective of the MSR is to improve the functioning of the internal market by strengthening the market surveillance of products covered by the Union harmonisation legislation, with a view to ensuring that only compliant products that fulfil requirements providing a high level of protection of public interests - such as health and safety in general, health and safety in the workplace, the protection of consumers, the protection of the environment and public security and any other public interests protected by that legislation - are made available on the Union market.

In terms of scope, the analysis covers the legal framework set out in the Regulation. The period under review runs from 16 July 2021, when the Regulation became fully applicable, to the first quarter of 2026, subject to data availability. Geographically, the evaluation extends to the European Economic Area (EEA), encompassing the EU Member States and the European Free Trade Association countries: Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, the evaluation is structured around five criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value. In line with Article 42(2), particular attention is given to whether the MSR has achieved its objective, notably with regard to reducing the number of non-compliant products on the Union market, ensuring effective and efficient enforcement of Union harmonisation legislation within the Union, improving cooperation between competent authorities, and strengthening the controls on products entering the Union market, while taking into account the impact on business and in particular on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In addition, this evaluation also assesses to the scope of application of the Regulation, the effectiveness of the peer review system and Union-financed market surveillance activities and cooperation between market surveillance and customs authorities, and possibilities to further improve the cooperation between the MSAs and customs authorities.

A combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence underpins the analysis, drawing on available data and stakeholder input, based on the study developed in support of this evaluation. Certain limitations need to be acknowledged, notably regarding the short period since the Regulation became applicable, together with certain constraints related to data availability and comparability across countries. The total number of non-compliant products entering and circulating in the Single Market remains unknown, as it is not possible for market surveillance authorities to check all products in the market: consequently, the data covers only a small subset of products subject to checks. In turn, existing data on the shares of non-compliant products amongst those tested is biased towards products perceived as having a higher risk of non-compliance, as MSAs are legally mandated by the MSR to apply a risk-based approach. Consequently, while the Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance (ICSMS) - the EU reporting platform for MSA investigations and compliance findings in which authorities are required to record all in-depth compliance checks - is the comprehensive communication platform for market surveillance on non-food products and for mutual recognition for goods, it does not provide a full picture of the situation on the market, and its use by the authorities is uneven, with the JRC 2025 study finding that only 10% of all conducted investigations is recorded in the tool. 6 , 7 Similar limitations apply to the data recorded in Safety Gate, the EU rapid-alert database for products posing safety risks requiring authorities to record all unsafe products. Taking those limitations into account, an assessment of the ICSMS and Safety Gate data has provided a good overview of key indicators related to the MSR's impact (see details in Annex 2). In addition, there are gaps in Member States reporting on available resources for market surveillance.

2.1 Description of the intervention and its objectives

2.1.1 Problems that the intervention aimed to address

The MSR aimed to address the problem that many products circulating on the Single Market did not comply with the rules set out in Union harmonisation legislation, causing potentially harm to consumers and users and resulting in unfair competition for law-abiding businesses. Four specific drivers were deemed to engender this problem:

I.market surveillance throughout the EU was fragmented, with insufficient coordination among competent authorities such as MSAs and customs authorities.

II.MSAs were not always equipped with necessary resources for effective market surveillance.

III.the regulatory toolbox was considered insufficient: MSAs did not have all the necessary powers to effectively deter and enforce cases of non-compliance, particularly in the context of increasingly complex supply chains, a growing volume of goods from outside the EU, and the rapid expansion of products sold online and through e-commerce.

IV.there were significant knowledge and information gaps, both among enforcement authorities and the stakeholders that were subject to market surveillance.

2.1.2 General and specific objectives of the intervention

To address these problems, the general objective of the MSR is spelled out in its Article 1(1):

“to improve the functioning of the internal market by strengthening the market surveillance of products covered by the Union harmonisation legislation […] with a view to ensuring that only compliant products that fulfil requirements providing a high level of protection of public interests, such as health and safety in general, health and safety in the workplace, the protection of consumers, the protection of the environment and public security and any other public interests protected by that legislation, are made available on the Union market”

The three specific objectives of the MSR to support this general objective 8 are:

1.Strengthening the enforcement toolbox, allowing MSAs to use more deterrent, effective and future-proof tools.

2.Increasing operational enforcement capacity, improving efficiency of market surveillance action, targeting of controls, and availability of resource.

3.Reinforcing market surveillance cooperation procedures, reducing fragmentation and inefficiencies.

2.1.3 The intervention logic

The above-mentioned general and specific objective set the framework for the activities, outputs and results of the intervention (see Figure 1). To pursue the specific objective of strengthening the enforcement toolbox, the MSR provided new powers to MSAs and to make deterrence more effective. This included, among others, the powers to require information from economic operators, carry out unannounced on-site inspections, enter premises, initiate investigations on their own initiative, and, crucially in the e-commerce field, acquire product samples under cover identity to check compliance (mystery shopping) under Article 14 of the MSR. Article 3 of the MSR provides a definition of an ‘economic operator’, which means the manufacturer, the authorised representative, the importer, the distributor, the fulfilment service provider or any other natural or legal person subject to obligations in relation to the manufacture of products, making them available on the market or putting them into service in accordance with the relevant Union harmonisation legislation. In Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 18, the MSR defined clear rights and obligations for economic operators including, for example, the obligations to cooperate with MSAs; to provide sufficient information and documentation in view of proving the conformity of the product; and to make sure that immediate, necessary, and corrective actions are taken to remedy any case of non-compliance with requirements and to mitigate any risks presented by products.

To pursue the specific objective of enhancing the capacity and resources of the MSAs, Article 11 requires them, firstly, to ensure that economic operators take appropriate and proportionate corrective action and, secondly, to take appropriate and proportionate measures where the economic operator fails to do so. This provision also compels MSAs to perform appropriate checks on the characteristics of products on an adequate scale, by means of documentary checks. The MSR require Member States to prioritise their resources and activities market surveillance strategies (Article 13), and introduces new resources at EU level, such as the EU Testing Facilities (EUTFs; Article 21), with the aim of addressing a capacity gap in testing compliance for certain risks or product categories. Digitalisation of information was also deemed crucial. Article 34 refers to an information and communication system that was later integrated into the ICSMS in a Commission Implementing Regulation. 9 Improved capacity for controls at the borders (Articles 25 to 28), guidelines and training provided by the Commission (Articles 33 and 42) and the recovery of costs from EOs by MSAs when products were found non-compliant (Article 15) were also expected to contribute to enhanced capacity and resources leading to effective and efficient controls.

To pursue the specific objective of reinforcing cooperation procedures, Article 10 of the MSR requires each Member State to appoint a Single Liaison Office (SLO) to represent a coordinated position at the EU level. Cooperation between different Member States is structured by joint activities (Article 9), peer reviews (Article 12), cross-border mutual assistance when information is needed from other Member States (Article 22) and, requests for enforcement measures (Article 23). Article 32 of the MSR defines a range of tasks for administrative cooperation groups (AdCos), including, for example, the facilitation of the uniform application of Union harmonisation legislation across countries, the promotion of communication and sharing of information between MSAs, and the establishment and coordination of common projects, including cross-border joint actions. The interaction between MSAs and the Commission is coordinated by the European Product Compliance Network (EUPCN), created by Article 29. Finally, cooperation with third countries is structured by Article 35.

The implementation of the Regulation was expected to produce positive results, i.e. higher rates of compliant products, which in turn contribute to wider impacts, such as increased protection of health, safety, and other public interests (including the environment). This would lead to greater consumer confidence and fairer competition and level playing field for businesses, resulting in enhanced competitiveness. The achievement of these objectives depends on several types of inputs, including financial and human resources, existing national and EU-level processes, and technical infrastructures such as the ICSMS, the EU Safety Gate, and EU CSW-CERTEX tools. 10

The Regulation has also been affected by external factors. These include developments in e-commerce, new economic models, digital technologies relevant for surveillance, rising global competition, and geopolitical tensions. The Regulation must also function in coherence with other major EU policies and legislative instruments, particularly the New Legislative Framework (NLF), but also the General Product Safety Regulation (GSPR) 11 , EU Customs rules and their ongoing reform, data protection laws, the Digital Services Act (DSA) 12 , and non-legislative instruments such as the Single Market Strategy and the Competitiveness Compass.

Figure 1 – Intervention logic

2.2 Points of comparison

The evaluation of actual performance is to be compared to the expected results and impacts of the preferred policy option as assessed in an impact assessment accompanying the MSR proposals. 13 In particular, the points of comparison (PoC) listed the indicators identified for the monitoring of compliance for the preferred option, also based on the previous evaluation accompanying the proposal. The 2017 IA suggested a large number of monitoring indicators (15). They were all related to assessing effectiveness, and not all of them are measurable with the available tools and data. Therefore, the points of comparison selected for the present evaluation focus on effectiveness indicators that capture the three key MSR objectives and allow before-and-after comparisons. The table below provides the selected list of key PoCs, including comments on the rationale for selecting them.

Table 1 – Points of comparison

3.1 Evolution of the market of products subject to the Regulation

As a horizontal legislation, the MSR covers a wide range of non-food product categories and manufacturing sectors in the EU. It applies to products subject to 70 Union harmonisation legislation listed in Annex I of the MSR (including toys, electronics, cosmetics, personal protective equipment or machinery, and to other) and to other acts specifying that the MSR applies to them (including the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Cyber Resilience Act).

The total value added of harmonised sectors grew by 2.1% from 2021 to 2024 (last available year, see Annex 6 for the sector coverage). 15 It amounted to EUR 1.1 trillion in 2024. The share of total value added by harmonised products increased from close to 61% in 2021 to 67% in 2024 (see Figure 3 A6.6 in Annex 6). Large companies account for about 72.9% of the total value added in harmonised sectors on average across the period, while medium sized enterprises add 18.9% of the value. Small and micro enterprises account for the remaining 8.1% of value added.

Between 2021 and 2024, the value of EU harmonised products sold 16 in the EU increased by around 14.8% from some EUR 2.7 trillion to over EUR 3.1 trillion. Among the harmonised products sold in the EU, the main categories are motor vehicles and their parts (18.7%), chemicals (4.4%), and metal structures and their parts (3%), as well as communication equipment, computers, and electronic components (jointly 7.6%). A further breakdown of the main product categories, based on Eurostat Prodcom data, is included in Table A6.104 of Annex IV.

Harmonised products account for around half of the total value of manufactured goods consumed in the EU (51% in 2024). 17  The total value increased from EUR 2.5 trillion in 2021 to EUR 2.7 trillion in 2024. By sector, the combined value of motor vehicles (incl. other parts and accessories), basic chemicals, metal structures and parts of structures, communication equipment, computer and peripheral equipment, and locks and hinges amounted to more than a third of the total value of harmonised products consumed in the EU in 2024. 18  

Harmonised products account for a large share of EU external trade. Harmonised imported products from third countries account, on average, for about 70% of all imports of manufactured goods over the period. The value of these products increased over the same period from EUR 1.1 trillion to EUR 1.3 trillion (16.3% increase). In addition, the value of harmonised exports accounts on average for 71.6% of the value of all exported manufacturing goods. It increased by 21.3% during this period from EUR 1.4 trillion in 2015 to EUR 1.7 trillion in 2024. 19 Pharmaceutical preparations (5.5% of total imports), communication equipment (4.9% of total imports), and motor vehicles (4.8% of total imports) rank in the top three sectors in terms of the share of the trade value of all harmonised goods. A further breakdown of the absolute value of the imports by product group and their share of total imports is presented in Table A6.16 of Annex VI.

Figure 2 – Sold production and external trade of the EU27 in harmonised products (2021-2024)

Source: Eurostat Prodcom - statistics by product 2026 [ds-059358]

Between 2021 and 2024, 45.7% of the value of harmonised products consumed within the EU came from imports from non-EU countries (representing EUR 1 066 billion annually). Annual ratios grew from 43.8% in 2021 to 46.6% in 2024. Among harmonised products, imports of pharmaceutical preparations account for about 7.7%, communication equipment for about 6.9%, and motor vehicles for about 6.7% (see Table A6.15 in Annex VI). For many of the imports, China is the dominant source for imported harmonised products.

Figure 3 – Harmonised (extra-EU) imports and harmonised consumption (2021-2024, EU-27)

Source: Eurostat Prodcom - statistics by product 2026 [ds-059358]

China alone accounts for 20% or more of the total value of extra-EU imports in 52 out of 85 harmonised product categories (61.2%). The US and UK follow from a wider distance (13/85 product categories or 15.3% each), followed by Türkiye (6/95 product categories or 7.1%) and Switzerland (5/85 product categories or 5.9%). In particular, China accounts for more than 50% of imports for example for computers (53.4%), communication equipment (53.8%), batteries and accumulators (78.4%) and electric domestic appliances (70.3%), as well as consumer electronics (63.8%). The country accounts for about 75.5% of imports of games and toys, and about 70% of imports of other imported goods (see Table A6.17 in Annex VI).

There are some 876,000 enterprises active in harmonised sectors. 20 Between 2021 and 2024, the number of enterprises in these sectors appears to have increased slightly by about 2.1%, from slightly over 858,000 enterprises in 2021. The number of enterprises in harmonised sectors amounts to about 42% of all enterprises in the manufacturing sectors. 95% of enterprises in the harmonised sectors are SMEs, while the remaining 3.8% are medium enterprises. Only 0.8% of the enterprises in the harmonised sectors are classified as large (more than 250 employees).

Enterprises in the harmonised sectors employ close to 16.3 million people. 21 This number has grown by 9% from 2021 to 2024. On average, 54.9% of manufacturing employees work in harmonised sectors each year during the observed period. Micro and small enterprises account for 25.2% of the people employed, while medium enterprises in harmonised sectors account for another 22%. Large companies in harmonised sectors account for about 53% of the total employment in those sectors (see also Annex VI).

In addition, Europe has become the leading region for international e-commerce. The revenue from products sold through e-commerce increased by 88% from EUR 227 billion in 2019 to EUR 427 billion in 2024, marking the largest nominal increase across all regions (EUR 236 billion). 22

Figure 4 – Global cross-border e-commerce revenue growth, billion USD

Source: ECDB as of March 2025.

The increasing volume of products bought online and imported into the EU is also visible through the number of small packages (e-commerce low value consignments of less than 150 EUR) reaching 5.9 billion packages in 2025, which is three times higher than in 2022 23 . These small packages make up 97.9% of all items recorded at the borders, while accounting for merely 2.1% of the trade value. The vast majority of small-value items purchased online from outside the EU, both in terms of value (78%) and volume (93%), originate from China 24 . Among EU Member States, Belgium led the market with 1.37 billion parcels, followed by Hungary with 974 million and the Netherlands with 936 million. France also recorded substantial volumes at 862 million parcels, while Germany, Italy, and Spain handled 475 million, 399 million, and 2020 million parcels, respectively. Ireland (159 million), Poland (118 million) and Czechia (106 million) also registered more than 100 million parcels each. Together, these ten countries represented 95.5% of the total EU parcel volume in 2025, highlighting the concentration of logistics activity within Europe’s largest e-commerce and distribution hubs.

In Europe 53% of total e-commerce revenue generated from shops and 47% from marketplaces (incl. first-party and third-party sales). 25 In 2024, Amazon was the biggest cross-border platform in terms of revenue across Germany, France and Italy by a considerable margin. 26 Other non-EU platforms, notably Chinese platforms such as Temu, Shein and AliExpress, also feature prominently among leading cross‑border marketplaces.

Country‑specific data suggest that consumer products, such as textiles, consumer electronics and household goods, are particularly prominent in e‑commerce. 27 EU-wide data confirms that clothing (including sportswear), shoes and accessories were the most prominent products purchased online in 2024, with 45% of people making these purchases in the previous 3 months. 28 These were followed by cosmetics and wellness products (20%), and furniture and home accessories or gardening items (19%).

3.2 Current state of play

3.2.1 Organisation of market surveillance at the national level

Across the EU, all Member States have established governance arrangements for market surveillance that formally align with the requirements of the MSR. Every Member State has designated multiple MSAs, authorities in charge of the control on products entering the Union market, as well as, pursuant to Article 10 of the MSR, a Single Liaison Office (SLO), whose role is to coordinate activities of MSAs in a Member State.

