?
|
Naslov in reference |
Title and reference |
|
Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje (četrti senat) z dne 3. decembra 2003. Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje (četrti senat) z dne 3. decembra 2003. Oznaka ECLI: ECLI:EU:T:2003:326 |
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 3 December 2003. Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 3 December 2003. European Court Reports 2003 II-05141 ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:T:2003:326 |
|
Datumi |
Dates |
|
|
|
Drugi podatki |
Miscellaneous information |
|
|
|
Postopek |
Procedure |
|
|
|
Pravna doktrina |
Doctrine |
|
|
|
Klasifikacije |
Classifications |
|
|
|
Besedilo |
Text |
| Stranke Razlogi za odločitev Izrek | Parties Grounds Decision on costs Operative part |
Stranke | Parties |
| V zadevi T-208/01, | In Case T-208/01, |
| Volkswagen AG, s sedežem v kraju Wolfsburg (Nemčija), ki jo zastopa R. Bechtold, odvetnik, | Volkswagen AG, established in Wolfsburg (Germany), represented by R. Bechtold, lawyer, |
| tožeča stranka, | applicant, |
| proti | v |
| Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti, ki jo zastopa W. Mölls, zastopnik, z naslovom za vročanje v Luxembourgu, | Commission of the European Communities, represented by W. Mölls, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg, |
| tožena stranka, | defendant, |
| zaradi, primarno, predloga za razglasitev ničnosti Odločbe Komisije 2001/711/ES z dne 29. junija 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES (zadeva COMP/F-2/36.693 – Volkswagen, UL L 262, str. 14), podredno pa predloga za znižanje globe, naložene tožeči stranki, | APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision 2001/711/EC of 29 June 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/F-2/36.693 ─ Volkswagen) (OJ 2001 L 262, p. 14) or, in the alternative, reduction of the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, |
| SODIŠČE PRVE STOPNJE EVROPSKIH SKUPNOSTI (četrti senat), | THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Fourth Chamber), |
| v sestavi V. Tiili, predsednica, P. Mengozzi in M. Vilaras, sodnika, | composed of: |
| sodna tajnica: D. Christensen, administratorka, | V. Tiili, President, |
| na podlagi pisnega postopka in javne obravnave z dne 18. junija 2003 | P. Mengozzi and |
| izreka naslednjo | M. Vilaras, Judges, |
| Sodbo | Registrar: D. Christensen, Administrator, |
| having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 18 June 2003, | |
| gives the following | |
| Judgment | |
Razlogi za odločitev | Grounds |
| Dejansko stanje | Facts |
| 1. Družba Volkswagen AG (v nadaljevanju: Volkswagen ali tožeča stranka) je holdinška družba in največje podjetje skupine Volkswagen, ki deluje v sektorju avtomobilske proizvodnje. Motorna vozila tožeče stranke prodajajo v Skupnosti zastopniki, s katerimi je tožeča stranka sklenila zastopniško pogodbo, in sicer po sistemu selektivne in ekskluzivne distribucije. | 1. Volkswagen AG (hereinafter " Volkswagen" or " the applicant" ) is the holding company and the largest undertaking of the Volkswagen group, which operates in the automobile construction sector. The motor vehicles produced by the applicant are sold in the Community, within the framework of a system of selective and exclusive distribution, by authorised dealers with which the applicant has concluded a dealership agreement. |
| 2. V skladu z zastopniško pogodbo, v različicah iz septembra 1995 in januarja 1998, družba Volkswagen zastopniku prepusti pogodbeno območje za program dobave in storitve za kupce. Nasprotno se zastopnik zavezuje, da bo na ozemlju, ki mu je bilo dano z zastopniško pogodbo, pospeševal prodajo in storitve za kupce ter optimalno izrabljal tržno zmogljivost. Na podlagi člena 2(6) (različica iz januarja 1989) ali člena 2(1) (različici iz septembra 1995 in januarja 1998) zastopniške pogodbe se zastopnik zavezuje, „da bo varoval interese [družbe Volkswagen], organizacijo distribucije družbe Volkswagen in znamko Volkswagen ter da bo z vsemi sredstvi zagotavljal njeno pospeševanje“. Določeno je tudi, da „bo zastopnik za to izpolnjeval vse zahteve za izvajanje pogodbe, kar zadeva distribucijo novih avtomobilov Volkswagen, oskrbo z nadomestnimi deli, storitve za kupce, pospeševanje prodaje, reklamo in izobraževanje ter zagotavljanje storilnosti na različnih področjih poslovanja družbe Volkswagen“. Nazadnje, na podlagi člena 8(1) zastopniške pogodbe, „[družba Volkswagen] izdaja nezavezujoče priporočene cene za končne cene in popuste“. | 2. Under Clause 4(1) of the dealership agreement in its September 1995 and January 1998 versions, Volkswagen grants the dealer an agreed territory for the range of vehicles and for after-sales service. In return, the dealer undertakes to promote sales and the after-sales service intensively within the agreed territory and to exploit its market potential to the utmost. Under Clause 2(6) (January 1989 version) or Clause 2(1) (September 1995 and January 1998 versions) of the dealership agreement, the dealer undertakes " to defend and promote in every way the interests of [Volkswagen], of the Volkswagen distribution organisation and of the Volkswagen brand" . It is also stipulated that " the dealer will comply with all instructions issued for the purposes of the agreement regarding the distribution of new Volkswagen cars, the stocking of replacement parts, customer service, sales promotion, advertising, training, and the ensuring of quality in each area of Volkswagen ' s business" . Finally, under Clause 8(1) of the dealership agreement, " [Volkswagen] will issue non-binding price recommendations concerning retail prices and discounts" . |
| 3. Komisija je 17. julija 1997 in 8. oktobra 1998 po pritožbi enega od kupcev v skladu s členom 11 Uredbe Sveta št. 17 z dne 6. februarja 1962, Prve uredbe o izvajanju členov [81] in [82] Pogodbe (UL 1962, 13, str. 204), na družbo Volkswagen naslovila zahteve za informacije v zvezi s cenovno politiko in zlasti določitvijo prodajne cene avtomobila Volkswagen Passat v Nemčiji. Družba Volkswagen je 22. avgusta 1997 in 9. novembra 1998 odgovorila na te zahteve. | 3. On 17 July 1997 and 8 October 1998, following a buyer ' s complaint, the Commission sent the applicant, under Article 11 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962: First Regulation implementing Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition, Series I, 1959-1962, p. 87), requests for information concerning its pricing policy and, particularly, the fixing of the selling price of the Volkswagen Passat model in Germany. The applicant replied to those requests on 22 August 1997 and 9 November 1998 respectively. |
| 4. Komisija je 22. junija 1999 na podlagi prejetih informacij tožeči stranki poslala obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, v katerem ji je očitala kršitev člena 81(1) ES, ker se je z nemškimi zastopniki v svojem distribucijskem omrežju dogovorila o strogi cenovni disciplini za prodajo avtomobila Volkswagen Passat. | 4. On 22 June 1999, on the basis of the information forwarded, the Commission sent the applicant a statement of objections in which it accused it of having infringed Article 81(1) EC by agreeing with the German dealers in its distribution network to strict price discipline for sales of the Volkswagen Passat model. |
| 5. Komisija je v tem obvestilu omenila zlasti tri okrožnice z dne 26. septembra 1996, 17. aprila in 26. junija 1997, ki jih je tožeča stranka naslovila na nemške zastopnike, ter pet dopisov, poslanih nekaterim od njih 24. septembra, 2. in 16. oktobra 1996, 18. aprila 1997 in 13. oktobra 1998 (v nadaljevanju skupno: sporni pozivi). | 5. The Commission relied therein, in particular, on three circulars sent by the applicant to its German dealers on 26 September 1996, and 17 April and 26 June 1997, and five letters sent to certain of them, on 24 September, 2 and 16 October 1996, 18 April 1997 and 13 October 1998 (hereinafter together called " the calls at issue" ). |
| 6. Tožeča stranka je z dopisom z dne 10. septembra 1999 odgovorila na navedeno obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, v katerem je navedla, da so bila dejstva, opisana v obvestilu, v bistvu pravilna. Zaslišanja ni predlagala. | 6. By letter of 10 September 1999, the applicant replied to that statement of objections and stated that the facts set out therein were essentially correct. The applicant did not request a hearing. |
