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Naslov in reference |
Title and reference |
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Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje (peti senat) z dne 26. aprila 2007. Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje (peti senat) z dne 26. aprila 2007. Oznaka ECLI: ECLI:EU:T:2007:115 |
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 26 April 2007. Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 26 April 2007. European Court Reports 2007 II-00947 ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:T:2007:115 |
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Miscellaneous information |
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Procedure |
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Pravna doktrina |
Doctrine |
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Classifications |
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| SODBA SODIŠČA PRVE STOPNJE (peti senat) | Parties Grounds Operative part |
| z dne 26. aprila 2007 ( *1 ) | |
| „Konkurenca — Omejevalni sporazumi — Trg samokopirnega papirja — Smernice za izračun globe — Trajanje kršitve — Teža kršitve — Zvišanje za odvračilne namene — Obteževalne okoliščine — Olajševalne okoliščine — Obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi“ | |
| V združenih zadevah T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 in T-136/02, | |
| Bolloré SA, s sedežem v Puteauxu (Francija), ki jo zastopata R. Saint-Esteben in H. Calvet, odvetnika, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-109/02, | |
| Arjo Wiggins Appleton Ltd, s sedežem v Basingstoku (Združeno kraljestvo), ki jo zastopajo F. Brunet, odvetnik, J. Temple Lang, solicitor, in J. Grierson, barrister, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-118/02, | |
| ob intervenciji | |
| Kraljevine Belgije, ki jo zastopata A. Snoecx in M. Wimmer, zastopnika, | |
| intervenientka v zadevi T-118/02, | |
| Mitsubishi HiTec Paper Bielefeld GmbH, prej Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH, s sedežem v Bielefeldu (Nemčija), ki jo zastopata I. van Bael, odvetnik, in A. Kmiecik, solicitor, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-122/02, | |
| Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, s sedežem v Oberkirchu (Nemčija), ki jo zastopata I. Brinker in S. Hirsbrunner, odvetnika, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-125/02, | |
| M-real Zanders GmbH, prej Zanders Feinpapiere AG, s sedežem v Bergisch Gladbachu (Nemčija), ki jo zastopata J. Burrichter in M. Wirtz, odvetnika, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-126/02, | |
| Papeteries Mougeot SA, s sedežem v Laval-sur-Vologne (Francija), ki so jo najprej zastopali G. Barsi, J. Baumgartner in J.-P. Hordies, nato G. Barsi in J. Baumgartner, odvetniki, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-128/02, | |
| Torraspapel, SA, s sedežem v Barceloni (Španija), ki jo zastopajo O. Brouwer, F. Cantos in C. Schillemans, odvetniki, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-129/02, | |
| Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles, SL, s sedežem v Deriu (Španija), ki jo zastopata E. Pérez Medrano in I. Delgado González, odvetnika, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-132/02, | |
| Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga, SA, s sedežem v Hernaniju (Španija), ki jo zastopa I. Quintana Aguirre, odvetnik, | |
| tožeča stranka v zadevi T-136/02, | |
| proti | |
| Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti, ki jo zastopajo v zadevah T-109/02 in T-128/02 W. Mölls in F. Castillo de la Torre, zastopnika, skupaj z N. Coutrelisom, odvetnik, v zadevah T-118/02 in T-129/02 W. Mölls in A. Whelan, zastopnika, skupaj z M. van der Woudejem, odvetnik, v zadevi T-122/02 najprej R. Wainwright in W. Mölls, nato R. Wainwright in A. Whelan, zastopnika, v zadevah T-125/02 in T-126/02 W. Mölls in F. Castillo de la Torre, skupaj s H.-J. Freundom, odvetnik, v zadevah T-132/02 in T-136/02 W. Mölls in F. Castillo de la Torre, skupaj z J. Rivasom Andrésom in J. Gutiérrezom Gisbertom, odvetnika, | |
| tožena stranka, | |
| zaradi predloga za razglasitev ničnosti Odločbe Komisije 2004/337/ES z dne 20. decembra 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP (zadeva COMP/E-1/36.212 – Samokopirni papir, UL 2004, L 115, str. 1) ali, podredno, predloga za znižanje globe, naložene tožečim strankam s to odločbo, | |
| SODIŠČE PRVE STOPNJE | |
| EVROPSKIH SKUPNOSTI (peti senat), | |
| v sestavi M. Vilaras, predsednik, F. Dehousse in D. Šváby, sodnika, | |
| sodni tajnik: J. Palacio González, glavni administrator, | |
| na podlagi pisnega postopka in obravnav z dne 2. junija (T-132/02 in T-136/02), 7. junija (T-109/02 in T-128/02), 14. junija (T-122/02), 16. junija (T-118/02 in T-129/02) in 21. junija 2005 (T-125/02 in T-126/02) | |
| izreka naslednjo | |
| Sodbo | |
| Dejansko stanje | |
| 1 | Jeseni leta 1996 je papirniška skupina Sappi, katere matična družba je Sappi Ltd, Komisiji predložila informacije in dokumente, ki so Komisiji dali povod za sum, da obstaja ali je obstajal tajni omejevalni sporazum o določitvi cen v sektorju samokopirnega papirja, v katerem je bila Sappi prisotna kot proizvajalka. | |
| 2 | Glede na podatke, ki jih je sporočila Sappi, je Komisija na podlagi člena 14(2) in (3) Uredbe Sveta št. 17 z dne 6. februarja 1962, Prve uredbe o izvajanju členov [81] in [82] Pogodbe (UL 1962, 13, str. 204), opravila preiskave pri nekaterih proizvajalcih samokopirnega papirja. Tako so bile preiskave, določene v členu 14(3) Uredbe št. 17, opravljene 18. in 19. februarja 1997 v prostorih družb Arjo Wiggins Belgium SA, Papeteries Mougeot SA (v nadaljevanju: Mougeot), Torraspapel, SA, Sarriopapel y Celulosa, SA (v nadaljevanju: Sarrió) in Grupo Torras, SA. Poleg tega so bile preiskave opravljene na podlagi člena 14(2) Uredbe št. 17 od julija do decembra 1997 pri družbah Sappi, Arjo Wiggins Appleton plc (v nadaljevanju: AWA), Arjo Wiggins Europe Holdings Ltd, Arjo Wiggins SA in njeni hčerinski družbi Guérimand SA, Mougeot, Torraspapel, Sarrió, Unipapel, Sociedade Comercial de Celulose e Papel Lda, Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH (v nadaljevanju: Stora; prej Stora-Feldmühle AG) in Papierfabrik August Koehler AG (v nadaljevanju: Koehler). | |
| 3 | Komisija je leta 1999 tudi poslala zahteve za informacije v skladu s členom 11 Uredbe št. 17 družbam AWA, Mougeot, Torraspapel, Cartiere Sottrici Binda SpA (v nadaljevanju: Binda), Carrs Paper Ltd (v nadaljevanju: Carrs), Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles, SL (v nadaljevanju: Divipa), Ekman Iberica, SA (v nadaljevanju: Ekman), Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga, SA (v nadaljevanju: Zicuñaga), Koehler, Stora, Zanders Feinpapier AG (v nadaljevanju: Zanders) in Copigraph SA. V teh zahtevah je zadevne družbe pozvala, naj predložijo podatke o svojih napovedih zvišanj cen, obsegih prodaje, strankah, prometu in srečanjih s konkurenti. | |
| 4 | AWA, Stora in Copigraph so v odgovoru na zahtevo za informacije priznale svojo udeležbo pri večstranskih sestankih omejevalnega sporazuma, ki so potekali med proizvajalci samokopirnega papirja. Komisiji so predložile različne dokumente in informacije. | |
| 5 | Družba Mougeot je stopila v stik s Komisijo 14. aprila 1999 in izjavila, da je pripravljena sodelovati pri preiskavi na podlagi obvestila Komisije o nenalaganju ali zmanjševanju glob v primeru kartelov (UL 1996, C 207, str. 4; v nadaljevanju: obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi). Priznala je obstoj omejevalnega sporazuma, katerega cilj je bil določitev cen samokopirnega papirja, ter Komisiji poslala informacije o strukturi kartela in zlasti o različnih sestankih, ki so se jih udeležili njeni predstavniki. | |
| 6 | Komisija je 26. julija 2000 uvedla postopek v tej zadevi in sprejela obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah (v nadaljevanju: OU), ki ga je poslala 17 družbam, med katerimi so bile AWA, Bolloré SA in njena hčerinska družba Copigraph, Carrs, Zicuñaga, Divipa, Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH (v nadaljevanju: MHTP), prej Stora, Mougeot, Koehler, Sappi, Torraspapel in Zanders. Te družbe so dobile dostop do preiskovalnega spisa Komisije v obliki kopije na CD-ROM-u, ki jim je bil poslan 1. avgusta 2000. | |
| 7 | Vse družbe, ki so prejele OU, razen družb Binda, International Paper in Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd, so predložile pisne pripombe v odgovor na očitke Komisije. | |
| 8 | Zaslišanje je potekalo 8. in 9. marca 2001. | |
| 9 | Komisija je po posvetu s Svetovalnim odborom za omejevalna ravnanja in prevladujoče položaje ter glede na končno poročilo pooblaščenca za zaslišanje 20. decembra 2001 sprejela Odločbo 2004/337/ES v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (EGP) (zadeva COMP/E-1/36.212 – Samokopirni papir, UL 2004, L 115, str. 1, v nadaljevanju: odločba). | |
| 10 | V členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe Komisija ugotavlja, da je enajst družb kršilo člen 81(1) ES in člen 53(1) Sporazuma EGP, ker sodelovalo pri več dogovorih in usklajenih ravnanj v sektorju samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 11 | V členu 1, drugi odstavek, odločbe Komisija ugotavlja, da so družbe AWA, Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Sappi, Torraspapel in Zanders sodelovale pri kršitvi od januarja 1992 do septembra 1995, Carrs od januarja 1993 do septembra 1995, Divipa od marca 1992 do januarja 1995, Zicuñaga od oktobra 1993 do januarja 1995 in Mougeot od maja 1992 do septembra 1995. | |
| 12 | V členu 2 odločbe je družbam, navedenim v členu 1, ukazano, naj opustijo kršitev iz navedenega člena, če tega niso že storile, in naj se pri svojih dejavnostih, povezanih s samokopirnim papirjem, vzdržijo vseh dogovorov ali usklajenih ravnanj, ki bi lahko imeli enak ali podoben cilj oziroma posledico kot kršitev. | |
| 13 | V členu 3, prvi odstavek, odločbe so zadevnim družbam naložene te globe: | — | AWA: 184,27 milijona EUR, | — | Bolloré: 22,68 milijona EUR, | — | Carrs: 1,57 milijona EUR, | — | Divipa: 1,75 milijona EUR, | — | MHTP: 21,24 milijona EUR, | — | Zicuñaga: 1,54 milijona EUR, | — | Mougeot: 3,64 milijona EUR, | — | Koehler: 33,07 milijona EUR, | — | Sappi Ltd: 0 EUR, | — | Torraspapel: 14,17 milijona EUR, | — | Zanders: 29,76 milijona EUR. | |
| 14 | V skladu s členom 3, drugi odstavek, odločbe je treba globe plačati v treh mesecih od datuma vročitve odločbe. V členu 3, tretji odstavek, odločbe je določeno, da se po izteku tega roka samodejno plačajo obresti po obrestni meri, ki jo uporablja Evropska centralna banka za svoje glavne operacije refinanciranja na 1. december 2001, povečani za 3,5 odstotne točke, to je 6,77 %. | |
| 15 | Odločba je naslovljena na enajst družb, navedenih v členih 1 in 2. | |
| 16 | Iz odločbe (uvodna izjava 77) izhaja, da so se članice omejevalnega sporazuma v medsebojnem soglasju sprejele celovit protikonkurenčni načrt, katerega cilj je bil predvsem izboljšanje donosnosti udeleženih družb s kolektivnimi zvišanji cen. V skladu z odločbo je bil glavni cilj omejevalnega sporazuma v okviru tega celovitega načrta dogovoriti se o zvišanjih cen in o časovnem razporedu za njihovo izvedbo. | |
| 17 | V ta namen naj bi bili organizirani sestanki na različnih ravneh, splošni, nacionalni ali regionalni. V skladu z uvodno izjavo 89 odločbe je splošnim sestankom kartela sledilo več nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankov, katerih cilj je bil od trga do trga zagotoviti izvedbo zvišanj cen, ki so bila dogovorjena na splošnih sestankih. Na teh sestankih so si udeleženci izmenjali podrobne in individualne informacije o svojih cenah in obsegih prodaje (uvodna izjava 97). Na nekaterih nacionalnih sestankih kartela so bile za zagotovitev uresničitve dogovorjenih zvišanj cen vsakemu udeležencu dodeljene prodajne kvote in za vsakega določeni tržni deleži (uvodna izjava 81). | |
| 18 | Komisija je menila, da so pri dogovorih v okviru omejevalnega sporazuma sodelovali vsi glavni gospodarski subjekti v EGP ter da so se ti dogovori oblikovali, usmerjali in spodbujali na visokih ravneh v vsaki udeleženi družbi. Izvajanje takega omejevalnega sporazuma naj bi že v osnovi samodejno povzročilo resno izkrivljanje konkurence (uvodna izjava 377). Komisija je glede na naravo preučenega ravnanja, njegov konkretni vpliv na trg samokopirnega papirja in dejstvo, da je obsegalo ves skupni trg in, po njegovi ustanovitvi, ves EGP, ocenila, da so družbe naslovnice odločbe zelo resno kršile člen 81(1) ES in člen 53(1) Sporazuma EGP (uvodna izjava 404). | |
| 19 | Da bi Komisija določila izhodiščni znesek globe glede na težo kršitve, je zadevne družbe razvrstila v pet kategorij glede na njihov relativni pomen na zadevnem trgu (uvodne izjave od 406 do 409). Da bi zagotovila dovolj odvračilen učinek globe, je nato tako določen izhodiščni znesek povečala za 100 % za družbe AWA, Bolloré in Sappi (uvodne izjave od 410 do 412). Komisija je nato upoštevala trajanje kršitve, ki jo je storila vsaka družba, da bi določila osnovni znesek naloženih glob (uvodne izjave od 413 do 417). | |
| 20 | Na podlagi obteževalnih okoliščin je Komisija za 50 % povečala osnovni znesek globe, naložene družbi AWA, zaradi njene vloge vodje omejevalnega sporazuma (uvodne izjave od 418 do 424). Komisija v tem primeru ni ugotovila nobene olajševalne okoliščine. | |
| 21 | Komisija je prilagodila končne zneske, da bi upoštevala določbe člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 (uvodna izjava 434), nato je uporabila obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi, ki je upravičevalo znižanje zneska glob za 50 % za družbo Mougeot, za 35 % za družbo AWA, za 20 % za družbo „Bolloré (Copigraph)“ ter za 10 % za družbe Carrs, MHTP in Zanders (uvodne izjave od 435 do 458). | |
| Postopek in predlogi strank | |
| 22 | Družbe Bolloré (T-109/02), AWA (T-118/02), MHTP (T-122/02), Koehler (T-125/02), Zanders (T-126/02), Mougeot (T-128/02), Torraspapel (T-129/02), Divipa (T-132/02) in Zicuñaga (T-136/02) so od 11. do 18. aprila 2002 v sodnem tajništvu Sodišča prve stopnje ločeno vložile te tožbe. | |
| 23 | Bolloré predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | primarno, razglasi ničnost členov 1, 2 in 3 odločbe v delih, kjer se ti členi nanašajo nanjo; | — | podredno, zelo zniža znesek globe, ki ji je naložena v členu 3 odločbe; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 24 | AWA predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | razveljavi ali, podredno, zelo zniža znesek globe, ki ji je naložena z odločbo; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov; | — | sprejme vse druge ukrepe, ki bi se mu zdeli ustrezni. | |
| 25 | Kraljevina Belgija, ki je intervenirala v podporo predlogom družbe AWA, predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj zelo zniža znesek globe, naložene tej družbi. | |
| 26 | MHTP predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | razglasi ničnost člena 1 odločbe, ker iz njega izhaja, da je pri kršitvi sodelovala pred 1. januarjem 1993; | — | zniža višino globe, ki ji je naložena; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 27 | Koehler predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | razglasi ničnost odločbe; | — | podredno, zniža globo, ki ji je naložena v členu 3 odločbe; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 28 | Zanders predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | razglasi ničnost člena 3 odločbe v delu, kjer ji ta nalaga globo v višini 29,76 milijona EUR; | — | podredno, zniža globo, ki ji je naložena v členu 3 odločbe; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 29 | Mougeot predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | primarno, razglasi ničnost odločbe; | — | podredno, zelo zniža globo, ki ji jo je naložila Komisija; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 30 | Torraspapel predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | razglasi ničnost člena 1 odločbe v delu, kjer je ugotovljeno, da je tožeča stranka kršila člen 81(1) ES med 1. januarjem 1992 in septembrom 1993, ter posledično zniža globo; | — | bistveno zniža globo, naloženo tožeči stranki v členu 3 odločbe; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov, vključno s stroški in z obrestmi, povezanimi s pologom bančne garancije ali plačilom celotne oziroma delne globe. | |
| 31 | Divipa predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | razglasi ničnost odločbe, ker je v njej poleg njenega sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu v zvezi s španskim trgom ugotovljeno njeno sodelovanje v kartelu, ki pokriva ves trg EGP, in, podredno, zniža globo, ki ji je naložena s to odločbo; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 32 | Zicuñaga predlaga Sodišču prve stopnje, naj: | — | primarno, razglasi ničnost členov 1, 3 in 4 odločbe, kolikor se ti členi nanašajo nanjo; | — | podredno, zniža znesek globe, ki jo je naložila Komisija tako, da: | — | razveljavi zvišanje globe za 10 %, ker njeno sodelovanje pri kršitvi ni trajalo več kot eno leto; | — | precej, najmanj za 60 %, zniža osnovni znesek globe zaradi obstoja olajševalnih okoliščin; | — | Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 33 | Komisija v vsaki od teh zadev predlaga, naj se tožba zavrne in tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| 34 | Sodišče prve stopnje je v zadevah T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-128/02, T-132/02 in T-136/02 postavilo pisna vprašanja, na katera so zadevne stranke odgovorile v predpisanem roku. | |
| 35 | Tožeča stranka v zadevi T-126/02 je z dopisom z dne 14. junija 2005, ki je vključeval stališča o poročilu za obravnavo, obvestila Sodišče prve stopnje o svoji spremembi firme in statusa iz Zanders Feinpapiere AG v M-real Zanders GmbH (v nadaljevanju: Zanders). | |
| 36 | Stranke so na obravnavah 2., 7., 14., 16. in 21. junija 2005 ločeno podale ustne navedbe in odgovorile na vprašanja Sodišča prve stopnje. | |
| 37 | Ker je Sodišče prve stopnje na obravnavi v vsaki zadevi stranke pozvalo, naj predložijo stališča o morebitni združitvi vseh zadev za izdajo sodbe, in ker te niso nasprotovale, Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da je treba v skladu s členom 50 Poslovnika Sodišča prve stopnje te zadeve združiti za izdajo sodbe. | |
| Pravo | |
| 38 | Predlogi tožečih strank se nanašajo na razglasitev ničnosti odločbe in/ali odpravo ali znižanje globe. | |
| I – Tožbeni razlogi za razglasitev ničnosti odločbe | |
| 39 | Tožeče stranke si, odvisno od posameznega primera, prizadevajo doseči razglasitev ničnosti odločbe v celoti ali nekaterih njenih določb, ki jih zadevajo. Ti predlogi za razglasitev ničnosti temeljijo na procesnih tožbenih razlogih, ki se nanašajo na potek upravnega postopka, ter materialnih tožbenih razlogih, ki se nanašajo na ugotovitve in ocene Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem nekaterih družb pri kršitvi. | |
| A – Tožbeni razlogi v zvezi s potekom upravnega postopka | |
| 1. Prvi tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravice do zaslišanja, ki izhaja iz nerazkritja dokumentov, ki jih je Komisija opredelila kot zaupne, med upravnim postopkom | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 40 | Zicuñaga trdi, da iz pravne literature in člena 19 Uredbe št. 17 izhaja, da je popoln dostop do preiskovalnega spisa procesno jamstvo, namenjeno za zagotavljanje učinkovitega uresničevanja pravic do obrambe, zlasti pravice do zaslišanja. Poudarja, da naj bi to jamstvo zadevni stranki omogočilo ne samo izpodbijati obremenilne dokumente, ki jih navaja Komisija, ampak tudi dobiti dostop do razbremenilnih dokumentov, ki bi lahko bili koristni za njeno obrambo. | |
| 41 | Glede zaupnih dokumentov je po njenem mnenju naloga Komisije, da uskladi legitimni interes zadevne družbe za spoštovanje zaupnosti s pravicami do obrambe. Vendar pa naj se Komisija v končni odločbi ne bi smela opreti na dokumente, o katerih obtoženi ni mogel izraziti svojega stališča. Zavrnitev Komisije, da razkrije dokument med upravnim postopkom, naj bi poleg tega pomenila kršitev pravic do obrambe, kadar obstaja možnost, da bi se upravni postopek pri razkritju tega dokumenta zadevni osebi končal drugače. Po mnenju družbe Zicuñaga iz tega izhaja, da so bile zaradi nerazkritja dokumentov, ki jih je Komisija opredelila kot zaupne, kršene pravice od obrambe tožeče stranke. | |
| 42 | Komisija poudarja, da preiskava, ki jo je opravila, upošteva vsa potrebna jamstva in ne krši nobenega pravnega načela. Poleg tega meni, da trditev družbe Zicuñaga ni dopustna, ker ne navaja natančno, katere obremenilne dokumente naj bi Komisija uporabila. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 43 | Najprej je treba poudariti dvoumnost trditev družbe Zicuñaga. Naslov zadevnega tožbenega razloga („Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja. Nepredložitev obremenilnih dokumentov.“) daje vtis, da tožeča stranka izpodbija samo to, da Komisija med upravnim postopkom ni razkrila dokumentov, ki so bili v odločbi uporabljeni kot obremenilni dokazi. Drugi odlomki iz njene tožbe kažejo, da graja tudi to, da med navedenim postopkom niso bili razkriti dokumenti, ki bi domnevno lahko vsebovali razbremenilne dokaze. | |
| 44 | Ker Zicuñaga graja dejstvo, da naj Komisija med upravnim postopkom ne bi predložila dokumentov, ki naj bi bili v odločbi domnevno uporabljeni kot obremenilni dokazi, je treba opozoriti, kot v pisanjih opozarja Komisija, da Zicuñaga ne navaja nobenega takega dokumenta. Ker trditev družbe Zicuñaga nikakor ni utemeljena, jo je treba zavrniti. | |
| 45 | Ker Zicuñaga graja dejstvo, da naj bi ji Komisija med upravnim postopkom zavrnila dostop do dokumentov, ki naj bi bili domnevno koristni za njeno obrambo, saj bi lahko vsebovali razbremenilne dokaze, je treba opozoriti, da je Komisija v skladu s sodno prakso, da bi zadevnim družbam omogočila učinkovito obrambo zoper očitke, navedene zoper njih v OU, tem dolžna omogočiti dostop do celotnega preiskovalnega spisa, razen dokumentov, ki vsebujejo poslovne skrivnosti drugih družb ali druge zaupne informacije, in internih dokumentov Komisije (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. marca 2002 v zadevi LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, T-23/99, Recueil, str. II-1705, točka 170 in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 46 | Poleg tega je treba pravico družb in podjetniških združenj do zaščite njihovih poslovnih skrivnosti uravnotežiti z jamstvom pravice do dostopa do celotnega spisa. Zato mora Komisija, če meni, da nekateri dokumenti v preiskovalnem spisu vsebujejo poslovne skrivnosti ali druge zaupne informacije, pripraviti ali naročiti, da družbe ali podjetniška združenja, od katerih prihajajo zadevni dokumenti, pripravijo nezaupne različice teh dokumentov. Če se priprava nezaupnih različic vseh dokumentov izkaže za težavno, mora zadevnim strankam poslati dovolj natančen seznam dokumentov, ki povzročajo težave, da bi jim omogočila oceniti, ali je primerno zahtevati dostop do posebnih dokumentov (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 29. junija 1995 v zadevi Solvay proti Komisiji, T-30/91, Recueil, str. II-1775, točke od 88 do 94). | |
| 47 | V obravnavanem primeru iz spisov družbe Zicuñaga izhaja, da ta še posebno graja dejstvo, da naj bi ji Komisija zavrnila dostop do podrobnih informacij, navedenih v uvodni izjavi 288 odločbe, v zvezi s prodajo več obdolženih družb, med temi Zicuñaga, po posameznih državah na ozemlju EGP v referenčnem obdobju omejevalnega sporazuma. Po mnenju zadnje te informacije verjetno vsebujejo elemente, ki bi ji omogočili dokazati, da ni izvajala politike cen, usklajene z evropskimi proizvajalci samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 48 | V zvezi s tem je s seznama dokumentov, ki sestavljajo spis v zadevi T-136/02, ki ga je Komisija predložila v odgovor na vprašanje Sodišča prve stopnje, razvidno, da je Komisija med upravnim postopkom strankam dala na razpolago nezaupno različico dokumentov, ki ustrezajo informacijam iz uvodne izjave 288, če so bili ti dokumenti razvrščeni kot nedostopni. Zicuñaga je torej lahko ocenila, ali je primerno zahtevati dostop do posebnih dokumentov. | |
| 49 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da Komisiji v postopku ugotavljanja kršitve člen 81 ES ni treba, da na svojo pobudo omogoči dostop do dokumentov, ki niso v njenem preiskovalnem spisu in jih ne namerava uporabiti proti zadevnim strankam v končni odločbi. Stranka, ki med upravnim postopkom izve, da ima Komisija dokumente, ki bi lahko bili koristni za njeno obrambo, mora instituciji predložiti izrecno zahtevo za dostop do teh dokumentov. Če stranka tega ne stori med upravnim postopkom, to na tej točki povzroči prekluzijo za ničnostno tožbo, ki bo morda vložena zoper končno odločbo (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 15. marca 2000 v združenih zadevah Cimenteries CBR in drugi proti Komisiji, T-25/95, T-26/95, od T-30/95 do T-32/95, od T-34/95 do T-39/95, od T-42/95 do T-46/95, T-48/95, od T-50/95 do T-65/95, od T-68/95 do T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 in T-104/95, Recueil, str. II-491, v nadaljevanju: sodba Cement, točka 383). | |
| 50 | Zicuñaga med upravnim postopkom ni uradno zahtevala dostopa do zaupne različice zgoraj navedenih informacij. Čeprav v odgovoru na vprašanje Sodišča prve stopnje navaja pisno zahtevo za dostop do teh informacij in predloži dopis Komisije o zavrnitvi te zahteve, je namreč treba ugotoviti, da je datum te zahteve 3. april 2002 ter da je torej bila vložena po končanem upravnem postopku in sprejetju odločbe. Ker Zicuñaga ni vložila take zahteve med upravnim postopkom, to povzroči prekluzijo za ničnostno tožbo. | |
| 51 | Zato je treba zavrniti ta tožbeni razlog, ki ga navaja Zicuñaga. | |
| 2. Drugi tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravice do dostopa do spisa zaradi nepredložitve dokumentov, ki niso vključeni v preiskovalni spis, poslan na CD-ROM-u | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 52 | Družba Koehler očita Komisiji, da ji ni omogočila dostopa do nekaterih dokumentov, ki niso del preiskovalnega spisa, poslanega na CD-ROM-u naslovnikom OU 1. avgusta 2000. Nanaša se predvsem na odgovore drugih naslovnikov OU na OU in priloge k tem odgovorom, zlasti izvedensko poročilo, ki je navedeno v opombi 365 odločbe in naj bi ga družba AWA poslala Komisiji. Trdi, da številna sklicevanja na odgovore na OU, ki jih vsebuje odločba, dokazujejo, da se je Komisija pri analizi dejanskega stanja in izračunu glob oprla na te odgovore. Koehler dodaja, da odgovor družbe Mougeot na OU kaže, da je spis očitno vseboval tudi informacije, ki bi bile koristne za njeno obrambo. | |
| 53 | Komisija odgovarja, da čeprav je res, da se lahko opre samo na dejstva, o katerih so lahko zadevne družbe predložile stališča, odgovori na OU niso del preiskovalnega spisa, do katerega je treba odobriti dostop. Upravni postopek je treba šteti za končan takoj po prejetju teh odgovorov in ga ni mogoče nadaljevati v nedogled, ker bi vsaka družba želela izraziti stališče o stališčih drugih družb. Družba Koehler naj ne bi opredelila obremenilnega dokaza, na kateri naj bi Komisija oprla svoj očitek zoper njo, ne da bi lahko izrazila svoje stališče v zvezi s tem. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 54 | Trditve družbe Koehler je mogoče razumeti tako, da vsebujejo dva vidika. Po eni strani naj bi Komisija nekatere dokumente, ki jih ni v preiskovalnem spisu, do katerega je imela dostop, uporabila kot obremenilne dokaze v odločbi, ne da bi družba Koehler imela dostop do njih med upravnim postopkom in ne da bi se lahko izrekla v zvezi z njimi. Po drugi strani naj Komisija družbi Koehler ne bi razkrila dokumentov, ki jih ni v preiskovalnem spisu, do katerega je imela dostop, ki pa bi lahko vsebovali razbremenilne dokaze. Ti dve točki je treba analizirati ločeno. | |
| 55 | Prvič, glede nerazkritja domnevno obremenilnih dokazov, ki jih ni v preiskovalnem spisu, do katerega je družba Koehler imela dostop, je treba najprej opozoriti, da je dokument mogoče šteti za obremenilen za tožečo stranko samo, če ga Komisija uporabi v podporo ugotovitvi kršitve, pri kateri naj bi ta tožeča stranka sodelovala (sodba Cement, točka 284). | |
| 56 | Ker dokumenti, ki zadevnim strankam niso bili sporočeni med upravnim postopkom, niso dokazna sredstva, ki jih je mogoče uveljavljati zoper njih (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča z dne 3. julija 1991 v zadevi AKZO proti Komisiji, C-62/86, Recueil, str. I-3359, točka 21, sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 10. marca 1992 v zadevi Shell proti Komisiji, T-11/89, Recueil, str. II-757, točki 55 in 56, ter v zadevi ICI proti Komisiji, T-13/89, Recueil, str. II-1021, točki 34 in 35), je treba, če se izkaže, da se je Komisija v izpodbijani odločbi oprla na dokumente, ki jih ni v preiskovalnem spisu in niso bili sporočeni tožečim strankam, navedene dokumente izključiti kot dokazna sredstva (sodba Cement, točka 382; glej v tem smislu tudi sodbo Sodišča z dne 25. oktobra 1983 v zadevi AEG proti Komisiji, 107/82, Recueil, str. 3151, točke od 24 do 30, zgoraj v točki 46 navedeno sodbo Solvay proti Komisiji, točka 57, in zgoraj navedeno sodbo ICI proti Komisiji, točka 36). | |
| 57 | Iz tega sledi, da če se Komisija namerava opreti na odlomek iz odgovora na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah ali na dokument, priložen takemu odgovoru, da bi dokazala obstoj kršitve v postopku uporabe člena 81(1) ES, je treba drugim strankam, vpletenim v ta postopek, dati možnost, da se izrečejo o takem dokazu (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 56 navedene sodbe AKZO proti Komisiji, točka 21; Shell proti Komisiji, točka 55, in ICI proti Komisiji, točka 34). | |
| 58 | V obravnavanem primeru tožeča stranka na splošno v tožbi trdi, da „[z]aradi številnih sklicevanj v opombah ne more biti nobenega dvoma, da je Komisija stališča drugih strank v postopku uporabila za utemeljitev obrazložitve dejstev in tudi izračuna zneska globe“. Vendar pa na podlagi tako splošne trditve ni mogoče ugotoviti, kateri dokumenti naj bi bili v odločbi domnevno uporabljeni kot obremenilni dokazi zoper družbo Koehler. Družba Koehler je na obravnavi poleg tega priznala, da ni bilo nobenega obremenilnega dokumenta, do katerega ni imela dostopa. | |
| 59 | Drugič, glede nerazkritja domnevno razbremenilnih dokazov, ki jih preiskovalni spis, do katerega je imela dostop, ne vsebuje, se družba Koehler sklicuje na odgovore drugih naslovnikov OU na OU in tudi na priloge k tem odgovorom. Vendar pa ne dokaže, da je Komisijo izrecno zaprosila za razkritje teh dokazov; na obravnavi je celo priznala, da ni vložila zahteve za dostop do teh dokumentov. Družba Koehler torej na Sodišču prve stopnje ne more izpodbijati dejstva, da ni imela dostopa do teh dokumentov (glej v tem smislu sodbo Cement, točka 383, glej tudi točko 49 zgoraj). | |
| 60 | Podredno družba Koehler ni dokazala, da bi lahko, če bi imela dostop do odgovorov drugih naslovnikov OU na OU in do prilog k tem odgovorom, navedla trditve, ki bi lahko vplivale na rezultat odločbe (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča z dne 10. julija 1980 v zadevi Distillers proti Komisiji, 30/78, Recueil, str. 2229, točka 26, in sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 27. novembra 1990 v zadevi Kobor proti Komisiji, T-7/90, Recueil, str. II-721, točka 30). | |
| 61 | Najprej, glede izvedenskega poročila, ki ga je družba AWA priložila svojemu odgovoru na OU, če je namen sklicevanja družbe Koehler na navedeno poročilo opredeliti dokument, ki ga preiskovalni spis, do katerega je imela dostop, ne vsebuje in ki bi lahko bil koristen za njeno obrambo, iz odločbe (uvodne izjave 390, 392 in 396) namreč izhaja, da je Komisija izrecno zavrnila trditve v zvezi z domnevnim neobstojem konkretnega vpliva kršitve na trg, ki jih je na podlagi tega poročila med upravnim postopkom navedla družba AWA. Trditev družbe Koehler, ki se nanaša na dejstvo, da je neobstoj dostopa do tega poročila med upravnim postopkom škodoval njeni obrambi, torej ne more uspeti. | |
| 62 | Nadalje, glede odgovora družbe Mougeot na OU družba Koehler v repliki trdi, da navedeni odgovor kaže, da je spis očitno vseboval koristne informacije za njeno obrambo. V zvezi s tem se sklicuje na odlomek iz tega odgovora, naveden v uvodni izjavi 293 odločbe, v katerem družba Mougeot, ki spreminja predhodno izjavo za Komisijo, trdi, da „[OU] ne dokazuje, da so sestanki AEMCP [Association of European Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper] bili okvir za tajno dogovorjene mehanizme pred prestrukturiranjem združenja septembra 1993“. Vendar pa Komisija v uvodni izjavi 295 odločbe izrecno zavrača to trditev, ko trdi, da izjave družb Sappi, Mougeot in AWA dokazujejo, da so se splošni sestanki kartela začeli najpozneje leta 1992. Ob sklicevanju se na uvodni izjavi 112 in 113 odločbe dodaja, da dokazi, ki jih je predložila Sappi, potrjujejo, da je obstajalo tajno dogovarjanje na sestankih Združenja evropskih proizvajalcev samokopirnega papirja (AEMCP) ali sestankih, ki so potekali ob teh sestankih pred septembrom 1993. Odlomek iz dogovora družbe Mougeot na OU, ki ga navaja Koehler, torej ne dokazuje, v nasprotju s tem, kar trdi zadnjenavedena družba, da bi odgovori na OU in dokumenti, priloženi tem odgovorom, tej družbi omogočili, da bi navedla trditve, na podlagi katerih bi se lahko upravni postopek končal drugače. | |
| 63 | Glede na vse zgoraj navedene ugotovitve je treba ta tožbeni razlog zavrniti. | |
| 3. Tretji tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravic do obrambe in načela kontradiktornosti, ki izhaja iz neujemanja med OU in odločbo | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 64 | Družba Bolloré trdi, da je v fazi OU Komisija ugotovila njeno sodelovanje pri kršitvi samo na podlagi njene odgovornosti kot matične družbe za ravnanje svoje hčerinske družbe Copigraph. Nasprotno pa naj bi odločba vsebovala nov očitek zoper njo, ki se nanaša na njeno osebno in neodvisno vpletenost v omejevalni sporazum. Družba Bolloré trdi, da naj bi Komisija s tem, ko ji ni ponudila možnosti izraziti stališča o tem očitku med upravnim postopkom, kršila njene pravice do obrambe. | |
| 65 | Komisija zanika, da je družba Bolloré v odločbi obravnavana kot osebno vpletena v kršitev. Tožeči stranki naj bi bilo ravnanje njene hčerinske družbe pripisano, ker naj bi z njo tvorila isto družbo. Ta tožbeni razlog bi torej lahko uspel samo, če bi bilo dokazano, da pripisovanje kršitve tožeči stranki iz tega razloga v OU ni očitno, ali če bi bilo ugotovljeno, da je Komisija oceno v odločbi oprla na dejstva, o katerih družba Bolloré ni mogla izraziti svojega stališča med predhodnim postopkom. To pa naj ne bi držalo. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 66 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da upoštevanje pravic do obrambe, ki je temeljno načelo prava Skupnosti in ga je treba zagotavljati v vseh okoliščinah, zlasti v vsakem postopku, ki lahko privede do kazni, tudi če gre za upravni postopek, zahteva, da ima zadevna družba možnost ustrezno predstaviti svoje stališče o resničnosti in upoštevnosti dejstev, očitkov in okoliščin, ki jih navaja Komisija (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 16. decembra 2003 v združenih zadevah Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied in Technische Unie proti Komisiji, T-5/00 in T-6/00, Recueil, str. II-5761, točka 32 in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 67 | V skladu s sodno prakso mora OU vsebovati dovolj jasen opis očitkov, pa čeprav zbiren, da se lahko zadevne stranke dejansko seznanijo z ravnanji, ki jim jih očita Komisija. Samo pod tem pogojem namreč lahko OU izpolnjuje nalogo, ki jo ima v skladu s predpisi Skupnosti, in sicer da se družbam in podjetniškim združenjem zagotovijo vse potrebne informacije, da bi se lahko učinkovito branili, preden Komisija sprejme končno odločbo (sodba Sodišča z dne 31. marca 1993 v združenih zadevah Ahlström Osakeyhtiö in drugi proti Komisiji, C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 in od C-125/85 do C-129/85, Recueil, str. I-1307, točka 42, ter sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Mo och Domsjö proti Komisiji, T-352/94, Recueil, str. II-1989, točka 63). | |
| 68 | Poleg tega se kršitev pravic do obrambe med upravnim postopkom presoja glede na očitke, ki jih Komisija uveljavlja v OU in odločbi (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 29. junija 1995 v zadevi ICI proti Komisiji, T-36/91, Recueil, str. II-1847, točka 70, in zgoraj v točki 46 navedena sodba Solvay proti Komisiji, točka 60). V teh okoliščinah ugotovitev kršitve pravic do obrambe predvideva, da Komisija očitek, za kateri družba trdi, da ni bil naveden zoper njo v OU, uveljavlja v izpodbijani odločbi. | |
| 69 | Ob upoštevanju sodne prakse, navedene v treh predhodnih točkah, je treba v obravnavanem primeru preveriti najprej, na kateri podlagi je Komisija v odločbi ugotovila odgovornost družbe Bolloré za kršitev. Ustrezne informacije so navedene v uvodnih izjavah od 353 do 356 odločbe (del II (Pravna presoja), točka 2.3 (Odgovornost za kršitev 2, Copigraph in Bolloré)). | |
| 70 | Te uvodne izjave se glasijo: | „353. | Družbo Copigraph, ki je bila ob kršitvi hčerinska družba v stoodstotni lasti družbe [Bolloré] (prej Bolloré Technologies SA), je novembra 1998 kupila družba AWA. Copigraph je svoje dejavnosti prenehala opravljati 2. februarja 2000 z učinkom od 30. decembra 2000. Družba Bolloré meni, da je ni mogoče šteti za odgovorno za ravnanje družbe Copigraph, saj je ta bila gospodarsko povsem neodvisna. Po mnenju družbe Bolloré ta neodvisnost izvira iz teh dejavnikov: strukturi upravljanja družb Copigraph in Bolloré sta bili popolnoma ločeni, Copigraph je imela svojo infrastrukturo in njena trgovinska politika ni bila odvisna, saj je skoraj 35 % svojih potreb po surovinah pokrila zunaj skupine Bolloré, zlasti pri konkurentu te skupine. | 354. | Družba Copigraph je bil del divizije skupine Bolloré ‚[P]osebni papirji‘ in tedanji vodja te divizije [g. V.] je bil hkrati tudi generalni direktor družbe Copigraph. Poleg tega je imel tedanji komercialni direktor družbe Copigraph [g. J. B.] od leta 1994 tudi prodajno funkcijo v papirnici v Thononu. Družba [Bolloré] je torej zagotovo vedela za sodelovanje svoje hčerinske družbe pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | 355. | Obstajajo tudi dokazi, ki matično družbo [Bolloré] neposredno povezujejo z dejavnostmi kartela. Družba Bolloré je bila članica združenja AEMCP, katerega uradni sestanki so od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993 bili tudi sestanki kartela. Predstavnik družbe Bolloré, [g. V.], vodja divizije ‚[P]osebni papirji‘, se je teh sestankov kartela udeleževal skupaj s komercialnim direktorjem družbe Copigraph. Udeležil se je tudi sestanka kartela 1. oktobra 1993, posvečenega francoskemu trgu. Na vseh poznejših sestankih kartela, na katerih so bili prepoznani posamični predstavniki družbe Copigraph, je bil komercialni direktor družbe Copigraph. Vsi ti sestanki so potekali leta 1994, in kot je že bilo navedeno, komercialni direktor družbe Copigraph je imel sočasno prodajno funkcijo v okviru družbe Bolloré. | 356. | Na tej podlagi Komisija meni, da je treba družbo Bolloré šteti za odgovorno ne samo za njeno ravnanje, ampak tudi za ravnanje družbe Copigraph v zvezi z omejevalnim sporazumom v celotnem določenem obdobju.“ | |
| 71 | Iz zgornjega izvlečka iz odločbe izhaja, da je bila odgovornost za kršitev družbi Bolloré pripisana, ker jo je bilo treba šteti za odgovorno za sodelovanje njene hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu in ker so obstajali dokazi o njeni neposredni vpletenosti v dejavnosti kartela. | |
| 72 | Bolloré ne izpodbija, da ji je OU omogočilo razumeti in sprejeti stališče o dejstvu, da ji je Komisija v navedenem OU pripisala kršitev zaradi njene odgovornosti kot matične družbe, stoodstotne lastnice družbe Copigraph, za sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu med kršitvijo. Njen ugovor se nanaša na to, da Komisija v OU ni navedla svojega namena, da ji kršitev pripiše tudi zaradi njene neposredne vpletenosti v dejavnosti omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 73 | Ustrezni odlomki OU so navedeni v točkah od 240 do 245 in 248 (del II (Pravna presoja), točka B (Uporaba pravil o konkurenci), 8 (Odgovornost za kršitev)). | |
| 74 | Najprej je treba navesti, da Komisija v teh točkah OU nikakor ne navaja neposredne vpletenosti družbe Bolloré v omejevalni sporazum v primerjavi z navedbami v zvezi z drugimi matičnimi družbami, navedenimi v OU, kot sta AWA in Torraspapel, za kateri Komisija navaja, kar zadeva družbo AWA, da „je neposredno in samostojno sodelovala pri nezakonitem omejevalnem sporazumu prek svoje divizije Arjo Wiggins Carbonless Paper Operation“, in kar zadeva družbo Torraspapel, da „obstajajo tudi dokazi, ki matično družbo neposredno povezujejo s tajnimi dejavnostmi“. | |
| 75 | Nadalje, kot pravilno poudarja družba Bolloré, iz točke 243 OU izhaja, da je Komisija razlikovala med dvema vrstama položajev: | „Kar zadeva odnose med matičnimi in hčerinskimi družbami, Komisija naslavlja to obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah na matično družbo, če | — | sta pri kršitvi sodelovali dve njeni hčerinski družbi ali je sodelovalo več njenih hčerinskih družb; | — | je bila matična družba vpletena v kršitev. | V drugih primerih sodelovanja hčerinske družbe je obvestilo naslovljeno na to hčerinsko in matično družbo.“ | |
| 76 | Glede skupine, ki jo sestavljata družbi Bolloré in Copigraph, je bilo OU naslovljeno ne samo na družbo Bolloré, ampak tudi na Copigraph, kar je glede na merila, navedena v točki 243 OU, družbi Bolloré zagotovilo, da Komisija v fazi OU ne meni, da je bila Bolloré, matična družba skupine, neposredno vpletena v kršitev. | |
| 77 | Ugotoviti je torej treba, da je glede na OU Komisija nameravala družbi Bolloré odgovornost za kršitev pripisati samo zato, ker jo je bilo kot matično družbo skupine, ki sta jo ob kršitvi sestavljali družbi Bolloré in Copigraph, hčerinska družba v njeni stoodstotni lasti, treba šteti za odgovorno za nezakonito ravnanje družbe Copigraph. Ob branju OU družba Bolloré ni mogla predvideti, da se Komisija namerava za to, da bi ji pripisala odgovornost za kršitev, opreti tudi na njeno neposredno vpletenost v dejavnosti omejevalnega sporazuma, kot stori v odločbi. | |
| 78 | Dodati je treba, da dejstva, ki jih Komisija navaja v uvodni izjavi 355 odločbe v podporo svoji trditvi v zvezi z neposredno vpletenostjo družbe Bolloré v kršitev, to je da je bila Bolloré članica AEMCP ter da sta jo na več sestankih kartela zastopala g. V. in g. J. B., niso bila navedena v OU. Tudi če bi v skladu s trditvijo Komisije priznali, da je bilo članstvo družbe Bolloré v AEMCP razvidno iz dokumentov, priloženih OU, je namreč treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija med člani AEMCP navedla samo družbo Copigraph in nikoli družbe Bolloré. Kar zadeva g. V. in g. J. B., sta bila v OU dosledno opredeljena kot predstavnika družbe Copigraph na sestankih kartela in ne kot predstavnika družbe Bolloré. Poleg tega Komisija v nobenem odlomku OU ni navedla družbe Bolloré med družbami, ki so bile zastopane na takih sestankih. | |
| 79 | Zato OU družbi Bolloré ni omogočilo, da se seznani z očitkom, ki se nanaša na njeno neposredno vpletenost v kršitev, niti z dejstvi, ki jih je Komisija uporabila v odločbi v podporo temu očitku, tako da družba Bolloré ni mogla, kot izhaja iz branja njenega odgovora na OU, ustrezno zagotoviti svoje obrambe med upravnim postopkom v zvezi s tem očitkom in temi dejstvi. | |
| 80 | Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da tudi če odločba vsebuje nove dejanske ali pravne navedbe, v zvezi s katerimi zadevne družbe niso bile zaslišane, bo ugotovljena napaka povzročila razglasitev ničnosti odločbe v zvezi s tem samo, če zadevnih navedb ni mogoče pravno zadostno dokazati na podlagi drugih dokazov v odločbi, o katerih so imele zadevne družbe priložnost izraziti svoje stališče (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 30. septembra 2003 v združenih zadevah Atlantic Container Line in drugi proti Komisiji, T-191/98, od T-212/98 do T-214/98, Recueil, str. II-3275, točka 196; glej v tem smislu tudi sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 28. februarja 2002 v zadevi Compagnie générale maritime in drugi proti Komisiji, T-86/95, Recueil, str. II-1011, točka 447). Poleg tega bi lahko kršitev pravic do obrambe družbe Bolloré vplivala na veljavnost odločbe v zvezi z družbo Bolloré samo, če bi odločba temeljila le na neposredni vpletenosti družbe Bolloré v kršitev (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 67 navedeno sodbo Mo och Domsjö proti Komisiji, točka 74). Ker v tem primeru novega očitka v odločbi, ki se nanaša na neposredno vpletenost družbe Bolloré v dejavnosti kartela, ne bi bilo mogoče podpreti, navedeni družbi ne bi bilo mogoče pripisati odgovornosti za kršitev. | |
| 81 | Nasprotno, če bi se pri preučitvi temelja (glej točke od 123 do 150) izkazalo, da je Komisija pravilno štela družbo Bolloré za odgovorno za sodelovanje njene hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu, napačna uporaba prava s strani Komisije ne more zadovoljivo upravičiti razglasitve ničnosti odločbe, ker ne bi mogla odločilno vplivati na izrek, ki ga je sprejela institucija (glej v tem smislu sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 2002 v zadevi Graphischer Maschinenbau proti Komisiji, T-126/99, Recueil, str. II-2427, točka 49, in z dne 14. decembra 2005 v zadevi Honeywell proti Komisiji, T-209/01, ZOdl. str. II-5527, točka 49). V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso namreč, če določeni razlogi v odločbi lahko pravno zadovoljivo utemeljijo to odločbo, napake, ki bi bile lahko podane pri drugih razlogih tega akta, nikakor ne vplivajo na njegov izrek (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 21. septembra 2005 v zadevi EDP proti Komisiji, T-87/05, ZOdl., str. II-3745, točka 144; glej v tem smislu tudi sodbo Sodišča z dne 12. julija 2001 v združenih zadevah Komisija in Francija proti TF1, C-302/99 P in C-308/99 P, Recueil, str. I-5603, točke od 26 do 29). | |
| 4. Četrti tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravic do obrambe, pravice do poštenega sojenja in načela domneve nedolžnosti | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 82 | Zicuñaga trdi, prvič, da je Komisija kršila načelo domneve nedolžnosti, s tem ko je njeno sodelovanje pri omejevalnem sporazumu ugotovila samo na podlagi domnev in posrednih izjav. Navaja, da lahko neobstoj dovolj jasne kazni za predložitev nepravilnih ali nepopolnih informacij družbe spodbudi k temu, da Komisiji predložijo spremenjene ali izkrivljene informacije, da bi poudarile svoje sodelovanje. Zicuñaga dodaja, da medtem ko je na začetku družba lahko upala, da jo bo Komisija ugodno obravnavala samo, če bo predložila odločilne dokaze, je Komisija nato ublažila svoje stališče. Trdi, da je treba v teh okoliščinah izjave družbe Sappi upoštevati previdno in da jih je mogoče šteti za zanesljive samo, če so podprte z drugimi dokazi. | |
| 83 | Drugič, Zicuñaga trdi, da Komisija svojih ocen ne more opreti na pričevanja osebe, katere identiteta ni znana, sicer krši pravice do obrambe, ker ne omogoči izpodbijanja trditev te priče v okviru njenega zaslišanja. Zicuñaga, ki se sklicuje na sodno prakso Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice, trdi, da je bistvenega pomena, da je mogoče pričo soočiti z njenimi trditvami, da se izmeri stopnja verodostojnosti pričanja in zadevne osebe ter obdolženemu da možnost izpodbijati obremenilno pričanje ter o tem zasliši avtorja med pričanjem ali pozneje. | |
| 84 | Komisija izpodbija označitev dokazov, na katere se opira za ugotovitev sodelovanja družbe Zicuñaga pri kršitvi, za samo domneve ali posredne izjave. Poudarja, da sodišča Skupnosti niso nikoli podvomila o zakonitosti obvestila o ugodni obravnavi niti o dokazni vrednosti izjav, ki so jih na tej podlagi dale družbe. Poleg tega naj v Uredbi št. 17 ne bi bila predvidena možnost zaslišanja prič v upravnem postopku in tožeča stranka naj ne bi na Sodišče prve stopnje vložila nobene zahteve v zvezi s tem. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 85 | Ker želi družba Zicuñaga s temi trditvami zanikati dokazno vrednost izjav neidentificiranih oseb, ki jih Komisija navaja v podporo očitkom zoper družbo Zicuñaga v odločbi, spadajo navedene trditve v preučitev temelja, ki bo opravljena pozneje in bo vključevala preverjanje zadostne utemeljenosti teh očitkov. | |
| 86 | Ker se obravnavane trditve nanašajo tudi na kršitev pravic do obrambe in pravice do poštenega sojenja, ker je to, da v OU ni bila navedena identiteta avtorja ali avtorjev izjav v podporo ugotovitvam Komisije v zvezi z družbo Zicuñaga, tej preprečilo da izpodbija te ugotovitve tako, da zahteva zaslišanje navedenega avtorja ali avtorjev med upravnim postopkom, je treba opozoriti, da čeprav drži, da je v členu 6(3)(d) Evropske konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin (EKČP) določeno, da „[k]dor je obdolžen kaznivega dejanja, ima naslednje minimalne pravice […], da zaslišuje oziroma zahteva zaslišanje obremenilnih prič in da doseže navzočnost in zaslišanje razbremenilnih prič ob enakih pogojih, kot veljajo za obremenilne priče“, pa iz ustaljene sodne prakse izhaja, da Komisija ni sodišče v smislu člena 6 EKČP (sodbi Sodišča z dne 29. oktobra 1980 v združenih zadevah Van Landewyck in drugi proti Komisiji, od 209/78 do 215/78 in 218/78, Recueil, str. 3125, točka 81, ter z dne 7. junija 1983 v združenih zadevah Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, od 100/80 do 103/80, Recueil, str. 1825, točka 7). Poleg tega je v členu 15(4) Uredbe št. 17 izrecno določeno, da odločbe Komisije, s katerimi so naložene globe za kršitev konkurenčnega prava, niso kazenskopravne (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 6. oktobra 1994 v zadevi Tetra Pak proti Komisiji, T-83/91, Recueil, str. II-755, točka 235). | |
| 87 | Kljub temu je Komisija med upravnim postopkom dolžna upoštevati splošna načela prava Skupnosti (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 8). Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da po eni strani, čeprav Komisija lahko zasliši fizične ali pravne osebe, če meni, da je to potrebno, nima pravice pozvati obremenilnih prič, ne da bi pridobila njihovo soglasje, in da po drugi strani dejstvo, da v določbah konkurenčnega prava Skupnosti ni določena obveznost za Komisijo, da pozove razbremenilne priče, katerih zaslišanje bi se zahtevalo, ni v nasprotju z zgoraj navedenimi načeli (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. marca 2002 v zadevi HFB in drugi proti Komisiji, T-9/99, Recueil, str. II-1487, točka 392). | |
| 88 | V obravnavanem primeru je poleg tega očitno, da družba Zicuñaga ne daje nobene informacije, ki bi kazala, da je med upravnim postopkom od Komisije zahtevala podrobnosti o identiteti oseb, ki so dale izjave, na katere se Komisija v OU sklicuje v podporo očitkom zoper to družbo, zaradi zaslišanja teh oseb v njeni prisotnosti. Zicuñaga ne dokazuje niti, da je med upravnim postopkom zahtevala, naj Komisija pozove in zasliši razbremenilne priče. | |
| 89 | Glede na zgoraj navedeno je treba ta tožbeni razlog v delu, ki se nanaša na kršitev pravic do obrambe in pravice do poštenega sojenja, zavrniti. Če je njegov cilj izpodbijanje dokazne vrednosti dokazov, ki jih Komisija v odločbi navaja v podporo očitkom zoper družbo Zicuñaga, se bo analiziral pri preučitvi temelja. | |
| 5. Peti tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela dobrega upravljanja med preiskavo zadeve in neobstoj obrazložitve odločbe | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 90 | Družba Zanders očita Komisiji, da je zadevo preiskovala samo z obremenilnega vidika. Trdi, da bi Komisija morala upoštevati informacije, ki jih je predložila decembra 2000 in marca 2001 v zvezi s svojo odločilno vlogo pri opustitvi omejevalnega sporazuma, ali da bi morala opraviti dodatne preiskave pri dvomu o vrednosti teh informacij. Graja tudi dejstvo, da Komisija ni upoštevala izvedenskega poročila, ki ga je predložila marca 2001, da bi dokazala minimalen, če ne celo ničen, vpliv poskusov omejevalnih sporazumov na cene. Odločba naj poleg tega ne bi vsebovala nobene obrazložitve neupoštevanja teh dveh dejavnikov. Vključevala naj tudi ne bi nobenega odlomka, v katerem bi bila preučena individualna vloga družbe Zanders. | |
