| 16.11.2022 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | L 295/7 | 16.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 295/7 |
| IZVEDBENA UREDBA KOMISIJE (EU) 2022/2247 | COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/2247 |
| z dne 15. novembra 2022 | of 15 November 2022 |
| o uvedbi dokončne protidampinške dajatve in o dokončnem pobiranju začasne dajatve, uvedene na uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in Brazilije | imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil |
| EVROPSKA KOMISIJA JE – | THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, |
| ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| ob upoštevanju Uredbe (EU) 2016/1036 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 8. junija 2016 o zaščiti proti dampinškemu uvozu iz držav, ki niso članice Evropske unije (1) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: osnovna uredba) in zlasti člena 9(4) Uredbe, | Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof, |
| ob upoštevanju naslednjega: | Whereas: |
| 1. POSTOPEK | 1. PROCEDURE |
| 1.1 Začetek | 1.1. Initiation |
| (1) | Evropska komisija (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Komisija) je 24. septembra 2021 na podlagi člena 5 osnovne uredbe začela protidampinško preiskavo v zvezi z uvozom izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske (v nadaljnjem besedilu: LRK ali Kitajska) in Brazilije (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj: zadevni državi). Obvestilo o začetku je objavila v Uradnem listu Evropske unije (2) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obvestilo o začetku). | (1) | On 24 September 2021, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel (‘ECCS’) originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’ or ‘China’) and Brazil (together ‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’). |
| (2) | Komisija je preiskavo začela na podlagi pritožbe z dne 13. avgusta 2021, ki jo je vložilo združenje evropskih jeklarjev (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Eurofer ali pritožnik). Pritožba je vsebovala dokaze o dampingu in znatni škodi, ki je zaradi njega nastala, kar je zadostovalo za začetek preiskave. | (2) | The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 13 August 2021 by the European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) (‘the complainant’). The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. |
| (3) | Pritožba je bila vložena v imenu naslednjih proizvajalcev Unije: ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine (Francija), ArcelorMittal Etxebarri S.A. (Španija) in ThyssenKrupp Rasselstein GmbH (Nemčija), ki domnevno predstavljajo 100 % industrije Unije. Med preiskavo je Komisija ugotovila, da je v Uniji še en proizvajalec izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, in sicer družba Acciaierie d’Italia. Glede na to, da so pritožniki ne glede na to predstavljali [85–95] % proizvodnje in prodaje industrije Unije, se je v skladu s členom 5(4) osnovne uredbe štelo, da je pritožbo vložila industrija Unije. | (3) | The complaint was made on behalf of the following Union producers: ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine (France), ArcelorMittal Etxebarri S.A. (Spain) and ThyssenKrupp Rasselstein GmbH (Germany), allegedly representing 100 % of the Union industry. In the course of the investigation, it came to the Commission’s attention the existence of an additional Union producer of ECCS, namely Acciaierie d’Italia. Since the complainants nonetheless represented [85-95] % of the production and sales of the Union industry, the complaint was considered to have been made by the Union industry in accordance with Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| 1.2 Zainteresirane strani | 1.2. Interested parties |
| (4) | Komisija je v obvestilu o začetku zainteresirane strani pozvala, naj se ji javijo, če želijo sodelovati v preiskavi. Poleg tega je o začetku preiskave izrecno obvestila pritožnika, znane proizvajalce Unije, znane proizvajalce izvoznike ter organe LRK in Brazilije, znane uvoznike, dobavitelje in uporabnike, trgovce ter združenja, za katera je znano, da jih to zadeva, in jih povabila k sodelovanju. | (4) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the authorities of the PRC and Brazil, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation, and invited them to participate. |
| 1.3 Začasni ukrepi | 1.3. Provisional measures |
| (5) | Komisija je v skladu s členom 19a osnovne uredbe 25. aprila 2022, tj. štiri tedne pred uvedbo začasnih dajatev (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obdobje predhodnega razkritja), stranem predložila povzetek predlaganih dajatev ter podrobne informacije o izračunu stopenj dampinga in stopenj, ki zadostujejo za odpravo škode, povzročene industriji Unije. Zainteresirane strani so bile pozvane, naj v treh delovnih dneh predložijo pripombe v zvezi s točnostjo izračunov. Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 29 do 34 začasne uredbe, je Komisija ugotovila, da zahteve za registracijo iz člena 14(5a) osnovne uredbe niso bile izpolnjene. Zato uvoz iz zadevnih držav v obdobju predhodnega razkritja ni bil predmet registracije. | (5) | In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 25 April 2022, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details about the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry four weeks before the imposition of provisional duties (‘the pre-disclosure period’). Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days. As explained in recitals (29) to (34) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that the requirements for registration under Article 14(5a) of the basic Regulation were not met. Therefore, imports from the countries concerned have not been subject to registration during the pre-disclosure period. |
| (6) | Komisija je prejela pripombe od družb Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Baosteel), Handan Jintai Packing Materials Co., Ltd. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Jintai) in CANPACK. Na podlagi pripomb družbe Baosteel je bila popravljena pisna napaka pri izračunu. Pripombe družbe Jintai so se nanašale na člen 7(2a) osnovne uredbe in torej niso zadevale točnosti izračunov. Zato jih je Komisija proučila po razkritju začasnih ukrepov in so obravnavane v oddelku 3.1 v nadaljevanju. Ker so se pripombe družbe CANPACK nanašale na interes Unije, so obravnavane v oddelku 7 v nadaljevanju. | (6) | The Commission received comments from Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd (‘Baosteel’), Handan Jintai Packing Materials Co., Ltd (‘Jintai’), and CANPACK. The submission of Baosteel led to the correction of a clerical error in the calculations. The comments of Jintai were related to Article 7(2a) of the Basic Regulation and therefore not related to the accuracy of calculations. Therefore they were considered after the disclosure of provisional measures and are addressed in Section 3.1 below. As the comments of CANPACK related to Union interest, they have been addressed in Section 7 below. |
| (7) | Komisija je 23. maja 2022 v Uradnem listu Evropske unije objavila Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2022/802 o uvedbi začasne protidampinške dajatve na uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in Brazilije (3) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: začasna uredba). | (7) | On 23 May 2022, the Commission published in the Official Journal of the European Union Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/802 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil (3) (‘the provisional Regulation’). |
| 1.4 Naknadni postopek | 1.4. Subsequent procedure |
| (8) | Po razkritju bistvenih dejstev in premislekov, na podlagi katerih so bile uvedene začasne protidampinške dajatve (v nadaljnjem besedilu: začasno razkritje), so Eurofer (pritožnik), Eviosys (uporabnik Unije), CANPACK, ki zastopa družbe CANPACK Slovakia s.r.o., Can-Pack Food, Industrial Packaging Sp. z o.o. in Tapon France S.A.S. (uporabniki Unije), Astir Vitogiannis Bros Single Member S.A. (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Astir Vitogiannis) (uporabnik Unije), Baosteel (proizvajalec izvoznik iz Kitajske), Jintai (proizvajalec izvoznik iz Kitajske), Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (v nadaljnjem besedilu: CSN) (proizvajalec izvoznik iz Brazilije), kitajsko združenje železarjev in jeklarjev (v nadaljnjem besedilu: združenje CISA), vlada LRK (v nadaljnjem besedilu: kitajska vlada) ter vlada Brazilije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: brazilska vlada) v roku, določenem v členu 2(1) začasne uredbe, predložili pisna stališča v zvezi z začasnimi ugotovitvami. | (8) | Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), Eurofer (complainant), Eviosys (Union user), CANPACK, representing CANPACK Slovakia s.r.o., Can-Pack Food and Industrial Packaging Sp. z o.o. and Tapon France S.A.S. (Union users), Astir Vitogiannis Bros Single Member S.A. (‘Astir Vitogiannis’) (Union user), Baosteel (exporting producer from China), Jintai (exporting producer from China), Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (‘CSN’) (exporting producer from Brazil), the China Iron and Steel Association (‘CISA’), the Government of the PRC (‘GOC’) and the Government of Brazil (‘GOB’) filed written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (9) | Stranem, ki so zahtevale zaslišanje, je bila ta možnost odobrena. Opravljena so bila zaslišanja z družbo Baosteel, združenjem CISA in družbo Astir Vitogiannis. | (9) | The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with Baosteel, CISA and Astir Vitogiannis. |
| (10) | Komisija je nadaljevala zbiranje in preverjanje vseh informacij, ki so bile po njenem mnenju potrebne za njene dokončne ugotovitve. Pri dokončnih ugotovitvah je upoštevala pripombe, ki so jih predložile zainteresirane strani, in po potrebi popravila svoje začasne ugotovitve. | (10) | The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate. |
| (11) | Komisija je 31. avgusta 2022 vse zainteresirane strani obvestila o ključnih dejstvih in premislekih, na podlagi katerih je nameravala uvesti dokončno protidampinško dajatev na uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in Brazilije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dokončno razkritje). Za vse strani je bil določen rok, v katerem so lahko predložile pripombe k dokončnemu razkritju. | (11) | On 31 August 2022, the Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure. |
| (12) | Po pripombah zainteresiranih strani je Komisija 16. septembra 2022 zainteresirane strani obvestila o nekaterih pojasnilih in manjših popravkih v dokončnem razkritju, ki pa niso vplivali na dokončne dajatve. Za strani je bil določen rok za pošiljanje pripomb v zvezi s tem. Pripombe je predložilo le združenje CISA. | (12) | Following comments from interested parties, the Commission informed, on 16 September 2022, interested parties about some clarifications and minor corrections in the final disclosure that did, however, not have an impact on the definitive duties. Parties were granted a period within which they could make comments. Only CISA made comments. |
| (13) | Stranem, ki so zahtevale zaslišanje, je bila odobrena tudi ta možnost. Izvedena so bila zaslišanja z združenjem CISA ter družbami Baosteel, Eviosys in Eurofer. | (13) | Parties who so requested were also granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with CISA, Baosteel, Eviosys and Eurofer. |
| 1.5 Pripombe glede začetka preiskave | 1.5. Comments on initiation |
| (14) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 6 in 7 začasne uredbe, je kitajsko združenje železarjev in jeklarjev CISA po začetku postopka predložilo pripombe, v katerih je trdilo, da se pritožba preveč opira na zaupne informacije in da nezaupna različica zato ni omogočala pravilnega razumevanja dokazov, na katerih temelji pritožba. Združenje CISA je to trditev ponovilo po uvedbi začasnih ukrepov. | (14) | As explained in recitals (6) and (7) of the provisional Regulation, the China Iron and Steel Association (‘CISA’) submitted comments following initiation claiming that the complaint relied too much on confidential information and that the non-confidential version was therefore insufficient to allow a proper understanding of the evidence underlying the complaint. CISA reiterated this claim following the imposition of provisional measures. |
| (15) | Komisija je potrdila svoj sklep iz uvodne izjave 8 začasne uredbe, da je nezaupna različica pritožbe, ki je bila zainteresiranim stranem na vpogled v spisu, vsebovala vse bistvene dokaze in nezaupne povzetke zaupnih podatkov, ki zainteresiranim stranem omogočajo, da ustrezno uveljavljajo pravico do obrambe, ter je zato trditev zavrnila. | (15) | The Commission confirmed its conclusion in recital (8) of the provisional Regulation that the non-confidential version of the complaint available in the file for inspection by interested parties contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of the confidential data allowing interested parties to properly exercise their rights of defence, and thus rejected the claim. |
| 1.6 Vzorčenje | 1.6. Sampling |
| (16) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede vzorčenja proizvajalcev Unije, uvoznikov in proizvajalcev izvoznikov, se uvodne izjave 9 do 17 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (16) | In the absence of comments regarding the sampling of Union producers, importers and exporting producers, recitals (9) to (17) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 1.7 Individualna preiskava | 1.7. Individual examination |
| (17) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 18 začasne uredbe, je proizvajalec izvoznik iz Kitajske GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. zahteval individualno preiskavo v skladu s členom 17(3) osnovne uredbe in v roku vrnil izpolnjen vprašalnik. Ta zahteva je bila ponovljena po dokončnem razkritju. Komisija je začasno ugotovila, da bi preiskava tega zahtevka pomenila preveliko obremenitev in bi onemogočila končanje preiskave v roku, določenem v osnovni uredbi. Opozorila je, da je omejila vzorec na dve družbi, ki sta predstavljali največji obseg uvoza iz Kitajske, ki ga je bilo mogoče ustrezno preiskati v razpoložljivem času. Obe družbi sta v celoti sodelovali, kar je vključevalo pregled in preverjanje (na podlagi navzkrižnih preverjanj na daljavo) informacij, ki jih je predložilo več povezanih subjektov na Kitajskem in v Uniji, kar je Komisiji preprečilo, da bi poleg vzorčenih družb individualno preiskala družbo GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. Ta sklep je ostal veljaven tudi v zaključni fazi. Zato je Komisija potrdila svojo odločitev, da ne ugodi zahtevku te družbe za individualno preiskavo. | (17) | As explained in recital (18) of the provisional Regulation, an exporting producer in China, GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation and provided a questionnaire reply within the deadline. This request was reiterated after the final disclosure. The Commission had provisionally found that an examination of this request would have been unduly burdensome and would not have allowed the completion of the investigation within the time period established in the basic Regulation. The Commission recalled that it had limited its sample to two companies representing the largest volume of imports from China that could reasonably be investigated within the time available. Both companies fully cooperated, which included examination and verification (by means of remote cross-checks or ‘RCCs’) of information provided by several related entities both in China and in the Union which precluded the Commission from individually examining GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. in addition to the sampled companies. This conclusion remained valid also during the definitive stage. The Commission therefore confirmed its decision not to grant individual examination to this company. |
| 1.8 Izpolnjeni vprašalniki in preveritveni obiski | 1.8. Questionnaire replies and verification visits |
| (18) | Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 19 in 21 začasne uredbe, je Komisija vprašalnike poslala trem proizvajalcem Unije, pritožniku, enemu nepovezanemu uvozniku, znanim uporabnikom in trem proizvajalcem izvoznikom iz zadevnih držav. Poleg tega je vladi Ljudske republike Kitajske poslala vprašalnike glede obstoja znatnega izkrivljanja v LRK v smislu člena 2(6a), točka (b), osnovne uredbe in izkrivljanja cen surovin na Kitajskem v zvezi z izdelkom v preiskavi. | (18) | As set out in recitals (19) and (21) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission sent questionnaires to three Union producers, the complainant, one unrelated importer and known users, and three exporting producers in the countries concerned. It also sent questionnaires to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’) concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation as well as concerning raw material distortions in China regarding the product under investigation. |
| (19) | Poleg navzkrižnih preverjanj na daljavo iz uvodne izjave 23 začasne uredbe je Komisija izvedla preveritveni obisk pri naslednjem uporabniku Unije: | — | Eviosys, Paris (Francija). | (19) | In addition to RCCs mentioned in recital (23) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission further carried out a verification visit at the following Union user: | — | Eviosys, Paris (France) |
| 1.9 Obdobje preiskave in obravnavano obdobje | 1.9. Investigation period and period considered |
| (20) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 24 začasne uredbe, je preiskava dampinga in škode zajemala obdobje od 1. julija 2020 do 30. junija 2021 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obdobje preiskave ali OP). Proučitev gibanj, pomembnih za oceno škode, je zajemala obdobje od 1. januarja 2018 do konca obdobja preiskave (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obravnavano obdobje). | (20) | As stated in recital (24) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2018 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’). |
| 2. ZADEVNI IZDELEK IN PODOBNI IZDELEK | 2. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT |
| 2.1 Zadevni izdelek | 2.1. Product concerned |
| (21) | Komisija je opozorila, da so zadevni izdelek ploščati valjani izdelki iz železa ali nelegiranega jekla, platirani ali prevlečeni s kromovimi oksidi ali s kromom in kromovimi oksidi s poreklom iz LRK in Brazilije, ki se trenutno uvrščajo pod oznaki KN 7210 50 00 in 7212 50 20 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zadevni izdelek), kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 25 začasne uredbe. | (21) | The Commission recalled that, as set out in recital (25) of the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, plated or coated with chromium oxides or with chromium and chromium oxides originating in the PRC and Brazil, currently falling under CN codes 7210 50 00 and 7212 50 20 (‘the product concerned’). |
| (22) | Izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla se uporabljajo za različne namene, običajno za potrošniško in industrijsko embalažo. Najpogosteje se uporabljajo za pakiranje živil, na primer za pokrove in dna pločevink, navojne pokrovčke in pokrove na kozarcih, ušesca na pločevinkah itd. Druge vrste uporabe vključujejo zunanje dele za gospodinjske aparate, škatlice za fotografske filme, zaščitni material za zaščito optičnih vlaken ali druge električne in elektronske dele. | (22) | ECCS is used in a wide range of applications, typically for consumer and industrial packaging. It is most frequently used for food packaging, for example in can tops and bottoms, screw and lug caps, tabs, etcetera. Other types of uses include external parts for home appliances, photographic film cases, protective material for optical fibre protection or other electrical and electronic parts. |
| 2.2 Podobni izdelek | 2.2. Like product |
| (23) | Ker ni bila predložena nobena trditev ali pripomba, se sklepa iz uvodnih izjav 27 in 28 začasne uredbe potrdita. | (23) | In the absence of any related claim or comment, the conclusions in recital (27) and (28) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| 3. DAMPING | 3. DUMPING |
| 3.1 Kitajska | 3.1. China |
| (24) | Komisija je po začasnem razkritju prejela pisne pripombe dveh vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov, tj. združenja CISA in kitajske vlade, k začasnim ugotovitvam o dampingu. | (24) | Following provisional disclosure, the Commission received written comments from the two sampled exporting producers, CISA and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’) on the provisional dumping findings. |
| 3.1.1 Normalna vrednost | 3.1.1. Normal value |
| (25) | Podrobnosti izračuna normalne vrednosti so navedene v uvodnih izjavah 42 do 109 začasne uredbe. | (25) | The details of the calculation of the normal value were set out in recitals (42) to (109) of the provisional Regulation. |
| 3.1.2 Obstoj znatnega izkrivljanja | 3.1.2. Existence of significant distortions |
| (26) | Po začasnem razkritju sta združenje CISA in kitajska vlada predložila pripombe glede uporabe člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe v sedanji preiskavi. Poleg tega je družba Baosteel potrdila pripombe združenja CISA. | (26) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA and the GOC commented on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the current investigation. In addition, Baosteel endorsed CISA’s comments. |
| Argumenti v zvezi s poročilom
(4) | Arguments concerning the Report
(4) |
| (27) | Kitajska vlada je navedla, da je poročilo dejansko in pravno pomanjkljivo ter da odločitve, ki temeljijo na njem, niso legitimne. Kar zadeva dejansko podlago, je poročilo po navedbah kitajske vlade zavajajoče, enostransko in povsem neusklajeno z dejanskim stanjem. Poleg tega dejstvo, da je Komisija objavila poročila o državi za nekaj izbranih držav, vzbuja pomisleke glede obravnave po načelu države z največjimi ugodnostmi. Kitajska vlada tudi meni, da opiranje Komisije na dokaze v poročilu ni v skladu z duhom poštene in pravične zakonodaje, saj industriji Unije zagotavlja nepošteno prednost in dejansko pomeni obravnavanje zadeve pred sojenjem. | (27) | The GOC submitted that the Report is factually and legally flawed and decisions based on it lack legitimacy. On the factual side, the Report is, according to the GOC, misrepresentative, one-sided and out of touch with reality. Moreover, the fact that the Commission has issued country reports for a few selected countries raises concerns about most favoured nation (‘MFN’) treatment. Further, relying by the Commission on the evidence in the Report is, in the GOC’s view, not in line with the spirit of fair and just law, as it provides unfair advantages to the Union industry and as it effectively amounts to judging the case before trial. |
| (28) | Podobno je združenje CISA navedlo, da se Komisija pretirano opira na poročilo, ki je po njegovem mnenju enostransko, neobjektivno in zastarelo ter namerno ne vključuje dejstev, ki bi olajšala vložitev pritožb na podlagi uporabe člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe. Poleg tega se ni strinjalo z odgovorom Komisije iz oddelka 3.1.3 začasne uredbe, v katerem je Komisija trdila, da so kitajska vlada in druge strani imele priložnost predložiti informacije, s katerimi bi izpodbijale vire, vključene v poročilo, pri čemer je pojasnilo, da dokazno breme v tem primeru nosi preiskovalni organ in ne izvozniki tretjih držav. Poleg tega je združenje CISA poudarilo, da se poročilo ne nanaša na industrijo izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, ampak je preprosto univerzalen dokument, ki ga Komisija brez razlikovanja uporablja za različne preiskave. Nadalje je navedlo, da so petletni načrti, na katere se Komisija sklicuje v preiskavi, da bi dokazala obstoj znatnega izkrivljanja, le smernice, ki izražajo stališča politike za prihodnost, podobno kot dokumenti, objavljeni tudi v Evropski uniji, in zato niso izkrivljajoči. Nazadnje je združenje CISA navedlo, da 13. petletni načrt iz poročila zajema le obdobje do leta 2020, kar pomeni, da ni upošteven za drugi del obdobja preiskave. | (28) | Similarly, CISA submitted that the Commission relied excessively on the Report, which in CISA’s opinion is one-sided, non-objective, outdated, and deliberately omits factual elements to facilitate lodging of the complaints based on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. CISA furthermore disagreed with the Commission’s reply in Section 3.1.3 of the provisional Regulation, where the Commission argued that both the GOC as well as other parties had the opportunity to submit information rebutting the sources included in the Report by specifying that the burden of proof lies in this case with the investigating authority and not the third country exporters. In addition, CISA underlined that the Report did not concern the ECCS industry but it is simply a one-size-fits-all document which the Commission uses for various investigations indiscriminately. Furthermore, CISA submitted that the Five-Year Plans (‘FYP’) to which the Commission refers in its investigation to prove the existence of significant distortions are merely guiding documents expressing policy views for the future, similar to such documents published also in the European Union, and hence not distortive. Finally, CISA submitted that the 13th FYP referred to in the Report only covers the period until 2020, meaning it was not relevant for the second part of the investigation period. |
| (29) | Komisija se s tem ni strinjala. Ti argumenti so bili večinoma že obravnavani v začasni uredbi, zato je Komisija potrdila sklepe iz uvodnih izjav 68 do 70 začasne uredbe. Komisija ni razumela, kako je lahko na primer sklicevanje na kitajsko veljavno zakonodajo neusklajeno z dejanskim stanjem. Podobno je združenje CISA navedlo, da je Komisija izpustila dejanske okoliščine, elemente in sklepe, ki bi bili v nasprotju z namenom poročila, ne da bi pojasnilo, katere specifične okoliščine ali elementi v zvezi z dejstvi bi lahko izpodbijali obstoj znatnega izkrivljanja v smislu člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe. Kar zadeva dokazno breme, je Komisija glede na poročilo in druge predložene dokaze izpolnila obveznost dokaznega bremena in niti združenje CISA niti druge zainteresirane strani niso mogle ovreči predloženih dokazov. Komisija je nadalje poudarila, da petletni načrti, ki jih je objavila kitajska vlada, niso le splošne smernice, ampak so pravno zavezujoči. V zvezi s tem se je sklicevala na podrobno analizo načrtov v poglavju 4 poročila, pri čemer je zavezujoča narava načrtov posebej obravnavana v oddelku 4.3.1. | (29) | The Commission disagreed. These arguments were already largely addressed in the provisional Regulation and the Commission therefore confirmed the conclusions from recitals (68) to (70) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission failed to see how, for example, referring to Chinese legislation in force can be out of touch with reality. Similarly, CISA claimed that the Commission omits factual circumstances, elements and conclusions which would contradict the purpose of the Report, without pointing out which specific factual circumstances or elements would put in question the existence of significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. Concerning the burden of proof, the Report as well as the other evidence put forward meant that the Commission had satisfied its burden of proof, and that neither CISA nor other interested parties had been able to rebut the evidence put forward. The Commission further underlined that the FYPs published by the GOC are not merely general guidance documents, but are of a legally binding nature. In this respect, the Commission referred to the detailed analysis of the plans in Chapter 4 of the Report, with a section specifically dedicated to the binding nature of plans in Section 4.3.1. |
| (30) | Kar zadeva trditev, da 13. petletni načrt ni bil upošteven za drugi del obdobja preiskave (1. januar–30. junij 2021), je Komisija poudarila, kot je že navedeno v uvodni izjavi 69 začasne uredbe, da so se 14. petletni načrti začeli objavljati šele v letu 2021. Splošni 14. petletni načrt je bil na primer objavljen 12. marca, 14. petletni načrt o odpadnem jeklu 15. septembra in 14. petletni načrt o razvoju surovin 21. decembra 2021. Komisija je ugotovila, da so se v obdobju od datuma uporabe 13. petletnega načrta do objave 14. petletnega načrta še vedno uporabljale določbe prvonavedenega načrta. Ne glede na to, kdaj točno so bili objavljeni posamezni 14. petletni načrti, dejstvo, da se je 13. petletni načrt uporabljal v prvi polovici obdobja preiskave, vsekakor že kaže na obstoj znatnega izkrivljanja v smislu člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe. Ta trditev je bila zato zavrnjena. | (30) | With regard to the claim that 13th FYP was irrelevant for the second part of the investigation period (1 January – 30 June 2021), the Commission reiterated, as already stated in recital (69) of the provisional Regulation, that the 14th FYPs only started being published throughout 2021. As an example, the General 14th FYP was published on 12 March, the 14th FYP on Scrap Steel on 15 September and the 14th FYP on Developing Raw Materials on 21 December 2021. The Commission noted that during the period between the date of application of the 13th FYP and the publication of the 14th FYP, the provisions of the 13th FYP were still applicable. In any event, irrespective of when exactly individual 14th FYPs were published, the fact that the 13th FYP was applicable during the first half of the investigation period is already indicative of the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. This claim was therefore dismissed. |
| (31) | Ob dokončnem razkritju je kitajska vlada ponovno predložila svoje trditve v zvezi s poročilom, ne da bi svojo utemeljitev dopolnila z dodatnimi elementi. Komisija je zato navedla, da so bile te trditve obravnavane že v uvodnih izjavah 68 do 70 začasne uredbe in v uvodni izjavi 29 zgoraj. | (31) | Upon final disclosure, the GOC re-submitted its claims concerning the Report, without adding any further elements to its argumentation. The Commission therefore noted that these claims were already addressed in recitals (68) to (70) of the provisional Regulation, as well as in recital (29) above. |
| (32) | Podobno je združenje CISA po dokončnem razkritju ponovilo svojo kritiko poročila, pri čemer je ponovilo svoje stališče, da poročilo ne izpolnjuje standardov nepristranskih in objektivnih dokazov. Poleg tega je ponovno opozorilo na vprašanje 13. petletnega načrta, in sicer, da se načrt na eni strani ne bi smel šteti za zavezujočo zakonodajo, ampak za splošen politični dokument, ki obstaja tudi v EU, in da se na drugi strani polovica obdobja preiskave ne ujema z obdobjem, ki ga zajema 13. petletni načrt. V zvezi s tem je združenje CISA Komisijo pozvalo, naj pojasni, kako se lahko vsebina 13. petletnega načrta po izteku njegove uporabe šteje za dokaz znatnega izkrivljanja. | (32) | Similarly, CISA repeated its criticism of the Report following the final disclosure, restating its view that the Report fails to meet the standards of impartial and objective evidence. In addition, CISA raised again the issue of the 13th FYP, pointing out that, on the one hand, the plan should not be considered to be binding law but rather a general policy document, which exists also in the EU, and that, on the other hand, half of the IP falls outside of the period covered by the 13th FYP. In that connection, CISA invited the Commission to explain how the content of the 13th FYP can be considered as evidence of significant distortions after its application expired. |
| (33) | Komisija se s tem ni strinjala. Prvič, kot je že navedeno v uvodni izjavi 29 zgoraj, Kitajska izvaja redne petletne cikle načrtovanja. V okviru takega cikla se posamezni načrtovalni dokumenti za naslednji cikel pripravljajo že med prejšnjim ciklom, hkrati pa se lahko posamezni načrtovalni dokumenti naslednjega cikla uradno izdajo z nekaj zamude po izteku veljavnosti ujemajočih se načrtovalnih dokumentov prejšnjega cikla. Dejstvo, da je uradni končni datum 13. petletnega načrta morda sredi obdobja preiskave ali da so bili zadevni 14. petletni načrti objavljeni z nekaj zamika po koncu prejšnjega obdobja načrtovanja, ne more spremeniti narave kitajskega načrtovalnega sistema, v okviru katerega so organi in nosilci dejavnosti vedno del cikla načrtovanja. Komisija se ni strinjala tudi s trditvijo združenja CISA, da je 13. petletni načrt le splošen politični dokument o prednostnih javnih naložbah. Za začetek, združenje CISA ni predložilo nobenih pomislekov glede analize Komisije iz oddelka 4.3.1. poročila, kot je navedena v uvodni izjavi 29 zgoraj. Poleg tega je primerjava nove industrijske strategije Komisije in 13. petletnega načrta, ki jo je navedlo združenje CISA, napačna z več vidikov, na primer v zvezi s tipologijo dokumentov (sporočilo Komisije Evropskemu parlamentu in drugim institucijam EU v primerjavi z dokumentom, ki ga je dejansko sprejel najvišji kitajski zakonodajni organ) ter njihovo naravo in vsebino (obrazložitveni dokument, v katerem so opisane politične prednostne naloge, v primerjavi z zavezujočimi smernicami s cilji za industrijsko proizvodnjo in izrecnimi obveznostmi glede izvajanja za vse zadevne subjekte). | (33) | The Commission disagreed. First of all, as already pointed out in recital (29) above, China operates a periodic five year planning cycle. In that cycle, individual planning documents for the following cycle are being prepared already in the course of the previous one while, at the same time, individual planning documents of the following cycle may be formally issued with some delay after the expiry of the corresponding planning documents of the previous cycle. The fact that the formal end date of the 13th FYP may fall into the middle of the IP or that the relevant 14th FYPs were published with a certain time gap following the end of the previous planning period cannot alter the nature of Chinese planning system in which the authorities and business operators always find themselves being part of a planning cycle. The Commission also disagreed with CISA’s argument that the 13th FYP was a mere general policy document on public investment priorities. To start with, CISA did not bring any argument calling into question the Commission’s analysis in Section 4.3.1. of the Report, as referred to in recital (29) above. Moreover, CISA’s comparison of the Commission’s ‘New Industrial Strategy’ with the 13th FYP is misplaced on a number of levels, such as the typology of the documents (a Commission communication to the European Parliament and other EU institutions compared to a document actually adopted by the Chinese highest legislative body) as well as their nature and substance (an explanatory document outlining policy priorities compare to a prescriptive guidance replete with industrial output targets and explicit implementation obligations for all subjects concerned). |
| (34) | Zato so bili argumenti, ki sta jih predložila kitajska vlada in združenje CISA, zavrnjeni, Komisija pa je potrdila sklepe iz uvodnih izjav 68 do 70 začasne uredbe. | (34) | Consequently, the arguments brought by the GOC and CISA were rejected and the Commission’s confirmed its conclusions in recitals (68) to (70) of the provisional Regulation. |
| Argumenti v zvezi z združljivostjo člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe s STO | Arguments concerning WTO compatibility of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation |
| (35) | Prvič, kitajska vlada in združenje CISA sta trdila, da izračun normalne vrednosti v skladu s členom 2(6a) osnovne uredbe ni v skladu s protidampinškim sporazumom STO, zlasti s členom 2.2 navedenega sporazuma, ki določa izčrpen seznam primerov, v katerih se lahko konstruira normalna vrednost, pri čemer ti primeri ne vključujejo znatnega izkrivljanja. | (35) | First, the GOC, as well as CISA, argued that constructing the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation is inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’), in particular with Article 2.2. of the ADA which provides an exhaustive list of situations where the normal value can be constructed, the ‘significant distortions’ not being listed among such situations. |
| (36) | Drugič, uporaba podatkov iz ustrezne reprezentativne države po mnenju kitajske vlade in združenja CISA ni v skladu s členom VI.1, točka (b), GATT in členom 2.2.1.1 protidampinškega sporazuma STO, ki zahtevata, da se pri računski določitvi normalne vrednosti uporabijo stroški proizvodnje v državi porekla. Združenje CISA meni, da Komisija ni upoštevala ugotovitve pritožbenega organa v zadevi Evropska unija – protidampinški ukrepi za biodizel iz Argentine (v nadaljnjem besedilu: DS473), da dovoljena uporaba podatkov iz vira zunaj države izvoznice „ne pomeni, da lahko preiskovalni organ s stroški zunaj države porekla preprosto nadomesti stroške proizvodnje v državi porekla“. Združenje CISA je nadalje opozorilo na navedbo pritožbenega organa v DS473, da mora preiskovalni organ v skladu s členom 2.2 protidampinškega sporazuma STO pri določitvi „stroškov proizvodnje v državi porekla“ na podlagi katerih koli informacij, pridobljenih zunaj države, zagotoviti, da se te informacije uporabijo za izračun „stroškov proizvodnje v državi porekla“ in da mora preiskovalni organ zato morda te informacije prilagoditi. Vendar glede na združenje CISA nobene evidence ne kažejo na prizadevanja Komisije, da bi za izračun stroškov proizvodnje na Kitajskem prilagodila podatke iz ustrezne reprezentativne države. Združenje CISA meni, da se to zdi neskladno z obveznostjo EU v skladu s členom 2.2 protidampinškega sporazuma STO. | (36) | Second, using data from an appropriate representative country is, according to the GOC and CISA, inconsistent with GATT Article VI.1(b) and Article 2.2.1.1. of the ADA which require using the cost of production in the country of origin when constructing the normal value. In CISA’s view, the Commission ignored the finding of the Appellate Body in European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina (‘DS473’) that the permissible use of data from the source outside the exporting country ‘does not mean that an investigating authority may simply substitute the cost from outside the country of origin for the cost of production in the country of origin.’ CISA further recalled that according to the Appellate Body in DS473, when relying on any out-of-country information to determine the ‘cost of production in the country of origin’ under Article 2.2 of the ADA, an investigating authority has to ensure that such information is used to arrive at the ‘cost of production in the country of origin’ and this may require the investigation authority to adapt that information. However, according to CISA, no record has shown that the Commission has made efforts to adapt the data from the appropriate representative country to arrive at the cost of production in China. This appears to be in CISA’s view inconsistent with the EU’s obligation under Article 2.2 of the ADA. |