| 7. Komisija je 15. januarja in 7. februarja 2001 na tožečo stranko naslovila novi zahtevi za informacije, na kateri je ta odgovorila 30. januarja in 21. februarja 2001. | 7. On 15 January and 7 February 2001, the Commission sent the applicant two further requests for information, to which it replied on 30 January and 21 February 2001 respectively. |
| 8. Komisija je 6. julija 2001 tožeči stranki vročila Odločbo 2001/711/ES z dne 29. junija 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES (zadeva COMP/F-2/36.693 – Volkswagen, UL L 162, str. 14, v nadaljevanju: izpodbijana odločba). | 8. On 6 July 2001, the Commission notified the applicant of its Decision 2001/711/EC of 29 June 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/F-2/36.693 ─ Volkswagen) (OJ 2001 L 162, p. 14, hereinafter " the contested decision" ). |
| 9. Izpodbijana odločba določa: | 9. The contested decision provides: |
| „Člen 1 | " Article 1 |
| Volkswagen AG je s tem, da je določila prodajne cene avtomobila Volkswagen Passat tako, da je od svojih nemških pogodbenih zastopnikov zahtevala, naj pri prodaji tega avtomobila strankam ne odobrijo popusta ali naj odobrijo samo omejen popust, kršila določbe člena 81(1) Pogodbe ES. | [Volkswagen] has infringed Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty by setting the selling price of the VW Passat on the basis of exhortations to its German authorised dealers to grant limited discounts or no discounts at all to customers in selling the VW Passat. |
| Člen 2 | Article 2 |
| Zaradi kršitve iz člena 1 se Volkswagen AG naloži globa 30,96 milijona eurov. | A fine of EUR 30.96 million is imposed on [Volkswagen] in respect of the infringement referred to in Article 1. |
| [...] | ... |
| Člen 4 | Article 4 |
| Naslovnica te odločbe je Volkswagen AG, D-38436 Wolfsburg [...]“ | This decision is addressed to [Volkswagen], D-38436 Wolfsburg. ... |
| Postopek | " |
| 10. Tožeča stranka je 10. septembra 2001 v sodnem tajništvu Sodišča prve stopnje vložila to tožbo. | Proceedings |
| 11. Komisija je 25. februarja 2002, torej štiri dni po izteku roka za predložitev duplike, v sodnem tajništvu Sodišča prve stopnje vložila dupliko, ne da bi predhodno zahtevala oziroma ne da bi ji bilo odobreno podaljšanje navedenega roka in ne da bi navedla okoliščine, ki bi utemeljevale nespoštovanje navedenega roka. Zato je Sodišče prve stopnje to vlogo zavrglo kot prepozno. | 10. The applicant brought this action by application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 10 September 2001. |
| 12. Na podlagi poročila sodnika poročevalca je Sodišče prve stopnje (četrti senat) odločilo začeti ustni postopek. | 11. On 25 February 2002, the Commission lodged its rejoinder at the Court Registry, that is four days after the expiry of the time-limit for doing so, without having previously either sought and obtained the extension of that time-limit or stated any circumstances excusing its non-observance. Consequently, the Court rejected that pleading as being out of time. |
| 13. Stranki sta ustne navedbe in odgovore na vprašanja Sodišča prve stopnje predstavili na obravnavi 18. junija 2003. | 12. On hearing the Report of the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court (Fourth Chamber) decided to open the oral procedure. |
| Predlogi strank | 13. The parties presented oral argument and answered questions put by the Court at the hearing on 18 June 2003. |
| 14. Tožeča stranka Sodišču prve stopnje predlaga, naj: | Forms of order sought by the parties |
| – razglasi izpodbijano odločbo za nično; | 14. The applicant claims that the Court should: |
| – podredno, zniža znesek globe iz člena 2 izpodbijane odločbe; | ─ annul the contested decision; |
| – Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | ─ in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed by Article 2 of the contested decision; |
| 15. Komisija Sodišču prve stopnje predlaga, naj: | ─ order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| – zavrne tožbo; | 15. The Commission contends that the Court should: |
| – tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | ─ dismiss the action; |
| Pravo | ─ order the applicant to pay the costs. |
| 16. Tožeča stranka primarno trdi, da bi bilo treba izpodbijano odločbo razglasiti za nično, ker tožeča stranka ni kršila člena 81(1) ES. Na eni strani naj med njo in njenimi nemškimi zastopniki ne bi bilo nobenega sporazuma; na drugi strani pa naj sporni pozivi – ob domnevi, da so bili predmet sporazuma – ne bi mogli vplivati – še manj pa pomembno vplivati – na trgovino med državami članicami, tako da naj se člen 81(1) ES ne bi uporabljal. Podredno pa tožeča stranka predlaga znižanje zneska z odločbo naložene globe. | Law |
| 17. Najprej je treba preučiti primarni zahtevek za razglasitev ničnosti izpodbijane odločbe in v tem okviru tožbeni razlog tožeče stranke, da sporni pozivi niso bili predmet sporazuma med njo in njenimi nemškimi zastopniki v smislu člena 81(1) ES. | 16. As its principal argument, the applicant claims that the contested decision should be annulled on the ground that the applicant has not infringed Article 81(1) EC. First, there was no agreement, within the meaning of that provision, between the applicant and its German dealers. Secondly, assuming that the calls at issue were the subject of an agreement, they were not capable of affecting, much less, appreciably affecting, trade between Member States, so that Article 81(1) EC does not apply. In the alternative, the applicant seeks the reduction of the amount of the fine imposed on it by the contested decision. |
| Trditve strank | 17. It is convenient to consider, first, the principal claim seeking the annulment of the contested decision and, in that context, the applicant ' s plea in law that the calls at issue were not the subject of any agreement, within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, between the applicant and its German dealers. |
| 18. Tožeča stranka najprej navaja, da je v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso soglasje volj podjetij osrednji element pojma sporazuma v smislu člena 81(1) ES. Zato se ta določba ne uporablja za enostranske ukrepe brez soglasja njihovega naslovnika. Prepovedani naj bi bili samo izjemoma, če so samo navidezno enostranski in če se njihov naslovnik z njimi molče strinja. Tako naj bi bilo celo v kontekstu selektivne distribucije (sodbe Sodišča z dne 12. julija 1979 v združenih zadevah BMW Belgium proti Komisiji, 32/78, od 36/78 do 82/78, Recueil, str. 2435, v nadaljevanju: sodba BMW Belgium; z dne 25. oktobra 1983 v zadevi AEG proti Komisiji, 107/82, Recueil, str. 3151, v nadaljevanju: sodba AEG; z dne 11. januarja 1990 v zadevi Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici proti Komisiji, C‑277/87, Recueil, str. I‑45, v nadaljevanju: sodba Sandoz, in z dne 8. februarja 1990 v zadevi Tipp-Ex proti Komisiji, C‑279/87, Recueil, str. I‑261, ter sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 26. oktobra 2000 v zadevi Bayer proti Komisiji, T‑41/96, Recueil, str. II‑3383, točka 71 in naslednje ter točke 162, 167, 169 in 170, v nadaljevanju: sodba Bayer). | Arguments of the parties |
| 19. Komisija naj bi torej v uvodni izjavi 62 izpodbijane odločbe napačno navajala, da so enostranski pozivi naročitelja sporazum v smislu člena 81(1) ES, ker „se z njimi poskuša vplivati“ na zastopnika pri izvajanju pogodbe, ter naj bi na podlagi tega sklepala, da je v obravnavani zadevi tak sporazum obstajal. S tem naj bi Komisija želela uveljaviti nov pravni pristop, ki razširja pojem sporazuma, poleg tega pa tudi v njeno korist spreminja pravila o dokaznem bremenu. Ta pristop naj bi pomenil, da bi lahko od takrat naprej vsak poskus vplivanja kršil člen 81(1) ES. Dejansko pa niti sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 6. julija 2000 v zadevi Volkswagen proti Komisiji (T‑62/98, Recueil, str. II‑2707, v nadaljevanju: sodba Volkswagen), na katero naj bi se opirala Komisija, niti sodbi Sodišča z dne 17. septembra 1985 v združenih zadevah Ford proti Komisiji (25/84 in 26/84, Recueil, str. 2725, v nadaljevanju: sodba Ford) in z dne 24. oktobra 1995 v zadevi Bayerische Motorenwerke proti ALD (C‑70/93, Recueil, str. I‑3439, v nadaljevanju: sodba BMW), na kateri naj bi se sklicevala sodba Volkswagen, ne bi vzbudile nobenih dvomov v sodno prakso, v skladu s katero naj bi bilo vse odvisno od vprašanja, ali obstaja soglasje izrecno ali molče. | 18. The applicant points out, first of all, that under settled case-law the concurrence of wills between undertakings is the central element in the concept of agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. For that reason, unilateral measures taken without the agreement of their addressee are not caught by that provision. They are prohibited only exceptionally, when they are unilateral purely by appearance and their addressee agrees to them tacitly. That is true even in the context of selective distribution (Joined Cases 32/78, 36/78 to 82/78 BMW Belgium v Commission [1979] ECR 2435, hereinafter " the BMW Belgium judgment" ; Case 107/82 AEG v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, hereinafter " the AEG judgment" ; Case C-277/87 Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici v Commission [1990] ECR I-45, hereinafter " the Sandoz judgment" ; Case C-279/87 Tipp-Ex v Commission [1990] ECR I-261; and Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, paragraphs 71 et seq., 162, 167, 169 and 170, hereinafter " the Bayer judgment" ). |