| 91 | Komisija trdi, da družba Zanders ni utemeljila svoje trditve, da je imela posebno vlogo pri opustitvi kršitve. Glede vpliva dogovorov o cenah na trg naj bi Komisija temu namenila ves oddelek odločbe (uvodne izjave od 382 do 402) pri preučitvi konkretnih učinkov kršitve. Odločba naj bi v celoti upoštevala obveznost obrazložitve, saj je bilo ravnanje tožeče stranke preučeno v povezavi z ravnanjem petih drugih družb v uvodnih izjavah od 263 do 271. Poleg tega naj družba Zanders v odgovoru na OU ne bi trdila, da naj bi bila njena vloga izključno pasivna. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 92 | Opozoriti je treba, da je v primerih, kot je obravnavani, v katerem imajo institucije diskrecijsko pravico, da bi lahko izpolnjevale svoje naloge, upoštevanje jamstev, ki jih v upravnih postopkih podeljuje pravni red Skupnosti, še bolj temeljnega pomena; med temi jamstvi je zlasti obveznost, da pristojna institucija skrbno in nepristransko preuči vse upoštevne vidike posameznega primera (sodba Sodišča z dne 21. novembra 1991 v zadevi Technische Universität München, C-269/90, Recueil, str. I-5469, točka 14, ter sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 24. januarja 1992 v zadevi La Cinq proti Komisiji, T-44/90, Recueil, str. II-1, točka 86, in z dne 11. julija 1996 v združenih zadevah Métropole télévision in drugi proti Komisiji, T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 in T-546/93, Recueil, str. II-649, točka 93). | |
| 93 | Poleg tega mora v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso obrazložitev, ki je zahtevana v členu 253 ES, jasno in nedvoumno izražati sklepanje organa Skupnosti, ki je sprejel zadevni akt, da se lahko zainteresirane stranke seznanijo z utemeljitvijo sprejetega ukrepa in da lahko pristojno sodišče opravi nadzor. Zahtevo za obrazložitev je treba presojati glede na okoliščine posameznega primera, predvsem glede na vsebino akta, naravo navedenih razlogov in interes za pojasnila, ki bi ga lahko imeli naslovniki ali druge osebe, ki jih akt neposredno in posamično zadeva (sodba Sodišča z dne 2. aprila 1998 v zadevi Komisija proti Sytraval in Brink’s France, C-367/95 P, Recueil, str. I-1719, točka 63, ter sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. marca 2002 v zadevi Lögstör Rör proti Komisiji, T-16/99, Recueil, str. II-1633, točka 368). | |
| 94 | V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da je v odločbi sklepanje Komisije izraženo jasno in nedvoumno ter da omogoča družbi Zanders, da se seznani z utemeljitvijo sprejetega ukrepa, in Sodišču prve stopnje, da opravi nadzor. Komisija je namreč v uvodnih izjavah od 263 do 271 odločbe preučila sodelovanje družbe Zanders pri omejevalnem sporazumu, skupaj s sodelovanjem družb AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora in Torraspapel. | |
| 95 | Družba Zanders natančneje trdi, da se njena vloga pri opustitvi kršitve in izvedensko poročilo, ki ga je predložila, nista upoštevala. | |
| 96 | Glede vloge družbe Zanders pri opustitvi kršitve je treba navesti, da je družba Zanders v odgovoru z dne 12. decembra 2000 na OU navedla dopis predsednika in generalnega direktorja družbe International Paper z dne 1. aprila 1996, naslovljen na vse zaposlene v skupini, v katerem jih je opozoril, da skupina pripisuje največji pomen upoštevanju zakonov ter etike pri stikih s strankami, poslovnimi partnerji, z upravami in drugimi organi. Navedla je tudi sestanek, ki je potekal v njenih prostorih ter katerega cilj je bil zagotoviti, da njeni zaposleni upoštevajo konkurenčno pravo, in sprejeti program za uskladitev s tem pravom. Poleg tega je opozorila, da je predsednik njenega upravnega odbora, ki je 1. januarja 1996 postal predsednik AEMCP, po prevzemu predsedniške funkcije v združenju javno in nedvoumno izjavil, da se je družba odpovedala tajnim dejavnostim. | |
| 97 | Treba je ugotoviti, da je družba Zanders elemente, navedene v prejšnji točki, predložila v odgovoru na OU v podporo stališčem za izpodbijanje očitka Komisije v OU, da so se tajni stiki nadaljevali še po jeseni 1995. Natančneje, predložitev navedenih elementov je bila del utemeljitve, ki jo je pripravila družba Zanders, da bi dokazala, da od jeseni 1995 ni več sodelovala pri tajnih sestankih kartela niti pri praksah usklajevanja cen s konkurenti, da njena cenovna politika ni bila odvisna in zlasti da zvišanje cen, ki ga je izvedla septembra 1996, ni bilo rezultat tajnega sestanka. | |
| 98 | Vendar pa je gotovo, da je Komisija med upravnim postopkom upoštevala utemeljitev družbe Zanders, navedeno v prejšnji točki. V odločbi se namreč konec obdobja kršitve, ugotovljen v zvezi z družbo Zanders, ujema s septembrom 1995 in ne kot v OU z marcem 1997. | |
| 99 | Nasprotno pa niti odgovor družbe Zanders z dne 12. decembra 2000 na OU niti dodatne pripombe, ki jih je družba Zanders poslala Komisiji 2. marca 2001, ne kažejo, da je družba Zanders med upravnim postopkom navedla elemente iz zgoraj navedene točke 96 ali druge elemente, da bi dokazala, kot si to prizadeva storiti zdaj, da naj bi imela odločilno vlogo pri opustitvi nezakonitega omejevalnega sporazuma, kar bi lahko upravičilo priznanje olajševalne okoliščine pri določitvi globe. Družba Zanders v teh okoliščinah Komisiji ne more očitati kršitve načela dobrega upravljanja, ker naj ta ne bi upoštevala zgoraj navedenih elementov kot elementov, ki naj bi bili domnevno namenjeni temu, da se dokaže, da je odločilno prispevala k opustitvi tajnega dogovarjanja pred prvimi preiskavami Komisije. | |
| 100 | Prav tako je treba navesti, da družba Zanders v odgovoru na OU ni navedla, da je imela v omejevalnem sporazumu izključno pasivno vlogo. Zato se torej ne more sklicevati na neobstoj obrazložitve v zvezi s tem v odločbi. Poleg tega je za obdobje od leta 1992 do jeseni 1995 v odgovoru na OU zanikala, da bi imela ključno ali vodilno vlogo, ki ji je bila pripisana v točkah 187 in 199 OU. Sklicevala se je torej na neobstoj obteževalnih okoliščin. Vendar pa jih Komisija ni uporabila zoper družbo Zanders. | |
| 101 | Kar zadeva poleg tega izvedensko poročilo, ki so ga pri družbi PricewaterhouseCoopers naročile družbe Koehler, MHTP in Zanders, je naslov tega poročila z dne 2. marca 2001„Konkurenčni položaj na evropskem trgu samokopirnega papirja od poletja ali jeseni 1995 do februarja ali marca 1997“ (v nadaljevanju: poročilo PricewaterhouseCoopers). | |
| 102 | Iz dopisa, priloženega poročilu PricewaterhouseCoopers, izhaja, da je bil njegov glavni cilj ovreči trditve Komisije v OU, kar zadeva delovanje omejevalnega sporazuma na trgu samokopirnega papirja od poletja ali jeseni 1995 do februarja ali marca 1997. Poleg tega je v sklepu tega poročila izrecno navedeno dejstvo, da ekonomska analiza kaže, da ravnanje treh zadevnih proizvajalcev od poletja ali jeseni 1995 do februarja ali marca 1997 ni bilo usklajeno. | |
| 103 | Treba je ugotoviti, da se poročilo PricewaterhouseCoopers nanaša na obdobje, ki ne spada v obdobje, ki se v odločbi obravnava kot obdobje kršitve. Zato tega poročila ni mogoče šteti za upoštevnega. | |
| 104 | Vendar pa iz branja tožbe izhaja, da se kritika družbe Zanders nanaša na dejstvo, da naj Komisija ne bi upoštevala informacij, ki so navedene tudi v poročilu PricewaterhouseCoopers, s katerimi naj bi dokazala minimalen, če ne celo ničen vpliv poskusov omejevalnih sporazumov na cene med januarjem 1992 in jesenjo 1995. | |
| 105 | V tem pogledu, tudi če bi menili, da je treba upoštevati dodatne informacije, predložene v podporo nepomembnemu dokazu, Komisiji ni mogoče očitati, da ni upoštevala trditev družbe Zanders o domnevno omejenem vplivu omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 106 | V uvodni izjavi 388 odločbe je namreč navedeno: | „Družbe AWA, Carrs, MHTP (Stora), Koehler, Sappi in Zanders trdijo, da je bil dejanski vpliv omejevalnega sporazuma na trg samokopirnega papirja v EGP zelo omejen oziroma da omejevalni sporazum ni imel nobenega negativnega vpliva. V zvezi s tem te družbe navajajo dejstvo, da je bil vpliv na cene omejen ali ničen, saj so bile cene, dejansko dosežene na trgu, nižje od dogovorjenih ali napovedanih zvišanj. Po mnenju teh članov omejevalnega sporazuma to dokazuje, da dogovorjena zvišanja cen niso bila uresničena v praksi. V podporo tej trditvi so predložili številne utemeljitve, zlasti naslednje: cene in marže proizvajalcev so precej padle; cene samokopirnega papirja izražajo predvsem spremembe stroškov celuloze in povpraševanja po njej, v zadnjih fazah omejevalnega sporazuma pa omejitve zmogljivosti; konkurenca med proizvajalci se je nadaljevala; proizvajalci so se morali o zvišanjih cen individualno pogajati s strankami.“ | |
| 107 | Čeprav v tem izvlečku iz odločbe poročilo PricewaterhouseCoopers, ki ga je družba Zanders poslala Komisiji med upravnim postopkom, ni izrecno navedeno, pa ta izvleček neizpodbitno dokazuje, da je Komisija med navedenim postopkom upoštevala predložene informacije, zlasti tiste, ki jih je predložila družba Zanders, da bi dokazala minimalen, če ne celo ničen vpliv poskusov omejevalnih sporazumov na cene v obdobju kršitve. To, da je Komisija zavrnila trditve družb, podprte s temi informacijami, pomeni, da je Komisija menila, da te trditve niso mogle spremeniti njenega stališča, navedenega v uvodnih izjavah od 382 do 387 odločbe, v zvezi s konkretnim vplivom kršitve na trg. Nasprotno, tega izvlečka ni mogoče razlagati tako, kot da dokazuje, da naj Komisija pri oceni zadeve ne bi ustrezno upoštevala elementov, ki jih je družba Zanders predložila v svojo obrambo (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 11. marca 1999 v zadevi Thyssen Stahl proti Komisiji, T-141/94, Recueil, str. II-347, točka 118). | |
| 108 | Glede na zgornjo analizo je treba peti tožbeni razlog zavrniti. | |
| 6. Šesti tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela dobrega upravljanja, pravice do dostopa do spisa in pravic do obrambe, ki izhaja iz dejstva, da je bilo nekatere dokumente v preiskovalnem spisu težko najti in da seznam dokumentov, ki sestavljajo navedeni spis, ni bil uporaben | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 109 | AWA trdi, da seznam dokumentov, ki ga je Komisija priložila na CD-ROM-u, ki ji je bil poslan med upravnim postopkom, ni bil uporaben. Zatrjuje namreč, da ta seznam ni vseboval niti kazala niti opisa zadevnih dokumentov, ampak so bili na njem navedeni samo razlogi v zvezi z domnevno zaupno naravo nekaterih dokumentov in mesto morebitne ustrezne nezaupne različice. | |
| 110 | Družba Koehler trdi, da je Komisija, preden je CD-ROM poslala naslovnikom OU, iz spisa umaknila nekatere zaupne dokumente in jih nadomestila z nezaupnimi različicami, ki pa so bile vstavljene na druga mesta v spisu. Komisija se naj ne bi niti v OU niti v odločbi potrudila, da bi posledično spremenila sklicevanja na tako premeščene dokumente. Poleg tega naj ne bi omenila obstoja teh nezaupnih različic niti navedla, kako jih je treba poiskati v spisu. Glede seznama dokumentov, ki ga je izdelala Komisija, naj bi ta omogočal samo zelo približno identifikacijo zadevnih dokumentov. Včasih naj celo ne bi bilo mogoče najti zadevnega dokumenta. | |
| 111 | Komisija meni, da ji ni mogoče očitati nobenega kršenja pravic do obrambe. Po eni strani naj bi družbam sočasno s CD-ROM-om dala na razpolago seznam različnih dokumentov spisa, pri čemer naj bi uporabila običajno razvrstitev glede na stopnjo dostopnosti dokumentov. Po drugi strani naj bi bili dokumenti, navedeni v OU, že priloženi temu obvestilu, s seznamom ujemanja med zaupnimi in nezaupnimi različicami. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 112 | Iz informacij, ki jih je Komisija predložila v dveh obravnavanih zadevah (T-118/02 in T-125/02), izhaja, da je 26. julija 2000 naslovnikom OU poslala seznam dokumentov, priloženih OU, sočasno kot navedeno OU in dokumente, navedene v njem. Komisija je ta seznam priložila odgovoru na tožbo v zadevi T-125/02. Na zahtevo Sodišča prve stopnje je Komisija navedeni seznam predložila tudi v zadevi T-118/02. | |
| 113 | Zadevni seznam vključuje za vsak dokument, naveden v OU, v vrstnem redu navajanja v tem OU, kratek opis dokumenta, identiteto družbe, pri kateri je bil dokument najden ali ki ga je poslala, številko dokumenta in po potrebi številko njegove nezaupne različice. | |
| 114 | Naslovniki OU so poleg tega 1. avgusta 2000 skupaj s CD-ROM-om, ki vsebuje ves preiskovalni spis Komisije, od Komisije prejeli seznam, z naslovom „Seznam dokumentov“, na katerem je za vsak dokument glede na vrstni red oštevilčenja spisa navedena oznaka dostopnosti dokumenta (A za dostopen; PA za delno dostopen; NA za nedostopen). Glede dokumentov, ki so razvrščeni kot nedostopni, in nedostopnih delov dokumentov, ki so razvrščeni kot delno dostopni, je bilo na seznamu navedeno, kje v spisu je mogoče najti nezaupno različico dokumenta ali dela zadevnega dokumenta in/ali kratek opis vsebine dokumenta oziroma dela zadevnega dokumenta. S tem je Komisija v celoti upoštevala določbe točke II A 1.4 svojega obvestila o notranjem poslovniku za obravnavanje zahtev po vpogledu v spis v zadevah iz členov [81] in [82] Pogodbe ES, členov 65 in 66 Pogodbe ESPJ in Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89 (UL 1997, C 23, str. 3). | |
| 115 | Družbi AWA in Koehler, ki sta imeli seznam dokumentov, priloženih OU, in „Seznam dokumentov“, naveden v prejšnji točki, sta tako imeli kot drugi naslovniki OU vse možnosti, da poiščeta iskane dokumente v preiskovalnem spisu v njihovi izvirni ali nezaupni različici na podlagi oznake dostopnosti, navedene na teh seznamih. | |
| 116 | Res je, kot trdi Komisija v svojih pisanjih v zvezi z zadevo T-125/02, da glede dokumentov – zlasti tistih, na katere se sklicuje družba Koehler in so navedeni v OU –, ki so bili razvrščeni kot nedostopni ali delno dostopni, naslovniki OU niso takoj našli njihove nezaupne različice ali kratkega opisa njihove vsebine na mestu, ki ustreza njihovi številki v spisu, in so morali uporabiti seznam, da bi ugotovili, kje v spisu se nahaja ta nezaupna različica ali ta kratki opis. Kljub temu pa za majhne nevšečnosti in majhno izgubo časa, ki jih je tak položaj lahko povzročil naslovnikom OU, očitno ni mogoče šteti, da lahko vplivajo na zakonitost odločbe. | |
| 117 | Iz tega sledi, da je treba šesti tožbeni razlog zavrniti. | |
| 7. Sedmi tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela dobrega upravljanja in pravic do obrambe zaradi prepozne vročitve odločbe | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 118 | Družba AWA trdi, da ji je bila odločba, čeprav je bila očitno sprejeta 20. decembra 2001, vročena šele 8. februarja 2002. Dodaja, da kljub razlogom za tako pozno vročitev mesec in pol po sprejetju odločbe ni mogla pojasniti, zlasti svojim strankam, zakaj je prejela najvišjo individualno globo, ki je bila kdaj koli naložena. | |
| 119 | Komisija odgovarja, da je 5. februarja 2002 sprejela kratek popravek odločbe z dne 20. decembra 2001 zaradi spremembe firme tožeče stranke. Zato vročitve odločbe 8. februarja 2002 skupaj s popravkom, v katerem so pojasnjene spremembe, ni mogoče šteti za prepozne. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 120 | Iz dopisa z dne 7. februarja 2002, s katerim je član Komisije, pristojen za zadeve na področju konkurence, uradno vročil odločbo njenim naslovnikom, med katerimi je bila tudi družba AWA, izhaja, da je bila odločba sprejeta 20. decembra 2001 in popravljena 5. februarja 2002 po pisnem postopku E/177/2002. Obstoj tega popravka pojasnjuje, zakaj je bila odločba svojim naslovnikom vročena mesec in pol po svojem sprejetju. Časa med sprejetjem odločbe in njenim popravkom ni mogoče šteti za čezmernega. | |
| 121 | Če bi bilo treba trditve družbe AWA še vedno razumeti kot grajo dejstva, da naj bi Komisija odločbo objavila, preden je z njo seznanila njene naslovnike, kar naj bi družbi AWA onemogočilo zagotoviti pojasnila za tretje strani o razlogih za to odločbo, je treba navesti, da družba AWA ni predložila nobenega dokaza, da je Komisija razkrila vsebino odločbe, preden je o njej obvestila njene naslovnike. Vsekakor, tudi če bi to držalo, je treba poudariti, da je bila odločba, ne glede na to, kako obžalovanja vredno je tako ravnanje, že sprejeta in da akti po njenem sprejetju ne morejo vplivati na njeno veljavnost (sodba Sodišča z dne 8. novembra 1983 v združenih zadevah IAZ in drugi proti Komisiji, od 96/82 do 102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 in 110/82, Recueil, str. 3369, točka 16). | |
| B – Tožbeni razlogi: kršitev člena 81 ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP ter tudi napake pri presoji Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem nekaterih družb pri kršitvi | |
| 122 | Tri družbe, to je Bolloré, Divipa in Zicuñaga, izpodbijajo utemeljenost ocen Komisije v zvezi s svojim sodelovanjem pri kršitvi. | |
| 1. Položaj družbe Bolloré | |
| 123 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da Komisija v odločbi (uvodne izjave od 353 do 356) družbo Bolloré šteje za odgovorno za kršitev na podlagi njene neposredne osebne vpletenosti v dejavnosti kartela in zaradi njene odgovornosti za sodelovanje njene hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. Vendar pa je bilo razsojeno (glej točke od 66 do 81 zgoraj), da se družba Bolloré na podlagi OU ni mogla seznaniti z očitkom, ki se nanaša na njeno osebno vpletenost v omejevalni sporazum, niti z dejstvi, ki jih v podporo temu očitku v odločbi navaja Komisija. Ta ugotovitev pomeni, da ni potrebe po preučitvi vsebinskih trditev, ki jih je predstavila družba Bolloré, da bi izpodbijala veljavnost svoje osebne in neposredne vpletenosti v omejevalni sporazum. | |
| 124 | Preučiti je torej treba trditve družbe Bolloré, da ji je Komisija napačno pripisala protipravno ravnanje njene hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 125 | Družba Bolloré trdi, da se Komisija v odločbi opira na dva dejavnika, da bi dokazala njeno odgovornost za ravnanje družbe Copigraph, in sicer na dejstvo, da je bila hčerinska družba Copigraph med kršitvijo v njeni stoodstotni lasti, in na dejstvo, da je bila zanesljivo obveščena o sodelovanju hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 126 | Trdi, da prvi dejavnik ne zadostuje, da bi se ji pripisalo protipravno ravnanje hčerinske družbe Copigraph. Potreben naj bi bil dodaten dokaz, na podlagi katerega bi Komisija lahko domnevala, da je matična družba odločilno vplivala na ravnanja svoje hčerinske družbe. Vendar pa naj bi v obravnavanem primeru tak dodaten dokaz manjkal. Družba Bolloré naj bi namreč v odgovoru na OU navedla, da družba Copigraph uživa veliko neodvisnost pri izvajanju svoje trgovinske politike, česar naj Komisija ne bi izpodbijala. Poleg tega naj bi družba Copigraph predstavljala samo eno tretjino prometa papirnice Bolloré v Thonon-les-Bains ter poslovni odnosi med družbama Bolloré in Copigraph naj ne bi vključevali omejitve poslovne neodvisnosti družbe Copigraph. | |
| 127 | Glede drugega dejavnika družba Bolloré navaja, da Komisija o njem sklepa na podlagi treh dejstev, to je dejstva, da je bila družba Copigraph del njene divizije „Posebni papirji“, dejstva, da je bil g. V., direktor te divizije, tudi generalni direktor družbe Copigraph in generalni direktor papirnice Bolloré v Thonon-les-Bains, ter dejstva, da je imel g. J. B., tedanji komercialni direktor družbe Copigraph, od leta 1994 tudi prodajno funkcijo v papirnici v Thonon-les-Bains. Ta tri dejstva pa naj ne bi omogočala ugotovitve, da je bila družba Bolloré zanesljivo obveščena o sodelovanju družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 128 | Po mnenju Komisije ni sporno, da je bila med letoma 1990 in 1998 Copigraph hčerinska družba v stoodstotni lasti družbe Bolloré, kar naj bi v skladu s sodno prakso zadostovalo za domnevo, da je zadnjenavedena družba odločilno vplivala na ravnanje svoje hčerinske družbe. To domnevo naj bi med drugim potrjevali dokazi, navedeni v uvodnih izjavah od 353 do 355 odločbe. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 129 | Najprej je treba poudariti, da družba Bolloré, čeprav izpodbija trajanje kršitve, ne zanika dejanske vpletenosti družbe Copigraph v dejavnosti kartela. | |
| 130 | V utemeljitvi v bistvu trdi, da dokazi, ki jih je Komisija navedla v odločbi, ne omogočajo, da bi jo štela za odgovorno za sodelovanje njene hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 131 | Opozoriti je treba, da v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso okoliščina, da je hčerinska družba ločena pravna oseba, ne zadostuje za izključitev možnosti, da se njeno ravnanje pripiše matični družbi, zlasti kadar hčerinska družba o svojem ravnanju na trgu ne odloča samostojno, ampak večinoma izvaja navodila matične družbe (sodbi Sodišča z dne 14. julija 1972 v zadevi ICI proti Komisiji, 48/69, Recueil, str. 619, točki 132 in 133, ter v zadevi Geigy proti Komisiji, 52/69, Recueil, str. 787, točka 44, in sodba Sodišča z dne 16. novembra 2000 v zadevi Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags proti Komisiji, C-286/98 P, Recueil, str. I-9925, točka 26). | |
| 132 | V zvezi s tem, čeprav dokaz v zvezi s stoodstotnim deležem v kapitalu hčerinske družbe močno kaže na to, da lahko matična družba odločilno vpliva na ravnanje svoje hčerinske družbe na trgu, pa ta ne zadostuje, da bi se lahko odgovornost za ravnanje hčerinske družbe pripisala matični družbi (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 131 navedeno sodbo Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags proti Komisiji, točke od 27 do 29, in sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Mischoja k tej sodbi, Recueil, str. I-9928, točke od 17 do 62). Dodaten element poleg odstotka udeležbe ostaja potreben, vendar je lahko v obliki indicev. Ni nujno, da je ta dodatni element dokaz, da je matična družba dejansko dala navodila hčerinski družbi, naj sodeluje pri omejevalnem sporazumu (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedene sklepne predloge, točke 40, 48 in 51). | |
| 133 | V obravnavanem primeru iz uvodnih izjav 353 in 354 odločbe izhaja, da se Komisija pri tem, da bi odgovornost za sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu pripisala družbi Bolloré, ni oprla izključno na neizpodbijani stoodstotni delež družbe Bolloré v kapitalu družbe Copigraph, ampak tudi na druga dejstva, navedena zgoraj v točki 127, s katerimi je želela dokazati, da je družba Copigraph v bistvu izvajala navodila, ki ji jih je dala družba Bolloré. | |
| 134 | Če povzamemo trditve družbe Bolloré iz njenega odgovora z dne 28. novembra 2000 na OU (uvodna izjava 353 odločbe), Bolloré navaja različne elemente, s katerimi želi dokazati, da družba Copigraph med kršitvijo poslovno ni bila odvisna. V teh okoliščinah je treba preučiti, ali so te različne trditve utemeljene ali pa nasprotno obstajajo znaki o odločilnem vplivanju družbe Bolloré na njeno hčerinsko družbo. | |
| 135 | Prvič, družba Bolloré je med upravnim postopkom trdila, da sta bila njen poslovodni organ in poslovodni organ družbe Copigraph popolnoma ločena. | |
| 136 | Vendar pa opomba 1 v odgovoru družbe Bolloré na OU vsebuje to navedbo: | „Do leta 1993 sta imeli družbi Bolloré in Copigraph skupno članico upravnega sveta, gospo [G.], ki je bila predstavnica Bolloré Participation v Conseil de Bolloré Technologie in stalna predstavnica Copigraph Holding v družbi Copigraph. Ti funkciji je prenehala opravljati 25. oktobra 1993.“ | |
| 137 | Brez vpliva na poznejšo preučitev utemeljenosti trditev družbe Bolloré, s katerimi izpodbija sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri kršitvi pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993, je bila v poslovodnem organu družbe Copigraph del obdobja, v katerem je po mnenju Komisije prihajalo do kršitve, tudi članica upravnega sveta družbe Bolloré. | |
| 138 | Poleg tega iz navedb družbe Bolloré v odgovoru na OU izhaja, da so štiri osebe, ki so sestavljale upravni svet družbe Copigraph od septembra 1993 do marca 1997, čeprav niso bile članice upravnega sveta družbe Bolloré, imele funkcije, večinoma vodstvene (finančne, računovodske ali upravljavske), v družbi Bolloré. Poleg tega, kot Komisija pravilno ugotavlja v uvodni izjavi 354 odločbe, je bil g. V., ki je bil v obdobju kršitve predsednik in generalni direktor družbe Copigraph, glede na odgovor družbe Bolloré na OU zaposlen v zadnjenavedeni družbi, v kateri je bil zadolžen za vodenje njene tovarne papirja v Thonon-les-Bains. Po informacijah iz iste uvodne izjave odločbe – informacijah, ki jih je družba Bolloré potrdila v svojih pisanjih – je bil g. V. poleg tega direktor divizije „Posebni papirji“ družbe Bolloré. Ta množična prisotnost članov vodstva družbe Bolloré na čelu družbe Copigraph dokazuje obseg vpletenosti družbe Bolloré v upravljanje njene hčerinske družbe. Družbi Bolloré je zanesljivo omogočila odločilno vplivanje na poslovno politiko družbe Copigraph na trgu. | |
| 139 | Kar zadeva obdobje kršitve od februarja do septembra 1995, to analizo dodatno potrjujejo informacije iz izjave g. J. B. z dne 2. aprila 2002, priložene tožbi, po katerih naj bi ta oseba, ki je bila komercialni direktor družbe Copigraph od konca septembra 1992 do marca 1997, hkrati imela komercialno funkcijo v družbi Bolloré od februarja 1995. | |
| 140 | V zvezi s tem je treba dodati, da dejstva, da je Sodišče prve stopnje v sodbi z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi KNP BT proti Komisiji (T-309/94, Recueil, str. II-1007, točki 47 in 48) razsodilo, da je sodelovanje člana upravnega odbora matične družbe na tajnih sestankih element, s katerim se lahko dokaže, da je matična družba zagotovo vedela za sodelovanje svoje hčerinske družbe pri kršitvi in ga odobrila, ni mogoče razlagati tako, da pomeni, da mora(-jo) član(-i) matične družbe, ki ima(-jo) vodstvene funkcije v hčerinski družbi, nujno biti predstavnik matične družbe, da bi se lahko ugotovilo, da hčerinska družba ni poslovno neodvisna od matične družbe (glej v tem smislu sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Mischoja k zgoraj v točki 132 navedeni sodbi Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags proti Komisiji, točka 58). Dejstvo, da oseba, ki pripada matični družbi, ni predstavnik te družbe, tej osebi namreč ne preprečuje, da bi pri izvajanju svojih vodstvenih nalog v hčerinski družbi zagotavljala, da je delovanje hčerinske družbe na trgu v skladu z s smernicami, določenimi na vodstveni ravni matične družbe. | |
| 141 | Drugič, družba Bolloré je med upravnim postopkom poudarila, da je imela družba Copigraph svojo infrastrukturo. | |
| 142 | Res je, da, kot trdi družba Bolloré v odgovoru na OU, dejstvo, da hčerinska družba ni niti lastnica proizvodnih obratov niti delodajalka svojih zaposlenih in da je njen promet vknjižen v letnih računovodskih izkazih matične družbe, lahko pomaga dokazati, da hčerinska družba ni neodvisna od matične družbe (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 67 navedeno sodbo Mo och Domsjö proti Komisiji, točke od 89 do 94). Kljub temu dejstvo, da je imela v obravnavanem primeru družba Copigraph, kot je navedla družba Bolloré v odgovoru na OU in ne da bi Komisija to izpodbijala, svoje proizvodne obrate in zaposlene ter je svoj promet knjižila v svoje letne računovodske izkaze, ne dokazuje, da je družba Copigraph svoje ravnanje na trgu opredelila popolnoma neodvisno od matične družbe Bolloré. | |
| 143 | Zadnjič, družba Bolloré je med upravnim postopkom navedla niz dejavnikov, ki po njenem mnenju dokazujejo neodvisnost trgovinske politike družbe Copigraph. Po eni strani naj dejavnosti, povezane s papirjem, ne bi bile pomembne, promet družbe Copigraph pa naj bi predstavljal samo majhen delež prometa skupine. Po drugi strani naj bi družba Copigraph tudi po tem, ko jo je kupila družba Bolloré, še naprej pokrivala skoraj 35 % svojih potreb po surovinah zunaj skupine Bolloré, zlasti pri neposrednem konkurentu te skupine. | |
| 144 | Vendar pa trditve družbe Bolloré v zvezi z majhnim obsegom njenih dejavnosti v sektorju papirja in prometom družbe Copigraph v okviru skupine Bolloré, tudi če bi držale, nikakor ne dokazujejo, da je Bolloré družbi Copigraph dovolila popolno samostojnost pri opredelitvi svojega ravnanja na trgu. Nobenega takega sklepa tudi ni mogoče izpeljati iz dejstva, da se je družba Copigraph v obdobju kršitve delno oskrbovala s surovinami pri dobaviteljih zunaj skupine Bolloré. Ta ugotovitev namreč nikakor ne izključuje, da je družba Copigraph s sodelovanjem pri omejevalnem sporazumu v bistvu izvajala navodila, ki ji jih je dala njena matična družba. | |
| 145 | V zvezi s tem je treba poleg tega poudariti, da je bila družba Copigraph, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 354 odločbe, ne da bi to izpodbijala Bolloré, del divizije „Posebni papirji“ družbe Bolloré. | |
| 146 | Poleg tega odgovor družbe Bolloré na OU vsebuje naslednje informacije v zvezi z okoliščinami, v katerih je družba Bolloré kupila družbo Copigraph: | „Leta 1990 je tovarna papirja Bolloré v Thonon-les-Bains (Haute-Savoie) naletela na zelo ostro konkurenco na trgu papirja, ki so jo zaznamovala štiri zaporedna leta rasti cen celuloze. | [Copigraph] je opravljala dejavnosti predelave in distribucije samokopirnega papirja in je bila zato med glavnimi strankami tovarne v Thononu. Copigraph je predstavljala več kot [tretjino] prometa te tovarne in več kot polovico njene zmogljivosti. | Družba Bolloré je torej kupila vse delnice družbe [Copigraph], predvsem da bi zagotovila trge za tovarno iz Thonona in nadaljnji obstoj te tovarne (v kateri je bilo takrat zaposlenih 340 oseb). | Ta vertikalna integracija se je tedaj zdela še toliko razumnejša, ker se je tovarna iz Thonona morala spoprijeti z zelo občutljivim položajem glede na presežno zmogljivost, ki je prizadela trg.“ | |
| 147 | Kot Komisija pravilno poudarja v svojih pisanjih, iz zgornjega izvlečka izhaja, da je bila vključitev družbe Copigraph v divizijo „Posebni papirji“ del načrta vertikalne integracije, v katerem je bila tovarna Bolloré v Thonon-les Bains zadolžena za proizvodnjo samokopirnega papirja, Copigraph pa za predelavo in distribucijo proizvoda. Iz tega izvlečka je tudi razvidno, da je bil namen družbe Bolloré z nakupom družbe Copigraph zagotoviti trge in nadaljnji obstoj tovarne Bolloré v Thonon-les-Bains v težavnih gospodarskih razmerah, povezanih z ostro konkurenco na trgu. Komisija je v teh navedbah utemeljeno videla element, na podlagi katerega je mogoče dokazati, da je sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu o cenah izviralo iz izvajanja splošne politike, ki jo je opredelila družba Bolloré, da bi zlasti poskušala ohraniti položaj svoje tovarne v Thonon-les-Bains na trgu. | |
| 148 | Iz zgoraj navedenega izhaja, da dokazi, ki jih navaja družba Bolloré, ne podpirajo njenih trditev o neodvisnosti družbe Copigraph. Nasprotno, dokazi, navedeni zgoraj v točkah od 136 do 140 in od 145 do 147, skupaj z navedbami v zvezi s stoodstotnim lastništvom družbe Bolloré v kapitalu družbe Copigraph med kršitvijo, vodijo do ugotovitve, da je bilo sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu o cenah posledica izvajanja odločilnega vpliva družbe Bolloré na ravnanje družbe Copigraph. Komisija je torej upravičeno štela družbo Bolloré za odgovorno za sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 149 | Poleg tega dejstvo, da je družbo Copigraph novembra 1998 prevzela AWA, ne more družbe Bolloré, ki še obstaja, razbremeniti odgovornosti za protipravno ravnanje družbe Copigraph pred tem prevzemom (glej v tem smislu sodbi Sodišča z dne 8. julija 1999 v zadevi Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, C-49/92 P, Recueil, str. I-4125, točka 145, in z dne 16. novembra 2000 v zadevi SCA Holding proti Komisiji, C-297/98 P, Recueil, str. I-10101, točka 25). | |
| 150 | Glede na vse zgoraj navedeno je treba zavrniti tožbeni razlog družbe Bolloré, ki se nanaša na kršitev člena 81 ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP, v delu, kjer ji Komisija pripisuje odgovornost za protipravno ravnanje njene hčerinske družbe Copigraph. Odgovornost družbe Bolloré za kršitev je torej dokazana kljub njeni neposredni vpletenosti v kršitev, ki je bila izločena (glej točke od 66 do 81 zgoraj). | |
| 2. Položaj družb Divipa in Zicuñaga | |
| a) Trditve strank | |
| 151 | Divipa in Zicuñaga trdita, da je Komisija napačno ugotovila njuno udeležbo na sestankih omejevalnega sporazuma o španskem trgu. Izpodbijata dokazno vrednost več dokumentov, na katere se opira Komisija. Navajata tudi, da ni mogoče šteti, da sta vedeli ali bi morali vedeti, da je imel omejevalni sporazum evropsko razsežnost. | |
| 152 | Obe poleg tega trdita, da Komisija ni upoštevala njunih posebnih značilnosti. Obe trdita, da nista članici AEMCP. Divipa dodaja, da je majhno družinsko podjetje, ki deluje izključno na španskem trgu in ni proizvajalka, ampak predelovalka in distributerka samokopirnega papirja. Njene cene naj bi bile odvisne od cen njenega glavnega dobavitelja, to je družbe Koehler, in cen njenih konkurentov. Zicuñaga vztraja, da ni nikoli prodajala samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 153 | Zicuñaga poleg tega trdi, da je Komisija napačno ugotovila, da je sodelovala pri celovitem načrtu, ki je vključeval usklajena ravnanja za zvišanja cen ter dogovore o določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev. | |
| 154 | Komisija izpodbija kritike tožečih strank v zvezi z dokazno vrednostjo dokumentov, na katere se sklicuje v podporo svoji trditvi. Navaja, da je treba dokaze presojati v celoti ob upoštevanju vseh upoštevnih dejanskih okoliščin. Ti dokazi naj bi potrjevali sodelovanje družb Divipa in Zicuñaga pri omejevalnem sporazumu na španskem trgu. Da bi jima Komisija lahko pripisala sodelovanje pri evropskem omejevalnem sporazumu, naj bi zadostovalo, da Komisija ne dokaže poznavanja vseh podrobnosti tega omejevalnega sporazuma, ampak obstoj niza objektivnih okoliščin, ki omogočajo ugotovitev, da sta poznali ali bi lahko razumno predvideli evropsko razsežnost omejevalnega sporazuma. Komisija dodaja, da v odločbi članstvo v AEMCP ni bilo obravnavano kot sestavni element kršitve. Poleg tega velikost ali status trgovca na debelo, distributerja ali predelovalca zadevne družbe ne more oprostiti odgovornosti pri kršitvi pravil o konkurenci. Dejstvo, da omejevalni sporazum ni bil vedno uspešen ali da zadevna družba ni dosledno upoštevala pogojev dogovora, naj ne bi preprečevalo ugotovitve njenega sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu. Ni nujno dokazati, da je družba sodelovala pri vseh vidikih omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 155 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je treba dokaze o sodelovanju pri omejevalnem sporazumu presojati v celoti ob upoštevanju vseh upoštevnih dejanskih okoliščin (glej v tem smislu sklepne predloge sodnika Vesterdorfa v vlogi generalnega pravobranilca k sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 24. oktobra 1991 v zadevi Rhône-Poulenc proti Komisiji, T-1/89, Recueil, str. II-867, II-956, skupni sklepni predlogi k sodbam, imenovanim „Polipropilen“). Nujno je, da se Komisija sklicuje na pravilne in dosledne dokaze, da bi utemeljila trdno prepričanost, da je bila storjena kršitev. Vendar je treba poudariti, da ni nujno, da vsak dokaz, ki ga predloži Komisija, izpolnjuje ta merila glede vsakega znaka kršitve; dovolj je, da se več indicev, na katere se sklicuje institucija in gledano na splošno, ujema s to zahtevo (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 8. julija 2004 v združenih zadevah JFE Engineering proti Komisiji, T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 in T-78/00, ZOdl., str. II-2501, točki 179 in 180 ter navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 156 | V skladu s členom 1, prvi in drugi odstavek, odločbe Komisija očita družbama Divipa in Zicuñaga, da sta v nasprotju s členom 81(1) ES in členom 53(1) Sporazuma EGP sodelovali pri „več dogovorih in usklajenih ravnanjih v sektorju samokopirnega papirja“. Kršitev naj bi se za družbo Divipa začela marca 1992 in za družbo Zicuñaga oktobra 1993, za obe pa naj bi se končala januarja 1995. | |
| 157 | Iz povezanega branja uvodnih izjav od 77 do 81, 252, 253, 327, 328, 333 in 334 odločbe izhaja, da je Komisija ugotovila, da je ta niz dogovorov in usklajenih ravnanj pomenil celovit protikonkurenčni načrt, katerega cilj je bil predvsem dogovor o zvišanjih cen in časovnem razporedu za njihovo uresničevanje ter občasno skupna določitev prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev ter izmenjava informacij, da bi olajšali sklenitev dogovorov o zvišanjih cen ali zagotovili uresničevanje dogovorjenih zvišanj cen. | |
| 158 | V uvodnih izjavah od 153 do 176 odločbe Komisija navaja več elementov, ki po njenem mnenju dokazujejo, da so tajni sestanki o španskem trgu potekali od februarja 1992 do oktobra 1994 ter da sta se družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga udeležili več teh sestankov. | |
| 159 | Nadalje Komisija v uvodni izjavi 286 odločbe trdi, da Divipa in Zicuñaga kljub ugotovitvi, da sta sodelovali samo na sestankih kartela v zvezi s španskim trgom, nista mogli prezreti, da je omejevalni sporazum zadeval vse ozemlje, ki je leta 1994 postalo EGP. V podporo tej trditvi v uvodni izjavi 287 navaja, pri čemer se sklicuje na uvodne izjave od 89 do 94 ter uvodne izjave 197, 211, 277 in 280 odločbe, zlasti dejstvo, da sta se prekrivali dve ravni sestankov in da noben udeleženec nacionalnih sestankov ni mogel prezreti dejstva, da so ti sestanki dopolnjevali splošne sestanke kartela. | |
| 160 | Zato je treba najprej preveriti utemeljenost trditev Komisije v zvezi z obstojem omejevalnega sporazuma na španskem trgu ter sodelovanjem družb Divipa in Zicuñaga pri njem. Če se te trditve izkažejo za utemeljene, bo nato treba preučiti, ali je na podlagi dokaza o takem sodelovanju, skupaj z elementi, navedenimi v uvodnih izjavah od 286 do 289 odločbe, mogoče dokazati, da sta Divipa in Zicuñaga sodelovali tudi pri splošnem omejevalnem sporazumu, ugotovljenem v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| Obstoj tajnih sestankov v zvezi s španskim trgom | |
| 161 | Ugotoviti je treba, da več dejavnikov kaže na obstoj omejevalnega sporazuma na španskem trgu samokopirnega papirja od februarja 1992 do leta 1995. | |
| 162 | Prvič, družba Sappi je priznala, da je sodelovala na sestankih kartela v zvezi s španskim trgom od februarja 1992, in predložila različne informacije v zvezi s tem. Sappi se v odgovoru Komisiji z dne 18. maja 1999 (dokumenti od št. 15193 do št. 15206) sklicuje na različne tajne sestanke v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki naj bi potekali 17. in 27. februarja 1992, 30. septembra in 19. oktobra 1993 ter 3. maja in 29. junija 1994. Za leta od 1993 do 1995 je uslužbenec družbe Sappi izjavil (dokumenta št. 15179 in št. 15180), da se je udeležil šestih ali sedmih sestankov v Barceloni z drugimi dobavitelji. Ti sestanki so potekali približno štirikrat ali petkrat na leto. Povedal je, da se je takega sestanka prvič udeležil 19. oktobra 1993 in zadnjič leta 1995. Po njegovem mnenju je bil cilj teh sestankov določiti cene na španskem trgu. Trajali naj bi približno dve uri in se praviloma končali z odločitvijo o zvišanju cen za določen odstotek. Na teh sestankih so sodelovale družbe Copigraph, Arjo Wiggins, Torraspapel, Zicuñaga, Koehler, Stora-Feldmühle (postala MHTP), Zanders in Divipa. Izvlečki iz izjav družbe Sappi, ki jih vsebujejo ti različni dokumenti, so bili del dokumentov, priloženih OU, tako da so imele vse tožeče stranke dostop do njih. Komisija jih je tudi predložila Sodišču prve stopnje. | |
| 163 | Drugič, družba AWA je priznala, da je sodelovala na večstranskih sestankih omejevalnega sporazuma med proizvajalci samokopirnega papirja, in Komisiji izročila seznam sestankov med konkurenti, ki so potekali med letoma 1992 in 1998. Dokument št. 7828, ki je izvleček iz odgovora z dne 30. aprila 1999, ki ga je AWA poslala Komisiji, vsebuje splošno trditev družbe AWA, ki se nanaša na organizacijo več sestankov, zlasti v Lizboni in Barceloni med letoma 1992 in 1994, na katerih so po njenem mnenju sodelovali predstavniki družb Sarrió, Binda, Stora-Feldmühle (postala MHTP) in Divipa ali nekaterih od teh družb ter verjetno samo na enem sestanku predstavniki družbe Zicuñaga. Tajna narava nekaterih od teh sestankov izhaja iz nadaljnjih izjav družbe AWA, povzetih v dokumentu št. 7829, da nekateri od teh sestankov „niso bili primerni“ (improper), ker so bili okvir za razprave o cenah samokopirnega papirja, vključno z izmenjavami namenov v zvezi z napovedmi zvišanj cen. Izjave družbe AWA, ki jih vsebujeta ta dokumenta (št. 7828 in 7829), predložena Sodišču prve stopnje, so bile prav tako del dokumentov, priloženih OU, do katerih sta družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga imeli dostop. | |
| 164 | AWA je nato v odgovoru na OU predložila seznam „neprimernih“ sestankov med konkurenti, za katere AWA trdi, da je pomagala dokazati njihov obstoj. Ta seznam vključuje samo za španski trg sestanke 17. februarja in 5. marca 1992, 30. septembra 1993, 3. maja, 29. junija in 19. oktobra 1994. Na tem seznamu, ki je naveden v uvodni izjavi 170 odločbe in predložitev katerega je Sodišče prve stopnje zahtevalo v zadevi T-132/02, niso navedene družbe, prisotne na teh sestankih. Niti Divipa, niti Zicuñaga, niti katera koli druga tožeča stranka tega seznama niso označile za obremenilen dokument, do katerega ne bi imele dostopa, niti niso vložile zahteve za dostop do njega. | |
| 165 | Tretjič, družba Mougeot, ki je prav tako priznala, da je sodelovala pri večstranskih sestankih omejevalnega sporazuma med proizvajalci samokopirnega papirja, je v izjavah z dne 14. aprila 1999 (dokumenti št. od 7647 do 7655) naštela več sestankov ter za vsakega navedla njegov cilj, vsebino in osebe, ki so se ga udeležile. Med temi sestanki je za španski trg naveden sestanek 19. oktobra 1994, na katerem so bili po navedbah družbe Mougeot prisotni predstavniki družb Copigraph, Stora, Torraspapel, Divipa, Ekman, Zicuñaga, Koehler, AWA in Mougeot. V skladu s temi dokumenti je bil cilj tega sestanka organizacija španskega trga in v razdelku „Vsebina sestanka“ je bilo navedeno: „Določitev cen na španskem trgu glede na velikost strank […]“ Izjave družbe Mougeot so bile tudi del dokumentov, priloženih OU in predloženih Sodišču prve stopnje. | |
| 166 | Res je, da so te izjave družbe Mougeot poznejše od dejanskega stanja in so bile dane zaradi uporabe obvestila o ugodni obravnavi. Vendar pa kljub temu ni mogoče šteti, da so brez dokazne vrednosti. Izjave, ki nasprotujejo interesom avtorja, je namreč praviloma treba šteti za zlasti zanesljive dokaze (zgoraj v točki 155 navedena sodba JFE Engineering proti Komisiji, točka 211). | |
| 167 | Vendar pa v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča prve stopnje izjave družbe, obtožene sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu, katere pravilnost izpodbija več drugih obtoženih družb, ni mogoče šteti za zadosten dokaz obstoja kršitve, ki so jo storile te družbe, ne da bi to potrjevali drugi dokazi (zgoraj v točki 155 navedena sodba JFE Engineering proti Komisiji, točka 219; glej v tem smislu tudi sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Enso-Gutzeit proti Komisiji, T-337/94, Recueil, str. II-1571, točka 91). | |
| 168 | V zvezi s tem je treba po eni strani navesti, da se izjave družb Sappi, AWA in Mougeot ujemajo v več točkah, tako da podpirajo druga drugo. Po drugi strani je očitno, da so v obravnavanem primeru njihove izjave potrjene z drugimi dokazi iz časa spornih dejstev. Tako obstoj vsakega od tajnih sestankov, ki jih navaja AWA, potrjuje drug dokument iz obdobja kršitve, ki prihaja od druge družbe, ki je pri njem sodelovala. | |
| 169 | Prvič, glede sestanka, ki je potekal 17. februarja 1992, je g. W. (Sappi) v telefaksu (dokument št. 4588, naveden v uvodni izjavi 157 odločbe in točki 61 OU) z dne 17. februarja 1992 obvestil svojega nadrejenega g. J., da položaj ostaja milo rečeno negotov zaradi obnašanja družb Koehler in Sarrió ter da je istega dne potekal sestanek zainteresiranih strani. | |
| 170 | Drugič, glede sestanka s 5. marca 1992 g. W. (Sappi) v obvestilu z dne 27. februarja 1992 (dokument št. 4589, povzet v uvodni izjavi 158 odločbe in točki 60 OU) obvesti isto osebo, da je poskrbel, da se bo naslednji teden udeležil sestanka v Barceloni z drugimi zainteresiranimi stranmi, na katerem se bodo pogovorili o nedavnih dogodkih na španskem trgu. Dodal je, da bo ta sestanek 5. marca 1992. Ta dokument in prejšnji dokument sta bila priložena OU. | |
| 171 | Obvestilo z dne 9. marca 1992 (dokumenta št. 4703 in 4704, povzeta v uvodni izjavi 156 odločbe in točki 60 OU) španskega zastopnika družbe Sappi v Sappi Europe res ni zapisnik sestanka, je pa zelo natančno glede ravnanja navedenih družb, med katerimi je Divipa. V njem se govori o zvišanju cen za 10 španskih pezet (ESP), ki je bil cilj, ki so ga določili distributerji in ni bil v celoti dosežen. Avtor tega obvestila trdi, da Divipa nikakor ni zvišala svojih cen. Po njegovem mnenju je očitno, da Sappi Europe ne more zvišati cen, če ji drugi dobavitelji ne sledijo. Med drugim navaja, da je Zicuñaga napovedala začetek projekta za proizvodnjo samokopirnega papirja na francoski strani španske meje, kar bi moralo še dodatno okrepiti konkurenco. | |
| 172 | Tretjič, glede sestanka, ki je potekal 30. septembra 1993 v Barceloni, so v obvestilu (dokumenta št. 5 in 9972, navedena v uvodni izjavi 163 odločbe), ki ga je na ta datum sestavil predstavnik družbe Sappi, navedene prodaje, ki so jih za leti 1992 in 1993 prijavile družbe AWA, Binda, Copigraph, Sappi, Divipa, Stora-Feldmühle, Koehler, Sarrió in Zanders, ter kvota za četrto četrtletje leta 1993. Udeleženci so se dogovorili, da bodo napovedali 10-odstotno zvišanje cen za papirne role in pole. Dogovorili so se tudi o ponovnem sestanku, da bi potrdili upoštevanje kvot. To obvestilo je bilo v celoti povzeto v točki 80 OU. | |
| 173 | Četrtič, v zvezi s sestankom z 19. oktobra 1993 naj bi ta v skladu z obvestilom (dokument št. 4474, naveden v uvodnih izjavah 165 in 192 odločbe), ki ga je v španščini sestavil uslužbenec družbe Sappi in ima naslov „Poročilo o obisku“ (informe vista), potekal 19. oktobra 1993, udeležili pa so se ga vsi distributerji, razen družbe Copigraph. Na tem sestanku so udeleženci določili 8-odstotno zvišanje cene papirnih rol, zaračunane končnemu uporabniku. Prav tako so se dogovorili, da bodo proizvajalca obvestili, da bodo sprejeli samo 7,5-odstotno zvišanje njegovih cen, kar bo privedlo do 0,5-odstotnega povečanja marže distributerja. Čeprav na tem obvestilu ni datuma, je treba poudariti, da sklicevanje na „današnje cene“ dokazuje, da je to obvestilo iz časa obravnavanih dejstev. Dejstvo, da obvestilo ni niti podpisano niti datirano, ne more presenetiti, ker gre za obvestilo v zvezi s sestankom, katerega protikonkurenčni cilj je bil za njegovega avtorja razlog, da pusti čim manj sledi (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 56 navedeno sodbo Shell proti Komisiji, točka 86). Po drugi strani zaradi jezika, v katerem je napisano obvestilo, in drugih informacij, ki jih je predložila družba Sappi, ni mogoče dvomiti, da je trg, na katerega se nanaša navedeno obvestilo, španski. Razen zadnjega stavka je bilo to obvestilo povzeto v točki 84 OU. | |
| 174 | Petič, glede sestanka s 3. maja 1994 spis vključuje obvestilo (dokument št. 14535) z istim datumom, ki ga je prav tako sestavil uslužbenec družbe Sappi in ima naslov „Poročilo o obisku“. To obvestilo vsebuje podnaslov „Sestanek proizvajalcev za analizo stanja cen“. V njem je za vsako sodelujočo družbo, to je Copigraph, AWA, Torraspapel, Zicuñaga, Koehler, Stora, Zanders, Sappi in Divipa, navedeno ime osebe, ki jo zastopa. To obvestilo vsebuje tudi tabelo, v kateri so navedene trenutne cene in – višje – cene, predvidene za 16. maj, pri čemer je navedeno, da te cene izhajajo iz dogovorov med distributerji. To obvestilo je bilo priloženo OU, njegova vsebina pa je podrobno opisana v točkah od 110 do 112 tega OU. | |
| 175 | Šestič, v zvezi s sestankom z 29. junija 1994 je obvestilo (dokument št. 4476, naveden v uvodnih izjavah 164 in 166 odločbe) z istega dne naslovljeno „Sestanek proizvajalcev samokopirnega papirja“. V njem je navedeno tudi ime osebe, ki zastopa vsako sodelujočo družbo, to je Torraspapel, Reacto, Divipa, Stora, AWA, Sappi, Zicuñaga. To obvestilo se začne z izrazom „[r]ole“, ki mu sledi pojasnilo „[v]se s polnimi knjigami naročil in kvotami“. Za role je navedeno zvišanje cen za 10 %, ki bo začelo veljati s 1. septembrom. Navedene so različne okvirne cene za neposredno prodajo tiskarjem, pri čemer se razlikuje med tremi kategorijami strank in vrsto proizvodov. Glede cene pol je v obvestilu navedeno, da se je vrnila na svojo prejšnjo raven, ker dogovorjena cena ni bila upoštevana. Odločeno je bilo, da se ta cena zviša v dveh korakih, 1. julija in 1. septembra 1994, vsakič za 5 %. To obvestilo se končna z navedbo „Naslednji sestanek 23. septembra ob 12.30“. Ta dokument je bil priložen OU, njegova vsebina pa je podrobno opisana v točkah od 121 do 123 tega OU. | |
| 176 | Poleg tega je na internem telefaksu (dokument št. 4565, naveden v uvodni izjavi 166 odločbe) družbe Sappi z dne 4. novembra 1994 navedeno, da je vodilna družba na španskem trgu, Torraspapel, napovedala znižanje cen za 10 ESP in da vse kaže, da novembrska zvišanja ne bodo izvršena, saj jih do zdaj ni napovedal noben distributer. Ta telefaks je bil naveden v točki 130 OU in priložen temu OU. | |
| 177 | Sedmič, glede sestanka z 19. oktobra 1994 iz na roke napisanega obvestila (dokument št. 1839, naveden v uvodnih izjavah 167, 222 in 223 odločbe) z dne 21. oktobra 1994, ki ga je sestavila družba Mougeot in se nanaša na španski trg, izhaja, da so se udeleženci dogovorili o cenah, ki se bodo začele uporabljati 3. januarja 1995. Družbama Zicuñaga in Mougeot je bilo „dovoljeno, da prodajata [pod] 5 [ESP]/kg“. Avtor obvestila navaja, da se mu „zdi utopično prositi družbo Zicuñaga, naj prodaja 2 % pod cenami velikih proizvajalcev, ne da bi govorili o količinah“. Naslednji sestanek je bil določen za 24. novembra 1994 ob isti uri na istem kraju. To na roke napisano obvestilo je bilo priloženo OU. | |
| 178 | Očitno je torej, da od sestankov, ki jih je navedla družba Sappi, družba AWA pa jih ni, to je sestanek s 27. februarja 1992 in sestanek z 19. oktobra 1993, samo prvi ni potrjen z nobenim drugim dokumentom. Kljub temu ni treba preveriti ugotovitev Komisije o izvedbi tega sestanka 27. februarja 1992, ki naj bi vsekakor bil zunaj obdobja kršitve, ki se očita družbama Divipa in Zicuñaga. | |
| 179 | Nazadnje, Komisija poleg teh sestankov, ki so potekali 17. februarja in 5. marca 1992, 30. septembra in 19. oktobra 1993 ter tudi 3. maja, 29. junija in 19. oktobra 1994, v tabeli 3 v uvodni izjavi 129 odločbe in Prilogi II k odločbi navaja tudi sestanek, ki je potekal 16. julija 1992 v Barceloni v zvezi s španskim in portugalskim trgom, ter sestanek, ki je potekal 23. septembra 1994 samo v zvezi s španskim trgom. | |
| 180 | Za sestanek s 16. julija 1992 iz uvodne izjave 159 odločbe izhaja, da ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi z izvedbo in s protikonkurenčnim ciljem tega sestanka temeljijo na informacijah iz dokumentov št. 4484, od 4501 do 4503 in 4520, navedenih v opombah 167 in 168 odločbe ter priloženih OU. | |
| 181 | G. B. G. iz družbe Unipapel, zastopnice družbe Sappi na Portugalskem, je v ustni izjavi potrdil, da je 16. julija 1992 odšel v Barcelono na sestanek, namenjen „razpravi o položaju trga samokopirnega papirja na Portugalskem in v Španiji“. | |
| 182 | To izjavo potrjujejo kopije obračunov potnih stroškov (dokumenti št. od 4501 do 4503), ki dokazujejo, da je g. B. G. 16. julija 1992 potoval v Barcelono in nazaj. | |
| 183 | V drugi ustni izjavi (dokument št. 4520) je g. B. G. navedel, da je bil cilj sestanka 16. julija 1992 razprava o zvišanjih cen in tržnih deležih. Dodal je, da so se dogovori nanašali predvsem na role. Prav tako je priznal obstoj enakih dogovorov za pole, ne da bi to lahko potrdil. Poleg tega je navedel, da so bile na tem sestanku izmenjane informacije o prodanih količinah in cenah, ki jih uporablja vsaka družba. | |