| (37) | Tretjič, kitajska vlada in združenje CISA sta navedla, da preiskovalne prakse Komisije iz člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe niso v skladu s pravili STO, če Komisija v nasprotju s členom 2.2.1.1. protidampinškega sporazuma STO ni upoštevala evidenc kitajskih proizvajalcev, ne da bi določila, ali so te evidence v skladu s splošno veljavnimi knjigovodskimi načeli na Kitajskem ter ali razumno odražajo stroške, povezane s proizvodnjo in prodajo. Združenje CISA je v zvezi s tem trdilo, da je bila praksa Komisije v DS473 že opredeljena kot neskladna s STO. Kitajska vlada je nadalje opozorila, da je pritožbeni organ v DS473 trdil in da je poročilo odbora v zadevi Evropska unija – metodologija prilagajanja stroškov II (Rusija) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: DS494) vsebovalo trditev, da se v skladu s členom 2.2.1.1 protidampinškega sporazuma STO, kadar se evidence izvoznika ali proizvajalca v preiskavi v sprejemljivih mejah natančno in zanesljivo ujemajo z vsemi dejanskimi stroški določenega proizvajalca ali izvoznika za obravnavani izdelek, za te evidence lahko šteje, da „razumno odražajo stroške, povezane s proizvodnjo in prodajo obravnavanega izdelka“, preiskovalni organ pa bi moral uporabiti take evidence za določitev stroškov proizvodnje proizvajalcev v preiskavi. | (37) | Third, the GOC and CISA claimed that the Commission’s investigating practices under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation are inconsistent with WTO rules insofar as the Commission, in violation of Article 2.2.1.1. of the ADA, disregarded records of the Chinese producers without determining whether those records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles in China and whether they reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sales. CISA claimed in this connection that the Commission’s practice was already found WTO-inconsistent in DS473. The GOC further recalled that the Appellate Body in DS473 and the Panel Report in European Union – Cost Adjustment Methodologies II (Russia) (‘DS494’) asserted that according to Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA, as long as the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation correspond – within acceptable limits – in an accurate and reliable manner, to all the actual costs incurred by the particular producer or exporter for the product under consideration, they can be deemed to ‘reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration’ and the investigating authority should use such records to determine the cost of production of the investigated producers. |
| (38) | Kar zadeva prvo trditev, je združenje CISA popolnoma enak argument navedlo že v pripombah k prvemu obvestilu, Komisija pa ga je podrobno obravnavala v uvodni izjavi 66 začasne uredbe. Komisija je zato potrdila svoje sklepe iz navedene uvodne izjave. | (38) | As to the first claim, CISA brought the identical argument already in its comments on the First Note and the Commission addressed it in detail in recital (66) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission therefore confirmed its conclusions in that recital. |
| (39) | Kar zadeva drugi argument, je večinoma ponovitev trditve, ki je že obravnavana v uvodnih izjavah 65 in 66 začasne uredbe. Poleg tega je Komisija navedla, da mora pri uporabi člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe uporabiti neizkrivljene stroške v ustrezni reprezentativni državi za zagotovitev, da na uporabljene stroške niso vplivala izkrivljanja in da ti stroški temeljijo na takoj dostopnih podatkih. Ker združenje CISA ni predložilo nobenih specifičnih informacij, ki bi utemeljevale nadaljnje prilagoditve, se je štelo, da neizkrivljeni stroški v reprezentativni državi, ki temeljijo na takoj dostopnih podatkih, izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe. Komisija je zato potrdila svoje ugotovitve iz vodne izjave 66 začasne uredbe in to trditev zavrnila. | (39) | Concerning the second argument, it is to a large extent a reiteration of the claim already addressed in recitals (65) and (66) of the Provisional Regulation. In addition, the Commission noted that when applying Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, it is bound to use undistorted costs in an appropriate representative country to ensure that the applied costs are not affected by distortions and are based on readily available data. In the absence of any specific information by CISA which would substantiate further adjustments, the undistorted costs in the representative country based on the readily available data, were considered to fulfil the criteria of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the Commission confirmed its findings in recital (66) of the provisional Regulation and rejected this claim. |
| (40) | Kar zadeva tretji argument, se razen tega, da ponavlja stališče, ki ga je združenje CISA že sporočilo v pripombah k prvemu obvestilu, in trditve, da Komisija domnevno ponavlja pravne napake, opredeljene v DS473, zdi, da je argument enak tistemu, ki je že obravnavan v uvodnih izjavah 66 in 67 začasne uredbe. Komisija je zato zavrnila trditev in potrdila svoje začasne ugotovitve. | (40) | With respect to the third argument, other than reiterating the position which CISA communicated already in its comments on the First Note and claiming that the Commission allegedly repeats its legal mistakes established in DS473, the argument appears to be of the same nature as the one already addressed in recitals (66) and (67) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission therefore rejected the claim and confirmed its provisional findings. |
| (41) | Ob dokončnem razkritju je kitajska vlada ponovno predložila trditve glede združljivosti člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe s pravili STO in glede preiskovalnih praks Komisije iz člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe v zvezi z uporabo evidenc kitajskih proizvajalcev, ne da bi svojo utemeljitev dopolnila z dodatnimi elementi. Komisija je zato navedla, da so bile te trditve obravnavane že v uvodnih izjavah 65 do 67 začasne uredbe in v uvodnih izjavah 35 do 37 zgoraj. Komisija je zato zavrnila tudi te argumente in potrdila svoje začasne ugotovitve. | (41) | Upon final disclosure, the GOC re-submitted its claims concerning the compatibility of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with WTO rules, as well as concerning the Commission’s investigating practices under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with respect to the use of records of the Chinese producers, without adding any further elements to its argumentation. The Commission therefore noted that these claims were already addressed in recitals (65) to (67) of the provisional Regulation, as well as in recitals (35) – (37) above. The Commission therefore rejected also these arguments and confirmed its provisional findings. |
| Drugi argumenti v zvezi z znatnim izkrivljanjem | Other arguments concerning significant distortions |
| (42) | Kitajska vlada je navedla, da bi Komisija morala biti dosledna in v celoti proučiti, ali v reprezentativni državi obstaja tako imenovano izkrivljanje trga. Če je pripravljena sprejeti podatke reprezentativne države brez take presoje, to pomeni „dvojne standarde“. Kitajska vlada je opozorila, da mora Komisija v skladu s pravom Unije pri določitvi normalne vrednosti uporabiti neizkrivljene cene. Zato meni, da bi morala Komisija na lastno pobudo preiskati in dokazati obstoj ali neobstoj izkrivljanj v reprezentativnih državah in ne pasivno čakati, da dokaze predložijo strani, ki sodelujejo v zadevi. Kitajska vlada je nadalje navedla, da bi morala Komisija proučiti, ali na domačem trgu EU obstajajo tržna izkrivljanja, predvsem zato, ker naj bi bilo v EU veliko situacij, ki bi morale vzbuditi pomisleke v zvezi z morebitnimi tržnimi izkrivljanji. | (42) | The GOC submitted that the Commission should be consistent and fully examine whether there are so-called market distortions in the representative country. Readily accepting the representative country’s data without such an evaluation represents ‘double standards’. The GOC pointed out that under the EU law, the Commission is obliged to use undistorted prices to construct the normal value. Therefore, the Commission should, in the GOC’s view, take the initiative to investigate and prove the existence or non-existence of distortions in the representative countries, rather than passively waiting for the parties involved in the case to submit evidence. The GOC further submitted that the Commission should examine whether there are market distortions in the EU domestic market, not least because there are allegedly many situations within the EU that should raise concerns of the potential of ‘market distortions’. |
| (43) | Te trditve je ponovno predložila tudi po dokončnem razkritju, pri čemer je poudarila svoje stališče, da se za regulacijo gospodarskih dejavnosti, ki jo mora vlada nujno zagotoviti, ne bi smelo šteti, da izkrivlja trg, in da se ne bi smela uporabiti kot podlaga za umetno zvišanje stopnje dampinga uvoženih izdelkov, ne da bi se ocenil vpliv podobnega ravnanja na stroške proizvodnje na domačem trgu. | (43) | The GOC re-submitted these claims also following definite disclosure, reiterating its position that a government’s necessary regulation of economic operation should not be regarded as market-distorting nor should it be considered a basis for artificially raising the dumping margin of imported products without assessing the impact of similar behaviours on production costs within the domestic market. |
| (44) | Združenje CISA je opozorilo, da bi bilo treba oceno znatnega izkrivljanja v skladu s členom 2(6a) osnovne uredbe opraviti ločeno za vsakega izvoznika, kar se pri sedanji preiskavi ni upoštevalo. | (44) | CISA pointed out that according to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the assessment of the significant distortions should be done for each exporter separately, which was not done in the current investigation. |
| (45) | V zvezi z argumenti kitajske vlade je Komisija opozorila, da v skladu s členom 2(6a), točka (a), osnovne uredbe normalno vrednost računsko določi na podlagi izbranih podatkov, ki niso domače cene in stroški v državi izvoznici, le, če ugotovi, da taki podatki ustrezno odražajo neizkrivljene cene in stroške. V tem postopku mora Komisija uporabiti le neizkrivljene podatke. Komisija v zvezi s tem nikakor ne pasivno čaka, ampak opravi analizo in v zgodnjih fazah preiskave zainteresirane strani tudi pozove, naj predložijo pripombe glede predlaganih virov za določitev normalne vrednosti, in sicer prek obvestil o neizkrivljenih virih, ki jih namerava uporabiti, objavljenih v začetku postopka. Pri končni odločitvi Komisije o tem, kateri neizkrivljeni podatki bi se morali uporabiti za računsko določitev normalne vrednosti, se v celoti upoštevajo vse pripombe, ki so jih predložile strani. Kar zadeva zahtevo kitajske vlade, naj Komisija oceni morebitno izkrivljanje na notranjem trgu EU, Komisija ni razumela pomembnosti te točke v okviru ocene obstoja znatnega izkrivljanja v skladu s členom 2(6a) osnovne uredbe. | (45) | Concerning the arguments by the GOC, the Commission recalled that, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it proceeds to construct the normal value on the basis of chosen data other than domestic prices and costs in the exporting country only where it establishes that such data is appropriate to reflect undistorted prices and costs. In this process, the Commission is bound to use only undistorted data. In that respect, far from waiting passively, the Commission does its own analysis and also invites interested parties to comment on the proposed sources for the determination of the normal value in the early stages of the investigation, namely via the notes on the undistorted sources it intends to use released early on in the proceeding. The Commission’s ultimate decision as to which undistorted data should be used to calculate the normal value takes full account of all comments received by parties. As to the GOC’s request for the Commission to evaluate possible distortions in the EU’s internal market, the Commission failed to see the relevance of this point in the context of assessing the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. |
| (46) | Argument združenja CISA je bil obravnavan in zavrnjen že v uvodnih izjavah 71 in 72 začasne uredbe. Komisija je navedla, da se je združenje CISA očitno odločilo prebrati le prvi stavek uvodne izjave 72 začasne uredbe. Zato se je sklicevala na drugi stavek navedene uvodne izjave in temeljno analizo iz oddelka 3.1.3 začasne uredbe. Ker zainteresirane strani niso predložile dodatnih argumentov, je Komisija dokončno potrdila ugotovitve iz navedenih uvodnih izjav začasne uredbe. | (46) | The argument by CISA was already discussed and rejected in recitals (71) and (72) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission noted that CISA appears to have chosen to read only the first sentence of recital (72) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission therefore referred to the second sentence of that recital and to the underlying analysis in Section 3.1.3 of the provisional Regulation. Absent any additional arguments by the interested parties, the Commission therefore definitively confirmed its findings in the aforementioned recitals of the provisional Regulation. |
| 3.1.3 Reprezentativna država | 3.1.3. Representative country |
| (47) | Zainteresirane strani niso predložile nobenih pripomb, s katerimi bi izpodbijale primernost Brazilije kot reprezentativne države in družbe CSN kot proizvajalca v reprezentativni državi. Sklep iz uvodne izjave 87 začasne uredbe je bil zato potrjen. | (47) | No comments were received from interested parties refuting the appropriateness of Brazil as a representative country and of CSN as a producer in the representative country. The conclusion of recital (87) of the provisional Regulation was therefore confirmed. |
| 3.1.4 Referenčne vrednosti, uporabljene za določitev normalne vrednosti | 3.1.4. Benchmarks used to establish the normal value |
| (48) | Po objavi začasne uredbe sta združenje CISA in družba Baosteel predložila pripombe glede nekaterih referenčnih cen, pri čemer sta navedla, da bi bilo treba uporabiti druge, bolj reprezentativne referenčne cene. | (48) | Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, CISA and Baosteel commented on some of the benchmark prices and claimed that other more representative benchmark prices should be used. |
| (49) | Prvič, združenje CISA in družba Baosteel sta izrazila pomisleke glede uporabe brazilskih domačih cen jekla pri določitvi referenčnih cen za vroče valjano in hladno valjano jeklo. Po navedbah teh strani so bile brazilske domače cene jekla znatno višje od cen v drugih državah, pomembnih za proizvodnjo jekla, kot sta Turčija in Indija. Strani menita, da so bile brazilske domače cene jekla v obdobju preiskave izkrivljene in se zato ne bi smele obravnavati kot reprezentativna referenčna vrednost. | (49) | Firstly, CISA and Baosteel questioned the use the Brazilian domestic steel prices to establish the benchmark prices for hot rolled steel and cold rolled steel. According to these parties, the Brazilian domestic steel prices were significantly higher than those in other major steel producing countries, such as Turkey and India. In their view, the Brazilian domestic steel prices were distorted during the investigation period, and therefore could not be considered as a representative benchmark. |
| (50) | Komisija je poudarila, da je bila Brazilija kot ustrezna reprezentativna država izbrana v skladu z objektivnimi merili iz člena 2(6a), točka (a), osnovne uredbe. Menila je, da so bile brazilske domače cene vroče valjanih in hladno valjanih jeklenih navitij, objavljene v publikaciji Metal Bulletin, s tega vidika ustrezne. | (50) | The Commission pointed out that Brazil was selected as an appropriate representative country in accordance with objective criteria established in Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission considered that the Brazilian domestic hot rolled steel coils (‘HRC’) and cold rolled steel coils (‘CRC’) prices published by Metal Bulletin were appropriate in that regard. |
| (51) | Komisija zlasti ni našla ničesar, kar bi kazalo, da so bile te domače cene izkrivljene in da njihova uporaba za referenčne vrednosti ni ustrezna. Menila je, da se v Braziliji niso izvajali ukrepi, za katere bi se lahko štelo, da toliko izkrivljajo domače cene jeklenih navitij, da se te cene ne bi smele upoštevati. | (51) | In particular, the Commission did not find any indication that that these domestic prices were distorted and inappropriate to use as benchmarks. The Commission did not consider that there were measures implemented in Brazil that could be considered as distorting the domestic prices of steel coils, to the extent that those should be disregarded. |
| (52) | Združenje CISA in družba Baosteel sta opozorila na omejeno število proizvajalcev jekla v Braziliji in posledično nizko raven konkurence. Združenje CISA in družba Baosteel sta navedla, da glede na poročilo komisije Združenih držav za mednarodno trgovino (ITC) (5) veliko večino hladno valjanega jekla v Braziliji proizvajajo tri družbe. Opozorila sta tudi na nekatere zadnje dogodke v brazilski industriji hladno valjanega jekla, povzete v navedenem poročilu. Ti dogodki so vključevali spremembe v obratovanju treh brazilskih proizvajalcev jekla, na primer zaustavitev proizvodnje, zaprtja in izklopi, začasno mirovanje ter širitve v obdobju 2015–2021. Poleg tega sta se bruto proizvodnja in bruto poraba v Braziliji med letoma 2018 in 2020 zmanjšali. Te razmere naj bi se še poslabšale zaradi znižanja vrednosti brazilskega reala. Vendar je Komisija navedla, da so bile vse te domneve splošne in niso dokazovale, da so bile domače cene izkrivljene. | (52) | CISA and Baosteel pointed to the limited number of steel producers in Brazil and the consequent low level of competition. CISA and Baosteel indicated that according to a report of the US International Trade Commission (ITC) (5), a ‘vast majority’ of the cold rolled steel in Brazil was produced by three companies. CISA and Baosteel also pointed to some recent developments of the Brazil cold rolled steel industry summarized in the same report. These developments included changes in operations by the three Brazilian steel producers, such as halted production, closings and shutdowns, temporary idling and expansions during the period 2015 – 2021. In addition, gross production and gross consumption decreased in Brazil between 2018 and 2020. This situation was allegedly exacerbated by the depreciation of the Brazilian Real. The Commission noted, however, that all these allegations were of a general nature and did not demonstrate that the domestic prices were affected by distortions. |
| (53) | Komisija je v zvezi s tem ugotovila, da Brazilija proizvaja veliko jeklenih izdelkov ter se s proizvodnjo 36,2 milijona ton surovega jekla in 34,8 milijona ton jeklenih izdelkov v letu 2021 uvršča med deset največjih držav proizvajalk jekla na svetu (6). V Braziliji je 31 jeklarn, ki jih upravlja 12 skupin podjetij (7). Trg treh glavnih konkurentov, kot so podrobno opisani v poročilu komisije Združenih držav za mednarodno trgovino, in več sekundarnih akterjev se kot tak ne more šteti za nekonkurenčni trg, ne da bi se zagotovili specifični dokazi, da ta trg ne deluje pravilno. Zato ni mogoče sprejeti domneve, da so bile brazilske cene izkrivljene zaradi visoke koncentracije in omejene konkurence. Četudi bi se domnevna brazilska struktura trga štela za koncentriran trg, Komisija domnevne ravni koncentracije na trgu same po sebi vsekakor ne bi mogla obravnavati kot izkrivljanje v smislu člena 2(6a). Ni bilo dokazov, da so bile domače cene posledica državnih navodil ali poseganja v običajne tržne sile. Nasprotno, dokazi kažejo, da obstaja konkurenčen trg, nedavni dogodki v brazilski industriji hladno valjanega jekla, opisani v uvodni izjavi 52, pa tej ugotovitvi ne nasprotujejo. To pomeni, da so brazilski trg jekla in njegove cene reprezentativni ter vsaj delno zaščiteni pred učinkom nihanj valut. | (53) | In this respect, the Commission noted that Brazil has a significant production of steel products, it is in the top 10 world steel producing countries with an output of 36,2 million tons of crude steel and 34,8 million tons of steel products in 2021 (6). There are 31 steel plants in Brazil, run by 12 business groups (7). A market of three main competitors, as detailed in the ITC report, and several secondary players, cannot be considered as such as a non-competitive market, without specific evidence that this market is not functioning properly. Therefore, the allegation that the Brazilian prices were distorted due to a high concentration and limited competition cannot be accepted. In any event, even if the Brazilian market structure as alleged, would be considered a concentrated market, the Commission could not consider the purported level of concentration on the market in itself as a ‘distortion’ in the sense of Article 2(6a). There was no evidence that the domestic prices were a consequence of State direction or intervention with normal market forces. On the contrary, the evidence suggests a competitive market, and the recent developments of the Brazil cold rolled steel industry described in recital (52) did not contradict this finding. This renders the Brazilian steel market and its prices representative, and at least partly protected from the effect of currency fluctuations. |
| (54) | Združenje CISA in družba Baosteel sta kot dodatno izkrivljanje cen navedla tudi obstoj 12-odstotnih uvoznih tarif za vroče valjana in hladno valjana navitja. Komisija je menila, da samo zaradi obstoja uvoznih tarif kot takih ni mogoče oblikovati sklepa, da so bile domače cene izkrivljene, in da večina držav uporablja določeno stopnjo uvoznih tarif. Poleg tega so brazilske cene, kot je določeno v uvodni izjavi 55, večino leta tesno sledile cenam na drugih nastajajočih trgih, zato ni bilo dokazov o strukturnem ali sistemskem izkrivljanju. | (54) | CISA and Baosteel also mentioned the existence of import tariffs of 12 % on HRC and CRC as a further price distortion. The Commission considered that the mere existence of import tariffs in itself, could not lead to the conclusion that the domestic prices were distorted, and most countries apply some level of import tariffs. Moreover, as set out in recital (55), for most of the year Brazilian prices closely followed those of other emerging markets, and there was thus no evidence of structural or systemic distortions. |
| (55) | Združenje CISA in družba Baosteel sta se sklicevala tudi na domnevno neravnovesje na brazilskem trgu ploščatih izdelkov iz jekla v letu 2020, zaradi katerega so se zvišale cene. Vendar je bilo to zvišanje cen mogoče opaziti na svetovni ravni. Glede na OECD (8) so bile cene ploščatih izdelkov iz jekla januarja 2021 za 47 % višje kot pred enim letom. Poleg tega so brazilske cene glede na podatke o cenah, ki sta jih predložila združenje CISA in družba Baosteel, na splošno sledile cenam v drugih gospodarstvih držav v razvoju, razen v zadnjih dveh mesecih obdobja preiskave; v teh dveh mesecih pa so se cene zvišale podobno kot cene v Evropi. Zato se zdi, da se gibanje cen v Braziliji ni razlikoval od svetovnih gibanj in da torej ni razloga, da bi se te cene štele za nereprezentativne ali izkrivljene. | (55) | CISA and Baosteel also referred to an alleged imbalance on the Brazilian flat steel market in 2020 which led to an increase in prices. However, this increase in prices was observed globally. According to the OECD (8), in January 2021, flat steel prices stood 47 % higher than one year earlier. Moreover, according to the price data submitted by CISA and Baosteel, Brazilian prices generally followed those in other developing countries’ economies except for the last two months of the investigation period; yet in those two months prices rose similar to those in Europe. So price developments in Brazil did not appear de-coupled from global trends rendering those prices unrepresentative or distorted. |
| (56) | V zvezi s trditvijo, da so bile brazilske cene znatno višje od cen v drugih državah, pomembnih za proizvodnjo jekla, kot sta Turčija in Indija, je Komisija navedla, da preproste razlike v ceni med različnimi možnimi reprezentativnimi državami niso zadostna utemeljitev za zavrnitev cen v reprezentativni državi. V različnih možnih reprezentativnih državah se bodo cene vedno nekoliko razlikovale in na lokalni ravni bodo vedno razlike med več proizvodnimi dejavniki. Te objektivne razlike v cenah ne pomenijo izkrivljanj v izbrani reprezentativni državi. V tem primeru bi se sistematično uporabljale najnižje vrednosti v vseh možnih reprezentativnih državah. To ne bi bilo v skladu z besedilom in logiko določb člena 2(6a) osnovne uredbe. Namesto tega Komisija meni, da je primerno uporabiti, kolikor je to mogoče (tj. če ni izkrivljanja ali neobičajnih razmer), domače cene v isti izbrani reprezentativni državi, da bi se zagotovila skladnost, saj so razmere na trgu podobne za vse vložke v zadevni državi. Poleg tega so brazilske cene, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 55, na splošno sledile cenam v drugih gospodarstvih držav v razvoju. Zvišanje cen v zadnjih dveh mesecih obdobja preiskave se ni razlikovalo od svetovnega gibanja cen v tem obdobju in Komisija je ugotovila, da zvišanje cen v tem obdobju vsekakor ni znatno vplivalo na izračun stopnje dampinga. Trditev je bila zato zavrnjena. | (56) | Concerning the claim that Brazilian prices were significantly higher than those in other major steel producing countries, such as Turkey and India, the Commission noted that simple price differentials as such between different potential representative countries are not a sufficient justification to reject prices in the representative country. There are always bound to be some price differences and local variations between the several factors of production in the different potential representative countries. These objective price differences are not in themselves an indication of distortions in the chosen representative country. If this was the case, it would lead to using systematically the lowest values in all the potential representative countries. This would not be in line with the letter and rationale of the provisions in Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. Instead, the Commission considers it appropriate to use, to the extent possible (that is, absent distortions or abnormal situations), domestic prices in the same representative country chosen in order to ensure coherence, as the market conditions are similar for all the inputs in that country. Moreover, as noted in recital (55), Brazilian prices generally followed those of other developing countries’ economies. The rise in the last two months of the investigation period was not decoupleddevelopments-Q2-2021.pdf from the global trend of rising prices during that period, and the Commission noted that in any event, the price increase during that period did not have an appreciable impact on the dumping margin calculation. This claim was therefore rejected. |
| (57) | Družba Baosteel je tudi izpodbijala referenčno vrednost iz podatkovne zbirke GTA, uporabljeno za vroče stisnjeno železo v bloku. Trdila je, da oznaka KN 7326 90 (drugi izdelki iz železne ali jeklene žice) zajema velik obseg izdelkov, ki so večinoma dražji od vroče stisnjenega železa v bloku. | (57) | Baosteel also contested the benchmark from the GTA used for Hot-Pressed Iron Block. Baosteel argued that CN code 7326 90 (‘other articles of iron or steel wire’) contains a large scope of products, most of which are more expensive than Hot-Pressed Iron Block. |
| (58) | Komisija je navedla, da je razpon cen izdelkov iz železne ali jeklene žice, uvrščenih pod oznako HS 7326 90, iz podatkovne zbirke GTA popolnoma drugačen od razpona cen, ki se na splošno uporabljajo za železo v bloku in ostanke železa, ki se dejansko uporabljajo za proizvodnjo jekla v fazi pretvorbe in taljenja (faktor več kot 30), ter da vrednost, povezana s to oznako, torej ni reprezentativna za specifičen proizvodni dejavnik. Zato je potrdila, da je bila začasno uporabljena referenčna vrednost neustrezna. Komisija je ugotovila, da je izdelek, ki je najbolj podoben vroče stisnjenemu železu v bloku, ki se uporablja v proizvodnji jekla, in za katerega je na voljo referenčna cena, železo v obliki briketov. Glede na publikacijo Metal Bulletin je bila v obdobju preiskave povprečna cena železa v obliki briketov, vključno s stroški prevoza (9), 2 464 CNY/tono. Komisija se je zato odločila, da bo to ceno gotovo uporabila kot referenčno ceno. | (58) | The Commission noted that GTA prices of ‘other articles of iron or steel wire’ falling under HS code 7326 90 were of a completely different range as compared to prices generally observed for iron blocks and scrap actually used for steelmaking at converter smelting stage (that is a factor of more than 30) and that the value linked to this code was thus not representative of the specific factor of production. Therefore, it accepted that the benchmark provisionally used was inappropriate. The Commission found that the closest resembling product to hot-pressed iron blocks used for steelmaking and for which a benchmark price was available was hot-briquetted iron (or ‘HBI’). According to Metal Bulletin, the price of hot-briquetted iron including freight (9) was 2 464 CNY/tonne on average during the investigation period. The Commission therefore decided to definitively use this as a benchmark price. |
| (59) | Tretjič, družba Baosteel je izpodbijala referenčno vrednost iz podatkovne zbirke GTA, uporabljeno za iztiskane izdelke iz aluminija. | (59) | Thirdly, Baosteel contested the benchmark from GTA used for ‘Aluminium Extrusions’. |
| (60) | Po analizi izdelka, ki ga je družba Baosteel dejansko uporabljala, je ugotovila, da je surovina, uporabljena v postopku pretvorbe in rafiniranja, odpadni aluminij in ne iztiskani izdelki iz aluminija. Komisija se je zato odločila, da bo referenčno vrednost nadomestila s ceno GTA za ostanke in odpadke aluminija, uvrščene pod oznako HS za to surovino (7602 00). Neizkrivljena referenčna cena odpadnega aluminija je bila določena na 15 132 CNY/tono. | (60) | After analysing the product actually used by Baosteel it found that the raw material used in the converter and refining process was aluminium scrap rather than ‘Aluminium Extrusions’. The Commission thus decided to replace the benchmark with the GTA price of aluminium scrap and waste falling under HS code for this raw material (7602 00). The undistorted benchmark price of aluminium scrap was determined at 15 132 CNY/tonne. |
| (61) | Nazadnje, družba Baosteel je izpodbijala uporabo referenčne vrednosti GTA za prah železove rude. Po navedbah družbe Baosteel se je velika večina te surovine uvažala iz držav s tržnim gospodarstvom (predvsem iz Avstralije in Brazilije) in v USD. Zato je družba Baosteel Komisijo pozvala, naj namesto referenčne cene uporabi dejansko uvozno ceno, ki jo je sporočila družba. | (61) | Lastly, Baosteel contested the use of the GTA benchmark for Iron Ore Powder. According to Baosteel the vast majority of this raw material were imported from market economy countries (mostly from Australia and Brazil) and in USD. Consequently, Baosteel requested the Commission to use the actual import price reported by Baosteel instead of the benchmark price. |
| (62) | Komisija je v zvezi s tem navedla, da družba Baosteel ni uvažala neposredno, ampak prek povezane družbe, ustanovljene v Hongkongu, in da ni predložila zadostnih ustreznih dokazov, na podlagi katerih bi Komisija lahko pozitivno sklenila, da na končno nakupno ceno družbe Baosteel ni vplival odnos med povezanima družbama in/ali prevladujoče znatno izkrivljanje na Kitajskem, kot je določeno v členu 2(6a), točka (a), tretja alinea, osnovne uredbe. Trditev je bila zato zavrnjena. | (62) | In this respect, the Commission noted that Baosteel did not import directly, but via a related company established in Hong Kong and that it had not provided sufficient appropriate evidence allowing the Commission to positively conclude that the final purchase price of Baosteel was not affected by the relationship between the related companies and/or by the prevailing significant distortions in China as requested by Article 2(6a)(a), third indent, of the Basic Regulation. Thus, the claim was rejected. |
| (63) | Komisija je zato pri končni določitvi normalne vrednosti za družbo Baosteel uporabila referenčne vrednosti iz uvodnih izjav 93 do 102 začasne uredbe, razen za dve surovini, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 58 in 60 zgoraj. | (63) | The Commission therefore used for its final determination of the normal value for Baosteel the benchmarks set out in recitals (93) to (102) of the provisional Regulation, with the exception of two raw materials, as explained above in recitals (58) and (60). |
| (64) | Na podlagi navedenega je Komisija konstruirala normalno vrednost glede na vrsto izdelka na podlagi franko tovarna. Metodologija za izračun normalne vrednosti je določena v uvodnih izjavah 103 do 109 začasne uredbe in se ob odsotnosti pripomb potrdi. | (64) | On this basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis. The methodology of the calculation of the normal value was set out in recitals (103) to (109) of the provisional Regulation, which in the absence of any comments is herewith confirmed. |
| 3.1.5 Izvozna cena | 3.1.5. Export price |
| (65) | Podrobni podatki za izračun izvozne cene so navedeni v uvodnih izjavah 110 in 111 začasne uredbe. Ker glede tega oddelka ni bilo pripomb, je Komisija potrdila svoje začasne sklepe. | (65) | The details of the calculation of the export price were set out in recital (110) and (111) of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its provisional conclusions. |
| 3.1.6 Primerjava | 3.1.6. Comparison |
| (66) | Podrobnosti o primerjavi normalne vrednosti z izvozno ceno so navedene v uvodnih izjavah 112 in 113 začasne uredbe. Ker glede tega oddelka ni bilo pripomb, je Komisija potrdila svoje začasne sklepe. | (66) | The details concerning the comparison of the normal value and the export price were set out in recitals (112) and (113) of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its provisional conclusions. |
| 3.1.7 Stopnje dampinga | 3.1.7. Dumping margins |
| (67) | Ker ni bilo nobenih pripomb glede metodologije, uporabljene za izračun stopnje dampinga, se uvodna izjava 114 začasne uredbe potrdi. Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 116 in 117 začasne uredbe, je Komisija za sodelujoče družbe, ki niso bile vključene v vzorec, izračunala tehtano povprečje stopenj dampinga dveh vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov. Za vse druge proizvajalce izvoznike na Kitajskem je Komisija stopnjo dampinga določila na podlagi razpoložljivih dejstev v skladu s členom 18 osnovne uredbe. Ker je bila raven sodelovanja v tem primeru nizka, se je Komisija odločila, da preostalo stopnjo dampinga za vse druge družbe določi na ravni najvišje stopnje dampinga, ugotovljene za vrste izdelka, ki jih v reprezentativnih količinah prodaja vzorčeni sodelujoči proizvajalec izvoznik z najvišjo stopnjo dampinga. | (67) | In the absence of any claim concerning the methodology used for the dumping margin calculation, recital (114) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. As explained in recitals (116) and (117) of the provisional Regulation, for the cooperating companies that were not sampled, the Commission calculated the weighted average of the dumping margins of the two sampled exporting producers. For all other exporting producers in China, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. As the level of cooperation in this case was low, the Commission decided that it was appropriate to establish the residual dumping margin for all other companies at the level of the highest dumping margin found for product types sold in representative quantities by the sampled cooperating exporting producer with the highest dumping margin. |
| (68) | Dokončne stopnje dampinga, izražene kot delež cene stroškov, zavarovanja in prevoznine (CIF) meja Unije brez plačane dajatve, so naslednje: | Družba | Dokončna stopnja dampinga | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 30,7 % | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 53,9 % | Sodelujoče družbe | 34,6 % | Vse druge družbe | 77,9 % | (68) | The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: | Company | Definitive dumping margin | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 30,7 % | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 53,9 % | Cooperating companies | 34,6 % | All other companies | 77,9 % |
| 3.2 Brazilija | 3.2. Brazil |
| (69) | Komisija je po začasnem razkritju prejela pisne pripombe sodelujočega proizvajalca izvoznika, tj. družbe CSN, glede začasnih ugotovitev o dampingu. | (69) | Following provisional disclosure, the Commission received written comments from the cooperating exporting producer, CSN, on the provisional dumping findings. |
| 3.2.1 Normalna vrednost | 3.2.1. Normal Value |
| (70) | Podrobnosti metodologije za izračun normalne vrednosti so navedene v uvodnih izjavah 119 do 127 začasne uredbe. Ker glede tega oddelka ni bilo pripomb, je Komisija potrdila svoje začasne sklepe. | (70) | The details of the calculation methodology of the normal value were set out in recitals (119) to (127) of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its provisional conclusions. |
| 3.2.2 Izvozna cena | 3.2.2. Export price |
| (71) | Podrobni podatki za izračun izvozne cene so navedeni v uvodni izjavi 128 začasne uredbe. Ker glede tega oddelka ni bilo pripomb, je Komisija potrdila svoje začasne sklepe. | (71) | The details of the calculation of the export price were set out in recital (128) of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its provisional conclusions. |
| 3.2.3 Primerjava | 3.2.3. Comparison |
| (72) | Podrobnosti o primerjavi normalne vrednosti z izvozno ceno so navedene v uvodnih izjavah 129 in 130 začasne uredbe. | (72) | The details concerning the comparison of the normal value and the export price were set out in recitals (129) and (130) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (73) | Po začasnem razkritju je proizvajalec izvoznik CSN trdil, da je v izpolnjenem vprašalniku poudaril, da bi Komisija morala obravnavati težave s kakovostjo, da je te težave vključil v podatke o domači prodaji in izvozu ter da je med navzkrižnim preverjanjem na daljavo zagotovil dodatne dokaze v zvezi s tem. Zato je Komisijo pozval, naj pri izračunih dampinga upošteva razlike v kakovosti, saj te razlike vplivajo na primerljivost cen. | (73) | After provisional disclosure, the exporting producer CSN claimed that in its questionnaire reply it had emphasized that quality issues should be considered by the Commission, that it had indicated such issues in its domestic and export sales data and that it had provided further demonstration in this sense during the RCCs. CSN therefore requested the Commission to consider in its dumping calculations the differences in quality, as such differences impact price comparability. |
| (74) | Komisija je menila, da čeprav je družba CSN dejansko predložila informacije o razlikah v kakovosti izdelka v preiskavi, ni niti v izpolnjenem vprašalniku niti med navzkrižnim preverjanjem na daljavo zahtevala prilagoditve na tej podlagi. Vendar je ob upoštevanju trditve, predložene po začasnem razkritju, ponovno proučila informacije v zvezi z razlikami v kakovosti. Razen zahtevka, da se upoštevajo razlike v kakovosti, družba CSN po začasnem razkritju ni predložila dodatnih informacij ali podatkov. | (74) | The Commission considered that, although CSN had indeed provided information regarding quality differences of the product under investigation, it had not made a claim for an adjustment on this basis in its questionnaire reply, nor during the RCC. However, in light of the claim made after provisional disclosure, the Commission re-examined the information provided with regard to quality differences. Apart from the request to consider quality differences, no additional information or data was provided by CSN after provisional disclosure. |
| (75) | Razlike v kakovosti zadevnega izdelka, v tem primeru prvorazredni in drugorazredni izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, so posledica fizikalnih značilnostih izdelka. Drugorazredni izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla imajo nekatere pomanjkljivosti in napake, ki bi lahko preprečile uporabo teh izdelkov za namene, za katere so bili proizvedeni. Kot je družba CSN pojasnila med postopkom dopolnitve in navzkrižnim preverjanjem na daljavo, take drugorazredne izdelke iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla prodaja v razsutem stanju strankam v tretjih državah v okviru majhnega razpisu podobnega postopka, pri katerem je izdelek prodan ponudniku z najvišjo ponudbo. | (75) | A difference in quality of the product concerned, in this case first and second quality ECCS, is due to the physical characteristics of the product. Second quality ECCS has certain flaws or defects which might prevent the use of the ECCS in the application for which it was produced. As explained by CSN during the deficiency process and the RCC, such second quality ECCS is sold by CSN to third country customers in bulk via a small tender-like procedure, where the product is sold to the highest bidder. |