| 20. Tožeča stranka navaja tudi, da naj bi se člen 81(1) ES – prav tako v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso – za navidezno enostranska ravnanja uporabljal samo, če so ta ravnanja „del“ pogodbenih razmerij, torej če so združljiva z obstoječimi pogodbenimi razmerji na podlagi usklajene razlage obeh strank pogodbe. Samo v tem primeru naj bi prišlo do „konkretizacije“ pogodbenih vezi, ki jih ugotavlja Komisija. Torej naj ne bi zadoščalo, da so pozivi naročitelja „del“ obstoječe pogodbene vezi in da se naročitelj v svojih pozivih sklicuje na zastopniško pogodbo. | 19. The Commission was therefore wrong to allege, in recital 62 to the contested decision, that unilateral calls by a manufacturer constitute an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC when they are " intended to influence" the dealer in the performance of its contract and to conclude, on that basis, that there was such agreement in this case. In doing so, the Commission is seeking to impose a new legal approach which not only enlarges the meaning of " agreement" , but also changes the rules on the burden of proof in its favour. That approach would mean that an attempt to influence would henceforth be capable of infringing Article 81(1) EC. In actual fact, neither the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, hereinafter " the Volkswagen judgment" , on which the Commission based its decision, nor the judgments of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 25/84 and 26/84 Ford v Commission [1985] ECR 2725, hereinafter " the Ford judgment" , and in Case C-70/93 Bayerische Motorenwerke v ALD [1995] ECR I-3439, hereinafter " the BMW judgment" , referred to in the Volkswagen judgment, cast any doubt on the case-law which requires that there be consent, express or tacit. |
| 21. Tožeča stranka trdi, da se lahko zastopnik, ki se pridruži distribucijskemu omrežju, strinja z distribucijsko politiko samo, če ta že obstaja. Poznejše spremembe te politike se lahko zgodijo samo, če pogodba predvideva ustrezen pridržek, in izključno v tem okviru. Če tega ni, morata pogodbo spremeniti obe stranki. Sporni pozivi – nekateri so izvirali samo od direktorja prodaje tožeče stranke in so bili napisani na papirju z njegovo osebno glavo – naj ne bi bili samo objektivno nezdružljivi z zastopniško pogodbo, še posebej z njenim členom 8(1), ki je določal samo priporočene cene, ampak naj bi jih kot take razumeli tudi zastopniki, kot naj bi bilo razvidno zlasti iz odzivov zastopnikov Binder in Rütz. Trditve Komisije, da navedena določba pogodbe ni zagotavljala, da tožeča stranka ne bo dajala zavezujočih navodil glede cen na podlagi člena 2(1) navedene pogodbe, ali da na podlagi dejstva, da je ravnanje v nasprotju s členom 81(1) ES, ni mogoče sklepati, da to ravnanje ne spada v okvir splošnega pogodbenega pridržka, naj ne bi bile združljive z metodami razlage pogodb. Iz istih razlogov naj Komisija ne bi mogla trditi, da je zastopniška pogodba vsebovala impliciten pridržek, ki je omogočal določanje cen. Poleg tega to, da naj bi določene sporne pozive spremljale grožnje z odpovedjo zastopniške pogodbe, nikakor ne pomeni, da je bila ta pogodba objektivna podlaga za navedene pozive. | 20. Also, the applicant points out, again according to settled case-law, that apparently unilateral behaviour may be covered by Article 81(1) EC only if it " forms part" of the contractual relations, that is to say that it is compatible with the existing contractual relationship by reason of the unanimous interpretation of both parties to the contract. It is only in such cases that the " materialisation" of the contractual links alleged by the Commission can take place. It is not therefore sufficient that the manufacturer ' s calls " form part" of a pre-existing contractual link, nor that the manufacturer refers, in such calls, to the dealership agreement. |
| 22. Po mnenju tožeče stranke je torej Komisija napačno trdila, da na vprašanje, ali so zastopniki zaradi spornih pozivov dejansko spremenili določanje svojih cen, ni treba odgovoriti, in da natančnejše ugotovitve v zvezi s tem niso bile potrebne. Obstoj sporazuma je namreč mogoče potrditi samo, če so se zastopniki strinjali s spornimi pozivi in so, vsaj kot dokaz za tak sporazum, prav tako spremenili svoje ravnanje glede cen. | 21. The applicant claims that a dealer who joins a distribution network can agree to a distribution policy only in so far as it is already established. Later changes to that policy can take place only if the contract contains an appropriate reservation, and only within its limits. If there is none, the contract would have to be varied by both parties. The calls at issue, some of which came moreover only from a sales director of the applicant and were written on his personal letterhead, are not only objectively incompatible with the dealership agreement, particularly with its Clause 8(1), which provides only for recommended prices, but also were perceived as such by the dealers, as is shown particularly by the reactions of the dealers Binder and Rütz. The Commission ' s assertions that that provision of the contract does not guarantee that the applicant will abstain from issuing binding instructions as to price in the context of Clause 2(1) of that contract, or that the fact that behaviour contravenes Article 81(1) EC does not mean that it is outside a general contractual reservation, are inconsistent with the rules of construction of contracts. For the same reasons, the Commission cannot suggest that the dealership agreement included an implied reservation allowing price fixing. Furthermore, the fact that some of the calls at issue were coupled with threats to terminate the dealership agreement does not in the least mean that this contract was the objective basis of those requests. |
| 23. Nazadnje tožeča stranka v zvezi z domnevnim ravnanjem zastopnikov na podlagi spornih pozivov trdi, da čeprav sama ne more dokazati, da ti niso vplivali na ravnanje zastopnikov glede cen, pa številke, ki jih navaja Komisija v izpodbijani odločbi, ne izražajo precejšnjih sprememb tega ravnanja in nasprotno razkrivajo celo povečanje popustov. Tožeča stranka predlaga zaslišanje priče glede tega in se sklicuje na številke, ki naj bi dokazovale, da so se popusti zastopnikov povečali. | 22. The Commission was therefore wrong, according to the applicant, to maintain that the question whether dealers had actually adjusted their prices in response to the calls at issue could be left open and that more precise findings in that regard were not necessary. The existence of an agreement could be assumed only if the dealers had acquiesced in the calls at issue and ─ at the very least as proof of such agreement ─ had also changed their conduct in relation to prices. |
| 24. Komisija trdi, da so sporni pozivi postali sestavni del zastopniške pogodbe in so zato pomenili sporazume v smislu člena 81(1) ES. | 23. Finally, in relation to the conduct of the dealers following the calls at issue, the applicant claims that, while it is not itself in a position to prove that they did not influence their conduct in relation to price, the figures quoted by the Commission in the contested decision, far from reflecting significant changes in that conduct, show, on the contrary, an increase in the discounts. The applicant proposes that a witness should be called on this subject and refers to figures which indicate that the discounts allowed by the dealers increased. |