The MSR does not prescribe the way Member States should organise market surveillance. The number and the type of MSAs among whom competences and powers are shared vary across countries. Overall architectures range from fully centralised to partly decentralised systems, reflecting different political structures and institutional traditions across the Union. Seven Member States have designated, in addition to central authorities, MSAs operating at regional level. Based on available information, there are currently 914 MSAs in the EU. 29  

However, notable changes have been implemented to the organisation of market surveillance in several Member States since the MSR entered into force. Some countries, such as Italy, Poland, and Romania, have substantially amended their governance structures, clarifying responsibilities between internal market surveillance and border controls or consolidating the coordination function of central authorities. Others, including Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, have maintained their existing organisational framework and made only smaller targeted adjustments to align processes and responsibilities with revised MSR requirements.

All Member States have adopted national market surveillance strategies for the 2022-2025 period, pursuant to Article 15 of the MSR, with the exception of Hungary, which has not adopted its strategy, and as such has not submitted it to the Commission. 30

Figure 4 – Number of MSAs per country

Member States have also fulfilled MSR requirements to formalise or reinforce cooperation between MSAs, as well as between MSAs and the customs authorities, within their countries, and to set up committees or agreements between them to improve information flows and collaboration on risk profiles and on cases, with updated mandates of authorities where needed. The newly appointed SLOs carry out an important coordination function, aggregating information and representing the common position of MSAs at the EU level.

3.2.2 Penalty regimes and other sanctions

All Member States have established penalty frameworks to support the enforcement actions of their MSAs, as notified to the Commission 31 . The overall strictness – and resulting deterrent effect – of the national penalty frameworks varies significantly. When comparing the legal ceilings for administrative fines and the availability of criminal sanctions, clear differences emerge between countries. Eight Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain) have set relatively high ceilings for administrative fines – reaching or exceeding EUR 100,000 - and foresee criminal liability of responsible economic operators for repeated, intentional or serious violations. Denmark also has a strict regime that allows for criminal sanctions, without ceilings for administrative fines. Finland set a general maximum fine level for legal persons of EUR 30,000.

A large number of Member States (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden) rely on administrative fines only, generally ranging between EUR 10,000 and EUR 50,000, without foreseeing criminal sanctions applicable for infringements in aggravated cases of marketing unsafe or non-compliant products. Finally, the administrative fines in Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Malta generally remain below EUR 10.000 with no possibility to impose criminal sanctions.

Penalty regimes in most Member States are defined in several pieces of legislation: at a general level in a national act on product safety and conformity, or on market surveillance, but also in several product-specific legislation. Therefore, the fines may depend on the product category (toys, electrical goods, chemicals).

4.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why?

This chapter outlines the performance of the MSR in terms of its effectiveness (fulfilling expectations and meeting the objectives), efficiency (proportionality of its cost and benefits) and coherence (internal and external).

The evaluation matrix included in Annex 3 lists the data and information sources, as well as the assessment methods of the general and specific objectives of the MSR. The methods used for assessing the specific objectives are desk research including legal mapping, targeted survey were also used as a source of information when relevant.

4.1.1 Effectiveness

4.1.1.1 To what extent has the MSR contributed to achieving its general objective?

The share of non-compliant products among all products entering and circulating in the Single Market cannot be measured with precision, but existing data indicates that non-compliant products are widespread. More precisely, the total number of non-compliant products entering and circulating in the Single Market remains unknown because it is not possible for MSAs to check all products in the market: consequently, the data only cover a small subset of products subject to checks. In turn, existing data on the shares of non-compliant products amongst those tested is biased towards products perceived as having a high risk of non-compliance, as MSAs are legally mandated by the MSR to apply a risk-based approach, prioritising their resources and actions based on factors such as potential hazards, past records of economic operators, customs risk profiling and information from consumer complaints or media reports. Taking the data limitation described above and in section 1.1. into account, existing evidence from public authorities indicates that non-compliant products remain widespread in the Single Market, with particularly high rates among high-risk products and products originating from third countries.

Notwithstanding these limitations, since the Regulation entered into force, available data shows that for products subject to investigations, the share of non-compliant products remain high. Since July 2021, the MSR requires Member States to use ICSMS for reporting data on in-depth checks of compliance. ICSMS data indicates that over 50% of investigated products were found non-compliant, with rates fluctuating during 2019–2025 between 50% and 58% (although it does not provide a full picture of the situation on the market, as the JRC 2025 study finding that only 10% of all conducted investigations is recorded in the tool).

Overall, compliance rates vary markedly by sector, but where investigation activity is substantial, non‑compliance levels remain consistently high, pointing to widespread compliance concerns. A JRC study reports that for sectors which have a high number of investigations, non-compliance is found in approximately 60% of cases. 32 This trend is also evident in the assessment of the ICSMS data. Between 2021 and 2025, the sectors with the highest number of investigations also exhibit high levels of non‑compliance (see Annex VI).

The ICSMS data also shows increases in non-compliance rates in key sectors between 2021 and 2025. In the toys sector, the non-compliance rate rose by 17 percentage points, from 42% in 2021 to 59% in 2022, and subsequently remained high, reaching 61% in 2025. Similar upward shifts are observed in other consumer‑oriented sectors such as cosmetics. The low voltage sector, on the other hand, while levels remain high, has seen a decrease in non-compliance rates, dropping from 60% in 2020 to 46% in 2025 (see Annex VI).

Available evidence suggests that products imported from third countries have a higher share of non-compliant products than products produced in the EU. ICSMS 2021-2025 data shows that the non-compliance rate stands at 62% for non-EU products compared to 47% for EU ones. The non-EU products accounted for almost half of all non-compliant products found and registered in ICSMS, against 20% for EU products and 30% for unknown-origin ones. Given that imported products accounted for about 45.7% of harmonised products on the market between 2021 and 2024 (see Section 3.1), this signals higher levels of non-compliant products imported from third countries compared to products produced in the EU. Similarly, most products found unsafe come from third countries. While data in Safety Gate - the EU rapid-alert database for products posing safety risks requiring authorities to record all unsafe products - faces similar data limitations as ICSMS, 57% of all products flagged as unsafe in Safety Gate in 2021-2025 originate from outside the EU, compared to 32% from EU countries (and 10% unknown).

In addition, the exponential growth of products imported from third countries through e-commerce is a major channel through which non‑compliant products continue to reach the EU market. According to the most recent Commission data, around 5.9 billion low-value consignments entered the EU in 2025, which is three times more than in 2022. This coincided with the rapid growth of certain online marketplaces. In addition, most of these imports originate in China. While customs authorities have increased the number of product compliance controls and resulting suspensions and refusals to release products for free circulation in absolute terms, the rate of interventions has declined relative to the overall volume of imports, indicating a widening gap between enforcement capacity and the volume of imported goods. In fact, it is noted that in 2024, customs controlled the compliance of only 0.0082% of all products imported due to the large quantities being imported. 33 Out of the inspected products, 62% were suspended for suspicions of non-compliance (0.0051% of all imported products), and 16% were refused (0.0013% of all imported products). This results in non-compliant products entering the Single Market.

In fact, when focusing on online sales only, most products found unsafe come from third countries and this ratio is increasing. The ratio for non-EU alerts in Safety Gate stands at 78% in 2025 (compared to 9% from the EU, and 13% of unknown origin), with the share increasing since the MSR entry into force (68% in 2021). Between 2021 and 2025, unsafe non-EU products are heavily concentrated in toys (16% of all alerts) and electrical appliances and equipment (10%). In both product groups, the share of alerts concerning products from third countries increased over the period. For toys, the share increased from 92% to 94%, while for electrical appliances and equipment, the share increased from 92% to 97%. Motor vehicles, which accounted for another significant share of alerts (13%) and where alerts mostly concern products from EU and EEA countries, also show that the share of alerts for products from third countries increased from 24% in 2021 to 29% in 2025. Similarly, the 2025 Priority Control Area (PCA) action between all 27 customs authorities and 108 relevant MSAs, focused on products offered on four major marketplaces, found that 65% of inspected e-commerce products failed to meet EU product requirements, which is above the 55% average non-compliance rate recorded in ICSMS over 2021–2025. 34

Stakeholders also perceive that most products sold online are not compliant with EU product rules. According to surveyed MSAs (N = 146), when asked what proportion of products placed on the EU market which they inspected were compliant, responses reveal a clear contrast between offline and online channels. For offline inspections, MSAs predominantly reported low levels of non-compliance, with more than four‑fifths estimating that 40% or fewer of inspected products were non‑compliant. By contrast, perceptions of online sales point to significantly higher non-compliance, with over half of respondents estimating that more than 40% of inspected online products were non‑compliant, while 36% of respondents reporting very high non-compliance rates of greater than 60%.

In sum, while a causal relation between a rise in third-country imports, notably through e-commerce, and the number of non-compliant products cannot be proven due to data limitations, existing evidence from various sources points to a strong link between imported products and non-compliant products. As the share of investigations finding non-compliant products remains very high, particularly among imported products, while the number of number of imports has increased, the absolute number of non-compliant products circulating on the market is likely to have increased.

While it is not possible to identify the portion of responsibility that may be attributed solely to the MSR for the share of non-compliant products circulating on the Single Market, recent evaluation study indicates that the Regulation does not effectively contribute to the prevention of non-compliant products entering and circulating in the EU Single Market. While the effectiveness of market surveillance has a causal link with the number of non-compliant and unsafe products entering and circulating in the Single Market, the exact contribution of the inefficient market surveillance cannot be quantified, as the MSR is only one element of a wider framework establishing requirements for products placed on the EU single market. Despite these limitations, the Evaluation of Article 4 finds that MSAs continue to face significant difficulties in effectively contributing to preventing the entrance and circulation of non-compliant products in the EU. This is confirmed in the results of the public consultation, where over half of respondents (55%) found the regulation to be ineffective in preventing non-compliant products from reaching the market (N=154).  35

4.1.1.2 To what extent has the MSR improved health and safety of consumers?

Despite the entry into application of the MSR, consistently high levels of non-compliant and risky products continue presenting risks to consumers' health and safety. The analysis above outlines the persistent presence of non-compliant products on the market. Yet a substantial subset of these products poses a threat to the health and safety of consumers. While accounting for data limitations (see Section 1.1), ICSMS data indicate that over the period 2021–2025, around one third (33%) of non‑compliant products posed a risk of some kind, with nearly one fifth (19%) assessed as presenting a high or serious risk. This is confirmed by the results of the public consultation, where the dominant view of the respondents is that the MSR did not ensure full respect for consumer protection (47%, N=154). Stakeholders present a similar view in the targeted consultation, with the dominant view of 44% of respondents (N=275) claiming that MSR did not ensure the full consumer protection (33%, N=274). 36

Taking into account data limitations, the number of alerts registered on the Safety Gate system has increased over the time period, growing from 2 150 alerts in 2019 to 4 645 alerts in 2025, with the vast majority of these alerts deemed to carry potentially a serious risk. While this upward trend can also indicate a growing detection capacity among national authorities, it demonstrates a persistent presence of unsafe non-food products on the EU market. This is confirmed by research conducted by the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC), revealing that out of 250 products purchased online and tested, 66% were unsafe. 37  

Figure 5 – Safety Gate alerts (2019-2025)

Source: Safety Gate 38 .

Reported data suggest that most alerts concern products coming from outside the EU 39 . Although the proportion of alerts linked to non-EU/EEA countries has decreased slightly over the period, this decline is offset by the increase in alerts where the product origin is unknown. Overall, the share of alerts involving non-EU/EEA countries remains high at approximately 60.02%, with 45.75% of all alerts linked to China as country of origin during the period 2019-2025 40 . The majority of ‘serious risk’ alerts originate from countries outside the EU/EEA.

The presence of non-compliant and dangerous products generates substantial social and economic costs for consumers. With regards to social costs, it has been estimated that around 15% of product-related injuries and premature deaths in the EU, corresponding to roughly EUR 11.5 billion in associated costs, could be avoided if products placed on the market complied with applicable safety requirements. 41 Considering persistently high rates of non-compliant and unsafe products reported by MSAs, it is expected that the consumer detriment have not changed significantly since 2019.

Figure 6 – Country of origin of alerts

Source: Safety Gate 42 .

4.1.1.3 To what extent has the MSR contributed to fairer competition, a level playing field and increased competitiveness?

An Evaluation Study on the implementation of Article 4 highlights that the MSR aligned product compliance obligations across Member States, thereby contributing to fostering the level playing field and removing competitive distortions caused by divergent national approaches. 43  By harmonising product compliance responsibilities of economic operators across Member States, it reduces regulatory fragmentation enhances consistency.

However, its impact is constrained by significant enforcement challenges, notably vis-à-vis non-EU economic operators, creating a competitive disadvantage for EU‑based operators. While legitimate EU businesses bear the full cost of compliance and are likely to face consequences if they breach EU product rules, non‑EU companies are likelier to operate with limited exposure to financial or legal consequences, due to the fact that MSAs face difficulties in enforcing the rules on non-EU-products. The fact that non-compliant non-EU operators avoid some of these costs while still accessing EU consumers, creates an uneven competitive environment. In some sectors costs related to conformity assessment, testing, documentation and regulatory obligations, can represent up to 40% of a product’s price. 44 This is substantiated by the recent European Parliament (2023) study 45 finding that gaps in market surveillance create unequal competitive conditions that distort the level playing field in the Single Market. Similarly, Ruohonen (2021) 46 argues that enforcement gaps and the increasing inflow of non-compliant products-particularly through globalised supply chains-undermine the effectiveness of EU product safety rules and create conditions for unfair competition within the Single Market. Finally, this is confirmed by the results of the public consultation where 65% of respondents (N=154) disagrees that the Regulation brought level-playing field in the Single Market. 47  

4.1.1.4 To what extent is the regulatory toolbox strengthened, establishing rights and obligations, and conferring powers to MSAs to use more deterrent, effective and future-proof tools (SO1)?

-To what extent are the powers of MSAs adequate to effectively detect and address product non-compliance?

MSAs make use of the investigative powers granted by MSR routinely as part of day-to-day surveillance, although some powers are applied less frequently. Compared to the Regulation 765/2008 where powers of MSAs were described more generally, MSR spelled them out in more details. Targeted survey results from MSA (N=143) show that MSAs do not use all enforcement powers to the same extent. Powers related to information gathering, on-site inspections and carrying out investigations are used most routinely as they form the core of day‑to‑day market surveillance activity. By contrast, enforcement powers to request corrective actions are regularly used, although given ineffectiveness of enforcement action on third country operators, especially in cases where an economic operator is established in the EU and cooperative. The least frequently used powers are product destruction (as the power is limited to products inspected at the border), undercover sampling (“mystery shopping”), or the systematic imposition of penalties. Regarding the powers against online offers, MSAs report that they most frequently request the removal of individual listings by online marketplaces, while the power to restrict access to online interfaces is less used. 

Before the entry into application of the MSR, market surveillance powers differed amongst Member States. 48  The 2017 IA highlighted that MSAs’ powers were unevenly distributed within Member States and across the EU. Investigative powers were widely available, but their scope varied across product sectors. In this regard, one of the main objectives of the MSR was to establish a minimum standard of market surveillance powers.

Regarding the effectiveness of these powers, MSAs largely consider their existing powers as effective, notably when applied to the products sold in a traditional way. A large majority of authorities (73%, N=136) consider the powers to require economic operators to bring a product into compliance to be effective, notably when comes to the power to require information and documentation from economic operators (74%, N=137), to carry out unannounced inspections and physical checks (80%, N=136), to initiate investigations on their own initiative (85%, N=136), to destroy the product or render it inoperable (70%, N=135), to require economic operators to alert end users at risk (68%, N=136), or to prohibit or restrict the sale of a product (86%, N=137).