| (76) | Člen 2(10), točka (a), osnovne uredbe določa: „Izvede se prilagoditev zaradi razlik v fizikalnih značilnostih zadevnega izdelka. Znesek prilagoditve ustreza razumni oceni tržne vrednosti razlike.“ | (76) | Article 2(10)(a) of the basic Regulation states the following: ‘An adjustment shall be made for differences in the physical characteristics of the product concerned. The amount of the adjustment shall correspond to a reasonable estimate of the market value of the difference.’ |
| (77) | Komisija je navedla, da družba CSN ni predložila razumne ocene tržne vrednosti razlike. Družba CSN je v odgovoru na eno od vprašanj Komisije med postopkom dopolnitve navedla, da je vrednost drugorazrednih izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla po navadi za določen odstotek nižja od vrednosti takih prvorazrednih izdelkov. Vendar je bilo pri pregledu podatkov, ki jih je družba na ravni vrste izdelka predložila za izvoz in domačo prodajo, jasno, da take splošne izjave ni mogoče oblikovati v zvezi z razliko v ceni. | (77) | The Commission considered that no reasonable estimate of the market value of the difference was provided by CSN. In reply to one of the Commission’s questions during the deficiency process, CSN had mentioned that second quality ECCS is usually a certain percentage lower than first quality. However, when examining the data supplied by the company at product type level for both export and domestic sales, it was clear that no such general statement could be made with regard to the price difference. |
| (78) | Prvič, drugorazredni izdelki niso bili vedno cenejši od prvorazrednih. Razlike v ceni med prvorazrednimi in drugorazrednimi izdelki med obdobjem preiskave so segale od negativnega dvomestnega odstotka do pozitivnega dvomestnega odstotka. Ta razpon je bil ugotovljen za celotno obdobje preiskave, medtem ko so bile razlike pri vsakomesečnem pregledu še večje. | (78) | First, second quality was not always cheaper than first quality. The price differences between first and second quality during the investigation period ranged from a negative two digit percentage to a positive two digit percentage. This was true for the investigation period as a whole, while the differences were even larger when examined on a monthly basis. |
| (79) | Drugič, razlike v ceni med prvorazrednimi in drugorazrednimi izdelki so se iz meseca v mesec lahko spreminjale. Za eno specifično vrsto izdelka je Komisija na primer ugotovila, da je bil prvorazredni izdelek v enem mesecu dejansko nekoliko dražji od drugorazrednega izdelka, le nekaj mesecev prej pa je bil znatno cenejši. | (79) | Second, the difference in price between the two qualities could differ from month to month. For example, for one specific product type the Commission noticed that the first quality product was indeed slightly more expensive than the second quality in one month, but it had been substantially cheaper than the second quality only a few months earlier. |
| (80) | Analiza je pokazala, da so razlike v ceni nastajale na mesečni ravni, pri čemer je razlika v ceni med prvorazrednimi in drugorazrednimi izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla lahko bila pozitivna ali negativna, odvisno od meseca. Kar zadeva prodajo Unije, je to najverjetneje povzročil razpisu podoben postopek za prodajo drugorazrednih izdelkov iz uvodne izjave 75, pri katerem določitev cene drugorazrednih izdelkov ni bila odvisna od cen prvorazrednih izdelkov, ampak od ponudbe in povpraševanja v času določenega razpisa za drugorazredne izdelke. Izjave družbe CSN med navzkrižnim preverjanjem na daljavo so to potrdile. | (80) | It was clear from the analysis that the price differences occurred on a monthly basis, where the price difference between first and second quality ECCS could be either positive or negative, depending on the month. For Union sales, this was most likely caused by the tender-like procedure for sales of second quality mentioned in recital (75), where the second quality price-setting did not depend on first quality prices, but rather on supply and demand at the time of a particular second quality tender. This was confirmed by statements made by CSN during the RCC. |
| (81) | Ker (i) so bile razlike v ceni med prvorazrednimi in drugorazrednimi izdelki nedosledne in spremenljive, (ii) te razlike niso izražale splošne razlike v ceni, ki jo je družba CSN navedla v odgovoru na poziv k dopolnitvi, in (iii) družba CSN ni predložile nobenih novih dokazov, s katerimi bi utemeljila svojo trditev, je Komisija menila, da razumna tržna vrednost razlike, kot je določena v členu 2(10), točka (a), ni bila dokazana ali da take vrednosti ni bilo mogoče oceniti. Komisija je zato zavrnila zahtevek družbe CSN za prilagoditev zaradi razlik v kakovosti. | (81) | Since (i) the price differences between first and second quality were inconsistent and erratic, (ii) they did not reflect the overall price difference mentioned by CSN in their deficiency letter reply and (iii) CSN did not provide any new evidence substantiating their claim, the Commission considered that no reasonable market value of the difference as required by Article 2(10)(a) had been demonstrated or could be estimated. The Commission therefore rejected CSN’s claim for an adjustment for quality differences. |
| 3.2.4 Stopnje dampinga | 3.2.4. Dumping margins |
| (82) | Ker v zvezi z izračunom stopnje dampinga ni bilo nobene sprejete trditve, se uvodna izjava 133 začasne uredbe potrdi. | (82) | In the absence of any accepted claim concerning the dumping margin calculation, recital (133) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. |
| (83) | Dokončne stopnje dampinga, izražene kot delež cene stroškov, zavarovanja in prevoznine (CIF) meja Unije brez plačane dajatve, so naslednje: | Družba | Dokončna stopnja dampinga | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 66,8 % | Vse druge družbe | 66,8 % | (83) | The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: | Company | Definitive dumping margin | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 66,8 % | All other companies | 66,8 % |
| 4. ŠKODA | 4. INJURY |
| 4.1 Opredelitev industrije Unije in proizvodnje Unije | 4.1. Definition of the Union industry and Union production |
| (84) | V uvodni izjavi 135 začasne uredbe je Komisija pojasnila, da so bili podatki v zvezi z oceno škode pridobljeni predvsem od treh vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije, od katerih dva spadata v isto skupino, zato so vsi podatki navedeni v indeksirani obliki ali kot razponi, da se zaščiti zaupnost predloženih podatkov. | (84) | In recital (135) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission explained that as data relating to the injury assessment was primarily derived from the three sampled Union producers, two of which belong to the same group, all figures are given in an indexed form or as ranges to protect the confidentiality of the data provided. |
| (85) | Po začasnem razkritju je združenje CISA navedlo, da zaradi predstavitve ekonomskih kazalnikov v obliki razponov, zlasti v zvezi s potrošnjo Unije in vključno s podatki Eurostata glede tujih izvoznikov s sklici na preglednici 1 in 4 začasne uredbe, ni moglo predložiti smiselnih pripomb glede teh kazalnikov, in od Komisije zahtevalo, naj zagotovi točne podatke. Poleg tega je trdilo, da glede na to, da štirje proizvajalci Unije zastopajo tri neodvisne skupine proizvajalcev Unije, ni nevarnosti, da bi lahko zainteresirane strani obratno obdelale informacije, specifične za proizvajalce Unije. | (85) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA claimed that the presentation of the economic indicators in the form of ranges, especially concerning Union consumption and including Eurostat data regarding foreign exporters with reference to Table 1 and Table 4 of the provisional Regulation, prevented it from being able to meaningfully comment on these indicators and requested the Commission to provide accurate data. CISA further argued that considering that there are four Union producers, which represent three independent Union producer groups, there is no danger of interested parties being able to reverse engineer information specific to Union producers. |
| (86) | Kot je v zvezi s tem pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 31 in 135 začasne uredbe, so bili podatki v zvezi z oceno škode pridobljeni predvsem od treh vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije, od katerih dva spadata v isto skupino. Zato je bilo treba vse podatke navesti v indeksirani obliki ali kot razpone, da se zaščiti zaupnost predloženih podatkov. Čeprav štirje proizvajalci Unije zastopajo tri skupine proizvajalcev Unije, sta dve skupini povezani, saj ima družba ArcelorMittal v lasti delnice družbe Acciaierie d’Italia (10). Zato je Komisija menila, da je treba zaščititi zaupnost predloženih podatkov in torej uporabiti razpone. | (86) | In this respect, as explained in recitals (31) and (135) of the provisional Regulation, data relating to the injury assessment was primarily derived from the three sampled Union producers, two of which belong to the same group. Therefore, all figures had to be provided in an indexed form or as ranges to protect the confidentiality of the data provided. In addition, although there are four Union producers representing three Union producer groups, two of the groups are related because ArcelorMittal has a stake in Acciaierie d’Italia (10). Therefore, the Commission considered that there is a need to protect the confidentiality of the data provided and thus use ranges. |
| (87) | Komisija je ocenila, da je treba tudi podatke o potrošnji Unije ter podatke o uvozu in tržnem deležu iz preglednic 1 in 4 začasne uredbe predstaviti v razponih, saj bi absolutne vrednosti omogočale izračun skupne prodaje in tržnega deleža proizvajalcev Unije ter tako razkrile zaupne poslovne informacije, specifične za posamezne proizvajalce Unije. Zato je bila trditev zavrnjena. | (87) | The Commission estimated that also data on Union consumption and the data regarding imports and market share contained in Tables 1 and 4 of the provisional Regulation needed to be presented in ranges because the absolute figures would render it possible to calculate the total sales and their market share of the Union producers and, therefore, divulge business confidential information specific to individual Union producers. Consequently, the claim was rejected. |
| (88) | Uvodne izjave 134 do 139 in 144 do 146 začasne uredbe se torej potrdijo. | (88) | Therefore, recitals (134) to (139) as well as recitals (144) to (146) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 4.2 Potrošnja Unije | 4.2. Union consumption |
| (89) | Pripomb v zvezi s potrošnjo Unije ni bilo, zato se uvodne izjave 137 do 139 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (89) | In the absence of comments regarding Union consumption, recitals (137) to (139) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 4.3 Uvoz iz zadevnih držav | 4.3. Imports from the countries concerned |
| 4.3.1 Kumulativna ocena učinkov uvoza iz zadevnih držav | 4.3.1. Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned |
| (90) | Ker v zvezi s kumulativno oceno učinkov uvoza iz zadevnih držav ni bilo pripomb, se uvodne izjave 140 do 143 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (90) | In the absence of comments regarding the cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned recitals (140) to (143) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 4.3.2 Cene uvoza iz zadevnih držav in nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen | 4.3.2. Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting |
| (91) | Brazilska vlada je navedla, da so v skladu s protidampinškim sporazumom STO osnovni parametri za izvedbo preskusa nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen cene dampinškega uvoza in podobnega izdelka v celotni članici uvoznici ter da niti v odstavkih 1 in 2 člena 3 protidampinškega sporazuma STO niti v kateri koli drugi določbi sporazuma ni podlage za izključitev uvoza iz družb, ki niso vključene v vzorec proizvajalcev/izvoznikov, saj se šteje za dampinški uvoz. Po navedbah brazilske vlade velja enako za analizo nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen, in sicer da nobena določba protidampinškega sporazuma STO ne dovoljuje izključitve transakcij med povezanimi stranmi ali katere koli druge vrste prodaje, ki se ne šteje za običajen potek trgovanja, iz izračuna cene podobnega izdelka članice uvoznice. Brazilska vlada se je v zvezi s tem sklicevala na sklepa odborov v zadevah ES – pritrdilni elementi (Kitajska) in Maroko – dokončni protidampinški ukrepi za delovne zvezke (Tunizija). | (91) | The GOB claimed that under the ADA, the basic parameters for carrying out an undercutting test are the prices of the dumped imports and the like product in the importing Member as a whole and that there is no basis in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 3 of the ADA nor in any other provision in the Agreement for excluding imports from companies not composing the producers/exporters sample, since they are considered to be dumped. In the same way, according to the GOB, for an undercutting analysis there is nothing in the ADA authorizing the exclusion of transactions between related parties or any other kind of sales not considered to be in the ordinary course of trade for the calculation of the price of a like product of the importing Member. The GOB referred to the decisions of the Panels in EC – Fasteners (China) and Morocco – Definitive anti-dumping measures on exercise books (Tunisia) in this respect. |
| (92) | Poleg tega je brazilska vlada trdila, da se glede na besedilo uvodne izjave 151 (11) začasne uredbe zdi, da je bila analiza nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen za Kitajsko in Brazilijo izvedena za vsako državo posebej, čeprav je v uvodni izjavi 33 začasne uredbe navedeno, da „se je Komisija odločila, da bo za namene analize, opisane v zgornjih uvodnih izjavah, kumulirala uvoz iz zadevnih držav“. Brazilska vlada je menila, da bi bilo treba po kumulaciji uvoza za analizo škode enak postopek uporabiti pri vseh pregledih, določenih v členu 3 protidampinškega sporazuma STO, vključno z učinki cen, in se je v zvezi s tem sklicevala na sklep odbora v zadevi ES – pribor (fitingi) za cevi. | (92) | Furthermore, the GOB claimed that the wording of recital (151 (11)) of the provisional Regulation suggests that the undercutting analysis was performed on a country-by-country basis for China and Brazil although in accordance with recital (33) of the provisional Regulation,
‘the Commission decided to cumulate the imports from the countries concerned for the purpose of the analysis described in the recitals above’
. The GOB’s understanding is that once the imports have been cumulated for injury analysis, the same procedure should be followed regarding all examinations required by Article 3 of the ADA, including price effects, and referred to the decision of the Panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings in this respect. |
| (93) | Brazilska vlada je Komisijo pozvala, naj pojasni, ali pravilno razume dejstva preiskave, in če jih, naj v izračunih izvede naslednje prilagoditve: | — | naj upošteva ceno vse prodaje podobnega izdelka proizvajalcev Unije, vključno s poslovnimi dejavnostmi med povezanimi stranmi, | — | naj upošteva celoten uvoz izdelka v preiskavi iz Kitajske in Brazilije, ne glede na vzorec proizvajalcev/izvoznikov v skladu s členom 6.10 protidampinškega sporazuma STO, in | — | naj pri oceni učinka dampinškega uvoza na cene podobnih izdelkov na domačem trgu kumulira uvoz vsakega porekla, ki se preiskuje (iz Kitajske in Brazilije). | (93) | The GOB requested the Commission to clarify whether its understanding of the investigation facts is correct and, if so, to perform the following adjustment in the calculations: | — | to consider the price of all sales of the like product by the Union producers, including operations between related parties; | — | to consider all the imports of the product under investigation from China and Brazil, regardless of producers/exporters sample made under Article 6.10 of the ADA; and | — | to cumulate the imports from all the investigated origins (China and Brazil) when assessing the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products. |
| (94) | Komisija je poudarila, da je dampinški uvoz iz Brazilije in Kitajske v obdobju preiskave močno oviral dvig cen industrije Unije, zaradi česar so bile finančne izgube v obravnavanem obdobju vse večje, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 186 in 194 začasne uredbe. Nasprotno so argumenti brazilske vlade osredotočeni na drug standard primerjave cen, tj. nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen (glej uvodni izjavi 91 in 92). Komisija je zato trdila, da je bil dvig cen na trgu Unije oviran od leta 2018 do konca obdobja preiskave. Četudi naj bi se argumenti brazilske vlade nanašali na oviranje dviga cen, v dokumentaciji niso na voljo nobene informacije o tem, da bi bile cene nevzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije znatno drugačne od cen vzorčenih proizvajalcev in da bi bili torej sklepi o oviranju dviga cen drugačni. Primerjava uvoznih cen in cen Unije v preglednicah 5 in 6 začasne uredbe dejansko že kaže, da so bile uvozne cene nižje od cen Unije (glej uvodno izjavo 149 začasne uredbe). Komisija je torej v okviru analize učinkov na cene upoštevala učinke celotnega uvoza na cene celotne prodaje industrije Unije. Vsekakor je navedla, da je izbira vzorca določena v osnovni uredbi in ustreznih določbah protidampinškega sporazuma STO, kadar je strani veliko, zato se preiskava lahko omeji na razumno število reprezentativnih strani, da bi se oblikovale reprezentativne ugotovitve. Sodna praksa, ki jo je navedla brazilska vlada, ni podprla trditve, da reprezentativnih ugotovitev v zvezi z vzorčenimi družbami ni mogoče uporabiti pri oblikovanju sklepov v zvezi s preostalo prodajo in uvozom. Zato so bile te trditve brazilske vlade zavrnjene. | (94) | The Commission underlined that as stated in recitals (186) and (194) of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry’s prices in the investigation period had been seriously suppressed by dumped imports from both Brazil and China, which led to increasing financial losses during the period considered. By contrast, the arguments by the GOB focus on the other standard of price comparison, that is, price undercutting (see recitals (91)-(92)). The Commission maintained therefore that prices on the Union market had been suppressed from 2018 to the end of the investigation period. Even if the arguments of the GOB were meant to refer to price suppression, there is no information on the file that the prices of non-sampled Union producers would be substantially different from the prices of the sampled producers, and hence that the conclusions on price suppression would be different. In fact, a comparison between import prices and Union prices in tables 5 and 6 of the provisional Regulation already shows that import prices were lower than Union prices (see recital (149) of the provisional Regulation). The Commission was thus, as part of its price effects analysis, taking into account the price effects of all imports on all sales of the Union industry. In any event, the Commission noted that the selection of a sample is provided in the basic Regulation, and the corresponding provisions of the WTO ADA when there is a large number of parties and therefore the investigation can be limited to a reasonable number of representative parties to reach representative findings. The case-law cited by the GOB did not support the assertion that representative findings with respect to the sampled companies could not be used to reach conclusions regarding the remainder of sales and imports. These claims by the GOB were therefore rejected. |
| (95) | Kar zadeva trditve glede nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen in obsega prodaje industrije Unije, uporabljenega v izračunih nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen, je Komisija potrdila, da se je uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov primerjal le s prodajo industrije Unije za enako vrsto izdelka. V zvezi s tem je Komisija izračunala nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen za celoten uvoz iz zadevnih držav in izvedla skupno analizo učinkov na cene. Rezultat je bil nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen med 1,9 % in 21,8 %, kar pomeni tehtano povprečje za obe državi v višini 11,2 %. | (95) | As for the claims concerning price undercutting and the set of the Union industry sales used for the undercutting calculations, the Commission confirmed that imports of ECCS of the sampled exporting producers were compared solely to Union industry sales of the same product type. In this respect, the Commission calculated undercutting for all imports from the countries concerned and conducted the price effects analysis together. The result was an undercutting ranging between 1,9 % and 21,8 %, that is a weighted average for both countries of 11,2 %. |
| (96) | Po dokončnem razkritju je brazilska vlada ponovila svojo trditev, da bi morala Komisija upoštevati prodajne transakcije med povezanimi stranmi. Trdila je tudi, da bi bilo treba v izračunih nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen in nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen upoštevati tudi prodajo nevzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije in proizvajalcev izvoznikov. Brazilska vlada se je sklicevala na poročilo odbora, v katerem je odbor zavrnil pristop preiskovalnega organa, da se cene domače industrije določijo tako, da nelojalno nižajo prodajne cene, ker je bilo ugotovljeno, da cene niso dobičkonosne (12). Komisija ni razumela, kako se to poročilo nanaša na trditev brazilske vlade, da bi morala v izračunih nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen upoštevati tudi prodajne transakcije med povezanimi stranmi. Ne glede na vse poročilo odbora ni bilo sprejeto. Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 94 zgoraj, je bila Komisija poleg tega upravičena do vzorčenja in uporabe reprezentativnih ugotovitev v zvezi z vzorčenimi družbami, da bi oblikovala sklepe o preostali prodaji in uvozu. Zato je trditev zavrnila. V zvezi z analizo učinkov dampinškega uvoza na cene v industriji Unije je Komisija menila, da je oviranje dviga cen, kot je opredeljeno v uvodnih izjavah 186, 188, 193, 194 in 208 začasne uredbe, vsekakor že zadosten kazalnik. Ugotovitve o oviranju dviga cen na makro ravni so bile potrjene tudi z ugotovitvami o znatnem nelojalnem nižanju ciljnih cen v zvezi s posameznimi vzorčenimi proizvajalci izvozniki med obdobjem preiskave. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 185, so se stopnje nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen gibale med 23,9 % in 53,2 %, kar pomeni tehtano povprečje za obe državi v višini 37,7 %. Poleg tega je, kot je navedeno v preglednici 9 začasne uredbe, povprečna prodajna cena industrije Unije na trgu Unije v obdobju preiskave znašala [780–910] EUR/tono, stroški proizvodnje na enoto pa [840–980] EUR/tono. Posledično je industrija Unije zaradi oviranja dviga cen prodajala po cenah, s katerimi ni mogla kriti niti stroškov proizvodnje, kaj šele običajno stopnjo dobička. Zato so bile v zaključni fazi potrjene ugotovitve o oviranju dviga cen, ki ga je povzročil dampinški uvoz iz zadevnih držav. | (96) | Following final disclosure, the GOB reiterated its claim that the Commission should have taken into account sales transactions between related parties. The GOB also argued that the sales of the non-sampled Union and exporting producers should have also been taken into account when carrying out undercutting and underselling calculations. The GOB referred to a Panel report where the Panel rejected the investigating authority’s approach to construct the prices of the domestic industry for the purpose of price undercutting because the prices were found not to be profitable (12). The Commission failed to see how this report is relevant for the GOB’s assertion that the sales transactions between related parties should have been also taken into account for its undercutting calculations. In any event, that Panel Report has not been adopted. Furthermore, as explained in recital (94) above, the Commission was entitled to apply sampling and to use the representative findings with respect to the sampled companies to reach conclusions regarding the remainder of sales and imports. Consequently, it rejected the claim. In any event, for analysing the price effects of the dumped imports on the Union industry, the Commission considered that the price suppression as established in recitals (186), (188), (193), (194) and (208) of the provisional Regulation is already a sufficient indicator. The findings of price suppression at the macro level was also confirmed by the findings of significant underselling with respect to each sampled exporting producer during the investigation period. As set out in recital (185), underselling margins ranged from 23,9 % to 53,2 %, that is a weighted average for both countries of 37,7 %. In addition, as indicated in table 9 of the provisional Regulation, in the investigation period the average sales price of the Union industry on the Union market was EUR/tonne [780-910], while the unit cost of production was EUR/tonne [840-980]. Consequently, due to the price suppression the Union industry sold at prices which did not even cover their cost of production let alone a normal profit margin. Therefore, the findings of price suppression of the dumped imports from the countries concerned were confirmed at definitive stage. |
| (97) | Komisija je navedla, da so te nedvoumne ugotovitve o znatnem oviranju dviga cen že same po sebi pravno zadostne za potrditev, da je dampinški uvoz industriji Unije povzročil znatno škodo. V teh okoliščinah ni nobene pravne zahteve za ločeno analizo in ugotovitve o nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen, saj je to alternativen standard analize učinkov na cene v skladu s členom 3(3) osnovne uredbe. Posledično pa analiza in ugotovitve o nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen ob upoštevanju navedenih ugotovitev o oviranju dviga cen niso pomembne za izid preiskave, in to kljub ugotovitvam o nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen iz začasne uredbe. Poleg tega je Splošno sodišče v nedavnih sodbah potrdilo, da se analiza znatnega oviranja dviga cen, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, uporabi kot orodje za oceno učinkov na cene v skladu s členom 3(3) osnovne uredbe (13). Glede na to so tudi pripombe strani o nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen brezpredmetne. Kljub temu se je Komisija zaradi popolnosti odločila obravnavati trditve zainteresiranih strani. | (97) | The Commission noted that these unequivocal findings of significant price suppression are already alone legally sufficient to confirm that the dumped imports caused significant injury to the Union industry. In these circumstances there is no legal requirement to have a separate analysis and findings on price undercutting, because it is an alternative standard of price effects analysis under Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, despite the findings on price undercutting made in the provisional Regulation, given the above findings on price suppression, the analysis and findings of price undercutting are unnecessary for the outcome of the investigation. Furthermore, in its recent judgments the General Court confirmed the Commission’s analysis of significant price suppression as a tool to assess the price effects under Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation (13). In view of this, the comments by the parties concerning price undercutting are also without object. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness the Commission decided to address the claims from interested parties. |
| (98) | Brazilska vlada je po dokončnem razkritju oporekala izjavi Komisije, da ugotovitve o nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen niso pomembne za rezultat preiskave, saj naj bi stopnja škode po mnenju brazilske vlade temeljila na nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen. Vendar kot je pojasnjeno v oddelkih 6.1 in 6.2 in v nasprotju s trditvijo brazilske vlade, stopnja škode ni temeljila na ugotovljenem nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen, ampak na stopnji nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen, določeni za posameznega vzorčenega proizvajalca izvoznika, razen za družbo Jintai, katere stopnja škode je bila enaka ugotovljeni stopnji dampinga. | (98) | Following final disclosure, the GOB took issue with the Commission’s statement that the findings of price undercutting are unnecessary to the outcome of the investigation as, according to GOB, the injury margin was based on price undercutting. However, as explained in sections 6.1 and 6.2 below, and contrary to GOB’s assertion, the injury margin was not based on the undercutting found but rather on the underselling margin established for each sampled exporting producer, except for Jintai for which the injury margin equalled the dumping margin found. |
| (99) | Kar zadeva trditev brazilske vlade, da bi morala Komisija upoštevati ceno celotne prodaje podobnega izdelka na trgu Unije, vključno s transakcijami med povezanimi stranmi, je Komisija navedla, da pri preiskavah zbere vse informacije, vključno s cenami prodaje med povezanimi stranmi. V zvezi s tem Komisija tudi pozove proizvajalce Unije, naj pojasnijo politike oblikovanja transfernih cen pri prodajnih transakcijah s povezanimi stranmi. Če na to prodajo vpliva odnos med stranmi in njihove cene niso določene pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, se ne upoštevajo pri analizi nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen, saj bi ta odnos vplival na izračune. Če pa prodaja med povezanimi stranmi poteka pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji in izraža tržno transakcijo, se lahko v celoti upošteva v izračunu nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen (če ni nobenih prilagoditev v zvezi z ravnjo trgovanja). Ta pristop je v celoti skladen s pravili osnovne uredbe in sodno prakso STO, na katero se sklicuje brazilska vlada. Ta trditev je bila zato zavrnjena. | (99) | With respect to the claim of the GOB that the Commission should consider the price of all sales of the like product in the Union market, including transactions between related parties, the Commission noted that in its investigations it collects all information, including sales prices between related parties. In this context, the Commission also asks Union producers to explain the transfer pricing policies of sales transactions with related parties. If these sales are affected by the relationship and their prices are not at arm’s length, they are not taken into account in the undercutting analysis because the resulting calculations would be tainted by this relationship. By contrast, if the sales between related parties are at arm’s length and reflect a market transaction, they may be fully taken into account in the undercutting calculation (provided there are no adjustments concerning level of trade). This approach is fully in line with the rules of the basic Regulation and the WTO jurisprudence quoted by the GOB. This claim was therefore dismissed. |
| (100) | Družba Baosteel je opozorila na težavo v zvezi s postopkom in pravicami do obrambe, povezano z dokumentom Komisije o razkritju, v katerem so prodajne cene na enoto in ciljne cene na enoto industrije Unije, ki so se upoštevale v teh izračunih, navedene v širokih razponih in enakih razponih ne glede na razliko v ceni med različnimi kontrolnimi številkami izdelka, zaradi česar družba ni mogla predložiti smiselnih pripomb. Ker se znesek nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen izračuna kot razlika med vrednostjo CIF izvoznika in ciljno ceno industrije Unije, izvozniki brez smiselnega razkritja zadnjenavedene ne bi mogli preveriti, ali je Komisija pravilno izračunala stopnjo nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen. Družba Jintai je navedla podobne pomisleke. | (100) | Baosteel raised a procedural and rights of defence issue with respect to the Commission’s disclosure document where the Union industry’s unit sales prices and target unit prices relied on for the purposes of these calculations are provided in broad ranges, and the same ranges irrespective of the difference in price between different PCNs, which prevented the company from providing meaningful comments. As the underselling amount is calculated as a difference between the exporter’s CIF value and the Union industry’s target price, without a meaningful disclosure of the latter, exporters would not be able to verify the accuracy of the Commission’s underselling margin calculations. Jintai expressed similar concerns. |
| (101) | Komisija je v zvezi s tem opozorila, da je treba podatke zaradi pomislekov glede zaupnosti, ki so že pojasnjeni v uvodni izjavi 86, navesti v razponih. Po trditvi družbe Baosteel je Komisija pregledala razpone ob upoštevanju razlik v ceni med različnimi kontrolnimi številkami izdelka. | (101) | In this respect, the Commission pointed out that because of the confidentiality concerns already explained in recital (86), it was necessary to present the data in ranges. Following the claim of Baosteel, the Commission revised the ranges taking into account the price differences between the different PCNs. |
| (102) | Poleg tega je družba Baosteel od Komisije zahtevala, naj pojasni, ali je primerjala cene na isti ravni trgovanja. Navedla je, da je Komisija na strani izvoznika odštela PSA-stroške in dobiček povezanih trgovcev, zato mora enako narediti na strani proizvajalca Unije, če ta prodaja izdelek prek povezanih trgovcev na trgu Unije. | (102) | Moreover, Baosteel requested the Commission to clarify whether it has compared the prices at the same level of trade. In particular, Baosteel claimed that since on the exporter’s side the Commission has deducted the SG&A and profits of the related traders, it must do the same on the Union producer’s side, if they do sell the product concerned via related traders on the Union market. |
| (103) | Družba Jintai je trdila tudi, da Komisija pri izračunu stopnje nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen ni primerjala cen na isti ravni trgovanja. Po navedbah družbe Jintai je Komisija s tem, ko je za primerjavo cen v okviru izračunov škode izenačila cene, ki jih vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije pri neposredni prodaji zaračunajo neodvisnim kupcem, in cene, ki jih povezani prodajni subjekti navedenih proizvajalcev zaračunajo tem kupcem, za ta izdelek upoštevala višjo ceno, ki je zato neugodna za družbo Jintai. Povedano drugače, ker je Komisija v zvezi s cenami vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije upoštevala določene elemente, ki se nanašajo na drugačno raven trgovanja, kot je tista, ki se uporablja za namene primerjave (franko tovarna), primerjava v okviru izračuna stopnje nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen družbe Jintai ni bila pravična. Družba Jintai je trdila, da bi njena stopnja nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen verjetno bila precej nižja od 0 %, če bi se pravilna in ustrezna primerjava izvedla na isti ravni trgovanja. Zato je od Komisije zahtevala, naj izvede primerjavo na ustrezni in pravični ravni trgovanja, da bi določila pravilno stopnjo nelojalnega višanja prodajnih cen družbe Jintai, pri čemer se je v zvezi s tem sklicevala na odločitve Sodišča v zadevah Jindal Saw in Jindal Saw Italia/Komisija (14) in Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan/Komisija (15). | (103) | Jintai also claimed that the Commission has failed to make a comparison of prices at the same level of trade when calculating the undercutting margin. According to Jintai, by carrying out, for the price comparison made in the context of the injury calculations, the assimilation between the prices charged by the sampled Union producers in their direct sales to independent buyers and the prices charged by the related selling entities of those producers to such buyers, the Commission took into account for that product a price which was inflated and therefore unfavourable to Jintai. In other words, by taking into account, in relation to the prices of the sampled Union producers, certain elements which concern a different level of trade from that which it used for the purposes of the comparison (ex-works), the Commission has not made a fair comparison in the calculation of Jintai’s price undercutting margin. Jintai argued that if the correct and proper comparison is done at the same level of trade, Jintai’s price undercutting margin would likely be far below 0 %. Therefore, Jintai requested the Commission to make a proper and fair level of trade comparison to establish Jintai’s correct price ‘over-cutting’ margin and referred to the Court decisions Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission (14) and Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan v Commission (15) in this respect. |
| (104) | Komisija je najprej navedla, da analizo nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen dopolnjujejo njene ločene ugotovitve o oviranju dviga cen, podrobno navedene v uvodnih izjavah 185, 186 in 194 začasne uredbe. Te ugotovitve o znatnem oviranju dviga cen so pravno zadostne za dokaz negativnega učinka na cene, ki jih zaračunava industrija Unije, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 97. Kljub temu je Komisija zaradi celovitosti obravnavala argumente v zvezi z nelojalnim nižanjem prodajnih cen, kot je pojasnjeno v navedeni uvodni izjavi. | (104) | The Commission first noted that the analysis on price undercutting is supplemented by its separate findings on price suppression as detailed in recitals (185), (186) and (194) of the provisional Regulation. These findings of significant price suppression are already legally sufficient to show the negative impact on the prices charged by the Union industry, as explained in recital (97). Nevertheless, as explained in that recital, the Commission addressed the arguments concerning undercutting for the sake of completeness. |
| (105) | Kar zadeva trditev družbe Baosteel glede prilagoditve PSA-stroškov in dobička povezanih trgovcev proizvajalcev Unije, je Komisija potrdila, da pri izračunih nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen ni izvedla take prilagoditve. Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 150 in 151 začasne uredbe, je Komisija izvedla veliko drugih prilagoditev, da bi zagotovila pravično primerjavo na isti ravni trgovanja. S tem so bile cene industrije Unije ponovno prilagojene na raven cene franko tovarna, uvozne cene proizvajalcev izvoznikov pa na raven cene CIF meja Unije (16). Izvedla pa je tudi simulacijo, tako da je izračunala nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen na podlagi člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe in brez upoštevanja tega člena po analogiji za prodajo družbe Baosteel, ter ugotovila, da je bilo nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen za družbo Baosteel znatno v obeh primerih, in sicer najmanj 7,5-odstotno. Tako je bilo v nasprotju s trditvijo družbe Baosteel ugotovljeno, da je nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen znatno, četudi se PSA-stroški in dobiček povezanih trgovcev družbe Baosteel ne odštejejo v skladu s členom 2(9). | (105) | Regarding the claim of Baosteel about an adjustment for SG&A and profits of the related traders of the Union producers, the Commission confirmed that in its undercutting calculations it had not made such an adjustment. As indicated in recitals (150) and (151) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission made a number of other adjustments in order to ensure a fair comparison at the same level of trade. This resulted in bringing back the Union industry prices to ex-works level and the exporting producers’ import prices to CIF Union frontier level (16). However, the Commission made a simulation by calculating undercutting both with and without the application of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation by analogy to the sales of Baosteel, and established that the undercutting was significant for Baosteel in both cases, with a minimum level of 7,5 %. Consequently, contrary to Baosteel’s claim, even when not deducting, under Article 2(9), the SG&A and profits of the related traders of Baosteel, a significant undercutting was found. |