| 25. Primarno Komisija najprej trdi, da v skladu s sodbami AEG, Ford, BMW in Volkswagen, vsaj glede selektivnih distribucijskih sistemov, kot je ta v obravnavanem primeru, ni potrebna privolitev zastopnika v poziv naročitelja v ravnanju zastopnika na podlagi tega poziva (na primer, potem ko ga je sprejel). Načeloma bi bilo treba šteti, da gre za privolitev že, ker je zastopnik vstopil v distribucijsko omrežje. Torej bi bilo treba šteti, da je zastopnik privolil v poziv že vnaprej. Komisija meni, da sodbe, ki jih navaja tožeča stranka, ne zmanjšujejo pomena navedene sodne prakse, na kateri temelji izpodbijana odločba, ampak nasprotno. | 24. The Commission maintains, on its part, that the calls at issue became integral parts of the dealership agreement and therefore constitute " agreements" within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. |
| 26. Komisija nato trdi, da za to, da poziv naročitelja postane del distribucijske pogodbe, ni treba, da ta pogodba vsebuje določbo o izrecnem pridržku. Najpomembnejši naj bi bil cilj navedenega poziva, in sicer vplivati na zastopnike pri izvajanju navedene pogodbe. Tako lahko torej protipravna politika naročitelja v okviru zakonite distribucijske pogodbe postane sestavni del te pogodbe, ne da bi le‑ta vsebovala izrecno določbo o pridržku v tem smislu. Dejansko naj bi se domnevalo, da zastopnik s pristopom k distribucijskemu sistemu vnaprej soglaša z distribucijsko politiko naročitelja, ki pa je seveda ob pristopu zastopnika ni mogoče podrobno predvideti. Ta načela naj bi veljala tudi za politiko naročitelja na področju prodajnih cen. To tezo naj bi potrjevali sodbi AEG in Ford. | 25. As its principal argument, the Commission claims, first of all, that, according to the AEG , Ford , BMW , and Volkswagen judgments, it is not necessary, at least in the case of selective distribution systems such as that in this case, to look for acquiescence to a call by the manufacturer in the behaviour which the dealer adopts in the context of that call (for example after its receipt). Such acquiescence must be regarded as established as a matter of principle, from the mere fact that the dealer has entered the distribution network. It is therefore deemed to have been given by the dealer. According to the Commission, that case-law, which serves as the basis of the contested decision, is not put in doubt by the judgments cited by the applicant, indeed on the contrary. |
| 27. Podredno in če bi bilo sprejeto stališče, da je izrecna določba o pridržku potrebna, pa bi bilo treba po mnenju Komisije za tako določbo šteti člen 2(1) ali (6) zastopniške pogodbe. Trditve tožeče stranke o področju uporabe člena 8(1) zastopniške pogodbe, da v tej pogodbi ni določbe o sankcijah za nespoštovanje priporočil proizvajalca in da je člen 2(1) ali (6) te pogodbe naveden le v nekaterih spornih pozivih, ne ogrožajo utemeljenosti te presoje. | 26. Also, the Commission claims that, for a call by the manufacturer to become part of the contract, it is not necessary that the distribution agreement include an express reservation clause. The decisive point is the purpose of the call, which is to influence dealers in the performance of that contract. Thus, an unlawful policy of a manufacturer adopted in the context of a lawful distribution agreement, can become an integral part of that contract without the necessity of the contract containing an express reservation to that effect. It is presumed that by joining a distribution system, the dealer approves the manufacturer ' s distribution policy in advance, a policy which is naturally not foreseeable in all its details when the dealer joins. Those principles apply also to the manufacturer ' s policy in relation to resale prices. The AEG and Ford judgments confirm that argument. |
| 28. Komisija nazadnje v zvezi z dejanskim ravnanjem strank na podlagi spornih pozivov v svojem odgovoru na tožbo meni, da to ravnanje potrjuje, da so sporni pozivi del zastopniške pogodbe. Trditve tožeče stranke v zvezi s pomenom, ki bi ga bilo treba pripisovati odzivom zastopnikov Binder in Rütz na sporne pozive, in v zvezi s tem, da naj bi sporni pozivi izvirali od nekega direktorja prodaje tožeče stranke, ki jih je napisal na osebnem dopisnem papirju, naj ne bi izpodbijale utemeljenosti te presoje. | 27. Alternatively, if it is held that an express reservation is necessary, Clause 2(1) or (6) of the dealership agreement must, according to the Commission, be regarded as such a clause. The arguments advanced by the applicant, based on the effect of Clause 8(1) of the dealership agreement, on the lack of any provision in the agreement for sanctions in the event of non-observance of the manufacturer ' s recommendations and on the fact that Clause 2(1) or (6) of that agreement is mentioned in only some of the calls at issue, does not put that assessment into question. |
| 29. Vendar pa Komisija opozarja, da z izpodbijano odločbo sankcionirani sporazum temelji izključno na spornih pozivih, saj je bilo soglasje zastopnikov dano že prej, in sicer z njihovim pristopom k distribucijskemu sistemu. Zato naj ne bi bilo pomembno, da zastopniki ponovno a posteriori z dejanskim ravnanjem glede cen soglašajo s spornimi pozivi. To vprašanje bi lahko ostalo brez odgovora (uvodna izjava 68 izpodbijane odločbe). Vse trditve tožeče stranke v zvezi s te m naj torej ne bi bile pomembne. | 28. Finally, so far as concerns the parties ' actual behaviour following the calls at issue, the Commission submits, in its defence, that such behaviour shows that they regarded those calls as forming part of the dealership agreement. The applicant ' s arguments, concerning the effect to be given to the reactions of the dealers Binder and Rütz to the calls at issue and to the fact that some of them came from a sales director of the applicant on his personal letterhead, do not put that assessment into question. |
| Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | 29. The Commission submits, however, that the agreement fined in the contested decision is based solely on the calls at issue, since the dealers ' approval had already been given previously by their joining the distribution system. Therefore, it is of little importance that the dealers also approved the calls at issue again, subsequently, by their actual behaviour in respect of prices. That question can be left open (recital 68 of the contested decision). All the applicant ' s submissions on that subject are therefore irrelevant. |
| 30. V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso za to, da gre za sporazum v smislu člena 81(1) ES, zadošča, da zadevna podjetja izrazijo svojo skupno voljo, da bodo na trgu ravnala na določen način (glej v tem smislu sodbi Sodišča z dne 15. julija 1970 v zadevi ACF Chemiefarma proti Komisiji, 41/69, Recueil, str. 661, točka 112, in z dne 29. oktobra 1980 v združenih zadevah Van Landewyck in drugi proti Komisiji, od 209/78 do 215/78 in 218/78, Recueil, str. 3125, točka 86, sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 17. decembra 1991 v zadevi Hercules Chemicals proti Komisiji, T-7/89, Recueil, str. II‑1711, točka 256, in sodba Bayer, točka 67). | Findings of the Court |
| 31. Glede oblike izražanja navedene skupne volje zadošča, da je ena določba izraz volje strank, da se je bodo pri ravnanju na trgu držale (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedene sodbe ACF Chemiefarma proti Komisiji, točka 112, Van Landewyck in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 86, in Bayer, točka 68). | 30. According to settled case-law, in order for there to be " agreement" within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC it is sufficient that the undertakings in question should have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (see, to that effect, Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, paragraph 112; Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, paragraph 86; Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, paragraph 256, and the Bayer judgment, paragraph 67). |
| 32. Iz tega sledi, da je osrednji element pojma sporazuma v smislu člena 81(1) ES, kot ga razlaga sodna praksa, obstoj soglasja volj med vsaj dvema strankama, katerega izrazna oblika ni pomembna, če izraža njuno resnično voljo (sodba Bayer, točka 69). | 31. As regards the form in which that common intention is expressed, it is sufficient for a stipulation to be the expression of the parties ' intention to behave on the market in accordance with its terms (see, to that effect, ACF Chemiefarma , cited above, paragraph 112; Van Landewyck and Others , cited above, paragraph 86, and the Bayer judgment, paragraph 68). |