However, enforcement powers targeting non-compliant products sold online are seen as ineffective. Targeted survey data from MSAs show that these powers (such as requesting content removal related to the product, requiring warnings to be displayed, or restricting access to an online interface) are considered the least effective overall, with less than half of respondents (49%) considering them effective, 13% expressing a neutral opinion, and 21% considering them ineffective. These requests oftentimes result only in a temporary removal of a product, as the non-compliant product frequently reappears under slightly modified listings, different seller accounts, or on other marketplaces. This pattern is consistently documented across multiple independent sources. Investigations by BEUC show that, even where online platforms comply with removal requests, dangerous or non‑compliant products often remain available through alternative listings 49 . Similar conclusions are drawn from industry‑led exercises involving coordinated mystery shopping of toys on major online marketplaces 50 .

With regard to the power to require information society service providers to restrict access to an online interface, evidence shows mixed views among MSAs. Article 14.4(k) MSR confers on MSAs the power to require OMs to remove product offers only as a matter of last resort and only in cases concerning products presenting serious risk. If such an order is not complied with, MSAs can require information society service providers to restrict access to the online interface. The GPSR further empowers MSAs to remove offers of products found unsafe and to require the OMs to remove all identical offers of an OMs for a prescribed period of time. However, these powers are not applicable to products found non-compliant for reasons other than safety. As noted by a CASP report, the powers are potentially strong enforcement instruments where no other effective means are available. 51  At the same time, a German national case on DNS blocking 52 highlights that this power is cumbersome and difficult to apply in practice. In addition, it does not prevent the continued sale of non‑compliant products, which often reappear through alternative domains, platforms or sellers. This results in a limited use of the power, as confirmed by a survey conducted in the framework of the EUPCN, 53 showing that only around 21% of MSAs reported having used these powers. Feedback from MSAs consistently indicates that threshold required to demonstrate a “serious risk” is burdensome and legal procedures lengthy.

In fact, MSAs face persistent difficulties in using their powers relating to goods manufactured by non-EU manufacturers. This is confirmed by the results of the public consultation, with 82% of respondents (N=154) across stakeholder groups agreeing that the current market surveillance framework is overall not fit for the purpose of tackling challenges posed by e-commerce. 54 In addition, 65% of 154 respondents of the public consultation agree that non-compliant products imported from third countries via e-commerce are not prevented from entering the Union market. 55  The powers thus have little deterrent effect discouraging economic operators from placing non‑compliant products on the Single Market. MSAs note that the legal framework is considered too restrictive, as their powers are in some cases limited to cases of serious risk, while non‑compliant products would not be tolerated in physical retail settings.

Evidence shows that while the power to acquire product samples in an offline setting is used and generally effective, the power to conduct so-called mystery shopping – acquiring samples under a cover identity – is rarely effective in practice. Regarding the power to purchase test samples, according to MSA survey responses, offline sampling is widely used and operationally effective (76%, N=136). In contrast, MSAs are more divided on mystery shopping, with less than half of the respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that it is widely used and operationally effective (48%, N=136), and 17% neutral and 16% disagree or strongly disagree. When asked about challenges with mystery shopping, targeted survey responses indicate that its effectiveness is hampered by a combination of legal, operational, and resource-related factors, particularly when carried out online.

The power to impose penalties is rarely and inconsistently used. As found in the Article 4 Evaluation 56 , MSAs lack the legal power to impose penalties on fraudulent economic operators outside the EU. In fact, several Member States report that they do not collect any penalties at all 57 . This leads to weak deterrence effect of the MSR, also evidenced by public consultation, where only 25% of respondents (39 out of 154) found the penalty regimes laid down by the MSR for non-compliant products to be dissuasive. Finally, based on the MSA responses to the targeted survey, current penalty collection rate is estimated at about 50% (N=150), with domestic collection working well in some Member States, while cross-border collection and collection of economic operators located outside the EU is near-zero.

-Use of corrective measures by MSAs

Pursuant to Article 16 of the MSR, MSAs - when they find that a product subject to Union harmonisation legislation is liable to compromise the health or safety of users or does not conform to such legislation - must without delay require the relevant economic operator to take appropriate and proportionate corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end or to eliminate the risk. Corrective actions that MSAs may require economic operators to take include rectifying formal non-compliance, preventing the sale of the product on the market, withdrawing or recalling it immediately, destroying it or otherwise rendering it inoperable, affixing to the product warnings of the risks that it might present, or alerting end users. The MSR contemplates that economic operators may take voluntary measures, that is, corrective actions not required by MSAs. If an economic operator fails to take appropriate corrective action or where the non-compliance or the risk persists, the MSR grants MSAs itself the power to prohibit or restrict the product or to order that it is withdrawn or recalled.

Over 2019-2025, MSAs have requested economic operators to take more mandatory measures where they have not done so voluntarily, but the share of cases where MSAs requested no measures is predominant, reflecting difficulties in identifying responsible economic operators. The share of all investigations recorded in ICSMS requiring at least one compulsory corrective measure rose from 22% in 2019 to 26% in 2025 (taking data limitations into account). In contrast, fewer voluntary measures were taken by economic operators reflecting decreasing willingness to take measures voluntarily, falling from a peak of 21% in 2020 to just 9% in 2025. However, the share of cases where no measures were requested remains predominant with around 60% over 2021-2025. This reflects difficulties with identifying responsible economic operators. According to JACOP 2024 report, among corrective measures taken by the authorities, requests to the EOs to change/improve the products were the most common (21%), followed by withdrawals (15%), requests to mark a product with warnings (14%) and recalls (13%). In terms of effectiveness, evidence shows that corrective actions are generally effective and implemented when authorities request them to be taken by clearly identifiable EU‑established economic operators (see Annex 6 for more details). Targeted survey replies indicate that corrective actions are generally perceived as effective. A clear majority of respondents to the targeted survey states that market surveillance measures bring non‑compliance to an end (65%, N= 276) 58 and that corrective actions requested by authorities are usually implemented by economic operators (64%, N=271). 59  

However, limitations in timeliness and enforcement reach can be observed. The JACOP report highlights that enforcement procedures are often slowed by administrative complexity, due‑process safeguards and national procedural requirements, which can reduce the deterrent effect of corrective actions, especially in rapidly evolving markets.

Effectiveness of corrective measures is further weakened in cross‑border contexts. Around a third of survey respondents (30%, N=273) consider that measures adopted in one Member State are effectively applied in other Member States. 60 MSAs flag that cross‑border enforcement relies on voluntary cooperation and informal follow‑up, and that measures issued nationally do not result in equivalent action in other Member States, even when information is shared via ICSMS. The most significant effectiveness gap concerns cases involving economic operators established outside the EU, with the majority of survey respondents agreeing that enforcing corrective measures is substantially more difficult in such cases (88%, N=276). 61  

-Rights and obligations of economic operators

Overall, the MSR sets clear obligations for economic operators in the Single Market, as confirmed by 64% of respondents of the targeted survey (176 out of 274, both economic operators and MSAs). The rights and obligations of economic operators - namely manufacturers, authorised representatives, importers, distributors, and fulfilment service providers - are set out in a structured manner in the MSR. Pursuant to Articles 4 and 5, a product may only be placed on the market if there is an economic operator established in the Union who is responsible for certain tasks related to product compliance. EU-based manufacturers, importers, authorised representatives (ARs), or fulfilment service providers, where no other economic operator is established in the EU, are responsible economic operators under this provision. In addition, Article 7 imposes cooperation obligations on economic operators and on information society service providers.

Regarding the tasks of responsible economic operators, they are found to be clear, but implementation difficulties arise in practice 62 . First, the evaluation of Article 4 found out that economic operators report that the obligation to verify and retain compliance documentation is not systematically implemented. Second, concerning the provision of information and documentation to MSAs upon reasoned request, both economic operators and MSAs report recurring difficulties. Once requests are made, economic operators often need to retrieve documentation from third parties, adapt it to national language requirements 63 , or clarify responsibilities. This results in a significant number of cases, where economic operators either do not reply, reply only after a delay, or indicate that they do not hold the documentation or the mandate required to respond substantively. Third, the obligation to inform MSAs when economic operators have reason to believe that a product present is rarely triggered on the economic operators’ own initiative. Finally, some economic operators report practical constraints in fulfilling the obligation to cooperate with MSAs, including following a request to take corrective actions. This is particularly the case for economic operators such as fulfilment service providers.

Yet, as concluded in the evaluation of Article 4, market surveillance authorities encounter difficulties to identify the responsible economic operators and hold them accountable for their product compliance-related responsibilities under Article 4 MSR, particularly for products sold online from third countries. Out the universe of EU-based responsible economic operators, market surveillance authorities have particular problems to identify authorised representatives of foreign manufacturers, as Article 4 contains no mechanism to verify their existence. It can be estimated that about 60% of products sold online on the EU market can currently not be traced to a responsible economic operator established in the EU, out of which 85% is attributable to the inability to identify the authorised representative 64 . In addition, a JAHARP report 65 finds that Article 4 alone is insufficient to address the scale and nature of non‑compliance in e‑commerce, as most problematic products are sold without any EU‑based economic operator involved. The report also found that many entities named as authorised representatives in online product listings lack a valid designation or are incorrectly designated by sellers or platforms without manufacturer involvement, making their role legally void. In other cases, fake authorised representatives are mentioned together with difficulties in verifying whether an authorised representative has actually been appointed by the manufacturer 66 .

Stakeholders confirm that issues with authorised representatives represent a critical enforcement challenge. In particular, 77% of survey respondents (N = 275, among all stakeholders group) indicated that enforcement is hindered because, in practice, an authorised representative often does not exist or cannot be reached. Interviews with MSAs estimate that in 90% of cases, the authorised representative cannot be found or verified. Finally, the respondents of the public consultation confirm that view, as over half disagrees that the MSR provides adequate mechanisms to enforce authorised representatives’ obligations (54%, N=148), including 60% of public authorities and 48% of businesses.

In addition, where authorised representatives are formally indicated and identified, the level of their responsibilities is too low. This is confirmed by the survey, where 67% of respondents (N = 272) report difficulties with responsibilities of authorised representatives. 67

Moreover, Article 4 applies only to products subject to 20 of the 70 pieces of Union harmonisation legislation covered by the MSR, leaving a significant gap not covered by the MSR nor by its equivalent. In addition, 16 other pieces of Union harmonisation legislation impose Article 4-like requirements. Yet a large majority of respondents to the public consultation (92%, N = 154) agree, of which 123 agree strongly, that an EU-based responsible economic operator should be required for all harmonised products. 68  

Finally, the evaluation on Article 4 also finds that fulfilment service providers (FSPs) represent a recurring enforcement challenge under Article 4, due to the low awareness of their responsibility and limited visibility in supply chains. Fulfilment Service Providers (FSPs) are companies that offer warehousing, packaging, addressing and dispatching. 69 Under Article 4 they can be made responsible for product compliance in case no other EU-based economic operator is available. However, both MSAs and other stakeholders report structural difficulties in translating this legal role into effective enforcement outcomes, as also evidenced by the JAHARP report. 70 A key issue identified in the study is that many FSPs are not aware of their responsibilities under Article 4 and frequently do not recognise themselves as falling within the scope of Article 4. While bigger platforms and major market players are generally aware of the responsibilities, smaller operators often do not consider themselves subject to Article 4. The Joint action report also identifies difficulties in identifying FSPs and establishing their role in the supply chain. FSPs are rarely visible on online product listings, and information on warehousing, packaging and dispatch is typically not disclosed.

Providers of online marketplaces (OMs), as providers of intermediary services, do not fall into the definition of economic operators under Article 2 of the MSR. As a result, amongst others, MSAs cannot exercise their powers on them. This is confirmed by stakeholders: lack of effective enforcement powers for online trade (e.g. towards marketplaces) is quoted as a second biggest challenge related to market surveillance. In addition, 73% of respondents (113 out of 154) to the public consultation agree that boosting the responsibilities of OMs would have a positive effect on market surveillance and increase product compliance. 71  

Cooperation obligations on information society service providers stemming from Article 7 are necessary but limited. An information society service provider is a company that delivers digital services online. Under this Article, information society service providers are required, upon request and in specific cases, to cooperate with MSAs to facilitate any action taken to eliminate or, if that is not possible, to mitigate the risks presented by a product that is or was offered for sale online through their services. Evidence show that this provision has strengthened cooperation in individual cases has had limited effect in addressing repeated, large‑scale or systemic non‑compliance in online markets. Across interviews, stakeholders broadly confirm that Article 7 establishes a necessary but limited cooperation framework for information society service providers.

4.1.1.5 To what extent has the MSR improved operational enforcement capacity and resources? (SO2)

-Operational enforcement capacity

Views from stakeholders confirm that insufficient enforcement capacity is one of the major challenges for market surveillance across the EU. Issue of capacity and resources for market surveillance were quoted by the market surveillance authorities in the targeted survey as the most common challenge for market surveillance (205 respondents out of 287, or 71%) 72 , in particular when it comes to insufficient human and financial resources and increased workload. Similarly, the public consultation indicates that 54% of respondents (n=148) disagreed or strongly disagreed (30% and 24%, respectively) that the resources allocated to market surveillance activities in their Member State have been adequate. 73  A 2025 JRC study shows that focus of EU‑level inspection volumes is highly uneven: consumer‑oriented product groups are often adequately or over‑inspected, whereas large industrial categories are significantly under‑represented, and only a small number of Member States achieve inspection levels proportionate to their market size. 74  

In addition, enforcement capacity varies across the Member States, fragmenting the Single Market. This can be reflected by a large dispersion in the number of inspections recorded in ICSMS, ranging from 9 to 1284 notifications per million of population across Member States (while taking into account data limitations - see Section 1.1). Stakeholders confirm that resources are not allocated at a comparable level across the EU, with 93 of the 148 respondents of the public consultation (63%). 75

-Human and financial resources

The MSR requires Member States to ensure that their MSAs have the necessary resources - including sufficient budgetary and other resources, such as a sufficient number of competent personnel, expertise, procedures - for the proper performance of their duties. This notwithstanding, overall human and budgetary resource remain inadequate.

Overall, evidence suggests the resources allocated to market surveillance remain broadly insufficient to ensure enforcement across the EU. A 2024 PROSAFE report indicates that the resources available to MSAs for compliance checks generally remain inadequate, prompting authorities to rely heavily on prioritisation practices, such as targeting specific product characteristics or types of economic operators.

Since the entry into application of the MSR, available evidence suggests that budgets of Member States form market surveillance have remained broadly unchanged between 2021 and 2025. The average budget for MSAs (excluding labour costs) decreased from around 5.97 million in 2014-2016 (before the entry into force of the Regulation) to EUR 5.76 million in 2020-2022 76 . While no robust estimates for 2019 exist, the total annual market surveillance budgets across the EU-27 amounted to about EUR 153 million in 2022, excluding staff costs. While it is very challenging to put that number into perspective and make a comparison with the total costs incurred before the MSR due to data availability, available evidence suggest that budgets have remained practically unchanged on average in the period 2021-2025, and in many cases even decreased in nominal terms 77 . The total annual budget (incl. staff costs) could thus be estimated at around EUR 650 million or 0.008% of total EU public spending 78 – in comparison France (as the only Member State with available data) spends 0.1% of public expenditure in 2025 only for customs 79 . Across reporting countries, the nominal budgets grew by 5.6% over the period, with growth rates ranging from -4.5% to +15.1%. After adjusting for country-specific inflation (HICP deflators), average real budget growth drops to just 0.7%, ranging from -7.6% to +8.9%, with half of the countries (5 out of 11) experiencing a real decline in their market surveillance budgets over the period. In addition, when accounting for the market size in different Member States for comparison purposes, JRC reports that national market surveillance budgets show a substantial dispersion in funding across Member States (ranging from around EUR 0.2 million to EUR 157 million per EUR 1 million of market value). The public consultation shows that 63% of respondents (n=148) disagree that all EU Member States have allocated a comparable level of resources.