| (106) | Kar zadeva družbo Jintai, je Komisija opozorila, da ta proizvajalec izvoznik izdelka v preiskavi ni izvažal prek povezanih prodajnih subjektov, zato po analogiji ni izvedla prilagoditve za njegovo izvozno ceno na podlagi člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe. V tem primeru se Komisija tudi ni zdelo primerno, da prilagodi prodajo proizvajalcev Unije. Navedla je, da je za zagotovitev simetrije pri primerjavi cen potrebno, da zadevne cene vključujejo enake elemente, kolikor je to mogoče, in da tudi čim bolj izražajo isto raven trgovanja. Kar zadeva prvi vidik, je izvozna cena družbe Jintai izražala neposredno prodajo kitajskega pravnega subjekta neodvisnim strankam v Uniji. Eden od vzorčenih proizvajalcev v Uniji je prodajal neposredno končnim strankam, njegova cena pa je izražala enake elemente kot cena družbe Jintai. Druga dva vzorčena proizvajalca Unije sta bila del skupine Arcelor Mittal. Proizvodni subjekti nobenega od njiju niso opravljali neposredne prodaje, ampak so prodajali prek povezanih subjektov. Komisija je ugotovila, da proizvodni subjekti niso imeli svoje prodajne strukture, ampak so se morali pri prodaji zanašati na njihove povezane prodajne subjekte. Povedano drugače, stroški, povezani s proizvodnjo in prodajo zadevnega izdelka, so bili razdeljeni med proizvodne subjekte, ki so krili le stroške proizvodnje, in povezane prodajne subjekte v različnih državah članicah, ki so krili stroške prodaje in trženja. Proizvodni subjekt ni imel nobenih prodajnih stroškov, prodajni oddelek skupine Arcelor Mittal pa je bil v celoti sestavljen iz ločenih pravnih prodajnih subjektov. PSA-stroške in dobiček v zvezi s prodajo skupine Arcelor Mittal so ustvarili povezani prodajni subjekti pri prodaji strankam Unije. Da bi Komisija zagotovila pravično primerjavo, je upoštevala ceno, ki jo je prodajni subjekt zaračunal strankam Unije, saj je ta cena izražala enake stroške proizvodnje in trženja, kot so izraženi v izvozni ceni družbe Jintai, ki je proizvodnjo in prodajo opravljala prek enega samega subjekta, enako kot drug vzorčeni proizvajalec Unije. Če se ne bi upoštevala cena povezanega prodajnega subjekta skupine Arcelor Mittal, bi se določila prenizka dejanska cena, saj ta ne bi izražala nujnih prodajnih stroškov subjekta, nastalih pri prodaji neodvisnim strankam v Uniji. Povezani prodajni subjekti industrije Unije na eni strani in družba Jintai na drugi strani so opravljali podobne prodajne funkcije, saj (1) morajo oboji najti stranke v Uniji, (2) sklepajo prodajne pogodbe ter (3) zagotavljajo dostavo in plačilo računov itd. Zato je ta primerjava cen v skladu s sodbama v zadevah Hansol (17), CRIA in CCCMC (18) ter Giant Electric Vehicles (19) izražala zadevne gospodarske razmere in ustrezne vloge zadevnih subjektov na strani izvoza in strani EU ter v trenutku, ko oba subjekta konkurirata na trgu Unije. | (106) | Regarding Jintai, the Commission pointed out that since this exporting producer did not export the product under investigation via related sales entities, no adjustment to its export price through the application of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation by analogy was made. In the present case, the Commission also did not consider it appropriate to adjust the sales of the Union producers. The Commission noted that in order to ensure symmetry in the price comparison, the respective prices should include as far as possible the same elements, and also reflect as far as possible the same level of trade. As for the former, the export price of Jintai reflected a direct sale from the Chinese legal entity to the independent customers in the Union. In the Union, one sampled producer had direct sales to final customers, and its price reflected the same elements as Jintai’s price. The other two sampled Union producers were part of the Arcelor Mittal Group. Both of them did not have direct sales from the producing entities, but sold via related entities. The Commission found that the producing entities did not have their own sales structure, but had to rely on their related selling entities in order to carry out the sales. In other words, the costs associated with the production and sale of the product concerned were split between the producing entities that were bearing just the manufacturing costs, and the related selling entities located in different Member States were bearing the sales and marketing costs. The production entity did not incur any selling expense, and the sales department of Arcelor Mittal was entirely contained in the separate legal sales entities. The SG&A and profit concerning the sales of Arcelor Mittal Group, were incurred by the related selling entities when selling to Union customers. In order to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission took into account the price of the selling entity to the Union customers, as this price reflected the same production and marketing costs reflected in the export price of Jintai, which conducted both production and sale through a single entity, just like the other sampled Union producer. Not taking the price of the Arcelor Mittal Group’s relating selling entity would understate the actual price as it would not reflect the necessary selling costs of the entity to independent customers in the Union. The related selling entities of the Union industry, on the one hand, and Jintai, on the other hand, exercised similar sales functions because (1) they both need to find customers in the Union, (2) sign sales contracts and (3) ensure deliveries and payments of invoices, etc. Therefore, in line with the judgments in Hansol (17), CRIA and CCCMC (18), and Giant Electric Vehicles (19), this price comparison reflected the respective economic realities and corresponding roles played by the respective entities on both the export and EU side, and at a point where both entities compete on the Union market. |
| (107) | Vendar tudi ob predpostavki, da ob ugoditvi zahtevi družbe Jintai (tj. da Komisija po analogiji prilagodi prodajo industrije Unije za namene izračuna nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen na podlagi člena 2(9) osnovne uredbe) ne bi bilo ugotovljeno nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen v zvezi s tem proizvajalcem izvoznikom, to ne bi spremenilo ugotovitve Komisije glede nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen v zvezi s Kitajsko in obema zadevnima državama kot celoto. Izvoz družbe Jintai v Unijo dejansko predstavlja le 6,3 % celotnega izvoza v Unijo in le 11,6 % izvoza v okviru vzorca. Četudi nelojalno nižanje prodajnih cen v zvezi z izvozom družbe Jintai ne bi bilo ugotovljeno, bi bile ugotovitve o nelojalnem nižanju prodajnih cen za Kitajsko in obe zadevni državi potrjene na podlagi drugega vzorčenega proizvajalca izvoznika. Podobno nobena ugotovitev o stopnji nelojalnega nižanja prodajnih cen družbe Jintai ne bi vplivala na ugotovitve Komisije o oviranju dviga cen, kot je že navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 97 in 104. Cene družbe Jintai so dejansko kazale visoko stopnjo nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen (glej uvodno izjavo 185). | (107) | Nevertheless, even assuming that granting Jintai’s request (namely, that the Commission adjusted the Union industry’s sales for the purposes of the undercutting calculation through the application of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation by analogy) would show no undercutting as regards this exporting producer, this would not change the Commission’s determination of undercutting as regards China and both countries concerned as a whole. Indeed, Jintai’s exports to the Union represent only 6,3 % of the total exports to the Union and only 11,6 % of the exports within the sample. Thus, even if there is no undercutting as regards Jintai’s exports, the findings of price undercutting would be confirmed on the basis of the other sampled exporting producer for China as well as for both countries concerned. Likewise, any finding as regards the level of undercutting of Jintai would not affect the Commission’s findings with respect to price suppression, as already recalled in recitals (97) and (104). Indeed, Jintai’s prices exhibited a high level of underselling (see recital (185)). |
| 4.4 Gospodarski položaj industrije Unije | 4.4. Economic situation of the Union industry |
| 4.4.1 Splošne opombe | 4.4.1. General remarks |
| (108) | Po začasnem razkritju se je združenje CISA pozanimalo, ali so podatki o makroekonomskih kazalnikih vključevali podatke o družbi Acciaierie d’Italia. Komisija je odgovorila pritrdilno. | (108) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA inquired whether the data concerning macroeconomic indicators included data pertaining to Acciaierie d’Italia. The Commission replied by the affirmative. |
| (109) | Zato se uvodne izjave 153 do 157 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (109) | Therefore, recitals (153) to (157) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 4.4.2 Makroekonomski kazalniki | 4.4.2. Macroeconomic indicators |
| (110) | Po začasnem razkritju je združenje CISA od Komisije zahtevalo, naj potrdi, ali je zagotovila, da so bili vsi proizvajalci, vključno z družbo Acciaierie d’Italia, dejansko vključeni v ustrezne podatkovne zbirke v zvezi z makroekonomskimi kazalniki, ter opozorilo, da samo družba Acciaierie d’Italia predstavlja [5–15] % celotne proizvodnje in prodaje zadevnega izdelka v Uniji, kar presega zanemarljivo raven. | (110) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA requested the Commission to confirm whether it has ensured that all producers, including Acciaierie d’Italia, have indeed been included in the relevant datasets concerning the macroeconomic indicators and pointed out that Acciaierie d’Italia alone accounts for [5-15] % of the total production and sales of the product concerned in the Union, which is above the negligible level. |
| (111) | Komisija je v zvezi s tem potrdila, da so se podatki v zvezi z družbo Acciaierie d’Italia upoštevali v makroekonomskih kazalnikih. | (111) | In this respect, the Commission confirmed that data relating to Acciaierie d’Italia have been considered in the macroeconomic indicators. |
| 4.4.2.1 Proizvodnja, proizvodna zmogljivost in izkoriščenost zmogljivosti | 4.4.2.1. Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation |
| (112) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede proizvodnje, proizvodne zmogljivosti in izkoriščenosti zmogljivosti, so bile uvodne izjave 158 do 160 začasne uredbe potrjene. | (112) | In the absence of comments regarding production, production capacity and capacity utilisation, recitals (158) to (160) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.2.2 Obseg prodaje in tržni delež | 4.4.2.2. Sales volume and market share |
| (113) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede obsega prodaje in tržnega deleža, sta bili uvodni izjavi 161 in 162 začasne uredbe potrjeni. | (113) | In the absence of comments regarding sales volume and market share, recitals (161) and (162) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.2.3 Zaposlenost in produktivnost | 4.4.2.3. Employment and productivity |
| (114) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede zaposlenosti in produktivnosti, sta bili uvodni izjavi 163 in 164 začasne uredbe potrjeni. | (114) | In the absence of comments regarding employment and productivity, recitals (163) and (164) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.2.4 Rast | 4.4.2.4. Growth |
| (115) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede rasti, so bile uvodne izjave 165 do 167 začasne uredbe potrjene. | (115) | In the absence of comments regarding growth, recitals (165) to (167) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.2.5 Višina stopnje dampinga in okrevanje od preteklega dampinga | 4.4.2.5. Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping |
| (116) | Po začasnem razkritju je brazilska vlada navedla, da je Komisija pri oceni višine stopnje dampinga zgolj ponovila sklepe, ki jih je že oblikovala v okviru drugih preiskav. Sklep, da so stopnje dampinga višje od praga de minimis, je na primer že naveden v uvodni izjavi 141 začasne uredbe v zvezi z oceno kumulacije uvoza in se lahko oblikuje na podlagi same uporabe začasnih ukrepov. Poleg tega sta obseg in cena dampinškega uvoza analizirana v členih 3.1, 3.2 in 3.5 protidampinškega sporazuma, ta analiza pa je obravnavana v uvodnih izjavah 144 do 152 začasne uredbe. Zato ni bila izvedena nobena posebna analiza v zvezi z višino stopnje dampinga. Glede na to je brazilska vlada od Komisije zahtevala, naj neredundantno analizira ta dejavnik v povezavi z drugimi kazalniki iz člena 3 protidampinškega sporazuma. | (116) | Following provisional disclosure, the GOB claimed that in its assessment of the magnitude of the margin of dumping, the Commission simply restated conclusions already reached under other examinations. For instance, the conclusion that the margins of dumping are above the de minimis threshold is already expressed in recital (141) of the provisional Regulation related to the assessment of imports cumulation and can be derived from the application of provisional measures itself. Moreover, the analysis of the volume and price of the dumped imports was made under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and is expressed in recitals (144) – (152) of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, no specific analysis regarding the magnitude of the margin of dumping was performed. Therefore, the GOB requested the Commission to analyse this factor in a non-redundant manner in relation to other indicators contained in Article 3 of the Anti-dumping Agreement. |
| (117) | V zvezi s tem je Komisija navedla, da upoštevanje višine stopnje dampinga vključuje proučitev, ali učinka na industrijo Unije, ob upoštevanju obsega in cene dampinškega uvoza, ni mogoče šteti za zanemarljivega. | (117) | In this respect, the Commission noted that consideration of the magnitude of the margin of dumping involves an examination of whether, having regard the volume and the price of the dumped imports, the impact on the Union industry cannot be considered negligible. |
| (118) | Komisija je opozorila, da so bile vse stopnje dampinga precej višje od stopnje de minimis. Obseg uvoza iz zadevnih držav je bil v obravnavanem obdobju in obdobju preiskave velik, cene dampinškega uvoza pa so nelojalno nižale prodajne cene in ovirale dvig cen industrije Unije. Glede na obseg in ceno dampinškega uvoza učinka dejanskih stopenj dampinga torej ni mogoče šteti za zanemarljivega in je bil dejansko znaten, kot je Komisija sklenila v uvodni izjavi 168 začasne uredbe. | (118) | The Commission recalled that all dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The volume of imports from the countries concerned was significant in the period considered and the investigation period, while the prices of the dumped imports have exerted price undercutting and price suppression on the prices of Union industry. Therefore, given the volume and the price of the dumped imports, the impact of the actual margins of dumping cannot be considered negligible and was even substantial, as concluded by the Commission in recital (168) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (119) | Zato sta bili uvodni izjavi 168 in 169 začasne uredbe potrjeni. | (119) | Therefore, recitals (168) and (169) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.3 Mikroekonomski kazalniki | 4.4.3. Microeconomic indicators |
| 4.4.3.1 Cene in dejavniki, ki vplivajo nanje | 4.4.3.1. Prices and factors affecting prices |
| (120) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede cen in dejavnikov, ki vplivajo nanje, so bile uvodne izjave 170 do 172 začasne uredbe potrjene. | (120) | In the absence of comments regarding prices and factors affecting prices, recitals (170) to (172) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.3.2. Stroški dela | 4.4.3.2. Labour costs |
| (121) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede stroškov dela, sta bili uvodni izjavi 173 in 174 začasne uredbe potrjeni. | (121) | In the absence of comments regarding labour costs, recitals (173) and (174) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.3.3 Zaloge | 4.4.3.3. Inventories |
| (122) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede zalog, sta bili uvodni izjavi 175 in 176 začasne uredbe potrjeni. | (122) | In the absence of comments regarding inventories, recitals (175) and (176) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.3.4 Dobičkonosnost, denarni tok, naložbe, donosnost naložb in zmožnost zbiranja kapitala | 4.4.3.4. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital |
| (123) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede dobičkonosnosti, denarnega toka, naložb, donosnosti naložb in zmožnosti zbiranja kapitala, so bile uvodne izjave 177 do 182 začasne uredbe potrjene. | (123) | In the absence of comments regarding profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital, recitals (177) to (182) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. |
| 4.4.4 Sklep o škodi | 4.4.4. Conclusion on injury |
| (124) | Po začasnem razkritju sta združenje CISA in družba Eviosys trdila, da industrija Unije ni utrpela znatne škode in da so bili morebitni negativni gospodarski učinki, ki jih je utrpela industrija Unije, dejansko posledica drugih dejavnikov, kot je vpliv pandemije COVID-19. Po dokončnem razkritju je združenje CISA ponovilo svoje trditve. | (124) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA and Eviosys claimed that the Union industry did not suffer material injury and that any negative economic effects experienced by the Union industry were in fact due to other factors such as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. After final disclosure, CISA reiterated its claims. |
| (125) | Prvič, opozorila sta na dejstvo, da se je tržni delež industrije Unije v zvezi z zmanjševanjem potrošnje Unije v obravnavanem obdobju dejansko povečal. | (125) | First, CISA and Eviosys pointed to the fact that the market share held by the Union industry in fact increased during the period considered in the context of a decreasing Union consumption. |
| (126) | Drugič, združenje CISA je v zvezi z makroekonomskimi kazalniki navedlo, da nobeden od njih nikakor ne more utemeljevati ugotovitve, da je industrija Unije utrpela znatno škodo. Opozorilo je, da se ravni proizvodne zmogljivosti in domače prodaje nista spreminjali, medtem ko se je potrošnja zmanjševala, kar pojasnjuje očitno povečanje tržnih deležev. Poleg tega je očitno, da se je v industriji Unije povečalo število zaposlenih oseb, kar tudi kaže, da ni bilo znatne škode. | (126) | Second, concerning the macroeconomic indicators, CISA noted that none of them could possibly result in a finding of the Union industry being materially injured. It pointed out that the levels of production capacity and domestic sales have been constant, against a background of decreasing consumption, thus explaining the clear increase in market shares. Moreover, the Union industry has clearly been able to increase the number of persons employed, again pointing to the contrary of a materially injured status. |
| (127) | Tretjič, združenje CISA je v zvezi z mikroekonomskimi kazalniki navedlo, da se prodajna cena Unije med obravnavanim obdobjem in obdobjem preiskave ni znižala, vmes pa je le nekoliko nihala. Družba Eviosys je opozorila tudi, da so prodajne cene industrije Unije na splošno ostale stabilne ter se ni strinjala s sklepom Komisije, da industrija Unije „ni mogla zvišati prodajnih cen, da bi pokrila višje stroške proizvodnje“ in da je bilo to domnevno posledica „cenovnega pritiska uvoza“. V zvezi s tem je trdila, da je zmanjševanje povpraševanja v obravnavanem obdobju skupaj z učinki pandemije COVID-19 industriji Unije preprečilo zvišanje prodajnih cen. | (127) | Third, in relation to the microeconomic indicators, CISA noted that the Union sales price did not decline between the period considered and the investigation period, and in the intermediate duration had only slightly fluctuated. Eviosys also pointed out that the Union industry’s sales prices remained overall stable and disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion that the Union industry
‘was not able to increase sales prices to cover the increased cost of production’
and that this was allegedly a result of
‘price pressure by imports’
. In this respect, Eviosys claimed that the decreasing demand during the period considered combined with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the Union industry from increasing its sales prices. |
| (128) | Četrtič, združenje CISA je opozorilo na nihanje dobičkonosnosti kljub dejstvu, da se je tržni delež industrije Unije povečal. V zvezi s tem je izrazilo pomisleke glede odločitve industrije Unije, da bo nadaljevala velike naložbe, kljub temu da se potrošnja Unije očitno ni povečevala, ter od Komisije zahtevalo, naj pojasni natančne pravne zahteve, v skladu s katerimi mora industrija Unije izvesti naložbe, in zagotovi njihovo ustreznost za zadevni izdelek. Navedlo je tudi, da višji stroški proizvodnje nikakor niso povezani z izvozom iz Kitajske, zato bi morala Komisija to obravnavati kot dejavnik, ki prekinja vzročno zvezo. | (128) | Fourth, CISA pointed to the fluctuation in the profitability figures in spite of the fact that the market share of the Union industry had increased. In this regard, CISA questioned the Union industry’s decision to continue significant investments, despite the fact that the Union consumption was clearly not increasing and requested the Commission to clarify the precise legal requirements under which the Union industry must make investments and to ensure their relevance in view of the product concerned. CISA also noted that the increased production costs have no link at all to exports from China, and as a result, this should be treated as a causality-breaking factor by the Commission. |
| (129) | Poleg tega je združenje CISA trdilo, da so zadevne tržne napovedi v nasprotju s stopnjami dobičkonosnosti, sporočenimi v začasni uredbi, na splošno zelo pozitivne. Sklicevalo se je na določene članke (20) in poudarilo, da so vsi trije vzorčeni proizvajalci (od katerih sta dva del iste skupine) v teh člankih izrecno omenjeni, pri čemer je navedeno, da je skupina Arcelor Mittal prejšnje leto povečala prodajo za 44 % in da je družba ThyssenKrupp decembra 2021 na medletni ravni povečala prihodke četrtletja za 39 %. | (129) | Furthermore, CISA claimed that in contrast to the profitability levels reported in the provisional Regulation, the relevant market outlooks are generally regarded as highly positive. CISA made reference to certain articles (20) and pointed out that the three sampled producers (two of which belong to the same group) are all explicitly referenced in these articles, indicating that Arcelor Mittal increased its sales by 44 % last year, and that ThyssenKrupp increased its quarter revenue by 39 % year-on-year in December 2021. |
| (130) | Združenje CISA je o dokončnem razkritju ponovilo svojo trditev, da bi Komisija morala oceniti domnevno visoko dobičkonosnost, ki sta jo skupina Arcelor Mittal in družba ThyssenKrupp dosegli po obdobju preiskave. Poleg tega sta združenje CISA in družba CANPACK trdila, da so se cene uvoza iz Kitajske in Brazilije po obdobju preiskave znatno zvišale ter da bi Komisija morala to upoštevati. | (130) | After final disclosure, CISA reiterated its claim that the Commission should assess the alleged high profitability achieved by Arcelor Mittal and ThyssenKrupp after the investigation period. Furthermore, CISA as well as CANPACK argued that the import prices from China and Brazil have increased significantly after the investigation period and that this should be taken into account by the Commission. |
| (131) | Komisija se s temi trditvami ni strinjala. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 183 začasne uredbe, so se gospodarski kazalniki na makro in mikro ravni v obravnavanem obdobju poslabšali. Čeprav je bil obseg prodaje industrije Unije v obravnavanem obdobju na splošno stabilen in se je tržni delež prodaje nekoliko povečal, se je finančni položaj industrije Unije poslabšal predvsem zaradi višjih stroškov proizvodnje, ki jih ni bilo mogoče pokriti z ustreznim zvišanjem prodajnih cen. Znatno oviranje dviga cen, ki ga je povzročil dampinški uvoz, je od leta 2019 povzročilo izgube, ki so se v obdobju preiskave še povečale. Čeprav se je število zaposlenih v obravnavanem obdobju povečalo, je bilo to povečanje zabeleženo predvsem v letih 2019 in 2020. V obdobju preiskave je industrija Unije odpuščala zaposlene. | (131) | The Commission disagreed with these claims. As stated in recital (183) of the provisional Regulation, economic indicators at both macro and micro level deteriorated during the period considered. Although the Union industry sales volume remained overall stable and it gained some market share in the period considered the financial situation of the Union industry deteriorated mainly due to the increased cost of production, which could not be covered by a corresponding increase of its sales prices. The significant price suppression exercised by the dumped imports led to losses as from 2019, which further increased in the investigation period. Although the number of employees increased during the period considered, this increase mainly occurred in 2019 and 2020. During the investigation period, the Union industry was laying off employees. |
| (132) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 187 začasne uredbe, so se dobičkonosnost, denarni tok in donosnost naložb v obravnavanem obdobju znatno poslabšali. To je negativno vplivalo na zmožnost industrije Unije, da sama financira poslovne dejavnosti, izvede potrebne naložbe in zbira kapital, kar je oviralo njeno rast in celo ogrozilo njeno preživetje. | (132) | As set out in recital (187) of the provisional Regulation, profitability, cash flow and return on investment deteriorated significantly during the period considered. This negatively affected the ability of the Union industry to self-finance operations, to make necessary investments and to raise capital, thus impeding its growth and even threatening its survival. |
| (133) | Kar zadeva naložbe za izpolnitev pravnih zahtev, je Komisija opozorila, da se te naložbe nanašajo na okoljske in socialne obveznosti ter niso povezane z morebitnim povečanjem proizvodne zmogljivosti. | (133) | As far as investments made to comply with legal requirements are concerned, the Commission pointed out that these investments relate to environmental and social obligations and are not linked to any production capacity increase. |
| (134) | Tržne napovedi, gibanje cen uvoza in domnevna dobičkonosnost proizvajalcev Unije, dosežena po koncu obdobja preiskave, na katere sta se sklicevala združenje CISA in družba CANPACK, niso pomembni za oceno škode, ki jo je industrija Unije utrpela v obdobju preiskave. | (134) | The market outlooks, price developments of imports as well as the alleged profitability of the Union producers achieved after the end of the investigation period referred to by CISA and CANPACK are irrelevant for the assessment of the injury suffered by the Union industry during the investigation period. |
| (135) | Združenje CISA je po dokončnem razkritju opozorilo na povečanje števila zaposlenih v povezavi z razlago Komisije, da so se izvedene naložbe nanašale na okoljske in socialne standarde, pri čemer je navedlo, da za take naložbe ne bi bilo treba povečati števila zaposlenih. Nadalje je od Komisije zahtevalo, naj natančno navede področje uporabe in zneske naložb, ki jih je izvedla industrija ter ki so bile potrebne za izpolnjevanje okoljskih in socialnih obveznosti. | (135) | Following final disclosure, CISA made a link between the increase in the number of employees and Commission’s explanation that the investments made related to environmental and social standards, arguing that such investments would not require an increase in employees. It further requested the Commission to elaborate on the precise scope and amounts of the investment undertaken by the industry that were needed to comply with environmental and social obligations. |
| (136) | Komisija se ni strinjala, da je povečanje števila zaposlenih povezano z izvedenimi naložbami. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 131 zgoraj, se je zaposlenost dejansko povečala predvsem v letih 2019 in 2020, med letom 2020 in obdobjem preiskave pa se je zmanjšala za 8,9 %. Hkrati so se naložbe med obdobjem preiskave še naprej večale. Komisija je tudi opozorila, da ne more razkriti natančnega področja uporabe in zneskov naložb, ki so jih izvedle vzorčene družbe, saj so to zaupne informacije. Vendar kot je že navedeno v uvodni izjavi 133 zgoraj, te naložbe niso bile povezane z morebitnim povečanjem proizvodne zmogljivosti, ampak s prilagajanjem in/ali nadomeščanjem že obstoječih zmogljivosti | (136) | The Commission did not make a link between the increase in employment and the investments made. Indeed, as pointed out in recital (131) above, employment increased mainly in 2019 and 2020, while it decreased by 8,9 % between 2020 and the investigation period. At the same time investments continued to increase during the investigation period. The Commission also pointed out that it was unable to disclose the precise scope and amount of investments made by the sampled companies since this is confidential information. However, as already indicated in recital (133) above, those investments were not linked to any production capacity increase but rather to adapting and/or replacing already existing capacities. |
| (137) | Zato je Komisija sklenila, da je industrija Unije utrpela znatno škodo v smislu člena 3(5) osnovne uredbe. Komisija je tako zavrnila trditve zainteresiranih strani, da znatne škode ni bilo, in potrdila uvodne izjave 183 do 188 začasne uredbe. | (137) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims of interested parties concerning the absence of material injury and confirmed recitals (183) to (188) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (138) | Trditve v zvezi z drugimi dejavniki, ki povzročajo škodo, so obravnavane v oddelku 5 v nadaljevanju. | (138) | The claims on other factors causing injury are addressed in Section 5 below. |
| 5. VZROČNA ZVEZA | 5. CAUSATION |
| 5.1 Učinki dampinškega uvoza | 5.1. Effects of the dumped imports |
| 5.1.1 Obseg in tržni delež dampinškega uvoza iz zadevnih držav | 5.1.1. Volume and market share of the dumped imports from the countries concerned |
| (139) | Po začasnem razkritju je združenje CISA trdilo, da ravni tržnih deležev zadevnih držav, ki nikoli niso bile višje od 18 % in so se nato v obdobju preiskave znižale, ni mogoče šteti za previsoke. | (139) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA argued that the levels of market shares held by the countries concerned, which never exceeded 18 %, and subsequently decreased in the investigation period, cannot be considered as excessively high. |
| (140) | Komisija se s to trditvijo ni strinjala. Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 192 začasne uredbe, se je tržni delež uvoza iz zadevnih držav povečal s 13,1 % leta 2018 na 15,4 % v obdobju preiskave. Komisija je menila, da je tak tržni delež znaten in da lahko glede na ugotovljene ravni cen vpliva na industrijo Unije v smislu člena 3(2) osnovne uredbe. Zato je trditev zavrnila in potrdila uvodne izjave 190 do 192 začasne uredbe. | (140) | The Commission disagreed with this claim. As explained in recital (192) of the provisional Regulation, the market share of the imports from the countries concerned increased from 13,1 % in 2018 to 15,4 % in the investigation period. The Commission considered such a market share to be significant and, in light with the price levels established, able to have an impact on the Union industry within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim and confirmed recitals (190) to (192) of the provisional Regulation. |
| 5.1.2 Cena dampinškega uvoza iz zadevnih držav in učinki na cene | 5.1.2. Price of the dumped imports from the countries concerned and price effects |
| (141) | Po začasnem razkritju je družba Eviosys trdila, da ni nobenih dokazov o morebitnem pritisku uvoza iz zadevnih držav na cene in da ni videti, da bi cene proizvajalcev Unije sledile kitajskim ali brazilskim cenam, kar kaže na to, da zadnjenavedene niso vplivale nanje. | (141) | Following provisional disclosure, Eviosys claimed that there is no evidence of any price pressure by the imports from the countries concerned and that the prices of the Union producers do not seem to have followed Chinese or Brazilian prices, which suggests that they were unaffected by the latter. |
| (142) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 193 začasne uredbe, so bile povprečne uvozne cene za uvoz iz zadevnih držav znatno nižje od povprečnih prodajnih cen industrije Unije na trgu Unije in ta uvoz je nelojalno nižal prodajne cene industrije Unije, in sicer na osnovi tehtanega povprečja za 11,2 %. Znaten obseg uvoza po nizkih cenah je znižal cene industrije Unije, ki niso mogle pokriti proizvodnih stroškov, kar je povzročilo izgube. | (142) | As explained in recital (193) of the provisional Regulation, the average import price of the imports from the countries concerned were significantly below the average sales prices of the Union industry in the Union market and these imports undercut the Union industry’s prices on weighted average by 11,2 %. The significant import volumes at low prices depressed the Union industry’s prices, which could not cover the costs of production, thereby incurring losses. |
| (143) | Poleg tega je ne glede na to, ali so cene industrije Unije sledile kitajskim in brazilskim cenam ali ne, očitno, da je uvoz iz zadevnih držav po nizkih cenah oviral dvig cen industrije Unije in tako negativno vplival na cene. Obstoj oviranja dviga cen v zvezi z analizo učinkov na cene v skladu s členom 3(3) osnovne uredbe zadostuje za oblikovanje sklepa, da so cene dampinškega uvoza znatno negativno vplivale na cene Unije. Zato je bila trditev zavrnjena, uvodna izjava 193 začasne uredbe pa potrjena. | (143) | Moreover, irrespective of whether the prices of the Union industry have followed or not the Chinese and Brazilian prices, it is clear that the imports from the countries concerned at low prices suppressed the Union industry prices and thus had a negative price effect. The existence of price suppression is sufficient in the context of the price effects analysis under Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation to conclude that there was a significant negative impact on the Union prices by the dumped import prices. Consequently, the claim was rejected and recital (193) of the provisional Regulation confirmed. |
| 5.1.3 Vzročna zveza med dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav in znatno škodo, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije | 5.1.3. Causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the material injury of the Union industry |
| (144) | Po začasnem razkritju je družba Eviosys ponovila trditev, da uvoz iz zadevnih držav ni mogel povzročiti nobene škode, in ponovno navedla, da je konkurenca med izdelki, ki jih prodaja industrija Unije, in uvozom iz zadevnih držav zaradi dejavnikov, kot so nižja raven kakovosti in neprimernost za nekatere uporabe, daljši dobavni roki in višji stroški prevoza ter omejena podpora strankam, zelo majhna, kar tudi pojasnjuje različne cene in dejstvo, da so cene uvoza na splošno nižje od prodajnih cen industrije Unije. | (144) | Following provisional disclosure, Eviosys repeated its claim that any injury could not have been caused by the imports from the countries concerned and reiterated that there is very little competitive relationship between the products sold by the Union industry and the imports from the countries concerned because of factors such as lower quality level and non-suitability for certain uses, longer lead times and higher transport costs as well as limited customer support, which also explains the different prices and the fact that they are generally lower than the Union industry’s sales prices. |
| (145) | Vendar družba Eviosys ni predložila novih dokazov, s katerimi bi utemeljila svojo trditev. Zato se uvodne izjave 194 do 197 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (145) | However, Eviosys failed to provide new evidence to substantiate its claims. Therefore, recitals (194) to (197) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 5.2 Učinki drugih dejavnikov | 5.2. Effects of other factors |
| 5.2.1 Uvoz iz tretjih držav | 5.2.1. Imports from third countries |
| (146) | Po začasnem razkritju je brazilska vlada ugotovila, da neškodljiva cena, izračunana v okviru predhodne ugotovitve, znaša [850–990] EUR/tono. Glede na to, da je ta vrednost višja od uvozne cene uvoza nepreiskanega porekla (822 EUR/tono) ter da je obseg uvoza nepreiskanega porekla večji od obsega uvoza iz Brazilije in Kitajske, bi morala Komisija posledice v oceni uvoza nepreiskanega porekla priznati kot možen drug dejavnik škode. Zato so škodljivi učinki tega uvoza ločeni in se razlikujejo od škodljivih učinkov, ki izhajajo iz domnevnega dampinškega uvoza. | (146) | Following provisional disclosure, the GOB observed that the non-injurious price calculated in the preliminary determination is EUR/tonne [850-990]. Considering that this value is higher than the import price of imports from non-investigated origins (EUR/tonne 822) and that the volume of imports from non-investigated origins is higher the one originating from Brazil and China, the Commission should recognize the implications in the assessment of the imports from non-investigated origins as a possible other injury factor. Thus, their injurious effects shall be separated and distinguished from the ones arising from the alleged dumped imports. |
| (147) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 199 začasne uredbe, sta se obseg uvoza iz drugih tretjih držav in njegov tržni delež v obravnavanem obdobju zmanjšala za 23 % oziroma 21 %, povprečna uvozna cena tega uvoza pa je ostala blizu povprečni prodajni ceni industrije Unije in je bila znatno nad povprečno uvozno ceno uvoza iz zadevnih držav. V zvezi s tem je bilo jasno, da je morebitno znatno škodo, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije, povzročil uvoz zadevnega izdelka, zaradi katerega so ravni cen ostale nizke. Čeprav ni mogoče izključiti, da bi drugi viri uvoza po uvedbi dajatev na uvoz zadevnega izdelka povzročili škodo industriji Unije, je jasno, da niso bili vzrok, ki bi lahko zmanjšal vzročno zvezo med dampinškim uvozom in znatno škodo, ugotovljeno v obdobju preiskave. | (147) | As stated in recital (199) of the provisional Regulation, the volume of imports from other third countries and their market share decreased during the period considered by 23 % and 21 %, respectively, and their average import price remained close to the average sales price of the Union industry, and were significantly higher than the average import price of imports from the countries concerned. In that context, it was clear that any material injury suffered by the Union industry was being caused by imports from the product concerned, which were keeping price levels down. Although it cannot be excluded that the other import sources would, once duties on the imports of the product concerned have been imposed, be a cause of injury to the Union industry, they were clearly not a cause capable of attenuating the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury observed during the investigation period. |