| 33. Iz sodne prakse izhaja tudi, da če odločitev izdelovalca pomeni enostransko ravnanje podjetja, ta odločitev ne spada v prepoved iz člena 81(1) ES (glej v tem smislu sodbi AEG, točka 38, in Ford, točka 21, sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 7. julija 1994 v zadevi Dunlop Slazenger proti Komisiji, T‑43/92, Recueil, str. II‑441, točka 56, in sodbo Bayer, točka 66). | 32. It follows that the concept of " agreement" within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, as interpreted by the case-law, centres around the existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties ' intention (the Bayer judgment, paragraph 69). |
| 34. V nekaterih okoliščinah so se ukrepi, ki jih je proizvajalec v okviru trajnih poslovnih razmerij z distributerji sprejel ali naložil navidezno enostransko, šteli za sporazum v smislu člena 81(1) ES (sodba BMW Belgium, točke od 28 do 30, sodba AEG, točka 38, sodba Ford, točka 21, sodba Sandoz, točke od 7 do 12, sodba BMW, točki 16 in 17, in sodba Bayer, točka 70). | 33. The case-law also shows that, where a decision of the manufacturer constitutes unilateral conduct of the undertaking, that decision escapes the prohibition in Article 81(1) EC (see, to that effect, the AEG judgment, paragraph 38; the Ford judgment, paragraph 21; Case T-43/92 Dunlop Slazenger v Commission [1994] ECR II-441, paragraph 56, and the Bayer judgment, paragraph 66). |
| 35. Iz navedene sodne prakse izhaja, da je treba primere, v katerih je podjetje sprejelo dejansko enostranski ukrep, to je brez izrecnega ali tihega sodelovanja drugega podjetja, razlikovati od tistih, v katerih je enostranskost samo navidezna. Medtem ko prvi ne spadajo pod člen 81(1) ES, je treba glede drugih šteti, da so sporazum med podjetji in zato lahko spadajo na področje uporabe tega člena. Tak je med drugim primer ravnanj in ukrepov, ki omejujejo konkurenco in jih proizvajalec v okviru pogodbenih razmerij s trgovci sprejme navidezno enostransko, vendar ti vanje vsaj tiho privolijo (sodba Bayer, točka 71). | 34. In certain circumstances, measures adopted or imposed in an apparently unilateral manner by a manufacturer in the context of its continuing relations with its distributors have been regarded as constituting an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC (the BMW Belgium judgment, paragraphs 28 to 30; the AEG judgment, paragraph 38; the Ford judgment, paragraph 21; the Sandoz judgment, paragraphs 7 to 12; the BMW judgment, paragraphs 16 and 17, and the Bayer judgment, paragraph 70). |
| 36. Iz navedene sodne prakse pa izhaja tudi, da Komisija ne more zagovarjati stališča, da je neko navidezno enostransko ravnanje proizvajalca v okviru njegovih pogodbenih razmerij s prodajalci v resnici podlaga za sporazum med podjetji v smislu člena 81(1) ES, če ne dokaže obstoja izrecnega ali tihega strinjanja drugih partnerjev z ravnanjem proizvajalca (glej v tem smislu sodbo BMW Belgium, točke od 28 do 30, sodbo AEG, točka 38, sodbo Ford, točka 21, sodbo Sandoz, točke od 7 do 12, in sodbo Bayer, točka 72). | 35. That case-law shows that a distinction should be drawn between cases in which an undertaking has adopted a genuinely unilateral measure, and thus without the express or implied participation of another undertaking, and those in which the unilateral character of the measure is merely apparent. Whilst the former do not fall within Article 81(1) EC, the latter must be regarded as revealing an agreement between undertakings and may therefore fall within the scope of that article. That is the case, in particular, with practices and measures in restraint of competition which, though apparently adopted unilaterally by the manufacturer in the context of its contractual relations with its dealers, nevertheless receive at least the tacit acquiescence of those dealers (the Bayer judgment, paragraph 71). |
| 37. Na podlagi te sodne prakse je treba v zvezi s spornimi pozivi preučiti, ali je Komisija v izpodbijani odločbi dokazala sporazum v smislu člena 81(1) ES med tožečo stranko in njenimi zastopniki. | 36. It is also clear from that case-law that the Commission cannot hold that apparently unilateral conduct on the part of a manufacturer, adopted in the context of the contractual relations which it maintains with its dealers, in reality forms the basis of an agreement between undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC if the Commission does not establish the existence of an acquiescence by the other partners, express or implied, in the attitude adopted by the manufacturer (see, to that effect, the BMW Belgium judgment, paragraphs 28 to 30; the AEG judgment, paragraph 38; the Ford judgment, paragraph 21; the Sandoz judgment, paragraphs 7 to 12, and the Bayer judgment, paragraph 72). |
| 38. V zvezi s tem je treba najprej ugotoviti, da ni dokazano, da se je sporne pozive izvajalo v praksi. Komisija v uvodni izjavi 74 izpodbijane odločbe to priznava z navedbo: | 37. It is in the light of that case-law that it must be established whether the Commission has, in the contested decision, proved an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC between the applicant and its dealers with regard to the calls at issue. |
| „V okoliščinah obravnavane zadeve ni mogoče natančno ugotoviti ravnanja zastopnikov […]“ | 38. In that regard, it must be held, first of all, that it has not been established that the calls at issue were implemented in practice. The Commission admits this, in particular, in recital 74 of the contested decision, in the following terms: |
| 39. Sodišče prve stopnje nadalje ugotavlja, da kot je razvidno iz vsebine uvodne izjave 60 izpodbijane odločbe, Komisija za to, da bi se ugotovil obstoj sporazuma v smislu člena 81(1) ES, zatrjuje, da so zastopniki ob podpisu zastopniške pogodbe molče sprejeli sporno distribucijsko politiko tožeče stranke. Zato po mnenju Komisije na „vprašanje, ali in v kolikšni meri so nemški zastopniki družbe Volkswagen dejansko spremenili oblikovanje svojih cen na podlagi okrožnic in pozivov, ni treba odgovoriti“ (uvodna navedba 68 izpodbijane odločbe). | " It is hardly possible, in the circumstances of the case, to determine the precise conduct of dealers ..." |
| 40. Komisija je svoje stališče potrdila v točki 8 odgovora na tožbo, v skladu s katero „vsaj glede selektivnih distribucijskih sistemov, kot je ta [v obravnavanem primeru], ni potrebna privolitev zastopnika v poziv naročitelja v ravnanju zastopnika na podlagi tega poziva (na primer, potem ko ga je sprejel)“. Po mnenju Komisije je „treba šteti, da gre za privolitev že, ker je zastopnik vstopil v distribucijsko omrežje proizvajalca“, „[t]orej bi bilo treba šteti, da je zastopnik privolil v poziv že vnaprej“. Komisija nadalje v bistvu meni, da to, ali pogodba vsebuje izrecno določbo o pridržku, s katero bi bil omogočen tak poziv, kot so sporni pozivi, ni upoštevno. Tak poziv bi lahko kljub neobstoju take določbe postal sestavni del pogodbe oziroma „del“ pogodbe. Odločilen naj bi bil cilj tega poziva, ki je vplivati na zastopnike pri izvajanju navedene pogodbe (točki 11 in 12 odgovora na tožbo). | 39. The Court holds also that, as is apparent, essentially, from recital 60 of the contested decision, the Commission ' s primary argument in finding the existence of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC is that the applicant ' s distribution policy at issue was tacitly accepted by the dealers on signing the dealership agreement. Therefore, according to the Commission, " the question of whether and to what extent the German Volkswagen dealers actually changed their pricing on the basis of the circulars and warnings can be left open" (recital 68 of the contested decision). |
| 41. Enaka teza je izražena v uvodni izjavi 62 izpodbijane odločbe, v kateri Komisija ob sklicevanju na sodbo Volkswagen (točka 236) navaja, da „pozivi proizvajalca motornih vozil pooblaščenim zastopnikom pomenijo sporazum, če ‚(se z njimi poskuša) […] vplivati na zastopnike […] pri izvajanju njihove pogodbe s (proizvajalcem ali uvoznikom)‘“. | 40. The Commission restates its position in paragraph 8 of its defence, which reads " it is not necessary, at least in the case of selective distribution systems such as that in this case, to look for acquiescence to a manufacturer ' s call in the conduct adopted by the dealer in the context of that call (for example after its receipt)" . According to the Commission, " such acquiescence must be regarded as established as a matter of principle by the mere fact that the dealer has entered the manufacturer ' s distribution network" and " it is deemed to have been given in advance" . The Commission goes on to state essentially that it is of little importance whether the contract contains an express reservation which allows calls such as the calls at issue. In the absence of such a clause, such a call could still become an integral part of the contract, or " form part" of the contract. The decisive point is the purpose of that call, which is to influence dealers in the performance of that contract (paragraphs 11 and 12 of the defence). |