Similarly to the budgetary resources, average MSA staffing remained essentially unchanged in the 2019-2025 period 80 . According to the JRC study 81 , the total number of FTEs in market surveillance increased between 2019 and 2022 but it remains low. The study also notes that data on FTEs were considered very imprecise due to different calculation methods, definitions, and scope. While it is not possible to provide a robust comparison due to the lack of complete data, partial data received from MSAs, points to a marginal decline in the total number of staff (in FTEs) available for market surveillance activities by -0.1% for the 2019-2025 period. At the country level, the average growth rate was 1.5%, ranging from -4.8% to +9.8%, with 4 of 11 countries recording a net decline. Overall available data suggests that staffing levels have remained broadly stable or slightly decreasing over the 2019-2025 period. Based on the current estimations, the total staff dedicated to market surveillance is around 10 000 FTEs 82 , which is limited compared to 82 700 in customs. 83  

-Testing capacity

Overall lack of testing capacity is reflected by the composition of checks, the product sectors they are performed in, and the Member States they are performed by. In 2024, 336 product groups and 9 172 specific models of products underwent testing, out of which more than a half of tested product groups can be attributed to one Member State, and seven Member States account for majority of products models tested. 84 More than half of all tested product models were concentrated in six sectors (i.e., Ecodesign, Chemicals, Toys, Hazardous Substances, Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment, Low Voltage Directive and Cosmetics) confirming that laboratory capacity is primarily directed towards core regulatory areas. Looking at the composition of checks in 2024 and 2025, the data show that, at an aggregate level, across the two years, documentary checks accounted for 47% of checks, 33% were physical checks, and 20% were laboratory checks. This is also confirmed by a recent EP study finding that access to sufficient testing capacity remains uneven and insufficient. 85

Stakeholders recognise the value of Union testing facilities (EUTFs), but the current capacity is insufficient to ease pressure on national resources. Evidence from the public consultation indicates persistent resource constraints, with 40% of respondents disagreeing that existing EUTFs have alleviated national capacity constraints linked to product checks. While MSAs were generally in agreement that EUTFs constitute a useful tool, a notable share expressed the view that existing facilities is not sufficient. Despite high levels of uncertainty, 33% agreed that testing facilities allow them to obtain reliable results for complex cases; while 43% agree that access to the facilities allows them to avoid potential conflict of interest. On the other hand, 30% disagree that their authority has sufficient access to EUTFs, when necessary, with only 18% agreeing that access is sufficient for their needs. Furthermore 50% disagree that the number of EUTFs is adequate to support market surveillance activities with only 5% indicating this number is sufficient.

While the number of EUTFs available has increased, challenges remain with regarding sufficient testing capacity across Member States. Article 21 of the MSR allows the Commission to designate EUTFs to increase product testing capacity. The Commission designated the Communications Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania as the EUTF for radio equipment 86 and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) 87 ; France’s Service Commun des Laboratoires as the EUTF for toys 88 ; Austria’s HBLFA as EUTF for Ecodesign and Energy Labelling 89 . However, 69% of MSAs who expressed their view in the targeted survey (79 out of 114), the number of laboratories is not adequate to support market surveillance activities. In fact, as noted by Commission’s experts working on the EUTFs, the designation of new laboratories is challenging due to a tedious and time-consuming two-step designation and financing process, creating unnecessary overhead that discourage candidate laboratories. Also, conditions for EUTFs are very stringent - currently EUTFs must be public entities and can only serve public entities (excluding private sector clients) - which limits the financial attractiveness of the status. In addition, MSAs utilise 25% of the total testing capacity of the EUTFs, as the access to EUTFs testing is subject to the EU and national public procurement procedures.

-IT tools and digitalisation

Digital tools such as ICSMS and Safety Gate support operational capacity by facilitating systematic information sharing, case documentation and coordination across Member States. ICSMS is the EU’s internal platform used by market surveillance authorities to share information on inspections and non-compliant products, while Safety Gate is the EU rapid alert system that enables authorities to report and coordinate responses to dangerous non-food products across Member States. The two IT tools are the main reporting systems for MSAs on products found non-compliant and unsafe. While both tools predate the MSR, the Regulation strengthened their role within the enforcement framework (including by making ICSMS mandatory for in-depth checks of compliance in 2021), although their effectiveness in practice remains limited by uneven uptake and interoperability challenges.

While accounting for data limitations (see Section 1.1), trends in both inspections launched in ICSMS and alerts recorded in Safety Gate indicate an increasing use of the systems over time, but the overall coverage remains limited. Total Safety Gate alerts nearly doubled from 2 150 in 2019 to 4 645 in 2025 (approx. 116% increase), suggesting a marked intensification of activity over time. ICSMS data show a similar trajectory: the number of individual MSAs that have created at least one record in ICSMS increased, from about 230-250 in the years 2019 to 2021 to 408 by 2025 (see Annex VI). The overall number of investigations also rose, indicating substantial growth in the system’s use for documenting enforcement activity. However, ICSMS does not provide a fully comprehensive picture of EU market surveillance activity: as estimated by the JRC, only 10% of all investigations are recorded in ICSMS 90 . In addition, data quality of investigations reported in ICSMS is inconsistent, with entries being recorded in different languages, with different level of details, and with important information missing. The targeted survey of MSAs confirms these findings: a large majority of respondents finds that the use of ICSMS varies across Member States (133 out of 170 MSAs, or 78%), and that completeness and quality of data vary across Member States (137 out of 170 MSAs, or 81%). Consequently, exchange of information across Member States and reliance on findings in other MSAs is poor, which is confirmed by 113 out of 170 MSAs (66%). This in turn impacts resources as the same product is often assessed multiple times in different Member States, generating unnecessary costs.

Regarding the effectiveness of these tools in supporting capacity, stakeholders' views are mixed. When MSAs responding to the public consultation were asked to what extent they believe ICSMS has fulfilled its mandate of improving the sharing, processing, and storage of information related to the enforcement of EU product rules (N=45), a majority expressed a positive view, with 60% agreeing or strongly agreeing that ICSMS has fulfilled this mandate, 24% disagreed, while 13% were neutral on the issue.

As highlighted in a 2023 EP study, the effectiveness of the tools remains constrained by several factors. These include ongoing interoperability issues with national databases and other EU systems, significant disparities in usage across Member States, and insufficient harmonisation of implementation and operational practices, all of which can undermine their contribution to coherent and effective market surveillance at Union level. 91

In fact, many Member States rely on one or multiple national IT tools, on top of ICSMS, which increases administrative burden for reporting and bears important costs. At present, many authorities continue to rely on domestic case-management tools. According to a survey among the MSAs, 60% of MSAs (100 out of 166) report the need to use other systems than ICSMS, with the reported number of distinct IT tools exceeding 194 (partial data for 24 Member States, total number is likely to be much higher). Among those national systems, 84% are not connected to ICSMS 92 . As the MSR includes a requirement to record in ICSMS all in-depth checks, this multitude of IT tools poses an administrative burden on authorities. It is estimated that unnecessary administrative burden from duplications in recording reaches EUR 5 billion 93 . A large majority of respondents of the targeted survey finds that reliance on parallel national tools creates duplication and administrative burden (105 out of 170 MSAs, or 62%).

Limited linkages of ICSMS with other EU IT tools, including tools used in customs, creates an additional layer of administrative burden for authorities. Currently, ICSMS is not linked to several sectoral databases (e.g. EUDAMED covering medical devices, and CPNP on cosmetic products), while the link to Safety Gate (used for dangerous products) only allows for the flow of information from ICSMS to Safety Gate, and not the other way around. This means that reporting obligations are duplicated at EU level, creating additional administrative burden. A large majority of MSAs replying to the public consultation (39 out of 45 MSAs, 87%) agreed that a greater synergy between digital databases and tools across relevant EU acts would boost market surveillance. Similarly, the majority of MSAs (67%, N=169) who replied to the targeted survey disagreed that the digital tools supporting the EU market surveillance system are sufficiently interconnected with other relevant IT systems (customs systems, nationals). In particular, web crawlers, used by national authorities in the detection of online offers of dangerous products, were most frequently perceived as insufficiently interconnected with ICSMS.

4.1.1.6 To what extent has the MSR achieved reinforced cooperation procedures? (SO3)

-Cooperation between competent authorities within Member States

Following the MSR’s introduction, national market surveillance systems have evolved toward more coordinated and structured governance arrangements, which strengthened the coordination of relevant authorities within Member States. However, different governance systems exist in Member States, which has an impact on cooperation. In sum, the majority of respondents of the targeted survey (52%, 122 out of 233) consider that the Regulation has enhanced cooperation between competent authorities within Member States. 94  

Since the application of the MSR, Member States have broadly adapted their systems in ways that have strengthened coordination, including through the appointment of SLOs. Under the MSR, Single Liaison Offices (SLOs) coordinate market surveillance activities at national level and facilitate cooperation and information exchange between Member States and the European Commission. According to an EP study on compliance, surveyed MSAs pointed to the benefits of more centralised national governance through the appointment of SLOs. 95 According to surveyed stakeholders 73% (n=45), SLOs have appropriately represented the coordinated position of the MSAs in their Member State. Evidence from open survey responses and interviews indicates that SLOs have strengthened coordination within Member States.

While patterns differ across Member States, cooperation between MSAs and customs authorities within Member States remains in some cases constrained by procedural complexity, capacity limitations and limited IT integration. Since the MSR’s adoption, progress regarding cooperation between MSAs and customs authorities has been uneven and differs in nature, as some Member States report streamlined procedures, while others note only marginal improvements and ongoing challenges. 96 In practice, as set up by MSR the customs authorities make a first check of a product and, even in cases where the non-compliance is obvious, they must refer their finding to an MSAs. MSAs in turn must revert to customs within four days whether to continue the suspension or not, and as a next step issue a decision on the refusal or release of the product. In practice, this system creates administrative burden (linked to communication, shipping samples to MSAs) and duplication of work in cases where there is no need for a specialised expertise to declare that a product is non-compliant. In practice, overloaded MSAs do not reply to customs within four days and customs are obliged to release the products, even in cases where they are obviously non-compliant. While exact numbers of these instances do not exist, Commission data reports that in 2025 only 26% of goods suspended by customs were refused, following the decision of MSAs. 97 In comparison, during the Priority Control Area actions in 2025 with enhanced mobilisation of both customs and market surveillance authorities, this ratio was found to be 83%. This illustrates that market surveillance authorities do not cope with the workload at the border in the current system. However, it is also important to note that in some Member States, such as France and Finland, customs authorities also serve as MSAs. In these cases, no formal notification from customs to MSAs of any suspension for the release of a product for free circulation is required, as customs authorities can independently assess whether a product is compliant or poses a serious risk and act accordingly.

In terms of barriers to effective cooperation between MSAs and customs within Member States, persistent issues include limitation to digital tools, as well as differences in working methods and lack of clearly attributed counterparts 98 . According to the MSAs and customs authorities consulted in the Article 4 evaluation, operational IT integration between MSA and customs systems is still not in place. Customs authorities reported that they continue to communicate with MSAs primarily by e‑mail and rely on the Customs Risk Management System for sharing risk information. The interconnection between the EU Customs Single Window Certificate Exchange System (EU CSW-CERTEX) and ICSMS was established at EU level in accordance with the legal deadline in December 2025. It is since then available for Member States customs administrations to interconnect, on a voluntary basis, their national customs systems to EU CSW-CERTEX. While several MS have announced their intention to interconnect, as of the time of writing, no MS has completed the interconnection. In addition, the cooperation between customs and MSAs is hindered by a mismatch in working methods and lack of clearly attributed counterparts.

-Cooperation between competent authorities of different Member States

Cross-border cooperation takes place in the EU at an insufficient level. Based on the targeted survey of MSAs, the share of investigations conducted jointly between MSAs in different EU Member States is estimated, on average, at only 13% of all national investigations. In addition, based on the targeted survey, each MSA participates only in approximately 4.3 collaborative actions per year. Finally, in 2025, MSAs reported an average of only 8 cases of mutual assistance cooperation (either through requests for information or enforcement requests), with only 47 enforcement requests sent in total across all 14 responding countries. This low volume reflects that only approximately 1.7% of investigation cases recorded in ICSMS during 2024 involved cross-border handling (taking into account data limitations – see Section 1.1). 99 According to the 2023 EP report 100 , cross-border cooperation is hindered by a lack of clearly attributed counterparts in different Member States, different national strategic priorities (also stemming from geographical position and market characteristics), differences in working methods, as well as limited functionalities of ICSMS in terms of translations impeding exchange of information.

The insufficient and uneven picture is supported by stakeholders. Less than half of respondents of the targeted questionnaire consider that the MSR has enhanced cooperation between competent authorities across Member States (48%, N=230). 101 In addition, 73% of respondents to the targeted survey agree that there are differences in the level of practical cross-border cooperation between Member States. 102  

However, joint actions remain a popular mechanism for coordination, though evidence does not indicate a significant increase in their use over time. According to the targeted survey, over half of MSAs or other authorities (N=167) have participated in joint actions or activities (54%). However, looking at trends from 2013 to the present, there is no evidence of a sustained increase in joint action reports following the MSR’s adoption in 2021.

Figure 7 – Joint action reports (2013- 2024)

Source: Own elaboration based on JRC. Note: Data reflects completed and ongoing joint actions.

Despite their perceived value, some stakeholders highlight that joint actions remain burdensome and could be further improved. Overall, 56% of authorities of the public consultation (N=45) agree that joint activities have contributed meaningfully to EU market surveillance. Interviewed SLOs highlighted both the benefits and limitations of joint actions. While stakeholders generally agreed that any form of cooperation is valuable, several noted that joint actions are often limited in scope relative to the size of national markets. Some SLOs cautioned that joint actions can be resource‑intensive, with benefits not always clearly proportional to the effort required, while others stressed their particular value for smaller Member States, for whom joint actions can make market surveillance activities feasible at all.

Mutual assistance mechanisms (MSMs) are contributing to enhanced cooperation between authorities, but their use remains concentrated among a few Member States and overall growth is limited, with current available evidence showing only isolated examples of effective collaboration. MSMs envisaged under Article 22 and Article 23 are designed to facilitate cooperation. MSMs include requests for information (which enable authorities to request necessary info across borders) or requests for enforcement actions (which enable them to request authorities in other Member States to implement enforcement measures). JRC report 103 for 2023121 indicates an increasing use of these cooperation mechanisms, but largely concentrated among a small group of Member States. Overall, according to the predominant view of MSAs in the public consultation (44% vs 36% respectively), cross‑border mutual assistance has only contributed marginally to EU market surveillance, suggesting that its effectiveness in practice remains uneven across Member States.

EU‑level coordination structures such as SLOs, the EUPCN, expert groups and AdCos play a central role in strengthening cooperation and knowledge‑sharing between authorities, and evidence suggests they have become increasingly important under the MSR. EU working bodies foster cooperation and information exchange between MS. As highlighted in an EP study, MSAs pointed to the benefits of more centralised national governance through the appointment of SLOs, as outlined in Article 10 of the MSR, and praised the role of EU-level working bodies for facilitating cooperation and knowledge sharing 104 . Additionally, expert working groups and joint actions were recognised as effective tools for tackling specific challenges and clarifying ambiguities in the harmonisation of legislation. According to surveyed MSAs (N=167), 63% indicate that there has been an improvement in pooling of expertise due to enhanced cooperation of MSAs at EU level (e.g. AdCos, EUPCN). 82% of MSAs who responded to the public consultation deem the EUPCN successful in boosting cooperation between MSAs across Member States. Views are more divided (40% agree compared to 16% who disagree, N=45) on whether it has sufficiently streamlined market surveillance practices. SLOs are also viewed positively in terms of their contribution towards ensuring cooperation between MSAs (56%, N=45).

4.1.1.7 What external factors and unintended effects (if any) have affected progress towards the objectives and how are they linked to the MSR?

Legal developments after the entry into application have positive effect on the compliance and safety of products. factors are identified as having an impact on effectiveness of the MSR. In particular, the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) entered into force in 2023 and strengthened product safety rules for the EU Single Market, particularly for online sales. Chapter IV introduced additional obligations for providers of online marketplaces and enabled coordinated EU enforcement actions, improving online product compliance. In addition, the Digital Services Act (DSA) became fully applicable in 2024 and introduced systemic enforcement obligations for online platforms, including OMs. The DSA strengthened oversight of very large online platforms through Commission-led investigations and platform-wide compliance measures.

However, other factors contribute negatively to the effectiveness of the MSR.