| (148) | Poleg tega je bila povprečna neškodljiva cena izračunana na podlagi specifičnega nabora izdelkov, ki temelji na dejanskem izvozu vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov, pri čemer se je primerjala s ceno z vsemi stroški za uvoz izdelkov teh proizvajalcev izvoznikov. Kot taka ni bila neposredno primerljiva s povprečnimi uvoznimi cenami CIF. | (148) | Furthermore, with respect to the average non-injurious price, this was calculated on the basis of a specific product mix based on the actual exports of the sampled exporting producers and compared with the landed price of the imports from those exporting producers. As such, it was not directly comparable to the average CIF import prices. |
| (149) | Zato je bila trditev zavrnjena, uvodne izjave 198 do 201 začasne uredbe pa potrjene. | (149) | Therefore, the claim was rejected and recitals (198) to (201) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 5.2.2 Pandemija COVID-19 | 5.2.2. The COVID-19 pandemic |
| (150) | Po začasnem razkritju so združenje CISA ter družbi Eviosys in CANPACK trdili, da so pandemija COVID-19 in njene gospodarske posledice prekinile vzročno zvezo med uvozom in stanjem industrije Unije. Združenje CISA je trdilo, da je pandemija COVID-19 predvsem kriza na strani povpraševanja in ne kriza povečanega uvoza, ki škodi industriji, glavni rezultat te krize pa je prekinitev proizvodnje in zaradi tega recesija na trgu Unije. | (150) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA, Eviosys and CANPACK claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences break the causal link between imports and the state of the Union industry. CISA argued that the COVID-19 pandemic is mostly a demand side-crisis and not one of increased imports injuring an industry, with the main result being the suspension of production and consequently a recession on the Union market. |
| (151) | Brazilska vlada se je sklicevala na uvodne izjave 203 do 205 začasne uredbe in trdila, da je Komisija domnevno zmanjšala učinke pandemije COVID-19 na industrijo Unije z utemeljitvijo, da „se je poslabšanje položaja industrije Unije začelo že pred pandemijo in se je nadaljevalo po obnovitvi proizvodnje industrije Unije v obdobju preiskave“. Brazilska vlada meni, da ta argument ni zadosten razlog za zmanjšanje učinkov pandemije COVID-19, saj bi ta pandemija lahko negativno vplivala na industrijo Unije hkrati z domnevnim dampinškim uvozom. | (151) | The GOB referred to recitals (203) to (205) of the provisional Regulation and argued that the Commission seemed to minimize the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Union industry on the grounds that
‘the deterioration of the situation of the Union industry had already started before the pandemic and continued after the production of the Union industry resumed in the IP’
. The GOB is of the opinion that this argument is not a sufficient reason for mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, since the afore-mentioned pandemic may have had negative effects of the Union industry simultaneously with the alleged dumped imports. |
| (152) | Komisija se je v zvezi s tem sklicevala na uvodno izjavo 203 začasne uredbe, v kateri je priznala, da je pandemija COVID-19 negativno vplivala na industrijo Unije, zlasti leta 2020, ko so se morali proizvodni obrati industrije Unije začasno zapreti, in da je mogoče, da je pandemija COVID-19 morda prispevala k škodi, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije. Vendar je vztrajala pri dejstvu, da se je poslabšanje finančnega položaja industrije Unije začelo že pred pandemijo in nadaljevalo v obdobju okrevanja po pandemiji COVID-19, tudi v obdobju preiskave. Zato se negativni vpliv pandemije COVID-19 ne more šteti za glavni vzrok škode, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije, ter vzrok, ki bi zmanjšal vzročno zvezo med to škodo in dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav. Zato je Komisija zavrnila te trditve. | (152) | In this respect, the Commission referred to recital (203) of the provisional Regulation, where it has acknowledged that the COVID-19 pandemic had a negative impact on the Union industry, especially in 2020 when production sites of the Union industry had to close temporarily and that it is possible that the COVID-19 pandemic might have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry. However, the Commission insisted on the fact that the deterioration of the financial situation of the Union industry had already started before the pandemic and continued during the post-COVID-19 recovery period, including in the investigation period. Therefore, the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be considered as the main cause of the injury suffered by the Union industry to the extent that it would have attenuated the causal link between such injury and the dumped imports from the countries concerned. Consequently, the Commission rejected these claims. |
| 5.2.3 Razvoj stroškov proizvodnje | 5.2.3. The evolution of the cost of production |
| (153) | Ker po začasnem razkritju ni bilo pripomb glede razvoja stroškov proizvodnje, se uvodne izjave 206 do 209 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (153) | In the absence of comments regarding the evolution of the cost of production following provisional disclosure, recitals (206) to (209) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 5.2.4 Izvoz industrije Unije | 5.2.4. Export performance of the Union industry |
| (154) | Po začasnem razkritju je združenje CISA opozorilo, da je obseg izvoza industrije Unije velik in je v obdobju preiskave znašal 22 %. Sklicevalo se je tudi na preglednico 14 začasne uredbe, v kateri je prikazano, da se je obseg izvoza industrije Unije zmanjšal za 7 odstotnih točk, cene izvoza pa so se znižale za 6 odstotnih točk. Trdilo je, da je negativen razvoj izvoza močno vplival na splošno gospodarsko uspešnost industrije Unije. | (154) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA pointed out that the exports of the Union industry were significant, amounting to 22 % in the investigation period. It further referred to Table 14 of the provisional Regulation showing that the export volume of the Union industry dropped by 7 percentage points and that export prices dropped by 6 percentage points. CISA claimed that the negative development relating to export sales had significant impact on the overall Union industry’s economic performance. |
| (155) | Družba CANPACK se ni strinjala s sklepom Komisije, da izvoz industrije Unije ni zadostoval za zmanjšanje vzročne zveze, saj je v preglednici 14 iz začasne uredbe jasno prikazano, da je bila prodajna cena proizvajalcev Unije, zaračunana državam zunaj Unije, na podobni ravni kot cene izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Kitajske. Menila je, da argument proizvajalcev Unije, da so zunaj Unije prodajali zato, ker industrija Unije izdelkov ne more prodati na trgu Unije, čeprav je bilo povpraševanje uporabnikov Unije po izdelkih iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla veliko, ni bil prepričljiv. | (155) | CANPACK disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion that export performance of the Union industry was not enough to attenuate the casual link as Table 14 in the provisional Regulation shows clearly that the sales price of Union producers to countries outside the Union was at a similar level as the prices of the ECCS originating in China. CANPACK considered that the argument of the Union producers that the reason for selling outside the Union was that the Union industry is not able to sell it within the Union market, while there was high demand of Union users for ECCS, was not convincing. |
| (156) | Brazilska vlada je ocenila, da izvoza ni mogoče šteti za manjši dejavnik, saj je obseg izvoza industrije Unije večji od domnevnega dampinškega uvoza. | (156) | The GOB estimated that given that the volume of exports of the Union industry is higher than the alleged dumped imports, the export performance could not be considered as a minor factor. |
| (157) | Kar zadeva izvoz industrije Unije, se je obseg izvoza v letih 2019 in 2020 najprej povečal in se nato v obdobju preiskave zmanjšal, povprečne izvozne cene pa so se zniževale od leta 2020. Ta razvoj se je ujemal z majhnim povečanjem prodaje industrije Unije med letom 2020 in obdobjem preiskave. Zato se ne zdi, da ima majhno zmanjšanje izvoza industrije Unije velik vpliv na splošno gospodarsko uspešnost industrije Unije, ki se je bolj poslabšala v istem obdobju. Poleg tega negativne številke dobičkonosnosti v preglednici 12 začasne uredbe temeljijo le na prodaji EU in torej niso rezultat kakršnih koli morebitnih izgub pri izvozu. Zato je Komisija potrdila sklep iz uvodne izjave 213 začasne uredbe, da čeprav je zmanjšanje izvoza morda prispevalo k škodi, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije, glede na velik delež prodaje Unije v primerjavi z izvozom to ni imelo tolikšnega vpliva, da bi se zmanjšala vzročna zveza med dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav in škodo, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije. Komisija je zato zavrnila trditve zainteresiranih strani v zvezi s tem. | (157) | Regarding the export performance of the Union industry, the export volume first increased in 2019 and 2020 before it decreased in the investigation period, while the average export prices decreased as from 2020. This evolution corresponded to a slight increase of the Union sales of the Union industry between 2020 and the investigation period. The slight decrease of the export performance of the Union industry therefore does not appear to have a strong impact on the overall economic performance of the Union industry, which deteriorated to a higher extent during the same period of time. Moreover, the negative profitability figures in Table 12 of the provisional Regulation are based only on EU sales, and are thus not the result of any potential export losses. Therefore, the Commission confirmed its conclusion in recital (213) of the provisional Regulation that although the decline in export performance could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry, it is not enough to attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry considering the high share of Union sales compared to export sales. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims of interested parties in this respect. |
| 5.2.5 Učinek letnih pogodb | 5.2.5. Effect of yearly contracts |
| (158) | Po začasnem razkritju se družba CANPACK ni strinjala z argumentom, da je ugotovljeni učinek dolgoročnih (letnih) pogodb med dobavitelji Unije in njihovimi strankami Unije na škodo industrije Unije omejen in ne more zmanjšati vzročne zveze. Družba CANPACK je trdila, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 214 začasne uredbe, da prodaja industrije Unije temelji na letnih pogodbah, v katerih so določene količine in cene za prihodnje leto ter ki proizvajalcem Unije omogočajo zelo malo manevrskega prostora (če sploh) za zvišanje prodajnih cen zaradi zvišanja cen surovin med izvajanjem letne pogodbe. Proizvajalci Unije oblikujejo svoje ponudbe na podlagi ocenjenih cen surovin in stroškov proizvodnje za naslednje leto ob upoštevanju tveganja sprememb (pogajanja o cenah za naslednje leto v praksi potekajo v četrtem četrtletju predhodnega leta). | (158) | Following provisional disclosure, CANPACK disagreed with the argument that effect of long-term (yearly) contracts between the Union suppliers and their Union customers on the injury of Union industry found is limited and cannot attenuate the casual link. According to CANPACK, as indicated in recital (214) of the provisional Regulation, sales of the Union industry are based on yearly contracts that fix the quantities and prices for the following year, and give the Union producers minimal (if any) margin to increase sales prices in the context of increasing raw materials prices during the application of the yearly contract. Union producers base their offers on the estimated prices of raw materials and production costs for the next year, considering the risk of changes (in practice negotiations of the prices for the next year take place in Q4 of the previous year). |
| (159) | V zvezi s tem se je Komisija sklicevala na uvodno izjavo 208 začasne uredbe, v kateri je navedeno, da industrija Unije ni mogla zvišati svojih prodajnih cen v celotnem obravnavanem obdobju, ki zajema več kot tri leta. To stanje je bilo mogoče opazovati v dolgem časovnem obdobju, zato ga ni bilo mogoče pojasniti le z višjimi stroški surovin in učinkom letnih pogodb v zvezi s fiksnimi cenami. | (159) | In this respect, the Commission referred to recital (208) of the provisional Regulation, where it was noted that the Union industry was unable to increase its sales prices during the entire period considered, which covers more than 3 years. Since this pattern was observed during a long period of time, it could not be explained only by the increase of raw materials cost and the effect of the yearly contracts in terms of fixed prices. |
| (160) | Zato je Komisija trditev zavrnila in potrdila uvodni izjavi 214 in 215 začasne uredbe. | (160) | Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim and confirmed recitals (214) and (215) of the provisional Regulation. |
| 5.2.6 Potrošnja | 5.2.6. Consumption |
| (161) | Po začasnem razkritju sta združenje CISA in družba Eviosys opozorila na zmanjšanje potrošnje kot na pomemben dejavnik pri proučevanju vzročne zveze. Združenje CISA je po dokončnem razkritju ponovilo trditev, da bi zmanjšanje potrošnje lahko prekinilo vzročno zvezo med dampinškim uvozom in ugotovljeno škodo. Vendar trditev nista utemeljila, zato so bile zavrnjene. | (161) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA and Eviosys pointed to the consumption decrease as a relevant factor when considering causality. After final disclosure, CISA reiterated its claim arguing that the decrease in consumption could break the causal link found between the dumped imports and the injury found. However, they did not substantiate their claims. Therefore, these claims were rejected. |
| (162) | Brazilska vlada se ni strinjala s sklepom Komisije iz uvodne izjave 218 začasne uredbe, da 3-odstotnega zmanjšanja povpraševanja na trgu ni mogoče šteti za vzrok škode, ki zmanjšuje vzročno zvezo med dampinškim uvozom in ugotovljeno škodo. Brazilska vlada je mnenja, da lahko tudi tržno zmanjšanje vpliva na obseg proizvodnje domače industrije in fiksne stroške ter bi ga bilo treba analizirati skupaj z drugimi dejavniki z enakimi učinki. | (162) | The GOB disagreed with the conclusion of the Commission in recital (218) of the provisional Regulation that the contraction of the market demand by 3 % could not be considered as a cause of injury attenuating the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury found. According to the GOB, market decrease also has the ability to affect the domestic industry production volume and fixed costs and it should be analysed jointly with other factors resulting in the same effects. |
| (163) | V zvezi s tem je Komisija v uvodni izjavi 217 začasne uredbe sklenila, da so podatki o prodaji Unije kljub 3-odstotnemu zmanjšanju trga ostali nespremenjeni, kar je pomenilo, da škode, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije, ni povzročila izguba obsega zaradi upada povpraševanja, ampak oviranje dviga cen zaradi uvoza iz zadevnih držav. Zato je trditev zavrnila in potrdila uvodne izjave 216 do 218 začasne uredbe. | (163) | In this respect, the Commission concluded in recital (217) of the provisional Regulation that despite the contraction of the market by 3 %, Union sales figures remained constant, which indicated that the injury suffered by the Union industry was not caused by a loss of volumes due to falling demand, but rather by the price suppression exerted by the imports from the countries concerned. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim and confirmed recitals (216) to (218) of the provisional Regulation. |
| 5.3 Sklep o vzročni zvezi | 5.3. Conclusion on causation |
| (164) | Obseg uvoza iz zadevnih držav in njegov tržni delež sta se v obravnavanem obdobju povečala, cene tega uvoza pa znižale. To je sovpadalo s poslabšanjem gospodarskega položaja industrije Unije. Komisija je zato potrdila, da je med tem uvozom in škodo, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije, očitna vzročne zveza. | (164) | The volume of imports from the countries concerned and their market share increased during the period considered, while their prices decreased. This coincided in time with the deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission confirmed that there is a clear causal link between these imports and the injury of the Union industry. |
| (165) | Brazilska vlada je po začasnem razkritju navedla, da Komisija učinkov izvoza industrije Unije, zmanjšanja potrošnje Unije in učinkov pandemije COVID-19 ni ustrezno ločila od učinkov dampinškega uvoza ter ni razlikovala med njimi, pri čemer se je sklicevala na odločbo pritožbenega organa STO v zadevi ZDA – vroče valjano jeklo (točka 226). | (165) | Following provisional disclosure, the GOB argued that the Commission did not properly separate and distinguish the effects of the export performance of the Union industry, the Union consumption decrease and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic from the effects stemming from the dumped imports and made reference to the Appellate Body ruling in US – Hot-Rolled Steel (para. 226). |
| (166) | Brazilska vlada je od Komisije zahtevala, naj ponovno oceni te tri dejavnike, po možnosti kumulativno, ob upoštevanju njihovih posledic za proizvodnjo industrije Unije in fiksne stroške ter te učinke loči in razlikuje od učinkov, povezanih z domnevnim dampinškim uvozom. | (166) | The GOB requested the Commission to reassess these three factors, preferably on a cumulative basis, with regard to their consequences to the Union industry output and fixed costs and to separate and distinguish those effects from the ones arising from the alleged dumped imports. |
| (167) | Družba Eviosys je trdila, da industrija Unije v obravnavanem obdobju ni mogla zvišati svojih prodajnih cen, čeprav so bili njeni stroški proizvodnje vse višji, zaradi zmanjševanja povpraševanja in pandemije COVID-19 . Menila je, da bi morala Komisija skrbneje oceniti učinek drugih dejavnikov na gospodarski položaj industrije Unije. | (167) | Eviosys claimed that the Union industry could not increase its sales prices during the period considered, although it faced increasing production cost, because of the decreasing demand and the COVID-19 pandemic. Eviosys considered that the Commission should assess more carefully the impact of other factors on the Union industry’s economic situation. |
| (168) | Tudi družba CANPACK je menila, da je Komisija podcenjevala učinek drugih dejavnikov. Zlasti se ni strinjala, da pandemija COVID-19 in pomanjkanje surovin na trgu Unije nista imela tolikšnega vpliva, da bi zmanjšala vzročno zvezo med dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav in znatno škodo, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije. | (168) | CANPACK also considered that the Commission has underestimated the impact of other factors. In particular, they disagreed that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of raw materials on the Union market was not sufficient to attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| (169) | Po dokončnem razkritju je združenje CISA navedlo tudi, da je Komisija nezadostno obravnavala učinke pandemije COVID-19, čeprav je celotno obdobje preiskave potekalo v času največjega vpliva te pandemije na gospodarstvo. Poleg tega je trdilo, da naložbe vzorčenih proizvajalcev Unije same pojasnjujejo zmanjšanje dobičkonosnosti in nastali položaj domače industrije. | (169) | After final disclosure, CISA also argued that the Commission did not sufficiently address the effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic while the entire investigation period was set during the most economically significant impact of this pandemic. Furthermore, CISA claimed that the investments made by the sampled Union producers singlehandedly explained the decreased profitability and the resulting state of the domestic industry. |
| (170) | V zvezi s tem je Komisija potrdila, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 220 začasne uredbe, da je opredelila učinke vseh znanih dejavnikov na položaj industrije Unije in jih ločila od škodljivih učinkov dampinškega uvoza. | (170) | In this respect, the Commission confirmed, as stated in recital (220) of the provisional Regulation, that it has distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. |
| (171) | Kar zadeva naložbe, je Komisija ugotovila, da je družba z najvišjimi zneski naložb med vzorčenimi družbami najuspešnejša. Zato dobičkonosnost industrije Unije ni bila neposredno povezana z naložbami, izvedenimi v obdobju preiskave. Naložbe so dejansko bile potrebne in v skladu z zakonodajo, pri čemer bi moralo biti financiranje teh naložb skupaj z vsemi stroški mogoče ob razumnem dobičku v skladu s členom 7(2c) osnovne uredbe, ob odsotnosti dampinškega uvoza. Zato je bila ta zahteva zavrnjena. | (171) | As far as investments are concerned, the Commission observed that the company that had the highest amounts of investments had the best performance among the sampled companies. Therefore, there was no direct link between the profitability of the Union industry and the investments made during the investigation period. Rather, investments were necessary and legally required and, together with the full costs, should have been possible to be financed by reasonable profits in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, in the absence of the dumped imports. Consequently, this claim was rejected. |
| (172) | Komisija je ob upoštevanju pripomb zainteresiranih strani ocenila vpliv drugih dejavnikov in sklenila, da ti dejavniki niso zmanjšali vzročne zveze. Dejavniki, kot so pandemija COVD-19 ali letne prodajne pogodbe s fiksnimi cenami za vse leto, so skupaj z zmanjševanjem povpraševanja po izdelkih iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v obravnavanem obdobju morda dejansko vplivali na uspešnost industrije Unije. Vendar ti dejavniki niso pojasnili oviranja dviga cen, ki ga je industrija Unije utrpela v celotnem obravnavanem obdobju in zlasti v obdobju preiskave. | (172) | The Commission assessed the impact of other factors taking into account the comments of interested parties and concluded that those factors did not attenuate the causal link. Indeed, factors such as the COVD-19 pandemic or the yearly sales contracts with fixed prices for the entire year together with the decreasing demand of ECCS during the period considered, might have had an impact on the performance of the Union industry. However, these factors did not explain the price suppression suffered by the Union industry during the entire period considered and, in particular, during the investigation period. |
| (173) | Gospodarski položaj industrije Unije se je začel slabšati pred pandemijo COVID-19 in motnjami v oskrbi s surovinami. Poleg tega bi morala biti industrija Unije v običajnih konkurenčnih razmerah po zvišanju stroškov surovin sposobna zvišati svoje prodajne cene, zato učinek letnih pogodb ni mogel pojasniti dejstva, da industrija Unije v celotnem obravnavanem obdobju ni mogla zvišati prodajnih cen, da bi ostala dobičkonosna. | (173) | The deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry started before the COVID-19 pandemic and the disruption of the raw material supply. Furthermore, in a normal competitive environment, the Union industry should be able to increase its sales prices following the increase of input materials cost; therefore, the effect of the yearly contracts could not explain the fact that the Union industry was unable to increase its sales prices for the entire period considered in order to remain profitable. |
| (174) | Komisija je torej potrdila sklep iz uvodnih izjav 219 do 221 začasne uredbe. | (174) | Therefore, the Commission confirmed the conclusion in recitals (219) to (221) of the provisional Regulation. |
| 6. STOPNJA UKREPOV | 6. LEVEL OF MEASURES |
| 6.1 Izračun stopnje nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen | 6.1. Underselling margin calculation |
| (175) | Po začasnem razkritju je združenje CISA navedlo, da se skladno z njegovim razumevanjem pri prilagoditvi, povezani s prihodnjimi okoljskimi stroški, niso upoštevala nobena obstoječa in prihodnja nadomestila industriji Unije za izravnavo zvišanj cen električne energije. V zvezi s tem je Komisija potrdila, da se ta nadomestila niso upoštevala pri izračunu prihodnjih okoljskih stroškov. | (175) | Following provisional disclosure, CISA commented that, according to its understanding, the adjustment linked to future environmental costs did not take into account any existing and future compensations to the Union industry to offset increases in electricity prices. In this respect, the Commission confirmed that such compensations have not been taken into account in the calculation of the future environmental costs. |
| (176) | Po začasnem razkritju je družba CSN navedla, da so dodatni prihodnji stroški v višini [10–20] EUR/tono iz uvodne izjave 228 začasne uredbe, ki so bili dodani neškodljivi ceni, samovoljni in špekulativni ter izkrivljajo primerljivost cen med prodajo Unije in prodajo Brazilije. Poudarila je, da se je Brazilija v okviru sporazuma med EU in Mercosurjem odločno zavezala trajnostnemu razvoju, zlasti v zvezi z večstranskimi standardi in sporazumi na področju dela, večstranskimi okoljskimi sporazumi ter trgovino in podnebnimi spremembami. Družba CSN je navedla, da Komisija proizvajalcem Unije zagotavlja zaščito, ki je večja, kot je potrebno za odpravo škodljivega dampinga, in je od Komisije zahtevala, naj ne doda dodatnih prihodnjih stroškov v zvezi z Brazilijo. | (176) | Following provisional disclosure, CSN submitted that the additional future cost of EUR/tonne [10-20] mentioned in recital (228) of the provisional Regulation, which is added to the non-injurious price, was arbitrary, speculative and distorted the price comparability between Union and Brazilian sales. CSN underlined that within the EU-Mercosur Agreement, Brazil made strong commitments regarding sustainable development, in particular regarding multilateral labour standards and agreements, multilateral environmental agreements, and trade and climate change. According to CSN, the Commission is offering to Union producers a protection in excess of what is necessary to remove injurious dumping and requested the Commission not to add an additional future cost with respect to Brazil. |
| (177) | Brazilska vlada je pred dokončnim razkritjem in po njem navedla, da so bili stroški, povezani z izpolnjevanjem drugih mednarodnih sporazumov (kot so Pariški sporazum in sporazumi, podpisani pod okriljem Mednarodne organizacije dela), vključeni v neškodljivo ceno, čeprav nikakor ne izražajo učinkov dampinškega uvoza. Poleg tega je navedla, da 6-odstotna stopnja dobička, uporabljena v izračunu neškodljive cene, v obdobju analize škode nikoli ni bila dosežena, zato bo Komisija z uporabo te stopnje dobička v izračunu neškodljive cene več kot izravnala škodljive učinke domnevnega dampinškega uvoza, s čimer odstopa od namena iz odstavka 2 člena VI GATT 1994. Zato je brazilska vlada od Komisije zahtevala, naj dodatne stroške odstrani iz neškodljive cene. | (177) | The GOB argued before and after final disclosure that costs associated with compliance with other international agreements (such as the Paris Agreement and the ones signed under the auspices of the International Labour Organization) were included in the non-injurious price, although they do not reflect the effects of the dumped imports in any way. In addition, the GOB argued that the profit margin used for constructing the non-injurious price of 6 % was never achieved during the period of injury analysis, thus, by using a profit margin of 6 % for constructing the non-injurious price the Commission will more than offset the injurious effects of the alleged dumping imports, deviating from the purpose set out in paragraph 2 of Article VI of GATT 1994. Therefore, the GOB requested the Commission to remove the additional costs from the non-injurious price. |
| (178) | V zvezi s tem je Komisija poudarila, da so se prihodnji stroški ne glede na razmere ter izvajanje okoljskih in delovnih standardov v tretji državi in/ali dvostranske in/ali večstranske sporazume, katerih pogodbenice so zadevne države, upoštevali v skladu s členom 7(2d) osnovne uredbe. Komisija je uporabila osnovno uredbo, ki je osredotočena izključno na stroške proizvodnje industrije Unije, med drugim tudi na morebitne prihodnje stroške zaradi sporazumov in konvencij, navedenih v zadevni določbi. V skladu s to določbo se ne zahteva, da ti prihodnji stroški izražajo učinke dampinškega uvoza. Zahteva, da se oceni uspešnost Brazilije pri izvajanju podobnih mednarodnih sporazumov ali sporazuma med EU in Mercosurjem (ki še ni začel veljati), v zvezi s tem ni pomembna. Komisija je torej zavrnila trditev brazilske vlade. | (178) | In this respect, the Commission pointed out that future costs were taken into account under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, irrespective of the situation and implementation of environmental and labour standards in a third country, and/or of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to which the respective countries are parties. The Commission applied the basic Regulation, which focuses exclusively on the cost of production of the Union industry, including, inter alia, possible future costs resulting from Agreements and Conventions referred to in that provision. This provision does not require that these future costs reflect the effects of the dumped imports. The request to assess the implementation by Brazil of similar international agreements or the EU-Mercosur Agreement (which is yet to enter into force), is irrelevant in this context. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim of the GOB. |
| (179) | Komisija je zato potrdila uvodne izjave 228 do 232 začasne uredbe. | (179) | Therefore, the Commission confirmed recitals (228) to (232) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (180) | Z namenom določitve stopnje nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen je Komisija, da bi obravnavala pripombe družbe Baosteel glede morebitne nesimetričnosti, za navedeno družbo uporabila konstruirano izvozno ceno, določeno v skladu s členom 2(9) osnovne uredbe, ki se smiselno uporablja, in jo primerjala s ciljno ceno industrije Unije, ki ni vključevala PSA-stroškov povezanih prodajnih subjektov skupine Arcelor Mittal. Tako določena ciljna cena se je uporabila v izračunih nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen za vse proizvajalce izvoznike. Posledično se niso upoštevali nobeni stroški povezanih prodajnih subjektov proizvajalcev Unije in tako je bila nesimetričnost odpravljena. Pristop neupoštevanja stroškov povezanih prodajnih subjektov proizvajalcev Unije je nedavno potrdilo Splošno sodišče (21). | (180) | For the purpose of establishing the underselling margin, in order to address the comments of Baosteel regarding possible asymmetry, the Commission used the constructed export price for Baosteel established pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, applied by analogy, and compared it with a target price of the Union industry which did not include the SG&A of the related sales entities of Arcelor Mittal. The target price thus established was used in the underselling calculations for all exporting producers. Consequently, no costs of the related selling entities of the Union producers were taken into account and, as a result, there was no longer any asymmetry. The approach of not taking into account costs of the related selling entities of the Union producers was recently confirmed by the General Court (21). |
| (181) | V skladu z enakim pristopom, kot je naveden v uvodni izjavi 234 začasne uredbe, je Komisija nato določila stopnjo nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen na podlagi primerjave med tehtano povprečno uvozno ceno vzorčenih sodelujočih proizvajalcev izvoznikov iz zadevnih držav in tehtano povprečno neškodljivo ceno podobnega izdelka, ki so ga vzorčeni proizvajalci Unije v obdobju preiskave prodajali na trgu Unije. Kakršna koli razlika, ki izhaja iz te primerjave, je bila izražena kot odstotek tehtane povprečne uvozne vrednosti CIF. Za druge sodelujoče družbe v LRK, ki niso bile vključene v vzorec, je Komisija uporabila tehtane povprečne stopnje dveh vzorčenih proizvajalcev izvoznikov. | (181) | Following the same approach as in recital (234) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission then determined the underselling margin on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in the countries concerned with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers in the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. For other cooperating companies in the PRC that were not sampled, the Commission used the weighted average margins of the two sampled exporting producers. |
| (182) | Komisija je v skladu s členom 9(4), tretji pododstavek, osnovne uredbe in glede na to, da v obdobju predhodnega razkritja ni registrirala uvoza, analizirala razvoj obsega uvoza, da bi ugotovila, ali se je uvoz, ki je predmet preiskave, v štiritedenskem obdobju predhodnega razkritja, opisanem v uvodni izjavi 7, dodatno znatno povečal in ali je treba upoštevati dodatno škodo, ki izhaja iz takega povečanja pri ugotavljanju stopnje nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen. | (182) | As provided for in Article 9(4), third subparagraph, of the basic Regulation, and given that the Commission did not register imports during the period of pre-disclosure, it analysed the development of import volumes to establish if there had been a further substantial rise in imports subject to the investigation during the four weeks period of pre-disclosure described in recital (7), and therefore whether it was necessary to reflect the additional injury resulting from such an increase in the determination of the underselling margin. |
| (183) | Na podlagi podatkov iz podatkovne zbirke Surveillance 2 je bil obseg uvoza iz zadevnih držav v obdobju predhodnega razkritja za 58 % večji od povprečnega obsega uvoza vsake štiri tedne v obdobju preiskave. Na podlagi tega je Komisija ugotovila, da se je uvoz, ki je predmet preiskave, znatno povečal v obdobju predhodnega razkritja. | (183) | Based on data from the Surveillance 2 database, import volumes from the countries concerned during the period of pre-disclosure were 58 % higher than the average import volumes in the investigation period on a four-week basis. On that basis, the Commission concluded that there had been a substantial rise in imports subject to the investigation during the period of pre-disclosure. |
| (184) | Da bi Komisija upoštevala dodatno škodo, ki jo je povzročila rast uvoza, se je odločila prilagoditi stopnjo odprave škode na podlagi povečanja obsega uvoza, ki velja za ustrezni utežni faktor na podlagi določb člena 9(4) osnovne uredbe. Zato je množilni količnik izračunala tako, da je vsoto obsega uvoza v štiritedenskem obdobju predhodnega razkritja v višini 10 109 ton in 52 tednov obdobja preiskave delila z obsegom uvoza v obdobju preiskave, ekstrapoliranim na 56 tednov. Izračunani količnik, tj. 4,1 %, izraža dodatno škodo, ki jo je povzročilo nadaljnje povečanje uvoza. Dokončne stopnje škode so bile tako pomnožene s tem količnikom. | (184) | To reflect the additional injury caused by the increase of imports, the Commission decided to adjust the injury elimination level based on the rise in import volume, which is considered the relevant weighting factor based on the provisions of Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation. It therefore calculated a multiplying factor established by dividing the sum of the volume of imports during the four weeks of the pre-disclosure period of 10 109 tonnes and the 52 weeks of the investigation period by the import volume in the investigation period extrapolated to 56 weeks. The resulting figure of 4,1 % reflects the additional injury caused by the further increase of imports. The definitive injury margins were thus multiplied by this factor. |
| (185) | Zato je dokončna stopnja nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen za sodelujoče proizvajalce izvoznike in vse druge družbe naslednja: | Država | Družba | Dokončna stopnja dampinga (v %) | Dokončna stopnja nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen (v %) | Ljudska republika Kitajska | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 30,7 | 33,9 | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 53,9 | 23,9 | Druge sodelujoče družbe: GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd.; Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 34,6 | 32,2 | Vse druge družbe | 77,9 | 77,9 | Brazilija | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 66,8 | 53,2 | Vse druge družbe | 66,8 | 53,2 | (185) | Therefore, the definitive underselling margin for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows: | Country | Company | Definitive dumping margin (%) | Definitive underselling margin (%) | The People’s Republic of China | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 30,7 | 33,9 | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 53,9 | 23,9 | Other cooperating companies: GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd.; Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 34,6 | 32,2 | All other companies | 77,9 | 77,9 | Brazil | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 66,8 | 53,2 | All other companies | 66,8 | 53,2 |
| 6.2 Proučitev stopnje, ki bi bila ustrezna za odpravo škode, povzročene industriji Unije, v primeru LRK | 6.2. Examination of the margin adequate to remove injury to the Union industry in relation to the PRC |
| (186) | Po začasnem razkritju je družba Jintai predložila pripombe glede uporabe člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe. Nasprotovala je obstoju izkrivljanja (preklic rabata v zvezi z DDV), vzročni zvezi med tem izkrivljanjem in cenami na kitajskem trgu ter ustreznosti uporabe brazilskih cen kot mednarodnih referenčnih vrednosti. | (186) | Following provisional disclosure, Jintai commented regarding the application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. It contested the existence of a distortion (VAT rebate withdrawal), the causality between this distortion and the prices on the Chinese market, as well as the appropriateness of Brazilian prices to be used as international benchmarks. |
| (187) | Prvič, obstoj izkrivljanja glede preklica rabata v zvezi z DDV je bil ugotovljen za vroče valjana navitja (oznaka KN 7208 27) in to izkrivljanje je bilo prisotno med celotnim obdobjem preiskave. Te informacije so na voljo v dokumentu z naslovom Customs Import and Export Tariff of the People’s Republic of China (Carinska uvozna in izvozna tarifa Ljudske republike Kitajske). Znižanje ali preklic vračila DDV je ena od situacij, ki so v členu 7(2a) osnovne uredbe navedene kot povzročitelji izkrivljanja na trgu surovin. | (187) | First, the existence of a distortion concerning the VAT rebate withdrawal was established for hot rolled coils or ‘HRC’ (CN code 7208 27) and this distortion occurred during the full investigation period. This information is available in the document ‘Customs Import and Export Tariff of the People’s Republic of China’. A VAT refund reduction or withdrawal is one of the situations specifically listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation giving rise to raw material distortions. |