| 42. Sodišče prve stopnje nazadnje ugotavlja, da Komisija nikjer ne trdi, da naj bi bila zastopniška pogodba, še posebej člen 2(1) ali (6) in člen 8(1), v nasprotju s pravom konkurence. | 41. The same idea is expressed in recital 62 of the contested decision, in which the Commission, citing the Volkswagen judgment (paragraph 236), states that " calls by a manufacturer to its authorised dealers constituted an agreement if they were " intended to influence the ... dealers in the performance of their contract with (the manufacturer or importer)" |
| 43. Iz navedenih ugotovitev je razvidno, da Komisija v točki 15 odgovora na tožbo jasno ponovi tezo, da se šteje, da je zastopnik, ki je podpisal zastopniško pogodbo v skladu s konkurenčnim pravom, ob tem podpisu in z njim vnaprej sprejel poznejši nezakonit razvoj te pogodbe, čeprav ta pogodba prav zaradi skladnosti s konkurenčnim pravom zastopniku ni mogla omogočiti, da bi predvidel tak razvoj. | " . |
| 44. Navedene teze Komisije, ki je glavni temelj izpodbijane odločbe in v skladu s katero je Komisija kot neupoštevno zavrnila vprašanje, ali so se zastopniki tožeče stranke dejansko strinjali s spornimi pozivi, ko so se z njimi seznanili, to je potem ko so jim bili poslani, ni mogoče upoštevati. | 42. The Court notes, finally, that the Commission does not assert that the dealership agreement, in particular Clause 2(1) or (6) and Clause 8(1) thereof, is contrary to competition law. |
| 45. Sicer je res, da si je mogoče predstavljati, da je mogoče šteti, da je ob podpisu zakonite zastopniške pogodbe in zaradi takega podpisa vnaprej sprejet pogodbeni razvoj, če gre za zakonit pogodbeni razvoj, ki je predviden s pogodbo ali ga zastopnik glede na poslovne običaje ali predpise ne more zavrniti. Ni pa sprejemljivo, da bi se štelo, da je ob podpisu zakonite distribucijske pogodbe in zaradi tega podpisa vnaprej sprejet nezakonit pogodbeni razvoj. V tem primeru bi bilo namreč mogoče soglasje k protipravni spremembi pogodbe dati šele, potem ko bi se zastopnik seznanil s spremembo, ki jo želi naročitelj. | 43. It follows from the foregoing findings that the Commission ' s case, clearly repeated in paragraph 15 of the defence, amounts to claiming that a dealer who has signed a dealership agreement which complies with competition law is deemed, upon and by such signature, to have accepted in advance a later unlawful variation of that contract, even though, by virtue precisely of its compliance with competition law, that contract could not enable the dealer to foresee such a variation. |
| 46. Zato je Komisija v obravnavani zadevi napačno domnevala, da je bila posledica dejstva, da so zastopniki Volkswagna podpisali zastopniško pogodbo, da so zastopniki sprejeli sporne pozive. Taka trditev je v nasprotju s členom 81(1) ES, kot se razlaga v navedeni sodni praksi v točkah od 30 do 36, v skladu s katero se zahteva dokaz o soglasju volj. | 44. That argument of the Commission, which is the principal basis of the contested decision and by virtue of which the Commission disregards, as irrelevant, the question whether the applicant ' s dealers actually acquiesced in the calls at issue when they became aware of them, that is to say after they were sent to them, cannot succeed. |
| 47. Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da Komisija napačno razlaga sodno prakso, ki jo navaja v podporo svoji tezi, ko trdi, da naj v skladu s sodbami AEG, Ford, BMW in Volkswagen, vsaj v primerih selektivnih distribucijskih sistemov, kot je ta v obravnavanem primeru, ne bi bila potrebna privolitev zastopnika v poziv naročitelja v ravnanju zastopnika na podlagi tega poziva (na primer, potem ko ga je sprejel) in da bi bilo treba načeloma šteti, da je zastopnik privolil v poziv že, ker je vstopil v distribucijsko omrežje. | 45. It can admittedly be envisaged that a contractual variation could be regarded as having been accepted in advance, upon and by the signature of a lawful dealership agreement, where it is a lawful contractual variation which is foreseen by the contract, or is a variation which, having regard to commercial usage or legislation, the dealer could not refuse. By contrast, it cannot be accepted that an unlawful contractual variation could be regarded as having been accepted in advance, upon and by the signature of a lawful distribution agreement. In that case, acquiescence in the unlawful contractual variation can occur only after the dealer has become aware of the variation desired by the manufacturer. |
| 48. Sodišče je namreč v nasprotju s tem, kar trdi Komisija, v sodbi AEG, ko je navedlo, da „pri sprejetju distributerja odobritev temelji na izrecnem ali tihem strinjanju pogodbenikov s politiko AEG, ki med drugim zahteva izključitev iz distribucijske mreže vseh tistih distributerjev, ki bi bili lahko vanjo sprejeti, vendar niso pripravljeni pristopiti k tej politiki“ (točka 38 sodbe), ugotovilo prav to, da so se distributerji izrecno strinjali s protikonkurenčnim ravnanjem AEG. | 46. Consequently, the Commission is wrong to assert, in this case, that the signature by the applicant ' s dealers of the dealership agreement involves acceptance on their part of the calls at issue. Such an assertion is contrary to Article 81(1) EC as interpreted in the case-law cited in paragraphs 30 to 36 above, which requires proof of a concurrence of wills. |
| 49. Z drugimi besedami, Sodišče v sodbi AEG ni zagovarjalo stališča, da pomeni strinjanje distributerjev s protikonkurenčno politiko AEG vnaprejšnje strinjanje – ob podpisu pogodbe – s še neznano politiko proizvajalca. | 47. The Court considers that the Commission is proceeding from a mistaken interpretation of the case-law which it cites in support of its case, when it argues that, according to the AEG , Ford , BMW and Volkswagen judgments, it is not necessary, at least in the case of selective distribution systems such as the one in this case, to look for acquiescence to a manufacturer ' s call in the conduct adopted by the dealer in the context of that call (for example after its receipt), and that such acquiescence ought to be regarded as having been established as a matter of principle by the mere fact that the dealer has entered the distribution network. |
| 50. Poleg tega je treba opozoriti na to, da navedba iz točke 38 sodbe AEG, da ravnanje AEG ni enostransko, ampak „je del pogodbenih razmerij podjetja s svojimi prodajalci“, ni brezpogojna, ampak temelji na predhodni ugotovitvi Sodišča o strinjanju distributerjev s takim ravnanjem, s katerim se je domnevno poskušalo vplivati na navedena pogodbena razmerja. | 48. In fact, contrary to the Commission ' s claim, the Court of Justice, in the AEG judgment, found expressly that the distributors acquiesced in AEG ' s anti-competitive actions when it stated that " in the case of the admission of a distributor, approval is based on the acceptance, tacit or express, by the contracting parties of the policy pursued by AEG which requires inter alia the exclusion from the network of all distributors who are qualified for admission but are not prepared to adhere to that policy" (paragraph 38 of the judgment). |
| 51. V sodbi Ford se spor ni nanašal na vprašanje, ali so se zastopniki strinjali s protikonkurenčno okrožnico, ki jim jo je poslal Ford. Ni bilo namreč sporno, da je Ford okrožnico izvajal v praksi in da so jo zastopniki kljub nasprotovanju spoštovali. Spor se je nanašal na vprašanje, ali bi bilo mogoče to okrožnico, ki so jo stranke izvajale, povezati z zastopniško pogodbo Forda za analizo te pogodbe v smislu člena 81(1) ES ter z vidika morebitnega odstopanja na podlagi člena 81(3) ES. Sodišče je v tem smislu, potem ko je ugotovilo, da je sporna okrožnica povezana z zastopniško pogodbo (priloga I k navedeni pogodbi), presodilo, da jo je Komisija upravičeno upoštevala pri analizi navedene pogodbe v smislu morebitnega odstopanja na podlagi člena 81(3) ES (sodba Ford, točke 20, 21 in 26). | 49. In other words, in the AEG judgment, the Court did not suggest that the distributors ' acquiescence in AEG ' s anti-competitive policy constituted acquiescence given in advance, upon signature of the contract, to an as yet unknown policy of the manufacturer. |