| 184 | Glede na informacije, navedene v prejšnjih treh točkah, je Komisija upravičeno ugotovila, da je 16. julija 1992 v Barceloni potekal sestanek, na katerem so bili sklenjeni dogovori o zvišanjih cen in porazdelitvi tržnih deležev v zvezi s Španijo in Portugalsko, vsaj za role. Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da Komisija ne trdi, da je bila družba Divipa prisotna na tem sestanku, saj je g. B. G. ni omenil med udeleženci. | |
| 185 | Za sestanek s 23. septembra 1994 obvestilo (dokument št. 4476), navedeno zgoraj v točki 175, res potrjuje, da je bil ta sestanek predviden. Vendar pa noben dokument in nobena izjava ne potrjujeta, da je ta sestanek tega dne dejansko potekal. Zato je treba ugotoviti, da Komisija ni dokazala, da je 23. septembra 1994 potekal sestanek v zvezi s španskim trgom. | |
| 186 | Kljub temu pa je Komisija na podlagi teh natančnih in skladnih dokazov pravno zadostno dokazala obstoj omejevalnega sporazuma na španskem trgu, vsaj od marca 1992 do januarja 1995. Učinki omejevalnega sporazuma so namreč obstajali še po uradnem končanju tajnih sestankov oktobra 1994, saj so morala zvišanja cen, določena na sestanku 19. oktobra 1994 (glej točko 177 zgoraj), začeti veljati 3. januarja 1995 (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča z dne 3. julija 1985 v zadevi Binon, 243/83, Recueil, str. 2015, točka 17, in sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 10. marca 1992 v zadevi Montedipe proti Komisiji, T-14/89, Recueil, str. II-1155, točka 231). | |
| 187 | Ta omejevalni sporazum je prevzel obliko ponavljajočih se sestankov med konkurenčnimi družbami, na katerih so se te dogovarjale predvsem o zvišanjih cen in njihovem časovnem razporedu. Na enem od teh sestankov, to je 30. septembra 1993 (glej zgoraj navedeno točko 172), so bile določene kvote. | |
| Sodelovanje družb Divipa in Zicuñaga pri omejevalnem sporazumu na španskem trgu | |
| 188 | V skladu s sodno prakso zadostuje, da Komisija, zato da zadostno dokaže sodelovanje družbe pri omejevalnem sporazumu, izkaže, da je zadevna družba sodelovala na sestankih, na katerih so bili sklenjeni protikonkurenčni dogovori, ne da bi ta družba temu očitno nasprotovala. Če je bilo sodelovanje na takih sestankih ugotovljeno, mora ta družba predložiti dokaze, da je bilo njeno sodelovanje na navedenih sestankih brez kakršnega koli protikonkurenčnega cilja, tako da izkaže, da je svojim konkurentom navedla, da na teh sestankih sodeluje z drugačnim namenom kot oni (sodba Sodišča z dne 8. julija 1999 v zadevi Hüls proti Komisiji, C-199/92 P, Recueil, str. I-4287, točka 155, zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točka 96, ter sodba Sodišča z dne 7. januarja 2004 v združenih zadevah Aalborg Portland in drugi proti Komisiji, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P in C-219/00 P, Recueil, str. I-123, točka 81). | |
| 189 | Družba, ki je sodelovala na navedenem sestanku in se ni javno distancirala od njegove vsebine, je namreč preostalim udeležencem dala vtis, da se strinja s tem, kar je bilo odločeno na tem sestanku, in da bo ravnala v skladu s tem (zgoraj v točki 188 navedena sodba Aalborg Portland in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 82). | |
| 190 | V obravnavanem primeru je očitno, prvič, da sta v tabeli (dokument št. 15199), v kateri so povzeti različni sestanki, njihov datum, cilj in udeleženci, iz odgovora družbe Sappi z dne 18. maja 1999, navedenega zgoraj v točki 162, družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga omenjeni kot udeleženki tajnega sestanka z 19. oktobra 1993. Ta podatek je potrjen z navedbo v obvestilu, navedenem zgoraj v točki 173, da so na njem sodelovali vsi distributerji, razen družbe Copigraph. | |
| 191 | Drugič, iz izjav uslužbenca družbe Sappi, navedenih zgoraj v točki 162, izhaja, da sta bili družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga prisotni na sestankih, ki se jih je udeležil od oktobra 1993 do leta 1995. Za sestanka 3. maja in 29. junija 1994 ta uslužbenec navaja celo, da sta družbo Divipa zastopala g. A. in g. C., družbo Zicuñaga pa g. E. Te izjave so za vsakega od teh sestankov potrjene z obvestiloma uslužbenca družbe Sappi, navedenima zgoraj v točkah 174 in 175, ki sta bili sestavljeni v času spornih dejstev. | |
| 192 | Tretjič, v skladu z izjavami družbe AWA, navedenimi zgoraj v točki 163, je družba Divipa sodelovala na sestankih, ki so potekali v zvezi s španskim trgom med letoma 1992 in 1994, ali vsaj na nekaterih izmed njih. Nasprotno naj bi Zicuñaga verjetno sodelovala samo na enem od teh sestankov. V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da ta precej previdna izjava, dana več let po spornih dejstvih, ne more omajati dokazne vrednosti natančnih informacij, ki jih vsebujejo dokazne listine, ki jih je med kršitvijo pripravila družba Sappi in v katerih je izrecno navedena prisotnost družbe Zicuñaga na sestankih 19. oktobra 1993, 3. maja in 29. junija 1994. | |
| 193 | Četrtič, iz izjav družbe Mougeot, navedenih zgoraj v točki 165, izhaja, da sta bili družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga prisotni na sestanku 19. oktobra 1994. Udeležbo družbe Zicuñaga na tem sestanku potrjuje tudi ročno napisano obvestilo družbe Mougeot z dne 21. oktobra 1994, navedeno zgoraj v točki 177, ki vsebuje navedbo „družbama Zicuñaga in Mougeot je dovoljeno, da prodajata [pod] 5 [ESP]/kg“. Komisija je na podlagi natančnih izjav družbe Mougeot o prisotnosti g. A. (Divipa) na tem sestanku in izjav družbe AWA, navedenih v prejšnji točki, lahko ugotovila, da je ta družba sodelovala na tem sestanku. | |
| 194 | Okoliščino, ki jo navaja Divipa, da Sappi v odgovoru z dne 18. maja 1999 ne omenja izvedbe sestanka v zvezi s španskim trgom 19. oktobra 1994, pojasnjuje dejstvo, da se Sappi ni udeležila tega sestanka, kot je razvidno s seznama udeležencev tega sestanka, ki ga je izdelala družba Mougeot. Vsekakor ta okoliščina ne more ovreči skupine skladnih dokazov, ki potrjujejo izvedbo tega sestanka in udeležbo družbe Divipa na njem. | |
| 195 | Iz vseh zgoraj navedenih elementov izhaja, da je Komisija pravno zadostno dokazala udeležbo družb Divipa in Zicuñaga na tajnih sestankih, ki so stalno potekali med 19. oktobrom 1993 in 19. oktobrom 1994. | |
| 196 | Čeprav naj ti družbi ne bi sodelovali na vseh sestankih, ki so bili del sistema rednih sestankov, ki ga navaja Komisija, pa niti Divipa niti Zicuñaga nista navedli dokazov v zvezi z morebitnim javnim distanciranjem od vsebine sestankov, na katerih sta sodelovali. Zato naj bi bili še vedno odgovorni za kršitev. Ker je dokazano, da sta tožeči stranki sodelovali na teh sestankih in da je bil cilj teh sestankov zlasti določiti cene, sta tožeči stranki svojim konkurentom dali vsaj vtis, da na njih sodelujeta z istim namenom kot oni (glej v tem smislu sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 17. decembra 1991 v zadevi Hercules Chemicals proti Komisiji, T-7/89, Recueil, str. II-1711, točka 232, in z dne 10. marca 1992 v zadevi Solvay proti Komisiji, T-12/89, Recueil, str. II-907, točka 98). Poudariti je treba, da je bil ta sistem sestankov del niza prizadevanj zadevnih družb, ki so poskušale doseči samo en gospodarski cilj, to je izkriviti običajno gibanje cen na trgu samokopirnega papirja. Umetno bi torej bilo, če bi to nadaljevano ravnanje, za katero je značilen samo en cilj, razdelili, tako da bi v njem videli več ločenih kršitev (zgoraj v točki 155 navedena sodba Rhône-Poulenc proti Komisiji, točka 126). | |
| 197 | Sodelovanje družbe Divipa pri omejevalnem sporazumu od marca 1992 je razvidno najprej iz izjav družbe AWA, navedenih zgoraj v točkah 163 in 192. Te so poleg tega potrjene z navedbo družbe Divipa v obvestilu z dne 9. marca 1992, navedenem zgoraj v točki 171. V tem obvestilu španski zastopnik družbe Sappi jasno preuči, ali so različne družbe uresničile zvišanje cene za 10 ESP, to je cilj, ki so ga predhodno določili distributerji. Izrecno navaja, da Divipa ni zvišala svojih cen. Vendar pa je spremljanje cenovne politike družbe Divipa poleg cenovne politike družb Sarrió in AWA, ki sta imeli svojo trgovsko družbo na španskem trgu, močan znak njenega sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu v tistem času. | |
| 198 | Teh ugotovitev o sodelovanju družbe Divipa pri omejevalnem sporazumu na španskem trgu od marca 1992 do januarja 1995 in družbe Zicuñaga od oktobra 1993 do januarja 1995 ni mogoče ovreči z razmisleki, ki se nanašajo na posebne značilnosti teh družb. | |
| 199 | Iz uvodnih izjav 17 in 330 odločbe izhaja, da je Komisija ustrezno upoštevala dejstvo, da niti Divipa niti Zicuñaga nista bili članici AEMCP. Poleg tega Komisija članstva v AEMCP ni obravnavala kot sestavnega dela kršitve. | |
| 200 | Glede razlik, ki jih poudarjata Divipa in Zicuñaga, med zvišanji cen, dogovorjenimi na sestankih, na katerih sta sodelovali, in gibanjem cen v obdobju, v katerem naj bi se ti dogovori izvajali, tudi če priznamo pravilnost številk, ki sta jih predložili ti družbi, da bi prikazali svojo cenovno politiko v tem obdobju, te razlike lahko kvečjemu dokažejo, da ti družbi nista upoštevali odločitev o zvišanjih cen, sprejetih na zadevnih sestankih. Na podlagi Smernic o načinu določanja glob, naloženih v skladu s členom 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 in členom 65(5) Pogodbe ESPJ (UL 1998, C 9, str. 3, v nadaljevanju: smernice), lahko neizvajanje sporazumov v praksi pomeni olajševalno okoliščino, zato bo treba preučiti trditve strank v zvezi s tem v okviru tožbenih razlogov za razglasitev ničnosti ali zmanjšanje globe (glej točke od 594 do 635). Nasprotno je treba navesti, da neupoštevanje dogovorjenih cen ne spremeni dejstva, da je bil cilj teh sestankov protikonkurenčen in da so tožeče stranke sodelovale pri omejevalnih sporazumih (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 6. aprila 1995 v zadevi Tréfilunion proti Komisiji, T-148/89, Recueil, str. II-1063, točka 79). Te razlike, čeprav dokazane, torej ne omogočajo izločitve dokazov o sodelovanju družb Divipa in Zicuñaga na teh tajnih sestankih. | |
| 201 | Dejstvo, ki ga navaja Zicuñaga, da dejavnosti proizvodnje in distribucije samokopirnega papirja v skupini opravlja Papeteries de l’Atlantique SA, ne more vzbuditi dvoma o sodelovanju družbe Zicuñaga pri kršitvi, edine družbe, navedene v izjavah drugih članov kartela. Poudariti je treba, da čeprav drži, da je imela Zicuñaga ob nastanku spornih dejstev v lasti samo 50 % kapitala Papeteries de l’Atlantique, Komisija šteje družbo Zicuñaga za odgovorno za kršitev zaradi njenega ravnanja in ne zato, ker je matična družba te hčerinske družbe. Po eni strani se namreč neposredne dokazne listine v zvezi s sestankoma s 3. maja in z 29. junija 1994 (glej točki 174 in 175 zgoraj) izrecno sklicujejo na prisotnost predstavnika družbe Zicuñaga na teh dveh tajnih sestankih v zvezi s španskim trgom. Po drugi strani je v ročno napisanem obvestilu z dne 21. oktobra 1994, ki ga je sestavila družba Mougeot (glej zgoraj navedeno točko 177), izrecno navedena družba Zicuñaga. Družba Papeteries de l’Atlantique ni nikjer navedena. Poleg tega, čeprav naj odločba ne bi izražala pravilno natančne narave dejavnosti družbe Zicuñaga v skupini, je treba ugotoviti, da Zicuñaga ni izpodbijala navedbe v uvodni izjavi 365 odločbe, da je bila odgovorna za politiko določanja cen za vse papirne proizvode skupine. | |
| 202 | Divipa se sklicuje tudi na razlike med podatki o svojih prijavljenih prodajah, ki jih vsebujejo obvestila družbe Sappi, in podatki, priloženimi njeni tožbi. Te razlike naj bi dokazovale, da podatkov, ki jih vsebujejo obvestila družbe Sappi, ni predložila sama. V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da podatki, ki jih je Divipa priložila tožbi, niso podprti z nobenim dokumentom, na podlagi katerega bi bilo mogoče preveriti njihovo resničnost. Vsekakor ob domnevi, da so pravilni, razlika, ki jo je mogoče opaziti med tem podatki in podatki v obvestilih družbe Sappi, kaže samo, da se zadnji niso ujemali z resničnostjo. Nasprotno pa ne dopuščajo sklepa, da naj Divipa na sestanku 30. septembra 1993 ne bi prijavila prodajnih povprečij, navedenih v obvestilih družbe Sappi. | |
| 203 | Divipa trdi tudi, da ne bi bilo razumljivo, če bi se majhna distributerka, kot je sama, udeležila sestankov proizvajalcev. Poudariti je treba, da njen status distributerke ne more ovreči skupine dokazov, ki dokazujejo sodelovanje družbe Divipa pri omejevalnem sporazumu na španskem trgu. Ta status poleg tega tudi ne pomeni, da ni imela interesa sodelovati pri omejevalnem sporazumu, ki je, glede na analizo Komisije, ki je navedena v uvodnih izjavah 153 in 165 odločbe in je Divipa ne izpodbija, nujno moral vključevati distributerje, da bi pravilno deloval na španskem trgu, za kateri je bila značilna obsežna integracija proizvodnih in distribucijskih mrež, tako da je bilo precejšnje število proizvajalcev tudi distributerjev. Poleg tega se je glede na obvestilo z dne 29. junija 1994 (dokument št. 4476, naveden zgoraj v točki 175) dogovor, dosežen na tem sestanku, nanašal na cene za potrošnike, kar glede na status družbe Divipa kot distributerke zadostuje za pojasnitev prisotnosti te družbe na tem sestanku. | |
| 204 | Nazadnje, dejstvo, da družba Divipa zadovolji med 60 % in 70 % svojih potreb po samokopirnem papirju pri družbi Koehler, preostanek pa pri drugih proizvajalcih, pomeni določeno odvisnost od njenih dobaviteljev v zvezi z nabavno ceno. Vendar po eni strani za to odvisnost ni mogoče šteti, da je popolna. Iz tabele, ki jo je Divipa predložila v prilogi k svoji tožbi, je namreč razvidno, da leta 1993 Divipa ni vedno takoj prenesla nekaterih znižanj svoje nabavne cene, tako da je njena marža ostala precejšnja. Po drugi strani in vsekakor to tudi ne pomeni, da ni imela interesa sodelovati pri omejevalnem sporazumu, saj je vsako zvišanje cen, dogovorjeno v tem okviru in uporabljeno za stranko, lahko privedlo do zvišanja njene profitne marže. Poleg tega iz iste tabele izhaja, da se je med januarjem in decembrom 1994 nabavna cena družbe Koehler zvišala s 159,25 na 195,70 in marža družbe Divipa z 20,38 na 43,81. Nazadnje iz obvestila v zvezi s sestankom 19. oktobra 1993, navedenega zgoraj v točki 173, izhaja, da so se pogajanja nanašala na ceno, ki jo mora distributer plačati proizvajalcu, in na zvišanje, ki ga bodo distributerji uporabili za svoje stranke, pri čemer je bilo predvideno povečanje marže distributerja. | |
| Sodelovanje družb Divipa in Zicuñaga pri omejevalnem sporazumu na evropskem trgu | |
| 205 | Iz uvodne izjave 286 odločbe izhaja, da je Komisija ugotovila samo sodelovanje družb Divipa in Zicuñaga na tajnih sestankih v zvezi s španskim trgom. Vendar pa Komisija trdi, da „ti družbi nista mogli prezreti, da je omejevalni sporazum zadeval vse ozemlje, ki je leta 1994 postalo EGP“. | |
| 206 | Komisija se pri tem opira na tesno povezanost, ki naj bi obstajala med evropskimi splošnimi sestanki omejevalnega sporazuma in nacionalnimi tajnimi sestanki, zlasti španskimi, na dejstvo, da naj bi veliki evropski proizvajalci samokopirnega papirja sodelovali pri tajnih dejavnostih na španskem trgu, in tudi na obseg trgovinskih tokov v Skupnosti v sektorju samokopirnega papirja v referenčnem obdobju. | |
| 207 | V skladu s sodno prakso je lahko družba, ki je pri mnogovrstni kršitvi pravil o konkurenci sodelovala s svojimi ravnanji, ki spadajo pod pojma sporazum ali usklajeno ravnanje s protikonkurenčnim ciljem v smislu člena 81(1) ES in ki naj bi pripomogla k uresničitvi kršitve v celoti, odgovorna tudi za ravnanja drugih družb v okviru te kršitve v celotnem obdobju svojega sodelovanja pri navedeni kršitvi, če se ugotovi, da zadevna družba ve za protipravna ravnanja drugih udeležencev ali da jih lahko razumno predvidi in da je pripravljena sprejeti tveganje (zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 158 in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 208 | V obravnavanem primeru zlasti iz zgoraj navedene točke 187 izhaja, da je bil cilj dogovorov v zvezi s španskim trgom, pri katerih sta Divipa in Zicuñaga sodelovali, skupna določitev zvišanja cen. Poleg tega so bile na sestanku 30. septembra 1993, ki se ga Zicuñaga, ki še ni sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu, ni udeležila, dodeljene prodajne kvote na tem trgu na podlagi izmenjave informacij o opravljenih prodajah. Ti dogovori so bili torej v skladu s splošnim evropskim omejevalnim sporazumom, katerega cilj je bil predvsem zvišati cene samokopirnega papirja in ob nekaterih priložnostih skupaj določiti prodajne kvote ali tržne deleže ter si izmenjati zaupne informacije, da bi olajšali sklenitev ali izvajanje dogovorov o zvišanjih cen. | |
| 209 | Vendar pa v skladu s sodno prakso dejstvo, da sta cilj dogovora, pri katerem je sodelovala družba, in cilj globalnega omejevalnega sporazuma enaka, ne zadostuje, da bi se tej družbi pripisalo sodelovanje pri globalnem omejevalnem sporazumu. Samo če je družba, ko je sodelovala pri tem dogovoru, vedela ali bi morala vedeti, da se je s tem vključila v globalni omejevalni sporazum, lahko namreč njeno sodelovanje pri zadevnem dogovoru pomeni izraz njenega pristopa k temu globalnemu omejevalnemu sporazumu (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. marca 2002 v zadevi Sigma Tecnologie proti Komisiji, T-28/99, Recueil, str. II-1845, točka 45). | |
| 210 | Komisija v odločbi trdi, da je to veljalo za družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga, kar pa ti izpodbijata. | |
| 211 | Res je gotovo, da Divipa in Zicuñaga nista bili članici AEMCP ter da nista nikoli sodelovali na uradnih sestankih tega združenja, ki so po mnenju Komisije do septembra 1993 bili okvir za evropski omejevalni sporazum, niti na splošnih sestankih kartela, ki naj bi potekali ob uradnih sestankih AEMCP od septembra 1993 naprej. Poleg tega iz nobenega dokaza v zvezi s sodelovanjem družb Divipa in Zicuñaga na tajnih sestankih o španskem trgu ne izhaja, da je bil na katerem koli od teh sestankov omenjen omejevalni sporazum o cenah, ki bi obstajal na evropski ravni. | |
| 212 | Vendar pa niti Divipa niti Zicuñaga nista predložili dokazov, s katerimi bi lahko izpodbijali ugotovitve Komisije v uvodnih izjavah od 89 do 94 in 211 odločbe ter izjave družbe Mougeot, povzete v uvodni izjavi 90. V skladu s temi izjavami je „družba AWA menila, da je bilo brez vključenosti vodij, odgovornih za lokalne trge, malo možnosti, da bi se dosegli pričakovani rezultati, kar je bilo pojasnilo izvedbe sestankov po posameznih trgih“, in „lokalni vodje, ki so jih njihovi nadrejeni obvestili, da želijo zvišanje cen, so bili zadolženi, da med seboj opredelijo praktična podrobna pravila za izvedbo tega zvišanja“. Iz teh izjav jasno izhaja, da so za zagotovitev uspeha odločitev o zvišanjih cen, sprejetih na splošnih sestankih kartela, udeleženci teh sestankov nameravali zagotoviti splošno uporabo navedenih odločitev na različnih regionalnih in nacionalnih trgih. Glede na velik obseg trgovine z zadevnim proizvodom med državami članicami bi bilo zelo neučinkovito sprejeti ukrepi, ki bi omejevali konkurenco izključno na ravni države članice. | |
| 213 | Komisija je tako predložila dve tabeli (tabeli 5 in 6 v uvodnih izjavah 207 in 217 odločbe ter v točkah 117 in 127 OU), ki ju je odkrila v prostorih družbe Sappi in v katerih so prikazana zvišanja cen, dogovorjena za različne države na dveh splošnih sestankih 21. junija in 22. septembra 1994. Za Španijo ti tabeli ne vsebujeta številk, ampak samo navedbo „navesti“. Vendar pa zapisnik sestanka z dne 29. junija 1994 (dokument št. 4476, naveden zgoraj v točki 175) v zvezi s španskim trgom in ročno napisano obvestilo družbe Mougeot z dne 21. oktobra 1994 (dokument št. 1839, naveden zgoraj v točki 177; glej tudi točko 235) po sestanku 19. oktobra 1994, ki se je prav tako nanašal na španski trg, kažeta, da je vsakemu od teh splošnih sestankov sledil nacionalni sestanek, na katerem so bila dejansko določena zvišanja cen za španski trg. Poleg tega, kot poudarja Komisija v svojih pisanjih, dejstvo, da je v tem ročno napisanem obvestilu družbe Mougeot navedeno „glede na količine AEMCP, napovedane v zvezi s Španijo,“ in omenjena razprava o teh številkah, potrjuje trditev, da sta se Divipa in Zicuñaga zagotovo zavedali širšega okvira, to je evropske razsežnosti, v katero so spadali sestanki v zvezi s španskim trgom, na katerih sta sodelovali. | |
| 214 | Poleg tega različni dokumenti, na katere se sklicuje Komisija v zvezi s španskimi sestanki (v uvodnih izjavah od 154 do 171 odločbe, v Prilogi II k odločbi in v ustreznih opombah), nedvomno kažejo, da je na teh sestankih sodelovalo več predstavnikov evropskih proizvajalcev samokopirnega papirja, katerih sodelovanja na splošnih sestankih omejevalnega sporazuma, glede na dokaze, ki jih je Komisija navedla v uvodnih izjavah od 263 do 276, ni mogoče izpodbijati in v večini primerov niti ni bilo izpodbijano. | |
| 215 | Težko si je zamisliti, da medtem ko, kot poudarja Komisija v uvodni izjavi 176 odločbe, iz informacij, ki jih je predložil predstavnik družbe Unipapel med preiskavami (dokument št. 4525, katerega ustrezni izvleček je povzet v točki 74 OU), izhaja, da so portugalske stranke sumile, da je vzrok ravnanj portugalskih gospodarskih subjektov v smislu zvišanj cen omejevalni sporazum evropske razsežnosti, družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga, ki sta na sestankih v zvezi s španskim trgom prihajali v stik s predstavniki velikih evropskih proizvajalcev samokopirnega papirja, vključenimi v splošne sestanke kartela, nista vedeli, da sta se, s tem ko sta sodelovali pri tajnih dogovorih o navedenem trgu, vključili v omejevalni sporazum evropske razsežnosti. | |
| 216 | V teh okoliščinah je treba ugotoviti, da sta bili družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga zagotovo obveščeni o obstoju in vsebini evropskega omejevalnega sporazuma (glej v tem smislu sodbo Cement, točka 4097) in da sta, s tem ko sta na španskem trgu sodelovali pri dogovorih z enakim protikonkurenčnim ciljem, kot ga je imel ta omejevalni sporazum, zagotovo vedeli, da sta s tem pristopili k temu omejevalnemu sporazumu (glej v tem smislu sodbo Cement, točka 4099). | |
| 217 | Glede dejstva, ki ga navaja Zicuñaga, da spis ne vsebuje dokaza, da so se cene v zvezi z drugimi trgi in ne v zvezi s španskim trgom obravnavale na španskih sestankih ali da so jo o njih seznanile druge družbe, se to v celoti ujema s splošnim sistemom organizacije omejevalnega sporazuma, v skladu s katerim je bil cilj razprav, ki so potekale zlasti na sestankih na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni, opredeliti praktična podrobna pravila za uporabo odločitev o zvišanjih cen, sprejetih na evropski ravni, za cene, ki se zaračunavajo na zadevnem lokalnem trgu. Poleg tega ne more ovreči zgoraj navedene analize. | |
| 218 | Zicuñaga se nadalje sklicuje na to, da ni sodelovala na sestankih in pri domnevno tajnih dejavnostih na francoskem in italijanskem trgu, kljub svojim trgovinskim interesom na teh trgih. V zvezi s tem je treba spomniti na trditev družbe Zicuñaga na zaslišanju, da „je bila odgovorna za politiko določanja cen vseh papirnih proizvodov skupine in […] je posledično sprejemala vse odločitve v zvezi s cenami, tudi glede proizvodov Papeteries de l’Atlantique“ (uvodna izjava 365 odločbe). Zato je trditev, da je imela Zicuñaga trgovinske interese ne samo v Španiji, ampak prek dejavnosti svoje hčerinske družbe Papeteries de l’Atlantique tudi v Franciji in Italiji, mogoče razumeti tako, da se je Zicuñaga, ki ni mogla prezreti, da so bile nekatere družbe, ki so bile zastopane na španskih sestankih, dejavne na francoskem in italijanskem trgu, za opredelitev cenovne politike svoje skupine zagotovo pozanimala, ali so bili dogovori, pri katerih je sodelovala, del evropskega omejevalnega sporazuma, in je torej zagotovo bila obveščena o obstoju takega omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 219 | Vsekakor okoliščina, navedena v prejšnji točki, ne more ovreči analize, navedene zgoraj v točkah od 205 do 217. Poleg tega bi bilo to okoliščino mogoče razumeti tudi kot dokaz, da je Zicuñaga vedela, da so bili dogovori, pri katerih je sodelovala na španskem trgu, del evropskega omejevalnega sporazuma in da se ji torej ni zdelo potrebno, da bi se udeležila sestankov in tajnih dejavnosti drugje kot v Španiji. | |
| 220 | Poleg tega je treba poudariti, da se položaj družbe Zicuñaga v več točkah razlikuje od položaja družbe Sigma Tecnologie di rivestimento v zadevi, v kateri je bila izrečena zgoraj v točki 209 navedena sodba Sigma Tecnologie proti Komisiji, na katero se Zicuñaga sklicuje v pisanjih. V primerjavi s tožečo stranko v tej zadevi je Zicuñaga v zadevnem sektorju dejavnosti delovala na več nacionalnih trgih. Poleg tega, tudi če sprejmemo trditev družbe Zicuñaga, da so njeni španski konkurenti njeno cenovno politiko dojemali kot agresivno, Zicuñaga ni predložila nobenega dokaza, da je bila tako kot Sigma Tecnologie di rivestimento zaradi svojega „neprilagojenega“ ravnanja izključena iz nekaterih sestankov ali tajnih dejavnosti (zgoraj v točki 209 navedena sodba Sigma Tecnologie proti Komisiji, točki 42 in 46). Nasprotno, obvestilo družbe Mougeot v zvezi s sestankom z 19. oktobra 1994, navedeno zgoraj v točki 177, kaže, da je Zicuñaga veljala za polnopravno članico španskega omejevalnega sporazuma, v okviru katerega je dobila dovoljenje za prodajo po nekoliko nižjih cenah od cen, ki so jih morali uporabljati drugi člani omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 221 | Zicuñaga v utemeljitvi, s katero želi dokazati, da ni izvajala spornih dogovorov o cenah, graja dejstvo, da naj bi ji Komisija med upravnim postopkom zavrnila dostop do podrobnih informacij, navedenih v uvodni izjavi 288 odločbe. V zvezi s tem je treba napotiti na utemeljitve iz zgoraj navedenih točk od 45 do 51. | |
| Sodelovanje družbe Zicuñaga pri dogovorih o določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev | |
| 222 | Nazadnje, kot je bilo navedeno zgoraj v točki 153, Zicuñaga zanika sodelovanje pri dogovorih o določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev. | |
| 223 | V zvezi s tem iz povezanega branja uvodnih izjav 77, 81, 252, 253, od 326 do 331, 376, 382 in 383 odločbe izhaja, da je Komisija ugotovila, da dogovori o določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev niso bili ločene kršitve, ampak sestavni deli ene kršitve, navedene v členu 1 odločbe in pripisane družbi Zicuñaga, katere splošni cilj je bil zvišati cene samokopirnega papirja na celotnem ozemlju, ki je leta 1994 postalo EGP (uvodna izjava 327 odločbe), in katere temeljni cilj je bil sklenitev dogovorov o zvišanjih cen (uvodna izjava 383 odločbe). | |
| 224 | Najprej je treba preveriti, ali je Komisija pravilno ugotovila obstoj dogovorov o določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev ter ali je utemeljeno menila, da so bili ti dogovori del celovitega protikonkurenčnega načrta, značilnega za kršitev, ugotovljeno v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. V zvezi s tem Komisija v uvodnih izjavah od 241 do 251 odločbe loči med podatki, ki po njenem mnenju dokazujejo obstoj dogovorov o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot, in podatki, ki po njenem mnenju dokazujejo obstoj dogovorov o delitvi trga. | |
| 225 | Najprej je treba glede trditve Komisije v zvezi z dodelitvijo prodajnih kvot navesti, prvič, da iz dokumenta, ki ga je sestavila družba Sappi v zvezi s sestankom 30. septembra 1993 v Barceloni (dokument št. 5, naveden zgoraj v točki 172), izhaja, da so udeleženci tega sestanka najprej prijavili svoja mesečna prodajna povprečja v letu 1992 in letu 1993 ter nadaljevali z razdelitvijo prodajnih kvot za četrto četrtletje leta 1993, nato so se dogovorili o napovedi 10-odstotnega zvišanja cen za role in pole 1. januarja 1994 ter se nazadnje odločili, da se bodo ponovno sestali na datum, ki ga bodo določili pozneje, da bi preverili upoštevanje kvot. | |
| 226 | Drugič, navesti je treba, da Zicuñaga ne izpodbija ugotovitev Komisije v uvodnih izjavah 138, 242 in 243 odločbe, da „obvestilo o sestanku“ (dokument št. 6, povzet v točki 87 OU), ki ga je sestavila družba Sappi na sestanku 1. oktobra 1993 v zvezi s francoskim trgom, kaže, da so se udeleženci tega sestanka dogovorili o zvišanju cen in tudi o dodelitvi kvot za četrto četrtletje leta 1993, „da bi omogočili zvišanja cen“. | |
| 227 | Kar zadeva nadalje trditve Komisije v zvezi z dogovori o delitvi trga, Zicuñaga ne navaja nobenega dokaza, s katerim bi ovrgla ugotovitve Komisije v uvodnih izjavah 141 in 246 odločbe, da je bil sestanek, ki je potekal v zvezi s francoskim trgom spomladi 1994 v Nogent-sur-Marne, hkrati okvir za dogovor o zvišanju cen in za dogovor o delitvi trga (dokument št. 7651, naveden v točkah od 113 do 115 OU in priložen OU). | |
| 228 | Iz zgoraj navedenih dejstev je mogoče ugotoviti, da je Komisija v uvodni izjavi 241 odločbe pravilno ugotovila, da „je bila za zagotovitev uresničitve dogovorjenih zvišanj cen na nekaterih nacionalnih sestankih kartela različnim udeležencem dodeljena prodajna kvota in za vsakega izmed njih določen tržni delež“. Komisija je torej lahko menila, da so bili dogovori o zvišanjih cen ter o skupni določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev neločljivi deli celovitega protikonkurenčnega načrta, ki pomeni kršitev, ugotovljeno v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| 229 | Nadalje je treba preučiti, ali je Komisija družbi Zicuñaga upravičeno očitala vidike samo ene kršitve v zvezi z dogovori o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot in delitvi trga. | |
| 230 | Izraz „[r]ole“, ki mu sledi navedba „[v]se s polnimi knjigami naročil in kvotami“, iz obvestila družbe Sappi z dne 29. junija 1994, navedenega zgoraj v točki 175, ne dokazuje nujno, da je bil dogovor o prodajnih kvotah sklenjen na sestanku 29. junija 1994. Kljub temu pa to dokazuje, da so bili v času tega sestanka vsi njegovi udeleženci, med katerimi je bila tudi Zicuñaga, stranke dogovora o razdelitvi prodajnih kvot za trg rol. | |
| 231 | Poudariti je treba, da je navedba iz prejšnje točke v zvezi s sestankom 29. junija 1994 edini dokaz, ki ga je mogoče uporabiti zoper družbo Zicuñaga kot dokaz njenega neposrednega sodelovanja pri dogovoru o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot. Komisija namreč ni ugotovila, da je Zicuñaga sodelovala na sestanku 30. septembra 1993 v Barceloni, na katerem je bil sklenjen dogovor o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot za četrto četrtletje leta 1993. Glede drugih sestankov, na katerih je Komisija pravilno ugotovila udeležbo družbe Zicuñaga, Komisija v odločbi ne trdi, da so bili ti sestanki okvir za dogovore o prodajnih kvotah. | |
| 232 | Vendar pa Komisija v odgovoru na tožbo kljub temu trdi, da so o prodajnih kvotah razpravljali tudi na sestanku 19. oktobra 1994. | |
| 233 | V zvezi s tem ročno napisano obvestilo družbe Mougeot z dne 21. oktobra 1994, ki se nanaša na sestanek 19. oktobra 1994 v zvezi s španskim trgom (glej točko 177 zgoraj), vsebuje naslednje informacije: | „– | Glede na količine AEMCP, napovedane za Španijo (razen družbe Zicuñaga) konec avgusta 94, [plus] 4300 [t], sem vprašal, kam so šle naše količine 93 ([minus] 50 %)? | – | Odgovor družbe Sarrió: ,Količine prihajajo in odhajajo!‘ | – | Odgovor družbe Koehler: ,Številke AEMCP niso pravilne!‘“ | |
| 234 | Res je, da bi to lahko pomenilo, kot navaja Komisija v odgovoru na tožbo, da so pogovori na sestanku 19. oktobra 1994 zadevali prodajne kvote ali količine. Vendar pa je očitno, da Komisija niti v delu odločbe, ki je bil namenjen sestankom v zvezi s španskim trgom, niti v delu, ki se nanaša na dodelitev prodajnih kvot ali delitev trga, ne navaja teh informacij v podporo svojim trditvam v zvezi s sklenitvijo dogovorov o prodajnih kvotah ali tržnih deležih v referenčnem obdobju. V teh okoliščinah teh informacij ni mogoče upoštevati, da bi se dokazalo sodelovanje družbe Zicuñaga pri dogovorih o prodajnih kvotah. | |
| 235 | Pri tem ostaja dejstvo, da podatek, povzet zgoraj v točki 230, dokazuje, da je bila Zicuñaga na sestanku 29. junija 1994 obveščena o obstoju dogovora o prodajnih kvotah. | |
| 236 | V teh okoliščinah in ker je ugotovljeno, da je Zicuñaga sodelovala pri dogovorih o zvišanjih cen na španskem trgu, pri čemer je vedela ali bi zagotovo morala vedeti, da se je s tem vključila v evropski omejevalni sporazum, ji je Komisija lahko pripisala tudi odgovornost za dogovore o prodajnih kvotah, sklenjene v obdobju njenega sodelovanja pri dogovorih o zvišanjih cen. Opozoriti je namreč treba, da je v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso družba, ki je pri mnogovrstni kršitvi pravil o konkurenci sodelovala z ravnanji, ki spadajo pod pojma sporazum ali usklajeno ravnanje s protikonkurenčnim ciljem v smislu člena 81(1) ES in ki naj bi pripomogla k uresničitvi kršitve v celoti, lahko odgovorna tudi za ravnanja drugih družb v okviru iste kršitve v celotnem obdobju svojega sodelovanja pri navedeni kršitvi, če se ugotovi, da zadevna družba ve za protipravna ravnanja drugih udeležencev ali da jih lahko razumno predvidi in da je pripravljena sprejeti tveganje (zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točka 203). | |
| 237 | Zato je treba družbo Zicuñaga šteti za odgovorno za dogovor o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot, omenjen na sestanku 29. junija 1994. | |
| 238 | Glede dogovorov o delitvi trgov iz uvodnih izjav od 246 do 251 odločbe izhaja, da Komisija opira svoje ugotovitve v zvezi z obstojem takih dogovorov najprej na trditve, ki se nanašajo na sestanka v zvezi s francoskim trgom, organizirana spomladi 1994 in 6. decembra 1994. Vendar pa odločba ne vsebuje nobenega dokaza, na podlagi katerega bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti, da je Zicuñaga vedela ali bi lahko razumno predvidela, da so sestanki v zvezi s francoskim trgom bili okvir za dogovore o delitvi trga. V zvezi s tem Komisija v nasprotju s svojimi ugotovitvami v zvezi z dogovori o zvišanjih cen v odločbi ni menila, da so bili dogovori o delitvi trga, opaženi na francoskem trgu, del decentralizirane uporabe domnevnega evropskega dogovora o razdelitvi trgov, katerega stranke naj bi obvestile lokalne vodje o različnih zadevnih trgih. V teh okoliščinah ni mogoče šteti, da je družba, kot je Zicuñaga, za katero ni sporno, da ni sodelovala na tajnih sestankih o drugih trgih poleg španskega, vedela ali bi morala razumno predvideti, da obstajajo zgoraj navedeni dogovori o delitvi trga. | |
| 239 | Po mnenju Komisije naj bi se nadalje zdelo, da so bili tržni deleži uvrščeni na dnevni red splošnih sestankov kartela (uvodna izjava 250 odločbe). Vendar pa je treba opozoriti, da ni sporno, da družba Zicuñaga ni nikoli sodelovala na splošnih sestankih kartela. Poleg tega se dokazi, ki jih navaja Komisija v uvodnih izjavah 250 in 251 odločbe v podporo svoji trditvi, nanašajo na splošni sestanek kartela z 2. februarja 1995, to je na sestanek po koncu obdobja kršitve, ugotovljene za družbo Zicuñaga v členu 1, drugi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| 240 | Iz tega sledi, da sodelovanje družbe Zicuñaga pri praksah delitve trga ni bilo dokazano. | |
| 241 | Glede na zgoraj navedeno je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija utemeljeno štela družbo Zicuñaga za odgovorno za prakse dodelitve prodajnih kvot med njenim sodelovanjem pri kršitvi. Nasprotno je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija napačno očitala družbi Zicuñaga vidik samo ene kršitve, ki se nanaša na dogovore o delitvi trga. | |
| 242 | Vendar pa ta napaka pri presoji ne more ovreči ugotovitve, da je družba Zicuñaga v okviru sestankov, namenjenih španskemu trgu, sodelovala pri dogovorih o zvišanjih cen, niti analize, da se je s temi dogovori vključila v evropski omejevalni sporazum o cenah samokopirnega papirja, ki je bil bistveni del kršitve, ugotovljene v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. Zgoraj navedeni razmisleki v zvezi z delitvijo trga torej ne morejo ovreči sodelovanja družbe Zicuñaga pri tej kršitvi. Ugotoviti je treba, da bi družba Zicuñaga, ki je več kot eno leto sodelovala pri navedenih cenovnih pobudah, lahko razumno predvidela, da bodo udeležene družbe poskušale zagotoviti uspeh teh pobud z različnimi mehanizmi, in da je bila pripravljena sprejeti to možnost. V okviru preučitve podrednih predlogov družbe Zicuñaga, s katerimi želi doseči znižanje globe, ki ji je naložena v členu 3 odločbe, bo kljub temu treba preveriti, ali in po potrebi v kolikšni meri neobstoj odgovornosti družbe Zicuñaga za prakse delitve upravičuje znižanje globe, ki ji je naložena. | |
| 243 | Na podlagi vseh teh ugotovitev je treba zavrniti tožbeni razlog družbe Divipa, ki se nanaša na kršitev člena 81 ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP, ter tožbeni razlog družbe Zicuñaga, ki se nanaša na napake pri presoji. | |
| C – Tožbeni razlogi v zvezi s trajanjem kršitve | |
| 244 | Več tožečih strank, to je Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot, Torraspapel, Divipa in Zicuñaga, izpodbija ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi s trajanjem svojega sodelovanja pri kršitvi. Nekatere od teh tožečih strank (MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel) navajajo svoje trditve v okviru predlogov za delno razglasitev ničnosti člena 1 odločbe in znižanje globe, ki jim je naložena v členu 3 te odločbe, medtem ko druge (Bolloré, Divipa in Zicuñaga) to storijo v okviru svojih podrednih predlogov za znižanje globe. Kar zadeva te zadnje družbe, iz njihovih spisov vseeno izhaja, da v bistvu izpodbijajo zakonitost izpodbijane odločbe, ker je v členu 1, drugi odstavek, te odločbe ugotovljeno trajanje kršitve, ki jo je storila vsaka od njih. Zato je treba na novo opredeliti njihov predlog tako, da se nanaša tudi na delno razglasitev ničnosti člena 1, drugi pododstavek, odločbe v zvezi s trajanjem kršitve. | |
| 245 | Družbe Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel navajajo v glavnem enake trditve, in sicer da Komisija ni dokazala njihovega sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 oziroma pred januarjem 1993, kar zadeva MHTP. Ob upoštevanju nekaterih posebnosti, povezanih z njihovim zadevnim položajem, v bistvu trdijo, da v nasprotju s trditvami Komisije ni dokazano, da so sestanki, ki so potekali na evropski ravni v okviru AEMCP pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993, bili okvir za tajne dogovore o cenah, in da ni dokazano, da so sodelovale na tajnih sestankih na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni pred tem obdobjem. Najprej je treba skupaj preučiti zadevne trditve različnih zgoraj navedenih družb in dodatne trditve družbe Mougeot, da Komisija ni dokazala njenega sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu po juliju 1995. Nato bo treba preučiti tožbene razloge, ki jih navajata družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga. | |
| 1. Tožbeni razlogi, ki jih navajajo družbe Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel | |
| a) Sodelovanje tožečih strank pri kršitvi pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| Trditve strank | |
| 246 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na kršitev člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17, družba Bolloré trdi, da Komisija ni dokazala njene odgovornosti v omejevalnem sporazumu med januarjem 1992 in septembrom ali oktobrom 1993. V podporo svoji trditvi zatrjuje, prvič, da je družba Copigraph zanikala, da bi sodelovala pri kakršnem koli omejevalnem sporazumu pred septembrom 1993. Drugič, zanika vsako dokazno vrednost izjav družbe AWA z dne 5. maja 1999, izjav družbe Mougeot z dne 14. aprila 1999 in izjav družbe Sappi z dne 6. januarja 1998, na katere se Komisija opira, da bi dokazala sodelovanje družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu pred septembrom 1993. Poudarja tudi protislovno naravo teh različnih izjav, pri čemer trdi, da se izjave družbe Mougeot nanašajo na domnevne splošne sestanke kartela, medtem ko se izjave družbe AWA nanašajo na domnevni omejevalni sporazum v zvezi s francoskim trgom. Trdi tudi, da je družba Copigraph prvo zvišanje cen izvedla decembra 1993, kar izključuje, da bi bila vpletena v omejevalni sporazum pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993. | |
| 247 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na neobstoj dokazov, družba MHTP trdi, da Komisija ni dokazala njenega sodelovanja pri kršitvi pred januarjem 1993. V podporo tej trditvi trdi, prvič, da izjave družb AWA, Sappi in Mougeot, navedene v uvodnih izjavah 107 in 108 odločbe, ne dokazujejo, da so sestanki AEMCP, organizirani leta 1992, bili okvir za omejevalni sporazum. Drugič, trdi, da v nasprotju z ugotovitvami Komisije ni dokazano, da je sodelovala na sestanku 5. marca 1992 v zvezi s španskim trgom, na sestanku spomladi 1992 v zvezi s francoskim trgom ter na sestanku 16. julija 1992 v zvezi s španskim in portugalskim trgom. | |
| 248 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na neobstoj dokazov, družba Koehler trdi, da Komisija ni dokazala njenega sodelovanja pri protikonkurenčnem omejevalnem sporazumu pred oktobrom 1993. V podporo tej trditvi navaja, prvič, da izjave družb Mougeot in Sappi, na katere se sklicuje Komisija, ne dokazujejo, da so bili tajni dogovori sklenjeni v okviru AEMCP pred oktobrom 1993. Dodaja, da dejstvo, da so tajni sestanki potekali na določenem številu nacionalnih ali regionalnih trgov pred oktobrom 1993, ne dokazuje obstoja usklajevanja na evropski ravni v tistem času. Drugič, družba Koehler trdi, da v nasprotju z ugotovitvami Komisije ni dokazano, da je sodelovala na sestankih 17. februarja in 5. marca 1992 v zvezi s španskim trgom, na sestanku spomladi 1992 v zvezi s francoskim trgom, na sestanku 16. julija 1992 v zvezi s španskim in portugalskim trgom, na sestanku 14. januarja 1993 v zvezi s trgoma Združenega kraljestva in Irske, na sestanku spomladi 1993 v zvezi s francoskim trgom ter na sestanku 30. septembra 1993 v zvezi s španskim trgom. | |
| 249 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na očitno napako pri presoji, družba Mougeot trdi, da Komisija ni dokazala, da je sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu pred oktobrom 1993. Poudarja, da v izjavah družbe Sappi, na katere se sklicuje Komisija, ni navedena med udeleženci tajnih sestankov, organiziranih v letih 1992 in 1993. Dodaja, da je, ker leta 1992 ni bila članica AEMCP, na sestankih tega združenja 26. maja in 10. septembra 1992 sodelovala izključno kot članica opazovalka ter da je treba vsekakor ugotoviti, da udeleženci sestanka AEMCP z 9. februarja 1993, ki je prvi sestanek tega združenja, na katerem je sodelovala kot njegova članica, v njeni prisotnosti niso razpravljali o obstoju ali smotrnosti omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 250 | Družba Mougeot tudi trdi, da je Komisija v uvodni izjavi 111 odločbe izkrivila vsebino njenih izjav z dne 14. aprila 1999. Poleg tega zanika vsako dokazno vrednost izjave družbe Sappi, ki jo je Komisija navedla v uvodni izjavi 112 odločbe v podporo svoji trditvi, da so uradni sestanki AEMCP bili okvir za tajne sestanke o cenah pred prestrukturiranjem združenja septembra 1993. | |
| 251 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na napačno uporabo člena 81(1) ES ter kršitve načela domneve nedolžnosti in bistvenega postopkovnega pravila, družba Torraspapel trdi, da ni nobenega dokaza o njenem domnevnem sodelovanju pri kršitvi od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993. Družba Torraspapel izraža nekaj uvodnih pripomb o tveganjih strateške ovadbe, povezanih z novo politiko prizanesljivosti Komisije, ter o neobstoju dokazne vrednosti izjav družb AWA, Sappi in Mougeot, na katere se sklicuje Komisija v podporo svoji trditvi. Nadalje zanika, prvič, da so uradni sestanki AEMCP bili okvir za tajna dogovarjanja o cenah do septembra 1993. Drugič, trdi, da v nasprotju z ugotovitvami Komisije ni sodelovala na sestankih 17. februarja in 5. marca 1992 v zvezi s španskim trgom, niti sestankih spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993 v zvezi s francoskim trgom ter niti na sestanku 16. julija 1992 v zvezi s španskim in portugalskim trgom. | |
| 252 | Komisija izpodbija kritike, ki se nanašajo na dokazno vrednost izjav družb AWA, Sappi in Mougeot. Te izjave naj bi omogočale razumeti organizacijo kartela, vključno z letom 1992. Komisija poleg tega po posameznih točkah odgovarja na trditve tožečih strank, ki se nanašajo na njihovo nesodelovanje na različnih zadevnih nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankih. | |
| Odločba | |
| 253 | V skladu s členom 1, drugi odstavek, odločbe so družbe Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler in Torraspapel sodelovale pri kršitvi od januarja 1992 do septembra 1995, medtem ko je v skladu z isto določbo družba Mougeot pri kršitvi sodelovala od maja 1992 do septembra 1995. | |
| 254 | Ustrezni odlomki iz odločbe, kar zadeva sodelovanje petih zadevnih tožečih strank pri kršitvi od januarja ali maja 1992, odvisno od posameznega primera, do septembra ali oktobra 1993, so naslednji: | „83. | Organizacija in usklajevanje omejevalnega sporazuma na ravni EGP sta potekala na splošnih sestankih kartela, ki so se sklicevali pod krinko uradnih sestankov poklicnega združenja AEMCP. | 84. | Na teh splošnih sestankih so udeleženci praviloma odločali o časovnem razporedu in višini (v odstotkih) zvišanja cen za vsako državo EGP. Dogovorili so se o več zaporednih zvišanjih cen za več mesecev vnaprej. | 85. | Sestanki AEMCP so bili okvir za sestanke kartela najmanj od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993 […] | 87. | Udeležba na sestankih AEMCP je bila na splošno visoka in med kršitvijo so na njih sodelovali vsi proizvajalci, ki so bili takrat člani AEMCP: AWA, Binda, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot, Stora, Torraspapel/Sarrió in Zanders.“ | |
| 255 | Poleg tega iz uvodnih izjav od 107 do 113 izhaja, da je družba Sappi priznala obstoj tajnega dogovarjanja med konkurenčnimi proizvajalci na rednih sestankih, ki so potekali vsaj od začetka leta 1992. Uslužbenec družbe Sappi je izjavil, da so ti sestanki „na ravni Skupnosti“ potekali od leta 1991. Družba AWA je prav tako priznala, da so taki sestanki potekali od začetka leta 1992. Družba Mougeot, ki se je v AEMCP včlanila konec leta 1992, je predložila izjave (dokument št. 7647, naveden zgoraj v točki 165) v zvezi z vsebino uradnega sestanka AEMCP iz leta 1993, na podlagi katerih Komisija sklepa, da je prenova združenja vključevala prestrukturiranje kartela. Družba Mougeot je izjavila: | „Nedvomno se je [g. B.] na uradnem sestanku AEMCP 14. septembra 1993 v Frankfurtu ali na predhodnem sestanku, vendar vsekakor, ko je nastopil funkcijo vodje generalne direkcije ,samokopirne‘ poslovalnice družbe AWA, jasno odločil, da na ,neuradne‘ sestanke povabi glavne proizvajalce samokopirnega papirja po posameznih trgih in da spremeni organizacijo uradnih sestankov AEMCP. [G. B.] se je odločil, da bo odslej na vsakem sestanku AEMCP prisoten odvetnik, da bi ti dobili uraden značaj in da jih ne bi bilo mogoče kritizirati. Nasprotno pa se je odločil, da se vse, kar bo zadevalo cene, ne bo več obravnavalo na teh sestankih, ampak samo na ,neuradnih sestankih‘.“ | |
| Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 256 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da mora Komisija glede izvedbe dokaza kršitve člena 81(1) ES dokazati kršitve, ki jih ugotovi, in predložiti dokaze, s katerimi lahko pravno zadostno dokaže obstoj okoliščin, ki pomenijo kršitev (sodbi Sodišča z dne 17. decembra 1998 v zadevi Baustahlgewebe proti Komisiji, C-185/95 P, Recueil, str. I-8417, točka 58, in zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točka 86). | |
| 257 | Tako je nujno, da Komisija predloži natančne in skladne dokaze, da bi utemeljila trdno prepričanje, da je bila kršitev storjena (glej sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 6. julija 2000 v zadevi Volkswagen proti Komisiji, T-62/98, Recueil, str. II-2707, točka 43 in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 258 | Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da ni nujno, da vsak dokaz, ki ga predloži Komisija, izpolnjuje ta merila glede vsakega elementa kršitve. Dovolj je, da se več indicev, na katere se sklicuje institucija, gledano na splošno, ujema s to zahtevo (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča z dne 15. oktobra 2002 v združenih zadevah Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij in drugi proti Komisiji, C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, od C-250/99 P do C-252/99 P in C-254/99 P, Recueil, str. I-8375, točke od 513 do 520). Poleg tega je treba, kot je Sodišče prve stopnje že navedlo v zgoraj navedenih točkah 155 in 166, dokaze presojati v celoti in za izjave, dane v okviru obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, ni mogoče šteti, da so samo zato brez dokazne vrednosti. | |
| 259 | Iz odločbe izhaja, da Komisija opira odgovornost petih zadevnih tožečih strank od januarja 1992 ali maja 1992, kar zadeva družbo Mougeot, do septembra ali oktobra 1993 na njihovo sodelovanje pri tajnih stikih in sistemu tajnih sestankov, ki vključuje preplet uradnih sestankov AEMCP, za katere trdi, da so bili okvir za tajna dogovarjanja o cenah in nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankih kartela. | |
| 260 | Najprej je treba analizirati domnevni sistem tajnih sestankov, ki ga sestavljajo uradni sestanki AEMCP in nacionalni ali regionalni sestanki kartela, ter nato sodelovanje zadevnih tožečih strank na teh sestankih pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993. | |
| – Domnevni sistem tajnih sestankov | |
| Uradni sestanki AEMCP pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| 261 | Iz uvodnih izjav od 107 do 113, od 254 do 256 in 295 odločbe izhaja, da se Komisija v podporo svojim trditvam o izvedbi splošnih (evropskih) sestankov kartela v okviru uradnih sestankov AEMCP pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 sklicuje, prvič, na izjave družbe Mougeot, ki jih vsebuje dokument št. 7647 (glej zgoraj navedeno točko 255); drugič, na pričanje uslužbenca družbe Sappi ter priznanja družb Sappi in AWA, ter tretjič, na obstoj številnih dokazov, ki potrjujejo organizacijo nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankov kartela od januarja 1992, kar bo obravnavano v točki 281 in naslednjih. | |
| 262 | Prvič, iz uvodnih izjav 113 in 254 odločbe je razvidno, da so izjave družbe Mougeot (dokument št. 7647), povzete v uvodni izjavi 108 navedene odločbe in navedene zgoraj v točki 255, osrednji element dokaza Komisije v zvezi s to točko. | |
| 263 | V zvezi s tem je treba najprej zavrniti trditve družbe Mougeot, da naj bi Komisija popačila vsebino njenih izjav. Primerjava uvodne izjave 108 odločbe in dokumenta št. 7647, ki vsebuje zadevne izjave, kaže, da je Komisija v odločbi dobesedno in zvesto obnovila izjave družbe Mougeot iz zgoraj navedenega dokumenta. | |
| 264 | Poleg tega je treba v odgovor na trditev družbe Koehler ugotoviti, da popolnoma jasen pomen izjav družbe Mougeot upravičuje, da kot izhaja iz uvodne izjave 295 odločbe, Komisija ni pripisala nobenega pomena poznejšemu zanikanju družbe Mougeot v njenem odgovoru na OU. | |
| 265 | Prav tako je treba zavrniti trditev družbe Torraspapel, da trditve v opombi 97 odločbe kažejo, da Komisija dvomi o dokazni vrednosti izjav družbe Mougeot. Dejstva, da je Komisija v tej opombi glede na vsebino dokaznih listin v spisu zavrnila trditev družbe Mougeot, da je ta prvič sodelovala na sestanku AEMCP 9. februarja 1993, namreč ni mogoče razlagati kot izraza splošnega dvoma Komisije o dokazni vrednosti trditev družbe Mougeot. Poleg tega v primerjavi s trditvijo družbe Mougeot, navedeno v opombi 97 odločbe, izjavam, povzetim v uvodni izjavi 108 te odločbe, ne nasprotuje noben dokaz, ki bi lahko vzbudil dvom o dokazni vrednosti teh izjav. | |