| (188) | Drugič, Komisija je opozorila, da v skladu s členom 7(2a) osnovne uredbe zadostuje opredelitev obstoja izkrivljanja (v tem primeru preklic rabata v zvezi z DDV) in da so domače kitajske cene surovin nižje od cen na reprezentativnih mednarodnih trgih. Ta določba ne vključuje pravne obveznosti dokazovanja vzročne zveze med tem izkrivljanjem in nižjimi cenami na kitajskem trgu v okviru veljavnega pravnega okvira. | (188) | Second, the Commission recalled that in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, it is sufficient to establish the existence of a distortion (here the VAT rebate withdrawal) and that the domestic Chinese raw material prices are lower as compared to prices in representative international markets. This provision contains no legal obligation to prove the causality between this distortion and the lower prices on the Chinese market under the applicable legal framework. |
| (189) | Tretjič, v obdobju preiskave je bila ugotovljena znatna razlika med nakupnimi cenami vroče valjanih navitij družbe Jintai in brazilskimi domačimi cenami franko tovarna za ta navitja ter cenami Turčije (domače cene franko tovarna) (podatki so bili v obeh primerih pridobljeni iz publikacije Metal Bulletin). Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 242 začasne uredbe, so bile te cene znatno višje od vhodnih cen družbe Jintai, in sicer v razponu med [10–30] % in [30–50] %. | (189) | Third, a significant price difference was observed during the investigation period between the HRC purchase prices of Jintai and the HRC Brazil domestic ex-works prices as well as those from Turkey (domestic ex-works) (both sourced from Metal Bulletin). As explained at recital (242) of the provisional Regulation, those prices were significantly higher than Jintai’s input prices, in the range of [10-30] % and [30-50] %. |
| (190) | Nazadnje, Komisija je analizirala, ali so turške in brazilske cene ustrezne cene, reprezentativne za mednarodne trge v skladu s členom 7(2a) osnovne uredbe. Komisija je na začetku navedla, da v osnovni uredbi niso določena specifična pravila o dejanskih cenah, ki jih je treba uporabiti, zato ima Komisija široko diskrecijsko pravico glede ustrezne sodne prakse evropskih sodišč. Kar zadeva vsebino trditve, je Komisija navedla, da je bilo v virih, kot je publikacija Metal Bulletin, na voljo veliko število referenčnih cen in da ni bilo na voljo nobeno ustreznejše povprečje, saj na primer ni bilo nobene referenčne vrednosti na osnovi združenih podatkov glede na regijo, ki bi se lahko uporabila v preiskavi. S primerjavo turških in brazilskih domačih cen vroče valjanih navitij z več drugimi možnimi mednarodnimi referenčnimi vrednostmi, na voljo v publikaciji Metal Bulletin, je Komisija ugotovila, da so bile nekatere višje, druge nižje, kar podpira sklep o reprezentativnosti brazilskih in turških cen kot ustrezne mednarodne referenčne vrednosti. Komisija je ugotovila tudi, da so bile osnovne količine vroče valjanih navitij, s katerimi se trguje v Braziliji, zelo velike. | (190) | Last, the Commission analysed whether the Turkish and Brazilian prices were appropriate prices representative of international markets according to Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission noted at the outset that in the absence of specific rules on the actual prices to be used in the basic Regulation, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion as per the relevant jurisprudence of the European Courts. On the substance of the claim, the Commission noted that a high number of benchmark prices were available from sources such as Metal Bulletin and that there was no more suitable average available, for instance there was no benchmark aggregated by regions that could be used for the purpose of the investigation. By comparing the Turkish and Brazilian HRC domestic prices with the other several potential international benchmarks available in Metal Bulletin, the Commission noted that some were higher and some lower, supporting the conclusion on the representativity of the Brazilian and Turkish prices as an appropriate international benchmark. The Commission also noted that the underlying quantities of HRC traded in Brazil were very significant. |
| (191) | Družba Jintai je trdila tudi, da so bile brazilske domače cene vroče valjanih navitij izkrivljene zaradi pandemije COVID-19. V ta namen je navedena družba primerjala cene vroče valjanih navitij v Braziliji in na Kitajskem. Vendar Komisija te primerjave ni mogla upoštevati, saj so bile kitajske cene surovin za zadevni izdelek, vključno z vroče valjanimi navitji, predmet znatnega izkrivljanja, kot je ugotovljeno v uvodni izjavi 75 začasne uredbe in potrjeno v uvodni izjavi 46 zgoraj. Poleg tega so se, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 55 zgoraj, hkrati z zvišanjem cen na brazilskem domačem trgu po vsem svetu zvišale cene ploščatih izdelkov iz jekla. Nazadnje, cene vroče valjanih navitij družbe Jintai so bile tudi znatno nižje od turških domačih cen franko tovarna, pridobljenih iz publikacije Metal Bulletin. | (191) | Jintai also claimed that the Brazilian domestic HRC prices were distorted by the COVID pandemic. For this purpose Jintai compared the HRC prices in Brazil and China. However, the Commission could not take into account this comparison as, as established in recital (75) of the provisional Regulation and confirmed in recital (46) above, Chinese prices of raw materials of the product concerned including HRC were subject to significant distortions. Moreover, as indicated above in recital (55), the increase in prices in Brazil domestic market was concomitant with a global increase of steel flat product prices. Finally, Jintai’s HRC prices were also significantly lower than the Turkish ex-works domestic prices sourced from Metal Bulletin. |
| (192) | Po dokončnem razkritju je družba Jintai predložila nadaljnje pripombe glede uporabe člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe. Trdila je, da je obstoj izkrivljanja nujen pogoj, ne pa tudi zadosten pogoj. Kitajska vlada je po dokončnem razkritju predložila podobno pripombo. Komisija je navedla, da je v členu 7(2a) osnovne uredbe določeno, da izkrivljanje obstaja, če so zaradi številnih ukrepov, opredeljenih v navedeni določbi, cene surovine „bistveno nižje v primerjavi s cenami na reprezentativnih mednarodnih trgih“, in da ta surovina predstavlja najmanj 17 % stroškov proizvodnje. Glede na ta dva pogoja bo opredeljeno izkrivljanje kot resno izkrivljanje zelo verjetno vplivalo na konkurenčnost kitajske industrije, hkrati pa povzročilo dodatno škodo industriji Unije. Poleg tega je Komisija opozorila, da je bila v skladu s členom 7(2b) osnovne uredbe izvedena dodatna analiza, preden je bila sprejeta odločitev, ali naj se uporabi člen 7(2) osnovne uredbe. Komisija ima pri izvedbi ustrezne analize v zvezi s tem široko diskrecijsko pravico (22). Zato uporaba člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe ni samodejna, kot je trdila družba Jintai, ampak rezultat celovite analize. | (192) | Following final disclosure, Jintai made further comments regarding the application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. It claimed that the existence of distortion is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition. The Government of China made a similar comment following final disclosure. The Commission noted that Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation provides that a distortion exists if, due to a number of measures identified in that provision, a price of a raw material is ‘significantly lower as compared to prices in representative international markets’ and that this raw material shall account for no less than 17 % of the costs of production. These two conditions means that the distortion identified is as a serious distortion very likely to impact the competitiveness of the Chinese industry, while causing additional injury to the Union industry. In addition, the Commission recalled that in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the Basic Regulation, a further analysis was made before deciding on whether or not to apply Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. In making the relevant analysis in this context, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion (22). The application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation is therefore not automatic as claimed by Jintai, but rather the outcome of a comprehensive analysis. |
| (193) | Skratka, strani niso predložile prepričljivih dokazov, da brazilske in turške domače cene franko tovarna niso bile reprezentativne za mednarodne trge. Komisija je zato potrdila začasni sklep, da se te cene obravnavajo kot reprezentativne za mednarodno referenčno vrednost v smislu člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe. | (193) | In conclusion, the parties submitted no compelling evidence that the Brazilian and Turkish domestic ex-works prices were not representative of international markets. The Commission, therefore confirmed its provisional conclusion to consider these prices representative as an international benchmark within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. |
| (194) | Glede na navedeno je bila trditev družbe Jintai zavrnjena, uvodne izjave 235 do 243 začasne uredbe pa potrjene. | (194) | In view of the above, the claim of Jintai was rejected and recitals (235) to (243) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed |
| (195) | V skladu z uvodno izjavo 239 začasne uredbe je Komisija nadalje preiskala, ali so bile cene drugih morebitnih surovin, kot so hladno valjana navitja, predmet izkrivljanja v smislu člena 7(2a). Komisija je ugotovila, da nobena surovina, katere stroški proizvodnje zadevnega izdelka znašajo več kot 17 %, v obdobju preiskave ni bila predmet izkrivljanja v smislu člena 7(2a). V zvezi z drugim vzorčenim proizvajalcem izvoznikom, tj. družbo Baosteel, ki ni kupovala vroče valjanih navitij na Kitajskem, je Komisija potrdila, da je modulacija pravila nižje dajatve postala brezpredmetna, saj je bila stopnja dampinga nižja od stopnje nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen. | (195) | In line with recital (239) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission further investigated whether other possible raw materials such as cold-rolled coils were subject to distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a). The Commission found that none of the raw materials accounting for more than 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned were subject to distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) during the investigation period. The Commission further confirmed that, as regards the other sampled exporting producer, Baosteel, who did not purchase HRC in China, the modulation of the lesser-duty rule became moot since the dumping margin was lower than the underselling margin. |
| (196) | Po začasnem razkritju se je kitajska vlada sklicevala na člen 7(2a) osnovne uredbe, pri čemer je navedla, da je namen ocene, ali so cene surovin izkrivljene, proučiti, ali bi dajatev, nižja od stopnje dampinga, zadostovala za odpravo škode. Po navedbah kitajske vlade obstoj izkrivljanja cen surovin ne pomeni nujno, da bi bilo treba stopnjo škode zvišati na raven stopnje dampinga. Trdila je, da Komisija ni ocenila, ali je stopnja nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen zadostovala za odpravo škode, in je neposredno uporabila stopnjo dampinga, kar je v nasprotju z zahtevami in namenom prava Unije. | (196) | Following provisional disclosure, the GOC referred to Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, arguing that the purpose of evaluating whether raw materials are distorted is to examine whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury. According to the GOC, the existence of raw materials distortions does not necessarily mean that the injury margin should be raised to the level of the dumping margin. The GOC claimed that the Commission had failed to make any assessment on whether the underselling margin was sufficient to eliminate injury and directly applied the dumping margin, which is contrary to the requirements and purpose of EU law. |
| (197) | Družba Jintai se je sklicevala na nedavne preiskave, pri katerih je Komisija stopnjo škode določila na ravni stopnje nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen, in trdila, da bi taka stopnja odpravila škodo, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije. Četudi je Komisija menila, da stopnja nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen za družbo Jintai ne zadostuje za odpravo škode, ne bi smela stopnje škode samodejno določiti na ravni stopnje dampinga, ampak na podlagi druge razumne metode. Zato je družba Jintai od Komisija zahtevala, naj za določitev stopnje odprave škode uporabi izračunano stopnjo nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen ali da za družbo Jintai izračuna drugo razumno stopnjo škode. | (197) | Jintai referred to recent investigations where the Commission set the injury margin at the level of underselling margin, and claimed that such margin would remove the injury suffered by the Union industry. Even if the Commission considered that the underselling margin for Jintai is not sufficient to remove the injury, the injury margin should not automatically be set at the level of the dumping margin but should be determined by another reasonable method. Therefore, Jintai requested the Commission to use the calculated underselling margin to determine the injury elimination level, or to calculate another reasonable injury margin for Jintai. |
| (198) | V zvezi s tem je Komisija navedla, da člen 7(2a) osnovne uredbe določa, da „Komisija pri ugotavljanju, ali bi dajatve, nižje od stopnje dampinga, zadostovale za odpravo škode, upošteva morebitno izkrivljanje na trgu surovin v zvezi z zadevnim izdelkom“, člen 7(2b) pa, da „[k]adar lahko Komisija na podlagi vseh predloženih informacij jasno ugotovi, da je v interesu Unije, da se določi znesek začasnih dajatev v skladu z odstavkom 2a tega člena, se odstavek 2 tega člena ne uporablja“. Kadar Komisija ugotovi obstoj izkrivljanja na trgu surovin v zvezi z zadevnim izdelkom in sklene, da je v interesu Unije, da se določi znesek začasnih dajatev na ravni dampinga, ji namesto stopnje dampinga ni treba izračunati „druge razumne stopnje škode“, kot je zahtevala družba Jintai, niti ni do tega upravičena. V vseh primerih, v katerih je ugotovljeno, da je uporaba člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe upravičena, kot v tem primeru, ob upoštevanju dodatne škode, ki jo je industrija Unije utrpela zaradi obstoja izkrivljanja na trgu surovin v državi izvoznici, se šteje za primerno, da se raven dajatve, ki naj bi bila nujna za odpravo te dodatne škode, določi s sklicevanjem na stopnjo dampinga. Komisija je zato zavrnila trditve kitajske vlade in družbe Jintai ter potrdila uporabo stopnje za določitev zneska dajatve na ravni dampinga v zvezi z družbo Jintai, kot je določeno v uvodni izjavi 277 začasne uredbe. | (198) | In this respect, the Commission noted that Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation provides that
‘when examining whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, the Commission shall take into account whether there are distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned’
and Article 7(2b) stipulates that
‘where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of the provisional duties in accordance with paragraph 2a of this Article, paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply’
. When the Commission establishes the existence of raw material distortions with regard to the product concerned and concludes that it is in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of the provisional duties at the level of dumping, the Commission is not required or entitled to calculate
‘another reasonable injury margin’
than the dumping margin as requested by Jintai. In all cases where it is concluded that the application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation is warranted, like in the present case, given the additional injury suffered by the Union industry due to the existence of the raw material distortions in the export country, the level of duty considered necessary to remove such additional injury is deemed appropriate to be set by reference to the margin of dumping. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claims of the GOC and Jintai and confirmed the application of the margin to set the amount of the duty at the level of dumping with respect to Jintai, as set out in recital (277) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (199) | Zato se uvodne izjave 275 do 280 začasne uredbe potrdijo. | (199) | Therefore, recitals (275) to (280) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 7. INTERES UNIJE | 7. UNION INTEREST |
| 7.1 Interes Unije v skladu s členom 7(2b) osnovne uredbe | 7.1. Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation |
| (200) | Komisija je v začasni fazi v skladu s členom 7(2a) osnovne uredbe sklenila, da je očitno v interesu Unije, da se stopnja dajatve za družbo Jintai zaradi obstoja izkrivljanja na trgu surovin določi na ravni ugotovljene stopnje dampinga. | (200) | At provisional stage, the Commission concluded in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation that it was clearly in the Union interest to set the duty rate for Jintai at the level of dumping margin found because of the existence of raw material distortions. |
| 7.1.1 Proste zmogljivosti v državi izvoznici | 7.1.1. Spare capacities in the exporting country |
| (201) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede prostih zmogljivostih v državi izvoznici, se uvodni izjavi 245 in 246 začasne uredbe potrdita. | (201) | In the absence of comments regarding spare capacities in the exporting country, recitals (245) and (246) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 7.1.2 Konkurenca za surovine | 7.1.2. Competition for raw materials |
| (202) | Povezano vprašanje glede kitajskih domačih cen za vroče valjana navitja je bilo obravnavano v uvodnih izjavah 186 do 194. Ker ni bilo podrobnejših pripomb glede konkurence za surovine, se uvodni izjavi 247 in 248 začasne uredbe potrdita. | (202) | The related question of the HRC Chinese domestic prices was addressed in recitals (186) to (194). In the absence of more specific comments regarding competition for raw materials, recitals (247) and (248) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 7.1.3 Učinek na dobavne verige za družbe Unije | 7.1.3. Effect on supply chains for Union companies |
| (203) | Po začasnem razkritju so družbe Eviosys, Astir Vitogiannis in CANPACK predložile dodatne trditve, da industrija Unije ne more zagotoviti potrebnih količin izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, zaradi česar se morajo zanašati na uvoz iz Kitajske. Trdile so tudi, da uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav ni alternativa zaradi dolgih in zapletenih postopkov potrjevanja, nerazpoložljivosti zadostnega razpona specifikacij in tarifnih kvot v okviru zaščitnih ukrepov Unije. | (203) | Following provisional disclosure, Eviosys, Astir Vitogiannis and CANPACK submitted additional claims that the Union industry is not in a position to provide the necessary quantities of ECCS, forcing them to rely on Chinese imports. They also claimed that imports from other third countries are not an alternative because of the long and complex validation processes, the unavailability of a sufficient range of specifications, and the tariff quotas under the Union safeguard measures. |
| (204) | Komisija je skrbno proučila vse dokaze, ki so jih v zvezi s tem predložili uporabniki Unije in industrija Unije. | (204) | The Commission carefully assessed all the evidence provided by Union users and Union industry in this respect. |
| (205) | Čeprav se trije zadevni uporabniki v zelo različnem obsegu zanašajo na uvoz iz Kitajske, je Komisija ugotovila, da so zadevni uporabniki od družbe Jintai kupili zelo majhen delež izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla iz Kitajske in da so večino količine kupili od družbe Baosteel, na katero ne bo vplivala uporaba določb člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe v zvezi z družbo Jintai, ali od drugih dveh nevzorčenih sodelujočih kitajskih proizvajalcev izvoznikov. | (205) | Although the three users rely to a very different extent on Chinese imports, the Commission observed that a very small proportion of ECCS from China has been purchased from Jintai and that most of the quantities were purchased from Baosteel which will not be affected by the application of the provisions of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with respect to Jintai or from the two other non-sampled cooperating Chinese exporting producers.. |
| (206) | Komisija je zato menila, da uporaba določb člena 7(2a) osnovne uredbe v zvezi z družbo Jintai, ki bo vplivala tudi na raven dajatev za nesodelujoče kitajske izvoznike, ne bo povzročila hudih motenj v vrednostni verigi za uporabnike Unije. Ti bi lahko dejansko dobavljali izdelke iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla od družbe Baosteel in drugih dveh sodelujočih kitajskih družb, ki nista vključeni v vzorec. To še zlasti velja glede na to, da je dokončna protidampinška dajatev za družbo Baosteel zaradi prilagoditev, pojasnjenih v uvodnih izjavah 57 do 60, popravljena občutno navzdol, zaradi česar je bila navzdol popravljena tudi dajatev za nevzorčene sodelujoče izvoznike. Poleg tega bi uporabniki izdelke iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla lahko uvažali iz drugih tretjih držav, za katere se ne uporabljajo protidampinški ukrepi. | (206) | Therefore, the Commission considered that the application of the provisions of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation for Jintai, which will also affect the level of duties for the non-cooperating Chinese exporters, would not lead to serious value chain disruptions for the Union users. Indeed, they could supply ECCS from Baosteel and the other two cooperating but not sampled Chinese companies. All the more so considering that the definitive anti-dumping duty for Baosteel is revised significantly downwards as a result of the adjustments explained at recitals (57)-(60), which also caused a revision downwards of the duty for the non-sampled cooperating exporters. In addition, users could also import ECCS from other third countries that are not subject to anti-dumping measures. |
| 7.1.4 Sklep o interesu Unije v skladu s členom 7(2b) osnovne uredbe | 7.1.4. Conclusion on Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation |
| (207) | Komisija je potrdila sklep iz uvodnih izjav 252 in 253 začasne uredbe, da je v interesu Unije, da v skladu s členom 7(2a) osnovne uredbe določi znesek začasnih dajatev v zvezi z družbo Jintai. | (207) | The Commission confirmed its conclusion in recitals (252) and (253) of the provisional Regulation that it is in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in relation to Jintai in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. |
| 7.2 Interes Unije v skladu s členom 21 osnovne uredbe | 7.2. Union interest under Article 21 of the basic Regulation |
| 7.2.1 Interes industrije Unije | 7.2.1. Interest of the Union industry |
| (208) | Ker ni bilo pripomb glede interesa industrije Unije, se uvodni izjavi 255 in 256 začasne uredbe potrdita. | (208) | In the absence of comments regarding the interest of the Union industry, recitals (255) and (256) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. |
| 7.2.2 Interes uporabnikov, nepovezanih uvoznikov in trgovcev | 7.2.2. Interest of users, unrelated importers and traders |
| (209) | Po začasnem razkritju se trije uporabniki, tj. družbe Eviosys, CANPACK in Astir Vitogiannis, nikakor niso strinjali s predhodno ugotovitvijo Komisije o interesu Unije in so ponovili trditve, da se uporabniki, ki oddajo naročila pri proizvajalcih izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji, spopadajo z več resnimi težavami z oskrbo, ki so vzrok za pomanjkanje na trgu Unije, in da proizvajalci Unije izvažajo velik del proizvedenih izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla. | (209) | Following provisional disclosure, three users, namely Eviosys, CANPACK and Astir Vitogiannis, strongly disagreed with the Commission’s preliminary conclusion on Union interest and reiterated their claims that there are several serious supply issues when users place orders with Union ECCS producers leading to a shortage on the Union market and that Union producers are exporting a significant portion of their produced ECCS. |
| (210) | Trije navedeni uporabniki so predložili določene dokaze o zavrnitvi ali nezmožnosti proizvajalcev Unije, da dobavijo zahtevane količine izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, ter o težavah s popolno in redno dobavo dogovorjenih količin. | (210) | The three above-mentioned users submitted certain evidence about a refusal or impossibility of Union producers to supply the requested quantities of ECCS, as well as about problems of delivering fully and regularly on agreed volumes. |
| (211) | Družba Eviosys je izrazila zaskrbljenost, da proizvajalca Unije, tj. družbi ThyssenKrupp in ArcelorMittal, kot dva ključna akterja, ki imata zelo velik skupni tržni delež in sta zaradi vzpostavljenih zaščitnih ukrepov že občutno zaščitena pred uvozom, izkoriščata njun tržni položaj, tako da izvajata politiko pretiranega zviševanja cen, zlasti od leta 2021. | (211) | Eviosys expressed concerns that the two Union producers, ThyssenKrupp and ArcelorMittal, are taking advantage of their market situation in which they are two key players with a very high combined market share and significant protection already, due to the safeguard measures in place, from imports by pursuing a policy of exorbitant price increases, especially since 2021. |
| (212) | Družbe Eviosys, CANPACK in Astir Vitogiannis se niso strinjale s sklepom Komisije, da ima industrija Unije zadostno proizvodno zmogljivost za zadostitev povpraševanju na trgu Unije. Navedle so, da tudi, če je res, da ima industrija Unije zadostno zmogljivost in je v teoriji morda zmožna oskrbovati trg Unije, proizvajalci Unije v resnici niso pripravljeni zagotoviti dobave ali ne morejo zadostiti povpraševanju njihovih strank, če izvažajo več kot 20 % celotne proizvodnje. Družba Astir Vitogiannis je navedla, da tudi teoretična zmogljivost industrije Unije pri 100-odstotni stopnji izkoriščenosti ne bi zadostovala za zadostitev povpraševanju celotne Unije. Kakršna koli motnja ali višja sila na strani proizvajalcev Unije, ki se je v preteklosti že večkrat zgodila, znatno vpliva na njihovo proizvodnjo izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla in s tem na sposobnost preživetja industrij nižje v prodajni verigi, ki so močno odvisne od te koncentrirane dobaviteljske industrije. Družba CANPACK je po dokončnem razkritju svojo trditev ponovila. | (212) | Eviosys, CANPACK and Astir Vitogiannis disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion that the Union industry has sufficient production capacity to cover the demand on the Union market. According to them, even if it was true that the Union industry has sufficient capacity and might be theoretically capable to serve the Union market, the reality is that the Union producers are not willing to supply or cannot meet the volume demands of their customers while exporting above 20 % of their total output. According to Astir Vitogiannis, even the theoretical capacity of the Union industry, operating at 100 % utilisation rate, would not be sufficient to meet the entire Union demand. Any disruption or force majeure on the side of the Union producers, which has happened already many times in the past, severely affects their output of ECCS and, as a result, impacts the viability of the downstream industries that depend heavily on this concentrated supplier industry. CANPACK reiterated its claim after final disclosure. |
| (213) | Nasprotno pa je industrija Unije vztrajala, da ima zadostno zmogljivost za zadostitev povpraševanju na trgu Unije in da bi lahko povpraševanju zadostila s preusmeritvijo izvoza na trg Unije, kar je že naredila. Proizvajalci Unije so tudi trdili, da so bile pretekle težave z dobavo posledica odločitev glede cen in ne pomanjkanja proizvodnje in dobave. Industrija Unije je nadalje navedla, da se povpraševanje v Uniji trenutno zmanjšuje in da bo zato mogoče dobaviti dodatne količine. | (213) | On the contrary, the Union industry insisted that it has sufficient capacity to cover the demand on the Union market and that it could re-direct export sales to the Union market to satisfy demand, which has already happened. The Union producers also claimed that the past supply issues were the result of price considerations rather than due to shortages of production and supply. The Union industry further stated that the demand in the Union is currently falling and that they would therefore have the possibility to supply additional quantities. |
| (214) | Družba CANPACK je po začasnem in dokončnem razkritju trdila, da se razmere in realnost na trgu po obdobju preiskave zelo razlikujeta od razmer, na podlagi katerih so proizvajalci izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji začeli preiskavo, in razmer v obdobju preiskave. Trenutno je raven cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, ki jih ponujajo kitajski proizvajalci, bolj primerljiva ali celo višja od cen na trgu Unije. Družba CANPACK je navedla, da je raven ukrepov, ki jih je sprejela Komisija, očitno nezadostna, saj so bile ravni začasnih dajatev nekajkrat višje od razlike med cenami izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Unije in Kitajske. Menila je, da bi ukrepi povzročili ogromne razlike med cenami, ki jih zaračunavajo proizvajalci izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji in na Kitajskem, kar bi proizvajalcem Unije zagotovilo priložnost za dodatna zvišanja cen in omogočilo vzpostavitev duopola dveh glavnih proizvajalcev izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji. Posledično bi se z uvedbo ukrepov povzročile finančne izgube uporabnikom izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji, ki te izdelke uvažajo iz Kitajske. Poleg tega bi bilo treba upoštevati dejstvo, da bodo stopnje dobička uporabnikov izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji zaradi uvedbe protidampinških dajatev nižje in da bodo morali ti uporabniki na stranke (ki se že spopadajo z visoko inflacijo) prenesti morebitno zvišanje cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla ali v najslabšem primeru celo opustiti dejavnost. | (214) | CANPACK claimed, both after provisional and final disclosure, that the post-investigation period situation and market reality differ significantly from that which constituted the basis for Union ECCS producers to initiate the investigation and which existed during the investigation period. At the moment, the level of ECCS prices offered by Chinese producers is more comparable, or even higher than those on the Union market. CANPACK argued that the level of the measures imposed by the Commission are clearly not adequate as is the provisional duty levels were several times higher than the difference between prices of ECCS originating in the Union and China. In the opinion of CANPACK, the measures would lead to immense differentiation of the prices offered by the Union and Chinese ECCS producers, opening up the possibility of additional price increases by the Union producers, as well as a duopoly of the two major ECCS producers in the Union. Consequently, the imposition of the measurers would result in financial losses on the part of Union ECCS users importing ECCS from China. Moreover, account should be taken of the fact that because of the imposition of anti-dumping duties, Union ECCS users will have lower profit margins and will have to pass on to consumers (already struggling with high inflation) any price increase in ECCS or, in the worst case scenario, even abandon their activities. |
| (215) | Družba Astir Vitogiannis je od Komisije zahtevala tudi, da pri oceni interesa Unije upošteva razvoj dogodkov po obdobju preiskave. Opozorila je, da čeprav člen 6(1) osnovne uredbe določa, da „[se] [i]nformacije, ki se nanašajo na obdobje, ki sledi obdobju preiskave, […] običajno ne upoštevajo“, je v ustaljeni sodni praksi sodišč Unije jasno navedeno, da se člen 6(1) osnovne uredbe nanaša le na oceno dampinga in škode in ne na oceno interesa Unije. V zvezi s tem se je družba Astir Vitogiannis sklicevala na zadevo Kazchrome, v kateri je Splošno sodišče potrdilo, da „člena 6(1) osnovne uredbe ni mogoče uporabiti za ugotavljanje obstoja interesa Skupnosti, kot je opredeljen v členu 21(1) osnovne uredbe, kar pomeni, da je mogoče pri ugotavljanju tega interesa upoštevati tudi podatke, ki se nanašajo na čas po koncu obdobja preiskave“ (23) in zadevo CPME, v kateri je Splošno sodišče odločilo, da ocena interesa Unije vključuje „napoved na podlagi predpostavk o prihodnjih dogodkih, ki zajema presojo zapletenih gospodarskih položajev“ (24). Natančneje, družba Astir Vitogiannis je trdila, da je industrija Unije v obdobju po preiskavi zvišala prodajne cene za skoraj 100 %, medtem ko je bilo zvišanje stroškov veliko manjše, kar je glede na najnovejše finančne rezultate, ki so jih sporočili sami pritožniki, omogočilo zdrave in trdne stopnje dobička. | (215) | Astir Vitogiannis also requested the Commission to consider the post-investigation period developments in the assessment of the Union interest. It pointed out that although Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation provides that
‘[I]nformation relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period shall, normally, not be taken into account’
, the settled case-law of the Union courts clearly maintained that Article 6(1) of the basis Regulation only relates to the assessment of dumping and injury and not to the assessment of Union interest. In this respect, Astir Vitogiannis referred to case Kazchrome where the General Court confirmed that
‘Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation does not apply in the context of determining whether there is a Community interest as contemplated in Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation, which means that information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period may be taken into account for those purposes’
(23) and case CPME where the General Court held that the assessment of Union interest involves a
‘forecast based on hypotheses regarding future developments, which includes an appraisal of complex economic situations’
(24). More specifically, Astir Vitogiannis claimed that during the post-investigation period, the Union industry had increased their selling prices almost 100 %, while the cost had increased to a much lesser extent, resulting in healthy and strong profit margins according to the latest financial results reported by the complainants themselves. |
| (216) | Komisija je skrbno proučila vse navedene argumente, vključno s tistimi, ki se nanašajo na razvoj dogodkov po obdobju preiskave. Kar zadeva ravni cen po obdobju preiskave, je Komisija navedla, da so se cene dejansko zvišale, vendar ni imela na voljo nobenih dokazov, da so bile te višje cene strukturne. Ravno nasprotno, Komisija je v zvezi z uvoznimi cenami iz zadevnih držav ugotovila, da so se po začetni najvišji vrednosti v obdobju po preiskavi in zlasti februarja začele zniževati, in sicer tik pred obdobjem predhodnega razkritja (25) in med njim, in to kljub napovedi, da bodo uvedene začasne dajatve. Kar zadeva domnevne težave z dobavo na trgu Unije, Komisija pri tehtanju različnih interesov ni bila prepričana, da so bile te težave tako velike in obsežne, da bi povzročile pomisleke glede obstoja ali ravni ukrepov. V zvezi s tem je upoštevala izjavo industrije Unije, da se ravnovesje med ponudbo in povpraševanjem spreminja v korist kupcev izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, saj se cene že znižujejo, kot je razvidno iz razvoja cen uvoza iz zadevnih držav. Komisija je ugotovila tudi, da je industrija Unije pripravljena preusmeriti izvoz na trg Unije, da bi zadostila morebitnemu presežku povpraševanja, kot se je v preteklosti že zgodilo. Poleg tega glede na pričakovano upočasnitev gospodarstva v preostalem delu leta 2022 in leta 2023 (26) ni pričakovati nadaljnjega zvišanja cen in povečanja povpraševanja. Komisija je tudi opozorila, da člen 21(1) osnovne uredbe določa, da „je posvečena posebna pozornost potrebi po odpravi učinkov škodljivega dampinga, ki izkrivlja trgovino[,] in vzpostavitvi učinkovite konkurence“. V zvezi s tem je Komisija navedla, da uporabniki niso zadostno utemeljili, da bi predvidena raven ukrepov vplivala na njihovo dobičkonosnost in delovanje v tako velikem obsegu, da bi to prevladalo nad potrebo po uvedbi ukrepov za preprečitev izkrivljajočih učinkov in znatne škode, ki jo je industrija Unije utrpela zaradi dampinškega uvoza. Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 265 začasne uredbe, se je na podlagi podatkov družbe Eviosys, edinega uporabnika, ki je izpolnil vprašalnik, dejansko zdelo, da bi lahko ta absorbiral morebitno zvišanje stroškov glede na njegovo sedanjo dobičkonosnost iz prodaje izdelkov z uporabo elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla in delež uvoza iz zadevnih držav v njegovem portfelju virov. Po začasnem razkritju niso bili izraženi pomisleki glede tega sklepa. Komisija zato ni ugotovila, da bi bila uvedba ukrepov ob upoštevanju vseh različnih zadevnih interesov zaradi razvoja dogodkov po obdobju preiskave neprimerna. | (216) | The Commission carefully considered all of the above arguments, including those concerning the post-investigation period developments. With regard to the price levels after the investigation period, the Commission noted that prices indeed increased but had no evidence at its disposal showing that such higher prices were structural. Rather, to the contrary, concerning import prices from the countries concerned, the Commission established that after their initial peak in the post-investigation period and in particular in February, import prices started to go down, both immediately before and during the pre-disclosure period (25) despite the announcement of the upcoming imposition of provisional duties. With regard to the alleged supply issues on the Union market, when weighing the various interests, the Commission was not convinced that these were of a sufficient magnitude and extent to put into question the existence or the level of the measures. In this respect, the Commission took note of the statement of the Union industry that the balance of supply and demand is shifting in favour of the buyers of ECCS with prices already going down as shown by the price development of imports from the countries concerned. The Commission also noted the Union industry’s readiness to re-direct export sales to the Union market to satisfy any demand surplus, as has already happened in the past. Moreover, in view of the expected slowdown of the economy for the rest of 2022 and 2023 (26), both prices and demand are not expected to increase further. The Commission also recalled that Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation specifies that ‘the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition shall be given special considerations’. In this respect, the Commission noted that the users did not make a compelling case that the envisaged level of measures would affect their profitability and operation to such an appreciable extent as to outweigh the need to impose the measures in order to prevent the distortive effects and material injury caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports. Indeed, as explained in recital (265) of the provisional Regulation, based on the data of Eviosys, the sole user which provided a questionnaire reply, it appeared that it would be able to absorb a possible cost increase considering its current profitability from sales of products using ECCS and the share of imports from the countries concerned in its sourcing portfolio. This conclusion has not been put into question following the provisional disclosure. The Commission thus did not find that the post-investigation period developments meant that the imposition of measures would be inappropriate, having regard to all the various interests at stake. |