First, limited consumer awareness contributes to the persistence of non-compliance, as consumers are generally unable to assess whether products meet EU requirements, particularly in online environments. Evidence shows that consumers tend to assume products offered online are safe and compliant, while in reality many products sold via online marketplaces do not meet EU safety rules and are directly imported from outside the EU, exposing consumers to risks they are not able to identify at the point of purchase 105 .

Second, evolving trade patterns, combined with the structural shift towards e-commerce via new business models, have increased the volume of products entering the Union market while reducing the effectiveness of traditional controls (see Section 4.1.1.1).

Third, the fast-evolving nature of EU product legislation increases the complexity of compliance. Continuously updated regulatory requirements, also due to emergence of new technologies and safety risks, create challenges for economic operators to comply and authorities to develop necessary expertise 106 .

4.1.2 Efficiency

4.1.2.1What were the costs of the intervention?

The implementation of MSR lead to costs for both MSAs, EU and economic operators.

a)Costs for MSAs

The MSR, Art.10(5), posits that in order to carry out market surveillance of products made available online and offline with the same effectiveness for all distribution channels, Member States shall ensure necessary resources. However, it is important to note that not all costs incurred by the MSAs can be attributed in their entirety to the MSR, because these costs include activities required by both national and sectoral legislation.

Since the entry into application of the MSR, budgets of Member States for market surveillance have stagnated between 2021 and 2025, while the average MSA staffing remained essentially unchanged in the 2019-2025 period 107 . While no robust estimates for 2019 exists, the total annual market surveillance budgets across the EU-27 amounted to about EUR 153 million in 2022, excluding staff costs. 108 Despite methodological difficulties, available data suggest that the average real MSR budget growth across EU countries amounts to just 0.7% (see Section 4.1.1.5 for more information). 109 Recent data on staffing received from MSAs points to a marginal decline in the total number of staff (in FTEs) available for market surveillance activities by -0.1% for the 2019-2025 period. 110 Based on the current estimations, the total staff dedicated to market surveillance is around 10 000 FTEs (see Section 4.1.1.5). 111  

As evidenced by the Article 4 evaluation, the MSR entry into force does not seem to have increased substantially the costs related to checks performed by MSAs. Recent information from MSAs points to the average duration of about 3 hours for simple checks (or EUR 120) and 8.44 hours for an in-depth compliance check (or EUR 340). 112 Compared to estimates pre-dating MSR, this duration is stable for simple checks while some increase in efficiency for in-depth compliance checks can be observed, although the data is partial. 113 Case-specific factors may affect the time, such as cooperation with economic operators in third countries and identification of responsible EU-based economic operators. Overall, the Art.4 implementation report 114 finds that most MSAs (70 out of 108) did not, according to the performed survey, experience any changes in the cost of market surveillance since Article 4 became applicable. These observations are also confirmed by the data received from the MSAs, where the costs in real terms for documentary checks, physical checks, and laboratory tests remain are stable over 2019-2025.

Many Member States rely on one or multiple national IT tools, on top of ICSMS, which decreases efficiencies through unnecessary administrative burden for reporting and bears important cost. At present, many authorities continue to rely on domestic case-management tools, customs interfaces, laboratory databases, and sector-specific registries that do not always communicate seamlessly with EU-level platforms. According to an ICSMS-specific survey of MSAs, 60% of MSAs (100 out of 166) report the need to use other systems than ICSMS. 191 distinct IT tools were reported (partial data for 24 Member States, the total number is likely to be much higher) out of which 84% are not connected to ICSMS. In fact, MSA experts note that about 30 minutes are needed to record a case in ICSMS, in contrast to 20 minutes in a national system. This multitude of IT tools poses an administrative burden on authorities estimated at around EUR 5 million of recurring administrative costs due to duplications in reporting. 115 In turn, a large majority of respondents finds that reliance on parallel national tools creates administrative burden (105 out of 170 MSAs, or 62%). At EU level, the costs of encoding cases in ICSMS for 2025 are estimated at EUR 867 thousand 116 . Finally, limited interoperability of ICSMS with other EU IT tools, including tools used in customs, creates an additional layer of administrative burden for authorities. This means that reporting obligations are duplicated at EU level, creating additional administrative burden estimated at EUR 8 million recurrent annual costs. 117  

Overall, the total costs for MSAs stemming from MSR remain stable since the entry into application of the MSR.

-Costs for economic operators

The overall compliance costs stemming from MSR for businesses are limited and in line with expectations. Annual MSR compliance costs for businesses (incl. manufacturers, importers, authorised representatives) are estimated at 0 to 0.03% of turnover, close to the 0.05% anticipated in the original IA. 118 The MSR did not substantially increase costs for economic operators. However, business associations noted in the interviews that it is very challenging to disaggregate MSR compliance costs from the costs of product-specific legislation. While compliance costs typically account for a larger share of turnover for smaller firms, the MSR-related compliance costs did not heavily weigh on any type of companies, including SMEs, given their limited amounts.

These costs include administrative costs to draw up, keep records of and show to MSAs the EU declaration of conformity or the technical documentation for their products (Art.4). Most respondents in the Art.4 evaluation did not observe changes since the entry into application of the MSR in the duration of MSA compliance checks. Targeted survey suggests a median of around 2.8 hours per investigation to verify that the EU declaration of conformity, as well as the technical documentation, have been drawn up (N=24). Several respondents also stressed that the process could take much longer when information must be collected from third-country suppliers, as well as for more complex products.

The cost for economic operators also includes costs to cooperate with EU MSAs. Art. 4 evaluation did not observe changes in the duration of MSA compliance checks. Partial data from businesses (N=13) indicates a range from 2 to 48 hours per check, with a median of around 8 hours. At the same time, several respondents stressed that the duration depends heavily on the type and intensity of the control. In particular, documentary checks may take only a few hours (1-4 hours) as indicated by MSAs in the targeted survey (N=16). More in-depth or physical checks may take days or, most likely, weeks (including waiting times) (N=21). Based on partial data, the cost of a check ranges from EUR 500 to 5,000 (N=5).

As regards to costs stemming from Article 4 for non-EU manufacturers, these remain low but hard to quantify precisely. This is also confirmed by the conclusion of the Article 4 Evaluation study. 119  Authorised representative fees, typically passed onto non-EU manufacturers, range from roughly EUR 200–500 (basic offer) to EUR 3,000–19,000 (large portfolios or high-risk sectors) annually. As noted by business stakeholders during interviews, fees are typically in the range of EUR 1000-8,000. Taking into account the volatility of estimates, costs are broadly in line with the expectations in the IA, where annual fees were expected to range “between about EUR 360 and EUR 1500 per year per business depending on the complexity of products”. Fees also skew higher in highly regulated sectors such as medical devices, where more intensive market surveillance and regulatory oversight are required. Furthermore, it should be highlighted that the service quality varies in terms of infrastructure provided, actual verification of compliance documents, insurance, and responsibility levels. Finally, there are no EU-wide statistics that quantify how many manufacturers use authorised representatives. 

Finally, regarding fulfilment service providers, the Article 4 evaluation concluded that compliance costs for this group of operators are marginal. Input gathered from stakeholders suggests that FSPs explicitly exclude their product compliance responsibility under their contracts with third-country companies and require that an authorised representative be established. Thus, their costs are likely very limited.

Finally, several businesses and business organisations also note additional costs stemming from legal uncertainty or inconsistent implementation (e.g., differing interpretations between Member States, overlapping horizontal rules), which forces repeated “case-by-case” assessments, re-labelling/re-documentation.

Overall, the total cost stemming from MSR for businesses is not significant and in line with expectations.

-Costs for the Union budget

The Union budget costs for market surveillance relate to EU-level support measures aimed at strengthening the enforcement of product safety and compliance rules across the Single Market. These costs include EUTFs, the establishment and operation of the Union Product Compliance Network, support for joint enforcement activities, peer reviews, and the development and maintenance of the Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance (ICSMS), including electronic interfaces with national market surveillance systems and customs authorities.

In 2026, the maximum Union contribution for Market Surveillance actions, amounts to around EUR 17.3 million. As shown in Table 4, the budget has increased between 2021 and 2026 by about EUR 6.5 million in nominal terms. In the 2021-2026 period, the average of the Union budget costs was EUR 14.5 million. The procurement costs in the 2021-2026 period amounted to about EUR 58.5 million, or EUR 9.8 million on average per year. These cover IT developments, joint actions, Administrative and technical secretariats for AdCos, and Union market surveillance campaigns and associated activities, including IT tools and training. The grant costs cover the EUTF costs, i.e. EUR 8 million. The costs for administrative arrangements and other expenditure in the period 2021-2026 are close to EUR 13.9 million, and EUR 3 million on average per year. These cover JRC Technical support and Customs Single Window.

Table 2 – Union budget for Market Surveillance actions (in million EUR)

*Note: An amending decision in 2024 deleted the specific grant section for 2023, but the finalised contribution for that year was adjusted to approximately EUR 11.9 million.

The AdCo costs were expected to reach approximately EUR 1.5 million per year (50 meetings, 20-25 AdCos) and are aligned with realised EUR 1 million in 2022 and EUR 929 000 in 2023. The Single Market Programme IA 120 estimated the necessary funding for the EU Product Compliance Network, including AdCo groups and ICSMS, to be EUR 21 million for the set-up phase of 2020-2022 and an operational budget of EUR 10 million annually from 2023 onwards. While the overall procurement costs are slightly higher, they in the same order of magnitude.

Overall, the costs of the MSR were limited for all stakeholders. On the Member States level this translates however into low funding and staffing of market surveillance activities. On the EU and business side, the costs were in line with expectations.

4.1.2.2What were the benefits of the intervention?

The implementation of MSR leads to benefits for both consumers and economic operators and MSAs.

-General benefits for consumers and businesses

The MSR has contributed positively, although to a limited extent, to improving compliance and safety of products reaching consumers and businesses. As demonstrated by the results of the targeted survey (across all stakeholders’ groups) and the public consultation, stakeholders predominantly acknowledge the MSR's positive contribution to improved product compliance and safety: 44% (N=275) 121 and 37% (N=154) 122 , respectively. In fact, improved market surveillance reduces the presence of unsafe products on the market, leading to safer consumer products, improving health and safety outcomes, lowering healthcare and premature death costs, reducing financial detriment to consumers, and increasing consumer trust in the market. At the same time, as noted in Section 4.1.1.1, while the MSR has been effective in strengthening market surveillance activity and reporting, the share of non-compliance in completed investigations remains above 50%.

In view of the high non-compliance rates, the MSR has marginally contributed to a level playing field in the Single Market. In fact, all stakeholder groups shared the predominant view that the MSR has marginally contributed to a level playing field, with 42% of respondents in the targeted survey (N=274) 123 and 30% of respondents in the public consultation (N=154). While the MSR has made progress in enhancing regulatory consistency, its effectiveness is limited (see Section 4.1.1.4).

The benefits stemming from a lower number of non-compliant and unsafe products circulating on the Single Market are affected by evolving trade patterns and complex supply chains, combined with the structural shift towards e-commerce via new business models. This exponential growth in e-commerce undermines the effectiveness of market surveillance under the current legal framework.

-Benefits for the MSAs

The MSR brought some efficiency gains to MSAs thanks to their increased powers. 59% of respondents of the targeted consultation of MSAs (N=168) consider that the MSR allowed them to generate efficiency gains.

In particular, although cross border cooperation remains limited, the MSR has still improved pooling of expertise across the EU. 63% of MSAs and customs authorities consider that the MSR has resulted in better pooling of expertise due to enhanced cooperation of market surveillance authorities at EU level through coordination mechanisms such as AdCos and the EUPCN (N=167) (see Section 4.1.1.6).

While their use is still insufficient and uneven, common EU level IT tools also improved access to relevant data for MSAs. According to 57% of the MSAs in the targeted survey (N=168) considered that ICSMS improved data sharing. The estimated savings from reusing information from the ICSMS are estimated at between EUR 150,000 and EUR 1 million per year 124 , and are largely aligned with the estimates provided in the initial IA.

The MSR has also likely increased the use of the mechanism for cost recovery for market surveillance activities by almost 8 percentage points as compared to a pre-MSR situation. 125 This refers to the possibility for MSA to reclaim from EOs the costs incurred in enforcement activities. According to estimates based on MSA information, the rate of recovery has quadrupled, from 2.4% in 2019 to 10% in 2021.

Although cooperation remains a challenge for MSAs, the MSR contributed to the enhancement of the cooperation of MSAs within Member States and created necessary structures at EU level. In sum, majority of respondents of the targeted survey of MSAs (122 out of 233) consider that the Regulation has enhanced cooperation between competent authorities within Member States (incl. customs). While cooperation between Member States remains challenging (see Section 4.1.1.6), the EUPCN network boosted coordination between Member States according to 82% of MSAs responding to the public consultation (N= 45).

Finally, despite underfunding of market surveillance the MSR, EUTFs brought limited although welcomed improvements in testing capacity. According to most MSAs responding to the targeted survey, the EUTFs provided the benefits of reliable results for complex cases that could not be handled through national resources alone (43%, N=158) and independent testing that helps avoid potential conflict of interest (33%, N=158).

Overall, the benefits of MSR for consumers and businesses were limited, also due to external factors. The MSR brough however efficiency gains and reinforced enforcement capacity at Member States level.

4.1.2.3Are the costs proportionate to the benefits?

The overall benefits and costs of the Regulation broadly equilibrate, but both remain relatively limited in magnitude. On the benefits side, the Regulation has improved efficiency of investigations, pooling of resources, coordination between national authorities, strengthened information exchange. However, the overall impact on reducing non-compliance has remained modest, as significant volumes of non-compliant products continue to enter and circulate within the EU market, particularly through e-commerce and imports from third countries. As a result, the gains in consumer protection, product safety, and fair competition have been relatively small compared to the scale of the problem identified in the IA.

At the same time, the costs generated by the Regulation have also remained limited. For businesses, the MSR introduced only targeted additional obligations, with most compliance requirements already stemming from sectoral product legislation rather than from the Regulation itself. Business stakeholders agree that the costs for economic operators are reasonable. 126 A smaller set of responses to the public consultation and the call for evidence, identify the costs for authorised representatives for micro and small businesses as more burdensome than those for larger companies. For market surveillance authorities, implementation costs have been constrained by limited additional funding and resources at the national level. However, while the feedback from stakeholders, across all groups, to the public consultation suggests that MSR-related costs are considered reasonable, there is a perception that they are not shared evenly across all actors across the supply chains because non-compliant (often non-EU) operators avoid compliance obligations. On the other hand, authorities and consumer organisations report that the current resources of MSAs are insufficient to face the surge in e-commerce and flag that disproportional societal costs stem from non-compliance. MSAs also flag inefficiencies with ICSMS, including reporting obligations on key indicators in ICSMS, as a source of costs. Consequently, while the MSR created useful coordination mechanisms and support tools, both its regulatory burden and its measurable market impact have remained relatively modest.

4.1.2.4What potential for simplification should be explored?

The MSR overall has potential for further simplification and cost reduction. Overall, 55% of respondents to the targeted survey (N= 275) consider that there is potential for further streamlining, against 7% considering the opposite. 127  

-Digitalisation of market surveillance

Potential for simplification and cost saving stemming from improving digital tools for market surveillance was identified as potential for simplification. Duplications in IT tools and their limited interoperability increases administrative burden for reporting and bears important costs (see Section 4.1.2.1). Digitalisation is one of the clearest areas of cross-stakeholder support, identified in the stakeholder consultations as a source of simplification and burden reduction. Stakeholders call for and upgrade of ICSMS and a better interconnection between existing databases like ICSMS, Safety Gate, and European Product Registry for Energy Labelling (EPREL). There is also a call from consumer and business representatives to invest in the full interoperability of these tools with the DPP, to automate compliance checks, and to integrate with the forthcoming EU Customs Data Hub. Public authorities suggest that ICSMS could evolve into a practical tool for managing product compliance throughout its lifecycle, with simplified and structured data collection.