| 266 | Iz teh izjav družbe Mougeot izhaja, da je na uradnem sestanku AEMCP g. B., ko je nastopil funkcijo vodje generalne direkcije poslovalnice „Samokopirni papir“ družbe AWA, odločil, da se reorganizirajo dejavnosti AEMCP, tako da bodo odslej uradni sestanki združenja potekali v prisotnosti odvetnika, da jih „ne bi bilo mogoče kritizirati“, da se na navedenih sestankih ne bo obravnavalo „nič, kar zadeva cene“, in da se bodo za obravnavo teh odslej sklicevali „neuradni sestanki“. Izjave družbe Mougeot jasno kažejo, da so pred reorganizacijo dejavnosti AEMCP, o kateri je odločil g. B. (AWA), uradni sestanki AEMCP bili okvir za razprave o cenah. Prav te razprave so bile sporni element teh sestankov. | |
| 267 | Nobena od zadevnih tožečih strank ne izpodbija navedbe iz uvodne izjave 110 odločbe, da je prvi uradni sestanek AEMCP v prisotnosti odvetnika potekal 18. novembra 1993. V teh okoliščinah je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila, da je bila odločitev g. B. o prestrukturiranju dejavnosti in sestankov AEMCP sprejeta na uradnem sestanku tega združenja, ki je potekal tik pred sestankom 18. novembra 1993, to je na sestanku 14. septembra 1993. Komisija je torej upravičeno menila, da so razprave o cenah potekale na uradnih sestankih AEMCP do sestanka 14. septembra 1993. | |
| 268 | To ugotovitev potrjujejo uvodne izjave od 115 do 121 odločbe, iz katerih izhaja, da so po tej odločitvi o prestrukturiranju ob robu uradnih sestankov AEMCP potekali neuradni sestanki, katerih cilj je bil dogovoriti se o zvišanjih cen v EGP. | |
| 269 | Drugič, Komisija se sklicuje na izvleček, povzet v uvodni izjavi 112 odločbe, iz pričanja (dokument št. 5407, priložen OU) osebe, ki jo je družba Sappi zaposlila februarja 1993 in se spominja, da so njeni sodelavci „s sestankov, vključno s sestanki AEMCP, prihajali z zelo natančno zamislijo o zvišanjih cen, ki se bodo izvedla, in da jim je bilo skoraj vseeno za odzive konkurence“. | |
| 270 | V nasprotju s trditvami nekaterih tožečih strank spomini tega uslužbenca družbe Sappi nikakor niso izraženi v dvomljivem ali previdnem tonu. Ker ne obstajajo nasprotne trditve, je treba te izjave razumeti tako, da se enako nanašajo na obdobje pred septembrom 1993 in tudi na obdobje po njem. Te izjave potrjujejo za obdobje od februarja do septembra 1993, da so tajni sestanki, ki so se nanašali na zvišanja cen na evropski ravni, potekali na uradnih sestankih AEMCP, česar poleg tega niso izpodbijale družbe, ki so priznale, da so od leta 1992 sodelovale pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 271 | Na tej stopnji analize je torej očitno, da je Komisija pravilno ugotovila, da so bili pred septembrom 1993 dogovori o cenah sklenjeni na uradnih sestankih AEMCP. Zdaj je treba preveriti, ali je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila, da so se uradni sestanki AEMCP začeli uporabljati kot okvir za take dogovore najpozneje januarja 1992 in so se neprekinjeno uporabljali kot tak okvir do septembra 1993. | |
| 272 | V zvezi s tem iz uvodnih izjav 86 in 113 odločbe izhaja, da Komisija v podporo svojim ugotovitvam navaja, da je bil prvi uradni sestanek AEMCP, za kateri ima pisne dokaze, 23. januarja 1992. Komisija na podlagi tega podatka v povezavi z domnevnimi skladnimi izjavami družb AWA in Sappi, navedenimi v uvodni izjavi 107 odločbe, ki naj bi dokazovale, da so tajni sestanki potekali na evropski ravni od začetka leta 1992, ter z dokazi, da se je organiziranje rednih sestankov in stikov na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni začelo januarja 1992 (ista uvodna izjava), da se je evropski omejevalni sporazum o cenah začel najpozneje januarja 1992. Komisija v uvodni izjavi 113 odločbe dodaja, da dokumenti, ki jih ima, kažejo, da je bilo med januarjem 1992 in sestankom 14. septembra 1993 osem sestankov AEMCP, ki so bili vsi v Zürichu. | |
| 273 | Najprej je treba ugotoviti, da nobena tožeča stranka ne izpodbija pravilnosti trditev v odločbi v zvezi z izvedbo uradnega sestanka AEMCP 23. januarja 1992. | |
| 274 | Nadalje je treba navesti, prvič, da družba AWA v izjavi (dokumenta št. 7828 in 7829, glej zgoraj navedeno točko 163), ki jo Komisija navaja v uvodni izjavi 107 odločbe, priznava, da je od začetka leta 1992 sodelovala s konkurenti na nekaterih „neprimernih“ (improper) sestankih, ki so bili okvir za izmenjave namenov v zvezi z napovedmi zvišanj cen. To priznanje družbe AWA se glede na njen odgovor na zahtevo Komisije za informacije (dokument št. 7829) nanaša na sestanke, na katerih naj bi sodelovale družbe Sarrió, Mougeot, Stora-Feldmühle, Copigraph, Koehler in Zanders ter ki naj bi potekali med letoma 1992 in 1995 v Parizu, Zürichu in Ženevi. Zürich je mesto, v katerem, kot izhaja iz tabele A v Prilogi I k odločbi, so potekali vsi uradni sestanki AEMCP, organizirani od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993. | |
| 275 | Vendar pa se glede na odgovor družbe AWA (dokument št. 7827) izvleček, naveden v uvodnih izjavah 61 in 107 odločbe, nanaša na podrobnosti sestankov, ki so potekali od 1. januarja 1992 do datuma priprave tega odgovora, razen uradnih sestankov AEMCP, tako da bi bilo mogoče sklepati, da je izključila vse sestanke AEMCP, ker niso bili tajni. Ker mora v skladu z načelom in dubio pro reo obstoj razumnega dvoma koristiti tožečim strankam, je treba ugotoviti, da iz izjav družbe AWA ni mogoče ugotoviti, da je bil uradni sestanek AEMCP s 23. januarja 1992 okvir za tajno dogovarjanje o cenah. Vendar pa so kljub temu pomemben znak obstoja omejevalnega sporazuma na evropski ravni od začetka leta 1992. | |
| 276 | Drugič, glede izjav družbe Sappi, navedenih v uvodni izjavi 107 odločbe, iz uvodne izjave 73 te odločbe izhaja, da se Komisija sklicuje na „izjave družbe Sappi [ki naj bi kazale], da so obstajali tajni stiki med evropskimi proizvajalci samokopirnega papirja od ustanovitve njihovega poklicnega združenja AEMCP leta 1981 in predvsem od sredine osemdesetih let“. | |
| 277 | V opombi 64 odločbe (dokument št. 4656) Komisija navaja: | „Sappi je Komisiji predložila izjavo enega do svojih zaposlenih, ki se je ukvarjal s prodajo samokopirnega papirja od sedemdesetih let, da ,je začel sumiti o obstoju tajnega dogovarjanja v sektorju samokopirnega papirja sredi osemdesetih let zaradi pripomb vodstva […] [M]enil je, da je to tajno dogovarjanje med drugimi vključevalo družbe Arjo Wiggins, Koehler in Stora-Feldmühle [ter] vedel je za dvostranske izmenjave informacij od sredine ali konca osemdesetih let‘.“ | |
| 278 | Izjava še enega uslužbenca družbe Sappi kaže, da so obstajali tajni stiki in sestanki med konkurenti na ravni Skupnosti od leta 1991 do leta 1993. Ta uslužbenec družbe Sappi navaja, da je menil, da so ti stiki vodili do tajnega dogovarjanja in da so se dobavitelji medsebojno pogovarjali o cenah na ravni Skupnosti. | |
| 279 | Izjavi uslužbencev družbe Sappi, navedeni v prejšnjih točkah, dokazujeta, da je od konca osemdesetih let ali začetka devetdesetih let na evropski ravni obstajal omejevalni sporazum o cenah, v kateri je bilo vključenih več proizvajalcev. Poleg tega ti izjavi potrjujeta izjave družbe AWA o obstoju omejevalnega sporazuma na evropski ravni od začetka leta 1992. Nasprotno pa ne omogočata trditve, da je bil uradni sestanek AEMCP s 23. januarja 1992 okvir za tajne stike. Tako kot izjave družbe AWA tudi ti izjavi ne omogočata ugotovitve, da je Komisija pravilno ugotovila, da so se tajni dogovori o cenah sklepali od januarja 1992 na uradnih sestankih AEMCP. | |
| 280 | Zato je treba preučiti tretji dejavnik, ki ga navaja Komisija, to je organizacijo tajnih sestankov in stikov na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni ob uradnih sestankih AEMCP od začetka leta 1992. | |
| Sestanki na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| 281 | Iz tabele 3, z naslovom „Nacionalni in regionalni sestanki kartela od februarja 1992 do spomladi 1995“, ki je povzeta v uvodni izjavi 129 odločbe, izhaja, da Komisija ugotavlja, da je bilo od februarja 1992 do 30. septembra 1993 sedem nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankov. Glede na podrobnosti o teh sestankih, navedene v Prilogi II k odločbi: | — | naj bi 17. februarja 1992 potekal sestanek v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležili družbi Koehler in Torraspapel; | — | naj bi 5. marca 1992 potekal sestanek v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležile družbe Stora (MHTP), Koehler in Torraspapel; | — | naj bi spomladi 1992, verjetno aprila, potekal sestanek v zvezi s francoskim trgom, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležile družbe Copigraph (hčerinska družba družbe Bolloré), Stora (MHTP), Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel; | — | naj bi 16. julija 1992 potekal sestanek v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležile družbe Stora (MHTP), Koehler in Torraspapel; | — | naj bi 14. januarja 1993 potekal sestanek v zvezi s trgoma Združenega kraljestva in Irske, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležili družbe Stora (MHTP) in Koehler; | — | naj bi spomladi 1993, verjetno aprila, potekal sestanek v zvezi s francoskim trgom, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležile družbe Copigraph (hčerinska družba družbe Bolloré), Stora (MHTP), Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel; | — | naj bi 30. septembra 1993 potekal sestanek v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki naj bi se ga med drugim udeležile družbe Copigraph (hčerinska družba družbe Bolloré), Stora (MHTP), Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel. | |
| 282 | Preveriti je treba utemeljenost ugotovitev Komisije v zvezi z izvedbo teh sestankov in njihovim protikonkurenčnim ciljem. | |
| 283 | Prvič, glede sestanka s 17. februarja 1992 v zvezi s španskim trgom je Sodišče prve stopnje v zgoraj navedenih točkah od 161 do 169 že ugotovilo, da je bil cilj tega sestanka, namenjenega zagotovitvi upoštevanja dogovora o zvišanju cen na španskem trgu, tajno dogovorjen in v skladu s splošnim ciljem kršitve. | |
| 284 | Drugič, glede sestanka s 5. marca 1992 prav tako iz ugotovitev Sodišča prve stopnje v zgoraj navedenih točkah od 161 do 170 izhaja, da sta dokazana izvedba in tajno dogovorjeni cilj tega sestanka. | |
| 285 | Tretjič, glede sestankov, ki sta potekala spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993 v zvezi s francoskim trgom, njuna vsebina in protikonkurenčni cilj izhajata iz izjav uslužbencev družbe Sappi, ki jih vsebujejo dokumenti št. 15026, 15027 in 15272, navedeni v uvodni izjavi 137 odločbe in priloženi OU. | |
| 286 | Izvleček iz izjave družbe Sappi, ki ga vsebuje dokument št. 15272, se glasi: | „Direktor (tedanji) prodajne službe družbe Sappi (UK) Ltd v Franciji je izjavil, da se je s svojim šefom [g. W.] udeležil dveh sestankov s konkurenti v Franciji. Prvi je potekal spomladi 1992 in drugi leto pozneje. Eden je potekal v hotelu na letališču Charles-de-Gaulle in drugi v središču Pariza. To sta edina taka sestanka, ki se ju je udeležil, in ne ve, ali so bili v Franciji še drugi sestanki. | Pogovori na teh sestankih so se nanašali predvsem na pole, ki jih družba Sappi takrat v Franciji ni prodajala. Sestanka se nista končala s soglasjem ali kakršnim koli dogovorom o polah. Glede rol so se pogovori nanašali na višino preteklih in trenutnih cen, ne pa na višino prihodnjih cen.“ | |
| 287 | Poleg tega družba Sappi v tabeli (dokument št. 15200, priložen OU), navedeni v odgovoru z dne 18. maja 1999 na zahtevo Komisije za informacije, navaja, da sta sestanka potekala na različna datuma spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993, verjetno aprila, v Parizu, na letališču Charles-de-Gaulle in v hotelu blizu Place de l’Étoile. V skladu s to tabelo je bil cilj teh sestankov izmenjati informacije in obravnavati stranke in cene, ki se jim zaračunavajo. Družba Sappi navaja, da so na teh sestankih sodelovali predstavniki družb Sappi, AWA, Sarrió, Zanders, zastopnice družbe Zanders v Franciji, Europapier in Feldmühle. Trdi, da se ne spominja, ali je bil na teh sestankih tudi predstavnik družbe Koehler. | |
| 288 | Iz informacij, povzetih v prejšnjih točkah, izhaja, da se uslužbenec družbe Sappi, ki je predložil te informacije in je bil osebno prisoten na navedenih dogodkih, natančno spominja, da sta sestanka med konkurenti potekala spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993 v Parizu ter da je bil njun cilj zlasti obravnavati stranke in cene, ki se jim zaračunavajo. Neobstoj natančnih informacij o natančnem datumu teh sestankov je mogoče verjetno razložiti s časom, ki je pretekel med spornimi dejstvi in trenutkom, v katerem je bil ta uslužbenec vprašan o teh dogodkih, in ne more zasenčiti natančnosti njegovega pričanja, kar zadeva obdobje, v katerem sta zadevna sestanka potekala, njun kraj in cilj. Ta neobstoj torej izjavam uslužbenca družbe Sappi ne more odvzeti njihove dokazne vrednosti v zvezi z različnimi vidiki. | |
| 289 | Glede sestanka, ki je potekal spomladi 1993, je treba dodati, da se dokumenti št. 4798, 4799 in 5034, ki jih Komisija navaja v opombi 135 odločbe, ujemajo z obračuni potnih stroškov in kažejo, da sta g. F. (Koehler) in g. W. (Stora-Feldmühle) šla v Pariz 14. aprila 1993. Taka informacija potrjuje trditev Komisije, da je sestanek, ki naj bi potekal spomladi 1993, dejansko potekal aprila. | |
| 290 | Res je, da iz izjav uslužbenca družbe Sappi, navedenih zgoraj v točki 286, izhaja, da kolikor se spominja, na teh sestankih, ki sta potekala spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993, ni bil sklenjen noben dogovor o cenah. Vendar pa je treba trditev, da udeleženci teh sestankov niso dosegli soglasja ali sklenili kakršnega koli dogovora glede pol, treba razlagati tako, da so na teh sestankih to poskušali v zvezi s polami, zato ta sestanka nista bila zakonita. | |
| 291 | V okviru teh poskusov so si udeleženci namreč zagotovo morali izmenjati individualne informacije o cenah in/ali obsegu prodaje, kar zadeva pole. V skladu s sodno prakso (zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točki 117 in 121) zahteva po neodvisnosti politike vsakega gospodarskega subjekta, ki jo vsebujejo določbe Pogodbe o konkurenci, strogo nasprotuje vsakršni navezavi neposrednih ali posrednih stikov med takimi gospodarskimi subjekti, ki lahko vpliva na ravnanje trenutnega ali potencialnega konkurenta na trgu oziroma razkrije takemu konkurentu ravnanje, za katero se je gospodarski subjekt odločil, da ga bo uresničeval ali ga namerava uresničevati na trgu, če je cilj ali učinek teh stikov ustvariti konkurenčne pogoje, ki ne bi ustrezali običajnim razmeram na zadevnem trgu. V zvezi s tem je treba z izjemo predložitve nasprotnega dokaza s strani zadevnih gospodarskih subjektov domnevati, da družbe, ki sodelujejo pri dogovarjanjih in ostanejo dejavne na trgu, upoštevajo informacije, ki si jih izmenjajo s svojimi konkurenti, da bi določile svoje ravnanje na trgu. Glede na to sodno prakso je treba priznati, da sta sestanka, ki sta potekala spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993, kar zadeva pole, bila okvir za dogovarjanja v nasprotju s členom 81(1) ES. | |
| 292 | Poleg tega so v izjavah uslužbenca družbe Sappi, navedenih zgoraj v točki 286, v zvezi z rolami omenjene izmenjave informacij ter tudi razprave na teh sestankih o strankah in cenah, ki se jim zaračunavajo, kar glede na sodno prakso iz prejšnje točke kaže na obstoj dogovarjanj, ki so prepovedana s členom 81(1) ES. | |
| 293 | Izvedba sestankov med konkurenti spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993 v Parizu ter njun protikonkurenčni cilj sta torej dokazana. | |
| 294 | Podredno, čeprav bi bilo treba ugotoviti, da so se na teh sestankih samo izmenjale informacije, ki so protipravne samo, če je njihov namen olajšati sklenitev dogovorov o zvišanjih cen in prodajnih kvotah ter nadzoru upoštevanja dogovorov (uvodna izjava 97 odločbe), bi rešitev ostala enaka. | |
| 295 | Ob upoštevanju, prvič, izvlečka iz izjave družbe Sappi, iz katerega izhaja, da so na zadevnih sestankih poskušali doseči dogovor o trgu pol, drugič, dokazov, ki potrjujejo, da so se najmanj od januarja 1992 sklepali dogovori o zvišanjih cen na evropski ravni v okviru uradnih sestankov AEMCP, in tretjič, prisotnosti določenega števila družb, ki so bili zastopane na navedenih uradnih sestankih (zlasti Sappi, AWA, Zanders), na sestanku spomladi 1992 in tudi na sestanku spomladi 1993, naj bi Komisija namreč upravičeno ugotovila, da je bil cilj izmenjave poslovnih informacij na teh francoskih sestankih nujno povezan z dogovorom o zvišanju cen samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 296 | Četrtič, glede sestanka s 16. julija 1992 iz ugotovitev Sodišča prve stopnje v zgoraj navedenih točkah od 180 do 184 izhaja, da sta dokazana izvedba in tudi tajno dogovorjeni cilj tega sestanka. | |
| 297 | Petič, glede sestanka s 14. januarja 1993 se Komisija, da bi dokazala izvedbo in protikonkurenčni cilj tega sestanka, opira na nezaupne dokumente št. 15026, 15175 in 15176, 15271 in 15272 ter 4752, priložene OU. | |
| 298 | Dokument št. 15026 vsebuje zlasti te informacije: | „Prvi uslužbenec nam je povedal, da […] misli, da sta dva sestanka potekala v Heathrow Business Centre in en v hotelu Intercontinental v Londonu, vendar se ne spomni, katera […] Drugi uslužbenec nam je povedal, da […] je v njegovem rokovniku na 14. januar 1993 vpisan sestanek v Heathrow Business Centre na terminalu 2 ob 10. uri. Ne vidi drugega razloga, zakaj bi lahko bil tam, razen sodelovanja na sestanku s konkurenti […]“ | |
| 299 | Dokumenta št. 15175 in 15176 vsebujeta ta pojasnila: | „Dokazi, ki jih je […] lahko zagotovil, so naslednji. […] Kot je navedeno v izjavah z dne 11. novembra in 20. decembra 1996, se je udeležil sestanka s konkurenti v Združenem kraljestvu, verjetno v četrtek, 14. januarja 1993, v Heathrow Business Centre na terminalu 2, ob 10. uri. Kopija zadevne strani iz njegovega rokovnika je v Prilogi 5. [G. I.], direktor prodaje in trženja družbe Sappi (UK) Ltd, ga je prosil, naj se udeleži sestanka. Sestanek se je nanašal predvsem na izmenjavo informacij o tem, kateri dobavitelj oskrbuje katere stranke, o težnjah in pričakovanjih trga. Dogovor ni bil dosežen […] Sestanek je vodila družba Arjo Wiggins. Šlo je bolj za izmenjavo informacij kot za sklenitev dogovorov o ravnanju v prihodnosti.“ | |
| 300 | Dokumenta št. 15271 in 15272 vključujeta te izjave: | „Prvi uslužbenec je dejal, da […] Vendar pa so včasih v Združenem kraljestvu potekali priložnostni neuradni sestanki med konkurenti, katerih cilj je bil spoznati trg, zlasti glede pretekle dejavnosti in zbrati mnenja konkurentov, ne pa doseči soglasja ali se vključiti v usklajeno ravnanje, da bi poskušali doseči zvišanje cen. Glede družbe Sappi je bil njen cilj sodelovanja na teh sestankih dobiti informacije, čeprav je mogoče, da so druge družbe uporabile te sestanke za posredovanje podatkov ali poskus izkrivljanja trga; razprave na teh sestankih se niso nanašale na razdelitev trga ali dodelitev strank; […] je potrdil, da je sodeloval na takih sestankih enkrat letno v letih 1992, 1993 in 1994. Lahko, da se je udeležil tudi enega ali dveh drugih sestankov (vendar ne več). Leta 1995 ali 1996 se ni udeležil nobenega sestanka. Praksa organiziranja takih sestankov je bila v tej industriji že ustaljena, ko se je začel ukvarjati s prodajo samokopirnega papirja […] Sestanki so običajno potekali na letališču Heathrow ali v hotelu v Londonu […]“ | |
| 301 | Dokument št. 4752 se ujema z izvlečkom iz rokovnika uslužbenca družbe Sappi in za 14. januar 1993 vsebuje to navedbo: „T2 Heathrow ob 10. uri Bus. Centre.“ | |
| 302 | Glede na različne informacije, navedene zgoraj v točkah od 298 do 301, je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila, da je sestanek med konkurenti potekal na letališču Heathrow 14. januarja 1993 ob 10. uri dopoldan. Res je, da iz izvlečka, povzetega zgoraj v točki 299, izhaja, da udeleženci tega sestanka niso dosegli dogovora. Vendar pa poleg dejstva, da je ta izvleček mogoče razlagati tako, da dokazuje obstoj poskusa sklenitve dogovora v nasprotju s členom 81(1) ES, zaradi česar iz razlogov, navedenih zgoraj v točki 291, zadevni sestanek ni zakonit, izvleček iz izjave družbe Sappi, povzet zgoraj v točki 299, dokazuje, da je bil sestanek okvir za izmenjavo informacij o zadevnih strankah različnih udeležencev tega sestanka. | |
| 303 | Glede izmenjave informacij je treba opozoriti, da jo Komisija šteje za protipravno, ker naj bi pripomogla k sklenitvi ali upoštevanju dogovora o zvišanju cen. | |
| 304 | Več indicev potrjuje trditev, da je bil cilj izmenjave informacij na britanskem sestanku povezan z dogovorom o zvišanju cen. Prvič, iz izvlečka iz izjave družbe Sappi je razvidno, da je na zadevnem sestanku prišlo do poskusa sklenitve dogovora. Drugič, obstajajo dokazi, da so se najmanj od januarja 1992 dogovori o zvišanjih cen sklepali na evropski ravni na uradnih sestankih AEMCP. Tretjič, na sestanku s 14. januarja 1993 so se zbrale nekatere družbe, ki so bile zastopane na uradnih sestankih AEMCP, v okviru katerih so potekali splošni sestanki kartela, ki so se nanašali na dogovore o zvišanjih cen. | |
| 305 | Med drugim je treba poudariti, da je glede na uvodno izjavo 183 odločbe AWA v odgovoru na OU potrdila, da je bil ta sestanek 14. januarja 1993 del „neprimernih“ sestankov med konkurenti (glej tudi točko 164 zgoraj). | |
| 306 | Šestič, glede sestanka s 30. septembra 1993 v Barceloni, navedenega v uvodni izjavi 163 odločbe, je Sodišče prve stopnje v zgoraj navedeni točki 172 že ugotovilo, da je Komisija pravilno ugotovila izvedbo tega sestanka in tudi dejstvo, da je ta bil okvir za izmenjavo poslovnih informacij o individualni prodaji v letih 1992 in 1993 ter za dogovore o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot za četrto četrtletje leta 1993 in o zvišanju cen s 1. januarjem 1994. Poleg tega dejstvo, da so si udeleženci na tem sestanku 30. septembra 1993 najprej izmenjali poslovne informacije o svojih prodajnih povprečjih, nato se dogovorili o razdelitvi prodajnih kvot, se odločili o kolektivnem zvišanju cen in dogovorili o ponovnem sestanku, da bi preverili upoštevanje prodajnih kvot, potrjuje trditev Komisije, da so bile ob določenih priložnostih izmenjane informacije o prodaji in sklenjeni dogovori o prodajnih kvotah, da bi olajšali sklenitev dogovorov o zvišanju cen in zagotovili njihovo uresničevanje. | |
| 307 | Zato je Komisija pravno zadostno dokazala potek tajnih sestankov v zvezi s španskim trgom 17. februarja, 5. marca in 16. julija 1992 ter tudi 30. septembra 1993, v zvezi s francoskim trgom spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993 ter v zvezi s trgoma Združenega kraljestva in Irske 14. januarja 1993. Izvedbo teh tajnih sestankov na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni glede na izjavo družbe Mougeot iz uvodne izjave 90 odločbe, da je bil razlog teh sestankov zagotoviti splošno uresničevanje zvišanj cen, sklenjenih na evropski ravni, potrjuje opis kršitve, ki ga je Komisija navedla v uvodni izjavi 77 odločbe, zlasti dejstvo, da je bilo sredstvo za uresničitev cilja omejevalnega sporazuma izvedba sestankov na različnih ravneh (splošni, nacionalni ali regionalni). | |
| 308 | Glede začetka kršitve je Komisija torej utemeljeno ugotovila, da je v Španiji sočasno, kot je potekal uradni sestanek AEMCP, to je 23. januarja 1992, prišlo do tajnih stikov, ki so imeli enak cilj kot splošni sestanki kartela, ki so bili do septembra 1993 organizirani v okviru uradnih sestankov AEMCP. Na podlagi te ugotovitve v povezavi s priznanji več družb glede njihovega sodelovanja pri evropskem omejevalnem sporazumu od januarja 1992 in tudi trditvijo družbe AWA glede njenega sodelovanja od januarja 1992 na „neprimernih“ sestankih na različnih nacionalnih ali regionalnih trgih, ki so se nanašali na izmenjave namenov v zvezi z napovedmi zvišanj cen (dokument št. 7828), Sodišče prve stopnje ugotavlja, da je Komisija upravičeno menila, da je uradni sestanek AEMCP, ki je potekal 23. januarja 1992, bil okvir za splošni sestanek kartela in možnost za družbe, ki so na njem sodelovale, da so določile začetek kršitve na januar 1992. | |
| 309 | Kot je bilo navedeno zgoraj v točki 272, v skladu z uvodno izjavo 113 odločbe, dokumenti, ki jih ima Komisija, kažejo, da je bilo med januarjem 1992 in sestankom, ki je potekal 14. septembra 1993, osem sestankov AEMCP, katerih natančni datumi so navedeni v tabeli A v Prilogi I k odločbi, vsi pa so potekali v Zürichu. Ob upoštevanju te informacije, ki je tožeče stranke niso izpodbijale, ter glede na priznanja družb Sappi in AWA ter izjavo družbe Mougeot, navedeno v uvodni izjavi 108 odločbe, iz katere izhaja, da so do septembra 1993 splošni sestanki kartela potekali v okviru uradnih sestankov AEMCP, izjava, ki je za obdobje od februarja do septembra 1993 potrjena z izjavami uslužbenca družbe Sappi (glej točko 269 zgoraj), je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila neprekinjenost evropskega omejevalnega sporazuma o cenah od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993, tudi če priznamo, da so samo nekateri od zgoraj navedenih osmih sestankov bili okvir za tajne dogovore o cenah na evropski ravni. | |
| 310 | Zato je treba šteti, da so ugotovitve Komisije, da so se od januarja 1992 in do septembra 1993 tajni dogovori o zvišanjih cen na evropski ravni sklepali na uradnih sestankih AEMCP, ki jim je sledilo več nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankov, katerih cilj je bil zagotoviti njihovo uresničevanje po posameznih trgih, zadostno dokazane. | |
| 311 | Treba je še preveriti, ali je Komisija za obdobje pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 pravilno ugotovila sodelovanje petih tožečih strank pri celovitem protikonkurenčnem načrtu, katerega glavni cilj je bil dogovoriti se o zvišanjih cen in časovnem razporedu za njihovo uresničevanje z izvedbo sestankov na različnih ravneh. | |
| – Sodelovanje tožečih strank na sestankih pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| 312 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da zadostuje, da Komisija, zato da zadostno dokaže sodelovanje družbe pri omejevalnem sporazumu, izkaže, da je zadevna družba sodelovala na sestankih, na katerih so bili sklenjeni protikonkurenčni dogovori, ne da bi ta družba temu očitno nasprotovala. Če je ta sistem sestankov del niza prizadevanj zadevnih družb, ki poskušajo doseči samo en gospodarski cilj, to je izkriviti običajno gibanje cen na zadevnem trgu, bi bilo umetno razdeliti to ravnanje, za katero je značilen samo cilj, tako da bi v njem videli več ločenih kršitev (glej zgoraj v točkah 188 in 196 navedeno sodno prakso). | |
| 313 | Sodišče prve stopnje ugotavlja, da niti družba Koehler niti družba Torraspapel ne izpodbijata navedb iz tabele B v Prilogi I k odločbi, da sta obe sodelovali na vseh uradnih sestankih AEMCP, ki so potekali od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993. Tudi če priznamo, da so samo nekateri od zgoraj navedenih sestankov bili okvir za tajne dogovore o cenah, taka ugotovitev zadostuje, da se ugotovi, da je Komisija upravičeno menila, da sta neprekinjeno sodelovali pri tajnih dogovorih o cenah in s tem pri kršitvi od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993, ugotovljeni v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| 314 | Družba MHTP ne izpodbija navedb iz tabele, navedene v prejšnji točki, da so družbe skupine Stora sodelovale na različnih uradnih sestankih AEMCP, ki so potekali od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993. Ker MHTP tudi ne izpodbija ugotovitev Komisije v uvodnih izjavah od 360 do 362 odločbe, da jo je treba šteti za odgovorno za nezakonita ravnanja družb skupine Stora, je Komisija upravičeno ugotovila sodelovanje družbe MHTP pri tajnih dogovorih o cenah in s tem pri kršitvi od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993, ugotovljeni v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| 315 | Poleg tega MHTP ne izpodbija svoje odgovornosti za kršitev od januarja 1993. S tem ko MHTP ne izpodbija dejstev, na katerih temelji ugotovitev kršitve od januarja 1993 do sredine leta 1995 – s čimer si je prislužila 10-odstotno znižanje globe, ki ji je bila naložena – (uvodni izjavi 456 in 458 odločbe), MHTP priznava izvedbo tajnih sestankov na evropski ravni od januarja 1993 do septembra ali oktobra 1993. Na obravnavi je poleg tega izjavila, da je bil obstoj teh evropskih sestankov omejevalnega sporazuma takrat povsem sprejemljiv. Med drugim je na obravnavi priznala, da je, če izjavo družbe Mougeot vzamemo dobesedno, povsem verjetno, da je bil v tistem času sestanek AEMCP forum omejevalnega sporazuma. Vendar pa niti MHTP niti druge družbe, ki izpodbijajo tajno naravo sestankov AEMCP pred njegovim prestrukturiranjem septembra ali oktobra 1993, niso predložile elementov, ki bi lahko dokazali kakršno koli spremembo organizacije ali strukture AEMCP januarja 1993. Poleg tega MHTP ni zagotovila drugega pojasnila, kot ga je dala Komisija, o kraju in izvedbi tajnih sestankov evropskega omejevalnega sporazuma pred prestrukturiranjem AEMCP septembra/oktobra 1993. | |
| 316 | Družba Bolloré ne izpodbija navedb iz tabele B v Prilogi I k odločbi, da je družba Copigraph sodelovala na uradnem sestanku AEMCP, ki je potekal 23. januarja 1992, nato na štirih sestankih od sedmih poznejših sestankov, ki so bili pred sestankom s 14. septembra 1993. Na podlagi navedbe o prisotnosti družbe Copigraph na uradnem sestanku AEMCP 23. januarja 1992 je mogoče ugotoviti, da je na ta datum Copigraph sodelovala pri tajnem dogovoru o cenah na evropski ravni. | |
| 317 | Čeprav ni zanesljivo, da so vsi uradni sestanki AEMCP, ki so potekali od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993, bili okvir za sklenitev tajnega dogovora o cenah, je iz ugotovitve, da je družba Copigraph sodelovala na petih sestankih od osmih uradnih sestankov, mogoče sklepati, da je ta družba od januarja 1992 do septembra 1993 neprekinjeno sodelovala pri tajnih dogovorih o cenah na evropski ravni. Družba Copigraph se namreč ni javno distancirala od sestankov, na katerih je sodelovala (glej zgoraj v točkah 188 in 196 navedeno sodno prakso). | |
| 318 | Nazadnje, glede družbe Mougeot ni sporno, da ni sodelovala na sestanku, ki je potekal 23. januarja 1992, in da je prvi sestanek AEMCP, na katerem je sodelovala, sestanek, ki je potekal 26. maja 1992. Družba Mougeot se je nato udeležila vseh sestankov AEMCP do septembra 1993, to je šestih od osmih sestankov pred sestankom 14. septembra 1993. Tako kot družba Copigraph se tudi družba Mougeot ni javno distancirala od sestankov, na katerih je sodelovala (glej zgoraj v točkah 188 in 196 navedeno sodno prakso). Čeprav je družba Mougeot na teh sestankih sodelovala kot opazovalka, pa ni dokazala, da je svojim konkurentom navedla, da na teh sestankih sodeluje z drugačnim namenom kot oni (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 188 navedeno sodbo Aalborg Portland in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 81). Iz nobenega predloženega dokumenta ne izhaja, da je bila družba Mougeot v AEMCP težko sprejeta ali marginalizirana. Nasprotno, glede na zapisnik sestanka AEMCP z dne 26. maja 1992 je bilo na predhodnem sestanku odločeno, da se družba Mougeot povabi k pridružitvi AEMCP. Poleg tega je predsednik AEMCP na tem sestanku predstavnika družbe Mougeot prosil, naj svojo družbo predstavi kot novo članico in ne samo kot povabljenko. V zapisnikih sestankov AEMCP z dne 10. septembra in 25. novembra 1992 je med udeleženci naveden predstavnik družbe Mougeot, ne da bi obstajala razlika med to družbo in drugimi. V zapisniku sestanka z dne 25. novembra 1992 je poudarjeno, de je predstavnik družbe Mougeot obvestil udeležence, da bi morala biti njegova družba sposobna dodati svoje številke k številkam združenja decembra, te številke naj bi pokrivale drugo polletje leta 1992. Čeprav je družba Mougeot status članice AEMCP dobila šele leta 1993, njena prisotnost na tajnih sestankih AEMCP v isti funkciji kot druge članice od maja 1992 in predložitev informacij, ki pokrivajo drugo polletje leta 1992, dokazujeta, ker ni nasprotnih dokazov, njeno sodelovanje pri omejevalnem sporazumu od 26. maja 1992. | |
| 319 | Te ugotovitve o sodelovanju zadevnih tožečih strank pri omejevalnem sporazumu na evropski ravni pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 zadostujejo, da se jim pripiše kršitev za to obdobje. | |
| 320 | Podredno je treba ugotoviti, da dokazi o sodelovanju več teh družb na sestankih na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni potrjujejo neprekinjenost njihovega sodelovanja pri kršitvi. | |
| 321 | Komisija tako ugotavlja, da sta družbi Koehler in Torraspapel sodelovali na sestanku, ki je potekal 17. februarja 1992. Pri tem se opira na interno obvestilo družbe Sappi z istega dne (dokument št. 4588), v katerem je opisan sestanek „zainteresiranih strani“. Na podlagi te navedbe v povezavi z navedbami iz istega obvestila, ki se nanašajo na negotovosti, ki jih povzroča ravnanje družb Koehler in Sarrió na španskem trgu, je Komisija ugotovila, da sta bili družbi Koehler in Sarrió med „zainteresiranimi stranmi“, ki so sodelovale na tem sestanku, na katerem naj bi se preučile težave, povezane z njunim neupoštevanjem zgoraj navedenega dogovora, h kateremu sta pristopili kot distributerki ali dobaviteljici samokopirnega papirja na španskem trgu, kot izhaja iz obvestila z dne 9. marca 1992 (dokumenta št. 4703 in 4704, navedena zgoraj v točki 171). | |
| 322 | Ker družba Torraspapel ni izpodbijala niti navedbe iz uvodne izjave 363 odločbe, da je družba Sarrió bila in je še vedno njena hčerinska družba v stoodstotni lasti, niti trditve Komisije iz iste uvodne izjave, da med upravnim postopkom ni izpodbijala svoje odgovornosti za ravnanje družbe Sarrió, ji je Komisija utemeljeno pripisala odgovornost za sodelovanje družbe Sarrió na tajnem sestanku, ki je potekal 17. februarja 1992. | |
| 323 | Glede sestanka, ki je potekal 5. marca 1992, iz opomb 7 in 10 v Prilogi II k odločbi izhaja, da se Komisija, da bi ugotovila sodelovanje družb Koehler in Torraspapel na tem sestanku, opira na interno obvestilo družbe Sappi z dne 9. marca 1992, navedeno v uvodni izjavi 156 odločbe (dokumenta št. 4703 in 4704, navedena zgoraj v točki 171). Vendar čeprav drži, da je na podlagi tega obvestila mogoče trditi, da sta bili ti družbi stranki dogovora o zvišanju cen za 10 ESP na kilogram v začetku februarja 1992 na španskem trgu, pa nasprotno ne vsebuje nobenega podatka, ki bi kazal, da sta sodelovali na tajnem sestanku, ki je potekal 5. marca 1992. | |
| 324 | Vendar pa iz odgovora družbe AWA z dne 30. aprila 1999 na zahtevo Komisije za informacije (dokument št. 7828, naveden zgoraj v točki 163) izhaja, da so bili predstavniki družb Sarrió (Torraspapel), Koehler in Stora (MHTP) prisotni na „neprimernih“ sestankih, katerih del je bil sestanek 5. marca 1992, kot je potrdila družba AWA v odgovoru na OU (uvodna izjava 170 odločbe). | |
| 325 | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da je pet zadevnih tožečih strank sodelovalo na dveh sestankih v zvezi s francoskim trgom. | |
| 326 | Na podlagi izjav družbe Sappi, navedenih v točkah od 276 do 279 in od 285 do 293, v povezavi s trditvijo družbe AWA, navedeno v dokumentu št. 7828, da so predstavniki te družbe med letoma 1992 in 1995 sodelovali na „neprimernih“ sestankih, zlasti v Parizu, na katerih so bili predstavniki družbe Sarrió, je mogoče skleniti, da je Komisija upravičeno ugotovila sodelovanje družbe Sarrió (Torraspapel) na zadevnih dveh sestankih. Dvom, ki ga je izrazil uslužbenec družbe Sappi (dokument št. 15027, priložen v prilogi 1 k OU) v zvezi z vprašanjem, ali je bil predstavnik družbe Sarrió, ki se je udeležil teh sestankov, vodja prodaje te družbe v Franciji ali ne, ne more zasenčiti dejstva, da v nasprotju s previdnim tonom tega uslužbenca, kar zadeva prisotnost predstavnika družbe Koehler na teh sestankih, ne izraža pomislekov glede zastopanja družbe Sarrió na teh sestankih. | |
| 327 | Kar zadeva družbo Stora (MHTP), trditev, ki jo vsebuje izjava, navedena zgoraj v točki 287, da je družba Feldmühle imela predstavnika na sestanku, ki je potekal spomladi 1992, v povezavi s trditvijo družbe AWA iz dokumenta št. 7828 v zvezi s sodelovanjem predstavnikov te družbe na „neprimernih“ sestankih, zlasti v Parizu, med letoma 1992 in 1995 ob predstavnikih družbe Stora-Feldmühle, podpira trditev Komisije, da je bila družba Stora-Feldmühle prisotna na sestanku, ki je potekal spomladi 1992, in torej to, da se družbi MHTP pripiše odgovornost za to sodelovanje. | |
| 328 | Družba MHTP v pisanjih poudarja, da uslužbenec družbe Sappi, ki je vir informacije iz prejšnje točke, trdi tudi, da družba Stora-Feldmühle ni bila prisotna na sestanku, ki je potekal spomladi 1993 v Parizu, medtem ko Komisija trdi, da ima dokaze, ki potrjujejo sodelovanje te družbe na navedenem sestanku. Trdi, da v teh okoliščinah ni izključeno, da se je uslužbenec družbe Sappi zmotil pri identifikaciji francoskega sestanka, na katerem je bila prisotna družba Stora-Feldmühle. Vendar pa zaradi odločnega tona trditve uslužbenca družbe Sappi v zvezi s prisotnostjo družbe Stora-Feldmühle na prvem od dveh francoskih sestankov, opisanih v njegovem pričanju, domneva, ki jo predlaga MHTP, ni povsem verjetna. | |
| 329 | Glede sestanka, ki je potekal spomladi 1993, družba MHTP ne izpodbija svojega sodelovanja pri kršitvi od januarja 1993 in ne izraža nobene kritike v zvezi z ugotovitvami Komisije, ki se nanašajo na sestanek, ki je potekal spomladi 1993 v Parizu, in njeno sodelovanje na tem sestanku. V teh okoliščinah ni treba preveriti utemeljenosti ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem družbe Stora-Feldmühle na sestanku, ki je potekal spomladi 1993 v Parizu. | |
| 330 | Glede družb Mougeot in Copigraph (hčerinska družba družbe Bolloré) se uslužbenec družbe Sappi nikjer ne sklicuje na njuno prisotnost na teh dveh sestankih. Vendar pa je splošna trditev v izjavi družbe AWA, ki jo vsebuje dokument št. 7828, v zvezi z organizacijo „neprimernih“ sestankov v Parizu, Zürichu in Ženevi med letoma 1992 in 1995 med predstavniki družb AWA, Sarrió, Mougeot, Stora-Feldmühle, Copigraph, Koehler in Zanders, dokaz sodelovanja družb Mougeot in Copigraph na sestankih, ki sta potekala spomladi 1992 in spomladi 1993 v Franciji. | |
| 331 | Res je, da ta znak ne more dokazati njunega sodelovanja na teh dveh sestankih. Vendar pa, ker sta bili družbi Mougeot in Copigraph dve od glavnih akterjev na francoskem trgu samokopirnega papirja, sklicevanje na ti družbi v splošni trditvi družbe AWA v zvezi s potekom sestankom med konkurenti med letoma 1992 in 1995, zlasti v Parizu, nujno pomeni, da ju je vsaj vodilna družba na evropskem trgu dojemala kot sodelujoči pri nezakonitem ravnanju na francoskem trgu v vsem obdobju, ne glede na njuno prisotnost ali odsotnost na zgoraj navedenih dveh sestankih. Ta znak sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu na francoskem trgu v tistem času je okrepljen z izjavami družbe Mougeot, da je „od enih ali drugih družb, najpogosteje družbe AWA, prejemala telefonske klice, v katerih so napovedovale podrobnosti o zvišanjih cen po posameznih trgih“ in to predvsem „do sredine leta 1995“ (dokument št. 11598, uvodna izjava 95 odločbe in točka 41 OU). | |
| 332 | Glede sestanek s 16. julija 1992 je g. B. G. zatrdil (glej dokument št. 4484, naveden zgoraj v točki 180), da so bile na tem sestanku prisotne družbe Sarrió (Torraspapel), AWA (g. F. in g. B.) in Koehler (g. F.). Ta izjava, ki potrjuje splošno trditev družbe AWA iz dokumenta št. 7828 v zvezi z njenim sodelovanjem na „neprimernih“ sestankih v Barceloni med letoma 1992 in 1994 ob predstavnikih zlasti družb Sarrió (Torraspapel) in Koehler, dokazuje sodelovanje teh dveh družb na tajnem sestanku, ki je potekal 16. julija 1992 v zvezi s španskim in portugalskim trgom. | |
| 333 | Glede družbe Stora (MHTP) se Komisija, da bi dokazala sodelovanje te družbe na sestanku 16. julija 1992, opira na izjave družbe AWA (dokument št. 7828), v skladu s katerimi je ta med letoma 1992 in 1994 sodelovala na več sestankih v Lizboni in Barceloni poleg predstavnikov družb Sarrió, Unipapel, Koehler, Ekman in Stora-Feldmühle ali nekaterih od teh družb. | |
| 334 | Navesti je treba, da g. B. G. v podrobnih izjavah o sestanku s 16. julija 1992 med udeleženci tega sestanka ne omenja družbe Stora. V teh okoliščinah se splošna trditev družbe AWA morda ne bi zdela zadostna, da se dokaže sodelovanje družbe Stora (MHTP) na sestanku, ki je potekal 16. julija 1992. | |
| 335 | Vendar pa je treba navesti, da kot poudarja Komisija v pisanjih v zadevi T-122/02, iz izjav g. B. G. izhaja, da je bil razlog sestanka s 16. julija 1992 očitno dejstvo, da sta Sarrió in Stora-Feldmühle na Portugalskem zaračunavali zelo nizke cene, nižje od stroška papirja. Kot Komisija pravilno poudarja, je to sklicevanje na politiko zelo nizkih cen, ki jo je izvajala zlasti družba Stora-Feldmühle, mogoče razložiti tako, da pomeni, da ta družba ni ravnala v skladu z disciplino glede cen, ki bi jo morala upoštevati na podlagi tržnega dogovora. Z drugimi besedami, za tako navedbo v povezavi s trditvijo družbe AWA iz dokumenta št. 7828 je mogoče šteti, da dokazuje, da je bila družba Stora-Feldmühle, čeprav ni sodelovala na sestanku s 16. julija 1992, v tistem času stranka dogovora o cenah na iberskih trgih. | |
| 336 | Komisija ugotavlja, da sta družbi Stora (MHTP) in Koehler sodelovali na sestanku, ki je potekal 14. januarja 1993. MHTP ne izpodbija svojega sodelovanja pri kršitvi od začetka januarja 1993. V teh okoliščinah ni treba preučiti utemeljenosti ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem te družbe na sestanku, ki je potekal 14. januarja 1993. | |
| 337 | Glede sodelovanja družbe Koehler na tem sestanku iz izvlečka iz izjave družbe Sappi, ki jo vsebuje dokument št. 15026, izhaja, da je bil po navedbah prvega uslužbenca, čigar pričanje je predmet te izjave, „[g. D.] (Koehler)“ prisoten na vseh sestankih ali delu sestankov, ki so potekali v Združenem kraljestvu na letališču Heathrow ali v londonskem hotelu. Drugi uslužbenec, čigar pričanje je prav tako predmet zgoraj navedene izjave, je navedel, da misli, da se je „[g. D.] (Koehler)“ udeležil sestanka, ki je potekal 14. januarja 1993. Zgoraj navedena izjava in tudi izjava, da je „[zadevni uslužbenec] poleg imen konkurentov, predloženih Komisiji decembra 1996, med udeleženci uspel prepoznati […] [g. K.] iz družbe Koehler“, sta navedeni tudi v dokumentih št. 15176 in 15178, ki ustrezata neki drugi izjavi družbe Sappi. Nazadnje, družba AWA je izjavila (dokument št. 7828), da so med letoma 1992 in 1994 njeni predstavniki v Združenem kraljestvu sodelovali na „neprimernih“ sestankih, na katerih so bili prisotni zlasti predstavniki družbe Koehler. | |
| 338 | Glede na to skupino indicev je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila, da je bila družba Koehler zastopana na sestanku, ki je potekal 14. januarja 1993. | |
| 339 | Glede sodelovanja družb Copigraph, Koehler, Stora-Feldmühle in Torraspapel na sestanku, ki je potekal 30. septembra 1993, iz opomb 40, 42, 44 in 45 v Prilogi II k odločbi izhaja, da Komisija svoje ugotovitve opira na dokumenta št. 5 in 7828. Navedba, ki jo vsebujejo „opombe za spis“ (notes for file) družbe Sappi o tem sestanku, v zvezi s „prijavljenimi“ prodajami ter informacija, ki izhaja iz istih opomb in se nanaša na dodelitev točnih prodajnih kvot za četrto četrtletje leta 1993 (glej točko 172 zgoraj), sta močna dokaza prisotnosti različnih družb, navedenih v točki 1 teh opomb, na sestanku, to je Copigraph, Stora-Feldmühle, Koehler in Sarrió. | |
| 340 | Poleg tega, kar zadeva družbe Sarrió, Koehler in Stora-Feldmühle, sta ta močna dokaza potrjena s splošno trditvijo v izjavi družbe AWA iz dokumenta št. 7828, da so se vodje družbe AWA v Španiji med letoma 1992 in 1994 udeležili več „neprimernih“ sestankov, zlasti v Barceloni, na katerih so bili po mnenju družbe AWA prisotni tudi predstavniki družb Sarrió, Koehler ter njene zastopnice Ekman in Stora-Feldmühle. | |
| 341 | Glede družbe Koehler je treba navesti še, da ima glede na opombo 186 v odločbi Komisija obračun potnih stroškov, letalsko vozovnico in hotelski račun g. F. (Koehler), ki dokazujejo, da je ta bila oseba 30. septembra 1993 v Barceloni. Na zahtevo Sodišča prve stopnje je Komisija te dokumente predložila v zadevi T-125/02. | |
| 342 | Poleg tega tudi ob domnevi, da nekatere od zadevnih tožečih strank dejansko niso bile prisotne na sestanku 30. septembra 1993, informacije, da so jim bile dodeljene prodajne kvote za zadnje četrtletje leta 1993 glede na njihove prijavljene prodaje za leti 1992 in 1993, dokazujejo, da so bile na ta dan del omejevalnega sporazuma v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki je vključeval protikonkurenčna ravnanja, kot izhajajo iz „opomb za spis“ družbe Sappi. | |
| 343 | Nazadnje, kot družba Koehler pravilno navaja v pisanjih, iz Priloge II k odločbi izhaja, da se Komisija, da bi ugotovila sodelovanje te družbe na zgoraj navedenem sestanku, opira na ugotovitev prisotnosti družbe Ekman na tem sestanku. Zdi se, da ta ugotovitev Komisije temelji na izvlečku iz izjave družbe AWA iz dokumenta št. 7828, da je bila med udeleženci španskih sestankov, na katerih je družba AWA sodelovala med letoma 1992 in 1994, „družba Ekman (zastopnica družbe Koehler)“. | |
| 344 | Družba Koehler v pisanjih trdi, da je bila družba Ekman neodvisna distributerka, tako da ni mogoče meniti, da družba Ekman in družba Koehler tvorita en gospodarski subjekt, in zato družbi Koehler ni mogoče pripisati ravnanja družbe Ekman. Vendar pa iz izjave družbe AWA, navedene v prejšnji točki, izhaja, da so drugi udeleženci menili, da družba Ekman na sestanku sodeluje kot zastopnica družbe Koehler in ne kot neodvisna distributerka. Nadalje, v „opombah za spis“ družbe Sappi v zvezi s sestankom s 30. septembra 1993 (dokument št. 5, naveden zgoraj v točki 172) so omenjene „prijavljene prodaje družbe Koehler“. To dokazuje, da je družbo Ekman na tem sestanku spremljal uslužbenec družbe Koehler, kot naj bi to izhajalo iz zgoraj navedene izjave družbe AWA v povezavi z dokaznimi listinami, ki potrjujejo prisotnost g. F. (Koehler) v Barceloni 30. septembra 1993, ali da je družba Ekman sodelovala na sestanku kot predstavnica družbe Koehler in ravnala v skladu z njenimi navodili, kot izhaja iz tega, kako je družba AWA dojemala status, s katerim je družba Ekman sodelovala na tem sestanku. Vsekakor je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila sodelovanje družbe Koehler na sestanku 30. septembra 1993. | |
| 345 | Skratka, Komisija je pravno zadostno dokazala sodelovanje družb Bolloré (prek hčerinske družbe Copigraph), Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel pri kršitvi pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 ter tudi MHTP pred januarjem 1993. | |
| b) Sodelovanje družbe Mougeot pri kršitvi po 1. juliju 1995 | |
| 346 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na očitno napako pri presoji, družba Mougeot trdi, da ni dokazano, da je sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu po 1. juliju 1995. Zanika svoje sodelovanje na neuradnem sestanku AEMCP 2. februarja 1995, navedenem v uvodni izjavi 273 odločbe. Prav tako trdi, da elementi, na katere se sklicuje Komisija, ne dokazujejo njenega pristopa k dogovoru o zvišanju cen, ki naj bi bil domnevno sklenjen na tem sestanku. Dodaja, da trditev Komisije iz uvodne izjave 273 odločbe v zvezi z njenim pristopom k zvišanju cen na italijanskem trgu septembra 1995, ni podprta z nobenim dokazom, navedenim v odločbi. | |
| 347 | Komisija ugotavlja, da je družba Mougeot sodelovala pri kršitvi do septembra 1995. Iz uvodnih izjav 126, 237, 250, 251 in 273 odločbe izhaja, da ta ugotovitev temelji na preučitvi količinskih potreb družbe Mougeot na splošnem sestanku kartela 2. februarja 1995 in na njenem pristopu k dogovorom, sklenjenim na tem sestanku. | |
| 348 | Ugotoviti je treba, prvič, da je Komisija, glede izvedbe in tajnega cilja tega sestanka predložila njegov zapisnik (dokument št. 7, priložen OU, in točke od 144 do 146 OU). Iz tega zapisnika izhaja, da je 2. februarja 1995 v Frankfurtu potekal splošni sestanek kartela, na katerem so se dogovorili o nizu zvišanj cen za različne trge EGP (Francija, Nemčija, Avstrija, Španija, Portugalska, Združeno kraljestvo, Italija, Finska, Danska, Norveška, Švedska, Grčija, Belgija, Nizozemska in Islandija) za role in pole ter o datumih začetka veljavnosti teh različnih zvišanj cen. Ti datumi so bili med 1. februarjem 1995 (10-odstotno zvišanje cene rol in 5-odstotno zvišanje cene pol na španskem trgu) in 1. septembrom 1995 (8-odstotno zvišanje cene rol in 5-odstotno zvišanje cene pol na trgu Združenega kraljestva; 10-odstotno zvišanje cene rol in pol na italijanskem trgu). | |
| 349 | Drugič, glede sodelovanja družbe Mougeot na tem sestanku je očitno, da seznam udeležencev tega sestanka, kot ga vsebuje zapisnik in je deloma povzet v uvodni izjavi 124 odločbe, vključuje g. P. B. (Mougeot). To osebo kot udeleženko navedenega sestanka navaja tudi družba Sappi v izjavah z dne 18. maja 1999 (dokument št. 15200 v nezaupni različici, naveden zgoraj v točki 162). | |
| 350 | Vendar pa je družba Mougeot predložila vstopni kupon g. P. B. za ob 15.30, ki po njenem mnenju dokazuje, da je njen predstavnik zapustil Frankfurt takoj po uradnem sestanku AEMCP, ki je potekal istega dne. | |
| 351 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da iz uvodne izjave 123 odločbe izhaja, da kot navaja Komisija, to ne izključuje, da je predstavnik družbe Mougeot sodeloval na začetku sestanka, ki je bil ob 14. uri na letališču. | |
| 352 | Čeprav družba Mougeot ni bila prisotna na tem splošnem sestanku kartela 2. februarja 1995, številni elementi, upoštevani v celoti, dokazujejo, da je bila povezana s sprejetimi odločitvami in je pristopila k njim. | |
| 353 | Prvič, čeprav bi bilo treba navedbo predstavnika družbe Mougeot na seznamu udeležencev tega sestanka šteti za napako, pa naj bi kljub temu dokazovala, da so za družbo Mougeot šteli, da je sodelovala na tem sestanku ali da je bila del omejene skupine, ki je sodelovala v kartelu. | |
| 354 | Drugič, očitno je, da so na tem sestanku razpravljali o količinskih potrebah družbe Mougeot, kot izhaja iz zapisnika tega sestanka. V skladu s tem zapisnikom namreč „družba Mougeot potrebuje tržni delež“ in „družba AWA bo predlagala, naj se ji dodeli določena tonaža“. Preučitev potreb družbe Mougeot na splošnem sestanku in predlagana rešitev dajeta vtis, da je družba Mougeot še vedno sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu. Ne potrjujeta trditve, da je šlo izključno za dvostranske pogovore med družbama Mougeot in AWA. | |
| 355 | Tretjič, kot je Sodišče prve stopnje že navedlo zgoraj v točki 331, je družba Mougeot izjavila (dokument št. 11598), da je „od enih in drugih družb, najpogosteje družbe AWA, prejemala telefonske klice, v katerih so napovedovale podrobnosti o zvišanjih cen po posameznih trgih […] do sredine leta 1995“. To je bilo torej februarja 1995. | |
| 356 | Četrtič, družba Mougeot v telefaksu z dne 2. februarja 1995 (dokument št. 1378, uvodna izjava 237 odločbe), ki ga je naslednjega dne poslala britanskemu distributerju J & H Paper, navaja, da „[g]lede na to, da se bodo 6. marca cene na trgu [Združenega kraljestva] zvišale za 8 %, vam predlagamo svojo najboljšo ponudbo“. Ta izjava v povezavi z izjavo iz zapisnika sestanka z dne 2. februarja 1995 v zvezi z dogovorom o 8-odstotnem zvišanju cene rol na trgu Združenega kraljestva s 1. marcem 1995 vodi do ugotovitve, da je bila ta družba na dan sestanka zanesljivo obveščena o tem, da je bil na tem sestanku sprejet dogovor o 8-odstotnem zvišanju cene rol na trgu Združenega kraljestva z začetkom marca 1995, in je to zvišanje nemudoma prenesla na cene, predlagane distributerju, ki mu je poslala zgoraj navedeni telefaks. | |
| 357 | Kot Komisija pravilno trdi v pisanjih, je treba zavrniti trditev družbe Mougeot, da ta telefaks ne izraža izvajanja dogovora o zvišanju cene, ampak enostransko odločitev, ki jo je družba Mougeot sprejela pred sestankom 2. februarja 1995. | |
| 358 | Res je, da se navedeni telefaks začne z besedami: „[K]ot sem vam dejal pretekli teden, moramo zvišati naše cene zaradi zvišanja [cene] celuloze januarja“. Vendar pa, kot Komisija pravilno poudarja, iz tega izvlečka iz telefaksa izhaja, da se je napoved družbe Mougeot za družbo J & H Paper v tednu, preden je bil ta telefaks poslan, nanašala samo na potrebo po zvišanju cene. Dejstvo, da je družba Mougeot natančni znesek tega zvišanja (8 %) sporočila šele 3. februarja 1995, daje vtis, da je družba Mougeot najprej nameravala opozoriti družbo J & H Paper na skorajšnje zvišanje cene papirja in ji je nato sporočila navedeni znesek na podlagi informacij, ki jih je prejela o zvišanju cene, dogovorjenem na splošnem sestanku kartela 2. februarja 1995 za trg Združenega kraljestva od 1. marca 1995. Poleg tega je v zadevnem telefaksu navedeno 8-odstotno zvišanje cene, ki se uporablja od 6. marca 1995 na „britanskem trgu“ in ne samo pri družbi Mougeot, kar potrjuje tajno dogovorjeni izvor te odločitve o zvišanju cene. | |