| 52. Glede sodbe BMW, izdane na podlagi predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da ni neposredno upoštevna za obravnavano zadevo. Postavljeno vprašanje v navedeni zadevi namreč ni toliko zadevalo tega, ali je med BMW in njegovimi zastopniki dejansko prišlo do sporazuma o vsebini okrožnice, ki jo je BMW poslal zadevnim zastopnikom, ampak ali se za tak poziv – pri domnevi, da je bil sprejet in torej pomeni sporazum v smislu člena 81(1) ES – uporablja ustrezna uredba o odstopanju, to je Uredba Komisije (EGS) št. 123/85 z dne 12. decembra 1984 o uporabi člena [81](3) Pogodbe EGS za nekatere skupine sporazumov o distribuciji in servisiranju motornih vozil (UL 1985, L 15, str. 16). | 50. It is appropriate, furthermore, to observe that the statement, in paragraph 38 of the AEG judgment, that AEG ' s attitude was not unilateral but " form[ed] part of the contractual relations between the undertaking and resellers" is not an unconditional statement, but rests on the Court ' s previous finding that the distributors had acquiesced in that conduct, which, necessarily, aimed to influence those contractual relations. |
| 53. Glede zadeve, v kateri je bila izdana sodba Volkswagen, tako iz odločbe Komisije kot sodbe Sodišča prve stopnje v navedeni zadevi (glej točko 236 sodbe Volkswagen v povezavi s točkami, na katere se sklicuje), ki jo je Sodišče potrdilo s sodbo z dne 18. septembra 2003 v zadevi Volkswagen proti Komisiji (C‑338/00 P, Recueil, str. I‑9189), jasno izhaja, da je pobudam proizvajalca sledilo tudi izvajanje v praksi, ker so ga italijanski zastopniki dejansko spoštovali in so torej zavračali prodajo strankam iz tujine. Strinjanje zastopnikov s protikonkurenčnimi pobudami družbe Volkswagen v navedeni zadevi je bilo torej gotovo. | 51. In the Ford judgment, the dispute was not about the question whether or not the dealers had acquiesced in the circular sent by Ford which was intended to be anti-competitive. It was, actually, common ground that the circular had been implemented in practice by Ford and that the dealers, despite some protests, had complied with it. The case concerned the question whether that circular, applied by the parties, could be linked to the Ford dealership agreement, when that agreement was examined in the light of Article 81(1) EC and with a view to possible exemption under Article 81(3) EC. It was in that context that the Court of Justice, having found that the disputed circular was linked to the dealership agreement (Annex I to that agreement), was able to rule that the Commission had been entitled to take it into account in its examination of the agreement with a view to the possibility of granting an exemption under Article 81(3) EC (the Ford judgment, paragraphs 20, 21 and 26). |
| 54. Odločitev v sodbi Volkswagen o zavrnitvi tožbenega razloga za razglasitev ničnosti odločbe Komisije – domnevno enostranske pobude Volkswagna – je torej temeljila na obstoju strinjanja, ki je bilo razvidno iz izvajanja pobud proizvajalca v praksi. | 52. So far as concerns the BMW judgment, given on a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court does not consider that it is directly relevant to this case. In that case the question referred was not so much whether an agreement had actually been reached between BMW and its dealers on the contents of the circular sent to them by BMW, as whether such a request, assuming that it was accepted and therefore constituted an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, came within the relevant exempting regulation, namely Commission Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article [81](3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements (OJ 1985 L 15, p. 16). |
| 55. Iz navedene analize sodb AEG, Ford, BMW in Volkswagen izhaja, da se Komisija nanje napačno sklicuje, da bi podprla tezo, da podpis pogodbe pomeni načelno in nepreklicno tiho strinjanje z morebitnimi protipravnimi spremembami pogodbe. | 53. So far as concerns the case which gave rise to the Volkswagen judgment, it follows clearly, both from the Commission ' s decision and from the Court of First Instance ' s judgment in that case (see paragraph 236 of the Volkswagen judgment, read in conjunction with the paragraphs to which it refers) and confirmed by the Court of Justice in Case C-338/00 P Volkswagen v Commission [2003] ECR I-9189), that the manufacturer ' s initiatives had actually been put into effect, since the Italian dealers had complied with them and refused to sell to their foreign customers. The acceptance by Volkswagen ' s dealers of its anti-competitive initiatives was not in doubt in that case. |
| 56. Poleg tega je treba opozoriti na to, da sodbe Sandoz, BMW Belgium, Bayer in Tipp-Ex proti Komisiji, ki jih navaja tožeča stranka, jasno dokazujejo neutemeljenost Komisijine teze. Te sodbe namreč potrjujejo, da je treba za ugotovitev obstoja sporazuma v smislu člena 81(1) ES dokazati soglasje volj. V skladu s sodno prakso, navedeno zgoraj v točkah 30 in 31, se mora poleg tega to soglasje volj nanašati na določeno ravnanje, ki ga morajo stranke ob njegovem sprejetju poznati. | 54. Thus, the conclusion reached by the Court in the Volkswagen judgment, whereby it rejected the plea for annulment of the Commission ' s decision based on Volkswagen ' s allegedly unilateral initiatives, was founded on acquiescence arising from implementation in practice of the manufacturer ' s initiatives. |
| 57. Sicer pa v nasprotju s tem, kar trdi Komisija, iz sodne prakse ne izhaja, da je odločilni element za vključitev določenega poziva v pogodbo ta, da se poskuša s tem pozivom vplivati na zastopnika pri izvajanju navedene pogodbe. Če bi bilo tako, potem bi dejstvo, da je proizvajalec svojim zastopnikom poslal poziv, sistematično vodilo v ugotovitev sporazuma, saj se s takim pozivom po definiciji poskuša vplivati na zastopnike pri izvajanju njihovih pogodb. | 55. It follows from that analysis of the AEG , Ford , BMW and Volkswagen judgments that the Commission was wrong to rely on them in support of its contention that the signature of a distribution agreement implies, as a matter of principle and irrefutably, the tacit acceptance of future unlawful variations of that agreement. |
| 58. Nasprotno pa poziv postane vključen v predhodno pogodbo, torej postane sestavni del navedene pogodbe, kadar se s tem pozivom dejansko poskuša vplivati na zastopnike pri izvajanju pogodbe, predvsem pa takrat, kadar se zastopniki na tak ali drugačen način s takim pozivom strinjajo. | 56. Moreover, the Commission ' s argument in this case is clearly undermined by the Sandoz , BMW Belgium and Bayer judgments and the judgment in Tipp-Ex v Commission , cited by the applicant. Those judgments all confirm that, for an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC to be found to exist, it is necessary to prove a concurrence of wills. In addition, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 30 and 31 above, such a concurrence of wills must cover particular conduct, which must, therefore, be known to the parties when they accept it. |
| 59. Komisija je v obravnavani zadevi navajala samo to – kar je očitno –, da se je s spornimi pozivi poskušalo vplivati na zastopnike pri izvajanju pogodbe. Ni se ji zdelo potrebno predložiti dokaza o dejanskem strinjanju zastopnikov s temi pozivi, ko so bili z njimi seznanjeni, ampak je napačno presodila, da podpis zakonite pogodbe pomeni vnaprejšnje tiho strinjanje z navedenimi pozivi. Zato je treba ugotoviti, da Komisija ni dokazala obstoja sporazuma v smislu člena 81(1) ES. | 57. In addition, contrary to the Commission ' s argument, it does not follow from the case-law that, for a request to form part of a contract, the decisive element is that the request be intended to influence the dealer in the performance of the contract. If that were the case, the sending by the manufacturer of a call to its dealers would lead, systematically, to the establishment of an agreement, since by definition such a call is intended to influence those dealers in the performance of their contracts. |
| 60. V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da se uvodni izjavi 66 in 67 izpodbijane odločbe, ki sta namenjeni analizi ravnanja, pisanj in izjav strank, nikakor ne nanašata na dokazovanje, da so se zastopniki strinjali s spornimi pozivi, ko so se z njimi seznanili. S tema uvodnima izjavama je želela Komisija samo utemeljiti svojo razlago pogodbe, navedeno v uvodnih izjavah od 63 do 65 izpodbijane odločbe, ki je podredna trditev Komisije, analizirana spodaj, po kateri sporne pozive in zastopniško pogodbo v vsakem primeru povezuje organska vez, ki jo pomeni člen 2(1) ali (6) navedene pogodbe. V prav takem smislu je treba razumeti tudi trditev Komisije v točki 29 odgovora na tožbo, da naj bi zastopniki sporne pozive šteli za „del“ pogodbe. | 58. On the other hand, a call forms part of a pre-existing contract, that is to say forms an integral part of that contract, where it is indeed intended to influence the dealers in the performance of the contract, but above all where that call is, in some way or other, actually accepted by the dealer. |