| (217) | Po dokončnem razkritju je družba Eurofer trdila, da je družba Astir nedavno zavrnila dobavo in se ni pozanimala glede morebitne prihodnje dobave, povpraševanje družbe Eviosys pa se je leta 2022 zmanjšalo. Komisija je navedla, da so večino dokazov predložili proizvajalci Unije, vendar ti dokazi niso bili potrjeni na podlagi navedb korespondence z zadevnimi uporabniki. Komisija zato ni mogla preveriti dodatnih predloženih dokazov, zlasti ker so bili predloženi v pozni fazi postopka. | (217) | After final disclosure, Eurofer claimed that Astir has recently refused deliveries and did not enquire about possible future deliveries, while Eviosys’ demand decreased in 2022. The Commission noted that most of the evidence was provided by the Union producers but was not confirmed by quotations of correspondence with the respective users. Consequently, the Commission was unable to verify the additional evidence provided, especially given its late submission in the course of the proceedings. |
| (218) | Poleg tega je družba Astir Vitogiannis, po dokončnem razkritju pa tudi združenje CISA in družba CANPACK, izrazila zaskrbljenost, da protidampinški ukrepi v obliki in na ravni, določeni z začasno uredbo, nesorazmerno in nepravično ščitijo ter dodatno krepijo obstoječi duopol proizvajalcev Unije do te mere, da škodijo neodvisnim uporabnikom in obdelovalcem. Trdila je tudi, da bodo uporabniki Unije zaradi zvišanja njihovih stroškov veliko manj konkurenčni od dobaviteljev izdelkov, ki temeljijo na izdelkih iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla (kovinska embalaža, kronski zamaški), v tretjih državah, kjer se ne izvajajo protidampinški ukrepi. Ti ukrepi bodo povzročili znatno zvišanje stroškov za uporabnike in obdelovalce na račun njihove dobičkonosnosti, saj sami ne morejo v celoti absorbirati takih zvišanj stroškov, ker izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla predstavljajo velik del stroškov končnih izdelkov (embalažni elementi za hrano in pijačo, kronski zamaški itd.). Družba Astir Vitogiannis je trdila, da je popoln prenos zvišanja stroškov v spodnji del dobavne verige preprosto nerealen, pri čemer je to trditev utemeljila z dokazi. | (218) | Astir Vitogiannis, as well as CISA and CANPACK after final disclosure, also expressed concerns that the anti-dumping measures in the form and at the level imposed by the provisional Regulation disproportionately and unfairly protect and further reinforce the existing duopoly of Union producers to the extreme detriment of independent users and processors. It further claimed that the increase in costs for Union users will make them significantly less competitive compared to suppliers of ECCS-based products (metal packaging, crown corks) in third countries with no anti-dumping measures in force. Such measures will result in significant cost increases for users and processors at the expense of their profitability, since they are not able to fully absorb such cost increases themselves, as ECCS constitutes a major part in the cost of final products (food and beverage packaging elements, crown corks, etc.) Astir Vitogiannis claimed that passing on the cost increase in full further down the supply chain is simply unrealistic, and substantiated its claim with supporting evidence. |
| (219) | Poleg tega je družba Astir Vitogiannis zaskrbljena, da protidampinški ukrepi na tako visokih ravneh in dejstvo, da se uporabljajo že v začasni fazi, pomenijo zelo veliko tveganje za uporabnike Unije, kar zadeva surovine in naročila, ki so že v tranzitu, saj bi se ti uporabniki lahko znašli v situaciji, v kateri zaradi izjemnih finančnih učinkov in jamstev za zavarovanje, ki se zahtevajo pri uvoznem carinskem postopku, ne bodo mogli uvažati materiala. Zato je od Komisije zahtevala, naj prouči te posebne okoliščine in zagotovi sprejetje ukrepov za omejitev posledic začasnih protidampinških ukrepov za blago v tranzitu. | (219) | Furthermore, Astir Vitogiannis is concerned that the anti-dumping measures at such high levels and their application already at the provisional stage are putting at a very high risk the Union users as far as the raw materials and orders already in transit are concerned, who face a situation where they will not to be able to import the material due to the extreme financial impact and collateral guarantees required at importation customs process. Therefore, Astir Vitogiannis requested the Commission to consider these particular circumstances and ensure that measures are taken in order to limit the fallout from provisional anti-dumping measures on goods that were in transit. |
| (220) | Kot je pojasnjeno tudi v uvodni izjavi 216 zgoraj, so se ti uporabniki zanašali na razmeroma splošne izjave ter niso količinsko opredelili in utemeljili učinka ukrepov na njihovo dobičkonosnost in sposobnost preživetja. Nasprotno, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 265 začasne uredbe, se je zdelo, da bi družba Eviosys, ki je edini uporabnik, ki je predložil izpolnjen vprašalnik ter podatke o stroških in dobičkonosnosti, lahko absorbirala morebitno zvišanje stroškov. Zato je Komisija te trditve zavrnila. | (220) | As also explained above at recital (216), these users relied on relatively general statements and did not quantify and substantiate the impact of the measures on their profitability and viability. On the contrary, as explained in recital (265) of the provisional Regulation, it appeared that Eviosys, which is the only user that submitted a questionnaire reply and data about costs and profitability, would be able to absorb a possible cost increase. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims. |
| (221) | Družba Eviosys je izrazila zaskrbljenost tudi glede hkratne uporabe zaščitnih in protidampinških ukrepov, katerih skupni učinki na iste uvožene izdelke bi poslabšali morebitne negativne učinke prelivanja posameznega ukrepa na uporabnike in potrošnike Unije. Sklicevala se je na predhodno predložene pripombe, v katerih je pojasnila, da so zaščitni ukrepi, ki se izvajajo, skupaj z drugimi nedavnimi dogodki na evropskem in svetovnem trgu jekla v Uniji povzročili znatno pomanjkanje zalog izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, kar je vplivalo na družbo Eviosys in celotno industrijo embalažnega jekla. To se ne nanaša le na uvoz iz Kitajske, ampak tudi na uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav, pri čemer za nekatere od teh držav v okviru zaščitnih ukrepov sploh ni določena kvota za posamezno državo. Družba Eviosys se ni strinjala z izjavo Komisije iz uvodne izjave 250 začasne uredbe, da bi lahko „uporabniki Unije […] izdelek v preiskavi pridobivali iz drugih tretjih držav“. Navedla je, da bodo protidampinški ukrepi, ki bi se uvedli za kitajski in brazilski uvoz, dodatno poslabšali situacijo omejene dobave na trgu Unije, zlasti ob upoštevanju ravni dajatev, ki jih je Komisija začasno uvedla in so zelo visoke. | (221) | Eviosys also expressed its concerns about the simultaneous application of safeguard and anti-dumping measures, the combined effects of which on the same imported products would exacerbate any negative spill-overs of each measure on Union users and consumers. Eviosys referred to previous submissions where it has explained that the safeguard measures in place, in combination with other recent developments in the steel market in Europe and worldwide, have led to significant supply shortages of ECCS in the Union, affecting both Eviosys and the steel packaging industry as a whole. This does not only concern imports from China but also imports from other third countries – some of which are not even allocated a country-specific quota under the safeguard measures. Eviosys disagreed with the statement of the Commission in recital (250) of the provisional Regulation that
‘Union users could source the product under investigation from other third countries’
. According to Eviosys, if anti-dumping duties are imposed on Chinese and Brazilian imports, such measures will further exacerbate the situation of limited supply in the Union market, especially given the level of the duties provisionally imposed by the Commission, which were extremely high. |
| (222) | Komisija je opozorila, da se protidampinški ukrepi uporabljajo le, če se za uvoz zadevnega izdelka ne uporabljajo zaščitni ukrepi. V skladu z Uredbo (EU) 2019/1382 (27) se za enak izdelek ne uporablja hkrati dvojno pravno sredstvo. To načelo bo izraženo tudi v tej uredbi, kot je določeno v uvodnih izjavah 262 in 263 v nadaljevanju. Vsekakor strani niso utemeljile, kako bi lahko kombinacija ukrepov dejansko tako negativno vplivala nanje, da bi bila uvedba protidampinških ukrepov v nasprotju z interesom Unije. Zato je bil ta argument zavrnjen. | (222) | The Commission recalled that the anti-dumping measures only apply if and to the extent that the imports of the product concerned are not subject to the safeguard measures. According to Regulation (EU) 2019/1382 (27), there is no double remedy in place at the same time on the same product. That principle will also be reflected in the present Regulation, as set out in recitals (262) and (263) below. In any event the parties failed to substantiate how the combination of the measures would actually affect them in such a negative way to render the imposition of the anti-dumping measures against the Union interest. Therefore this argument was rejected. |
| (223) | Družba CANPACK se po začasnem in dokončnem razkritju ni strinjala z ugotovitvijo Komisije, da imajo uporabniki izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla v Uniji drugo možnost v obliki dobave teh izdelkov iz tretjih držav glede na to, da so zaščitne tarifne kvote, dodeljene drugim tretjim državam, nižje od kvot, dodeljenih Kitajski, in se zato ti izdelki porabljajo veliko hitreje. V nasprotju z izjavo Komisije iz začasne uredbe je trdila, da cene izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Japonske in Južne Koreje v obdobju preiskave niso bile znatno višje, ampak primerljive s povprečnimi uvoznimi cenami iz Kitajske (Japonska 776 EUR (+ 8,5 % v primerjavi s kitajskimi cenami); Južna Koreja 763 EUR (+ 6,7 % v primerjavi s kitajskimi cenami)), medtem ko je raven stroškov v teh dveh državah višja kot na Kitajskem. | (223) | Both after provisional and final disclosure, CANPACK disagreed, with the Commission’s finding that Union users of ECCS have an alternative in the form of ECCS supplies from third countries, considering that the safeguard tariff quotas granted to other third countries are lower than those granted to China, and are thus being consumed much faster. CANPACK claimed that, contrary to the Commission’s statement in the provisional Regulation, the prices of ECCS originating in Japan and South Korea in the investigation period were not significantly higher but comparable to the average import price of imports from China (Japan EUR 776 (+ 8,5 % in comparison to Chinese prices); South Korea EUR 763 (+ 6,7 % in comparison to Chinese prices)), while the cost level in these two countries is higher than in China. |
| (224) | Družba Astir Vitogiannis je tudi opozorila, da se bo z zelo visokimi protidampinškimi dajatvami učinkovito prepovedala večina uvoza iz Kitajske in Brazilije, pri čemer ni realistične in zadostne alternativne dobave iz drugih tretjih držav, in se ni strinjala s trditvijo Komisije, da se je uvoz iz drugih držav, ki niso bile vključene v preiskavo, zmanjšal zaradi domnevno nizkih in dampinških uvoznih cen iz Brazilije in Kitajske ter da „[č]e dampinškega uvoza iz zadevnih držav ne bi bilo, bi se uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav povečal, saj bi bile prodajne cene na trgu Unije privlačnejše“. Navedla je, da so se glede na razpoložljive podatke Eurostata uvozne cene iz držav, ki niso bile vključene v preiskavo (npr. Združenega kraljestva, Južne Koreje), v zadnjem obdobju (tj. po koncu obdobja preiskave) znatno zvišale kljub domnevno nizkim in dampinškim cenam iz Kitajske in Brazilije ter kljub dejstvu, da se je obseg uvoza iz teh držav, ki niso bile vključene v preiskavo, hkrati zmanjšal. To dodatno dokazuje, da se na uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav ni mogoče zanašati kot na zanesljivo in zajamčeno zamenjavo za izgubljeni uvoz iz Brazilije in Kitajske. Nazadnje je družba Astir Vitogiannis navedla, da je za uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav zaradi vrste dejavnosti potreben do eno leto dolg postopek preverjanja in potrjevanja. | (224) | Astir Vitogiannis also pointed out that the very high anti-dumping duties will effectively ban the majority of imports from China and Brazil while there are no realistic and sufficient alternative supplies from other third countries and disagreed with the Commission’s assertion that decreasing imports from other, non-investigated countries, is due to allegedly low and dumped import prices from Brazil and China, and that
‘[I]n the absence of dumped imports from the countries concerned, imports from other third countries would increase, as the sales prices on the Union market would be more attractive’
. According to Astir Vitogiannis, the available Eurostat data shows that import prices from non-investigated countries (e.g. UK, South Korea) have increased significantly during the most recent past (i.e., following the end of the investigation period) despite the alleged low and dumped prices from China and Brazil, and equally despite the fact that import volumes from these non-investigated countries decreased at the same time. This further demonstrates that imports from other third countries cannot be relied upon as a valid and guaranteed backup for lost imports from Brazil and China. Finally, Astir Vitogiannis argued that imports from other third countries, require long qualification and validation process up to one year due to the nature of the business. |
| (225) | Komisija se s tem ni strinjala. Kot je že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 250 začasne uredbe, je Komisija ugotovila, da se je skupni uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav v obravnavanem obdobju zmanjšal za 23 %, hkrati pa se je uvoz iz zadevnih držav povečal. Če dampinškega uvoza iz zadevnih držav ne bi bilo, bi se uvoz iz drugih tretjih držav verjetno povečal, saj bi bil trg Unije privlačnejši in bi se lahko zaračunale višje cene. Poleg tega so se cene glede na informacije, ki jih je predložila industrija Unije, začele zniževati že maja 2022, kar so potrdile tudi cene uvoza iz zadevnih držav, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 216; razmere pa so se začele spreminjati v korist kupcev, pri čemer je industrija Unije vsekakor pripravljena preusmeriti del izvoza za zagotovitev dobave kupcem v Uniji. Zato je bila ta trditev zavrnjena. | (225) | The Commission disagreed. As already explained at recitals (250) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission found that the total volume of imports from other third countries decreased by 23 % over the period considered, while at the same time imports from the countries concerned increased. In the absence of dumped imports from the countries concerned, imports from other third countries would likely increase as the Union market would be more attractive and higher prices could be charged. Furthermore, according to information submitted by the Union industry, prices already started to fall in May 2022, which as explained in recital (216), was confirmed also by the prices of the imports from the countries concerned; the balance was shifting in favour of buyers, and that in any event they are ready to re-direct part of the export sales to supply buyers in the Union. Therefore this claim was rejected. |
| (226) | Po začasnem in dokončnem razkritju je združenje CISA navedlo, da bi moral trenutni inflacijski pritisk na gospodarstvo Unije skupaj s pritiskom na dobavne verige ter omejeno razpoložljivostjo zadevnega izdelka in njegovih surovin zaradi geopolitičnega razvoja pa tudi hude motnje v svetovni dobavni verigi spodbuditi Komisijo k opustitvi ali vsaj začasni prekinitvi ukrepov. Poleg tega sta združenje CISA in kitajska vlada navedla, da se izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla uporabljajo predvsem v proizvodnji poceni konzervirane hrane, katere glavni porabniki so potrošniki Unije z nižjimi prihodki, katerih življenjski stroški so zaradi inflacije že tako višji. Sklicevala sta se tudi na pripombe družbe Eviosys glede pomanjkanja zalog na trgu Unije ter nadalje opozorila na veliko tržno moč proizvajalcev Unije v škodo pogajalske moči industrije nižje v verigi. V zvezi s tem sta se sklicevala na sklep Komisije z dne 11. junija 2019, s katerim je bila prepovedana ustanovitev skupnega podjetja družb Tata Steel in ThyssenKrupp (28). | (226) | Following provisional and final disclosure, CISA argued that the current inflationary pressure experienced in the Union economy, together with the pressure on supply chains and the limited availability of the product concerned and its raw materials due to geopolitical developments, as well as the severe global supply chain disruptions, should prompt the Commission to abandon the measures or at least to suspend them. In addition, CISA and the GOC argued that ECCS is primarily used to produce low-cost canned foods, which are relied on extensively by Union consumers at the lower income levels, who are already experiencing increased cost of living expenses due to inflation. CISA and the GOC also referred to the comments made by Eviosys with respect to supply shortages on the Union market and further pointed to the strong market power of the Union producers, to the detriment of the downstream industry’s bargaining power. In this regard, they referred to Commission decision of 11 June 2019 prohibiting the Tata steel and ThyssenKrupp joint venture. (28) |
| (227) | Komisija se s tem ni strinjala. Prvič, ugotovila je, da so te trditve združenja CISA splošne in da ni bila predložena nobena dejanska razlaga ali dokazi o učinku navedenih dejavnikov na položaj uporabnikov. Nadalje, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 266 začasne uredbe, uporabnik Eviosys v zvezi z možnim učinkom na cene hrane ni utemeljil svoje trditve, da bi dokazal, da bi zvišanje cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla povzročilo zvišanje cen embalaže za živila in posledično zvišanje cen živil ali da bi bilo to morebitno zvišanje sorazmerno z zvišanjem cen izdelkov elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla. Poleg tega se elektrolitsko kromirano jeklo uporablja le za dna in pokrove pločevink za živila, pokositrena pločevina, ki je dražja, pa se uporablja za obod pločevink. Zato ni verjetno, da bi morebitno zvišanje cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla samo po sebi znatno vplivalo na cene živilske embalaže. Po začasnem razkritju niso bili izraženi pomisleki glede tega sklepa. Komisija je zato zavrnila trditve združenja CISA in kitajske vlade. | (227) | The Commission disagreed. First, it noted that these assertions by CISA were generic and there no actual explanation or evidence of the impact of the factors mentioned on the users’ situation was provided. Furthermore, as explained at recital (266) of the provisional Regulation concerning possible effect on food prices, Eviosys did not substantiate its claim to demonstrate that the increase of ECCS prices would result in an increase in food packaging prices, and ultimately in an increase of foodstuff prices, or that such potential increases would be in the same proportion as the increase of ECCS prices. Furthermore, ECCS is only used for food cans’ endings, while tinplate, which is more expensive, is used for the cans’ body. Therefore, any potential increase of ECCS prices alone is not likely to affect food packaging prices significantly. This conclusion has not been put into question following provisional disclosure. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claims of CISA and the GOC. |
| (228) | Nazadnje je Komisija ugotovila, da v skladu s členom 21(1) osnovne uredbe odločitev o tem, ali interes Unije zahteva posredovanje, temelji na ocenitvi vseh različnih interesov, vzetih kot celota. Pri taki preiskavi je posebna pozornost namenjena potrebi po odpravi učinkov škodljivega dampinga, ki izkrivlja trgovino, in vzpostavitvi učinkovite konkurence. | (228) | In conclusion, the Commission noted that under Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation a determination as to whether the Union interest calls for an intervention shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole. In such an examination, the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition shall be given special consideration. |
| (229) | Komisija je skrbno ocenila vse trditve in dokaze v zvezi z interesom Unije ter preverila, ali bi bila zaščita, zagotovljena industriji Unije na podlagi ukrepov, očitno nesorazmerna v primerjavi z interesi uporabnikov, kot so določeni v tem oddelku. | (229) | The Commission carefully assessed all claims and evidence in relation to Union interest and verified whether the protection offered the Union industry by measures would be clearly disproportionate when compared to the interest of users, as specified in this section. |
| (230) | Glede na očitne razmere v zvezi z dampingom in škodo je Komisija sklenila, da so dokončni ukrepi upravičeni, da bi lahko proizvajalci Unije ponovno vzpostavili trajnostne stopnje dobička. Zlasti je sklenila, da sta škoda, ki jo je utrpela industrija Unije, in potreba, da se industrija Unije zaščiti pred dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav, pomembnejši od vprašanj, ki so jih predložili uporabniki. Kljub temu je Komisija ob upoštevanju vprašanj, ki so jih opisali uporabniki, in razvoja trga po obdobju preiskave, kot je nadalje pojasnjen v uvodni izjavi 244 v nadaljevanju, proučila uporabo oblike dajatev, ki bi bile primernejše glede na ta razvoj. | (230) | In view of the clear dumping and injury picture, the Commission concluded that definitive measures are warranted to enable the Union producers to return to sustainable profit levels. Specifically, the Commission concluded that the injury suffered by the Union industry and the need to protect it from dumped imports from the countries concerned prevailed over the issues raised by users. Nevertheless, in light of the issues described by the users and the market developments after the investigation period, as further explained in recital (244) below, the Commission considered the application of a form of duties that would be better suited to these developments. |
| (231) | Zato je Komisija potrdila začasno ugotovitev, da v okviru interesa Unije v skladu s členom 21 osnovne uredbe ni dovolj utemeljenih razlogov, ki bi nasprotovali uvedbi dokončnih ukrepov za uvoz zadevnega izdelka. | (231) | Therefore, the Commission confirmed the provisional conclusion that there are no sufficient compelling reasons of Union interest under Article 21 of the basic Regulation against the imposition of definitive measures on imports of the product concerned. |
| 7.2.3 Sklep o interesu Unije | 7.2.3. Conclusion on Union interest |
| (232) | Na podlagi navedenega je Komisija potrdila sklep iz uvodne izjave 274 začasne uredbe, da ni prepričljivih razlogov, da uvedba ukrepov za uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz zadevnih držav ni v interesu Unije. | (232) | Considering the above-mentioned, the Commission confirmed the conclusion in recital (274) of the provisional Regulation that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of ECCS originating in the countries concerned. |
| 8. DOKONČNI PROTIDAMPINŠKI UKREPI | 8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES |
| 8.1 Dokončni ukrepi | 8.1. Definitive measures |
| (233) | Glede na sprejete sklepe o dampingu, škodi, vzročni zvezi, stopnji ukrepov in interesu Unije bi bilo treba v skladu s členom 9(4) osnovne uredbe uvesti dokončne protidampinške ukrepe, da se prepreči, da bi uvoz zadevnega izdelka po dampinških cenah še naprej povzročal škodo industriji Unije. | (233) | In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. |
| (234) | V skladu z enakim pristopom, kot je pojasnjen v uvodni izjavi 278 začasne uredbe, je dokončna dajatev za druge sodelujoče nevzorčene družbe v LRK temeljila na tehtani povprečni stopnji dampinga, določeni za vzorčeni družbi v LRK, ki je bila, v nasprotju z začasno fazo, nižja od tehtane povprečne stopnje škode. | (234) | Following the same approach explained in recital (278) of the provisional Regulation, the definitive duty for the other cooperating non-sampled companies in the PRC was based on the weighted average dumping margin as established for the two sampled companies in the PRC, which, contrary to the provisional stage, was lower than the weighted average injury margin. |
| (235) | Po pojasnilih in popravkih, ki jih je Komisija zagotovila 16. septembra 2022, je združenje CISA navedlo, da še vedno ni jasno, ali je fiksna dajatev za druge sodelujoče družbe temeljila na stopnji dampinga ali stopnji škode, ugotovljeni za te družbe. Poleg tega je ponovno navedlo argument, da Komisija ni sprejela ugotovitev o surovinah za sodelujoče nevzorčene družbe. Zato se člena 7(2a) in 7(2b) osnovne uredbe ne bi smela uporabljati za te družbe. | (235) | Following the clarifications and corrections made by the Commission on 16 September 2022, CISA commented that it was still unclear whether the fixed duty for other cooperating companies was based on the dumping margin or injury margin found for these companies. In addition, it reiterated its argument that the Commission did not make findings of raw materials for the cooperating non-sampled companies. As a result, Articles 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation should not apply to those companies. |
| (236) | Komisija je pojasnila, da je fiksna dajatev za sodelujoče nevzorčene družbe temeljila na tehtani povprečni stopnji dampinga, ki je bila nižja od ugotovljene tehtane povprečne stopnje škode. Poleg tega je Komisija menila, da je vzorec proizvajalcev izvoznikov v LRK reprezentativen, pri čemer nobena stran ni izpodbijala izbranega vzorca ali predložila pripomb v zvezi z njim, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 16 začasne uredbe. Zato so se ugotovitve za vzorčene družbe, tudi v zvezi s členoma 7(2a) in 7(2b) osnovne uredbe za družbo Jintai, prav tako obravnavale kot reprezentativne za nevzorčene sodelujoče družbe. Komisija je torej menila, da je te ugotovitve primerno upoštevati v izračunu tehtane povprečne stopnje škode in stopnje dampinga sodelujočih nevzorčenih družb na podlagi dveh vzorčenih družb. Zato je to trditev zavrnila. | (236) | The Commission clarified that the fixed duty for the cooperating non-sampled companies was based on the weighted average dumping margin which was lower than the weighted average injury margin found. Furthermore, the Commission considered that the sample of the exporting producers in the PRC was representative and, as pointed out in recital (16) of the provisional Regulation, no party challenged or even commented on the selected sample. Consequently, the findings for the sampled companies, including regarding Articles 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation for Jintai, were also considered representative for the non-sampled cooperating companies. Hence, the Commission considered it appropriate to take into account those findings when calculating the weighted average injury and dumping margins of the cooperating non-sampled companies on the basis of the two sampled companies. It therefore rejected the claim. |
| (237) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 279 in 280 začasne uredbe, je glede na nizko stopnjo sodelovanja proizvajalcev v LRK in dejstvo, da je stopnja dajatve za družbo Jintai temeljila na stopnji dampinga, ugotovljeni v skladu s členom 7(2a) osnovne uredbe, stopnja dajatve na ravni države temeljila na najvišjih stopnjah dampinga, ugotovljenih glede na vrsto izdelka, ki ga je družba Jintai prodala v reprezentativnih količinah. Komisiji ni bilo treba izračunati stopenj nelojalnega nižanja ciljnih cen ali stopenj škode v zvezi z nesodelujočimi družbami zaradi ugotovitev o izkrivljanju na trgu surovin v skladu s členom 7(2a). | (237) | As explained in recitals (279) and (280) of the provisional Regulation, given the low level of cooperation from producers in the PRC and the fact that the duty level for Jintai was based on the dumping margin found in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the level of the countrywide duty level was based on the highest dumping margins found per product types sold in representative quantities by Jintai. The Commission did not need to calculate the underselling or the injury margins as regards non-cooperating companies because of the findings of raw materials distortions under Article 7(2a). |
| (238) | Kar zadeva Brazilijo, je bila stopnja sodelovanja visoka, zato je preostala dajatev določena na isti ravni kot tista, ki se uporablja za družbo Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional. | (238) | Regarding Brazil, cooperation was high and as a result, the residual duty was set at the same level as the one applicable to Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional. |
| (239) | Komisija je v začasni fazi uvedla dajatve ad valorem. Po začasnem razkritju so družbe CSN, Eviosys in Baosteel ter grško ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve od Komisije zahtevali, naj prouči možnost uporabe minimalne uvozne cene namesto dajatev ad valorem. Družba CSN je trdila, da bi minimalna uvozna cena proizvajalcem Unije omogočila, da si opomorejo od učinkov domnevnega škodljivega dampinga, hkrati pa preprečila morebitne škodljive učinke neupravičenih zvišanj cen po obdobju preiskave, ki bi lahko zelo negativno vplivala na poslovanje uporabnikov. Minimalna uvozna cena bi tudi odpravila pomisleke uporabnikov, ki jih je strah pomanjkanja zadevnega izdelka, in preprečila hude motnje v oskrbi trga Unije. | (239) | At provisional stage, the Commission imposed ad valorem duties. Following provisional disclosure, CSN, Eviosys, Baosteel and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Commission to consider the application of a minimum import price (‘MIP’) instead of ad valorem duties. CSN claimed that a MIP would allow the Union producers to recover from the effects of alleged injurious dumping while preventing any adverse effect of undue price increases after the investigation period which could have a significant negative impact on the users’ business. A MIP would also accommodate the concerns of users as they fear a shortage of the product concerned and would prevent serious disturbances in the supply of the Union market. |
| (240) | Komisija je ocenila te trditve in sklenila, da minimalna uvozna cena ni primerna oblika dajatev, saj pomeni določitev cene na fiksni ravni in lahko torej intenzivneje posega na trg. To bi lahko bilo v tem primeru zlasti problematično, saj je za trg značilno majhno število proizvajalcev Unije. Poleg tega minimalna uvozna cena pogosto ni primerna oblika dajatve za nestanovitne trge (npr. nestanovitnost cen surovin), kot je trg jeklenih izdelkov. Komisija je zato te zahteve zavrnila. | (240) | The Commission assessed these claims and considered that a MIP was not an appropriate form of duties as it tends to set the price at a fixed levels and thus has the potential to interfere on the market in a more forceful way. This could be particularly problematic in the case at hand where the market is characterised by a small number of Union producers. In addition, a MIP is often not an appropriate form of duty for markets that are subject to volatility (e.g. raw material prices volatility), which is the case for steel products. Therefore, the Commission rejected these requests. |
| (241) | Po dokončnem razkritju sta družbi Eviosys in Baosteel ponovili zahtevo, da se prouči možnost uporabe minimalne uvozne cene. To zahtevo je podprla družba CANPACK. Poleg tega je družba Eviosys predlagala, da bi se morala minimalna uvozna cena skupaj z dajatvijo ad valorem, ki se uporablja, kadar se minimalna uvozna cena ne spoštuje, uporabljati prvi dve leti izvajanja ukrepov, potem pa bi jo samodejno nadomestila fiksna dajatev. Svojo zahtevo je utemeljila z izjemnimi razmerami v zvezi z razpoložljivostjo zalog zadevnega izdelka pri proizvajalcih Unije, kar naj bi se po njenih navedbah uredilo v naslednjih dveh letih. Poleg tega se je sklicevala na več prejšnjih predpisov (29), s katerimi je Komisija spremenila dajatve v minimalno uvozno ceno, da bi zaščitila interese uporabnikov in preprečila pomanjkanje zalog. Sklicevala se je tudi na prejšnje preiskave, pri katerih je bilo trajanje protidampinških ukrepov zaradi izjemnih tržnih razmer omejeno na dve leti (30). | (241) | After final disclosure, Eviosys and Baosteel reiterated their request for considering the application of a MIP. This request was supported by CANPACK. In addition, Eviosys proposed that a MIP, combined with an ad valorem duty that becomes applicable when the MIP is not respected, should be applicable for the first two years of the application of the measures after which a fixed duty would automatically replace the MIP. Eviosys justified its request on the basis of exceptional circumstances regarding the availability of supplies of the product concerned by the Union producers which it considered will be solved within the next two years. Furthermore, it referred to several previous Regulations (29) where the Commission changed the duties to a MIP in order to safeguard the interests of the users and prevent shortages of supply. In addition, it made reference to previous investigations where the duration of the anti-dumping measures was limited to two years due to exceptional market circumstances (30). |
| (242) | Po dokončnem razkritju je družba Eurofer podprla ugotovitve Komisije, da minimalna uvozna cena zaradi velikega nedavnega zvišanja stroškov proizvodnje izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, ki vpliva na prodajno ceno teh izdelkov, v zadevni preiskavi ne bi bila primerna protidampinška dajatev. Zato minimalna uvozna cena industriji ne bi zagotovila primerne razbremenitve. Poleg tega se je ta zadeva precej razlikovala od prejšnjih preiskav, pri katerih se je uporabila minimalna uvozna cena, pri čemer je te cene lahko zaobiti ali absorbirati. | (242) | After final disclosure, Eurofer supported the Commission’s findings that a MIP would not be an appropriate anti-dumping duty in the investigation at hand because of the sharp recent increase in costs of production for ECCS, which impacts the sales price of ECCS. A MIP would therefore not bring adequate relief to the industry. Moreover, this case was substantially different from previous investigations where a MIP was applied, and MIPs are easy to circumvent or absorb. |
| (243) | Komisija je ugotovila, da družba Eviosys in družba Baosteel ponovljenih zahtev glede uvedbe minimalne uvozne cene nista podprli z novimi informacijami ali dokazi. Zato so ugotovitve iz uvodne izjave 240 ostale veljavne. Družba Eviosys prav tako ni predložila dokazov v podporo trditvi, da bi bila za odpravo domnevnega začasnega pomanjkanja zalog minimalna uvozna cena primernejša od fiksne dajatve, ki jo je predlagala Komisija. Poleg tega so bili predloženi pomisleki o domnevnem začasnem pomanjkanju zalog, saj je industrija Unije navedla, da bo še naprej prodajala zadostne količine zadevnega izdelka. Četudi bi se domnevno pomanjkanje zalog dejansko uresničilo, nič v spisu ni kazalo na to, da bi bila dveletna uvedba minimalne uvozne cene ustrezno in sorazmerno orodje za obravnavanje tega pomanjkanja. Kar zadeva prejšnje predpise, na katere se je družba Eviosys sklicevala v zvezi z uvedbo minimalne uvozne cene, je Komisija opozorila, da se ocena, ali je uvedba minimalne uvozne cene primerna, izvede za vsak primer posebej in je odvisna od posebnih razmer v posameznem primeru. Zaradi razlogov iz uvodne izjave 240 zgoraj, in sicer da minimalna uvozna cena zagotavlja le osnovno raven zaščite, ki v tem primeru ob upoštevanju jasnih ugotovitev glede dampinga in škode ter trenutnih težkih in nestanovitnih tržnih razmer ni zadostna, se je v obravnavanem primeru štelo, da minimalna uvozna cena ne bi bila primerna vrsta protidampinškega ukrepa. Kar zadeva sklicevanja na prejšnje predpise, s katerimi je bilo skupno trajanje zadevnih protidampinških ukrepov omejeno na dve leti, Komisija ni razumela njihove pomembnosti, saj so se nanašali le na skupno trajanje ukrepov in ne na njihovo spremembo oblike po več letih uporabe, kot je predlagala družba Eviosys. Poleg tega, kot je opozorila že družba Eviosys, je bil v vsakem od teh predpisov razlog za omejitev trajanja ukrepov zelo specifičen za dejanske okoliščine določene preiskave, pri čemer so se razlogi zelo razlikovali. Zato je Komisija menila, da so se navedeni predpisi nanašali na razmere, drugače od razmer v obravnavanem primeru. Glede na navedene premisleke je Komisija te zahteve zavrnila. | (243) | The Commission observed that no new information or evidence was submitted by Eviosys or Baosteel in support of their reiterated requests for imposing a MIP. Therefore, the findings made in recital (240) above remained valid. In addition, no evidence was provided by Eviosys in support of its claim that a MIP would be more appropriate than the fixed duty as proposed by the Commission to address the alleged temporary shortage of supply. In addition, the alleged temporary shortage of supply was questioned, given the submissions by the Union industry that it will continue selling sufficient quantities of the product concerned. Finally, even if the alleged shortage of supply would indeed materialise, nothing on the file indicated that the two years’ period of imposing a MIP would be the appropriate and proportionate tool for addressing it. As far as the previous Regulations referred to by Eviosys regarding the imposition of a MIP are concerned, the Commission recalled that the assessment of whether the imposition of a MIP is appropriate is carried out on a case-by-case basis and depend on the particular circumstances of each case. In the case at hand, for the reasons set out in recital (240) above, namely that the MIP only offers a basic level of protection which is not sufficient in this case in view of the clear findings of dumping and injury, and the current difficult and volatile market conditions, it was considered that a MIP would not be a suitable type of anti-dumping measure. Regarding the references to previous Regulations where the overall duration of the respective anti-dumping measures was limited to two years, the Commission failed to see their relevance as they concerned only the overall duration of the measures and not their change in form after several years of application as proposed by Eviosys. In addition, as pointed out by Eviosys itself, in each of those Regulations the reasoning to limit the duration of the measures was very specific to the factual circumstances of that particular investigation and differed substantially among each other. Consequently, the Commission considered that the quoted Regulations concerned different situations than in the case at hand. In view of the above considerations, the Commission rejected these requests. |
| (244) | Kar zadeva obliko ukrepov, je Komisija ob upoštevanju nestanovitnosti cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla po koncu obdobja preiskave, ki so se skoraj podvojile, proučila uporabo fiksne dajatve na tono namesto dajatev ad valorem. Fiksna ali posebna dajatev bi omogočila zaščito industrije Unije pred škodljivim dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav, hkrati pa bi bila v primeru zvišanja cen manj omejevalna kot dajatev ad valorem, saj se v takem primeru njena teža znatno zmanjša. | (244) | With regard to the form of measures, in view of the volatility of the ECCS prices after the end of the investigation period, which almost doubled, the Commission considered the application of a fixed duty per tonne instead of ad valorem duties. A fixed or specific duty would allow the protection of the Union industry from injurious dumped imports from the countries concerned, while being less prohibitive compared to an ad valorem duty in case of an increase of prices, as its weight is significantly reduced in such a case. |