| 359 | Šestič in nazadnje je treba ugotoviti, da se družba Mougeot ni distancirala od omejevalnega sporazuma in torej od odločitev, sprejetih na tem splošnem sestanku kartela 2. februarja 1995. Nasprotno, družba Mougeot ne zanika, da je sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu do julija 1995. Priznava svojo prisotnost na sestanku spomladi 1995, katerega cilj je bil določiti julijske cene. | |
| 360 | Iz vseh teh elementov izhaja, da je Komisija upravičeno ugotovila, da je družba Mougeot pristopila k dogovorom, sklenjenim na splošnem sestanku 2. februarja 1995, vključno z odločitvijo o zvišanju cen v Združenem kraljestvu in Italiji. Dodati je treba, da dejstvo, ali je družba Mougeot izvajala ali ni izvajala teh zvišanj cene, ne more vplivati na njeno odgovornost za kršitev. Dejstvo, da družba ne izvaja sklepov sestanka, katerega cilj je protikonkurenčen, je namreč ne more razbremeniti odgovornosti za sodelovanje pri omejevalnem sporazumu, razen če se ni javno distancirala od njegove vsebine (sodba Sodišča z dne 16. novembra 2000 v zadevi Sarrió proti Komisiji, C-291/98 P, Recueil, str. I-9991, točka 50, in zgoraj v točki 188 navedena sodba Aalborg Portland in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 85). | |
| 361 | Zato je na podlagi ustaljene sodne prakse, navedene zgoraj v točki 186, v skladu s katero se člen 81 ES uporablja tudi za dogovore, ki učinkujejo še po njihovem uradnem prenehanju, Komisija pravilno ugotovila, da je družba Mougeot sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu do septembra 1995, datuma zadnjega zvišanja cen, določenega na sestanku 2. februarja 1995. | |
| 362 | Zato je treba zavrniti tožbeni razlog družbe Mougeot, ki se nanaša na njeno nesodelovanje pri omejevalnem sporazumu po 1. juliju 1995. | |
| 2. Tožbeni razlog, ki ga uveljavlja družba Divipa | |
| 363 | V okviru tožbenih razlogov, ki se nanašajo na napačno uporabo člena 81 ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP ter tudi na napako pri presoji, Divipa trdi, da ji je Komisija napačno naložila globo na podlagi obdobja od marca 1992 do januarja 1995. Trdi, da se ni udeležila nobenega od sestankov, za katere ji Komisija očita, da je na njih sodelovala od marca 1992 do oktobra 1994. Dodaja, da se cene, ki jih je uporabila januarja 1995, ne ujemajo s cenami, ki naj bi bile dogovorjene na sestanku 19. oktobra 1994, tako da ni mogoče meniti, da je po tem sestanku pripadala omejevalnemu sporazumu. | |
| 364 | V zvezi s tem iz zgoraj navedene točke 185 izhaja, da ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi z domnevnim tajnim sestankom, ki je potekal 23. septembra 1994 v zvezi s španskim trgom, in torej tudi sodelovanje družbe Divipa na tem sestanku niso dokazani. Nasprotno pa je treba po preučitvi, opravljeni zgoraj v točkah od 170 do 195, za dokazane šteti ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem družbe Divipa na tajnih sestankih, ki so potekali v zvezi s španskim trgom 30. septembra in 19. oktobra 1993 ter tudi 3. maja, 29. junija in 19. oktobra 1994. | |
| 365 | Čeprav sodelovanje družbe Divipa na tajnem sestanku 5. marca 1992 ni bilo neposredno dokazano, iz skupine skladnih indicev (glej zlasti zgoraj navedene točke od 170 do 195 in od 205 do 215) izhaja, da je bila Divipa članica omejevalnega sporazuma od marca 1992, tako da je Komisija utemeljeno ugotovila sodelovanje te družbe pri kršitvi od tega datuma naprej. | |
| 366 | Glede konca obdobja sodelovanja družbe Divipa pri kršitvi iz zgoraj navedenih točk 162 in 177 izhaja, da je Komisija pravilno ugotovila, da je Divipa 19. oktobra 1994 sodelovala na sestanku v zvezi s španskim trgom, na katerem so bile določene cene, ki naj bi se začele uporabljati 3. januarja 1995. V teh okoliščinah, tudi če bi verjeli trditvam družbe Divipa, da se cene, ki jih je uporabila januarja 1995, niso ujemale s cenami, ki so bile dogovorjene na zgoraj navedenem sestanku, take trditve lahko dokažejo največ, da januarja 1995 Divipa ni ravnala v skladu z dogovorom, sklenjenim 19. oktobra 1994, kar v povezavi z neobstojem dokaza v zvezi s sodelovanjem družbe Divipa pri tajnem dogovoru po januarju 1995 vodi do ugotovitve, da se je sodelovanje družbe Divipa pri kršitvi, kot Komisija ugotavlja v odločbi, končalo januarja 1995. Nasprotno, te trditve ne omajajo ugotovitve, da je Divipa 19. oktobra 1994 na sestanku sodelovala pri dogovoru o določitvi cen in se z drugimi udeleženci dogovorila, da ga bo izvedla 3. januarja 1995, kar izraža njeno pripadnost omejevalnemu sporazumu do tega datuma. Komisija je torej upravičeno ugotovila, da je Divipa sodelovala pri kršitvi do januarja 1995. | |
| 367 | Ugotoviti je treba, da sodelovanje družbe Divipa na tajnih sestankih v zvezi s španskim trgom izraža njeno pripadnost splošnemu evropskemu omejevalnemu sporazumu (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 205 do 215) in torej njeno sodelovanje pri kršitvi, ugotovljeni v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| 3. Tožbeni razlog, ki ga uveljavlja družba Zicuñaga | |
| 368 | V okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na napake pri presoji, Zicuñaga trdi, da se trditve Komisije nanašajo samo na njeno domnevno sodelovanje na sestankih, organiziranih od oktobra 1993 do oktobra 1994. Dodaja, da noben element ne dokazuje njenega sodelovanja na sestanku oktobra 1993, tako da je njeno sodelovanje pri kršitvi trajalo največ pet mesecev. | |
| 369 | V zvezi s tem iz ugotovitev Sodišča prve stopnje v zgoraj navedenih točkah od 161 do 201 izhaja, da je Komisija pravilno ugotovila, da je družba Zicuñaga sodelovala na tajnih sestankih v zvezi s španskim trgom, ki so potekali 19. oktobra 1993, 3. maja, 29. junija in 19. oktobra 1994. Ugotoviti je treba, da sodelovanje družbe Zicuñaga na teh različnih sestankih izraža njeno sodelovanje pri kršitvi, ugotovljeni v členu 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe. | |
| 370 | Glede sestanka, ki je potekal 19. oktobra 1994, je bilo zgoraj v točki 193 navedeno, da je družba Zicuñaga na tem sestanku sodelovala pri dogovoru o določitvi cen in se z drugimi udeleženci dogovorila, da bo ta dogovor uresničila 3. januarja 1995, kar izraža njeno pripadnost omejevalnemu sporazumu do tega datuma v skladu s sodno prakso, navedeno zgoraj v točki 188. | |
| 371 | Glede na zgoraj navedeno je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija v členu 1, drugi odstavek, odločbe utemeljeno ugotovila, da je družba Zicuñaga sodelovala pri kršitvi od oktobra 1993 do januarja 1995. Obravnavani tožbeni razlog je zato treba zavrniti. | |
| II – Tožbeni razlogi, ki se nanašajo na odpravo ali znižanje glob, določenih v členu 3, prvi odstavek, odločbe | |
| 372 | Vse tožeče stranke so predložile predloge za znižanje naložene globe. Družba AWA primarno predlaga razveljavitev globe, ki ji je bila naložena. Njeno utemeljitev je v bistvu mogoče razčleniti na osem tožbenih razlogov ali niz tožbenih razlogov. | |
| A – Tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravic do obrambe in načela varstva upravičenega pričakovanja zaradi nepopolnosti in nenatančnosti OU v zvezi z globami | |
| 1. Trditve strank | |
| 373 | Ta tožbeni razlog je razdeljen na tri dele. Prvič, AWA trdi, da je Komisija določila globo, ki ji je bila naložena, na podlagi več dejavnikov, ki niso bili napovedani v OU in o katerih torej ni imela možnosti izraziti svojega stališča med upravnim postopkom. Drugič, Komisiji očita, da ji je naložila globo, ki je višja od glob v njenih prejšnjih odločbah. Tretjič, trdi, da je Komisija globo določila brez upoštevanja smernic in ne da bi svoj namen, da se bo oddaljila od teh smernic, napovedala v OU. | |
| 374 | Komisija meni, da se je družba na podlagi OU lahko seznanila z dejavniki, ki so veljali za upoštevne za določitev globe, ki ji je bila naložena. Poleg tega trdi, da je ravnala popolnoma v skladu s smernicami. Nazadnje, dejstvo, da je Komisija v preteklosti nalagala globe v določeni višini za nekatere vrste kršitev, ne pomeni, da te višine ne more zvišati v okviru meja, določenih v Uredbi št. 17. | |
| 2. Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 375 | Tega tožbenega razloga se je treba lotiti tako, da se najprej preučita drugi in tretji del, v katerih AWA trdi, da je Komisija, s tem ko se je oddaljila od svoje predhodne prakse in smernic, kršila njeno pravico do zaslišanja in tudi njeno upravičeno pričakovanje. | |
| a) Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja in neupoštevanje upravičenega pričakovanja, ker naj bi se Komisija oddaljila od svoje predhodne prakse | |
| 376 | Glede predhodne prakse odločanja je treba opozoriti, da v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso dejstvo, da je Komisija v preteklosti nalagala globe v določeni višini za nekatere vrste kršitev, ne pomeni, da te višine ne more zvišati v okviru meja, določenih v Uredbi št. 17, če je to potrebno za zagotovitev izvajanja politike konkurence Skupnosti (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 109, zgoraj v točki 196 navedena sodba Solvay proti Komisiji, točka 309, in sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Europa Carton proti Komisiji, T-304/94, Recueil, str. II-869, točka 89). Učinkovita uporaba Skupnostnih pravil o konkurenci namreč zahteva, da lahko Komisija kadar koli prilagodi višino glob potrebam te politike (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 109, ter zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 237). | |
| 377 | Poleg tega v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso gospodarski subjekti ne morejo upravičeno zaupati v ohranitev obstoječega položaja, ki ga lahko institucije Skupnosti spremenijo v okviru svojega pooblastila za odločanje po prostem preudarku (sodbi Sodišča z dne 15. julija 1982 v zadevi Edeka, 245/81, Recueil, str. 2745, točka 27, ter z dne 14. februarja 1990 v zadevi Delacre in drugi proti Komisiji, C-350/88, Recueil, str. I-395, točka 33). Zato družbe, vključene v upravni postopek, ki lahko privede do globe, ne morejo upravičeno pričakovati, da Komisija ne bo presegla višine predhodno izrečenih glob (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 12. julija 2001 v združenih zadevah Tate & Lyle in drugi proti Komisiji, T-202/98, T-204/98 in T-207/98, Recueil, str. II-2035, točka 146, in zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 243). | |
| 378 | Zato se družba AWA ne more sklicevati na dejstvo, da naj bi Komisija prekoračila višino globe, ki jo je uporabljala v svoji predhodni praksi. Poleg tega se zdi, da AWA v repliki prizna, da si na podlagi predhodne prakse Komisije ne more ustvariti upravičenih pričakovanj. | |
| b) Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja in načela varstva upravičenega pričakovanja, ker naj bi se Komisija oddaljila od smernic | |
| 379 | AWA trdi, da se je Komisija oddaljila od smernic, ne da bi napovedala, da namerava to storiti, s čimer naj bi škodovala upravičenemu pričakovanju, ki ga je AWA vložila v te določbe. Komisija naj bi se oddaljila od smernic najprej s tem, ko je prezrla dejstvo, da zadevna kršitev ni imela nobenega učinka ali je imela največ omejen učinek. Nadalje, na podlagi presoje teže kršitve naj bi izhodiščni znesek določila na 70 milijonov EUR, to je na znesek, ki je 3,5-krat višji od izhodiščnega zneska, navedenega v smernicah za „zelo resne kršitve“, to je 20 milijonov EUR. Nazadnje AWA trdi, da bi Komisija morala napovedati, da namerava naložiti globo, katere znesek je bil pred znižanjem, opravljenim na podlagi obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, 2,5-krat višji od najvišje globe, ki jo je Komisija kdaj koli naložila samo eni družbi. | |
| 380 | Opozoriti je treba, da so bile smernice objavljene januarja 1998, kar je po kršitvi, vendar preden je bilo poslano OU, to je 26. julija 2000. | |
| 381 | Po mnenju družbe AWA bi se Komisija lahko svobodno oddaljila od smernic in naložila višje globe, če bi spremenila smernice ali vsaj, če bi tak namen napovedala v OU, česar pa ni storila. | |
| 382 | Vendar pa je treba ugotoviti, da AWA ni dokazala, kako naj bi se Komisija pri določitvi globe oddaljila od smernic. Tožbeni razlog družbe AWA namreč temelji na napačnem razumevanju smernic in tudi odločbe. | |
| 383 | Prvič, glede vpliva kršitve je Komisija v uvodnih izjavah od 382 do 409 odločbe pojasnila, kako je pri presoji teže kršitve upoštevala konkreten vpliv kršitve na trg in tudi dejanski učinek nezakonitega ravnanja vsakega udeleženca na konkurenco. Komisija je navedla trditev o zelo omejenem dejanskem vplivu omejevalnega sporazuma na trg, ki so jo med upravnim postopkom razvile nekatere družbe, vključno z družbo AWA. Nato je Komisija pojasnila, zakaj je treba tako trditev zavrniti. Komisija je torej v odločbi menila, da je kršitev dejansko vplivala, in je na tej podlagi določila globo. AWA torej ne more trditi, da Komisija ni upoštevala vpliva kršitve. To upoštevanje pomeni, da Komisiji tudi ni mogoče očitati, da ni napovedala svojega namena, da ne bo upoštevala neobstoječega ali omejenega vpliva kršitve. | |
| 384 | Ob domnevi, da AWA dejansko izpodbija presojo Komisije v zvezi z vplivom kršitve na trg, se njena kritika v tem pogledu ujema s kritiko, ki je podlaga njenega tožbenega razloga v zvezi s težo kršitve, in bo preučena v tem okviru. | |
| 385 | Poleg tega je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija napovedala svoj namen, da bo upoštevala vpliv kršitve. V OU je namreč navedla, da bo pri presoji teže kršitve upoštevala njen „dejanski vpliv na trg“ (točka 262). | |
| 386 | Drugič, ker družba AWA trdi, da je Komisija prekoračila izhodiščni znesek, naveden v smernicah, je treba opozoriti, da so v teh za „zelo resne kršitve“, kot so „horizontalne omejitve, kot so ,cenovni karteli‘ in kvote o delitvah trga“, določene „možne globe“, ki so lahko „nad 20 milijonov ECU“. Glede na možnost, dano Komisiji, da se odloči za izhodiščni znesek, ki presega 20 milijonov EUR, ni mogoče trditi, da se je Komisija v tej točki oddaljila od smernic. | |
| 387 | Dodati je treba, da se je Komisija pri določitvi izhodiščnega zneska 70 milijonov EUR za družbo AWA oprla na posebno težo družbe in dejanski učinek njenega nezakonitega ravnanja na konkurenco, kot izhajata iz prometa tožeče stranke v zvezi z zadevnim proizvodom v EGP. V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da je Komisija v točki 266 OU napovedala, da bo upoštevala pomen vsake sodelujoče družbe na zadevnem trgu in tudi vpliv njenega kaznivega ravnanja na konkurenco. | |
| 388 | Tretjič, glede višine globe, določene pred znižanjem na podlagi obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, AWA ne dokaže, kako naj bi smernice nasprotovale naložitvi globe v taki višini. Poleg tega je treba spomniti na sodno prakso, navedeno zgoraj v točki 377, v skladu s katero AWA ni mogla upravičeno pričakovati, da Komisija ne bo presegla višine predhodno izrečenih glob. | |
| 389 | AWA navaja splošnejšo trditev, da bi Komisija morala napovedati svoj namen, da bo uporabila „novo politiko na področju glob“. | |
| 390 | Težko je razbrati, v čem naj bi bila metoda izračuna, uporabljena v odločbi, nova v primerjavi s predhodno prakso, če ni to prek uporabe smernic, ki izražajo metodo izračuna, ki se razlikuje od predhodne prakse na področju izračunavanja zneska glob. Poudariti je treba, da v nasprotju s tožečimi strankami v zadevah, v katerih so bile izrečene sodbe, imenovane „Predizolirane cevi“ (zlasti zgoraj v točki 209 navedena sodba Sigma Tecnologie proti Komisiji), AWA ne izpodbija sprememb, ki so bile uvedene s smernicami v primerjavi s predhodno prakso. Zdi se, da v svojem primeru nasprotuje samo metodi izračuna glob, ki je po njenem mnenju v nasprotju z upravno prakso in tudi s smernicami Komisije. | |
| 391 | V skladu s sodno prakso Komisiji ni bilo treba, če je navedla dejanske in pravne elemente, na katere bo oprla svoj izračun zneska glob, pojasniti, kako bo uporabila vsakega do teh elementov za določitev višine globe (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 21, ter sodba Sodišča z dne 9. novembra 1983 v zadevi Michelin proti Komisiji, 322/81, Recueil, str. 3461, točka 19). | |
| 392 | Tudi če bi bilo treba metodo, ki jo je v tej zadevi uporabila Komisija, šteti za inovativno v primerjavi z obstoječo upravno prakso, Komisiji med upravnim postopkom torej ni bilo treba zadevnim družbam sporočiti svojega namena, da bo uporabila novo metodo izračuna zneska glob (zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 207). | |
| 393 | Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da ob upoštevanju diskrecijske pravice Komisije pri nalaganju glob tožeča stranka ni mogla upravičeno pričakovati, da Komisija ne bo presegla višine predhodno izrečenih glob (zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 243). | |
| 394 | Nazadnje je treba navesti, da v tem okviru sklicevanje družbe AWA na sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Sarrió proti Komisiji (T-334/94, Recueil, str. II-1439), pri čemer ta družba navaja dejstvo, da v OU ni bila napovedana povsem nova in bistveno strožja politika določanja glob, ni upoštevno, ker ta sodba ne obravnava vsebine obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, ampak obrazložitev odločbe. | |
| 395 | Zato glede načina, kako je Komisija uporabila smernice, ni mogoče ugotoviti nobene kršitve pravice do zaslišanja ali načela varstva upravičenega pričakovanja. | |
| c) Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja, ker naj bi Komisija globo določila tako, da se je oprla na dejavnike, ki niso napovedani v OU | |
| 396 | Preučiti je treba še trditve, da je Komisija določila globo, naloženo družbi AWA, na podlagi več dejavnikov, ki niso bili napovedani v OU in o katerih AWA zato ni imela možnosti izraziti svojega stališča med upravnim postopkom. AWA očita Komisiji, da ni napovedala svojega namena, da bo povečala izhodiščni znesek globe zaradi odvračilnih namenov, in da ni pojasnila, kako bo upoštevala odvračanje, zlasti na podlagi velikosti družbe AWA. Komisija naj tudi ne bi napovedala, kako bo upoštevala vodilno vlogo vpletenih družb. | |
| 397 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da Komisija v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso, če v svojem obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah izrecno navede, da bo preučila, ali je treba zadevnim družbam naložiti globe, ter če navede glavne dejanske in pravne elemente, ki lahko privedejo do globe, kot so teža in trajanje domnevne kršitve ter dejstvo, da je bila ta storjena naklepno ali iz malomarnosti, izpolnjuje svojo obveznost upoštevati pravice družb do zaslišanja. S tem jim zagotovi potrebne elemente za obrambo ne samo zoper ugotovitev kršitve, ampak tudi zoper dejstvo, da jim bo naložena globa (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 21, ter zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 199). | |
| 398 | Iz tega sledi, da so, kar zadeva določitev zneska glob, pravice zadevnih družb do obrambe zajamčene pred Komisijo prek možnosti, da izrazijo stališča o trajanju, teži in protikonkurenčni naravi dejstev, ki se jim očitajo. Poleg tega imajo družbe dodatno jamstvo glede določitve zneska glob, ker Sodišče prve stopnje odloča z neomejeno pristojnostjo in lahko med drugim odpravi ali zniža globo na podlagi člena 17 Uredbe št. 17 (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Tetra Pak proti Komisiji, točka 235, in zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 200). | |
| 399 | V obravnavanem primeru je treba preučiti točki, v katerih naj bi po mnenju družbe AWA Komisija kršila njeno pravico do zaslišanja. | |
| 400 | Glede glavne vloge družbe AWA pri omejevalnem sporazumu je treba ugotoviti, da je bilo v OU dejansko napovedano, da bo tak dejavnik upoštevan. Komisija je v točki 198 OU namreč podrobno pojasnila „vlogo vodje omejevalnega sporazuma, ki jo je prevzela družba AWA“, medtem kot je v delu OU, namenjenem globi, navedla, da bo individualna globa, ki bo naložena vsaki od udeleženih družb, izražala zlasti vlogo, ki jo je imela vsaka od teh družb v „zgoraj opisanih“ omejevalnih sporazumih. Poleg tega iz odločbe izhaja, da je AWA med upravnim postopkom izpodbijala, da bi imela glavno vlogo v omejevalnem sporazumu, kar dokazuje, da je dobro razumela očitek v zvezi s tem v OU in da je izrazila svoje stališče v zvezi s tem. | |
| 401 | V zvezi z elementom, ki se nanaša na odvračanje, je Komisija v točki 264 OU izrecno napovedala svoj namen, da „bo globe določila v višini, ki bo odvračilna“. Poleg tega je Komisija v skladu s sodno prakso v točkah od 262 do 266 OU navedla glavne dejanske in pravne elemente, na katere bo oprla izračun zneska globe, ki jo bo naložila tožeči stranki, tako da je v tem pogledu ustrezno upoštevala pravico tožeče stranke do zaslišanja. | |
| 402 | V takem okviru AWA ne more razumno trditi, da bi Komisija morala podrobneje napovedati dejavnike, ki jih bo upoštevala za zagotovitev zadostno odvračilnega učinka globe. Ker je Komisija znesek globe lahko določila šele, ko je zaslišala družbe in končala upravni postopek, med upravnim postopkom ni mogla predvideti zneskov glob, ki bodo naložene zadevnim družbam, ali celo oceniti odvračilnega učinka teh zneskov in se izreči o morebitni potrebi po prilagoditvah za zagotovitev takega učinka glob. | |
| 403 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti na sodno prakso, v skladu s katero Komisiji ni bilo treba, če je navedla dejanske in pravne elemente, na katere bo oprla svoj izračun zneska glob, pojasniti, kako bo uporabila vsakega od teh elementov za določitev višine globe. Če bi bila dana pojasnila v zvezi z višino predvidenih glob, kadar družbe niso imele možnosti uveljavljati svojih stališč o očitkih zoper nje, bi to namreč pomenilo neprimerno prejudiciranje odločitve Komisije (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 21, ter zgoraj v točki 391 navedena sodba Michelin proti Komisiji, točka 19). | |
| 404 | Iz vseh teh razlogov je treba tožbeni razlog družbe AWA, ki se nanaša na kršitev pravic do obrambe in načela varstva upravičenega pričakovanja, v celoti zavrniti. | |
| B – Tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti | |
| 1. Trditve strank | |
| 405 | Trditev, da naj bi Komisija v tem primeru uporabila novo politiko na področju glob, je tudi podlaga za tožbeni razlog družbe AWA, ki se nanaša na kršitev načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti. Kršitev načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti naj bi izhajala iz dejstva, da je bila globa, ki je bila naložena družbi AWA, veliko višja od glob, ki so bile naložene ob kršitvi. Po mnenju družbe AWA Komisija ne bi smela uporabiti nove politike na področju glob, ne da bi o taki spremembi svoje politike obvestila družbe. | |
| 406 | Komisija trdi, da je ravnala povsem v skladu s smernicami, tako da ji v tej zadevi ni mogoče očitati, da je retroaktivno uporabila novo politiko na področju glob. | |
| 2. Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| 407 | Opozoriti je treba, da družbe, vključene v upravni postopek, ki lahko privede do globe, ne morejo upravičeno pričakovati, da Komisija ne bo presegla višine predhodno izrečenih glob niti da bo uporabila določene metode izračuna teh glob. Zato morajo navedene družbe upoštevati možnost, da se Komisija lahko kadar koli odloči, ali bo dvignila višino zneska glob v primerjavi z višino, izrečeno v preteklosti. To velja ne samo, kadar Komisija dvigne višino glob, ko izreka globe v posamičnih odločbah, ampak tudi, če se ta dvig opravi z uporabo splošno veljavnih pravil ravnanja, kot so smernice, za določene primere. | |
| 408 | Ugotoviti je treba, da so bile smernice in predvsem nova metoda izračuna glob, ki jo te vsebujejo, ob domnevi, da je ta povzročila zvišanje naloženih glob, razumno predvidljive za družbe, kot so tožeče stranke, v času, ko so bile zadevne kršitve storjene. | |
| 409 | Zato Komisija, s tem ko je v sporni odločbi uporabila smernice za kršitve, storjene pred njihovim sprejetjem, ni kršila načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti (sodba Sodišča z dne 28. junija 2005 v združenih zadevah Dansk Rørindustri in drugi proti Komisiji, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, od C-205/02 P do C-208/02 P in C-213/02 P, ZOdl., str. I-5425, točke od 228 do 232). | |
| 410 | Kolikor družba AWA dejansko trdi, da je Komisija kršila načelo prepovedi retroaktivnosti, ne s tem ko je uporabila smernice, ampak s tem ko se je oddaljila od njih pri določitvi globe za tožečo stranko, je treba napotiti na točke od 379 do 395, iz katerih izhaja, da je treba ta tožbeni razlog zavrniti. | |
| 411 | Nazadnje, kolikor je treba tožbeni razlog, ki se nanaša na kršitev načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti, razumeti tako, da graja tudi dejstvo, da se je Komisija oddaljila od svoje predhodne prakse odločanja, je treba v zvezi s tem napotiti na zgoraj navedene točke od 376 do 378, v katerih je Sodišče prve stopnje predlagalo zavrnitev tega tožbenega razloga. | |
| 412 | Iz vseh teh razlogov je treba zavrniti tožbeni razlog, ki se nanaša na kršitev načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti. | |
| C – Tožbeni razlogi: nezadostnost dokazov, kršitev načel domneve nedolžnosti, sorazmernosti in enake obravnave ter napake pri presoji glede ugotovitev Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem nekaterih družb pri omejevalnem sporazumu | |
| 413 | Družbi Divipa in Zicuñaga predlagata znižanje zneska globe, ki jima je bila naložena, pri čemer trdita, da se je Komisija oprla na njuno sodelovanje pri evropskem omejevalnem sporazumu, medtem ko sta dejansko sodelovali samo pri omejevalnem sporazumu na nacionalni ravni. Ti družbi v zvezi s tem ponavljata trditve, ki sta jih navedli kot materialni tožbeni razlog v okviru svojih predlogov za razglasitev ničnosti odločbe. V okviru istega tožbenega razloga Divipa tudi očita Komisiji, da pri določitvi globe, ki ji je bila naložena, ni upoštevala, da ni sodelovala pri nezakonitem omejevalnem sporazumu niti ni neposredno sodelovala pri sprejemanju odločitev o cenah. | |
| 414 | Glede sodelovanja pri evropskem omejevalnem sporazumu je treba napotiti na zgoraj navedene točke od 205 do 215, iz katerih izhaja, da niti Divipa niti Zicuñaga nista mogli prezreti, da je bilo njuno sodelovanje pri omejevalnem sporazumu na nacionalni ravni del širšega evropskega omejevalnega sporazuma. Zato na tej podlagi ne moreta zahtevati znižanja svoje globe. | |
| 415 | V zvezi s sodelovanjem družbe Divipa pri omejevalnem sporazumu iz zgoraj navedenih točk od 155 do 204 izhaja, da je Komisija zadostno dokazala, kar zadeva španski trg, sodelovanje družbe Divipa pri omejevalnem sporazumu med marcem 1992 in januarjem 1995, ki izhaja zlasti iz njenega sodelovanja na več sestankih, na katerih so se družbe, dejavne na španskem trgu, dogovorile o zvišanjih cen, in na sestanku o dodelitvi prodajnih kvot, ki je potekal 30. septembra 1993. Divipa torej ne more zahtevati znižanja globe, ki ji je bila naložena, zaradi nesodelovanja pri nezakonitem omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 416 | V zvezi s trditvijo družbe Divipa, da naj ne bi neposredno sodelovala pri sprejemanju odločitev o cenah, je treba poudariti, da ta družba ne dokaže, da se je javno distancirala od vsebine sestankov, na katerih je bila prisotna. Družba je torej drugim udeležencem dala vtis, da se strinja s tem, kar je bilo odločeno na teh sestankih, in da bo ravnala v skladu s tem (zgoraj v točki 188 navedena sodba Aalborg Portland in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 82). Kolikor s to trditvijo uveljavlja pasivno vlogo, bo ta preučena v okviru presoje olajševalnih okoliščin (glej točke od 596 do 635). | |
| 417 | Glede družbe Zicuñaga je treba ugotoviti, ali in po potrebi v kolikšni meri dejstvo, da njeno sodelovanje pri praksah delitve trga ni bilo dokazano (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 238 do 240), upravičuje znižanje globe, ki ji je bila naložena. | |
| 418 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da je v povzetku kršitve v uvodnem delu odločbe navedeno: „omejevalni sporazum in/ali usklajeno ravnanje, […] s katerim so se [zadevni proizvajalci in distributerji] dogovorili o zvišanjih cen, dodelili prodajne kvote in določili tržne deleže ter vzpostavili mehanizme, ki so jim omogočali spremljanje omejevalnih dogovorov“ (uvodna izjava 2 odločbe). Pri opisu narave kršitve Komisija v uvodni izjavi 376 odločbe navaja kršitev, ki „je prevzela obliko določitve cen in razdelitve trgov, ki pomenita najhujši kršitvi člena 81(1) [ES] in člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP“. | |
| 419 | Vendar pa je očitana kršitev v izvedbenem delu odločbe opisana samo na splošno, kot „vrsta dogovorov in usklajenih ravnanj v sektorju samokopirnega papirja“ (člen 1, prvi odstavek, odločbe). | |
| 420 | Poleg tega iz odločbe izhaja, da je dogovor o zvišanjih cen „glavni cilj“ (uvodna izjava 77) in „temeljni kamen“ (uvodna izjava 383) omejevalnega sporazuma. Pri opisu ciljev omejevalnega sporazuma v uvodnih izjavah od 77 do 81 odločbe Komisija navaja „celovit protikonkurenčni načrt, katerega cilj je bilo predvsem izboljšanje donosnosti udeleženih družb s kolektivnimi zvišanji cen“, ter pojasnjuje, da „je bil glavni cilj omejevalnega sporazuma v okviru tega celovitega načrta dogovoriti se o zvišanjih cen in o časovnem razporedu za njihovo izvedbo“. V skladu z uvodno izjavo 81 odločbe je bil cilj dodelitve prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev na nekaterih nacionalnih sestankih kartela „zagotoviti uresničitev dogovorjenih zvišanj cen“, „preprečiti odstopanja od skupnega sistema“ in „preprečiti konkurenco pri drugih trgovinskih vidikih“. | |
| 421 | V zvezi s tem je treba navesti, da dogovori in usklajena ravnanja, navedena v členu 81(1) ES, nujno izhajajo iz sodelovanja več družb, ki so vse sostorilke kršitve, vendar lahko sodelujejo na različne načine, zlasti glede na značilnosti zadevnega trga in položaj vsake družbe na tem trgu, cilje, ki si jih prizadevajo doseči, ter izbrana ali načrtovana sredstva izvajanja. | |
| 422 | Vendar pa samo dejstvo, da vsaka družba sodeluje pri kršitvi na svoj način, ne zadostuje, da bi se izključila njena odgovornost za celotno kršitev, vključno z ravnanji, ki jih praktično uresničujejo druge sodelujoče družbe, vendar imajo enak protikonkurenčni cilj ali učinek. | |
| 423 | Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da so v členu 81 ES prepovedani sporazumi med podjetji in sklepi podjetniških združenj, vključno z ravnanji, ki pomenijo izvajanje teh sporazumov ali sklepov, ter tudi usklajena ravnanja, ki bi lahko prizadeli trgovino v Skupnosti in imajo protikonkurenčni cilj ali učinek. Iz tega sledi, da lahko kršitev tega člena izhaja ne samo iz osamljenega dejanja, ampak tudi iz niza dejanj ali celo nadaljevalnega ravnanja. Te razlage ni mogoče izpodbijati na podlagi dejstva, da bi lahko več elementov tega niza dejanj ali nadaljevalnega ravnanja prav tako pomenilo kršitev navedenega člena 81 ES (zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točke od 79 do 81). | |
| 424 | V obravnavanem primeru Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da so bili v okoliščinah tega primera ugotovljeni dogovori in usklajena ravnanja zaradi enakega cilja in tesnih sinergij del celovitega načrta, ki pa je sam bil del niza prizadevanj zadevnih družb, ki so poskušale doseči samo en gospodarski cilj, to je izkriviti razvoj cen. Kot pravilno trdi Komisija v uvodni izjavi 253 odločbe, bi bilo umetno razdeliti to nadaljevalno ravnanje, za katero je značilen samo en cilj, tako da bi v njem videli več ločenih kršitev, medtem ko gre pravzaprav za samo eno kršitev, ki se je progresivno konkretizirala z dogovori in tudi usklajenimi ravnanji. Da gre za samo eno kršitev, namreč izhaja iz tega, da so si vsi sodelujoči pri dogovoru prizadevali doseči enak cilj, in ne iz podrobnih pravil uporabe tega dogovora (sodba Cement, točka 4127). | |
| 425 | V takih okoliščinah je bila družba, ki je pri taki kršitvi sodelovala s svojim ravnanjem, ki je spadalo pod pojma sporazum ali usklajeno ravnanje s protikonkurenčnim ciljem v smislu člena 81(1) ES in ki naj bi pripomoglo k uresničitvi kršitve v celoti, odgovorna tudi za ravnanja drugih družb v okviru iste kršitve v vsem obdobju svojega sodelovanja pri navedeni kršitvi. To namreč drži, če se ugotovi, da je zadevna družba vedela za protipravna ravnanja drugih udeležencev ali da bi jih lahko razumno predvidela in da je bila pripravljena sprejeti tveganje. | |
| 426 | Ugotoviti je treba, da je Komisija pravno zadostno dokazala sodelovanje družbe Zicuñaga pri sistemu sestankov omejevalnega sporazuma, pri zvišanjih cen in tudi pri nekaterih ukrepih za lažje uresničevanje zvišanj cen v vsem obdobju njenega sodelovanja pri kršitvi (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 155 do 243). | |
| 427 | Dejstvo, da je Zicuñaga tako nameravala pripomoči k uresničitvi kršitve v celoti, omogoča ugotovitev njene odgovornosti za ravnanja, ki so jih načrtovale ali izvajale druge družbe in pomenijo različne sestavne dele kršitve. Družba Zicuñaga je namreč vedela za vse te elemente ali bi jih lahko razumno predvidela na podlagi več kot enoletnega sodelovanja na periodičnih sestankih proizvajalcev in distributerjev samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 428 | Glede ukrepov za lažje uresničevanje zvišanj cen zadostuje ugotoviti, da so različne oblike ravnanja, navedene v uvodni izjavi 2 odločbe, vse pomožne narave glede na zvišanja cen, saj je njihov cilj ustvariti ugodne pogoje za uresničitve cenovnih ciljev, ki so jih določili proizvajalci in distributerji samokopirnega papirja. Ugotoviti je treba, da bi lahko družba Zicuñaga, ki je več kot eno leto sodelovala pri navedenih cenovnih pobudah, razumno predvidela, da bodo udeležene družbe poskušale zagotoviti uspeh teh pobud z različnimi mehanizmi, in da je bila pripravljena sprejeti to možnost. Zato čeprav ni dokazano, da je družba Zicuñaga fizično sodelovala pri sprejemanju ali izvajanju vseh teh ukrepov, je kljub temu odgovorna za konkretna ravnanja drugih družb v teh okoliščinah v okviru samo ene kršitve, pri kateri je sodelovala in h kateri je pripomogla (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 149 navedeno sodbo Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točke od 205 do 207). | |
| 429 | Vendar pa je treba opozoriti, da Komisija ni dokazala sodelovanja družbe Zicuñaga pri praksah delitve trga (glej točke od 238 do 240 zgoraj). Čeprav dejstvo, da družba ni sodelovala pri vseh elementih, ki predstavljajo omejevalni sporazum, ni upoštevno, da se dokaže obstoj kršitve, je tak dejavnik treba upoštevati pri presoji teže kršitve in po potrebi pri določitvi globe (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 188 navedeno sodbo Aalborg Portland in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 292). Ker Komisija ni dokazala, da tega nesodelovanja pri praksah delitve trga ni upoštevala pri vseh parametrih, ki so privedli do določitve končnega zneska globe, naložene družbi Zicuñaga, Sodišče prve stopnje v okviru svoje neomejene pristojnosti meni, da je treba globo, naloženo družbi Zicuñaga, znižati za 15 %. | |
| D – Tožbeni razlogi: nezadostnost dokazov, kršitev člena 253 ES, člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 ter načel sorazmernosti in enake obravnave, neobstoj individualne določitve glob, napačne dejanske ugotovitve, napake pri presoji in napačna uporaba prava pri oceni teže kršitve | |
| 430 | Več družb izpodbija presojo teže kršitve, ki jo je Komisija opravila na podlagi elementov, navedenih v odločbi, to je narave kršitve in njenega konkretnega vpliva, ter razvrstitev sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu glede na težo kršitve in povečanje globe v odvračilne namene. | |
| 1. Narava kršitve | |
| 431 | Komisija je menila, da je kršitev prevzela obliko določitve cen in razdelitve trgov, ki pomenita najhujši kršitvi člena 81(1) ES in člena 53(1) Sporazuma EGP. | |
| 432 | AWA izpodbija resnost spornih dogovorov, pri čemer trdi, da so bili omejeni predvsem na razprave o časovnem razporedu in znesku napovedi zvišanj cen, niso pa se nanašali na razdelitve tržnih deležev niti na dodelitev prodajnih kvot oziroma so se nanašali nanje samo neznatno ali zelo neučinkovito. Po njenem mnenju nekatere izjave družbe Sappi potrjujejo, da sestanki niso bili okvir za dogovore v zvezi s tržnimi deleži. AWA dodaja, da omejevalni sporazum na trgu papirja ni bil v celoti institucionaliziran in ni vključeval mehanizma za dejansko spremljanje dogovorov. Zaradi vseh teh dejavnikov naj bi bila kršitev manj resna kot kršitve, ugotovljene v drugih zadevah. | |
| 433 | Družba Torraspapel trdi, da je Komisija napačno ugotovila, da se je omejevalni sporazum nanašal na prakse določitve cen in razdelitve trgov, zato je ta omejevalni sporazum napačno opredelila kot zelo resno kršitev. | |
| 434 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso težo kršitve treba presojati zlasti ob upoštevanju narave omejevanja konkurence (glej sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 22. oktobra 1997 v združenih zadevah SCK in FNK proti Komisiji, T-213/95 in T-18/96, Recueil, str. II-1739, točka 246 in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 435 | Poleg tega „je treba kršitve, ki vključujejo določitev cen in razdelitev trgov, […] šteti za še posebno resne, ker vključujejo neposreden poseg v bistvene parametre konkurence na zadevnem trgu“ (zgoraj v točki 107 navedena sodba Thyssen Stahl proti Komisiji, točka 675). | |
| 436 | Sodišče prve stopnje je pojasnilo pojem zelo resne kršitve zlasti v sodbi z dne 9. julija 2003 v zadevi Archer Daniels Midland Company in Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients proti Komisiji (T-224/00, Recueil, str. II-2597, v nadaljevanju: sodba ADM proti Komisiji, točke od 117 do 131). Iz te sodbe izhaja, da opredelitev kršitve kot zelo resne ni pogojena z obstojem delitve trgov. Nasprotno, za horizontalne omejevalne sporazume v zvezi s cenovnimi karteli ali kvotami razdelitve trgov se predvideva, da ogrožajo pravilno delovanje notranjega trga, zato se tudi druge prakse, ki lahko povzročijo tak učinek, lahko opredelijo kot zelo resne kršitve. | |
| 437 | Niti iz te sodne prakse niti iz smernic ne izhaja, da mora za opredelitev kršitve kot zelo resne obstajati več od teh praks. Horizontalni omejevalni sporazum lahko pomeni tako kršitev, če ogroža pravilno delovanje trga. Dokazano pa je, da so se v obravnavanem primeru zadevne družbe dogovarjale o cenah, učinek dogovorov pa je bil ogroženo pravilno delovanje trga. To v obravnavanem primeru zadostuje, da se kršitev opredeli kot zelo resna, čeprav so se sporni dogovori nanašali samo na prakse določanja cen. | |
| 438 | Podredno je treba navesti, da AWA v resnici ne izpodbija obstoja dogovorov o delitvi trga ali dodelitvi kvot, ampak trdi predvsem, da te dejavnosti niso bile preveč pomembne in da v glavnem niso bile učinkovite. | |
| 439 | Nazadnje je treba v zvezi z domnevno neinstitucionalizirano naravo omejevalnega sporazuma in neobstojem mehanizma nadzora navesti, da se je vzpostavljena struktura izkazala za zadostno, da je omejevalni sporazum deloval več let. Iz več odlomkov iz odločbe izhaja, da so si udeleženci sestankov kartela izmenjevali podrobne in individualne podatke o svojih cenah ter obsegih prodaje in da je izvajanje dogovorov spremljala zlasti družba AWA. Tako je v zapisniku sestanka z dne 1. oktobra 1993, ki ga je sestavila družba Mougeot (dokument št. 7648, naveden v uvodni izjavi 104 odločbe in priložen OU), navedeno, da so se za neupoštevanje dogovorov uporabljale kazni („[G. B.] je izrecno navedel, da ne bo dopustil, da se to zvišanje cen ne bo upoštevalo, in da bo osebno poskrbel za vse tiste, ki ne bodo igrali po njegovih pravilih“). Družba Mougeot, ki je bila pozvana, naj opiše mehanizem nadzora ter pojasni razloge za avtoriteto g. B. in družbe AWA, je odgovorila (dokument št. 11494, naveden v uvodni izjavi 104 odločbe in priložen OU): | „Kolikor vemo, ni bilo pogodb, dokumentov ali pravnih okoliščin, ki bi družbi AWA omogočili, da zahteva kakršno koli avtoriteto. Vendar je imela položaj moralnega in gospodarskega vodje na trgu […] Finančna in industrijska teža družbe AWA je [g. B.] omogočila, da izjavi, da če ta zvišanja cen ne bodo uresničena, bo AWA poskrbela za to, da bo popolnoma uničila trg z izvajanjem cenovne politike, na podlagi katere bo večina ‚obležala‘. Poleg tega je povsem jasno pokazal, kaj zmore, z uničenjem [družbe Binda] v Italiji.“ | |
| 440 | AWA naj bi družbi Mougeot tudi očitala, da ni sledila njenim navodilom (uvodna izjava 143 odločbe). Poleg tega dejstvo, da je tudi družba Sappi pozorno spremljala razvoj cen in kvot članov omejevalnega sporazuma glede na določene cilje, izhaja iz obvestila z dne 9. marca 1992 in obvestila o sestanku 30. septembra 1992, navedenih zgoraj v točki 171 oziroma 172. | |
| 441 | Vsekakor niti iz smernic niti iz sodne prakse ne izhaja, da mora omejevalni sporazum vključevati posebne institucionalne strukture, da bi kršitev opredelili kot zelo resno. | |
| 442 | Glede na zgornje elemente je Komisija omejevalni sporazum upravičeno opredelila kot zelo resno kršitev. | |
| 2. Konkreten vpliv kršitve | |
| 443 | Več tožečih strank (AWA, MHTP, Zanders in Torraspapel) trdi, da je bil dejanski vpliv omejevalnega sporazuma na trg samokopirnega papirja zelo omejen. Komisija naj ne bi pravilno preučila razvoja cen tega proizvoda in naj bi upoštevala samo zvišanja, ne pa tudi znižanj. Po mnenju tožečih strank so bile cene, dejansko dosežene na trgu, nižje od dogovorjenih ali napovedanih zvišanj. To naj bi dokazovalo, da ta zvišanja niso bila uresničena v praksi. Poleg tega se nekatere tožeče stranke sklicujejo na neugoden razvoj cen samokopirnega papirja in na znižanje svojih profitnih marž ali neznatne dobičke. Cene samokopirnega papirja naj bi izražale predvsem razlike v stroških celuloze in povpraševanju po njej. | |
| 444 | AWA je predložila dve izvedenski poročili, ki ju je izdelala družba National Economic Research Associates (v nadaljevanju: poročili Nera). Prvo poročilo iz decembra 2002 je bilo predloženo v okviru upravnega postopka. Drugo iz aprila 2002 je bilo izdelano za sodni postopek. Cilj obeh je dokazati, da cene, ki izhajajo iz protipravnih dogovorov, niso mogle biti zvišane nad cene, ki bi bile dosežene v običajnih konkurenčnih razmerah. Družbi Koehler in Zanders sta med upravnim postopkom predstavili ter na Sodišče prve stopnje predložili poročilo PricewaterhouseCoopers, v katerem je opisan položaj evropskega trga samokopirnega papirja od poletja ali jeseni 1995 do februarja ali marca 1997 (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 101 do 103). | |
| 445 | V uvodnih izjavah od 382 do 402 odločbe Komisija zavrne trditve zadevnih družb, pri čemer trdi predvsem, da samo dejstvo, da so bila zvišanja cen in njihovi datumi napovedani neposredno po dogovarjanjih, zadostuje, da se dokaže vpliv na trg. Tudi če priznamo upadanje trga samokopirnega papirja, Komisija meni, da to ne izključuje, da je omejevalnemu sporazumu uspelo nadzorovati ali omejiti upadanje cen. Po mnenju Komisije primeri razhajanja mnenj nikakor ne dokazujejo popolnega neuspeha izvajanja dogovorov. Nekatera dogovorjena zvišanja so bila preložena in včasih so bila uresničena manjša zvišanja od predvidenih. | |
| 446 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je treba pri določitvi teže kršitve upoštevati zlasti zakonodajni in gospodarski okvir spornega ravnanja (sodbi Sodišča z dne 16. decembra 1975 v združenih zadevah Suiker Unie in drugi proti Komisiji, od 40/73 do 48/73, 50/73, od 54/73 do 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 in 114/73, Recueil, str. 1663, točka 612, ter z dne 17. julija 1997 v zadevi Ferriere Nord proti Komisiji, C-219/95 P, Recueil, str. I-4411, točka 38). V zvezi s tem iz sodne prakse izhaja, da se mora Komisija, da bi ocenila konkreten vpliv kršitve na trg, opreti na konkurenco, ki bi običajno obstajala, če ne bi bilo kršitve (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Suiker Unie in drugi proti Komisiji, točki 619 in 620, sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Mayr-Melnhof proti Komisiji, T-347/94, Recueil, str. II-1751, točka 235, in zgoraj v točki 107 navedeno sodbo Thyssen Stahl proti Komisiji, točka 645). | |
| 447 | Kar zadeva smernice, je v njih v zvezi s tem določeno, da je treba pri oceni teže kršitve upoštevati naravo kršitve, njen dejanski vpliv na trg, če ga je mogoče izmeriti, in velikost zadevnega geografskega trga. Pod naslovom „zelo resne kršitve“ so v smernicah navedeni primeri vrst kršitev in njihovega cilja, ne da bi bil omenjen njihov konkretni vpliv, razen zelo splošne navedbe ogrožanja pravilnega delovanja notranjega trga. V smernicah teža kršitve ni neposredno povezana z njenim vplivom. Konkreten vpliv je dejavnik med drugimi, ki ga je celo treba izločiti, če ga ni mogoče izmeriti. | |
| 448 | Komisija se je pri presoji teže kršitve kljub temu oprla na dejstvo, da je imela po njenem mnenju kršitev konkreten vpliv na trg samokopirnega papirja v EGP (uvodne izjave od 382 do 402 odločbe), tako kot to mora odslej storiti v skladu s točko 1A, prvi odstavek, smernic, če se izkaže, da je ta vpliv izmerljiv. | |
| 449 | Ugotoviti je treba, da konkretni dokazi, ki jih navaja Komisija, kažejo z razumno verjetnostjo, da je imel omejevalni sporazum nezanemarljiv vpliv na zadevni trg. | |
| 450 | Prvič, zlasti iz uvodnih izjav 203, 204, 213, 214, 215, 225, 227, 235, 236, 237 in Priloge V k odločbi izhaja, da so se dogovori o cenah pogosto izvajali tako, da so bila strankam napovedana zvišanja cen, dogovorjena na sestankih. V skladu z izjavami družbe Mougeot z dne 14. aprila 1999 (dokument št. 7649, priložen OU) naj bi g. B. na sestanku 1. oktobra 1993 pojasnil, da „je treba zvišanja cen sporočiti z okrožnicami, s poslanimi strankam, da bi ta zvišanja začela veljati“. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 384 odločbe, so dogovorjena zvišanja torej zagotovo bila podlaga za določitev individualnih transakcijskih cen. | |
| 451 | Dejstvo, da so družbe dejansko napovedale dogovorjena zvišanja cen in da so tako napovedane cene bile podlaga za določitev individualnih transakcijskih cen, zadostuje za ugotovitev, da je bil cilj in učinek tajnega dogovarjanja o cenah resno omejevanje konkurence (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Cascades proti Komisiji, T-308/94, Recueil, str. II-925, točka 194). Komisija torej ni bila dolžna preučiti podrobnosti trditev strank, s katerimi so želele dokazati, da učinek zadevnih dogovorov ni bilo zvišanje cen nad cene, ki bi bile opažene v običajnih konkurenčnih razmerah, in nanje odgovoriti od točke do točke. Zlasti ni bila dolžna ovreči analize v tem smislu, ki jo vsebuje prvo poročilo Nera, ki ga je predložila družba AWA, kot to pojasni v uvodnih izjavah od 390 do 401 odločbe. V nasprotju s tem, kar naj bi trdila družba AWA, Komisiji ni mogoče očitati nobenega neobstoja obrazložitve v zvezi s tem. | |
| 452 | Poleg tega dejstvo, da se navodila nekaterih tožečih strank v zvezi s cenami niso vedno natančno ujemala s cenovnimi cilji, opredeljenimi na sestankih, ne more omajati ugotovitve vpliva na trg prek upoštevanja napovedi dogovorjenih cen pri določitvi individualnih cen, kajti učinki, ki jih je Komisija upoštevala za določitev splošne višine glob, niso učinki, ki izhajajo iz dejanskega ravnanja, za katero določena družba trdi, da ga je prevzela, ampak učinki, ki izhajajo iz celotne kršitve, pri kateri je družba sodelovala z drugimi (glej v tem smislu zgoraj v točki 196 navedeno sodbo Hercules Chemicals proti Komisiji, točka 342). | |
| 453 | Te ugotovitve o vplivu na trg prek napovedi dogovorjenih cen in njihovega upoštevanja na ravni strank ni mogoče ovreči z dejstvom, da dokazne listine, ki jih je zbrala Komisija v zvezi s tem, ne zajemajo celotnega obravnavanega obdobja. Po eni strani iz uvodnih izjav 383 in 384 odločbe jasno izhaja, da je Komisija izrecno upoštevala ta dejavnik, ko je merila vpliv na trg. Po drugi strani je pri svoji analizi vpliva na trg in prek tega teže kršitve upoštevala druge dejavnike. | |
| 454 | Drugič, Komisija se namreč sklicuje na občasne dogovore o določitvi kvot in razdelitvi trgov, ki naj bi bili vsaj delno upoštevani. | |
| 455 | Iz spisa izhaja, da so bile prodajne kvote dodeljene na sestanku, ki je 30. septembra 1993 potekal v Barceloni (dokument št. 5, naveden zgoraj v točki 172), in na sestanku, ki je 1. oktobra 1993 potekal v Parizu (dokument št. 6). Informacije, ki so jih predložile nekatere družbe o svoji dejanski prodaji za leti 1992 in 1993, potrjujejo obstoj tesne povezave med dogovorjenimi kvotami in prodajnimi številkami, izmenjanimi na teh sestankih (glej Prilogo III k odločbi). V zapisniku sestanka z dne 29. junija 1994 (glej zgoraj navedeno točko 175) so prav tako omenjene kvote. Poleg tega iz izjav družbe Mougeot z dne 14. aprila 1999 (dokumenti št. od 7651 do 7653, navedeni zgoraj v točki 165) in njihovih prilog (dokumenta št. 7657 in 7658, priložena OU) izhaja, da so bili dogovori o tržnih deležih sklenjeni 31. maja 1994 na sestanku v Nogent-sur-Marne in 6. decembra 1994 sestanku v Ženevi. Komisija torej upravičeno meni, da te dodelitve kvot in razdelitve trgov pomenijo dodaten indic vpliva kršitve na trg. | |
| 456 | Tretjič, Komisija navaja, da je ugotovitev v zvezi s konkretnim vplivom omejevalnega sporazuma okrepljena z dejstvom, da se je uresničevanje zvišanj cen spremljalo in nadzorovalo. | |
| 457 | Ugotoviti je treba, da elementi, ki jih navaja Komisija v uvodnih izjavah od 97 do 106, dejansko dokazujejo obstoj takega nadzora, ki ga je izvajala zlasti AWA. To izhaja zlasti iz izjav družbe Mougeot z dne 14. aprila 1999, ki so navedene v uvodni izjavi 104 odločbe in so že bile navedene zgoraj v točki 439, da je „[G. B.] […] izrecno navedel, da ne bo dopustil, da se to zvišanje cen ne bo upoštevalo, in da bo osebno poskrbel za vse tiste, ki ne bodo igrali po njegovih pravilih“. Spremljanje ravnanja članov omejevalnega sporazuma, zlasti glede izvajanja dogovorjenih zvišanj cen, je razvidno tudi iz več obvestil družbe Sappi (glej točke 169, 171, 175 in 176 zgoraj). | |
| 458 | Poudariti je treba, da je za presojo teže kršitve upošteven samo obstoj tega nadzora ali spremljanja in da ni pomembno, ali je ta ali ona družba imela prevladujočo vlogo pri njegovem izvajanju. Nadzor izvajanja dogovorjenih cen je bil del načrta, v kateri so privolili člani omejevalnega sporazuma. Družba Torraspapel torej Komisiji ne more očitati, da je te mehanizme nadzora upoštevala na stopnji presoje narave kršitve, saj je bila individualna odgovornost vsake udeleženke preučena kasneje, na poznejši stopnji. | |
| 459 | Kar zadeva zadnji indic vpliva omejevalnega sporazuma, ki ga navaja Komisija in ki se nanaša na dolgotrajnost kršitve kljub nastalim tveganjem, je treba navesti, da ker so zadevne prakse v večini primerov trajale tri leta, ni zelo verjetno, da so proizvajalci takrat menili, da niso učinkovite ali koristne (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. aprila 1999 v združenih zadevah Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij in drugi proti Komisiji, od T-305/94 do T-307/94, od T-313/94 do T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 in T-335/94, Recueil, str. II-931, točka 748). | |
| 460 | Na podlagi vseh teh dejavnikov Sodišče prve stopnje ugotavlja, da je Komisija upravičeno menila, da je zadevna kršitev konkretno vplivala na trg. | |
| 461 | Dodati je treba, da Komisiji ni mogoče očitati, da na tej stopnji ni upoštevala položaja upadanja trga samokopirnega papirja. Komisija namreč to dejstvo navaja v uvodni izjavi 392 odločbe, natančneje v okviru preučitve konkretnega vpliva kršitve, pri čemer jasno pojasni razloge, zakaj to upadanje ne izključuje vpliva omejevalnega sporazuma na trg. Komisija, ki sicer priznava, da je v takih razmerah mogoče pričakovati padec cen, meni, da „to ne izključuje, da je omejevalnemu sporazumu uspelo nadzorovati ali omejiti upadanje cen“. Zato je po njenem mnenju „omejevalni sporazum lahko preprečil naravno prilagoditev proizvodne zmogljivosti povpraševanju, tako da je neučinkovite konkurente ohranil na trgu dlje, kot bi na njem ostali v običajnih konkurenčnih razmerah“. | |