| 61. Komisija podredno trdi, da če bi ocenili, da je za ugotovitev vključitve spornih pozivov v zastopniško pogodbo potreben pridržek v tej pogodbi, bi bilo treba šteti, da je člen 2(1) ali (6) navedene pogodbe tak pridržek. Komisija pojasnjuje, da naj člen 8(1) te pogodbe ne bi bil namenjen omejevanju člena 2(1) ali (6) v tem smislu, da se ne bi uporabljal za zavezujoče pozive v zvezi s prodajnimi cenami. | 59. In the present case, the Commission has merely observed, as was evident, that the calls at issue were intended to influence the dealers in the performance of their agreements. It did not consider it relevant to prove actual acquiescence by the dealers to those requests when they had become aware of them, but submitted, wrongly, that the signature of a ─ lawful ─ contract implied tacit acceptance of those calls in advance. Therefore, it must be held that the Commission has not proved the existence of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. |
| 62. Te podredne trditve ni mogoče upoštevati. | 60. It is appropriate, in that regard, to hold that recitals 66 and 67 in the contested decision, dealing with the examination of the parties ' conduct, documents and statements, do not in the least seek to prove that the dealers acquiesced in the calls at issue when they became aware of them. By those recitals, the Commission seeks only to justify its interpretation of the contract, expressed in recitals 63 to 65 in the contested decision, and which constitutes the Commission ' s alternative argument analysed below, that an organic link, established by Clause 2(1) or (6) of the dealership agreement, in any event unites the calls at issue to that contract. It is also in that sense that the Commission ' s allegation, at paragraph 29 of its defence, must be understood, namely that the dealers regarded the calls at issue as " forming part" of the contract. |
| 63. Člen 2(1) ali (6) zastopniške pogodbe, v skladu s katerim se zastopnik zavezuje, „da bo varoval interese [družbe Volkswagen], organizacijo distribucije [družbe] Volkswagen in znamko Volkswagen ter da bo z vsemi sredstvi zagotavljal njeno pospeševanje“, se lahko razlaga le tako, da se nanaša samo na zakonita sredstva. Zagovarjanje nasprotnega bi pomenilo, da bi se iz take, nevtralno formulirane pogodbene določbe sklepalo, da so se zastopniki zavezali z nezakonito pogodbo. | 61. In the alternative, the Commission claims that, even were it to be held that a reservation clause in the dealership agreement is necessary before it can be held that the calls at issue form part of that agreement, Clause 2(1) or (6) of that agreement must be regarded as being such a clause. The Commission states that Clause 8(1) of that agreement could not have been intended to limit Clause 2(1) or (6) by preventing its application to binding calls relating to the selling price. |
| 64. Tudi člen 8(1) zastopniške pogodbe je zapisan nevtralno, celo bolj v smislu prepovedi možnosti, da bi družba Volkswagen izdajala zavezujoča cenovna priporočila. | 62. That alternative argument cannot be accepted. |
| 65. To, da je Komisija v uvodni izjavi 65 izpodbijane odločbe ugotovila, da člen 8(1) zastopniške pogodbe „zastopnikom ne daje zagotovila, da se bo proizvajalec za vedno vzdržal zavezujočih navodil glede cen […]“, samo poudarja nevtralnost te določbe in to, da nikakor ne predvideva zavezujočih ukrepov. | 63. Clause 2(1) or (6) of the dealership agreement, by which the dealer binds itself to " defend and to promote in every way the interests of Volkswagen ..., of the Volkswagen distribution organisation and of the Volkswagen brand" , can only be interpreted as referring solely to lawful means. To maintain the contrary would amount, in effect, to deducing from such a contractual clause, drafted in neutral terms, that the dealers had bound themselves by an illegal agreement. |
| 66. Sodišče prve stopnje nazadnje ugotavlja, da ker se družba Volkswagen v spornih pozivih sklicuje na člen 2 zastopniške pogodbe, ta člen objektivno ni podlaga za te pozive. Obstoj morebitne organske povezave med členom 2 zastopniške pogodbe in spornimi pozivi je mogoče ugotoviti samo objektivno, z analizo zadevnih določb, neodvisno od tega, kaj pozneje navaja ena od pogodbenih strank. Kot je bilo navedeno zgoraj, pa iz besedila člena 2 izhaja, da ta določba nikakor ne predvideva protikonkurenčne spremembe pogodbe. | 64. As regards Clause 8(1) of the dealership agreement, it is also drafted in neutral terms, indeed in terms rather prohibitive of the possibility for Volkswagen to issue binding price recommendations. |
| 67. Iz navedenega je razvidno, da podredna trditev Komisije, da je člen 2(1) ali (6) zastopniške pogodbe upoštevna določba o pridržku, katere učinek je strinjanje s spornimi pozivi ob sklenitvi navedene pogodbe, ni pravilna. | 65. The fact that, in recital 65 in the contested decision, the Commission noted that Clause 8(1) of the dealership agreement " does not mean that the dealer has any specific guarantee that the manufacturer will in future abstain from making binding specifications in relation to price, ..." only emphasises the neutrality of that provision and the fact that it makes no mention at all of binding measures. |
| 68. Iz vsega navedenega je razvidno, da Komisija v izpodbijani odločbi ni dokazala soglasja volj tožeče stranke in zastopnikov v zvezi s spornimi pozivi. Iz tega sledi, da je bila izpodbijana odločba sprejeta v nasprotju s členom 81(1) ES in jo je zato treba razglasiti za nično, ne da bi se bilo treba opredeliti o drugem tožbenem razlogu tožeče stranke za razglasitev ničnosti oziroma o podrednem zahtevku za znižanje globe. | 66. The Court observes, finally, that the fact that Volkswagen refers to Clause 2 of the dealership agreement in the calls at issue does not mean that, objectively, that clause justifies those requests. The existence of a possible organic link between Clause 2 of the dealership agreement and the calls at issue can be established only objectively, by analysing the provisions concerned independently of what one of the contracting parties later states. As has been stated above, it is clear from the very terms of Clause 2 that it does not in any way envisage an anti-competitive variation of the contract. |
| Stroški | 67. It follows from the foregoing that the Commission incorrectly argues, in the alternative, that Clause 2(1) or (6) of the dealership agreement constitutes a relevant reservation clause, so that the calls at issue were accepted when that agreement was made. |
| 69. V skladu s členom 87(2) Poslovnika Sodišča prve stopnje se neuspeli stranki naloži plačilo stroškov, če so bili ti priglašeni. Ker Komisija ni uspela, se ji v skladu s predlogom tožeče stranke naloži plačilo stroškov. | 68. It follows from all the above considerations that the Commission has not proved, in the contested decision, a concurrence of wills between the applicant and its dealers in relation to the calls at issue. It follows that the contested decision was taken in breach of Article 81(1) EC and must therefore be annulled, without the necessity of ruling on the other plea for annulment advanced by the applicant, or on the alternative application for the reduction of the amount of the fine. |
Izrek | Decision on costs |
| Iz teh razlogov je | Costs |
| SODIŠČE PRVE STOPNJE (četrti senat) | 69. Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the other party ' s pleadings. As the applicant has applied for costs and the Commission has been unsuccessful, the Commission must be ordered to pay the costs. |
| razsodilo: | |
| 1) Odločba Komisije 2001/711/ES z dne 29. junija 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES (zadeva COMP/F-2/36.693 – Volkswagen) se razglasi za nično. | |
| 2) Komisiji se naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
Operative part | |
| On those grounds, | |
| THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber) | |
| hereby: | |
| 1. Annuls Commission Decision 2001/711/EC of 29 June 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/F-2/36.693 ─ Volkswagen); | |
| 2. Orders the Commission to pay the costs. |