In addition, stakeholders across all groups, including authorities, business representatives, and consumer organisations, share a strong consensus that AI and web crawlers are essential for increasing the efficiency of market surveillance in the digital age. These groups agree that such tools can significantly boost performance by automating the tracing of non-compliant products across complex online networks, conducting forensic image searches, automatising documentary inspections and identifying systemic risk patterns.

-Simplification and efficiency gains through improved traceability of operators

Potential for efficiency gains could also be found in a better identification of responsible EU based economic operators, notably linked to imports from third countries and e-commerce. MSAs perceive the current enforcement model as resource-intensive as authorities must pursue numerous sellers, often located outside the EU, to find a responsible economic operator, which makes the investigations last much longer and generates unnecessary costs. The survey respondents, including business associations, individual businesses and MSAs, point to the need for a clearly identifiable responsible EO established in the EU, especially for distance sales, to increase efficiency of market surveillance.

Article 4 continues to be a key focus for stakeholders and source of possible simplification and efficiency gains. Some stakeholders (particularly business associations) call for simplifying it and reducing multiple categories of economic operators who can be responsible for a product into a single clear EU representative role. Others stress the importance of verification of the identity of these operators or the mandates they receive from foreign manufacturers, with some pointing to possible increased role of providers of OMs

Finally, some stakeholders (both authorities and businesses) advocated in the public consultation a broader and better use of risk-based approach that concentrates enforcement resources on high-risk products. These would allocate resources efficiently focusing on non-compliant traders with a poor track record (particularly online).

-Improved cross-border cooperation procedures

More efficient cross-border cooperation between authorities in different Member States could also generate efficiency gains and lead to simplification. A broad range of stakeholders consulted point to insufficient coordination and inconsistent implementation across Member States as a significant source of burden. In fact, lack of cooperation and efficient information exchange between authorities in different Member States duplicates work already performed, in turn increasing the overall costs of market surveillance in the EU. In these responses, simplification is often linked to a more consistent interpretation of rules, and stronger information-sharing between authorities. Business stakeholders tend to emphasise predictability, level-playing field and reduced duplications from checks across the EU, whereas authorities more often stress the need for stronger procedural arrangements.

4.1.3 Coherence

To what extent is the MSR internally coherent?

The MSR is overall internally coherent, but specific provisions require clarification, notably Articles 3 and 4 and of the EU MSR.

The application of Article 4 MSR is not uniform across harmonised products. Article 4.1 MSR spells out a key requirement: a product may be placed on the market only if there is an EU-based economic operator who is responsible for certain product-related tasks. Yet while the MSR applies to products subject to 70 Union harmonisation legislation, the requirement of Article 4.1 applies only to products subject to a subset of 5 Regulations and 15 Directives listed in Article 4.5. This makes the identification of which product is or is not subject to the requirement in Article 4.1 MSR complicated, creating an uneven enforcement landscape within the Regulation’s own scope. 128  

The definition and duties of economic operators subject to Article 4 is not coherent. Article 3.13 of the MSR defines ‘economic operator’ as the manufacturer, the authorised representative, the importer, the distributor, the fulfilment service provider or any other natural or legal person who is subject to certain obligations. This said, not only, pursuant to Article 4.2 MSR, the requirement in Article 4.1 applies to a sub-set of economic operators ― manufacturer, importer, authorised representative, fulfilment service provider ― but such economic operators listed in Article 4.2 of the MSR are not subject to the same compliance related responsibilities.

To what extent is the MSR externally coherent?

The MSR operates alongside other acts affecting product compliance, most relevantly the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR), the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Union Customs Code (UCC). While the MSR is overall coherent with the GPSR, its coherence with the UCC and the DSA may be further improved.

This assessment is confirmed by the views expressed by the stakeholders in the targeted survey. Two thirds of the respondents (N=273) agree that the MSR is coherent with the GPSR 129 . While the predominant dominant view of 40% of respondents (N = 270) considers the MSR to be coherent with the DSA, there is a high uncertainty (as 38% of respondents does not know) and substantive disagreement (as 21% of respondents consider the MSR not to be coherent with the DSA). 130 While 38% of respondents (N = 272) considers the MSR to be coherent with the UCC, there is a very high uncertainty (as 44% of respondents does not know) and substantive disagreement (as 19% of respondents consider the MSR not to be coherent with the UCC). 131

The MSR is closely related to and largely coherent with the GPSR. The MSR ensures the compliance of harmonised products. While the GPSR ensures the safety of non-harmonised consumer products, it may apply to harmonised products too, if certain safety aspects are not covered in Union harmonisation legislation. Moreover, the GPSR renders certain provisions of the MSR applicable to non-harmonised products. Article 16 GPSR makes Article 4 MSR applicable to non-harmonised products. Article 23 GPSR makes the certain other MSR provisions ― including those related to the designation of MSAs, activities of MSAs, peer reviews, powers of MSAs, recovery of costs, market surveillance measures, procedural rights of economic operators, mutual assistance ― applicable to non-harmonised products. At the same time, certain provisions of the GPSR such as Chapter IV on obligations of online marketplaces apply also to harmonised products. For this reason, as far as market surveillance activities, obligations, powers, measures, and cooperation among market surveillance authorities are concerned, the GPSR and the MSR have been aligned. This creates, to a high extent, a coherent market surveillance regime in the EU concerning all consumer products.

Yet there is margin to improve coherence further between the two acts. The GPSR goes in fact further than the MSR in certain aspects. For instance, Article 22 GPSR sets new obligations on OMs, which also apply to harmonised products, but only insofar as they are non-compliant because of safety reasons. Article 22 GPSR does not apply to harmonised products that are non-compliant for reasons other than safety. Also, while the GPSR empowers MSAs to issue take-down orders to OMs for dangerous products (even requiring removal of identical content), the MSR allows OMs to do so only as last resort and to eliminate a serious risk and is silent regarding identical content.

The MSR also interacts with the DSA. The 2025 Commission Report on the application of Article 33 of the DSA and on the interaction of the DSA alignment with other EU acts found that ‘the MSR and DSA have complementary provisions’. 132 On the one hand, the DSA sets certain due diligence obligations on OMs, including obligations to act upon orders issued by competent authorities, establish notice-and-action mechanisms for illegal content, and provide reasons for follow-up decisions. For Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines, the DSA further require systemic risk assessment and mitigation measures. On the other hand, the MSR empowers MSAs to issue take-down orders as a last resort measure, to eliminate a serious risk and after fulfilling with procedural requirements. Also, Article 7.2 MSR mandates ‘information society service providers’ to cooperate with MSAs, upon request and in specific cases, to facilitate any action taken to eliminate or, if that is not possible, to mitigate the risks presented by a product that is or was offered for sale online through their services. Thus, while MSR governs compliance and enforcement with regard to individual products under Union harmonisation legislation, the DSA enforces at the systemic level for all matters relating to the supervision of OMs.

However, the two acts are not fully coherent. First, while the MSR is without prejudice to Articles 4 (‘Mere conduit’), 5 (‘Caching’), 6 (Hosting) and 8 (No general monitoring or active fact-finding obligations) of the DSA, the DSA allows Union legislation to establish more rules specifying complementing its framework. The DSA is without prejudice to the rules laid down by other Union legal ― such as the MSR ― regulating other aspects of the provision of intermediary services in the internal market or specifying and complementing the DSA. Second, the MSR neither explicitly covers providers of online marketplaces, nor does it impose of them obligations related to product compliance, while they play a key role in enabling the large-scale distribution of non-compliant products through high-volume e-commerce supply chains.

The MSR and the UCC complement each other and are broadly coherent. To ensure effective controls and compliance checks on products entering the Union market from third countries, the UCC provides the legal basis for compliance controls on products entering the Union market, Chapter VII of the MSR establishes a structured framework and procedures for cooperation between MSAs and customs authorities. The two acts jointly allow suspending the release for free circulation of products where non-compliance is suspected, pending verification by MSAs. Where MSAs conclude that a product cannot be placed on the market as it does not comply with the Union law applicable to it, they must require customs authorities not to release it for free circulation.

However, there is a scope for improving coherence between the UCC and MSR, in particular with respect to the definition, the roles and the responsibilities that the two acts provide in relation to importers. This aspect is going to be even more relevant in light of the EU customs reform, which amongst other plans to introduce the concept of importer for distance sales.

4.2How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?

The MSR provided a common framework for market surveillance and presents a clear EU added value that goes beyond of what would have been achieved by the Member States acting alone. The harmonisation of the market surveillance system is achieved through setting up common rules for 27 national regimes with a single framework.

Stakeholders are nearly unanimous in their acknowledgement of the EU added value of the MSR. The targeted survey provides strong quantitative support for the MSR's added value: 82% of respondents (N=277) agree or strongly agree that the Single Market would be negatively affected in the MSR's absence 133 , and 83% (N=276) disagree that national-only approaches would be sufficient. 134 In fact, separate national approaches would create administrative burden and decrease overall effectiveness of the system.

The harmonised framework reduced the costs for businesses, including SMEs, of doing business across borders. MSR introduced a single, predictable set of market surveillance rules across the EU. Business stakeholders value this common framework as it helps distinguish them from "rogue traders" who benefit from avoiding compliance costs. 135 This is particularly important for SMEs, which typically have more limited financial and administrative resources to navigate differing national regulatory regimes and compliance procedures.

The MSR has contributed positively, although to a limited extent, to the protection of consumers’ health and safety. As demonstrated by the results of the consultations, most stakeholders acknowledge the MSR's positive contribution to improved product compliance and safety, although its impact is limited (see Section 4.1.2.2). This has positive effects for consumers and society by improving health and safety outcomes, lowering healthcare and premature death costs or reducing financial detriment to consumers.

The MSR brought improvements and efficiency gains for the public authorities. In fact, 59% of authorities who responded to the targeted consultation (N=168) consider that the MSR allowed them to generate efficiency gains. In particular, 63% of authorities consider that the MSR has resulted in better pooling of expertise due to enhanced cooperation of MSAs at EU level through coordination mechanisms such as AdCos and the EUPCN (N=167).

Common EU level IT tools improved access to relevant data and boosted the exchange of information between MSAs. According to 57% of the MSAs in the targeted survey (N=168), ICSMS improved data sharing and increased efficiency of market surveillance.

Pooling resources through joint actions funded by the EU also provides additional benefits, particularly for smaller Member States lacking their own accredited laboratories. 136 While limited in scope, the joint actions allow for a reliable testing of selected products. The 2026 ECTI study for the European Parliament suggests that less well-equipped Member States test fewer products overall, and without the pooling mechanism provided by EUTFs and joint actions, these disparities would accentuate.  137

The MSR has also contributed to the enhancement of the cooperation of MSAs within Member States and between Member States. Since the application of the MSR, Member States have broadly adapted their systems in ways that have strengthened coordination, including through the appointment of SLOs. (see Section 4.1.1.6). In sum, majority of respondent of the targeted survey (122 out of 233) consider that the Regulation has enhanced cooperation between competent authorities within Member States. This was achieved by standardising the role of customs authorities and their cooperation with MSAs. EU level coordination structures such as SLOs, the EUPCN, expert groups and AdCos play a central role in strengthening cooperation and knowledge sharing between authorities (see Section 4.1.1.6). 

Evidence 138 supports the finding that cross-border enforcement challenges cannot be effectively addressed through national legislation alone. Only a coordinated EU-level framework can ensure consistent enforcement across Member States and at external borders, preventing non-compliant products from exploiting regulatory arbitrage between national systems. Because there are no internal borders, shortcomings in one national system affect the entire Union, as non-compliant products can circulate freely once they enter any point of the EU, which is why EU action is needed to establish harmonised approaches that cannot be achieved through fragmented national measures.

4.3 Is the intervention still relevant?

4.3.1 General relevance of MSR objectives

The MSR’s general and specific objectives remain relevant, but the core problems the Regulation was designed to address (non-compliant and dangerous products on the Single Market, uneven enforcement across Member States, and the need for cross-border cooperation) have intensified rather than receded. The results of the public consultation support these findings relating to the MSR general objective, with 137 out of 154 respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that the MSR’s general objective remains relevant. Specific objectives are overwhelmingly endorsed by the stakeholders ranging between 76–82% (N=277). 

The three specific objectives all remain pertinent, but the challenges they were designed to address have evolved significantly since adoption: SO1 (enforcement toolbox) needs to address new dynamics such as the rapid surge and complexity of business models that fall outside the current regulatory framework; SO2 (enforcement capacity) must contend with a surge in workload that was not foreseen at the scale now observed; SO3 (cooperation) faces a growing mismatch between nationally-based enforcement structures and challenges that are increasingly EU-wide in scope and origin.

While its objectives remain highly relevant in addressing contemporary market challenges (e.g. e-commerce growth, cross-border trade, and resource disparities), their achievement could be assessed as partial and uneven (see Section 4).

4.3.2 Do the objectives and provisions of the MSR still match current needs of stakeholders and the internal market?

The objective of strengthening the enforcement toolbox remains relevant. The rise of e-commerce and the increasing complexity of global supply chains created enforcement gaps that existing regulatory tools cannot address. The MSR’s provisions, including Article 14(4)(k) (website takedowns), Article 4 (EO obligations), and cost-recovery mechanisms (Article 15), address n enforcement needs, but their practical application has revealed limitations (see Section 4.1.1.4).

The objective of addressing fragmented and insufficiently coordinated market surveillance across Member States remains highly relevant. The need for coordinated market surveillance remains critical, given the increasingly cross-border nature of trade. The MSR’s mechanisms (SLOs, EUPCN and AdCos) address a genuine gap in the pre-MSR framework and are necessary. However, their effectiveness is constrained by operational and systemic limitations (see Section 4.1.1.6). The EP study also identifies a mismatch between nationally based enforcement models and enforcement tasks that have increasingly European scope, origin and impact. 139

The objective to ensure sufficient operational enforcement capacity also remains highly pertinent. The MSR’s emphasis on Union testing, digital tools, and efficiency gains through cooperation remains a relevant response to the continued enforcement constraints. However, the scale of enforcement needs has outpaced available capacity in many Member States (see Section 4.1.1.5 on resources).

4.3.3 To what extent do the issues addressed by the Regulation continue to require action at the EU-level?

The evidence suggests that the issues addressed by the MSR will continue to necessitate action at EU level in the future. Product non-compliance and dangerous goods remain a pervasive issue across the Single Market. 140 Indeed, the 2025 evaluation of Article 4 indicates that the issues addressed by the MSR are increasingly pertinent 141 due to the rapid growth in e-commerce.

Feedback from stakeholders’ signals that there is almost a consensus among respondents to the public consultation that continued action at the EU level is required. The public consultation indicates that 144 out of 154 respondents agree or strongly agree with this statement. The targeted survey also confirms this near-unanimity, with 88% of respondents agreeing (66% strongly, N=180) that the MSR's objectives continue to require EU-level action. 142

The need for EU-level action stems from the inherently cross-border nature of product compliance and safety challenges. As indicated in Section 3.1, the volume of low-value imports linked to e-commerce has increased sharply in recent years. When asked how they expect the number of non-compliant imported products to evolve without further policy action, 80% of respondents to the targeted survey anticipate fast growth (N=98).

4.3.3 Is the MSR sufficiently adaptable to new challenges and developments?

The MSR is only partially adaptable to new challenges and developments. It was designed for relatively simple supply chains with identifiable EU-based EOs and is structurally ill-suited to address challenges stemming from e-commerce.

Respondents to the targeted survey assess the MSR as not adapted to the key e-commerce market developments. These in particular relate to growth of third-country direct sales (79% of stakeholders, incl. MSAs, business and consumer organisations, considers MSR not adaptable, N=273) 143 , to novel online selling models (76%, N=273) 144 , to e-commerce growth (76%, N=274) 145 and increased imports (75%) 146 . Adaptability to complex products and new digital tools receives somewhat less negative assessments (58% and 47%, respectively) 147 . Stakeholders who took part in the Call for Evidence emphasise that the MSR is currently unable to cope with the explosive growth of global e-commerce, as the current model was designed for linear supply chains and is structurally ineffective against the massive volume of fragmented consignments from third countries.