| 462 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da dejstvo, da zadevni trg v zatonu in da nekatere družbe doživljajo izgube, ne more preprečiti vzpostavitve omejevalnega sporazuma niti uporabe člena 81 ES. Nasprotno, nekatere družbe so priznale, da jih je ta položaj spodbudil k temu, da so se pridružile kartelu. Dodati je treba, da slabe tržne razmere, ob domnevi, da so dokazane, ne pomenijo, da omejevalni sporazum ni učinkoval. Kot trdi Komisija, so dogovorjena zvišanja cen lahko omogočila nadzor ali omejitev padanja cen in s tem izkrivila konkurenco. Dejstvo, da je zaradi tržnih razmer lahko prišlo do padanja cen, ne spremeni očitka v zvezi z dogovorjenimi zvišanji cen. Glede dejstva, da je zvišanje cene celuloze lahko spodbudilo družbe k dvigu cene samokopirnega papirja, to ne vpliva na očitek, da tega niso naredile samostojno, ampak s tajnim dogovarjanjem in s sklepanjem dogovorov. Poleg tega bi dejstvo, da je na trgu v upadu, za kateri je bila značilna velika strukturna presežna zmogljivost in na katerem bi pričakovali upadanje cen, cena samokopirnega papirja lahko sledila zvišanjem cene celuloze, lahko šteli prav za znak omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 463 | Kot sklep v zvezi s težo kršitve Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da je Komisija sporne dogovore pravilno opredelila kot zelo resno kršitev. Gre namreč za kršitev, ki je po naravi zelo resna, je vplivala na trg in je zajemala ves skupni trg in ves EGP, ko je bil vzpostavljen. | |
| 3. Razvrstitev sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu za določitev zneskov glob | |
| 464 | V skladu s smernicami bo znotraj vsake od predvidenih kategorij kršitve ter zlasti za resne in zelo resne kršitve „predlagana lestvica višin glob omogočila uporabo različnega obravnavanja podjetij v skladu z naravo storjenih kršitev“. | |
| 465 | Komisija, ki je za podlago vzela promet od prodaje proizvoda v EGP leta 1995, je zadevne družbe razdelila v pet kategorij glede na njihov relativni pomen na zadevnem trgu v EGP. AWA, ki je največja proizvajalka samokopirnega papirja, sama sestavlja prvo kategorijo. Druga kategorija vključuje družbe MHTP, Zanders in Koehler, tretja družbi Torraspapel in Bolloré, četrta družbi Sappi in Mougeot, ter nazadnje peta družbe Divipa, Zicuñaga in Carrs. | |
| 466 | Trditve, ki jih navajajo tožeče stranke v tem okviru, se nanašajo na več dejavnikov, in sicer na izbiro referenčnega leta, upoštevanje napačnega prometa in nesorazmeren rezultat, dosežen z metodo Komisije. | |
| 467 | Preden analiziramo te dejavnike, je treba spomniti na sodno prakso, navedeno zgoraj v točki 376, iz katere izhaja, da ima Komisija na podlagi Uredbe št. 17 diskrecijsko pravico pri določanju zneska glob, da bi ravnanje družb usmerila v upoštevanje pravil o konkurenci. Učinkovita uporaba navedenih pravil zahteva, da lahko Komisija kadar koli prilagodi višino glob potrebam te politike konkurence Skupnosti, po potrebi tako, da jo zviša. | |
| 468 | Poleg tega je ustaljena sodna praksa, da lahko merila za presojo teže kršitve, odvisno od posameznega primera, vključujejo količino in vrednost blaga, ki je predmet kršitve, velikost in gospodarsko moč družbe ter torej vpliv, ki ga je ta lahko imela na trg. Po eni strani iz tega sledi, da je za določitev zneska globe dopustno upoštevati skupni promet družbe, ki je znak, čeprav približen in nepopoln, njene velikosti in gospodarske moči, ter tudi del tega prometa od prodaje blaga, ki je predmet kršitve, in ki je torej lahko znak obsežnosti te kršitve. Po drugi strani iz tega sledi, da se niti enemu niti drugemu prometu ne sme pripisati nesorazmernega pomena glede na druge elemente presoje, tako da določitev ustreznega zneska globe ne more biti rezultat preprostega izračuna na podlagi skupnega prometa (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točki 120 in 121, sodbi Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. julija 1994 v zadevi Parker Pen proti Komisiji, T-77/92, Recueil, str. II-549, točka 94, in z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi SCA Holding proti Komisiji, T-327/94, Recueil, str. II-1373, točka 176, ter zgoraj navedena sodba ADM proti Komisiji, točka 188). | |
| a) Izbira referenčnega leta | |
| 469 | Izbiro referenčnega leta grajata družbi Torraspapel in Divipa. Zadnja meni, da bi se Komisija morala opreti na promet za leto 1994. Več družb, vključno z njo, namreč leta 1995 ni bilo več vključenih v omejevalni sporazum. Družba Torraspapel trdi, da je bil njen promet za leto 1995 izredno visok v primerjavi s prometom v prejšnjih letih in torej ni verodostojno izražal dejanskega pomena tožeče stranke na trgu v obdobju kršitve. | |
| 470 | Opozoriti je treba, da Komisija, kot priznava tudi Divipa, v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodišča prve stopnje ni dolžna izračunati zneska glob glede na težo kršitve na podlagi zneskov, ki temeljijo na prometu vpletenih družb, kajti težo kršitev je treba ugotoviti na podlagi številnih dejavnikov, kot so zlasti posebne okoliščine zadeve, njen okvir in odvračilni učinek glob, ne da bi bil izdelan obvezujoč ali izčrpen seznam meril, ki jih je nujno treba upoštevati (sklep Sodišča z dne 25. marca 1996 v zadevi SPO in drugi proti Komisiji, C-137/95 P, Recueil, str. I-1611, točka 54, in zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Ferriere Nord proti Komisiji, točka 33, ter sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Buchmann proti Komisiji, T-295/94, Recueil, str. II-813, točka 163). | |
| 471 | Iz uvodne izjave 407 odločbe izhaja, da je Komisija uporabila promet od prodaje proizvoda v EGP iz leta 1995 – zadnjega leta obdobja ugotovljene kršitve –, da bi primerjala relativni pomen družb na zadevnem trgu in jih razvrstila v različne kategorije glede na zmožnost vsake med njimi za izkrivljanje konkurence. | |
| 472 | V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da rezultat za družbi Torraspapel in Divipa kljub na utemeljenosti njunih trditev ne bi bil drugačen, če bi se Komisija oprla na njun promet v letu 1994. Iz tabele 1(b), povzete v uvodni izjavi 18 odločbe, namreč izhaja, da bi s prometom in tržnim deležem, primerljivima s prometom in tržnim deležem družbe Bolloré (Copigraph), družba Torraspapel ostala v tretji kategoriji, Divipa pa bi bila še vedno v zadnji kategoriji. Odločbe torej ni mogoče izpodbijati v tej točki. Zato je treba ugotoviti, da ta očitek ni upošteven. | |
| b) Upoštevanje napačnega skupnega prometa | |
| 473 | Družbi AWA in Koehler menita, da je Komisija upoštevala skupni promet vsake od njunih zadevnih skupin, medtem ko naj bi pri družbah MHTP in Zanders upoštevala samo promet zadevne družbe. | |
| 474 | AWA trdi, da če bi Komisija upoštevala samo njen promet, ne bi ugotovila, da obstaja zelo velika razlika v velikosti med njo in drugimi zadevnimi družbami, zaradi česar bi bil izhodiščni znesek globe nižji in končna globa nižja za 141,75 milijona EUR. Družba Koehler trdi, da jo je Komisija, s tem ko ni upoštevala razlik v gospodarski teži skupin, ki jim pripadajo MHTP, Zanders in ona, napačno uvrstila v isto kategorijo kot ti družbi. | |
| 475 | Ker družbi AWA in Koehler grajata razvrstitev sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu na podlagi napačnega skupnega prometa, njun tožbeni razlog ne more uspeti. | |
| 476 | Iz uvodnih izjav od 406 do 409 odločbe jasno izhaja, da je Komisija razdelila zadevne družbe „glede na njihov relativni pomen na zadevnem trgu“, pri čemer je kot podlago vzela „promet od prodaje proizvoda v EGP“. Skupni promet družb ali skupin družb torej na tej stopnji ni bil uporabljen. | |
| 477 | Podredno je treba navesti, da se ugovarjanje družb AWA in Koehler ne nanaša toliko na njun promet, kot na to, da ni bil upoštevan promet skupine pri družbah MHTP in Zanders. Tudi če bi se Komisija pri zadnjih dveh družbah zmotila, se ne more nihče v svojo korist sklicevati na nezakonitost, ki je bila storjena v korist drugega (zgoraj v točki 468 navedena sodba SCA Holding proti Komisiji, točka 160). Trditev, da naj bi bila družbama MHTP in Zanders naložena prenizka globa, ne more privesti do znižanja globe družbe AWA ali družbe Koehler. Tožbeni razlog, ki ga uveljavljata, je torej treba zavrniti. | |
| 478 | Še bolj podredno, ker ni bilo dokazov, da sta bili skupini, ki jima družbi Zanders in MHTP pripadata, vpleteni v kršitev, Komisija utemeljeno ni uporabila skupnega prometa teh skupin. Ker Komisija ni našla zadostnih dokazov, da bi kršitev pripisala navedenima skupinama, so bile tožeče stranke tiste, ki bi morale, če so menile, da vpletenost teh skupin izhaja iz spisa, predložiti dokaze za to (glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. marca 2002 v zadevi ABB Asea Brown Boveri proti Komisiji, T-31/99, Recueil, str. II-1881, v nadaljevanju: sodba ABB proti Komisiji, točka 181). V obravnavanem primeru pa niti družba AWA niti družba Koehler nista predložili tega dokaza. Njun tožbeni razlog je torej treba zavrniti. | |
| c) Nesorazmeren rezultat uporabe metode Komisije | |
| 479 | Več družb trdi, da znesek globe, ki ga je Komisija določila glede na težo kršitve, ni sorazmeren v primerjavi z njihovim prometom, drugimi udeleženci omejevalnega sporazuma ali v primerjavi z zneski, naloženimi v drugih odločbah, oziroma več temi združenimi dejavniki, odvisno od posameznega primera. Metoda izračuna osnovnega zneska globe naj bi tako kršila načelo sorazmernosti in načelo enake obravnave. | |
| Kršitev načela sorazmernosti | |
| 480 | Družba MHTP trdi, da ni očitno, da je Komisija upoštevala njen promet na zadevnem trgu. Komisija naj bi namreč zadevne družbe razvrstila v različne kategorije glede na njihove deleže na zadevnem trgu. Uporaba tržnih deležev za razlikovanje med družbami, vpletenimi v kršitev, pa naj ne bi samodejno povzročila upoštevanja načela sorazmernosti. Komisija naj bi, s tem ko se je oprla izključno na tržne deleže, upoštevala samo relativne razlike med prometom in ne absolutne višine prometa na trgu zadevnega proizvoda. | |
| 481 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je treba težo kršitev ugotoviti na podlagi številnih dejavnikov, kot so zlasti posebne okoliščine zadeve, njen okvir in odvračilni učinek glob, ne da bi bil izdelan obvezujoč ali izčrpen seznam meril, ki jih je nujno treba upoštevati (glej zgoraj v točki 87 navedeno sodbo HFB in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 443, in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 482 | Poleg tega dejstvo, da se Komisija v tem okviru ni oprla izključno na promet na upoštevnem trgu vsake od družb, ampak je upoštevala druge dejavnike v zvezi s pomenom družb na tem trgu, ne more privesti do ugotovitve, da naj bi Komisija naložila nesorazmerno globo. Iz sodne prakse namreč izhaja, da se ne sme niti skupnemu prometu družbe niti prometu od prodaje proizvodov, ki so predmet kršitve, pripisati nesorazmernega pomena glede na druge elemente presoje (zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 303). | |
| 483 | Dejavniki, ki jih je upoštevala Komisija v obravnavanem primeru, so jasno navedeni v uvodnih izjavah od 372 do 408. Vključujejo promet na zadevnem trgu. Poleg tega zato, ker izhodiščni zneski, ki jih je določila Komisija, ne temeljijo na določenem odstotku prometa, kot v zadevi, v kateri je bila izrečena sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags proti Komisiji (T-354/94, Recueil, str. II-2111), ti zneski niso nesorazmerni. | |
| 484 | Nazadnje, Komisija pri določitvi zneska glob glede na težo in trajanje zadevne kršitve ni dolžna izračunati globe na podlagi zneskov, ki temeljijo na prometu zadevnih družb, niti zagotoviti, da kadar so globe naložene več družbam, vpletenim v isto kršitev, končni zneski glob, ki so izračunani za zadevne družbe, izražajo vse razlike med njimi glede njihovega skupnega prometa ali prometa na trgu zadevnega proizvoda (zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 278). | |
| 485 | Očitek družbe MHTP je torej treba zavrniti. | |
| 486 | Družba Koehler trdi, da je Komisija kršila načelo sorazmernosti, ko ji je naložila globo, ki ni sorazmerna z njeno gospodarsko močjo in s koristjo, izhajajočo iz omejevalnega sporazuma. Poudarja, da sta Sodišče in Sodišče prve stopnje večkrat potrdili bistveno vlogo, ki jo ima merilo gospodarske moči zadevne družbe pri presoji teže kršitve. Tudi v smernicah naj bi bil velik pomen pripisan velikosti zadevne družbe. | |
| 487 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da je Komisija zato, da bi upoštevala specifično težo vsake družbe in torej dejanski učinek njenega nezakonitega ravnanja na konkurenco, zadevne družbe razdelila v pet kategorij glede na njihov relativni pomen na zadevnem trgu (uvodna izjava 406 odločbe). Komisija je torej opravila razlikovanje na podlagi velikosti družb. | |
| 488 | Družba Koehler sicer to prizna in hkrati trdi, da Komisija pravilno navaja, da je potreben diferenciran izračun globe, ampak smernic, ki si jih je sama določila, ne uspe prepričljivo uporabiti v konkretnem primeru. V svoji repliki dodaja, da Komisija ni opravila potrebnih razlikovanj, ki naj bi jih zahtevala njena metoda za določitev globe. | |
| 489 | Zdi se, da se glavna trditev družbe Koehler nanaša na dejstvo, da je družinsko podjetje, ki nima dostopa do trga kapitala ter tako glede svoje velikosti in glede svojih sredstev spada med majhna podjetja v primerjavi z drugimi kaznovanimi udeleženci. | |
| 490 | Da bi družba Koehler dokazala kršitev načela sorazmernosti, primerja globo, ki ji je bila naložena, z globami, naloženimi družbam MHTP, Zanders in AWA. | |
| 491 | Vendar pa je treba ugotoviti, da družba Koehler pri dokazovanju vključi v skupni promet družb MHTP in Zanders promet skupine, ki ji po njenem mnenju ti družbi pripadata. Sodišče prve stopnje pa je zgoraj v točki 478 ugotovilo, da Komisija upravičeno ni upoštevala skupnega prometa skupine, ki ji ti družbi pripadata. | |
| 492 | Glede primerjave globe družbe Koehler z globo družbe AWA je treba opozoriti, da je v izhodiščnem znesku, določenem v uvodni izjavi 409 odločbe, izrecno upoštevan relativni pomen družb na zadevnem trgu, pri čemer je za podlago vzet promet od prodaje zadevnega proizvoda v EGP. Tako na tej stopnji izhodiščni znesek globe vsake od teh dveh družb izraža globalno razmerje, ki ločuje njun promet na trgu samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 493 | Komisija nato v odvračilne namene podvoji izhodiščni znesek družb AWA, Sappi in Bolloré, da bi upoštevala njihovo velikost in njihova skupna sredstva. S tem ko Komisija na tej podlagi podvoji globo družbe AWA, ne pa tudi globe družbe Koehler, Komisija torej upošteva razliko v velikosti in skupnih sredstvih, ki ločuje ti družbi. | |
| 494 | Dodati je treba, da preprosta primerjava odstotka, ki ga predstavljajo globe glede na skupni promet zadevnih družb, ne more zadostovati, da bi se dokazala nesorazmerna narava globe družbe Koehler. Določitev ustreznega zneska globe namreč ne more biti rezultat preprostega izračuna na podlagi skupnega prometa (glej zgoraj v točki 468 navedeno sodno prakso). | |
| 495 | Poleg tega te primerjave ne dokazujejo, da osnovni znesek globe, naložene družbi Koehler, ni sorazmeren, ob upoštevanju velikosti zadevne družbe in njenih skupnih sredstev. Tožeča stranka ne predloži nobenega elementa, s katerim bi lahko dokazala, da je osnovni znesek globe previsok glede na njeno specifično težo. Čeprav drži, da je družba Koehler družinsko podjetje, je na podlagi njenega prometa od samokopirnega papirja ni mogoče uvrstiti med majhna podjetja sektorja. | |
| 496 | Nazadnje, Komisija pri določitvi zneska glob ni dolžna zagotoviti, da kadar so globe naložene več družbam, vpletenim v isto kršitev, končni zneski glob izražajo vse razlike med zadevnimi družbami glede njihovega skupnega prometa (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 29. aprila 2004 v združenih zadevah Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji, T-236/01, T-239/01, od T-244/01 do T-246/01, T-251/01 in T-252/01, Recueil, str. II-1181, točka 217). | |
| 497 | Zato je treba zavrniti očitek družbe Koehler, ki se nanaša na kršitev načela sorazmernosti. | |
| Kršitev načela enake obravnave | |
| 498 | AWA trdi, da je znesek globe, naložen v njenem primeru glede na težo kršitve, previsok v primerjavi z zneskom, določenim za druge udeležence omejevalnega sporazuma. Komisija naj bi ravnala v skladu s smernicami, kar zadeva družbe MHTP, Zanders in Koehler, medtem ko naj bi zanjo uporabila stari sistem, ki je temeljil na upoštevnem pomenu zadevnih družb na trgu. | |
| 499 | Družba Zanders trdi, da jo je razlikovanje, ki ga je opravila Komisija, diskriminiralo v primerjavi z njenimi konkurentkami, ki so bile izrazito dejavnejše pri omejevalnem sporazumu, kot so Koehler, MHTP in Torraspapel. | |
| 500 | Družba Koehler trdi, da je splošno načelo enake obravnave kršeno, kadar glede na gospodarsko moč zadevne družbe globa to družbo prizadene veliko močneje kot druge zadevne družbe. Kot družinsko podjetje izpodbija svojo uvrstitev v isto kategorijo kot družbi MHTP in Zanders. Njene trditve se v velikem delu ujemajo s trditvami, ki so že bili preučene v okviru kršitve načela sorazmernosti. Zato je treba napotiti na zgoraj navedene točke od 486 do 497. | |
| 501 | V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso je načelo enake obravnave kršeno samo, kadar se primerljivi položaji obravnavajo različno ali kadar se različni položaji obravnavajo enako, razen če taka obravnava ni objektivno utemeljena (glej sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi BPB de Eendracht proti Komisiji, T-311/94, Recueil, str. II-1129, točka 309 in navedena sodna praksa). | |
| 502 | V smernicah je določeno, da bo pri kršitvah, ki vključujejo več družb (vrste „kartel“), morda treba v nekaterih primerih uporabiti ponderje za zneske, določene znotraj izbrane kategorije, da bi se upoštevala specifična teža in torej dejanski vpliv protipravnega ravnanja vsake družbe na konkurenco, zlasti kadar obstaja precejšnja razlika v velikosti družb, ki so storile kršitev iste vrste. | |
| 503 | V tem primeru je v smernicah dodano, da „lahko načelo enakega kaznovanja za isto ravnanje, če je zaradi okoliščin to upravičeno, vodi k različnim globam, naloženim udeleženim podjetjem, ne da bi k taki diferenciaciji vodilo aritmetično izračunavanje“. | |
| 504 | V skladu s sodno prakso, kadar Komisija razdeli zadevne družbe v kategorije zaradi določitve zneska glob, mora biti določitev pragov za vsako od tako opredeljenih kategorij skladna in objektivno utemeljena (zgoraj v točki 496 navedena sodba Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 220). | |
| 505 | Na tej podlagi je treba preveriti, ali razvrstitev, ki jo je opravila Komisija, upošteva načelo enake obravnave. | |
| 506 | Opozoriti je treba, da je Komisija zato, da bi „upoštevala specifično težo vsake družbe in torej dejanski učinek njenega nezakonitega ravnanja na konkurenco“, v odločbi (uvodni izjavi 406 in 407) zadevne družbe razdelila na pet kategorij „glede na njihov relativni pomen na zadevnem trgu“. Za to je „za podlago vzela promet od prodaje proizvoda v EGP, da bi primerjala relativni pomen družb na zadevnem trgu“. Uvodna izjava 408 se sklicuje tudi na njihove tržne deleže. Razlogi za uporabljeno razvrstitev so torej jasni. | |
| 507 | Ker je na podlagi teh dejavnikov, to je prometa družbe od prodaje proizvoda v EGP in tudi njenih tržnih deležev, mogoče sklepati o pomenu družbe, jih Komisija lahko upošteva v tem okviru v skladu s sodno prakso, navedeno zgoraj v točki 468. | |
| 508 | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 407 odločbe, je Komisija pri določitvi različnih kategorij uporabila številke iz tabele 1(b), povzete v uvodni izjavi 18 odločbe. | |
| 509 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da promet, naveden v tej tabeli, temelji na informacijah, ki so jih predložile družbe v svojih odgovorih na zahteve za informacije. AWA se torej v tem postopku ne more sklicevati, da je predložila napačne podatke. Vsekakor je očitno, da nove številke, ki jih navaja v tožbi, ostajajo v istem redu velikosti in torej ne bi spremenile rezultata. | |
| 510 | Poleg tega v nasprotju s trditvami družbe AWA iz primerjave številk v zadevni tabeli in kategorij, ki jih je opredelila Komisija, ne izhaja, da naj bi Komisija za družbo AWA uporabila drugačen sistem od sistema, ki ga je uporabila za druge družbe. | |
| 511 | Res je, da bi bila uporaba tržnih deležev med drugimi dejavniki za razlikovanje med družbami v nasprotju z načelom enake obravnave, če ne bi veljala za vse zadevne družbe. Vendar pa AWA v tožbi predloži tabelo, iz katere po njenih trditvah izhaja, da „so zneski, določeni za težo kršitve, na splošno v medsebojni odvisnosti s tržnimi deleži udeležencev na prizadetem trgu“. V nasprotju s tem, kar trdi AWA, je bilo načelo enake obravnave torej upoštevano. | |
| 512 | Družba Zanders meni, da je bila predmet diskriminacije, ker je bila razvrščena v isto kategorijo kot družbi MHTP in Koehler, čeprav sta bili v omejevalni sporazum vključeni veliko dejavneje kot ona, ali ker ni bila razvrščena v isto kategorijo kot družba Torraspapel, čeprav ni bilo nobenega objektivnega razloga, da bi bila obravnavana drugače. | |
| 513 | Navesti je treba, da je bil glede na številke, ki jih je upoštevala Komisija, tržni delež družbe Zanders leta 1994 in leta 1995 okoli 12 %, tržni delež MHTP okoli 14 % in tržni delež družbe Koehler okoli 10 %, medtem ko je tržni delež družbe Torraspapel znašal 5,4 % leta 1994 in 6,9 % leta 1995. Glede na to merilo kategorije, ki jih je določila Komisija, torej niso diskriminacijske zoper družbo Zanders niti zoper družbo Koehler, čeprav zadnja trdi, da je družinsko podjetje (glej tudi točko 487 zgoraj in naslednje). | |
| 514 | Kljub temu pa želi družba Zanders dokazati, da je bil njen tržni delež manjši od tržnega deleža družbe Torraspapel na nekaterih trgih, zlasti v Franciji, Španiji in Združenem kraljestvu. | |
| 515 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da se je Komisija pri vseh sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu oprla na njihov promet od prodaje proizvoda in njihove tržne deleže v EGP. Menila je namreč, da je omejevalni sporazum pokrival ves skupni trg in ves EGP, potem ko je bil ustanovljen (uvodna izjava 403 odločbe). Dokazi družbe Zanders torej niso upoštevni, ker veljajo samo za nekatere trge. | |
| 516 | Glede domnevno manjše vpletenosti družbe Zanders v omejevalnem sporazumu, ki jo Komisija izpodbija, bi jo morda bilo mogoče upoštevati kot olajševalno okoliščino na podlagi smernic. Vendar pa je ni mogoče upoštevati na stopnji določitve izhodiščnega zneska glede na težo kršitve, kjer se opravi ponderiranje na podlagi objektivnih meril, da bi „upoštevali specifično težo […] vsakega podjetja na konkurenco“. | |
| 517 | Nazadnje je treba preučiti trditev družbe AWA, da naj bi bila splošna višina zneskov, določenih glede na težo kršitve za ta omejevalni sporazum, previsoka v primerjavi z zneski, določenimi v drugih nedavnih zadevah. | |
| 518 | AWA trdi, da so si, z zelo opazno izjemo zneska, določenega v njenem primeru, izhodiščni zneski v obravnavanem primeru in zneski, določeni za vsako kršitev v drugih zadevah, ki vključujejo zelo resne kršitve, zelo podobni. Vendar pa bi po mnenju družbe AWA morali biti precej nižji, ker dogovori niso povzročili zvišanja cen v primerjavi z običajnimi konkurenčnimi razmerami, udeležencem niso preprečili, da bi ustvarili minimalne dobičke, so bili omejeni na razprave o cenah in niso vključevali mehanizma nadzora. | |
| 519 | Ugotoviti je treba, da AWA s trditvami izpodbija opredelitev kršitve v obravnavanem primeru kot zelo resne in ne zneskov, določenih glede na to opredelitev zelo resne kršitve, ki jih AWA opiše kot zelo podobne zneskom, določenim v drugih zadevah za isto vrsto kršitve. | |
| 520 | Ker je Komisija kršitev upravičeno opredelila kot zelo resno (glej točke od 431 do 442 zgoraj), očitek neenake obravnave v primerjavi z nedavnimi zadevami ne more uspeti, ker AWA prizna, da je znesek tak, kot je bil uporabljen v drugih zadevah za to vrsto kršitve. | |
| 521 | Kar poleg tega zadeva znesek, določen v primeru družbe AWA, je treba opozoriti, da v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso dejstvo, da je Komisija v preteklosti nalagala globe v določeni višini za nekatere vrste kršitev, ne pomeni, da te višine ne more zvišati v okviru meja, določenih v Uredbi št. 17, če je to potrebno za zagotovitev izvajanja politike konkurence Skupnosti. | |
| 522 | Zato je treba zavrniti tožbene razloge, s katerimi se izpodbijajo razvrstitev sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu in izhodiščni zneski, določeni na tej podlagi. | |
| 4. Zvišanje globe v odvračilne namene | |
| 523 | AWA in Bolloré nasprotujeta podvojitvi izhodiščnega zneska glob v odvračilne namene. Tako zvišanje naj bi povzročilo skrajno nesorazmernost globe glede na obseg prodaje, na katero se nanaša omejevalni sporazum, ter naj ne bi upoštevalo teže kršitve, ki se očita različnim družbam, in njihove specifične vloge. AWA tudi trdi, da navedeno zvišanje v odvračilne namene nikakor ni obrazloženo niti v obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah niti v odločbi in ni združljivo z uporabo obvestila o ugodni obravnavi. | |
| 524 | Komisija je v uvodnih izjavah od 410 do 412 odločbe navedla, da zaradi zagotavljanja zadostnega odvračilnega učinka globe meni, da je pri družbah AWA, Sappi in Bolloré „treba zvišati izhodiščni znesek globe, izračunan glede na relativni pomen zadevnega trga, da bi se upoštevali njihova velikost in vsa njihova sredstva“. Komisija je že v OU napovedala, da namerava določiti tako visoke globe, da bodo imele odvračilni učinek. | |
| 525 | Smernice določajo, da je treba „določiti kazen na ravni, ki naj zagotavlja, da ima dovolj odvračilen učinek“. Poleg tega se lahko upošteva dejstvo, da „imajo velika podjetja običajno pravno in gospodarsko znanje in infrastrukturo, ki jim omogoča, da lažje spoznajo, da njihovo ravnanje predstavlja kršitev in se zavedajo posledic, ki izhajajo iz tega iz prava o konkurenci“. | |
| 526 | Treba je opozoriti, da lahko Komisija globe zviša, da bi okrepila njihov odvračilni učinek (zgoraj v točki 196 navedena sodba Solvay proti Komisiji, točka 309). Poleg tega lahko Komisija naloži večje globe družbi, katere dejanja na trgu so imela glede na njen prevladujoči položaj na trgu večji vpliv kot dejanja drugih družb, ki so storile isto kršitev, ne da bi s tem kršila načelo enakega obravnavanja. Tako določanje višine globe je tudi v skladu z zahtevo, da mora biti ta dovolj odvračilna (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 11. decembra 2003 v zadevi Minoan Lines proti Komisiji, T-66/99, Recueil, str. II-5515, točka 284; v tem smislu glej tudi sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 8. oktobra 1996 v združenih zadevah Compagnie maritime belge transports in drugi proti Komisiji, od T-24/93 do T-26/93 in T-28/93, Recueil, str. II-1201, točka 235). | |
| 527 | Odvračanje, kot izhaja iz zgoraj v točki 86 navedene sodbe Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji (točka 106), mora biti hkrati natančno določeno in splošno. Poleg tega, da je globa kazen za posamično kršitev, je tudi del splošne politike za zagotovitev, da bi podjetja upoštevala pravila o konkurenci. Tudi v povezavi z zadevno družbo odvračanje ne sme biti omejeno samo na zadevni trg, ampak mora veljati za vse njene dejavnosti. Bolloré torej ne more zahtevati znižanja naložene globe na podlagi prodaje svojega sektorja samokopirnega papirja in neobstoja mogoče ponovne kršitve v tem sektorju. | |
| 528 | V odgovor na izpodbijanje odvračilnega učinka globe erga omnes družbe AWA je treba navesti, da čeprav naj bi imela globa odvračilni učinek za zadevno družbo in tudi za druge družbe, ki bi jih mikala kršitev pravil o konkurenci, se je v obravnavanem primeru izračunala ob upoštevanju posebnega položaja zadevne družbe in vseh okoliščin tega primera. Če ni nesorazmerna glede na zadevno podjetje, tudi ne more biti nesorazmerna samo zato, ker ima hkrati odvračilni učinek erga omnes. | |
| 529 | Vendar tožeče stranke v obravnavanem primeru izpodbijajo predvsem obseg zvišanja v odvračilne namene v njihovem primeru, za kateri menijo, da ni sorazmeren in pojasnjen. | |
| 530 | Glede domnevne nesorazmernosti multiplikatorja, ki se je v obravnavanem primeru uporabil v odvračilne namene, je Sodišče prve stopnje v sodbi ABB proti Komisiji (točka 162) odobrilo podvojitev globe, ki jo je Komisija uporabila v odvračilne namene, da bi izražala pomen tožeče stranke v sektorju predizoliranih cevi ob upoštevanju njenega položaja ene glavnih evropskih skupin. | |
| 531 | Iz tabele 1(b) v uvodni izjavi 18 odločbe izhaja, da so družbe AWA, Bolloré in Sappi glavne evropske skupine. Njihov skupni promet, ki je v istem velikostnem razredu, je precej večji od prometa drugih zadevnih družb. Iz tega izhaja, da podvojitve globe za družbi AWA in Bolloré ni mogoče šteti za nesorazmerne glede na položaj njune skupine. | |
| 532 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da v nasprotju z domnevo družb AWA in Bolloré, da naj bi se Komisija pri zvišanju v odvračilne namene oprla na svetovni promet njune skupine, multiplikator ni bil izračunan po matematični formuli in ni sorazmeren s skupnim prometom tožeče stranke (v tem smislu glej sodbo ABB proti Komisiji, točka 180). Če namreč po pomembnosti primerjamo skupni promet družb AWA, Bolloré in Torraspapel iz tabele 1(b), ugotovimo, da je promet družb Bolloré in AWA med petkrat in sedemkrat večji od prometa družbe Torraspapel, medtem ko je Komisija uporabila le multiplikator 2, pri čemer ni razlikovala med družbama AWA in Bolloré. | |
| 533 | V zvezi s trditvijo, da naj bi bilo tako zvišanje v očitnem nesorazmerju s prometom, na kateri se nanaša kršitev, je treba navesti, da je bil izhodiščni znesek globe glede na težo kršitve izračunan na podlagi prometa iz prodaje proizvoda na zadevnem trgu. To dejstvo je Komisija torej na začetku vsekakor upoštevala. Namen zvišanja v odvračilne namene je, da se v poznejši fazi upoštevajo velikost in vsa sredstva družbe. | |
| 534 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da lahko Komisija upošteva ves promet družbe, ki je, čeprav je približen in ni popoln, pokazatelj njene velikosti in gospodarske moči, kot tudi delež tega prometa, ki se nanaša na blago, ki je predmet kršitve (zgoraj v točki 86 navedena sodba Musique diffusion française in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 121). | |
| 535 | Kljub temu AWA Komisiji očita, da je že pri določitvi izhodiščnega zneska zaradi pomena tožeče stranke na trgu samokopirnega papirja uporabila multiplikator 3,5, nato pa iz naslova odvračanja še multiplikator 2. | |
| 536 | Kot je bilo že navedeno, obe zvišanji ne upoštevata enakih dejstev. Prvo se nanaša na pomen družbe na trgu zadevnega proizvoda, drugo pa na vse dejavnosti družbe ali skupine, katere del je, da bi se upoštevala vsa njena sredstva. | |
| 537 | V zvezi z nepojasnjenostjo zvišanja v odvračilne namene je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija v odločbi navedla, da je v primeru družb AWA, Sappi in Bolloré „treba zvišati izhodiščni znesek globe, izračunan glede na relativni pomen zadevnega trga, da bi se upoštevali njihova velikost in vsa njihova sredstva“. V nasprotju s trditvami družbe AWA je zadevno zvišanje torej ustrezno obrazloženo. | |
| 538 | Vendar AWA nasprotuje temu, da bi se v odvračilne namene upoštevali velikost družbe in vsa njena sredstva. Kot trdi, bi se po razumni ekonomski teoriji odvračanja globe morale določiti glede na pričakovane dobičke zaradi kršitve na zadevnem trgu in glede na verjetnost njenega odkritja. Po njenem mnenju vprašanje odvračanja nima razumne povezave s prometom skupine v svetovnem merilu neke družbe. | |
| 539 | Glede upoštevanja velikosti in vseh sredstev zadevnih družb Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da Komisija ni napačno presodila, da imajo velike družbe na splošno na voljo več sredstev za seznanjanje z zahtevami in s posledicami prava o konkurenci kot manjše družbe (sodba ABB proti Komisiji, točka 169). | |
| 540 | Še več, ker je upoštevanje odvračilnega učinka globe eden od dejavnikov, ki jih je v skladu s sodno prakso treba upoštevati pri določanju teže kršitve, AWA Komisiji ne more očitati, da je pri določitvi izhodiščnega zneska, ki bi ustrezal teži njene kršitve, upoštevala odvračilni učinek glob. Upoštevanje odvračilnega učinka glob je namreč sestavni del ponderiranja glob glede na težo kršitve (sodba ABB proti Komisiji, točka 167). AWA torej neutemeljeno trdi, da bi morala Komisija uporabiti zvišanje v odvračilne učinke šele na zadnji stopnji izračuna globe. | |
| 541 | V zvezi z domnevno nezdružljivostjo zvišanja v odvračilne namene z uporabo obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, je treba poudariti, da se ta koraka jasno razlikujeta in da hkratne uporabe teh dveh elementov ni mogoče obravnavati kot kontradiktorne. Zvišanje globe v odvračilne namene spada namreč v fazo izračuna globe za storjeno kršitev. Po določitvi tega zneska je namen uporabe obvestila o ugodni obravnavi nagraditi družbe, ki so se odločile sodelovati s Komisijo. V nasprotju s trditvijo družbe AWA dejstvo, da se neka družba odloči sodelovati pri preiskavi, da bi dosegla znižanje globe, ki ji je bila v okviru tega naložena, nikakor ne zagotavlja, da se bo v prihodnje vzdržala podobne kršitve. | |
| 542 | Elemente, ki bi lahko povzročili znižanje globe za neko družbo na podlagi zanjo značilnih olajševalnih okoliščin, je treba, kadar je to primerno, upoštevati v okviru preučitve olajševalnih okoliščin in ne v fazi zvišanja v odvračilne namene. To velja na primer za vlogo slednika, ki jo je domnevno imela družba Copigraph (Bolloré), in njeno odpravo kršitve pred začetkom preiskave. | |
| 543 | Nazadnje je treba pred dokončno preučitvijo trditev tožečih strank, povezanih z zvišanjem globe v odvračilne namene, v zvezi s tem ponovno opozoriti na neenako obravnavanje, ki naj bi po mnenju nekaterih družb izhajalo iz dejstva, da se je v njihovem primeru upošteval promet skupine, katere del so, medtem ko Komisija pri drugih udeleženkah omejevalnega sporazuma tega ni upoštevala. Ker Komisija trdi, da želi v okviru zvišanja glob v odvračilne namene upoštevati velikost in vsa sredstva zadevnih družb (uvodna izjava 411 odločbe), je lahko vprašanje, ali je družba del skupine ali ne, odločilnega pomena. | |
| 544 | V zvezi z družbo AWA je treba opozoriti, da je matična družba skupine neposredno in neodvisno sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu, ne da bi bilo to v preostalem izpodbijano, zato se je upravičeno upošteval promet skupine. | |
| 545 | V zvezi z družbo Bolloré je Sodišče prve stopnje v zgoraj navedenih točkah od 66 do 81 menilo, da je treba zavrniti očitek v zvezi z neposredno vpletenostjo družbe Bolloré, saj se na podlagi OU ni mogla seznaniti s tem očitkom in si v tej točki zagotoviti obrambe. Kljub temu je Sodišče prve stopnje po preučitvi položaja družbe Bolloré (glej točke od 129 do 150 zgoraj) menilo, da je Komisija upravičeno ocenila, da mora navedena družba odgovarjati za sodelovanje svoje hčerinske družbe Copigraph pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 546 | Iz tega izhaja, da se je obe družbi lahko štelo za solidarno odgovorni za ravnanje, ki se jima je očitalo, saj je bilo dejanja ene mogoče pripisati drugi (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 87 navedeno sodbo HFB in drugi proti Komisiji, točke 54, 524 in 525). Treba je poudariti, da je iz tabele 1(b) v uvodni izjavi 18 odločbe razvidno, da je promet v zvezi s samokopirnim papirjem, ki se je upošteval za družbo Bolloré, promet družbe Copigraph, saj je samo slednja imela tak promet. Komisija je torej pravilno določila izhodiščni znesek globe za družbo Bolloré ob upoštevanju prometa družbe Copigraph. Ker sta Copigraph in Bolloré isto podjetje v smislu člena 81 ES, so se zaradi zagotavljanja zadostnega odvračilnega učinka torej upravičeno upoštevala vsa sredstva skupine. | |
| 547 | Na podlagi te analize je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija za družbi AWA in Bolloré utemeljeno zvišala izhodiščni znesek globe, da bi jima zagotovila zadosten odvračilni učinek. | |
| 548 | Poleg tega je Komisija pri svetovnem prometu družbe Bolloré upravičeno uporabila zgornjo mejo 10 % prometa, določeno v členu 15(2) Uredbe št. 17. To zgornjo mejo je namreč treba izračunati na podlagi skupnega prometa vseh družb, ki sestavljajo gospodarski subjekt, ki deluje kot „podjetje“ v smislu člena 81 ES (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 87 navedeno sodbo HFB in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 528). | |
| 549 | Zato je treba zavrniti vse tožbene razloge, ki se nanašajo na nezadostne dokaze, kršitev člena 253 ES, člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 in načela sorazmernosti, enakega obravnavanja, neobstoj posamičnega določanja glob, napačne ugotovitve dejanskega stanja, napake pri presoji in napačno uporabo prava pri presoji teže kršitve. | |
| E – Tožbeni razlogi v zvezi s trajanjem kršitve | |
| 550 | Treba je opozoriti, da je v skladu s členom 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 trajanje kršitve eden od dejavnikov, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri določitvi globe za podjetja, ki kršijo pravila o konkurenci. | |
| 551 | V zvezi z dejavnikom trajanja kršitve smernice razlikujejo med kratkotrajnimi kršitvami (na splošno trajajo manj kot eno leto), pri katerih se izhodiščni znesek, določen v skladu s težo kršitve, ne poveča, srednjetrajnimi kršitvami (na splošno trajajo od enega leta do petih let), pri katerih se ta znesek lahko poveča do 50 %, in dolgotrajne kršitve (na splošno trajajo več kot pet let), pri katerih se ta znesek lahko poveča letno za 10 % (točka 1 B, prvi odstavek, prva, druga in tretja alinea). | |
| 552 | Komisija v uvodnih izjavah od 414 do 416 odločbe navaja: | „414. | […] [K]ršitev je bila za vse zadevne družbe srednjetrajna (od enega do petih let). | 415. | Kršitev družb AWA, Copigraph (Bolloré), Koehler, Sappi, MHTP (Stora), Torraspapel in Zanders je trajala tri leta in devet mesecev. Izhodiščni zneski, določeni na podlagi teže kršitve, […] se torej za vsako družbo skupaj povečajo za 35 %. | 416. | Pri družbah Mougeot, Carrs, Divipa in Zicuñaga je kršitev trajala od enega leta in štirih mesecev do treh let in petih mesecev. Izhodiščni zneski, določeni na podlagi teže kršitve, se torej za družbo Mougeot povečajo za 30 %, za družbo Carrs za 25 %, za družbo Divipa za 25 % in za družbo Zicuñaga za 10 %.“ | |
| 553 | Več tožečih strank je izpodbijalo ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi s trajanjem njihove kršitve. V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti na zgoraj navedene točke od 256 do 371, iz katerih izhaja, da so zvišanja, ki jih je Komisija uporabila zaradi trajanja kršitve, utemeljena. | |
| 554 | Poleg tega AWA v zvezi z zvišanjem zaradi trajanja kršitve trdi, da Komisija zvišanja globe zaradi trajanja kršitve ni uporabila za izhodiščni znesek globe, kot je bilo navedeno v uvodni izjavi 415 odločbe, ampak za dvakratnik tega zneska. | |
| 555 | Drži, da je v uvodni izjavi 415 odločbe sklicevanje na „izhodiščne zneske, določene na podlagi teže kršitve,“ in da je v oklepaju dodano sklicevanje na uvodno izjavo 409, ki vsebuje izhodiščne zneske glob, določene glede na težo kršitve pred zvišanjem v odvračilne namene. | |
| 556 | Komisija priznava, da gre za tipkarsko napako in da bi se morala sklicevati na uvodno izjavo 412, v kateri je naveden znesek, ki vključuje zvišanje v odvračilne namene. | |
| 557 | Končni rezultat je vsekakor enak. Zaradi doslednosti odločbe bi se bilo seveda bolje sklicevati na izhodiščni znesek, ki je bil že povečan v odvračilne namene. Vendar rezultat ne bi bil drugačen, če bi izračun izvedli v obratnem vrstnem redu, to je če bi izhodiščni znesek v višini 70 milijonov EUR zaradi trajanja kršitve povečali za 35 %, nato pa ga podvojili v odvračilne namene. Osnovni znesek globe za družbo AWA bi bil enak, kot je naveden v uvodni izjavi 417. | |
| 558 | Zato je treba zavrniti tožbene razloge v zvezi s trajanjem kršitve. | |
| F – Tožbeni razlog: kršitev načel sorazmernosti in enakega obravnavanja ter napačna presoja dejanskega stanja | |
| 559 | Zaradi obteževalnega dejavnika, ki ga predstavlja vloga vodje pri kršitvi, je Komisija za 50 % povečala osnovni znesek globe za družbo AWA (uvodna izjava 424 odločbe). | |
| 560 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da je upoštevanje vloge vodje v skladu s sodno prakso in smernicami. | |
| 561 | Iz sodne prakse izhaja, da je treba, če kršitev stori več družb, pri določitvi glob preučiti relativno težo sodelovanja vsake izmed njih (zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Suiker Unie in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 623), kar zlasti pomeni, da se ugotovi njihova posamična vloga med trajanjem sodelovanja pri kršitvi (zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točka 150, in sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 17. decembra 1991 v zadevi Enichem Anic proti Komisiji, T-6/89, Recueil, str. II-1623, točka 264). Iz tega zlasti izhaja, da je treba vlogo „vodje“, ki jo ima v okviru kartela ena ali več družb, upoštevati pri izračunu globe, saj morajo družbe, če so imele tako vlogo, zato v primerjavi z drugimi družbami nositi posebno odgovornost (zgoraj v točki 121 navedena sodba IAZ in drugi proti Komisiji, točki 57 in 58, sodba z dne 16. novembra 2000 v zadevi Finnboard proti Komisiji, C-298/98 P, Recueil, str. I-10157, točka 45, in zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Mayr-Melnhof proti Komisiji, točka 291). V skladu s temi načeli je v točki 2 smernic pod obteževalnimi okoliščinami naveden neizčrpen seznam okoliščin, zaradi katerih se lahko osnovni znesek globe poveča in med katerimi je zlasti „vloga vodje ali pobudnika kršitve“ (sodba ADM proti Komisiji, točke od 238 do 240). | |
| 562 | Vendar AWA trdi, da dokazov o njenem vodilnem položaju pri kršitvi ni ali da jih je malo ter da 50-odstotno zvišanje globe vsekakor ni sorazmerno in je v nasprotju z načelom enakega obravnavanja glede na druge družbe, ki so imele vodilno vlogo pri kršitvi. | |
| 1. Napačna presoja dejanskega stanja | |
| 563 | V uvodnih izjavah 418 in 419 odločbe je navedeno, da več elementov potrjuje, da je imela AWA vlogo vodje pri kršitvi, med njimi so zlasti sklicevanje in vodenje nekaterih sestankov, njena vloga pobudnice prestrukturiranja omejevalnega sporazuma, sprožitev zvišanja cen in nadzor nad izvajanjem omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 564 | AWA po točkah odgovarja na vsako od teh trditev. Dejstvo, da je prevzela skrb za praktično organizacijo nekaterih sestankov, naj še ne bi pomenilo, da je bila vodja omejevalnega sporazuma, zlasti ker naj bi druga podjetja poskrbela za rezervacijo prostorov za generalne ali lokalne sestanke kartela. Če ob pomanjkanju natančnejših navedb domnevamo, da je treba njeno zatrjevano vlogo pobudnice pripisati funkciji v AEMCP, ki jo je tedaj opravljal g. B., AWA trdi, da navedena funkcija ne more biti dokaz za kakršno koli vodenje z njene strani. Za domnevna zvišanja cen, ki naj bi jih sprožila, naj ne bi bilo nikakršnih dokazov in naj bi temeljila na izjavah družbe Mougeot, ki naj ne bi bile zanesljive. AWA naj ne bi bila edina napovedala zvišanj cen, dejstvo, da je to storila prva, pa naj bi pojasnjeval njen vodilni položaj na trgu, ta pa naj ne bi bil sporen in naj ne bi pomenil, da je imela vodilno vlogo pri kršitvi. AWA zanika, da bi pritiskala na katerega koli od proizvajalcev, in obstajali naj ne bi nikakršni dokazi o tem, da je dejansko izrabila svoj vodilni položaj na trgu, da bi dosegla upoštevanje dogovorov, ali vsaj dokazi o grožnjah v tem smislu. Tudi če bi izjave družbe Mougeot sprejeli za resnične, naj bi dokazovale le to, da je AWA včasih uporabila ostre besede do nekaterih proizvajalcev. | |
| 565 | Treba je navesti, da AWA nekaterih elementov ne izpodbija kot takih, temveč samo njihovo razlago, kakor jo navaja Komisija. Tako AWA ne zanika, da je poskrbela za praktično organizacijo nekaterih sestankov, niti da je g. B. vodil AEMCP med njenim prestrukturiranjem, niti da je napovedala zvišanja cen in da je to storila prva, in nenazadnje, niti da je zahtevala in dobila dovoljenje za preverjanje podatkov o prodajnih količinah družbe Sarrió v prostorih te. | |
| 566 | Iz uvodne izjave 423 izhaja, da je na podlagi vseh teh elementov Komisija sklepala o vlogi vodje družbe AWA: | „Iz več povezanih dokazov je razvidno, da je družba AWA, ki je imela vodilni gospodarski položaj na trgu samokopirnega papirja in je lahko pritiskala na svoje konkurente, saj je kupovala ali distribuirala velik del proizvodnje nekaterih malih dobaviteljev, imela tudi ključno vlogo pri nadzoru in izvajanju dogovorov“. | |
| 567 | Komisija je na podlagi OU trdila: | „Nobenega dvoma ni, da je bila AWA, ki je prva proizvajalka samokopirnega papirja v Evropi, glavna pospeševalka omejevalnega sporazuma v vsem EGP, razen v Španiji. Dejanski dokazi […] v zvezi s tajnimi sestanki potrjujejo, da so mnoge med njimi sklicali in vodili predstavniki družbe AWA. […] Poleg tega nekateri elementi dajejo slutiti, da je zvišanja cen, dogovorjena na vsaj dveh splošnih sestankih in na več nacionalnih sestankih, sprožila AWA in da je [ta] od drugih udeležencev zahtevala, naj uporabijo enaka zvišanja. Vlogo družbe AWA kot pospeševalke omejevalnega sporazuma potrjujejo tudi nekateri dokumenti, iz katerih je razvidno, da je AWA prva napovedala zvišanja cen na trgu in da so tem napovedim sledili drugi konkurenti. V zapisniku splošnega sestanka kartela z dne 2. februarja 1995 je izrecno navedeno, da je AWA prva napovedala na sestanku dogovorjena zvišanja cen.“ | |
| 568 | Treba je ugotoviti, prvič, da čeprav so, kot zatrjuje AWA, druge družbe občasno lahko rezervirale prostore, sklicevale sestanke ali napovedale zvišanja cen, pa nobene ne obremenjuje toliko elementov, ki kažejo na to, da je imela vodilno vlogo, kot prav družbo AWA. Čeprav v zvezi s tem na primer drži, da je tudi družba Koehler predsedovala AEMCP od januarja 1995, pa vloge g. F. (Koelher) ni mogoče primerjati z vlogo g. B. (AWA), ki je spremenil delovanje omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 569 | Drugič, očitno je, da članice omejevalnega sporazuma niso predložile nobenega dokaza, ki bi ovrgel vodilno vlogo družbe AWA. Nasprotno, izjave družbe Mougeot, navedene v uvodnih izjavah 95, 97, 104, 108, 120, 141, 143, 193, 194, 210, 234 in 246 odločbe, zlasti tiste iz zgoraj navedene točke 439, nekako dokazujejo vodilno vlogo družbe AWA. | |
| 570 | Kljub temu AWA izpodbija dokazno vrednost izjav družbe Mougeot, ker naj bi jih spodbudil interes te družbe, da se pokaže v vlogi žrtve pritiskov družbe AWA in da bi bila v zameno za take podatke Komisija do nje prizanesljiva. | |
| 571 | V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da se kljub nekaterim nesoglasjem med družbama Mougeot in AWA izjave družbe Mougeot v več točkah, zlasti glede strukture in zgodovine omejevalnega sporazuma, na splošno ujemajo z izjavami družbe AWA, katerih namen je bil prav tako doseči ugodnosti, ki izhajajo iz obvestila o ugodni obravnavi (glej zlasti zgoraj navedene točke od 163 do 168 in točko 261). O verodostojnosti izjav družbe Mougeot torej ne moremo dvomiti samo glede vodilne vloge družbe AWA, še zlasti ker to vlogo vodje dokazuje več povezanih in skladnih dokazov. | |
| 572 | Poleg tega je treba poudariti, da ti dokazi poleg izjav družbe Mougeot vključujejo tudi dokumente, ki jih je Komisija našla v prostorih družbe Sappi (uvodna izjava 103 odločbe), ter izjave in sporočila te družbe (glej uvodno izjavo 181 in sklicevanje iz uvodnih izjav 228 in 233 na stran 7 spisa Komisije, ki vsebuje izjave družbe Sappi). Ni torej mogoče trditi, da ugotovitev Komisije temelji samo na izjavah družbe Mougeot. | |
| 573 | In končno, v zvezi s pritiski, ki naj bi jih AWA izvajala na druge družbe, Komisija v odgovoru na tožbo pojasnjuje, da družbe AWA ni obtožila, da je druge družbe silila k sodelovanju pri omejevalnem sporazumu, čeprav so nekatere, na primer Carrs in Torraspapel, v odgovorih na OU potrdile, da so delovale pod pritiskom družbe AWA. | |
| 574 | V uvodni izjavi 425 odločbe Komisija v okviru preučitve olajševalnih okoliščin, povezanih z izključno pasivno vlogo, navaja dejstvo, da „družbe Carrs, Copigraph in Torraspapel trdijo, da so imele pri kršitvi izključno pasivno vlogo in da so bile v sodelovanje pri omejevalnem sporazumu prisiljene zaradi pritiskov vodje kartela, družbe AWA“, ter da „tudi družba Koehler trdi, da so bile grožnje družbe AWA dejavnik, ki jo je napeljal k sodelovanju pri tajnem dogovoru“. Vendar gre v tem primeru za navajanje trditev, ki so jih te stranke predložile v odgovor na OU, da bi se jim na tej podlagi priznale olajševalne okoliščine, te trditve pa je Komisija v uvodnih izjavah 426 in 427 odločbe zavrnila. | |
| 575 | Poleg tega je treba ugotoviti, da se elementi, ki jih je Komisija navedla v uvodnih izjavah od 418 do 423 odločbe, da bi dokazala vodilno vlogo družbe AWA, ne sklicujejo na taka nagovarjanja ali grožnje, s katerimi je želela družbe prisiliti k sodelovanju pri omejevalnem sporazumu. AWA torej ne more trditi, da je bila neupravičeno obtožena takih groženj niti da ni imela vpogleda v izjave družb, v katerih so se nanje sklicevale. Iz uvodnih izjav od 420 do 422 odločbe in pisanj družbe AWA izhaja, da je očitek o vlogi vodje obravnavala z vseh vidikov in z njegovim izpodbijanjem uveljavila pravico do obrambe. V zvezi s tem se ne more sklicevati na kršitev pravice do obrambe. | |
| 576 | Na podlagi vseh zgornjih ugotovitev Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da Komisija ni storila napake pri presoji, ko je na podlagi kopice povezanih in skladnih indicev presodila, da je imela AWA vlogo vodje pri kršitvi. | |
| 577 | Nadalje je treba preveriti, ali je ta vloga upravičila 50-odstotno zvišanje globe za družbo AWA. | |
| 2. Kršitev načela sorazmernosti | |
| 578 | AWA trdi, da tudi če bi imela vodilno vlogo pri kršitvi, ta okoliščina ne bi upravičevala 50-odstotnega zvišanja globe. Pri dokazovanju nesorazmernosti tega zvišanja se opira na prakso odločanja Komisije in svoj položaj primerja s položajem drugih družb, katerih globa se je prav tako zvišala. | |
| 579 | Vendar trditev, da naj bi bilo 50-odstotno zvišanje višje od zvišanja, ki se po navadi uporablja v odločbah Komisije, ne dokazuje, da gre za kršitev načela sorazmernosti (v tem smislu glej sodbo ADM proti Komisiji, točka 248). | |
| 580 | V zvezi s tem je dovolj opozoriti, da ima v skladu s sodno prakso Komisija pri določitvi posameznih glob diskrecijsko pravico in ni dolžna uporabiti natančne matematične formule (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 6. aprila 1995 v zadevi Martinelli proti Komisiji, T-150/89, Recueil, str. II-1165, točka 59, in zgoraj v točki 67 navedena sodba Mo och Domsjö proti Komisiji, točka 268, po pritožbi potrjena s sodbo Sodišča z dne 16. novembra 2000 v zadevi Mo och Domsjö proti Komisiji, C-283/98 P, Recueil, str. I-9855, točka 47). | |
| 581 | Podredno in v odgovor na trditev, da 50-odstotna stopnja pomeni najvišje odstotno zvišanje, ki je bilo kdaj koli naloženo zaradi vloge vodje, v absolutnem smislu pa drugo največje zvišanje, ki temelji na takem razlogu, je treba opozoriti, da te stopnje ne smemo šteti za izjemo. | |