| (245) | Fiksna dajatev bo temeljila na ustrezni neškodljivi in nedampinški ceni v obdobju preiskave. | (245) | The fixed duty will be based on the respective non-injurious or non-dumped price during the investigation period. |
| (246) | Če bi se uvozne cene iz zadevnih držav znatno spremenile ter bi bila ta sprememba trajna in bi zmanjšala učinkovitost protidampinških ukrepov, Komisija v zvezi s tem opozarja strani, da bi lahko v skladu s členom 11(3) osnovne uredbe upoštevala te trajne spremembe in morda ustrezno prilagodila ukrepe novim okoliščinam, pri čemer bi lahko spremenila tudi njihovo obliko. | (246) | Should the import prices from the countries concerned change significantly and should this change be of lasting nature and result in the anti-dumping measures become less effective, the Commission reminds the parties that Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation would allow the Commission to take these lasting changes into account to possibly adapt the measures according to the new circumstances, including by changing their form. |
| (247) | Po dokončnem razkritju je družba Eurofer oporekala predlagani fiksni dajatvi, pri čemer je navedla, da so dogodki po obdobju preiskave utemeljevali uporabo dajatve ad valorem. Trdila je zlasti, da so se cene plina in električne energije v Uniji močno zvišale in pričakovati je, da se bodo v bližnji prihodnosti še zvišale. Poleg tega cene energije v Braziliji in LRK ne sledijo enakemu naraščajočemu gibanju, kar bi uvozu iz teh držav lahko omogočilo vstop v Unijo po nizkih cenah. Zato je družba Eurofer navedla, da so dajatve ad valorem glede na stalno visoko raven cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla nujne za zagotovitev ustrezne zaščite industrije Unije. Nazadnje, ker raven cen izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla ne bo dosegla nobenih drugih zelo nenavadnih najvišjih vrednosti, ni tveganja, da bi bile dajatve ad valorem preveč omejevalne. | (247) | Following final disclosure, Eurofer took issue with the proposed fixed duty arguing that developments in the post investigation period justified the application of an ad valorem duty. In particular, it claimed that gas and electricity prices in the Union have increased dramatically and are expected to increase further in the near future. Moreover, energy prices in Brazil and the PRC are not following the same upward trend which would allow the imports from those countries to enter at low prices into the Union. Consequently, Eurofer argued that given the persistent high ECCS price level, ad valorem duties are necessary to ensure adequate protection of the Union industry. Finally, given that the ECCS price level will not experience any other highly unusual peaks, there is no risk that ad valorem duties would be too prohibitive. |
| (248) | Komisija je priznala, da so se cene energije dejansko zvišale. Niso pa bile predložene nobene trditve in dokazi v zvezi s tem, da proizvajalci izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla ne morejo zvišati svojih cen in celotnih zvišanih stroškov prenesti na uporabnike, ter v zvezi s tem, kako bi se v tem kontekstu fiksna dajatev razlikovala od dajatve ad valorem. Podobno niso bili predloženi nobeni dokazi v zvezi s tem, da bi fiksne dajatve, izračunane za zadevno nedampinško ali neškodljivo ceno, ugotovljeno v obdobju preiskave, industriji Unije preprečile okrevanje po škodi, ki jo je utrpela v obdobju preiskave. Hkrati velja, kot je priznala družba Eurofer, da čeprav so cene morda dosegle vrhunec v obdobju od februarja do maja 2022 in so se od tega vrhunca znižale, so tudi po tem obdobju ostale znatno višje od ravni cen v obdobju preiskave. Na podlagi tega je Komisija potrdila svoje sklepe iz uvodne izjave 244 zgoraj, da bo fiksna dajatev zaščitila Unijo pred škodljivim dampinškim uvozom iz zadevnih držav, pri čemer so bili hkrati v največji možni meri obravnavani pomisleki uporabnikov glede visokih cen. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 246 zgoraj, če bi se cene iz zadevnih držav znatno spremenile in bi bila ta sprememba trajna ter bi zmanjšala učinkovitost protidampinških ukrepov, se lahko vsekakor ponovno prouči raven in/ali oblika ukrepov. | (248) | The Commission acknowledged that energy prices have indeed increased. However, no claim was made and no evidence was provided that the ECCS producers would be unable to increase their prices and to pass on their increased overall costs to the users and how a fixed rather than an ad valorem duty would be different in this respect. Similarly, no evidence was provided that the fixed duties calculated on the respective non-dumped or non-injurious price found during the investigation period would prevent the Union industry from recovering from the injury suffered during the investigation period. At the same time, as acknowledged by Eurofer, even though prices may have reached their peak in the period February to May 2022 and they have declined since that peak, prices remained, also after this period, well above the price levels of the investigation period. In these circumstances the Commission confirmed its conclusions in recital (244) above that the fixed duty will ensure protection of the Union industry from injurious dumped imports from the countries concerned, whereas at the same time the concerns of users with regard to the high prices were addressed to the extent possible. In any event, as indicated in recital (246) above, should prices from the countries concerned change significantly and should this change be of lasting nature and result in the anti-dumping measures become less effective, the level and/or the form of the measures can be revisited. |
| (249) | Po dokončnem razkritju je brazilski proizvajalec izvoznik CNS 13. septembra 2022 ponudil cenovno zavezo. Ker je bila ta ponudba prejeta precej po roku iz člena 8 osnovne uredbe, jo je Komisija zavrnila z utemeljitvijo, da ni bila predložena pravočasno. Komisija je vse zainteresirane strani o tem obvestila z obvestilom k spisu. | (249) | Following final disclosure, the Brazilian exporting producer CNS offered a price undertaking on 13 September 2022. Since that offer was received well after the deadline set by Article 8 of the basic Regulation, the Commission rejected the offer on the grounds that it had been submitted out of time. The Commission informed all interested parties of this through a note to the file. |
| (250) | Na podlagi navedenega bi morale biti dokončne stopnje protidampinške dajatve, izražene kot cena CIF meja Unije brez plačane carine, naslednje: | Država | Družba | Stopnja dampinga (v %) | Stopnja škode (v %) | Dokončna protidampinška dajatev (v %) | Dokončna protidampinška dajatev (v EUR/tono) | Ljudska republika Kitajska | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 30,7 | 33,9 | 30,7 | 239,82 | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 53,9 | 53,9 | 53,9 | 428,37 | Druge sodelujoče družbe: GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 34,6 | 37,6 | 34,6 | 271,01 | Vse druge družbe | 77,9 | 77,9 | 77,9 | 607,98 | Brazilija | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 66,8 | 53,2 | 53,2 | 348,39 | Vse druge družbe | 66,8 | 53,2 | 53,2 | 348,39 | (250) | On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed as a CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows: | Country | Company | Dumping margin (%) | Injury margin (%) | Definitive anti-dumping duty (%) | Definitive anti-dumping duty (EUR/tonne) | The People’s Republic of China | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 30,7 | 33,9 | 30,7 | 239,82 | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 53,9 | 53,9 | 53,9 | 428,37 | Other cooperating companies: GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co.,Ltd. Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 34,6 | 37,6 | 34,6 | 271,01 | All other companies | 77,9 | 77,9 | 77,9 | 607,98 | Brazil | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 66,8 | 53,2 | 53,2 | 348,39 | All other companies | 66,8 | 53,2 | 53,2 | 348,39 |
| (251) | Stopnje protidampinške dajatve za posamezne družbe, navedene v tej uredbi, so bile določene na podlagi ugotovitev te preiskave. Zato odražajo stanje, v kakršnem so bile te družbe med navedeno preiskavo. Te stopnje dajatev se torej uporabljajo izključno za uvoz zadevnega izdelka s poreklom iz zadevnih držav, ki so ga proizvedli poimensko navedeni pravni subjekti. Za uvoz zadevnega izdelka, ki ga je izdelala katera koli druga družba, ki ni izrecno omenjena v izvedbene delu te uredbe, vključno s subjekti, povezanimi z izrecno omenjenimi, se te stopnje dajatev ne morejo uporabljati in zanj velja stopnja dajatve, ki velja za „vse druge družbe“. | (251) | The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| (252) | Družba lahko zahteva uporabo teh individualnih stopenj protidampinške dajatve, če naknadno spremeni ime subjekta. Zahtevek je treba nasloviti na Komisijo (31). Vsebovati mora vse ustrezne informacije, s katerimi je mogoče dokazati, da sprememba ne vpliva na upravičenost družbe do stopnje dajatve, ki se zanjo uporablja. Če sprememba imena družbe ne vpliva na njeno pravico do izkoriščanja ugodnosti stopnje dajatve, ki se zanjo uporablja, se v Uradnem listu Evropske unije objavi uredba o spremembi imena. | (252) | A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (31). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| (253) | Za zmanjšanje tveganja izogibanja ukrepom zaradi razlik v stopnjah dajatve so potrebni posebni ukrepi, da se zagotovi pravilna uporaba individualnih protidampinških dajatev. Družbe, za katere veljajo individualne protidampinške dajatve, morajo carinskim organom držav članic predložiti veljaven trgovinski račun. Ta račun mora ustrezati zahtevam iz člena 1(3) te uredbe. Za uvoz, za katerega ta račun ni predložen, bi bilo treba uporabiti protidampinško dajatev, ki se uporablja za „vse druge družbe“. | (253) | To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| (254) | Čeprav je predložitev tega računa potrebna, da lahko carinski organi držav članic uporabijo individualne stopnje protidampinške dajatve za uvoz, pa ni edini element, ki ga morajo carinski organi upoštevati. Četudi predloženi račun izpolnjuje vse zahteve iz člena 1(3) te uredbe, bi morali carinski organi držav članic izvajati običajne kontrole in lahko kot v vseh drugih primerih zahtevajo dodatne dokumente (odpremne listine itd.) za preverjanje točnosti navedb v deklaraciji in zagotovitev, da je uporabljena stopnja dajatve upravičena v skladu s carinsko zakonodajo. | (254) | While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law. |
| (255) | Če bi se zlasti po uvedbi zadevnih ukrepov znatno povečal obseg izvoza ene od družb, za katere veljajo nižje individualne stopnje dajatev, bi se lahko tako povečanje obsega obravnavalo kot sprememba v vzorcu trgovanja, ki je posledica uvedbe ukrepov v smislu člena 13(1) osnovne uredbe. V takih okoliščinah se lahko začne preiskava o izogibanju, če so za to izpolnjeni pogoji. S to preiskavo se lahko med drugim prouči potreba po odpravi individualnih stopenj dajatve in posledični uvedbi dajatve na ravni države. | (255) | Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty. |
| (256) | Da se zagotovi ustrezno izvrševanje protidampinških dajatev, bi bilo treba protidampinško dajatev za vse druge družbe uporabljati ne le za nesodelujoče proizvajalce izvoznike v tej preiskavi, ampak tudi za proizvajalce, ki v obdobju preiskave niso izvažali v Unijo. | (256) | To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period. |
| 8.2 Dokončno pobiranje začasnih dajatev | 8.2. Definitive collection of the provisional duties |
| (257) | Glede na ugotovljene stopnje dampinga in glede na raven škode, povzročene industriji Unije, bi bilo treba zneske, zavarovane z začasnimi protidampinškimi dajatvami, ki so bile uvedene z začasno uredbo, dokončno pobrati v obsegu, določenem v tej uredbi. | (257) | In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation. |
| 9. ZAHTEVKI ZA OPUSTITEV | 9. CLAIMS FOR SUSPENSION |
| (258) | Po začasnem razkritju so grško ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve, družbi Astir Vitogiannis in Baosteel ter združenje CISA trdili, da bi bilo treba ukrepe opustiti v skladu s členom 14(4) osnovne uredbe. Po dokončnem razkritju je združenje CISA predložilo enake trditve. Sklicevalo se je tudi na javna razpisa nemškega in evropskega združenja strojne industrije VDMA ter reprezentativnega združenja Unije za tehnološke industrije EU Orgalim, ki sta EU pozvala, naj zaradi vojaške agresije Ruske federacije proti Ukrajini opusti dajatve na trgovinska sredstva za jeklene izdelke. Vendar se nobeden od navedenih členov ni nanašal posebej na izdelke iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla ali na razmere na trgu za ta konkreten nišni izdelek. | (258) | Following provisional disclosure, Astir Vitogiannis, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baosteel and CISA claimed that the measures should be suspended according to Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation. Following final disclosure, the same claims were made by CSN and CISA. CISA also referred to public calls of VDMA, the German and European Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, and of Orgalim, the Union’s representative association of EU technology industries, both of which called on the EU to suspend trade remedies duties on steel products due to the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. However, none of the articles referred to concerned particularly ECCS or the situation of the market for that particular niche product. |
| (259) | Družba Baosteel ni dodatno pojasnila, zakaj je opustitev potrebna. Združenje CISA in družba CSN sta se sklicevala na zvišanja cen v obdobju po preiskavi, pritisk na dobavne verige ter omejeno razpoložljivost izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla in njihovih surovin zaradi nedavnih geopolitičnih dogodkov. | (259) | Baosteel did not explain further why a suspension was necessary. CISA and CSN referred to the post-investigation period price increases, the pressure on supply chains and the limited availability of ECCS and its raw materials due to recent geopolitical developments. |
| (260) | Družba Astir Vitogiannis je navedla, da je razpoložljivost izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla omejena in da se škoda ne bo nadaljevala, saj industrija Unije glede na splošne pozitivne rezultate zadevnih dveh proizvajalcev Unije domnevno ne trpi več škode. Grško ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve se je sklicevalo le na začasne spremembe na trgu, ki jih doslej še ni bilo, v smislu zelo visokih cen v obdobju po preiskavi. | (260) | Astir Vitogiannis argued that there is limited availability of ECCS and that injury will not resume as the Union industry is allegedly no longer injured based on the overall positive results of the two Union producers. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs only referred to the unprecedented and temporary changes on the market in terms of very high prices in post-investigation period. |
| (261) | V odziv je Komisija opozorila na svoje ugotovitve, ki jih je že oblikovala v okviru ocene interesa Unije. Zlasti je opozorila, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 216 in 225, da so se cene začele zniževati. Poleg tega glede na pričakovano upočasnitev gospodarstva v preostalem delu leta 2022 in leta 2023 ni pričakovati nadaljnjega zvišanja cen in povečanja povpraševanja. Ob upoštevanju ugotovitev o obsegu škodljivega dampinga, ki ga je povzročil uvoz iz zadevnih držav v obdobju preiskave, tudi ni bilo nobenih dokazov, da so se tržne razmere začasno toliko spremenile, da bi takojšnje nadaljevanje uvoza iz zadevnih držav pomenilo, da industrija Unije devet mesecev verjetno ne bi trpela škode. Na podlagi tega je Komisija sklenila, da zdaj ni primerno nadalje obravnavati trditev o opustitvi ukrepov. | (261) | In response, the Commission recalled its findings already set out in the context of the Union interest assessment. In particular, as noted in recitals (216) and (225), prices had started to fall. In addition, and in view of the expected slowdown of the economy for the rest of 2022 and 2023, prices and demand are not expected to increase further. In light of the findings of the extent of the injurious dumping caused by the imports from the countries concerned during the investigation period, there was also no evidence that market conditions had temporarily changed to the extent that the immediate resumption of imports from the countries concerned would mean that the Union industry would be unlikely to suffer injury for the duration of nine months. On that basis, the Commission decided that it was not appropriate to further consider the claims about suspending the measures at this time. |
| 10. KONČNA DOLOČBA | 10. FINAL PROVISION |
| (262) | Komisija je z Izvedbeno uredbo Komisije (EU) 2019/159 (32) uvedla zaščitni ukrep v zvezi z nekaterimi izdelki iz jekla za obdobje treh let. Z Izvedbeno uredbo Komisije (EU) 2021/1029 (33) je bil zaščitni ukrep podaljšan do 30. junija 2024. Zadevni izdelek spada v eno od kategorij izdelkov, ki jih zajema zaščitni ukrep. Posledično bi bilo treba, ko bodo tarifne kvote, določene v okviru zaščitnega ukrepa, presežene, za isti uvoz plačati tarifno dajatev nad kvoto in protidampinško dajatev. Ker lahko taka kumulacija protidampinških ukrepov z zaščitnimi ukrepi povzroči večji učinek na trgovino, kot je zaželeno, je Komisija sklenila, da v času trajanja uvedbe zaščitne dajatve prepreči sočasno uporabo protidampinške dajatve in tarifne dajatve nad kvoto za zadevni izdelek. | (262) | By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 (32), the Commission imposed a safeguard measure with respect to certain steel products for a period of three years. By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 (33), the safeguard measure was prolonged until 30 June 2024. The product concerned is one of the product categories covered by the safeguard measure. Consequently, once the tariff quotas established under the safeguard measure are exceeded, the above-quota tariff duty and the anti-dumping duty would become payable on the same imports. As such cumulation of anti-dumping measures with safeguard measures may lead to an effect on trade greater than desirable, the Commission decided to prevent the concurrent application of the anti-dumping duty with the above-quota tariff duty for the product concerned for the duration of the imposition of the safeguard duty. |
| (263) | To pomeni, da kadar se za zadevni izdelek začne uporabljati tarifna dajatev nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) 2019/159 in ta dajatev preseže stopnjo protidampinške dajatve v skladu s to uredbo, se pobira samo tarifna dajatev nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Uredbe (EU) 2019/159. V obdobju sočasne uporabe zaščitne in protidampinške dajatve se pobiranje dajatev, uvedenih v skladu s to uredbo, opusti. Kadar se za zadevni izdelek začne uporabljati tarifna dajatev nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Uredbe (EU) 2019/159 in je ta dajatev določena na ravni, ki je nižja od ravni protidampinške dajatve iz te uredbe, se pobere tarifna dajatev nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Uredbe (EU) 2019/159, ki se ji doda razlika med to dajatvijo in višjo od ravni protidampinške dajatve v skladu s to uredbo. Del zneska nepobrane protidampinške dajatve se opusti. | (263) | This means that where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and exceeds the level of the anti-dumping duty pursuant to this Regulation, only the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected. During the period of concurrent application of the safeguard and anti-dumping duty, the collection of the duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation shall be suspended. Where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and is set at a level lower than the level of the anti-dumping duty in this Regulation, the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected in addition to the difference between that duty and the higher of the level of the anti-dumping duty pursuant to this Regulation. The part of the amount of anti-dumping duty not collected shall be suspended. |
| (264) | V skladu s členom 109 Uredbe (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (34) je obrestna mera, kadar je treba znesek povrniti na podlagi sodbe Sodišča Evropske unije, obrestna mera, ki jo Evropska centralna banka uporablja v svojih operacijah glavnega refinanciranja, objavljena v seriji C Uradnega lista Evropske unije, in ki velja na prvi koledarski dan posameznega meseca. | (264) | In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (34), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month. |
| (265) | Ukrepi iz te uredbe so v skladu z mnenjem odbora, ustanovljenega s členom 15(1) Uredbe (EU) 2016/1036 – | (265) | The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, |
| SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO: | HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: |
| Člen 1 | Article 1 |
| 1. Uvede se dokončna protidampinška dajatev na uvoz ploščatih valjanih izdelkov iz železa ali nelegiranega jekla, platiranih ali prevlečenih s kromovimi oksidi ali s kromom in kromovimi oksidi, imenovanih tudi izdelki iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla, ki se trenutno uvrščajo pod oznaki KN 7210 50 00 in 7212 50 20, s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in Brazilije. | 1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, plated or coated with chromium oxides or with chromium and chromium oxides, also designated as electrolytic chromium coated steel products, currently falling under CN codes 7210 50 00 and 7212 50 20 and originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil. |
| 2. Stopnje dokončne protidampinške dajatve, ki se uporabljajo za neto ceno franko meja Unije pred plačilom dajatev za izdelke iz odstavka 1, ki jih proizvajajo spodaj navedene družbe, so naslednje: | 2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below, shall be as follows: |
| Država | Družba | Dokončna protidampinška dajatev | (v EUR/tono) | Dodatna oznaka TARIC | Country | Company | Definitive anti-dumping duty | (EUR/tonne) | TARIC additional code |
| Ljudska republika Kitajska | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 239,82 | C039 | The People’s Republic of China | Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 239,82 | C039 |
| Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 428,37 | C862 | Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd. | 428,37 | C862 |
| Druge sodelujoče družbe: GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 271,01 | C137 | Other cooperating companies: GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd. Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. | 271,01 | C137 |
| Vse druge družbe | 607,98 | C999 | All other companies | 607,98 | C999 |
| Brazilija | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 348,39 | C212 | Brazil | Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional | 348,39 | C212 |
| Vse druge družbe | 348,39 | C999 | All other companies | 348,39 | C999 |
| 3. Pogoj za uporabo individualnih stopenj dajatve, določenih za družbe iz odstavka 2, je, da se carinskim organom držav članic predloži veljaven trgovinski račun, ki vsebuje izjavo z datumom in podpisom uradnika subjekta, ki izdaja tak račun, ter njegovim imenom in funkcijo, in sicer: „Podpisani potrjujem, da je (količina) (zadevnega izdelka), prodanega za izvoz v Evropsko unijo, ki ga zajema ta račun, proizvedla družba (ime in naslov družbe) (dodatna oznaka TARIC) v [zadevni državi]. Izjavljam, da so informacije na tem računu popolne in točne.“ Če tak račun ni predložen, se uporabi dajatev, ki se uporablja za vse druge družbe. | 3. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply. |
| 4. V primerih, ko se blago poškoduje, preden je dano v prosti promet, in se zato dejansko plačana ali plačljiva cena porazdeli za določitev carinske vrednosti v skladu s členom 131(2) Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) 2015/2447 (35), se znesek protidampinške dajatve, izračunan na podlagi zgoraj navedenih zneskov, zniža za odstotek, ki ustreza porazdelitvi dejansko plačane ali plačljive cene. | 4. In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 131(2) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 (35) the amount of anti-dumping duty, calculated on the basis of the amounts set above, shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable. |
| 5. Če ni določeno drugače, se uporabljajo veljavne določbe v zvezi s carinami. | 5. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. |
| Člen 2 | Article 2 |
| Zneski, zavarovani z začasno protidampinško dajatvijo v skladu z Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2022/802 o uvedbi začasne protidampinške dajatve na uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in Brazilije, se dokončno poberejo. Zavarovani zneski, ki presegajo dokončne stopnje protidampinške dajatve, se sprostijo. | The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/802 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released. |
| Člen 3 | Article 3 |
| Člen 1(2) se lahko spremeni, da se dodajo novi proizvajalci izvozniki iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in se za njih uvede ustrezna tehtana povprečna stopnja protidampinške dajatve za sodelujoče družbe, ki niso vključene v vzorec. Novi proizvajalec izvoznik predloži dokaze, da: | Article 1(2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that: |
| (a) | v obdobju preiskave (med 1. julijem 2020 in 30. junijem 2021) ni izvažal blaga, opisanega v členu 1(1); | (a) | it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021); |
| (b) | ni povezan z nobenim izvoznikom ali proizvajalcem, za katerega veljajo ukrepi, uvedeni s to uredbo, in | (b) | it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and |
| (c) | je zadevni izdelek dejansko izvažal ali prevzel nepreklicno pogodbeno obveznost, da bo po koncu obdobja preiskave izvozil znatno količino v Unijo. | (c) | it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation. |
| Člen 4 | Article 4 |
| 1. Kadar se za izdelke iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla iz člena 1(1) začne uporabljati tarifna dajatev nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) 2019/159, se pobere tarifna dajatev nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) 2019/159, ki se ji doda razlika med to dajatvijo in višjo od enakovrednih ravni protidampinške dajatve ad valorem iz člena 1(2). | 1. Where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to electrolytic chromium coated steel products, referred to in Article 1(1), the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected in addition to the difference between that duty and the higher of the equivalent ad valorem level of the anti-dumping duty set out in Article 1(2). |
| 2. Del zneska protidampinških dajatev, ki ni bil pobran v skladu z odstavkom 1, se opusti. | 2. The part of the amount of anti-dumping duties not collected pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be suspended. |
| 3. Opustitev iz odstavka 2 je časovno omejena na obdobje uporabe tarifne dajatve nad kvoto iz člena 1(6) Izvedbene uredbe (EU) 2019/159. | 3. The suspensions referred to in paragraph 2 shall be limited in time to the period of application of the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159. |
| Člen 5 | Article 5 |
| Ta uredba začne veljati dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije. | This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| Ta uredba je v celoti zavezujoča in se neposredno uporablja v vseh državah članicah. | This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. |
| V Bruslju, 15. novembra 2022 | Done at Brussels, 15 November 2022. |
| Za Komisijo | For the Commission |
| predsednica | The President |
| Ursula VON DER LEYEN | Ursula VON DER LEYEN |
| (1)
UL L 176, 30.6.2016, str. 21. | (1)
OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21. |
| (2) Obvestilo o začetku protidampinškega postopka za uvoz izdelkov iz elektrolitsko kromiranega jekla s poreklom iz Ljudske republike Kitajske in Brazilije (UL C 387, 24.9.2021, str. 2). | (2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel (ECCS) products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil (OJ C 387, 24.9.2021, p. 2). |
| (3)
UL L 143, 23.5.2022, str. 11. | (3)
OJ L 143, 23.5.2022, p. 11. |
| (4) Delovni dokument služb Komisije o znatnih izkrivljanjih v gospodarstvu Ljudske republike Kitajske za namene preiskav trgovinske zaščite, 20. december 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final, str. 2). | (4) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2. |
| (5) https://www.usitc.gov/investigations/701731/2021/cold_rolled_steel_flat_products_brazil_china_india/first_review_full.htm | (5) https://www.usitc.gov/investigations/701731/2021/cold_rolled_steel_flat_products_brazil_china_india/first_review_full.htm |
| (6) Brazilski inštitut za jeklo (https://acobrasil.org.br/). | (6) Brazil Steel Institute (https://acobrasil.org.br/). |
| (7) Prav tam. | (7) Ibid. |
| (8) OECD, Steel market developments, Q2 2021 (Gibanje trga jekla – drugo četrtletje 2021), na voljo na: https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/steel-market-developments-Q2-2021.pdf. | (8) OECD, Steel market developments, Q2 2021, available at: https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/steel-market-developments-Q2-2021.pdf |
| (9) Uporabila se je cena CFR v italijanskih pristaniščih. V podatkovni zbirki Metal Bulletin je to bila edina cena CFR na voljo za ta izdelek. | (9) The price CFR Italian ports was used. It was the only CFR price available for this product on the Metal Bulletin database. |
| (10) https://corporate.arcelormittal.com/media/press-releases/arcelormittal-completes-investment-agreement-with-invitalia, obiskano 28. avgusta 2022. | (10) https://corporate.arcelormittal.com/media/press-releases/arcelormittal-completes-investment-agreement-with-invitalia, accessed on 28 August 2022. |
| (11) Brazilska vlada se je napačno sklicevala na uvodno izjavo 158 začasne uredbe. | (11) The GOB erroneously referred to recital (158) of the provisional Regulation. |
| (12) WT/DS578/R, Maroko – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on School Exercise Books from Tunisia (Dokončni protidampinški ukrepi za delovne zvezke iz Tunizije), poročilo odbora z dne 27. julija 2021, točka 7.207. | (12) WT/DS578/R, Morocco – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on School Exercise Books from Tunisia, Panel Report of 27 July 2021, para. 7.207. |
| (13) Glej sodbi Splošnega sodišča z dne 14. septembra 2022, Methanol Holdings (Trinidad)/Komisija, T-744/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:558, točka 100, in Nevinnomysskiy Azot in NAK „Azot“/Komisija, T-865/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:559, točke 195 in 261–268. | (13) See judgments of the General Court of 14 September 2022, Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) v Commission, Case T-744/19 ECLI:EU:T:2022:558, para. 100 and of 14 September 2022, Nevinnomysskiy Azot and NAK ‘Azot’ v Commission, Case T-865/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:559, paras 195, 261-268. |
| (14) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 10. aprila 2019, Jindal Saw in Jindal Saw Italia/Komisija, T-301/16, EU:T:2019:234, točka 184. | (14) Judgment of the General Court of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, T-301/16, EU:T:2019:234, para. (184). |
| (15) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 27. aprila 2022, Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan/Komisija, T-242/19, EU:T:2022:259, točki 89 in 90. | (15) Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022, Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan v Commission, T-242/19, EU:T:2022:259, paras (89) and (90). |
| (16) Na primer za carino in stroške, nastale po uvozu, ter prilagoditve za popuste in rabate. | (16) Such as for customs duties and post importation costs, as well as adjustments for discounts and rebates. |
| (17) Sodba Sodišča z dne 12. maja 2022, Komisija/Hansol Paper, C-260/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2022:370, točke 95–114. | (17) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper, C-260/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2022:370, paras (95)-(114). |
| (18) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 4. maja 2022, China Rubber Industry Association (CRIA) in China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC)/Evropska komisija, ECLI:EU:T:2022:266, točki 139 in 140. | (18) Judgment of the General Court of 4 May 2022, China Rubber Industry Association (CRIA) and China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2022:266, paras (139)-(140). |
| (19) Glej opombo 15 zgoraj. | (19) See footnote 15 above. |
| (20) Glej ArcelorMittal earnings skyrocket, foresees supportive 2022 conditions, 10. februar 2022, na voljo na https://www.kallanish.com/en/news/steel/market-reports/article-details/arcelormittal-sees-2022-market-conditions-supportive-0222/; Thyssenkrupp cashes in on higher steel prices (Družba Thyssenkrupp služi z višjimi cenami jekla), 10. februar 2022, na voljo na https://eurometal.net/thyssenkrupp-cashes-in-on-higher-steel-prices/; EU mills lift HRC further amid cost escalation (Obrati EU sredi zviševanja stroškov dodatno zvišali cene vroče valjanih navitij), 10. marec 2022, na voljo na https://eurometal.net/eu-mills-lift-hrc-further-amid-cost-escalation/. | (20) See
‘ArcelorMittal earnings skyrocket, foresees supportive 2022 conditions’
, 10 February 2022, available at https://www.kallanish.com/en/news/steel/market-reports/article-details/arcelormittal-sees-2022-market-conditions-supportive-0222/;
‘Thyssenkrupp cashes in on higher steel prices’
, 10 February 2022, available at https://eurometal.net/thyssenkrupp-cashes-in-on-higher-steel-prices/;
‘EU mills lift HRC further amid cost escalation’
10 March 2022, available at https://eurometal.net/eu-mills-lift-hrc-further-amid-cost-escalation/ |
| (21) Glej sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 14. septembra 2022, Methanol Holdings (Trinidad)/Komisija, T-744/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:558, točka 103. | (21) See judgment of the General Court of 14 September 2022, Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) v Commission, Case T-744/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:558, para. 103. |
| (22) Glej sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 14. septembra 2022, Nevinnomysskiy Azot in NAK „Azot“/Komisija, T-865/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:559, točka 377. | (22) See Judgment of the General Court of 14 September 2022, Nevinnomysskiy Azot and NAK ‘Azot’ v Commission, Case T-865/19, ECLI:EU:T:2022:559, para. 377. |
| (23) Glej sodbo v zadevi Transnational Company „Kazchrome“ in ENRC Marketing/Svet, T-192/08, EU:T:2011:619, točke 221–225. | (23) See, Case T-192/08, Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council, EU:T:2011:619, paras 221-225 |
| (24) Glej zadevo Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME) in drugi/Svet, T-422/13, EU:T:2017:251, točka 144, ki se sklicuje na zadevo Euroalliages in drugi/Komisija, T-132/01, EU:T:2003:189, točka 47. | (24) See, Case T-422/13, Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME) and Others v. Council, EU:T:2017:251, para. 144, referring to Case T-132/01, Euroalliages and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2003:189, para. 47. |
| (25) Predhodno razkritje je bilo izvedeno 25. aprila 2022. | (25) Pre-disclosure took place on 25 April 2022. |
| (26) Evropska komisija, Poletna gospodarska napoved 2022: poslabšanje obetov zaradi vojne Rusije, na voljo na: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/sl/ip_22_4511. | (26) European Commission, ‘Summer 2022 Economic Forecast: Russia’s war worsens the outlook’, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4511 |
| (27) Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2019/1382 z dne 2. septembra 2019 o spremembi nekaterih uredb, ki uvajajo protidampinške ali protisubvencijske ukrepe za nekatere izdelke iz jekla, za katere veljajo zaščitni ukrepi (UL L 227, 3.9.2019, str. 1). | (27) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1382 of 2 September 2019 amending certain Regulations imposing anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures on certain steel products subject to safeguard measures (OJ L 227, 3.9.2019, p. 1). |
| (28) Sklep Komisije z dne 11. junija 2019 v zadevi M.8713, Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV, točka 444. | (28) Commission decision in Case M.8713 – Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp/JV, 11 June 2019, para. 444. |
| (29) Te preiskave so se med drugim nanašale na uvoz zrnato usmerjenih ploščato valjanih izdelkov iz silicijevega jekla za elektropločevine iz Kitajske, Rusije, Koreje, Japonske in ZDA, vroče valjanih ploščatih izdelkov iz Brazilije, Irana, Rusije in Ukrajine, melamina iz Kitajske ter solarnega stekla iz Kitajske. Popoln seznam je na voljo na straneh 4 in 5 predložitve družbe Eviosys z dne 13. septembra 2022. | (29) Among others, those investigations concerned imports of grain oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel from China, Russia, Korea, Japan and USA, hot-rolled flat products from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine, melamine from China and solar glass from China. For a complete list see pp 4-5 of Eviosys submission dated 13 September 2022. |
| (30) Prav tam, glej str. 6 in 7. | (30) Idem, see pp. 6-7. |
| (31) Evropska komisija, Generalni direktorat za trgovino, Direktorat H, Wetstraat Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Bruselj, Belgija. E-naslov: TRADE-Defence-Complaints@ec.europa.eu. | (31) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Wetstraat 170 Rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium. Email: TRADE-Defence-Complaints@ec.europa.eu |
| (32) Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2019/159 z dne 31. januarja 2019 o uvedbi dokončnih zaščitnih ukrepov proti uvozu nekaterih izdelkov iz jekla (UL L 31, 1.2.2019, str. 27). | (32) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27). |
| (33) Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2021/1029 z dne 24. junija 2021 o spremembi Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) 2019/159 zaradi podaljšanja zaščitnega ukrepa v zvezi z uvozom nekaterih izdelkov iz jekla (UL L 225 I, 25.6.2021, str. 1). | (33) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products (OJ L 225 I, 25.6.2021, p. 1). |
| (34) Uredba (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. julija 2018 o finančnih pravilih, ki se uporabljajo za splošni proračun Unije, spremembi uredb (EU) št. 1296/2013, (EU) št. 1301/2013, (EU) št. 1303/2013, (EU) št. 1304/2013, (EU) št. 1309/2013, (EU) št. 1316/2013, (EU) št. 223/2014, (EU) št. 283/2014 in Sklepa št. 541/2014/EU ter razveljavitvi Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 966/2012 (UL L 193, 30.7.2018, str. 1). | (34) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1). |
| (35) Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2015/2447 z dne 24. novembra 2015 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za izvajanje nekaterih določb Uredbe (EU) št. 952/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o carinskem zakoniku Unije (UL L 343, 29.12.2015, str. 558). | (35) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558). |