5.1 Conclusions

The MSR has not fully fulfilled its general objective. It has expanded MSAs' regulatory toolbox, to a limited extent increased enforcement capacity (through ICSMS and EUTFs), improved coordination at national level (through SLOs) and embedded necessary institutional coordination at EU level. However, its general objective – ensuring only compliant products circulate on the Single Market – remains not fully unmet, also due to external factors linked to a surge in e-commerce. Taking into account data limitations (see Section 1.1), the number of non-compliant products remains high (53% of completed ICSMS investigations in 2025), which puts health and safety of consumer at risk and undermines a level playing field for compliant businesses.

Regarding specific objective 1, while the MSR has strengthened the regulatory toolbox at disposal of MSAs to enforce Union harmonisation legislation, it remains incomplete, particularly in digital markets and for products imported from third countries. The main constraint is the limited enforceability of Union harmonisation legislation in complex, cross‑border and online supply chains. The current regulatory framework does not enable MSAs to effectively detect and address instances of product non-compliance due to three main factors: i) difficulty in identifying the responsible economic operator for the products at issue; ii) insufficient product compliance responsibilities of economic operators commensurate to their role in the supply chain; and iii) lack of powers of MSAs to enforce such rules and responsibilities. Furthermore, Article 4 applies only to products subject to 20 of the 70 pieces of Union harmonisation legislation covered by the MSR, leaving a significant enforcement gap. Providers of online marketplaces do not fall within the definition of economic operators and are subject only to limited cooperation obligations under the MSR.

While Article 4 has strengthened the framework in legal terms by introducing a clear requirement that certain products may only be placed on the EU market if a responsible EO is established in the Union, its practical enforcement is limited. MSAs encounter difficulties to identify the responsible economic operators and hold them accountable for the product compliance-related responsibilities under this provision, particularly for products sold online from third countries. In addition, Article 4 of the MSR applies only to products subject to 20 of the 70 pieces of Union harmonisation legislation covered by the MSR, leaving an enforcement gap in remaining harmonised sectors.

There are limited product compliance obligations for providers of online marketplaces (OMs) under the MSR. The MSR currently contains only a general cooperation obligation for OMs to cooperate with MSAs on individual product listings, and to facilitate actions to eliminate or mitigate the risks presented by a product that is or was offered for sale online through their services.

MSAs do not dispose of sufficient powers required to effectively address non-compliance of products, notably in e-commerce to prevent their reappearance.

Penalties remain a weak element of the toolbox in practice. Although all Member States have established national penalty regimes, their level and application vary widely, and penalties are often not dissuasive enough to deter non-compliance. Only 25% of public consultation respondents found penalty regimes dissuasive (N=154), the estimated collection rate is around 50%, and cross-border and third-country collection is near zero.

Regarding specific objective 2, enforcement capacity of market surveillance authorities is insufficient and uneven across the Union.

The market surveillance system remains underfunded. Market surveillance is also persistently understaffed, with a large dispersion in staffing levels across countries. The total EU-27 market surveillance budget stood at approximately EUR 150 million in 2022 (excluding staff costs), with essentially no real growth over 2021–2025. Staffing across the EU totals around 10,000 FTEs, with a marginal decline of -0.1% over the period. This contrasts sharply with the enforcement challenge: in 2024, customs were able to control the product compliance of only 0.0082% of all imported products.

Interoperability gaps and uneven use of common EU tools significantly constrain the effectiveness of digital enforcement tools. While ICSMS and Safety Gate are increasingly used and seen as valuable to support market surveillance, their impact is constrained by an uneven uptake across Member States and persistent interoperability gaps with national systems and other EU databases, leading to duplications and administrative burden.

Testing capacity remains limited and concentrated in a small number of Member States and product categories.

Regarding specific objective 3, cooperation within Member States has improved since the entry into force of the MSR, yet some national systems face substantial challenges stemming from institutional and procedural setup. In addition, while cross-border cooperation between MSAs improved since MSR, it remains insufficient and uneven.

The MSR has strengthened internal coordination within Member States through more centralised national governance, particularly via SLOs but complexity remains high in some Member States. Following the MSR’s introduction, Member States have broadly adapted their national market surveillance systems towards more coordinated and centralised arrangements. However, the fragmentation of national structures makes cooperation between relevant authorities, within and amongst Member States, difficult. Cooperation between MSAs and customs authorities is essential for enforcement but remains constrained by procedural complexity, capacity limitations and limited IT integration.

Cross border cooperation has not been sufficiently strengthened via EU-level coordination mechanisms, such as EUPCN or joint actions. Current mechanisms operate on an ad hoc and voluntary basis. In addition, currently joint actions present some procedural deficiencies limiting their effectiveness. Quantitatively, only 13% of investigations are conducted jointly across Member States, and each MSA participates in only approximately 4.3 collaborative actions per year on average. In 2025, only 47 enforcement requests were sent across all 14 responding countries, with cross-border handling involved in only 1.7% of ICSMS investigation cases (taking into account data limitations – see Section 1.1).

The overall benefits and costs of the Regulation broadly equilibrate, but both remain relatively limited in magnitude. Compliance costs attributed to MSR are negligible for economic operators, as most of total compliance costs stem from sectoral legislation. The costs for MSAs remain stable, also reflecting limitations in resources for market surveillance. Annual MSR compliance costs for businesses are estimated at 0–0.03% of turnover (vs 0.05% anticipated in the IA). EU-level market surveillance costs amount to EUR 17.3 million in 2026. ICSMS efficiency gains for MSAs are estimated at EUR 150,000–1 million per year, and the cost recovery rate has quadrupled from 2.4% in 2019 to 10% in 2021.

The MSR provided a common framework for market surveillance presenting a clear EU added value that goes beyond of what would have been achieved by the Member States acting alone.

The MSR’s general and specific objectives remain relevant, but the core problems the Regulation was designed to address (non-compliant and dangerous products on the Single Market) have intensified rather than receded. The MSR is only partially adaptable to new challenges: 79% of stakeholders consider it not adapted to the growth of third-country direct sellers, and 76% consider it not adapted to novel online selling models or the exponential growth of e-commerce.

The MSR is overall coherent internally and to a large extent externally, but potential for improvement remains. Specific internal coherence issues identified include: the mismatch between the MSR’s scope (70 pieces of Union harmonisation legislation) and the narrower scope of Article 4.5 (about 20 pieces), inconsistencies between Article 3(13) and Article 4.2 regarding which economic operators bear product compliance responsibilities, and the confusion between customs ‘importers’ and product compliance ‘authorised representatives’ in B2C e-commerce, which undermines the effectiveness of Articles 25–28 MSR.

5.2 Lessons learned

The problems and needs that triggered the original intervention have not been resolved and have intensified in the online environment. Three structural lessons stand out:

·regulatory toolkit is not yet fit for purpose for MSAs to effectively detect and address product non-compliance, especially in relation to imports from third countries and e-commerce.

·there is insufficient and uneven enforcement capacity compared to the rapidly increasing workload.

·cooperation within and between Member States remains challenging, while cross-border mechanisms are underused relative to its potential.

Closing existing regulatory gaps and strengthening the powers of market surveillance authorities are essential to ensuring an effective market surveillance system. In particular, evolving supply chains, online sales channels, and the growing presence of non-EU economic operators require authorities to have clear and robust enforcement powers across all distribution channels.

At the same time, regulatory improvements need to be matched by a substantial reinforcement of the operational capacity of market surveillance authorities. Adequate staffing, technical expertise, financial resources, and IT tools are necessary to ensure that authorities can effectively exercise their expanded responsibilities in practice.

While the existing cooperation architecture has demonstrated clear operational value, its effectiveness depends on sustained and structured participation by all actors involved. Continued engagement will be necessary to ensure effective information exchange, coordinated enforcement, and long-term cooperation across Member States.

Finally, additional efforts should be done to collect reliable administrative data on market surveillance, to enable a better analysis of market surveillance in the EU and enforcement at EU level under the MSR and other legislation (e.g. systemic enforcement in the DSA). MSAs need to dispose of a fully digital state-of-the-art tool to record and exchange enforcement information, eliminate reporting duplications, and benefit of interconnection with the EU systems.

Simplification and efficiency gains can be achieved through:

·digitalisation (interoperable IT tools, AI-powered enforcement tools),

·simplification and efficiency gains through improved traceability of operators

·better coordination among authorities and at EU level, especially in a cross-border context

·legal simplification of relevant product compliance legislation.

1.LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES

Lead DG: DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW)

Directorate: Directorate H – Construction, Machinery and Market Surveillance

This evaluation corresponds to the initiative with the Decide reference PLAN/2026/1664 for the Revision of Regulation (EU)2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of products

2.ORGANISATION AND TIMING

The call for evidence feedback and the public consultation period ran from 12 November 2025 to 4 February 2026.

An interservice coordination group was convened and chaired by DG GROW. The following Directorates-General participated: SG, LS, BUDG, CLIMA, CNECT COMP, DIGIT, ENER, ENV, JRC, JUST, MOVE, SANTE, TAXUD and TRADE. The ISCG met 4 times. The last meeting on was held on 5 May 2026.

3.CONSULTATION OF THE RSB

The RSB was consulted in an informal upstream meeting on 23 September 2025. This evaluation assessment was submitted to the RSB on 20 May 2026. The meeting with the RSB took place on 17 June 2026. Following the opinion of the RSB, covering both this Evaluation and the related Impact Assessment as part of a back-to-back package, changes were made to the two documents in order to reflect the recommendations of the Board. The opinion and the explanations of how the RSB recommendations were addressed will be published when the proposal for a revision of the MSR is adopted.

4.EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY

This evaluation is supported by a complementary study undertaken by an external contractor, who was responsible for conducting the interviews, systematically analysing data gathered from both public and targeted stakeholder consultations, and strengthening these findings through additional desk research. This combined methodological approach allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter by integrating qualitative insights from stakeholders with relevant secondary data sources, thereby improving the robustness and credibility of the overall assessment.

The analytical work underpinning this evaluation relied primarily on the support study carried out by the external contractor on behalf of the Commission. The study was conducted in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines and the requirements set out in the Terms of Reference and aimed to provide a robust and comprehensive assessment of the implementation and performance of the intervention.

The contractor developed a methodological framework during the inception phase, including the intervention logic, evaluation matrix and points of comparison used to structure the evidence gathering and analysis. The study assessed both the evolution of the regulatory and market context over the evaluation period and the extent to which the intervention achieved its objectives under the Better Regulation evaluation criteria. Particular attention was given to issues related to e-commerce, non-compliant imports from third countries, enforcement practices across Member States, administrative burden for economic operators – especially SMEs – and broader market developments linked to digitalisation.

The contractor’s methodology combined several complementary analytical methods and evidence sources. Desk research constituted a core and continuous component of the study. It included the review of legislation, policy documents, implementation reports, statistical data, academic literature, previous evaluations and other relevant studies, as well as grey literature such as reports and position documents from business associations, consumer organisations, and other sources.

In parallel, the contractor built on extensive stakeholder consultation activities, including a Call for Evidence and a public consultation run by the European Commission. The contractor complemented these consultations with targeted surveys, a dedicated data request to market surveillance authorities, interviews, and a validation workshop. These consultation activities gathered qualitative and quantitative evidence from a broad range of stakeholders, including economic operators and their representatives, market surveillance authorities, customs and public authorities, consumer organisations and civil society organisations.

The contractor’s methodology also included developing four case studies to illustrate specific implementation and enforcement issues in practice. The case studies provided more detailed qualitative and quantitative insights into how the Regulation functions in concrete situations across different sectors, product categories and national contexts. In particular, they examined practical experiences related to market surveillance activities, cross-border cooperation, enforcement challenges in e-commerce and online sales, the treatment of non-compliant products originating from third countries, and the administrative implications for economic operators, including SMEs. The case studies complemented the broader analytical findings by providing contextual evidence and concrete examples of how the intervention operates in practice.

The Commission services closely monitored and assessed the contractor’s work throughout the study. Regular exchanges took place to discuss methodological choices, the availability and quality of evidence, preliminary findings and emerging analytical issues. The continuous supervision and review by the Commission services, including iterative feedback on methodological and analytical outputs and consistency checks, contributed to ensuring the transparency, coherence and robustness of the study results. Overall, the Commission considered the contractor’s work to be sufficiently robust to support the evaluation. The Commission agreed with the main findings and conclusions of the study, while in certain areas, additional caution was applied when interpreting results affected by limited evidence, data gaps or diverging stakeholder views. In some cases, the Commission complemented the contractor’s analysis with additional cross-checking against other available evidence sources and recent policy developments.

The study nevertheless faced data limitations, also due to the relatively limited time elapsed since the legislation entered into force. First, the contractor encountered important data limitations, particularly concerning the quality and comparability of available ICSMS data. Existing datasets did not allow for a full assessment of market surveillance performance across Member States. Furthermore, significant data cleaning and harmonisation efforts were required because enforcement measures were recorded inconsistently and in different languages across Member States. In many areas, the evidence base is constrained by the short timespan since the entry into force of the MSR, as some of the available data covers only a few years.

The contractor implemented several mitigating measures to address these limitations. Data gaps were mitigated through methodological triangulation, systematically cross-checking findings across multiple evidence sources, including desk research, consultation activities, case studies and available statistical evidence. Where quantitative evidence was incomplete or uncertain, qualitative evidence and stakeholder input were used to contextualise findings and support the analysis. Conclusions were formulated cautiously where significant uncertainty remained.

Overall, despite the identified limitations and uncertainties, the contractor’s study provided a sufficiently robust and credible evidence base for the evaluation. The combination of multiple evidence sources, complementary methodologies, stakeholder consultation activities and quality assurance measures strengthened the reliability and consistency of the analytical findings underpinning this evaluation.

Consultation strategy

The stakeholder consultation strategy was devised for both the evaluation and the impact assessment supporting the revision of the MSR, and included the following tools:

·Call for Evidence (C4E)

·Public Consultation

·Target surveys

·Targeted interviews, including case study interviews

·Validation workshop

Consultations in the scope of this study were implemented between November 2025 and May 2026.

Call for Evidence

The Call for Evidence was published on the ‘Have your say’ portal163 on 12 November 2025 and remained open until 4 February 2026. The Call for Evidence gathered 97 contributions. As shown in the table below, companies and business associations jointly accounted for 62% of the contributions. Another 12% of the contributions were submitted by individual citizens. NGOs and consumer organisations submitted another 12 contributions, and eight public authorities participated in the Call for Evidence.

Table A5.1– Contributions to the Call for Evidence by stakeholder category

The two points raised most often across contributions were the role of online marketplaces and, linked to this, an observed e-commerce enforcement gaps (49%, 47 out of 97 responses). Some respondents suggested that the MSR should be revised to make online marketplaces more accountable, for example, by including them explicitly as economic operators in the scope of the MSR, and to enhance their obligations at the point of sale. Controls of imports at the border were mentioned as another important topic by

% of respondents (46 out of 97 responses). Respondents favoured a strong push to strengthen checks on incoming products and identified a need for addressing low-value B2C imports in particular.

A similar share of respondents expressed a need to increase the resources and expertise of market surveillance authorities (46%, 44 out of 97 responses), calling for more staff, funding, technical capacity, and testing capabilities for MSAs. Other topics mentioned in the Call for Evidence were digital tools and the interoperability across EU tools, oftentimes accompanied by an overall request for improvements in data-sharing systems, also in light of other ongoing policy initiatives (e.g. through the DPP).

Lastly, 31% (30 out of 97 responses) of the stakeholders highlighted a need for stronger EU-level coordination, pooling expertise and in some cases expressed support for a central EU authority in the field of Market Surveillance.

Public Consultation

The public consultation was open for contributions on the ‘Have your say’ portal between 12 November 2025 and 4 February 2026. The public consultation gathered 154 contributions from 22 countries (19 EU Member States). The majority of the feedback came from Germany (27%, 42 out of 154 responses) and Belgium (25%, 39 out of 154 responses), followed by France (8%, 12 out of 154 responses), Sweden and Spain (each with 5%, 8 out of 154 responses each). Between 1 and 5 contributions were submitted by respondents from the other countries each (see figure below).