| 582 | Komisija je namreč v Odločbi 2002/271/ES z dne 18. julija 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP (zadeva COMP/E-1/36.490 – Grafitne elektrode, UL 2002, L 100, str. 1) družbi SGL Carbon AG naložila 85-odstotno zvišanje iz naslova obteževalnih okoliščin. Vendar pa je res, da vloga vodje ni bila edina obteževalna okoliščina, saj se je družbi SGL Carbon očitalo tudi, da je ovirala preiskavo Komisije in da ni hotela odpraviti kršitev. V primeru družbe UCAR International Inc. je bilo zvišanje 60-odstotno zaradi njene vloge vodje in pobudnice ter zaradi nadaljevanja kršitve po preverjanjih. V Odločbi Komisije 1999/210/ES z dne 14. oktobra 1998 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 85 Pogodbe ES (zadeva IV/F-3/33.708 – British Sugar plc, zadeva IV/F-3/33.709 – Tate & Lyle plc, zadeva IV/F-3/33.710 – Napier Brown & Company Ltd, zadeva IV/F-3/33.711 – James Budgett Sugars Ltd, UL L 76, str. 1) je bilo zvišanje 75-odstotno. Družbi British Sugar plc je bila naložena kazen zaradi njene vloge pobudnice in „gonilne sile kršitve“ ter tudi zato, ker je kršila svoje zaveze o spoštovanju prava Skupnosti in dvakrat kršila pravila o konkurenci na istem trgu. | |
| 583 | Tudi za druge družbe se je zaradi njihove vloge vodje uporabilo 50-odstotno zvišanje, na primer za družbo F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG z Odločbo Komisije 2003/2/ES z dne 21. novembra 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP (zadeva COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamini, UL L 6, str. 1) ter za družbi Archer Daniels Midland in Ajinomoto z Odločbo Komisije 2001/418/ES z dne 7. junija 2000 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP (zadeva COMP/36.545/F3 – Aminokisline, UL L 152, str. 24). | |
| 584 | Vendar AWA meni, da je v skladu s prakso odločanja Komisije za uporabo 50-odstotne stopnje potreben element pobude ali prisile. | |
| 585 | V zvezi z elementom pobude je treba opozoriti, da je bilo v Odločbi 2001/418 družbi ADM naloženo 50-odstotno zvišanje, čeprav se je vloga pobudnice jasno pripisala družbi Ajinomoto. Ta primer tako nasprotuje trditvi družbe AWA, da je za uporabo 50-odstotne stopnje nujen element pobude. | |
| 586 | Vendar tudi če bi se bilo treba strinjati s trditvijo družbe AWA, da je za uporabo 50-odstotnega zvišanja potreben element pobude, ta v obravnavanem primeru ne bi manjkal. AWA je namreč sklicala in vodila več sestankov kartela, bila je „pobudnica prestrukturiranja kartela“ (uvodna izjava 418 odločbe), prevzela je pobudo za več zvišanj cen in pogosto je prva napovedala zvišanja cen na trgu. 50-odstotnega zvišanja torej ni mogoče šteti za nesorazmernega (glej točke od 568 do 576 zgoraj). | |
| 587 | Podredno je v zvezi z elementom prisile treba opozoriti, da so v smernicah med obteževalnimi okoliščinami navedeni tudi povračilni ukrepi proti drugim podjetjem zaradi ohranjanja praks, ki pomenijo kršitev. Ti ukrepi so torej obteževalna okoliščina, ki se razlikuje od vloge vodje ali pobudnika kršitve. | |
| 588 | Poleg tega se v obravnavanem primeru, kot je razvidno iz uvodne izjave 104 odločbe, izjave družbe Mougeot nanašajo na grožnje, saj je „[g. B.] izrecno navedel, da ne bo dopustil, da se to zvišanje cen ne bo upoštevalo, in da bo osebno poskrbel za vse tiste, ki ne bodo igrali po njegovih pravilih“. | |
| 589 | Poleg tega ni mogoče izključiti, da je gotova vodilna gospodarska vloga, ki jo je imela družba AWA na trgu samokopirnega papirja, teh dala določeno prisilno moč. Izjave družbe Mougeot iz zgoraj navedene točke 439 to potrjujejo. | |
| 590 | Zato 50-odstotno zvišanje globe za družbo AWA zaradi njene vloge vodje ne krši načela sorazmernosti. | |
| 3. Kršitev načela enakega obravnavanja | |
| 591 | Po navedbah družbe AWA 50-odstotno zvišanje globe zaradi njene vloge vodje krši tudi načelo enakega obravnavanja, ker je več družb imelo povsem enako vlogo kot ona. Družba Koelher naj bi organizirala več sestankov. Družbe Torraspapel, Mougeot in MHTP naj bi imele vodilno vlogo pri nacionalnih dogovorih, saj so prevzele skrb za praktično organizacijo sestankov. V odločbi naj bi bila družba Torraspapel opisana kot vodja kartela na španskem trgu. Nezvišanje globe tudi za te družbe naj bi torej pomenilo neupravičeno diskriminacijo. | |
| 592 | Treba je opozoriti, da nobene od teh družb ne obremenjuje več povezanih in skladnih dokazov, ki bi bili po naravi in pomenu enaki dokazom, v katerih je družba AWA označena za vodjo zadevne kršitve. Dejstvo, da je ena od teh družb lahko imela različne funkcije pri omejevalnem sporazumu, še ne pomeni, da je bila vodja. Šele na podlagi vsote določenega števila elementov, podprtih z izjavami različnih družb, je mogoče to vlogo pripisati družbi AWA (glej točke od 568 do 576 zgoraj). | |
| 593 | Komisija je na podlagi obteževalnih okoliščin globo za družbo AWA torej upravičeno zvišala za 50 %. | |
| G – Tožbeni razlogi: kršitev člena 253 ES, člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 ter načel sorazmernosti in enakega obravnavanja, neobstoj posamične določitve glob, preozka razlaga Smernic v zvezi z globami in očitne napake pri presoji zaradi neupoštevanja nekaterih olajševalnih okoliščin | |
| 1. Izključno pasivna vloga ali vloga „sledi mojemu vodji“ pri omejevalnem sporazumu | |
| 594 | Več tožečih strank (Bolloré, Zanders, Mougeot, Divipa in Zicuñaga) navaja, da so imele pri omejevalnem sporazumu le pasivno, „sledi mojemu vodji“ ali obrobno vlogo. Komisija naj bi bila torej dolžna znižati njihovo globo na podlagi olajševalnih okoliščin. | |
| 595 | Komisija zavrača njihove trditve z obrazložitvijo, da so bili vsi sodelujoči pri omejevalnem sporazumu njegovi aktivni člani. | |
| 596 | Treba je opozoriti, da je treba, če je kršitev storilo več družb, preučiti relativno težo sodelovanja pri kršitvi vsake izmed teh družb (zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Suiker Unie in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 623, ter zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točka 150), da se ugotovi, ali zanje obstajajo obteževalne ali olajševalne okoliščine. | |
| 597 | Točki 2 in 3 smernic določata prilagoditev osnovnega zneska globe glede na nekatere obteževalne in olajševalne okoliščine. Zlasti „izključno pasivna vloga ali vloga ‚sledi mojemu vodji‘“ pri izvajanju kršitve je, če je dokazana, olajševalna okoliščina v skladu s točko 3, prva alinea, smernic, pri čemer je natančno določeno, da ta pasivna vloga pomeni, da zadevna družba „ne izstopa“, to pomeni, da pri pripravi enega ali več protikonkurenčnih dogovorov ne sodeluje aktivno (sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 9. julija 2003 v zadevi Cheil Jedang proti Komisiji, T-220/00, Recueil, str. II-2473, točke od 165 do 167). | |
| 598 | Poleg tega tožeče stranke ne morejo trditi, da bi se morala njihova globa zato, ker niso bile ena od vodij omejevalnega sporazuma, znižati. Ob zatrjevanju, da niso imele aktivne vloge, navajajo samo neobstoj obteževalne okoliščine (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 93 navedeno sodbo Lögstör Rör proti Komisiji, točka 322, in sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 20. marca 2002 v zadevi Dansk Rørindustri proti Komisiji, T-21/99, Recueil, str. II-1681, točka 230). | |
| 599 | Kot navaja družba Bolloré, je Komisija iz redne udeležbe družbe Copigraph na sestankih omejevalnega sporazuma in pri pobudah za zvišanja cen sklepala, da njena vloga ni bila izključno pasivna. Po njenem mnenju na podlagi redne udeležbe na sestankih in pri ukrepih zvišanja cen ni mogoče izključiti, da je imela zadevna družba pri omejevalnem sporazumu samo vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“. Komisija naj bi bila dolžna konkretno preveriti stopnjo udeležbe zadevne družbe pri omejevalnem sporazumu, in sicer s kvantitativnega in kakovostnega vidika. Družba Bolloré naj bi bila najmanj zavzeta članica AEMCP na sestankih. | |
| 600 | V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da stopnja udeležbe družbe Copigraph, ki jo je družba Bolloré priznala v tožbi, to je na 15 od 21 sestankov AEMCP, na 8 od 11 sestankov med 14. septembrom 1993 in septembrom 1995 ter na 3 od 4 splošnih sestankov, če ne štejemo njene udeležbe na nacionalnih sestankih na francoskem trgu, in na 4 od 6 sestankov v zvezi s španskim trgom, ni zanemarljiva. To nikakor ne dokazuje, da se je sestankov udeleževala bistveno redkeje v primerjavi z rednimi članicami omejevalnega sporazuma v smislu zgoraj v točki 501 navedene sodbe BPB de Eendracht proti Komisiji (točka 343). Njena udeležba na teh sestankih in pri pobudah za zvišanja cen ter priznanje sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu torej ne potrjujejo izključno pasivne vloge ali vloge „sledi mojemu vodji“. | |
| 601 | Kljub temu se zdi, da Bolloré trdi, da če se družba sklicuje na pasivno vlogo, ji mora Komisija priznati olajševalne okoliščine in znižati naloženo globo, razen če dokaže, da je družba dejansko imela aktivno vlogo. Te trditve ni mogoče sprejeti. | |
| 602 | V smernicah namreč ni navedeno, da mora Komisija vedno ločeno upoštevati vsako od olajševalnih okoliščin iz točke 3. Ugotoviti je treba, da čeprav so okoliščine s seznama v točki 3 smernic zagotovo med tistimi, ki jih Komisija v danem primeru lahko upošteva, pa Komisija ni dolžna samodejno priznati dodatnega znižanja na tej podlagi, takoj ko družba predloži elemente, ki lahko upravičijo obstoj ene od teh okoliščin. Tako je treba vprašanje, ali je primerno znižati globo na podlagi olajševalnih okoliščin, preučiti s splošnega vidika, ob upoštevanju vseh upoštevnih okoliščin. Ker smernice olajševalnih okoliščin, ki se lahko upoštevajo, ne določajo kot obveznih, je treba ugotoviti, da si je Komisija pri splošni presoji obsega morebitnega znižanja glob na podlagi olajševalnih okoliščin pridržala določeno diskrecijsko pravico. | |
| 603 | V smernicah je med primeri olajševalnih okoliščin vsekakor navedena „izključno“ pasivna vloga ali vloga „sledi mojemu vodji“ pri izvajanju kršitve. Vendar je udeležba na večini tajnih sestankov že zadosti aktivna, da ne more biti „izključno“ pasivna ali posnemovalna. | |
| 604 | Družba Mougeot navaja nesorazmernost naložene globe glede na njeno stopnjo odgovornosti pri omejevalnem sporazumu. Vendar s trditvami, ki jih navaja, ni mogoče dokazati, da je imela izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“, česar niti ne trdi. Tudi dejstvo, da ni imela vloge vodje, ne more biti razlog za znižanje globe, in sicer zaradi razloga, navedenega zgoraj v točki 598. | |
| 605 | Divipa navaja, da Komisija ni upoštevala njene izključno pasivne in podrejene vloge pri omejevalnem sporazumu. Trdi, da ni sodelovala na nobenem sestanku niti pri odločitvah proizvajalcev samokopirnega papirja in da je z njimi imela samo povsem vertikalna razmerja le kot distributerka. Vendar je Sodišče prve stopnje presodilo, da je treba zavrniti tožbeni razlog družbe Divipa, katerega namen je bil izpodbijati njeno sodelovanje pri kršitvi (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 155 do 221). Ker je bila dokazana njena udeležba na tajnih sestankih na španskem trgu, njene vloge ni mogoče opredeliti kot izključno pasivne. Dejstvo, da je na teh sestankih sodelovala kot distributerka, te ugotovitve ne more spremeniti. | |
| 606 | Zicuñaga med olajševalnimi okoliščinami, ki naj bi jih bila Komisija dolžna upoštevati pri izračunu globe, ki ji je bila naložena, navaja svojo izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“ pri kršitvi. V podporo tej trditvi se sklicuje izključno na odločbe Komisije, v katerih je ta različno obravnavala vodje in redne člane. | |
| 607 | Ker pa je Komisija dokazala udeležbo družbe Zicuñaga na tajnih sestankih v zvezi s španskim trgom (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 155 do 243), Zicuñaga ne more utemeljeno zahtevati znižanja naložene globe samo s sklicevanjem na svojo izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“, ne da bi za to predložila kakršen koli dokaz. | |
| 608 | Družba Zanders ne izpodbija, da je bila med januarjem 1992 in septembrom 1995 članica omejevalnega sporazuma, zato je tudi dosegla znižanje globe na podlagi obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, vendar zanika aktivno, celo glavno vlogo, ki ji jo Komisija očita pri omejevalnem sporazumu. Izpodbija svojo navzočnost na nekaterih sestankih in dodaja, da neposredni dokazi, ki jih ima na voljo Komisija, dokazujejo, da ni sodelovala pri pomembnih vidikih omejevalnega sporazuma, ali vsaj, da je pri njih sodelovala manj kot druga podjetja, pri čemer se omejuje na vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“. Zanders zanika zlasti udeležbo na neuradnih sestankih organizacije AEMCP po njenem prestrukturiranju spomladi 1993. | |
| 609 | Treba je navesti, da dejstvo, da udeležbe družbe Zanders na nekaterih sestankih ni mogoče dokazati in da je bila aktivnejša pri tajnih dogovorih na nacionalni ravni kot na evropski ravni, ne dokazuje, da je imela izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo ‚sledi mojemu vodji. Sicer pa družba Zanders pravi, da načelno ne zanika, da so se z njo dogovarjali po nekaterih sestankih, na katerih ni bila navzoča. Poleg tega je družba Zanders kljub odločitvi, da se ne bo več udeleževala neuradnih sestankov organizacije AEMCP po njenem prestrukturiranju, na obravnavi priznala, da drugih članic ni obvestila, da se distancira od omejevalnega sporazuma ali da pri njem več ne sodeluje. Druge članice so jo torej še naprej štele za polnopravno članico in jo obveščale o rezultatih tajnih sestankov. Nazadnje iz izjav družbe Zanders na obravnavi izhaja, da je uveljavila odločitve, sprejete na sestankih, ki se jih ni udeležila, razen v nekaterih primerih, v katerih jih ni upoštevala. Ti elementi torej omajajo trditev o izključno pasivni drži družbe Zanders. | |
| 610 | Zdi se, da družba Zanders želi predvsem dokazati, da ni imela „glavne vloge“. Vendar glede na sodno prakso, navedeno zgoraj v točki 598, s to trditvijo navaja samo neobstoj obteževalne okoliščine. | |
| 611 | Glede diskriminacije, ki naj bi je bila družba Zanders deležna glede na druge družbe, ki so bile po njenem mnenju očitno aktivnejše pri omejevalnem sporazumu, je treba izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“ pri omejevalnem sporazumu presojati za vsako družbo posebej. Dejstvo, da so bile lahko druge družbe aktivnejše, še ne pomeni, da je imela družba Zanders izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“. V poštev bi lahko prišla samo popolna pasivnost, vendar ta ni dokazana. | |
| 612 | Skratka, Komisija upravičeno navaja, da so bile vse družbe, ki so sodelovale pri omejevalnem sporazumu, njegove aktivne članice, ker so sodelovale na sestankih, na katerih so si izmenjavale informacije in odločale o zvišanjih cen, ki so bila nato sporočena kupcem. Čeprav drži, da niso bile nujno vse tako aktivne pri vseh vidikih kršitve in na vsem trgu, pa strogo vzeto nobena ni imela izključno pasivne vloge ali vloge „sledi mojemu vodji“. Komisija je torej pravilno uporabila smernice, ki ne določajo vmesnih stopenj med vlogo vodje in izključno pasivno vlogo ali vlogo „sledi mojemu vodji“. | |
| 2. Velikost in vpliv na trg družbe kršiteljice | |
| 613 | Divipa meni, da ne bi smela biti razvrščena v isto skupino kot družbi Carrs in Zicuñaga, ker je majhno družinsko podjetje, ki izvaja dejavnosti predelave in distribucije izključno na nacionalni ravni. Kršitev, ki se ji očita, naj ne bi imela nobenega omejevalnega učinka na konkurenco. | |
| 614 | Komisija trdi, da je upoštevala omejeni vpliv družbe Divipa, saj jo je razvrstila v peto kategorijo. Ker so vse družbe, ki so bile članice omejevalnega sporazuma, kršile pravila o konkurenci, družbe Divipa na podlagi njene trditve ni mogoče razvrstiti v nižjo kategorijo kot družbi Carrs in Zicuñaga. | |
| 615 | V zvezi s tem je po eni strani treba ugotoviti, da se je majhnost družbe Divipa ustrezno upoštevala, saj je bila razvrščena v zadnjo kategorijo z izhodiščnim zneskom globe 1,4 milijona EUR, medtem ko bi za zelo resno kršitev ta znesek lahko presegel 20 milijonov EUR. Po drugi strani je Sodišče prve stopnje presodilo, da dejstvo, da je tožeča stranka srednje veliko družinsko podjetje, nikakor ne more biti olajševalna okoliščina (zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 338). | |
| 616 | Glede trditve, da kršitev, ki se očita družbi Divipa, naj ne bi imela nobenega omejevalnega učinka na konkurenco, presoja učinkov omejevalnega sporazuma ne more biti omejena samo na trg, za kateri Divipa trdi, da na njem deluje, medtem ko se je omejevalni sporazum nanašal na ves skupni trg in nato na EGP. Trgovina med državami članicami je bila torej prizadeta, zato se uporablja člen 81 ES. Če bi bilo treba to trditev razlagati, kot da navaja neobstoj konkretnega vpliva kršitve, ki se ji očita, na konkurenco, bi se bilo treba sklicevati na zgornje točke od 445 do 459. | |
| 617 | Družbi Divipa tako ni bilo mogoče priznati olajševalne okoliščine na podlagi njene velikosti in omejenega vpliva. | |
| 3. Ravnanje na trgu v obdobju kršitve | |
| 618 | Divipa trdi, da ni nikoli izvajala dogovorov, ki naj bi bili sklenjeni na sestankih, ki se jih ni udeležila. Njeno poslovno ravnanje naj bi bilo v nasprotju z vsebino navedenih dogovorov. Vpliv njenega ravnanja na trg naj bi bil zato minimalen, celo ničen. | |
| 619 | Družba Torraspapel navaja, da Komisija ni upoštevala dejstva, da ni spoštovala dogovorov o cenah kljub pritiskom, ki jim je bila izpostavljena. Razvoj njene cenovne politike naj se nikakor ne bi ujemal z zatrjevanimi dogovori o cenah. Njeno ravnanje glede cen naj bi redno oviralo protikonkurenčne učinke omejevalnega sporazuma, kar naj bi zadostovalo, da bi ji Komisija morala priznati olajševalno okoliščino. | |
| 620 | Zicuñaga trdi, da je treba na podlagi smernic in prakse Komisije kot olajševalno okoliščino upoštevati dejstvo, da se prepovedan dogovor ni izvajal ali pa se je izvajal le delno. | |
| 621 | Komisija trdi, da ji kot olajševalne okoliščine ni treba upoštevati nespoštovanja nezakonitega dogovora. V zvezi s tem se sklicuje zlasti na zgoraj v točki 469 navedeno sodbo z dne 14. maja 1998 v zadevi SCA Holding proti Komisiji (točka 142). | |
| 622 | Kot je že bilo opozorjeno, je treba, če je kršitev storilo več družb, preučiti relativno težo sodelovanja pri kršitvi vsake izmed teh družb (zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Suiker Unie in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 623, ter zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba Komisija proti Anic Partecipazioni, točka 150), da se ugotovi, ali zanje obstajajo obteževalne ali olajševalne okoliščine. | |
| 623 | Pod točko 3, z naslovom „Olajševalne okoliščine“, smernic je neizčrpen seznam okoliščin, ki lahko vodijo do znižanja osnovnega zneska globe, med katerimi je dejansko neizvajanje dogovorov (točka 3, druga alinea). | |
| 624 | Treba je ugotoviti, da to besedilo ne našteva nujno olajševalnih okoliščin, ki naj bi jih Komisija morala upoštevati. Posledično Komisija delno ohrani pravico, da v splošnem oceni obseg morebitnega znižanja zneska glob iz naslova olajševalnih okoliščin. | |
| 625 | V zvezi s tem je pomembno preveriti, ali je na podlagi okoliščin, ki so jih navedle tožeče stranke, mogoče dokazati, da so se v obdobju, v katerem so soglašale s protipravnimi dogovori, dejansko ognile izvajanju teh dogovorov tako, da so na trgu ravnale konkurenčno (sodba ADM proti Komisiji, točka 268; v tem smislu glej tudi zgoraj v točki 49 navedeno sodbo Cement, točke od 4872 do 4874). | |
| 626 | V tem primeru na podlagi podatkov, ki so jih predložile tožeče stranke, ni mogoče sklepati, da so se dejansko ognile izvajanju zadevnih protipravnih dogovorov tako, da so na trgu ravnale konkurenčno. | |
| 627 | Čeprav je, kar zadeva družbo Torraspapel, res, da je iz uvodnih izjav 157, 166 in 216 odločbe mogoče sklepati, da ta družba ni vedno izvedla dogovorjenih zvišanj cen ali jih je izvedla z zamudo, je na podlagi več drugih podatkov (glej zlasti uvodne izjave 204, 206, 215, od 225 do 227, od 236 do 238 odločbe) mogoče ugotoviti, da je v glavnem izvedla te dogovore. Iz uvodnih izjav 204 in 206 na primer izhaja, da so družbe AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora in Torraspapel od januarja do maja 1994 napovedale povsem enaka zvišanja cen, kot so bila dogovorjena na splošnem sestanku 19. januarja 1994. Enako so za september in oktober 1994 družbe AWA, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel in Zanders napovedale povsem enaka zvišanja cen, kot so bila dogovorjena na sestanku 21. junija 1994 (uvodna izjava 215). Za obdobje med decembrom 1994 in februarjem 1995 Komisija v uvodni izjavi 225 trdi, da je ugotovila, da so vsi udeleženci splošnega sestanka, ki je potekal 22. septembra 1994 – družbe AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel in Zanders –, napovedali povsem enaka zvišanja cen, kot so bila dogovorjena na tem sestanku. Nazadnje lahko v dokumentu z dne 16. februarja 1995, ki ga je predložila družba Sappi in je naveden v uvodni izjavi 238, preberemo, da „6-odstotno zvišanje [role] 1. marca 1995 napovedujejo vodilni na trgu Sarrió/Stora/AWA“. Iz dokumentov, ki jih je predložila Komisija, prav tako izhaja, da je družba Torraspapel včasih sklenila ločene dogovore za nekatere večje stranke, in sicer tako, da je odložila dogovorjeno zvišanje cen. V številkah, ki jih navaja v podporo svoji trditvi, ki se nanaša na neizvajanje dogovorjenih zvišanj cen, pa tožeča stranka primerja povprečne mesečne cene, ne da bi pojasnila te zamude ali preložitve izvajanja. | |
| 628 | Kar zadeva družbo Divipa, njena trditev, da je samo distributerka, ki naj ne bi bila konkurenčna drugim vpletenim družbam, ni utemeljena. Tudi če je od proizvajalcev kupovala velike role, je sama proizvajala pole in manjše role, ki jih je kot druge vpletene družbe dobavljala tretjim osebam. Na španskem in portugalskem trgu so nekateri proizvajalci sami distribuirali svoje proizvode, drugi pa prek neodvisnih distributerjev (uvodna izjava 153 odločbe). Integrirani proizvajalci so nadzirali celoten postopek in določali cene tiskarjem, medtem ko so se morali proizvajalci, ki niso bili vertikalno integrirani, za prodajne cene dogovarjati z distributerjem. V tem primeru je bilo treba določiti dve vrsti cen: ceno, ki jo je od distributerja zahteval proizvajalec, in ceno, ki jo od tretjih oseb zahteval distributer. Obvestilo v zvezi s sestankom, ki je potekal v Barceloni 19. oktobra 1993 (dokument št. 4474, naveden v uvodni izjavi 192 in zgoraj v točki 173), pa izkazuje, da je omejevalni sporazum pokrival tudi to ceno. Ker je sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu, je imela Divipa tako možnost vplivati na svojo profitno maržo. | |
| 629 | Poleg tega je Komisija dokazala, da je bila Divipa udeležena pri tajnih sestankih na španskem trgu, na katerih so bile sprejete odločitve o zvišanjih cen. Vendar Divipa trdi, da ni izvajala teh dogovorov. Toda v tem primeru na podlagi podatkov, ki jih je posredovala tožeča stranka, ni mogoče ugotoviti, da ta ni izvajala spornih dogovorov s tem, da je na trgu ravnala tako, da bi bilo mogoče preprečiti protikonkurenčne učinke ugotovljene kršitve. Namreč tabele, ki jih je v prilogi k tožbi dodala Divipa, na primer kažejo, da so se leta 1994 njene marže in prodajne cene precej zvišale kljub strukturni presežni zmogljivosti in upadanju trga. Poleg tega le dejstvo, da njeno ravnanje lahko ni bilo povsem v skladu z dogovori, če bi bilo dokazano, ne bi zadostovalo, da bi ji Komisija morala priznati olajševalne okoliščine. Tožeča stranka bi namreč lahko s svojo politiko, ki na trgu bolj ali manj ni odvisna, preprosto poskusila uporabiti omejevalni sporazum sebi v korist (zgoraj v točki 468 navedena sodba SCA Holding proti Komisiji, točka 142, in zgoraj v točki 451 navedena sodba Cascades proti Komisiji, točka 230). | |
| 630 | Iste ugotovitve, ki so za družbo Divipa predstavljene v prejšnji točki, se lahko uporabijo za družbo Zicuñaga. Komisija je dokazala, da je bila družba Zicuñaga udeležena pri tajnih sestankih na španskem trgu, na katerih so bile sprejete odločitve o zvišanjih cen. Čeprav je res, da družba Zicuñaga kot olajševalno okoliščino navaja neizvajanje teh zvišanj, tega ne dokaže. V okviru svoje trditve v zvezi z olajševalnimi okoliščinami se omejuje na sklicevanje na več odločb Komisije, izmed katerih je bila sicer večina sprejeta pred izvajanjem smernic. Navaja dejstvo, da je Komisija v teh odločbah pri ocenjevanju teže kršitve upoštevala neizvajanje ali omejeno izvajanje zadevnih dogovorov. Za oceno olajševalnih okoliščin pa je treba v skladu z načelom posamičnosti kazni in sankcij preučiti relativno težo sodelovanja družbe pri kršitvi (sodba ADM proti Komisiji, točka 265). | |
| 631 | Vsekakor podatki, ki jih je predložila Zicuñaga v drugih delih svoje tožbe, ki niso povezani z vprašanjem olajševalnih okoliščin, potrjujejo, da so se cene družb Zicuñaga in Divipa delno spremenile. Iz tožbe sicer tudi izhaja, da so se cene družbe Zicuñaga s 174,99 ESP novembra 1993 dvignile na 210,99 ESP decembra 1994. Dejstvo, da se cene, ki jih je uvedla Zicuñaga, ne ujemajo popolnoma s cenami, o katerih je bilo odločeno na različnih tajnih sestankih, ne more dokazati, da Zicuñaga ni uveljavila zadevnih dogovorov. | |
| 632 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da Komisija v uvodni izjavi 397 odločbe trdi, da „dokazi, ki se nanašajo na sestanke in zvišanja cen, prikazujejo, da so bila včasih dogovorjena zvišanja preložena na poznejši datum, da so bila izvedena nekoliko nižja zvišanja, kot je bilo dogovorjeno, ali da so bili organizirani drugi sestanki za pregled dogovora“. Komisija na podlagi tega sklepa, da je imel omejevalni sporazum „vpliv na politiko določanja cen članov kartela, čeprav so bila izvedena zvišanja včasih nižja, kot dogovorjeno, ali izvedena pozneje“. | |
| 633 | Komisija posledično ni trdila, da so bila vsa dogovorjena zvišanja izvedena glede na znesek, določen na zadevnem sestanku. Neizvedba natančno določenega zneska zvišanja, dogovorjenega na tem ali onem sestanku, ne more dokazati, da omejevalni sporazum ni vplival na politiko določanja cen članov kartela, med katerimi je bila družba Zicuñaga. Prav tako ne more biti izključeno, da je Zicuñaga ob tem, ko je izvajala cene, ki se niso ujemale s cenami, ki naj bi izhajale iz izvajanja dogovorov, čeprav je še vedno sodelovala pri tajnih sestankih na španskem trgu, poskušala od drugih članov omejevalnega sporazuma pridobiti dovoljenje za prodajo po cenah, nižjih od cen iz splošne odločbe (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 45 navedeno sodbo LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 342, ki je na podlagi pritožbe potrjena z zgoraj v točki 409 navedeno sodbo Dansk Rørindustri in drugi proti Komisiji). Ročno napisano obvestilo družbe Mougeot z dne 21. oktobra 1994, navedeno zgoraj v točki 177, vsekakor potrjuje, da je Zicuñaga pridobila to dovoljenje, kar lahko predstavlja drug način izkoriščanja kartela. | |
| 634 | V teh okoliščinah Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da ima dovolj informacij iz odločbe in podatkov, ki jih je predložila Zicuñaga, da lahko potrdi, ne da bi Komisijo zaprosilo za dodatne informacije, da se družbi Zicuñaga ne prizna olajševalne okoliščine iz naslova dejanskega neizvajanja dogovorov ali protipravnih praks. | |
| 635 | Torej je Komisija pravilno odločila, da se tožečim strankam ne priznajo olajševalne okoliščine zaradi dejanskega neizvajanja dogovorov ali protipravnih praks. | |
| 4. Obstoj groženj in pritiskov | |
| 636 | Več tožečih strank (Koehler, Bolloré za Copigraph in Torraspapel) navaja, da Komisija ni upoštevala groženj ali pritiskov, ki so jih doživele, zlasti od družbe AWA. | |
| 637 | Čeprav je res, da Komisija v uvodnih izjavah 104, 106 in 425 odločbe upošteva grožnje družbe AWA, pa v uvodni izjavi 427 trdi: | „Grožnje (v tem primeru vodje omejevalnega sporazuma) ne morejo upravičiti kršitev pravil o konkurenci Skupnosti in EGP. Namesto da so se pridružile kartelu, bi morale družbe obvestiti pristojne organe, zlasti Komisijo, o nezakonitem ravnanju njihovih konkurentov, da bi se tako ravnanje končalo.“ | |
| 638 | Treba je ugotoviti, da v smernicah obstoja groženj in pritiskov ni med navedenimi olajševalnimi okoliščinami, ki sicer niso izčrpne. | |
| 639 | Ti pritiski, v kakršni koli obliki, namreč ne morejo predstavljati olajševalne okoliščine. Obstoj takih groženj nikakor ne vpliva na dejansko stanje ali težo storjene kršitve (zgoraj v točki 409 navedena sodba Dansk Røhrindustri in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 370). Tožeče stranke bi lahko pristojnim organom prijavile pritiske, ki so jih bile deležne, in pri Komisiji vložile pritožbo na podlagi člena 3 Uredbe št. 17, namesto da so sodelovale pri omejevalnem sporazumu (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 45 navedeno sodbo LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 339). Ta ugotovitev velja za vse zadevne družbe v tem primeru, ne da bi bilo med njimi treba razlikovati glede na domnevno stopnjo intenzivnosti zatrjevanih pritiskov. | |
| 640 | Komisiji posledično kot olajševalno okoliščino ni bilo treba upoštevati groženj, ki jih navajajo nekatere tožeče stranke. | |
| 5. Opustitev kršitve | |
| 641 | Družbe Bolloré, MHTP in Zanders navajajo, da Komisija v njihovem primeru kot olajševalno okoliščino ni upoštevala dejstva, da je bila kršitev opuščena takoj, ko je Komisija prvič intervenirala. Zicuñaga trdi, da je Komisija v več prejšnjih odločbah znižala globo z obrazložitvijo, da je bila kršitev opuščena pred sprejetjem dokončne odločbe. | |
| 642 | Komisija v uvodni izjavi 429 odločbe družbi MHTP odgovarja, da je za ocenitev kršitve upoštevala le omejeno obdobje, za katero je menila, da ima zadostne dokaze. Dodaja, da ker resničnost kršitve ni vzbujala dvomov, je treba zavrniti trditev družbe MHTP, da se mora hitro opustitev kršitve upoštevati kot olajševalno okoliščino. | |
| 643 | Treba je ugotoviti, da je opustitev kršitev ob prvi intervenciji Komisije ena izmed olajševalnih okoliščin, ki so izrecno navedene v točki 3 smernic. | |
| 644 | Kljub temu je treba poudariti, da Komisiji v splošnem ni treba upoštevati nadaljevanja kršitve kot obteževalne okoliščine in prav tako ne opustitve kršitve kot olajševalne okoliščine (sodba ABB proti Komisiji, točka 213). | |
| 645 | V tem primeru se je izkazalo, da je datum, na kateri naj bi zadevne tožeče stranke opustile kršitev, in sicer najpozneje septembra 1995, nastopil pred prvimi intervencijami ali preverjanji Komisije, ki so se zgodili januarja 1997. | |
| 646 | V tem primeru pa naj bi bilo znižanje uveljavljeno dvakrat, saj se pri izračunu glob v skladu s smernicami že upošteva trajanje kršitev. Namen tega upoštevanja naj bi bilo zlasti strožje kaznovanje družb, ki kršijo pravila na področju konkurence v daljšem obdobju, kot družb, katerih kršitve so kratkotrajnejše. Tako naj bi znižanje zneska globe z obrazložitvijo, da je družba prenehala ravnati protipravno pred prvimi preverjanji Komisije, povzročilo, da bi bili odgovorni za krajše kršitve že drugič v boljšem položaju. | |
| 647 | Iz uvodne izjave 348 odločbe vsekakor izhaja, da Komisija ni mogla določiti datuma, na kateri je bil kartel opuščen. Konec kršitve je določila na september 1995, ker je imela dokazne listine le do tega datuma. Komisija pa ne izključuje možnosti, da so se tajni dogovori po tem datumu nadaljevali. To pa ne spremeni dejstva, da dogodki po septembru 1995 niso bili upoštevani pri izračunu zneska zadevnih glob, zato je treba zavrniti vse zahteve po znižanju glob iz tega naslova. | |
| 648 | Če bi bilo poleg tega treba preučiti trditve strank, katerih namen je bilo znižanje globe zaradi opustitve kršitve pred intervencijo Komisije, rešitev ne bi bila drugačna. | |
| 649 | Da bi podprla svojo zahtevo po znižanju naložene globe z obrazložitvijo, da je opustila kršitev pred intervencijo Komisije, se Zicuñaga namreč omejuje na navajanje odločb Komisije, ki so bile sprejete v tem smislu. | |
| 650 | Treba je poudariti, da v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso Komisije ne zavezujejo njene prejšnje odločbe, sploh ker so bile navedene odločbe sprejete pred uporabo smernic. Zicuñaga tudi ni navedla nobenega podatka, ki bi veljal le za njen položaj in bi upravičil znižanje naložene globe z obrazložitvijo, da je bila kršitev hitro opuščena. Dejstvo, da je kršitev, ki ji je očitana, kratkotrajnejša kot kršitev, ki je očitana drugim družbam, je že bilo upoštevano, saj je bilo zvišanje, uporabljeno zaradi trajanja kršitve, nižje od tistega, ki je bilo uporabljeno za druge družbe. | |
| 651 | Družbi Bolloré in MHTP tudi nista predložili podatkov, ki bi lahko dokazali, da sta se glede opustitve kršitve znašli v posebnem položaju, ki bi upravičil znižanje njune globe. | |
| 652 | Družba Zanders tudi ne navaja le opustitve kršitve, temveč tudi aktivno vlogo, ki jo je imela v zvezi s tem. Sklicuje se na več dejstev. Njen upravni odbor naj bi na sestanku jeseni 1995 z vpletenimi zaposlenimi v družbi zahteval strogo upoštevanje pravil konkurenčnega prava. Ta sestanek naj bi pomenil začetek pomembnega programa za uskladitev, v okviru katerega je bilo za zaposlene v družbi organizirano izobraževanje na področju konkurenčnega prava. Predsednik družbe International Paper naj bi spomladi 1996 na vse sodelavce družbe naslovil pismo (priloga 8 k tožbi), v katerem jih je spomnil na spoštovanje pravil o konkurenci, k pismu pa so bile priložene direktive o spoštovanju evropskega konkurenčnega prava. Poleg tega naj bi z upoštevanjem zunanjega sveta predsednik upravnega odbora družbe Zanders, ki je 1. januarja 1996 postal predsednik AEMCP, ob tej priložnosti brez najmanjše možnosti nesporazuma naznanil konkurentom, da je družba Zanders „naredila konec“ omejevalnemu sporazumu. Število sestankov AEMCP naj bi se v letu 1996 zmanjšalo, družba Zanders pa naj ne bi bila več zastopana na skrivnih sestankih. | |
| 653 | Kakor koli, čeprav je pomembno, da je tožeča stranka sprejela ukrepe, da bi zagotovila, da njeni zaposleni v prihodnje ne bi ponovno kršili konkurenčnega prava Skupnosti, to dejstvo ne spremeni ničesar v zvezi dejanskim stanjem kršitve, ki je bila ugotovljena v tem primeru. Na podlagi te okoliščine Komisiji ni bilo treba znižati zneska globe tožeče stranke iz naslova olajševalne okoliščine (zgoraj v točki 409 navedena sodba Dansk Rørindustri in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 373, ki jo je na podlagi pritožbe potrdila zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 345). Ta ugotovitev v tem primeru velja toliko bolj, ker Komisija pri izračunu globe ni upoštevala obdobja, v katerem naj bi družba Zanders po njenih trditvah sprejela ukrepe za opustitev kršitve. | |
| 654 | Poleg tega je treba poudariti, da se zdi aktivna vloga, ki naj bi jo imela družba Zanders pri opustitvi omejevalnega sporazuma, zlasti kot predsednica AEMCP, težko združljiva z izključno pasivno ali posnemovalno vlogo, ki naj bi jo družba Zanders po svojih trditvah imela pri kršitvi. | |
| 655 | Nazadnje in vsekakor v zvezi z vsemi družbami, ki navajajo ta tožbeni razlog, Komisiji v okviru njene diskrecijske pravice nikakor ni treba odobriti znižanja globe zaradi opustitve očitne kršitve, ne glede na to, ali je opustitev nastopila pred njenimi intervencijami ali po njih. | |
| 656 | Ker je bila v tem primeru določitev cen v sektorju samokopirnega papirja gotovo očitna kršitev, ki jo je Komisija upravičeno označila kot „zelo resno“ (glej zgoraj navedene točke od 434 do 442), tožeče stranke napačno očitajo Komisiji, da jim ni dodelila znižanja globe z obrazložitvijo, da so opustile sodelovanje pri tej kršitvi pred odprtjem preiskave. | |
| 6. Gospodarske razmere v sektorju samokopirnega papirja | |
| 657 | Številne tožeče stranke (Bolloré, Zanders, Mougeot, AWA ob intervenciji Kraljevine Belgije, Koehler) Komisiji očitajo, da v nasprotju z uveljavljeno prakso odločanja ni upoštevala krize, v kateri se je v spornem obdobju znašel sektor samokopirnega papirja. | |
| 658 | V točki 5, z naslovom „Splošne opombe“, smernice določajo, da je glede na okoliščine treba upoštevati „določene objektivne podatke, kot so posebne gospodarske razmere“. | |
| 659 | Iz uvodnih izjav 24, 25 in 392 odločbe izhaja, da so bili za trg samokopirnega papirja značilni strukturne presežne zmogljivosti in upadajoče povpraševanje zaradi uporabe elektronskih sredstev. Več družb je zatrdilo, da so v spornem obdobju utrpele velike izgube. | |
| 660 | V uvodni izjavi 392 odločbe Komisija sama priznava, da je bil v obdobju, ki ga pokriva odločba, „trg samokopirnega papirja v upadanju“. V uvodni izjavi 431 pa ocenjuje, da na podlagi podatkov, ki so bili prejeti kot odgovor na OU, in poročila družbe Mikulski Hall Associates (v nadaljevanju: poročilo MHA), ki ga je naročila AEMCP, ni mogoče sklepati, da je bil sektor samokopirnega papirja med trajanjem kršitve med letoma 1992 in 1995 v kriznih razmerah, ki bi bile primerljive z razmerami zadevnih sektorjev v predhodnih zadevah na področju konkurence, ki so jih navedle družbe. | |
| 661 | Komisija navaja, da omejevalni sporazumi pogosto nastanejo na podlagi kriznih gospodarskih razmer, tako da pride možnost upoštevanja gospodarskih težav zadevnega sektorja v poštev le v popolnoma izjemnih okoliščinah. Obdobje kršitve pa naj se ne bi moglo šteti kot posebno krizno obdobje. Kljub začetku obdobja upadanja naj bi namreč prodaje ostale na visoki ravni. | |
| 662 | Komisija trdi, da vprašanje obstoja in morebitnega obsega krize v zadevnem sektorju zajema ocenitev kompleksnih ekonomskih podatkov, v zvezi s katero je nadzor sodišča Skupnosti omejen na preverjanje upoštevanja postopkovnih pravil in pravil glede obrazložitve, materialne pravilnosti dejstev, neobstoja očitne napake pri ocenitvi in zlorabe pooblastil. | |
| 663 | V zvezi z razmerami v sektorju samokopirnega papirja zadostuje spomniti, da je Sodišče prve stopnje v zgoraj v točki 93 navedeni sodbi Lögstör Rör proti Komisiji, (točki 319 in 320) presodilo, da Komisiji kot olajševalne okoliščine ni treba upoštevati slabega finančnega stanja zadevnega sektorja. Sodišče prve stopnje je tudi potrdilo, da čeprav je Komisija v predhodnih zadevah kot olajševalno okoliščino upoštevala gospodarske razmere v sektorju, ji te prakse ni treba nujno nadaljevati (zgoraj v točki 56 navedena sodba ICI proti Komisiji, točka 372). Kot je Komisija namreč upravičeno navedla, karteli v splošnem nastanejo, ko se sektor znajde v težavah. Če bi upoštevali utemeljitev tožečih strank, bi se morala globa praviloma znižati v skoraj vseh primerih. Torej prav tako ni treba preveriti, ali so bila dejstva v tem primeru in dejstva, ki so bila predmet drugih odločb, v katerih so se strukturne krize štele kot olajševalne okoliščine, res primerljiva (zgoraj v točki 496 navedena sodba Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 345). | |
| 664 | Poleg tega je treba ugotoviti, da je Komisija upoštevala razmere v sektorju samokopirnega papirja in da tožeče stranke niso dokazale, da je pri analizi razmer na trgu, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, bila storjena očitna napaka pri ocenitvi ali zloraba pooblastil. V zvezi s tem je treba spomniti na sodno prakso Sodišča (sodbi z dne 11. julija 1985 v zadevi Remia in drugi proti Komisiji, 42/84, Recueil, str. 2545, točka 34, ter z dne 17. novembra 1987 v združenih zadevah BAT in Reynolds proti Komisiji, 142/84 in 156/84, Recueil, str. 4487, točka 62), na podlagi katere velja, da če sodišče Skupnosti v splošnem izvede ves nadzor, da bi ugotovilo, ali so pogoji uporabe člena 81(1) ES izpolnjeni ali ne, je nadzor, ki ga izvede nad kompleksnimi ekonomskimi ocenami Komisije, nujno omejen na preverjanje upoštevanja postopkovnih pravil in pravil glede obrazložitve, materialne pravilnosti dejstev, neobstoja očitne napake pri ocenitvi in zlorabe pooblastil (sodba Sodišča z dne 28. maja 1998 v zadevi Deere proti Komisiji, C-7/95 P, Recueil, str. I-3111, točka 34). | |
| 665 | Poleg tega iz poročila MHA (uvodne izjave od 25 do 28 odločbe) izhaja, da če se je povečanje povpraševanja upočasnilo od leta 1990/1991 naprej, je dejanski upad nastopil v letu 1995, to je proti koncu kršitve, ugotovljene v odločbi. Stranke niso predložile nikakršnih dokazov, ki bi lahko izpodbijali te podatke. Na podlagi teh pa je mogoče sklepati, da če je res, da je trg upadal, se začetek krize ujema s koncem kršitve. | |
| 666 | Komisija je torej upravičeno menila, da razmere na trgu samokopirnega papirja ne predstavljajo olajševalne okoliščine. | |
| 7. Nepridobivanja koristi od kršitve in finančnega stanja kršitelja | |
| 667 | Več tožečih strank navaja, da so med trajanjem kršitve ustvarile minimalne dobičke ali celo utrpele izgubo. | |
| 668 | Družbi Mougeot in Bolloré se na svoje izgube sklicujeta v okviru tožbenega razloga, ki se nanaša na neupoštevanje težkega gospodarskega položaja, zato se je v zvezi s tem treba vrniti k zgoraj navedenim točkam od 657 do 666. | |
| 669 | Za družbo Koehler je posledica upoštevanja pridobivanja koristi od omejevalnega sporazuma upoštevanje utrpljenih izgub. Po njenem mnenju iz tega izhaja, da bi morala Komisija zaradi nepristranskosti znižati globo, ki ji je bila naložena, saj je utrpela precejšnje izgube v skoraj vsem obdobju kršitve in je tako od sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu pridobila zelo majhne koristi, celo nične. | |
| 670 | Temu tožbenemu razlogu ne more biti ugodeno. | |
| 671 | Sodišče prve stopnje je namreč v sodbi Cement (točka 4881) presodilo, da dejstvo, da družba ni imela nobenih koristi od kršitve, ne more predstavljati ovire pri nalaganju globe, saj bi ta sicer izgubila svoj odvračilni značaj. Iz tega izhaja, da Komisiji pri določevanju glob ni treba dokazati, da so zadevne družbe od kršitve pridobile nezakonito korist, ali če je to potrebno, upoštevati nepridobivanja koristi, ki naj bi bile pridobljene z zadevno kršitvijo. | |
| 672 | Treba je dodati, kot upravičeno trdi Komisija, da dejstvo, da številke, ki jih je predložila tožeča stranka, navajajo izgube v sektorju samokopirnega papirja v obdobju kršitve, ne izključuje možnosti, da bi bile razmere slabše brez omejevalnega sporazuma in da je kljub vsemu od njega pridobila določeno korist. Na podlagi številk, ki jih je v tožbi predložila družba Koehler, je imela velike izgube v letu 1992, so se pa precej zmanjšale v letu 1993. Tožeča stranka je nato ustvarila dobiček v letu 1994 in spet utrpela izgube v letu 1995, vendar v manjšem znesku kot v letu 1993. Zato ne moremo izločiti možnosti, da je omejevalni sporazum družbi Koehler omogočil znižanje njenih izgub. | |
| 673 | Iz navedenega izhaja, da Komisija ni storila nobene napake, ko je presodila, da v tem primeru ni olajševalnih okoliščin. | |
| H – Tožbeni razlogi: kršitev načel varstva upravičenih pričakovanj, sorazmernosti in enakega obravnavanja pri uporabi obvestila o ugodni obravnavi ter napačna uporaba tega obvestila | |
| 674 | Več tožečih strank (Zicuñaga, MHTP, Mougeot, AWA in Koehler) graja uporabo obvestila o ugodni obravnavi Komisije, pri čemer navajajo kršitev načela enakega obravnavanja. | |
| 1. Zicuñaga | |
| 675 | Zicuñaga navaja, da uporaba tega sistema znižanja ali preklica globe na podlagi sodelovanja s Komisijo dejansko predstavlja kršitev načela enakega obravnavanja, ki zahteva enako obravnavanje za enako ravnanje. | |
| 676 | Najprej je treba opomniti, da čeprav Zicuñaga s tem želi izpodbijati zakonitost obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, ni navedla, da se obvestilo ne uporablja na podlagi člena 241 ES. | |
| 677 | Nato je treba poudariti, da je znižanje globe iz naslova sodelovanja med upravnim postopkom upravičeno samo, če je ravnanje zadevne družbe Komisiji omogočilo, da je lažje ugotovila obstoj kršitve in jo po potrebi odpravila (zgoraj v točki 149 navedena sodba SCA Holding proti Komisiji, točka 36). Iz navedenega izhaja, da ne more priti do diskriminacije med družbo, ki se je sama odločila, da bo sodelovala, in družbo, ki je to zavrnila, saj se ravnanje prve razlikuje od ravnanja druge, kar upraviči različno kaznovanje. | |
| 678 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da je bila možnost sodelovanja ponujena tudi družbi Zicuñaga (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 409 navedeno sodbo Dansk Rørindustri proti Komisiji, točka 419). Vendar je ni izkoristila. Zato glede tega ne more navajati, da je bila obravnavana diskriminatorno. | |
| 679 | Tožbeni razlog, ki ga v zvezi s tem navaja Zicuñaga, se mora zavrniti. | |
| 2. MHTP | |
| 680 | MHTP navaja, da je Komisija kršila načeli varstva upravičenih pričakovanj in enakega obravnavanja, saj je globo, ki ji je bila naložena, znižala le za 10 %, čeprav je priznala dejstva in kršitev. Trdi, da so v obdobju, v katerem je sodelovala s Komisijo, odločbe, ki so omogočale uporabo obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, priznavale znižanje globe za najmanj 20 %, medtem ko je bilo znižanje za 10 % določeno za družbe, ki niso priznale kršitve. Zato je upravičeno pričakovala, da bo zanjo veljalo 20-odstotno znižanje, saj se je odpovedala uveljavljanju pravice do obrambe in priznala sodelovanje pri kršitvi, preden je bilo poslano OU. | |
| 681 | Treba je opozoriti, da za primer MHTP velja točka D obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, v skladu s katero „je družba, kadar sodeluje, ne da bi bili izpolnjeni pogoji iz [točk] B in C, upravičena do znižanja globe – ki lahko znaša od 10 do 50 % –, ki bi ji bila naložena zaradi nesodelovanja“. To obvestilo pojasnjuje: | „Za tak primer gre, če: | — | družba Komisiji, preden ta pošlje obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, pošlje podatke, dokumente ali druge dokazne elemente, ki prispevajo k potrditvi obstoja storjene kršitve; | — | družba, potem ko je prejela obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, Komisijo obvesti, da ne izpodbija resničnosti dejstev, na katera je Komisija oprla svoje obtožbe.“ | |
| 682 | V tem primeru je Komisija iz naslova točke D, drugi odstavek, druga alinea, obvestila o ugodni obravnavi družbi MHTP dodelila 10 -odstotno znižanje, ker ta ni izpodbijala resničnosti dejstev (uvodna izjava 458 odločbe). Ni ji dodelila znižanja iz naslova točke D, drugi odstavek, prva alinea, tega obvestila. Čeprav Komisija v uvodni izjavi 446 odločbe prizna, da ji je družba MHTP sporočila podatke pred obvestilom o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, pa v uvodni izjavi 450 poudarja: | „Odgovor družbe MHTP (Stora) je bil najmanj jasen: priznava obstoj razprav o cenah med konkurenti, toda trdi, da ni bil sklenjen noben dogovor o zvišanju. Ta nejasna in nepomembna navedba se ne more šteti kot podatek ali dokument, ki bi prispeval k potrditvi obstoja storjene kršitve, in zato ne upraviči nobenega znižanja zneska globe.“ | |
| 683 | Treba je poudariti, da družba MHTP ni podala nobenega elementa, ki bi lahko dokazal, da so podatki, ki jih je predložila Komisiji pred OU, prispevali k potrditvi obstoja storjene kršitve. | |
| 684 | Glede primerjave tega primera s predhodno prakso Komisije je treba poudariti, da le dejstvo, da je Komisija v svoji predhodni praksi odločanja dodelila določeno stopnjo znižanja za določeno ravnanje, ne pomeni, da mora v okviru poznejšega upravnega postopka pri ocenitvi podobnega ravnanja dodeliti enako sorazmerno znižanje (zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Mayr-Melnhof proti Komisiji, točka 368, in zgoraj navedena sodba ABB proti Komisiji, točka 239). | |
| 685 | V sodbi ABB proti Komisiji Sodišče prve stopnje ostaja pri tej ugotovitvi, da zavrne kršitev načela enakega obravnavanja glede na predhodne odločbe Komisije, ne da bi te odločbe preučilo. Natančna preučitev spoštovanja načela enakega obravnavanja v točkah 240 do 245 iste sodbe se namreč nanaša le na primerjavo položaja različnih sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu. | |
| 686 | Družba MHTP se sklicuje na zgoraj v točki 459 navedeno sodbo Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij in drugi proti Komisiji (točka 1232), da bi dokazala, da je Sodišče prve stopnje že preučevalo zahteve, ki so temeljile na neenakosti obravnavanja glede na druge zadeve. Toda čeprav je res, da ta sodba obravnava to vprašanje, ga obravnava zaradi zavrnitve trditve, da Komisija ni upoštevala načela enakega obravnavanja glede na svojo predhodno prakso. Po mnenju Sodišča prve stopnje se določitev zneska glob opira na več meril, ki jih je treba preučiti za vsak primer posebej glede na okoliščine primera, Komisiji pa zaradi uporabe glob na določeni ravni za določene vrste kršitev v preteklosti ne more biti odvzeta možnost dviga te stopnje, če je to potrebno za zagotovitev izvajanja konkurenčne politike. Ta sodba tako ne more podpreti trditev družbe MHTP. | |
| 687 | Vsekakor je treba ugotoviti, da se vrednosti, določene v točki D obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, raztezajo od 10 do 50 %, ne da bi bila določena posebna merila za prilagoditev znižanja znotraj teh vrednosti. Tako ne ustvarjajo upravičenih pričakovanj o pridobitvi posebnih odstotkov znižanja. | |
| 688 | Na podlagi celote teh ugotovitev Sodišče prve stopnje zavrže ta tožbeni razlog. | |
| 3. Mougeot | |
| 689 | Najprej je treba opozoriti, da v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso Komisija v okviru svoje ocene sodelovanja, ki ga ponudijo člani omejevalnega sporazuma, ne more kršiti načela enakega obravnavanja (glej zgoraj v točki 496 navedeno sodbo Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji, točka 394 in navedena sodna praksa). Vsekakor je treba Komisiji priznati široko diskrecijsko pravico pri ocenitvi kakovosti in uporabnosti sodelovanja, ki ga ponudijo različni člani omejevalnega sporazuma, pri čemer se lahko graja le očitno prekoračenje te pravice. | |
| 690 | Mougeot trdi, da je diskriminirana glede na družbo Sappi, ki ji je bilo priznano stoodstotno znižanje globe, in da bi ji morala Komisija dodeliti ugodnost iz dela B obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, ki predvideva 75-odstotno znižanje. | |
| 691 | Treba je ugotoviti, kot izhaja iz uvodnih izjav od 436 do 445 odločbe, da je bila družba Sappi, ki je prijavila kartel, edina družba, ki je izpolnila kumulativne pogoje iz točke B obvestila o ugodni obravnavi. Ker je dokaze o obstoju omejevalnega sporazuma predložila šele po tem, ko je Komisija na podlagi odločbe izvedla preverjanja, se družba Mougeot ni mogla sklicevati na določbe iz točke B. Da bi zanjo veljale določbe iz točke C, bi morala družba Mougeot izpolniti pogoje iz točke B, od (b) do (e). Vendar Mougeot v svoji tožbi priznava, da ni bila prva družba, ki je Komisiji posredovala podatke v zvezi z omejevalnim sporazumom. Poleg tega je Mougeot v nasprotju z družbo Sappi, ki je jeseni 1996 na svojo pobudo Komisiji prijavila omejevalni sporazum, začela sodelovati šele z odgovorom na zahtevo po informacijah, ki jo je marca 1999 nanjo naslovila Komisija. | |
| 692 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da iz besedila točke B(b) obvestila o ugodni obravnavi izhaja, da „prvi“ družbi ni treba predložiti celote podatkov, ki bi dokazovala vse podrobnosti delovanja omejevalnega sporazuma, temveč zadostuje, da predloži „nekaj“ odločilnih podatkov. Natančneje, to besedilo ne zahteva, da so predloženi podatki „zadostni“ za nastanek obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah in tudi ne za sprejetje dokončne odločbe, ki bi ugotovila obstoj kršitve. Zato le dejstvo, da je družba Mougeot pozneje lahko predložila podatke, ki naj bi odločilno pripomogli k temu, da je Komisija lahko navedla dokaz o kršitvi, ne more spremeniti dejstva, da je bila Sappi prva družba, ki je prijavila omejevalni sporazum, in ne more povzročiti, da za družbo Mougeot velja določba, ki velja le za prvo družbo, ki prijavi kartel pred preverjanji Komisije. | |
| 693 | Komisija je torej upravičeno določila, da za družbo Mougeot velja točka D obvestila o ugodni obravnavi. S tem, da ji je iz tega naslova dodelila 50-odstotno znižanje, kar je najvišje mogoče znižanje, je Komisija pravilno upoštevala pomembnost podatkov, ki jih je predložila družba Mougeot, ter njeno sodelovanje med preverjanji na kraju samem in med preiskavo. | |
| 4. AWA | |
| 694 | Družba AWA trdi, da bi ji moralo biti dodeljeno enako znižanje kot družbi Mougeot, ker je stopila v stik s Komisijo, preden je to storila družba Mougeot, in ker so bili dokazi, ki jih je predložila, uporabnejši kot dokazi, ki jih je predložila družba Mougeot. | |
| 695 | Ob upoštevanju sodne prakse, navedene zgoraj v točki 689, je treba preveriti, ali je Komisija, s tem da je družbi AWA dodelila 35-odstotno znižanje, družbi Mougeot pa 50-odstotno, očitno prekoračila svoje pristojnosti pri izvajanju svoje široke diskrecijske pravice, ki ji je priznana na tem področju. | |