Figure A5.1 – Number of responses to the public consultation by country

Almost half of the respondents represented business associations (46%, 70 out of 154 replies), followed by public authorities (29%, 45 out of 154 replies) and companies (15%, 23 out of 154 replies). EU citizens, consumer organisations, environmental organisations, NGOs and other accounted for the remaining 11% (17 out of 154 replies). Among responding companies (23 out of 154 replies), 83% (19 out of 23 companies) were large enterprises, while 17% (4 out of 23 companies) were SMEs or micro companies.

Figure A5.2 – Number of responses to the public consultation by stakeholder category

Many respondents expressed the view that there is room to improve the current implementation of the MSR. 62% (95 out of 154 replies) expressed the view that market surveillance authorities do not yet carry out product checks at an adequate scale, and almost 70% (107 out of 154 replies) expressed the view that checks are not carried out at a comparable scale across Member States. Similarly, the respondents were critical regarding customs controls at EU borders: 66% (101 out of 154 replies) disagreed that controls are adequate to prevent non-compliant products entering the EU through e-commerce, and 61% (94 out of 154 replies) disagreed that border controls are comparable across Member States. More than half of the respondents (51%, 79 out of 154 replies) do not consider the cooperation between market surveillance authorities and customs authorities as effective.

Resource constraints were identified as a persistent challenge. Half of the respondents (52%, 80 out of 154 replies) disagreed that Member States allocate sufficient resources for the implementation of the Regulation, while 60% (93 out of 154 replies) noted considerable differences in the resource allocation across Member States. Large shares of respondents were unable to express a view on the effectiveness of EU-level resource pooling and EUTFs, though relative majorities still disagreed that these mechanisms adequately alleviate national capacity constraints.

More than half of the respondents, 55% (85 out of 154 replies), consider the Regulation as not effective at all or ineffective in ensuring that only compliant products reach the Single Market, while only 10% (15 out of 154 replies) considered it effective or very effective. Key reasons cited include high volumes of imports from third countries, complex global supply chains, reliance on self-declaration of conformity, limited resources and technical capacity of authorities, difficulties in monitoring online marketplaces, and insufficient harmonisation and coordination across Member States.

E-commerce emerged as a central concern among the respondents to the public consultation. 58% of respondents agreed that products sold online are more likely to be non-compliant or dangerous than those sold in-store, and 85% indicated that, in their view, market surveillance authorities are not sufficiently equipped to meet the challenges posed by the growth of e-commerce.

Respondents expressed strong support for both non-legislative and legislative measures to revise the current MSR. 66% (102 out of 154 replies) supported additional guidance and training for authorities on tracing non-compliant or dangerous products sold online, and 76% (113 out of 148 replies) supported greater use of digital and AI-based tools. There was broad agreement that all products placed on the EU market should have a responsible economic operator established in the EU, and strong backing for closer cooperation between market surveillance authorities and customs, enhanced EU-level digital tools, and strengthened EU-level governance, including a possible EU Market Surveillance Authority to coordinate cross-border enforcement.

Data request to MSAs

A dedicated data request was shared with MSAs across the EEA to gather data on the resources available for market surveillance across countries, statistics on the activities implemented by market surveillance authorities on an annual basis, and the frequency of cross-border cooperation. 81 responses were collected from MSAs and SLOs from 17 countries across the EEA. A large share of responses came from Cyprus (20%, 16 out of 81 responses) and Germany (19%, 15 out of 81 responses).

Market Surveillance Authorities across Member States reported a strong reliance on external laboratory capacity to support enforcement activities. Comprehensive in‑house laboratory facilities were reported only in a limited number of cases and typically restricted to specific sectors. As reported by authorities, this increases dependence on available funding and can limit the volume and frequency of testing activities.

The number of formal checks has increased more strongly than in-depth investigations during the period from 2019 to 2025, with little change to laboratory testing rates.

Inspections were most followed by corrective actions or voluntary measures taken by economic operators, while the application of penalties was reported as relatively infrequent. Cost recovery mechanisms were also reported as rarely applied and generally limited to specific legal contexts.

Authorities reported that proactive checks account for most recorded controls. Reactive inspections triggered by customs notifications, Safety Gate alerts or requests from authorities in other Member States were consistently reported as a smaller share of total activity. At the same time, several authorities indicated that reactive and informal cooperation actions are not fully captured in quantitative reporting systems, suggesting that reported figures may not reflect the full extent of such activities.

MSAs consistently emphasised the importance of EU‑level coordination mechanisms. Tools such as Safety Gate, ICSMS and participation in EU joint actions were described as central to the functioning of national market surveillance systems, particularly for authorities with limited resources or fragmented institutional structures. Authorities reported that these mechanisms play a key role in supporting coordination, information exchange and effective enforcement across the Single Market.

Targeted survey

The targeted survey was launched on 2 March 2026 and provided stakeholders the opportunity to provide more detailed information on the implementation, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value of the current MSR, while also exploring the impacts of the refined policy options for the potential revision of the MSR in greater detail. The targeted survey remained open until 10 April 2026.

The survey gathered 287 valid responses. 15% of the replies (42 out of 287 responses) were submitted by individual companies, and 18% (52 out of 287 replies) were submitted by business organisations, of which half were submitted by national and EU-level organisations, respectively. About 4% of the replies (11 out of 287 responses) were submitted by customs authorities. The majority of 51% of the contributions (146 out of 287 responses) were submitted by MSAs, while other authorities accounted for up 21 of the responses. The stakeholder category other made up 7% (15 out of 287 responses). A complete breakdown of the share of responses by stakeholder group is presented in the figure below.

Figure A5.3 – Responses to the targeted survey by stakeholder category

In their replies, 73% (203 of 280 replies) of respondents suggested that there are differences in the implementation of the MSR, while 83% (229 of 276 replies) agreed or strongly agreed that there are differences in the capacities and resources for market surveillance across Member States. About 73% (201 of 276 replies) identified differences in the level of practical cross-border cooperation across the EU.

About 64% of the respondents (176 of 274 replies) noted that the implementation of the MSR created clear obligations for economic operators. The same share of stakeholders saw a (strong) improvement in the strengthening of the powers of market surveillance authorities in the same time period. Among the respondents, 43% (117 out of 274 responses) identified a contribution of the MSR to the objective of strengthening the controls on products entering the single market from third countries, while the same number of stakeholders identified no improvement or even a deterioration. Only 28% of the stakeholders (78 out of 276 replies) identified an improvement in the operational enforcement capacity and resources available to market surveillance authorities, with 54% (156 replies) reporting no change or a deterioration compared to a few years back.

A majority of 55% (151 out of 275 responses) replied that they see potential for further simplification, whereas only 7% (19 out of 275) replied that there is no further room for simplification under the MSR. Respondents especially noted potential for simplification through avoiding double reporting and the manual entry of information by integrating IT systems (ICSMS, Safety Gate, DPP). Other areas for simplifications identified by stakeholders were the reduction of burdens by harmonising definitions, obligations and procedures across legislation, notably between the MSR on the one side and the GPSR, DSA, and sectoral legislation on the other side to ensure consistent enforcement.

A very large majority of respondents, between 76% (210 out of 276 replies) and 89% (247 out of 277 replies), responded that the objectives of the MSR remain relevant in light of the current and evolving needs.

The results of the targeted survey indicate mixed views among stakeholders on the coherence of the MSR with other EU legislation, such as the GPSR, NLF, DSA, UCC, and others. The MSR is considered least coherent with the DSA, ESPR, REACH, UCC, and the CLP, as between 27% (72 out of 266 replies for the CLP) and 46% (125 out of 273 replies for the GPSR) of respondents suggested in their contributions. At the same time, considerable shares of respondents, between 22% (59 out of 273 replies) and 60% (106 out of 177 replies), considered themselves not in a position to provide any judgement.

Almost 9 out of 10 respondents (241 out of 274) strongly agree that the objectives supported by the Regulation continue to require action at the EU level, while less than 2% (5 out of 274) disagreed.

Overall, stakeholders expressed strong support for additional policy action at the EU level to strengthen the legislative framework on market surveillance further. About half of the respondents (134 out of 274) expressed support for the most stringent policy option with regard to the objective to close current regulatory loopholes. While consumer organisations and EU-level business associations show very strong support (beyond two-thirds of respondents from these groups), the support is less pronounced among businesses and their associations. Also, about half of the respondents (134 out of 274) supported the third option in relation to the objective to strengthen capacity, expressing support for an enhanced ICSMS system, more EUTFs, and additional powers for customs authorities and for the EU-level in the form of both an auditing system as well as in the form of investigative and enforcement powers. A plurality of stakeholders (38%, 105 out of 274 replies) further expressed support for the set-up of permanent clusters of seconded national inspectors to enhance coordination across borders.

Targeted interviews

A total of 47 interviews were carried out as part of the consultations. The interviewees were conducted with stakeholders from across eight categories: business associations, SLOs, online marketplaces, authorised representatives, chambers of commerce, consumer organisations, NGOs, and customs authorities.

SLOs accounted for the majority of interviews with 34% (16 out of 47 interviews), followed by business associations 21% (10 out of 47) and online marketplaces 15% (7 out of 47). The overall divide of interviews across stakeholder categories is shown in the figure below.

Figure A5.4 – Stakeholder groups interviewed in the scope of the consultations

Under Objective 1 on the closing of regulatory loopholes, SLOs and MSAs widely considered the current Article 4 of the MSR to be ineffective for online sales because of authorised representatives not existing, not being contactable, or not holding the listed mandate. Most authorities, therefore, supported the extension of Art. 4 and the implementation of a mandatory verification mechanism (through an AR database or the DPP) to ensure a real and accountable EU-based operator. Business associations broadly agreed that the loopholes in Article 4 mainly affect e-commers and sellers from third countries. They expressed support for an extension of the scope of Article 4 and the introduction of a verification mechanism for authorised representatives, conditional on ensuring that no additional burden is created for already compliant firms and SMEs. Consumer organisations viewed Article 4 critically and expressed that the current regulation is not sufficient to guarantee accountability. The interviewed consumer organisations expressed strong support for the extension of the MSR to all harmonised product legislation and for the introduction of a verification mechanism. Online marketplaces acknowledged that information on authorised representatives is frequently unreliable and favoured a centralised, automated verification system over expanding legal liabilities. Authorised representatives highlighted that the current Article 4 is working conceptually but is limited in its enforceability through untrue mandates, shell companies and unreliable manufacturer information. An extension of the scope of Article 4 was only supported if it were paired with an enforceable verification mechanism and mandate clarity. The respondents cautioned that a shifting of product compliance responsibility to authorised representatives without structural safeguards would destabilise the function instead of improving compliance.

Regarding the extension of responsibilities for online marketplaces, SLOs and MSAs voiced that cooperation with large platforms is generally working well, but ineffective without tools to prevent relisting. The stakeholders expressed support for the introduction of a systematic, ex-ante verification and repeat-offer prevention tools for OMPs. Business associations overarchingly supported increasing the responsibilities of OMPs to restore a level playing field for EU manufacturers. Concerns were voiced should obligations require extensive manual compliance checks without automation. OMPs supported the display and database-based verification requirements, such as the DPP or an AR registry, but opposed the extension of obligations to general monitoring or substantive compliance assessments. Deeming marketplaces as responsible for product compliance was widely seen as incompatible with the existing business models.

Under Objective 2 on boosting market surveillance capacity, MSAs and SLOs voiced strong support for integrating ICSMS, DPP, customs systems, and automation flows to reduce the workload and enable risk-based enforcement at scale. An introduction of such tools was deemed to be associated with a reduction in time spent on verification procedures. Business associations overall recognised existing capacity constraints and supported the introduction of additional IT tools and coordination, provided controls become more effective in practice. Increased obligations were considered acceptable only if they were matched with stronger enforcement against non-compliant operators. Consumer organisations supported the introduction of digital tools such as the DPP and web crawlers, only if these led to concrete enforcement outcomes. OMPs responded that they already invest heavily in compliance and detection tools, but stressed limitations caused by the fragmentation of databases and inconsistencies in data quality. The introduction of a centralised, interoperable EU system was seen as essential to reduce manual checks and to speed up enforcement actions.

Under objective 3 on strengthening cooperation between authorities, MSAs and SLOs largely supported stronger EU-level coordination mechanisms for large cross-border and e-commerce cases, but stressed the need to safeguard national autonomy. Business associations voiced issues with inconsistent enforcement across Member States, creating competitive distortions and legal uncertainty. A CPC-style coordination mechanism or an increase in structured joint actions was generally preferred over an EU-level centralisation of market surveillance. Online marketplaces supported the harmonisation of market surveillance enforcement across the EU, as long as roles remain clearly separated.

Case studies

Four case studies were implemented in the scope of the consultations, combining desk research with interviews. These interviews took the form of designated case study interviews with dedicated questionnaires.

In total, 23 stakeholders were interviewed in the scope of four case studies. The stakeholders interviewed for the case studies were spread across 11 EU Member States (see Figure 6).

Figure A5.5 – Case study interview division by country

Case study 1 focused on market surveillance at the border for imports from third countries - Customs and MSAs collaboration. Six stakeholders from four countries were consulted for interviews (two SLOs, MSAs, and customs authorities each). The interviewees suggested that operational constraints in cooperation resulted from a misalignment between the legal deadline and the real timeline for inspections, the absence of integrated IT tools between customs and MSAs, and uncertainties on the competencies of MSAs in relation to B2C parcels.

Case study 2 covered the topic of enforcement for products sold on online marketplaces. Three stakeholders from three countries and three EU-level organisations were consulted for interviews(two online marketplaces (OMP) and MSAs each, one SLO and one business association). A significant barrier to enforcement identified by the stakeholders in the interviews is the challenge to identify and contact the responsible economic operator, including the authorised representative, under Article 4 and limited product information in recall requests by MSAs to OMPs, which slows the recall process down.

Case study 3 investigated potential fragmentation and governance divergence between Member States. Five stakeholders from three countries were interviewed (Three SLOs, one MSA, and one consumer organisation). Stakeholders identified inefficiencies in the current system, which they consider to be driven by unclear procedures and limitations of the current ICSMS system.

Case study 4 focused on the administrative burden and simplification potential of the MSR, focussing on the digital infrastructure and interoperability. Five stakeholders from five EU countries were interviewed (four SLOs and one MSA). The case study interviews flagged a lacking interconnectedness of national systems with ICSMS as a key issue and noted a misalignment between the investigations reported in ICSMS and the true volume of cases pursued by MSAs. They noted that these challenges are augmented by a growing e-commerce sector. Simplification priorities identified by stakeholders were the creation of a national to ICSMS IT interface for automated data transfers, and creating interoperability between ICSMS and other EU-level tools and databases such as Safety Gate and customs.

Validation workshop

The validation workshop took place on 13 May. The main findings and lessons learned for the evaluation were presented and structured around four guiding questions. For the impact assessment, one breakout group with MSAs focused on Objectives 2 and 3, while the other focused on measures for ARs and OMs, discussing and confirming the validity of estimates and assumptions.

Identified campaigns and ad-hoc contributions

No campaigns were identified in the context of the public consultation. Position papers were provided by stakeholders in the scope of the Call for Evidence, public consultation, targeted survey and the targeted interviews, and analysed in the scope of these consultation activities. No ad-hoc documents were received outside the consultation activities.

1.ICSMS and Safety Gate data 

Table A6.1. Evolution of the MSAs creating notifications on ICSMS by Member State (2019 - 2025)

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Figure A6.1. Evolution of the number of MSAs creating notification on ICSMS (2019 - 2025)

Table A6. 2. Evolution of the number of notifications created on ICSMS by Member State (2019-2025)

Table A6. 3. Evolution of the number and share of non-compliant products in completed investigations recorded on ICSMS (2019-2025)

Table A6.4. Non-compliance rate by sector (2021 - 2025)

Note: Sectors shown are top 10 according to the number of investigations over the time period 2021-2025.

Table A6.5. – Results of ICSMS investigations

Table A6.6. – Share of corrective action

Figure A6. 2. Year-on-year growth by type of check performed

Source: MSAs reporting.

Figure A6.3 Average share of checks in which the costs were recovered out of total checks (all countries)