| 696 | Glede vrstnega reda, v katerem so bili Komisiji predloženi podatki, je treba ugotoviti, da je AWA res sporočila, da namerava sodelovati s Komisijo, preden je to storila družba Mougeot, da pa je bila družba Mougeot prva, ki je podatke dejansko poslala Komisiji, in sicer 14. aprila 1999. Datum, na kateri je AWA dejansko začela sodelovati, je namreč 30. april 1999. | |
| 697 | V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da Komisiji ni bilo treba upoštevati za odločilno dejstvo, da je ena družba naznanila sodelovanje nekoliko prej kot druge. Iz obvestila o ugodni obravnavi namreč jasno izhaja, da je za uporabo točk B in C pomembno to, da družba prva predloži odločilne podatke. V tem primeru je ta pogoj izpolnila družba Sappi (glej točki 691 in 692 zgoraj). Za družbi AWA in Mougeot je torej veljala točka D, ki se nikakor ne nanaša in ne dodeljuje nobenega pomena dejstvu, da je neka družba začela sodelovati prej kot druga. | |
| 698 | Poleg tega dejstvo, da je AWA morda želela obvestiti druge člane omejevalnega sporazuma o svoji nameri sodelovanja, preden je stopila v stik s Komisijo, ni znamenje njenega sodelovanja s Komisijo. | |
| 699 | Nasprotno, ker sta AWA in Mougeot svoje prispevke Komisiji poslali po tem, ko je to storila družba Sappi in ko je Komisija izvedla preverjanja, je treba preveriti, ali so si ti prispevki po „vrednosti podobni“. | |
| 700 | V zvezi s tem se je treba vrniti k uvodnima izjavama 447 in 448 odločbe: | „Mougeot je prostovoljno dala izjave in predložila dokumente, ki vsebujejo podrobne podatke o sestankih kartela (v večini v zvezi s svojim domačim trgom v Franciji), predvsem o datumih sestankov, identiteti sodelujočih, dnevnem redu in sklenjenih dogovorih. | AWA je Komisiji prostovoljno predložila podatke o sestankih kartela, v katerih so bila natančno navedena obdobja, v kateri so v različnih državah članicah Skupnosti potekali sestanki, in imena sodelujočih družb. Glede dnevnega reda sestankov je AWA izjavila, da ‚se je na nekaterih od teh sestankov […] dogovarjalo o cenah samokopirnega papirja […] do izmenjav namer v zvezi z napovedjo zvišanja cen‘.“ | |
| 701 | Poleg tega Komisija v uvodni izjavi 252 odločbe našteva dokazno gradivo v zvezi z omejevalnim sporazumom v njegovi celoti. Med njimi so izjave družb Mougeot in Sappi, dokazi, ki jih je v zvezi z „neprimernimi“ sestanki v odgovoru na zahtevo po informacijah Komisije predložila družba AWA, ter zapisniki in podrobne izjave o nacionalnih ali regionalnih sestankih, ki sta jih podali družbi Mougeot in Sappi. | |
| 702 | Primerjava teh uvodnih izjav pokaže, da so bili podatki družbe Mougeot podrobni, podatki družbe AWA pa ne. Družba Mougeot naj bi predvsem natančno navedla datume sestankov, medtem ko naj bi AWA navedla le obdobja. Vsekakor tudi če v skladu z uvodno izjavo 61 odločbe prvotna izjava družbe AWA ni tako podrobna, kot izjava družbe Mougeot, je AWA v odgovoru na zahtevo po informacijah Komisiji predložila „seznam ‚neprimernih‘ (improper) sestankov ali skupin ‚neprimernih‘ sestankov, ki so med konkurenti potekali od leta 1992 do leta 1998“. Ta seznam našteva sestanke, ki so potekali natančno na datume, za katere je AWA pripomogla, da so se ugotovili. Poleg tega je obdobje, ki ga pokrivajo izjave družbe AWA, daljše od obdobja, na katero se nanašajo izjave družbe Mougeot. Sestanki, ki jih v svoji izjavi z dne 14. aprila 1999 navaja družba Mougeot (dokumenti št. 7647 do 7655, navedeni zgoraj v točki 165), so namreč potekali od 1. oktobra 1993 do poletja 1995. Glede podatkov v zvezi s potekanjem tajnih sestankov torej ni bistvenih razlik med družbama Mougeot in AWA. | |
| 703 | Glede sodelujočih pri tajnih sestankih se podatki družbe Mougeot o „identiteti sodelujočih“ skoraj ne razlikujejo od podatkov družbe AWA o „imenih sodelujočih družb“. Vsekakor iz Priloge II k odločbi izhaja, da so bile izjave družbe AWA (dokument št. 7828) zelo uporabne za Komisijo, ko je ugotavljala sodelovanje na sestankih vsake izmed družb. To potrjuje dejstvo, da je ta dokument izmed vseh dokumentov daleč največkrat naveden v opombah na dnu strani v podporo seznamu sestankov in njihovih sodelujočih. | |
| 704 | Nazadnje uvodni izjavi 447 in 448 izpostavljata omejitev izjav družbe Mougeot na zlasti „domači trg v Franciji“, medtem ko se podatki družbe AWA nanašajo na sestanke „v različnih državah članicah Skupnosti“. Ker je več družb izpodbijalo omejevalni sporazum na ravni Evrope, so podatki, ki jih je v zvezi s tem podala AWA, toliko pomembnejši. | |
| 705 | Zato je Komisija storila očitno napako pri presoji, ko je družbi Mougeot dodelila 50-odstotno znižanje, družbi AWA pa 35-odstotno. Namreč tudi če je družba Mougeot, v nasprotju z družbo AWA, predložila dokumente, ki so nastali v spornem obdobju, in če so v nekaterih točkah njene izjave podrobnejše, se podatki družbe AWA nanašajo na daljše obdobje in pokrivajo širše geografsko območje. Torej je treba oceniti, da sta si sodelovanji družb AWA in Mougeot po vrednosti podobni. Poleg tega ni mogoče trditi, da se njuni sodelovanji razlikujeta glede na to, koliko sta bili uporabni za Komisijo. Iz preostale preučitve, ki jo je zgoraj v zvezi s španskim trgom (glej točke 161 do 168 zgoraj) ali s tajnostjo uradnih sestankov AEMCP pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 (glej točke od 256 do 310 zgoraj) izvedlo Sodišče prve stopnje, izhaja, da se podatki, ki sta jih predložili družbi AWA in Mougeot, večinoma dopolnjujejo in skupaj s podatki družbe Sappi tvorijo celoto indicev, ki so bistvenega pomena za razumevanje delovanja omejevalnega sporazuma in dokaz njegovega obstoja. | |
| 706 | Iz navedenega izhaja, da mora biti tožbenemu razlogu družbe AWA, ki se nanaša na nezadostnost in diskriminatornost znižanja, ki ji je bilo dodeljeno iz naslova njenega sodelovanja, ugodeno. | |
| 707 | Pri izvajanju svojih neomejenih pristojnosti Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da ker je vrednost dokazov, ki sta jih predložili družbi Mougeot in AWA, podobna, je treba družbi AWA iz naslova njenega sodelovanja dodeliti enako znižanje kot družbi Mougeot, to je 50-odstotno. Posledično se bo morala globa, naložena družbi AWA, znižati. | |
| 5. Koehler | |
| 708 | Nazadnje, družba Koehler meni, da Komisija ni upoštevala njenega polnega sodelovanja, preden je bilo poslano OU in tudi po tem. Po njenem mnenju je dejstvo, da so družbe Carrs, MHTP in Zanders obravnavane s prizanesljivostjo, ona pa ne, v nasprotju z načelom enakega obravnavanja. | |
| 709 | Uvodni izjavi 457 in 458 odločbe se glasita: | „457. | Družba Koehler izjavlja, da ne izpodbija ‚določenih dejstev‘ iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah. Izpodbija pa pomembne dele dejanskega opisa svojega sodelovanja pri omejevalnem sporazumu v njegovem celotnem obdobju. Družba Koehler posebej izpodbija opis dogovorov o delitvi kvot in trga, ki ga je podala Komisija, ter obstoj nadzornega sistema. Komisija torej sklepa, da družba Koehler v resnici ni sodelovala. | 458. | Komisija družbam Carrs, MHTP in Zanders dodeljuje 10-odstotno znižanje, ker niso izpodbijale resničnosti dejstev.“ | |
| 710 | Glede obdobja, preden je bilo poslano OU, družba Koehler trdi, da je popolnoma sodelovala s Komisijo. Dodaja, da „je tako preverjanje pri družbi Koehler 9. in 10. decembra 1997 ni bilo prisiljeno, saj je [M. F.], član upravnega odbora, v to vnaprej privolil“. | |
| 711 | V zvezi s tem se le privolitev v preverjanje ne more šteti kot dokaz polnega sodelovanja. Obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi določa precejšnje znižanje globe, če družba Komisiji, preden ta pošlje obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah, pošlje podatke, dokumente ali druge dokazne elemente, ki prispevajo k potrditvi obstoja storjene kršitve. Družba Koehler ni predložila ničesar od naštetega in tega tudi ne izpodbija. Trditev družbe Koehler torej ne more biti utemeljena. | |
| 712 | Kar zadeva obdobje po tem, ko je bilo poslano OU, obvestilo o ugodni obravnavi predvideva precejšnje znižanje globe, če družba Komisijo obvesti, da ne izpodbija resničnosti dejstev, na katera je Komisija oprla svoje obtožbe. Treba je preveriti, ali ta primer velja za družbo Koehler, kot trdi sama, in to tudi v primerjavi z drugimi družbami, za katere velja ta določba. | |
| 713 | V stališčih o OU je družba Koehler izjavila, da priznava „dejstva in očitke, ki jih je pravilno preučila in dokazala Komisija“. V svoji tožbi dodaja, da „če to priznanje res ni bilo popolno, je bilo tako zato, ker ni ocenila kot sprejemljivo, da mora za pravilno označiti nekaj, kar ni pravilno, le da bi dobila znižanje globe“. | |
| 714 | Vsekakor je treba ugotoviti, da tudi če družba Koehler v nadaljevanju poskuša delno utemeljiti nepopolnost svoje izjave z naknadno spremembo stališča Komisije, priznava, da so nepopolnosti bile in da je „relativizirala ugotovitve Komisije glede dogovorov o delitvi kvot in trga“ Ko poleg tega družba Koehler priznava obstoj izmenjave informacij o prodanih količinah na regionalni ravni – in jih ob tem zanika na evropski ravni – dodaja, da gre za izjeme, ki se nanašajo na zaključena obdobja. | |
| 715 | Poleg tega je res, da je družba Koehler na obravnavi navedla, da se je izpodbijanje nanašalo le na obdobje pred oktobrom 1993 in da je v poznejšem obdobju kljub nekaterim mogoče manj jasno ali negotovo oblikovanim izjavam sodelovala s Komisijo. Kljub temu pa iz njenih stališč o OU ne izhaja, da je družba Koehler svoje izpodbijanje izrecno omejila na prvo obdobje. Nasprotno v svojih uvodnih opombah navaja, da ne bo izpodbijala določenih dejstev, in sicer tistih, ki jih je Komisija pravilno ugotovila in ocenila v OU. Nadalje del III, ki se nanaša na izpodbijanje očitanih dejstev, vsebuje točko 3, ki je naslovljena „Nič dogovorov o delitvi kvot ali porazdelitvi trgov na evropski ravni“, in točko 4, z naslovom „Nič nadzornih sistemov“. Za ta izpodbijanja, ki niso časovno omejena, se ne more šteti, da niso gotova ali natančna. | |
| 716 | Vendar je treba opozoriti, da je znižanje zneska globe upravičeno samo, če je ravnanje družbe Komisiji omogočilo, da je lažje ugotovila kršitev in jo po potrebi odpravila (glej sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 13. decembra 2001 v združenih zadevah Krupp Thyssen Stainless in Acciai speciali Terni proti Komisiji, T-45/98 in T-47/98, Recueil, str. II-3757, točka 270 in navedena sodna praksa). Komisija ima v zvezi s tem diskrecijsko pravico, kot izhaja iz besedila točke D 2 obvestila o ugodni obravnavi in posebej iz uvodnih besed „Za to gre zlasti v primeru […]“. Poleg tega in predvsem zato je lahko znižanje na podlagi obvestila o ugodni obravnavi upravičeno le, če bi se za predložene podatke in splošneje za ravnanje zadevne družbe v tem smislu lahko štelo, da gre za resnično sodelovanje te družbe (zgoraj v točki 409 navedena sodba Dansk Rørindustri in drugi proti Komisiji, točki 394 in 395). | |
| 717 | Nepopolno priznanje ali dvoumne izjave pa ne pomenijo resničnega sodelovanja in ne morejo olajšati dela Komisije, saj zahtevajo preverjanja. To drži še toliko bolj, ker se ta nepopolnost nanaša na točke, kot so v tem primeru trajanje kršitve, prodajne kvote, tržni deleži ali izmenjava informacij. | |
| 718 | Ker je s pomočjo te nepopolnosti družba Koehler izpodbijala številne elemente omejevalnega sporazuma ali vsaj ni pomagala Komisiji pri njeni nalogi preiskave in kaznovanja omejevalnega sporazuma, ne more zahtevati precejšnjega znižanja zneska globe, ki ji je bila naložena iz naslova neizpodbijanja resničnosti dejstev. | |
| 719 | Nazadnje je treba preveriti, ali je bilo, kot trdi družba Koehler, s tem da je bilo znižanje njene globe iz tega naslova zavrnjeno, kršeno načelo enakega obravnavanja, ker so družbe Carrs, MHTP in Zanders pridobile 10-odstotno znižanje globe. | |
| 720 | Ker družba Koehler pri tem graja stopnjo znižanja, ki je bila dodeljena tem drugim družbam, ker niso izpodbijale dejstev, ki so jim bila očitana, in tudi če je Komisija res dodelila previsoko znižanje globe, naložene tem drugim družbam, je treba spomniti, da mora biti spoštovanje načela enakega obravnavanja usklajeno s spoštovanjem načela zakonitosti, na podlagi katerega ne more nihče sebi v korist navesti nezakonitosti, ki je bila storjena v korist drugega (zgoraj v točki 468 navedena sodba SCA Holding proti Komisiji, točka 160, zgoraj v točki 446 navedena sodba Mayr-Melnhof proti Komisiji, točka 334, in zgoraj v točki 45 navedena sodba LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji, točka 367). | |
| 721 | Ker se poleg tega izpodbijanje družbe Koehler nanaša na dejstvo, da ni dobila znižanja globe iz naslova obvestila o ugodni obravnavi, se je treba vrniti k zgoraj navedenim točkam od 708 do 718, iz katerih izhaja, da v okoliščinah tega primera tega ne more zahtevati. | |
| 722 | Poleg tega je v zvezi z izpodbijanjem resničnosti dejstev drugih družb, ki so dobile 10-odstotno znižanje glob, treba poudariti, da družba Carrs priznava obstoj omejevalnega sporazuma in svoje sodelovanje pri njem v celotnem obdobju kršitve, navedene v odločbi. Vendar pa navaja, da je sodelovala le pri sestankih, ki so se nanašali na trga Združenega Kraljestva in Irske, ter da ni bila seznanjena z omejevalnim sporazumom na evropski ravni. Ob tem ne izpodbija resničnosti dejstev. Sicer pa dejstvo, da družba Carrs trdi, da so bili učinki omejevalnega sporazuma omejeni, prav tako ni v nasprotju s priznavanjem resničnosti dejstev. | |
| 723 | Za družbi Zanders in MHTP družba Koehler trdi, da uvodni izjavi 455 in 456, na podlagi katerih naj družbi ne bi izpodbijali dejstev, nista v skladu z ugotovitvijo iz uvodne izjave 395, da naj bi družbi MHTP in Zanders zanikali uporabo dogovorov, ki so bili namenjeni izvedbi določitve cen in porazdelitve kvot. | |
| 724 | Treba je opozoriti, da je namen trditev družb MHTP in Zanders, navedenih v uvodni izjavi 395, izpodbijanje učinkovitosti dogovorov, da bi se jim priznala manjša teža. Te trditve ne izpodbijajo obstoja omejevalnega sporazuma in zato niso nezdružljive z neizpodbijanjem dejstev. | |
| 725 | Glede dejstva, da je družba MHTP priznala, da je sodelovala pri omejevalnem sporazumu šele od konca leta 1992 (uvodni izjavi 270 in 271), je treba poudariti, da je Komisija to upoštevala. V skladu z uvodno izjavo 456 odločbe namreč „družba MHTP navaja, da ne izpodbija dejstev, na katerih temelji ugotovitev kršitve med letom 1992 in sredino leta 1995“. | |
| 726 | Sicer pa za stališče družbe MHTP, ki je izpodbijala le datum začetka kršitve, ne more biti odločeno, da je primerljivo s stališčem družbe Koehler, katerega nepopolnosti so se nanašale na več elementov omejevalnega sporazuma. | |
| 727 | V teh okoliščinah družba Koehler ni dokazala, da je bila predmet neenakega obravnavanja. Iz celote teh ugotovitev izhaja, da Komisija upravičeno ni znižala globe, ki je bila družbi naložena iz naslova obvestila o ugodni obravnavi. | |
| III – Zahteva po predložitvi dokumentov, ki jo je vložila družba AWA | |
| 728 | AWA poziva Sodišče prve stopnje, naj od Komisije zahteva, naj predloži interne dokumente, ki se nanašajo na izračun globe, ki ji je bila naložena, in vse dokumente, navedene v odločbi, razen tistih, ki jih je prejela 1. avgusta 2000. | |
| 729 | Najprej je treba spomniti, da lahko na podlagi člena 49 Poslovnika Sodišče prve stopnje v kateri koli fazi postopka odredi ukrep procesnega vodstva ali pripravljalni ukrep iz členov 64 in 65 Poslovnika. Sem sodi tudi zahteva po predložitvi dokumentov. | |
| 730 | Da bi Sodišče prve stopnje lahko odločilo, ali je za učinkovit potek postopka uporabno, da odredi predložitev določenih dokumentov, mora stranka, ki to zahteva, natančno navesti zahtevane dokumente in Sodišču prve stopnje predložiti vsaj najmanjši skupek elementov, ki dokazujejo uporabnost teh dokumentov za postopek (zgoraj v točki 256 navedena sodba Baustahlgewerbe proti Komisiji, točka 93). | |
| 731 | Treba pa je ugotoviti, da kot sta navedeni v tožbi, niti v zahtevi po predložitvi internih dokumentov, ki se nanašajo na izračun globe, niti v zahtevi, ki se nanaša na vse dokumente, navedene v odločbi, razen dokumentov, ki so bili na družbo AWA naslovljeni 1. avgusta 2000, zahtevani dokumenti niso navedeni dovolj natančno, da bi Sodišče prve stopnje lahko ocenilo njihovo uporabnost v tem postopku. | |
| 732 | Zato je obe zahtevi treba zavrniti. | |
| 733 | Poleg tega AWA ni dokazala uporabnosti teh dokumentov za ta postopek. | |
| 734 | Glede njene zahtevo za predložitev internih dokumentov Komisije, ki se nanašajo na izračun globe, ki ji je bila naložena, le dejstvo, ki ga navaja AWA, da je zlasti v več zadevah, na podlagi katerih so bile sprejete sodbe, imenovane „Kartonske plošče“ (zlasti zgoraj v točki 483 navedena sodba Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags proti Komisiji), Sodišče prve stopnje od Komisije zahtevalo, naj predloži take dokumente, ne more dokazati njihove uporabnosti v tem primeru in Sodišču prve stopnje le zaradi tega dejstva ni treba odrediti enakih ukrepov. | |
| 735 | Sicer pa, kot poudarja Komisija, so bile sodbe, imenovane „Kartonske plošče“, sprejete pred uporabo smernic. Namen teh pa je prav zagotovitev preglednosti in objektivnosti odločb Komisije, kar omogočajo s prikazom načrta nove metode, ki se uporablja za izračun zneska globe. V tem primeru odločba, pri kateri so jasno uporabljene smernice, podrobno obrazloži izračun globe. | |
| 736 | Nazadnje iz ustaljene sodne prakse izhaja, da se z internimi dokumenti Komisije stranke ne seznanijo, razen če to na podlagi trdnih indicev, ki jih morajo te predložiti, zahtevajo izjemne okoliščine primera (sklep Sodišča z dne 18. junija 1986 v združenih zadevah BAT in Reynolds proti Komisiji, 142/84 in 156/84, Recueil, str. 1899, točka 11, zgoraj v točki 716 navedena sodba Krupp Thyssen Stainless in Acciai speciali Terni proti Komisiji, točka 34; v tem smislu glej tudi sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 27. oktobra 1994 v zadevi Deere proti Komisiji, T-35/92, Recueil, str. II-957, točka 31). V tem smislu pa AWA ni predložila trdnih indicev. | |
| 737 | Glede zahteve po predložitvi vseh dokumentov, navedenih v odločbi, razen tistih, ki so bili na družbo AWA naslovljeni 1. avgusta 2000, družba trdi, da bi na podlagi te zahteve lahko videla in preučila dokaze, ki jih je Komisija navedla v odločbi. | |
| 738 | Tudi če v zvezi s tem graja neuporabnost kazala (glej točke od 109 do 117 zgoraj), AWA ni izpodbijala dejstva, da je imela med upravnim postopkom dostop do spisa Komisije. Ker za obtožbo podjetja v odločbi Komisija ne uporablja drugih dokumentov kot tistih, do katerih je imela družba med upravnim postopkom dostop, ni dolžna družbi omogočiti dostop do vseh dokumentov, navedenih v odločbi (v tem smislu glej zgoraj v točki 45 navedeno sodbo LR AF 1998 proti Komisiji in navedeno sodno prakso). | |
| 739 | Zahteva, ki je naslovljena na Sodišče prve stopnje, se nanaša na vse dokumente, navedene v odločbi, razen na tiste, ki so bili 1. avgusta 2000 naslovljeni na družbo AWA. V nasprotju s pismom, ki ga je AWA naslovila na Komisijo 22. februarja 2002, ta zahteva ne navaja podrobno, da se nanaša zlasti na odgovore drugih naslovnikov OU in na poročilo PricewaterhouseCoopers. | |
| 740 | Vendar tudi če priznamo, da je glede na splošno zahtevo, naslovljeno na Sodišče prve stopnje, treba upoštevati te podrobnosti in da se za zahtevo, ki se v splošnem nanaša na odgovore drugih naslovnikov OU, lahko šteje, da dovolj natančno navaja zaprošene dokumente, AWA nikakor ni dokazala uporabnosti teh dokumentov v tem postopku. | |
| 741 | Zahtevo po ukrepu procesnega vodstva, ki jo je na Sodišče prve stopnje naslovila AWA, je treba torej zavrniti. | |
| 742 | Na podlagi celote teh ugotovitev je treba tožbe, ki so bile vložene v zadevah T-109/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02 in T-132/02, zavrniti. V zadevi T-118/02 se globa, ki je bila naložena družbi AWA, zniža na 141,75 milijona EUR. V zadevi T-136/02 se globa, ki je bila naložena družbi Zicuñaga, zniža na 1,309 milijona EUR. | |
| Stroški | |
| 743 | V skladu s členom 87(2) Poslovnika se neuspeli stranki naloži plačilo stroškov, če so bili ti priglašeni. Na podlagi odstavka 3, prvi pododstavek, iste določbe lahko Sodišče prve stopnje, če vsaka stranka uspe samo deloma, odloči, da se stroški delijo. | |
| 744 | V zadevah T-109/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02 in T-132/02 tožeče stranke s predlogi niso uspele. Zato v skladu s predlogi tožene stranke nosijo vse stroške. | |
| 745 | Ker je bilo v zadevi T-118/02 tožbi delno ugodeno, bodo okoliščine zadeve pravično ocenjene z odločitvijo, da tožeča stranka nosi dve tretjini svojih stroškov in dve tretjini stroškov, ki jih je priglasila Komisija, Komisija pa nosi tretjino svojih stroškov in tretjino stroškov, ki jih je priglasila družba AWA. Ker je Kraljevina Belgija intervenirala v podporo predlogom tožeče stranke zaradi znižanja globe iz naslova olajševalnih okoliščin, povezanih s težavami, v katerih se je znašel sektor samokopirnega papirja, se ji naloži plačilo njenih stroškov in v skladu s predlogi Komisije tudi plačilo stroškov Komisije, povezanih s to intervencijo. | |
| 746 | Ker je bilo v zadevi T-136/02 tožbi delno ugodeno, bodo okoliščine zadeve pravično ocenjene z odločitvijo, da tožeča stranka nosi dve tretjini svojih stroškov in dve tretjini stroškov, ki jih je priglasila Komisija, Komisija pa nosi tretjino svojih stroškov in tretjino stroškov, ki jih je priglasila tožeča stranka. | |
| | Iz teh razlogov je | SODIŠČE PRVE STOPNJE (peti senat) | razsodilo: | |
| | 1. | V zadevi Bolloré proti Komisiji (T-109/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 2. | V zadevi Arjo Wiggins Appleton proti Komisiji (T-118/02): | — | znesek globe, naložene tožeči stranki s členom 3 Odločbe Komisije 2004/337/ES z dne 20. decembra 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP (zadeva COMP/E-1/36.212 – Samokopirni papir), znaša 141,75 milijona EUR; | — | v preostalem se tožba zavrne; | — | tožeča stranka nosi dve tretjini svojih stroškov in dve tretjini stroškov, ki jih je priglasila Komisija; le-ta nosi tretjino svojih stroškov in tretjino stroškov, ki jih je priglasila tožeča stranka; | — | intervenientki se naloži plačilo lastnih stroškov in stroškov Komisije, povezanih z intervencijo. | |
| | 3. | V zadevi Mitsubishi HiTec Paper Bielefeld proti Komisiji (T-122/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 4. | V zadevi Papierfabrik August Koehler proti Komisiji (T-125/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 5. | V zadevi M-real Zanders proti Komisiji (T-126/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 6. | V zadevi Papeteries Mougeot proti Komisiji (T-128/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 7. | V zadevi Torraspapel proti Komisiji (T-129/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 8. | V zadevi Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles proti Komisiji (T-132/02) se: | — | tožba zavrne; | — | tožeči stranki naloži plačilo stroškov. | |
| | 9. | V zadevi Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga proti Komisiji (T-136/02): | — | znesek globe, naložene tožeči stranki s členom 3 Odločbe Komisije 2004/337/ES z dne 20. decembra 2001 v zvezi s postopkom na podlagi člena 81 Pogodbe ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP (zadeva COMP/E-1/36.212 – Samokopirni papir), znaša 1,309 milijona EUR; | — | v preostalem se tožba zavrne; | — | tožeča stranka nosi dve tretjini svojih stroškov in dve tretjini stroškov, ki jih je priglasila Komisija; le-ta nosi tretjino svojih stroškov in tretjino stroškov, ki jih je priglasila tožeča stranka. | |
| | Vilaras | Dehousse | Šváby | Razglašeno na javni obravnavi v Luxembourgu, 26. aprila 2007. | Sodni tajnik | E. Coulon | Predsednik | M. Vilaras | |
| Stvarno kazalo | |
| | Dejansko stanje | |
| | Postopek in predlogi strank | |
| | Pravo | |
| | I – Tožbeni razlogi za razglasitev ničnosti odločbe | |
| | A – Tožbeni razlogi v zvezi s potekom upravnega postopka | |
| | 1. Prvi tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravice do zaslišanja, ki izhaja iz nerazkritja dokumentov, ki jih je Komisija opredelila kot zaupne, med upravnim postopkom | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 2. Drugi tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravice do dostopa do spisa zaradi nepredložitve dokumentov, ki niso vključeni v preiskovalni spis, poslan na CD-ROM-u | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 3. Tretji tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravic do obrambe in načela kontradiktornosti, ki izhaja iz neujemanja med OU in odločbo | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 4. Četrti tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravic do obrambe, pravice do poštenega sojenja in načela domneve nedolžnosti | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 5. Peti tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela dobrega upravljanja med preiskavo zadeve in neobstoj obrazložitve odločbe | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 6. Šesti tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela dobrega upravljanja, pravice do dostopa do spisa in pravic do obrambe, ki izhaja iz dejstva, da je bilo nekatere dokumente v preiskovalnem spisu težko najti in da seznam dokumentov, ki sestavljajo navedeni spis, ni bil uporaben | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 7. Sedmi tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela dobrega upravljanja in pravic do obrambe zaradi prepozne vročitve odločbe | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | B – Tožbeni razlogi: kršitev člena 81 ES in člena 53 Sporazuma EGP ter tudi napake pri presoji Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem nekaterih družb pri kršitvi | |
| | 1. Položaj družbe Bolloré | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | 2. Položaj družb Divipa in Zicuñaga | |
| | a) Trditve strank | |
| | b) Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | Obstoj tajnih sestankov v zvezi s španskim trgom | |
| | Sodelovanje družb Divipa in Zicuñaga pri omejevalnem sporazumu na španskem trgu | |
| | Sodelovanje družb Divipa in Zicuñaga pri omejevalnem sporazumu na evropskem trgu | |
| | Sodelovanje družbe Zicuñaga pri dogovorih o določitvi prodajnih kvot in tržnih deležev | |
| | C – Tožbeni razlogi v zvezi s trajanjem kršitve | |
| | 1. Tožbeni razlogi, ki jih navajajo družbe Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot in Torraspapel | |
| | a) Sodelovanje tožečih strank pri kršitvi pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| | Trditve strank | |
| | Odločba | |
| | Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | – Domnevni sistem tajnih sestankov | |
| | Uradni sestanki AEMCP pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| | – Sodelovanje tožečih strank na sestankih pred septembrom ali oktobrom 1993 | |
| | b) Sodelovanje družbe Mougeot pri kršitvi po 1. juliju 1995 | |
| | 2. Tožbeni razlog, ki ga uveljavlja družba Divipa | |
| | 3. Tožbeni razlog, ki ga uveljavlja družba Zicuñaga | |
| | II – Tožbeni razlogi, ki se nanašajo na odpravo ali znižanje glob, določenih v členu 3, prvi odstavek, odločbe | |
| | A – Tožbeni razlog: kršitev pravic do obrambe in načela varstva upravičenega pričakovanja zaradi nepopolnosti in nenatančnosti OU v zvezi z globami | |
| | 1. Trditve strank | |
| | 2. Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | a) Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja in neupoštevanje upravičenega pričakovanja, ker naj bi se Komisija oddaljila od svoje predhodne prakse | |
| | b) Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja in načela varstva upravičenega pričakovanja, ker naj bi se Komisija oddaljila od smernic | |
| | c) Kršitev pravice do zaslišanja, ker naj bi Komisija globo določila tako, da se je oprla na dejavnike, ki niso napovedani v OU | |
| | B – Tožbeni razlog: kršitev načela prepovedi retroaktivnosti | |
| | 1. Trditve strank | |
| | 2. Presoja Sodišča prve stopnje | |
| | C – Tožbeni razlogi: nezadostnost dokazov, kršitev načel domneve nedolžnosti, sorazmernosti in enake obravnave ter napake pri presoji glede ugotovitev Komisije v zvezi s sodelovanjem nekaterih družb pri omejevalnem sporazumu | |
| | D – Tožbeni razlogi: nezadostnost dokazov, kršitev člena 253 ES, člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 ter načel sorazmernosti in enake obravnave, neobstoj individualne določitve glob, napačne dejanske ugotovitve, napake pri presoji in napačna uporaba prava pri oceni teže kršitve | |
| | 1. Narava kršitve | |
| | 2. Konkreten vpliv kršitve | |
| | 3. Razvrstitev sodelujočih pri omejevalnem sporazumu za določitev zneskov glob | |
| | a) Izbira referenčnega leta | |
| | b) Upoštevanje napačnega skupnega prometa | |
| | c) Nesorazmeren rezultat uporabe metode Komisije | |
| | Kršitev načela sorazmernosti | |
| | Kršitev načela enake obravnave | |
| | 4. Zvišanje globe v odvračilne namene | |
| | E – Tožbeni razlogi v zvezi s trajanjem kršitve | |
| | F – Tožbeni razlog: kršitev načel sorazmernosti in enakega obravnavanja ter napačna presoja dejanskega stanja | |
| | 1. Napačna presoja dejanskega stanja | |
| | 2. Kršitev načela sorazmernosti | |
| | 3. Kršitev načela enakega obravnavanja | |
| | G – Tožbeni razlogi: kršitev člena 253 ES, člena 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 ter načel sorazmernosti in enakega obravnavanja, neobstoj posamične določitve glob, preozka razlaga Smernic v zvezi z globami in očitne napake pri presoji zaradi neupoštevanja nekaterih olajševalnih okoliščin | |
| | 1. Izključno pasivna vloga ali vloga „sledi mojemu vodji“ pri omejevalnem sporazumu | |
| | 2. Velikost in vpliv na trg družbe kršiteljice | |
| | 3. Ravnanje na trgu v obdobju kršitve | |
| | 4. Obstoj groženj in pritiskov | |
| | 5. Opustitev kršitve | |
| | 6. Gospodarske razmere v sektorju samokopirnega papirja | |
| | 7. Nepridobivanja koristi od kršitve in finančnega stanja kršitelja | |
| | H – Tožbeni razlogi: kršitev načel varstva upravičenih pričakovanj, sorazmernosti in enakega obravnavanja pri uporabi obvestila o ugodni obravnavi ter napačna uporaba tega obvestila | |
| | 1. Zicuñaga | |
| | 2. MHTP | |
| | 3. Mougeot | |
| | 4. AWA | |
| | 5. Koehler | |
| | III – Zahteva po predložitvi dokumentov, ki jo je vložila družba AWA | |
| | Stroški | |
| ( *1 ) Jeziki postopka: španščina, nemščina, angleščina in francoščina. | |
Parties | |
| In Joined Cases T‑109/02, T‑118/02, T‑122/02, T‑125/02, T‑126/02, T‑128/02, T‑129/02, T‑132/02 and T‑136/02, | |
| Bolloré SA, established in Puteaux (France), represented by R. Saint‑Esteben and H. Calvet, lawyers, | |
| applicant in Case T‑109/02, | |
| Arjo Wiggins Appleton Ltd, established in Basingstoke (United Kingdom), represented by F. Brunet, lawyer, J. Temple Lang, Solicitor, and J. Grierson, Barrister, | |
| applicant in Case T‑118/02, | |
| supported by | |
| Kingdom of Belgium, represented by A. Snoecx and M. Wimmer, acting as Agents, | |
| intervener in Case T‑118/02, | |
| Mitsubishi HiTec Paper Bielefeld GmbH, formerly Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH, established in Bielefeld (Germany), represented by I. van Bael, lawyer, and A. Kmiecik, Solicitor, | |
| applicant in Case T‑122/02, | |
| Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, established in Oberkirch (Germany), represented by I. Brinker and S. Hirsbrunner, lawyers, | |
| applicant in Case T‑125/02, | |
| M‑real Zanders GmbH, formerly Zanders Feinpapiere AG, established in Bergisch Gladbach (Germany), represented by J. Burrichter and M. Wirtz, lawyers, | |
| applicant in Case T‑126/02, | |
| Papeteries Mougeot SA, established in Laval‑sur‑Vologne (France), represented initially by G. Barsi, J. Baumgartner and J.‑P. Hordies, and subsequently by Messrs Barsi and Baumgartner, lawyers, | |
| applicant in Case T‑128/02, | |
| Torraspapel, SA, established in Barcelona (Spain), represented by O. Brouwer, F. Cantos and C. Schillemans, lawyers, | |
| applicant in Case T‑129/02, | |
| Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles, SL, established in Derio (Spain), represented by E. Pérez Medrano and I. Delgado González, lawyers, | |
| applicant in Case T‑132/02, | |
| Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga, SA, established in Hernani (Spain), represented by I. Quintana Aguirre, lawyer, | |
| applicant in Case T‑136/02, | |
| v | |
| Commission of the European Communities, represented, in Cases T‑109/02 and T‑128/02, by W. Mölls and F. Castillo de la Torre, acting as Agents, assisted by N. Coutrelis, lawyer, in Cases T‑118/02 and T‑129/02, by W. Mölls and A. Whelan, acting as Agents, assisted by M. van der Woude, lawyer, in Case T‑122/02, initially by R. Wainwright and W. Mölls, and subsequently by R. Wainwright and A. Whelan, acting as Agents, in Cases T‑125/02 and T‑126/02, by W. Mölls and F. Castillo de la Torre, assisted by H.‑J. Freund, lawyer, in Joined Cases T‑132/02 and T‑136/02, by W. Mölls and F. Castillo de la Torre, assisted by J. Rivas Andrés and J. Gutiérrez Gisbert, lawyers, | |
| defendant, | |
| APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision 2004/337/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Case COMP/E-1/36.212 — Carbonless paper) (OJ 2004 L 115, p. 1) or, in the alternative, reduction in the fine imposed on the applicants by that decision | |
| THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Fifth Chamber), | |
| composed of M. Vilaras, President, F. Dehousse and D. Sváby, Judges, | |
| Registrar: J. Palacio González, Principal Administrator, | |
| having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearings on 2 (T‑132/02 and T‑136/02), 7 (T‑109/02 and T‑128/02), 14 (T‑122/02), 16 (T‑118/02 and T‑129/02) and 21 June 2005 (T‑125/02 and T‑126/02), | |
| gives the following | |
| Judgment | |
Grounds | |
| Background | |
| 1. In autumn 1996, the Sappi paper group, owned by Sappi Ltd, provided the Commission with information and documents which gave the Commission grounds for suspecting that a secret cartel existed or had existed for fixing prices in the carbonless paper sector, in which Sappi operated as a producer. | |
| 2. In light of the information provided by Sappi, the Commission carried out investigations at the premises of a number of carbonless paper producers pursuant to Article 14(2) and (3) of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ English Special Edition 1959-62, p. 87). Accordingly, inspections provided for under Article 14(3) of Regulation No 17 were carried out on 18 and 19 February 1997 at the premises of Arjo Wiggins Belgium SA, Papeteries Mougeot SA (‘Mougeot’), Torraspapel, SA, Sarriopapel y Celulosa, SA (‘Sarrió’) and Grupo Torras, SA. In addition, inspections were carried out under Article 14(2) of Regulation No 17 between July and December 1997 at the premises of Sappi, Arjo Wiggins Appleton plc (‘AWA’), Arjo Wiggins Europe Holdings Ltd, Arjo Wiggins SA and its subsidiary Guérimand SA, Mougeot, Torraspapel, Sarrió, Unipapel, Sociedade Comercial de Celulose e Papel L da , Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH (‘Stora’; formerly Stora‑Feldmühle AG) and Papierfabrik August Koehler AG (‘Koehler’). | |
| 3. In 1999 the Commission also sent requests for information pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation No 17 to AWA, Mougeot, Torraspapel, Cartiere Sottrici Binda SpA (‘Binda’), Carrs Paper Ltd (‘Carrs’), Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles, SL (‘Divipa’), Ekman Iberica, SA (‘Ekman’), Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga, SA (‘Zicuñaga’), Koehler, Stora, Zanders Feinpapier AG (‘Zanders’) and Copigraph SA. In those requests, the undertakings concerned were asked to give particulars of their announcements of price rises, their sales volumes, customers, turnover and meetings with competitors. | |
| 4. In reply to the request for information, AWA, Stora and Copigraph admitted their participation in multilateral cartel meetings held between carbonless paper producers. They provided the Commission with various documents and information. | |
| 5. Mougeot, for its part, contacted the Commission on 14 April 1999 stating that it was prepared to cooperate in the investigation pursuant to the Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 1996 C 207, p. 4; ‘the Leniency Notice’). It accepted that there was a cartel for fixing prices in the carbonless paper sector and it provided the Commission with information on the structure of the cartel, and in particular on the various meetings attended by its representatives. | |
| 6. On 26 July 2000 the Commission initiated the procedure and adopted a statetement of objections (‘SO’), which it addressed to 17 undertakings, that is, AWA, Bolloré SA, and its subsidiary Copigraph, Carrs, Zicuñaga, Divipa, Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH (‘MHTP’), formerly Stora, Mougeot, Koehler, Sappi, Torraspapel and Zanders. They were given access to the Commission’s investigation file in the form of a copy on CD-ROM, which was sent to them on 1 August 2000. | |
| 7. All the undertakings to which the SO was addressed, save Binda, International Paper and Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd, submitted written observations in response to the objections raised by the Commission. | |
| 8. A hearing took place on 8 and 9 March 2001. | |
| 9. After obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, and in light of the final report of the hearing officer, the Commission adopted, on 20 December 2001, Decision 2004/337/EC relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/36.212 — Carbonless paper) (OJ 2004 L 115, p. 1; ‘the decision’). | |
| 10. In the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision, the Commission finds that 11 undertakings infringed Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement by participating in a complex of agreements and concerted practices in the sector of carbonless paper. | |
| 11. In the second paragraph of Article 1 of the decision, the Commission finds that AWA, Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Sappi, Torraspapel and Zanders participated in the infringement from January 1992 to September 1995, Carrs from January 1993 to September 1995, Divipa from March 1992 to January 1995, Zicuñaga from October 1993 to January 1995 and Mougeot from May 1992 to September 1995. | |
| 12. In Article 2 of the decision, the undertakings referred to in Article 1 are ordered to bring the infringement referred to therein to an end, if they have not already done so, and to refrain from any agreements or concerted practices in relation to their activities in carbonless paper which may have the same or a similar object or effect to that of the infringement. | |
| 13. According to the first paragraph of Article 3 of the decision, the following fines were imposed on the undertakings concerned: | |
| – AWA: EUR 184.27 million; | |
| – Bolloré: EUR 22.68 million; | |
| – Carrs: EUR 1.57 million; | |
| – Divipa: EUR 1.75 million; | |
| – MHTP: EUR 21.24 million; | |
| – Zicuñaga: EUR 1.54 million; | |
| – Mougeot: EUR 3.64 million; | |
| – Koehler: EUR 33.07 million; | |
| – Sappi Ltd: EUR 0; | |
| – Torraspapel: EUR 14.17 million; | |
| – Zanders: EUR 29.76 million. | |
| 14. According to the second paragraph of Article 3 of the decision, the fines are payable within three months of the date of notification of the decision. The third paragraph of Article 3 provides that, after expiry of that period, interest will automatically be payable at the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations on 1 December 2001, plus 3.5 percentage points, namely 6.77 per cent. | |
| 15. The decision is addressed to the 11 undertakings referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the decision. | |
| 16. According to the decision (recital 77) the parties to the cartel agreed on an overall anti-competitive plan aiming essentially at improving the profitability of the participants by collectively increasing prices. According to the decision, the principal objective of the cartel through that plan was to agree price increases and also the timing of those increases. | |
| 17. To that end various meetings were organised at different levels – general, national and regional. According to recital 89 of the decision, the general cartel meetings were followed by a series of national or regional meetings, the purpose of which was to ensure market-by-market implementation of the price increases agreed at the general cartel meetings. During these meetings the participants exchanged detailed and individual information on their prices and sales volumes (recital 97). In order to ensure implementation of the agreed price increases, in some national cartel meetings sales quotas were allocated and market shares were fixed for each participant (recital 81). | |
| 18. The Commission took the view that the cartel arrangements involved all major operators in the EEA and were conceived, directed and encouraged at high levels in each participating company. By its very nature, the implementation of that type of cartel leads automatically to an important distortion of competition (recital 377). Taking into account the nature of the behaviour under scrutiny, its actual impact on the carbonless paper market and the fact that it covered the whole of the common market and, following its creation, the whole EEA, the Commission considered that the undertakings concerned by the decision had committed a very serious infringement of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (recital 404). | |
| 19. In order to establish the starting amount of the fine according to the gravity of the infringement, the Commission put the undertakings concerned into five categories according to their relative importance in the market concerned (recitals 406 to 409). In order to ensure that the fine had a sufficient deterrent effect, it then increased the starting amount of the fine thus determined by 100% for AWA, Bolloré and Sappi (recitals 410 to 412). The Commission then took into account the duration of the infringement committed by each undertaking in order to fix the basic amount of the fines imposed (recitals 413 to 417). | |
| 20. As regards aggravating circumstances, the Commission increased the basic amount of the fine imposed on AWA by 50% on account of its position as cartel leader (recitals 418 to 424). The Commission did not establish any extenuating circumstances in the present case. | |
| 21. The Commission adopted the final amounts to take into account the provisions of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 (recital 434), then applied the Leniency Notice which justified a reduction in the amount of the fines by 50% for Mougeot, 35% for AWA, 20% for ‘Bolloré (Copigraph)’ and by 10% for Carrs, MHTP and Zanders (recitals 435 to 458). | |
| Procedure and forms of order sought | |
| 22. By separate applications lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance between 11 and 18 April 2002, Bolloré (T‑109/02), AWA (T‑118/02), MHTP (T‑122/02), Koehler (T‑125/02), Zanders (T‑126/02), Mougeot (T‑128/02), Torraspapel (T‑129/02), Divipa (T‑132/02) and Zicuñaga (T‑136/02) brought the present actions. | |
| 23. Bolloré claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the decision, in so far as those articles relate to it; | |
| – in the alternative, very substantially reduce the amount of the fine imposed on it in Article 3 of the decision; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 24. AWA claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul or substantially reduce the fine imposed on it by the decision; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs; | |
| – take all other measures which the Court may deem appropriate. | |
| 25. The Kingdom of Belgium, which intervened in support of AWA’s application, claims that the Court should substantially reduce the fine imposed on AWA. | |
| 26. MHTP claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul Article 1 of the decision in so far as it is apparent that it participated in an infringement before 1 January 1993; | |
| – reduce the level of the fine imposed on it; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 27. Koehler claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul the decision; | |
| – in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed on it under Article 3 of the decision; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 28. Zanders claims that Court should: | |
| – annul Article 3 of the decision, in so far as it imposes on it a fine of EUR 29.76 million; | |
| – in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it under Article 3 of the decision; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 29. Mougeot claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul the decision; | |
| – in the alternative, substantially reduce the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 30. Torraspapel claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul Article 1 of the decision in that it finds that the applicant infringed Article 81(1) EC between 1 January 1992 and September 1993, and reduce the fine accordingly; | |
| – substantially reduce the fine imposed on the applicant under Article 3 of the decision; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs, including the expenses and interest arising from the provision of a bank guarantee or from the payment of the whole or part of the fine. | |
| 31. Divipa claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul the decision to the extent that it establishes, in addition to its participation in a cartel relating to the Spanish market, its participation in a cartel covering the entire EEA market and, in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it by that decision; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 32. Zicuñaga claims that the Court should: | |
| – annul Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the decision, in so far as those articles relate to it; | |
| – in the alternative, reduce the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission as follows: | |
| – annul the increase of the 10%, on the ground that its participation in the infringement does not exceed one year; | |
| – reduce substantially, at the very mimimum by 60%, the basic amount of the fine, due to the existence of mitigating circumstances; | |
| – order the Commission to pay the costs. | |
| 33. For each of those cases, the Commission contends that the Court should dismiss the application and order the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 34. In Joined Cases T‑109/02, T‑118/02, T‑122/02, T‑125/02, T‑128/02, T‑132/02 and T‑136/02, the Court asked questions in writing to which the parties replied within the prescribed period. | |
| 35. By letter of 14 June 2005, which included observations on the report for the hearing, the applicant in Case T‑126/02 informed the Court of the change in its company name and status, from Zanders Feinpapiere AG to M-real Zanders GmbH (also ‘Zanders’). | |
| 36. The parties presented oral argument separately and answered the Court’s questions at the hearings on 2, 7, 14, 16 and 21 June 2005. | |
| 37. Since the parties were requested by the Court, at the hearing in each case, to present their observations on a possible joinder of all the cases for the purposes of the judgment and they did not raise any objections, the Court considers that the present cases should be joined pursuant to Article 50 of the Rules of Procedure. | |
| Law | |
| 38. The parties seek annulment of the decision and/or cancellation or reduction of the fine. | |
| I – The pleas for annulment of the decision | |
| 39. The applicants seek, as the case may be, annulment of the decision in full or certain of its provisions which concern them. Those claims for annulment rely on procedural pleas relating to the administrative procedure and substantive pleas concerning the Commission’s findings as to the participation of certain undertakings in the infringement. | |
| A – The pleas relating to the administrative procedure | |
| 1. The first plea, alleging infringement of the right to be heard resulting from the failure to disclose documents classed as confidential by the Commission during the administrative procedure | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 40. Zicuñaga maintains that it is clear both from legal literature and from Article 19 of Regulation No 17 that full access to the investigation file is a procedural guarantee intended to ensure effective exercise of the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard. It points out that that guarantee is intended to enable the party concerned not only to dispute the inculpatory documents relied on by the Commission, but also to gain access to exculpatory documents which may be useful for its defence. | |
| 41. In the relation to the confidential documents, it is for the Commission to reconcile the legitimate interests of the undertaking concerned in respecting confidentiality, on the one hand, with the rights of the defence on the other. However, the Commission cannot base its final decision on documents on which the party accused of the infringement did not have an opportunity to comment. The Commission’s refusal to disclose a given document during the administrative procedure constitutes, moreover, a breach of the rights of the defence where it is conceivable that the administrative procedure might have had a different outcome had the document in question been disclosed to the interested party. According to Zicuñaga, it follows that the failure to disclose documents classified as confidential by the Commission infringed the applicant’s rights of defence. | |
| 42. The Commission submits that its investigation of the case complies with all the necessary safeguards and does not infringe any principle of law. It considers, in addition, that since Zicuñaga does not specify which inculpatory documents the Commission used, its argument is inadmissible. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 43. At the outset, it is necessary to point out the ambiguity of Zicuñaga’s argument. The title of the plea in question (‘Infringement of the right to be heard. Failure to produce inculpatory documents’) gives the impression that the applicant only disputes the Commission’s failure, in the course of the administrative procedure, to disclose documents used against it in the decision. Other passages in its application suggest that it also criticises the Commission’s failure to disclose, during the procedure, documents which allegedly might have contained exculpatory evidence. | |
| 44. In so far as Zicuñaga seeks to criticise the fact that the Commission did not produce, during the administrative procedure, documents allegedly used against it in the decision, it should be pointed out, as the Commission also does in its written pleadings, that Zicuñaga does not identify any document of that nature. Since it is not in any way substantiated, Zicuñaga’s contention must, to that extent, be dismissed. | |
| 45. In so far as Zicuñaga criticises the fact that the Commission refused it access, during the administrative procedure, to documents allegedly useful for its defence, in that they might contain exculpatory evidence, it should be recalled that, according to case-law, in order to allow the undertakings in question to defend themselves effectively against the objections raised against them in the SO, the Commission has an obligation to make available to them the entire investigation file, except for documents containing business secrets of other undertakings, other confidential information and internal documents of the Commission (Case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 v Commission [2002] ECR II-1705, paragraph 170 and the case-law cited). | |
| 46. In addition, the right of undertakings and associations of undertakings to the protection of their business secrets must be weighed against the safeguarding of the right of access to the entire investigation file. Therefore, if the Commission takes the view that certain documents in its investigation file contain business secrets or other confidential information, it should prepare non-confidential versions of those documents or have them prepared by the undertakings or associations of undertakings providing the documents in question. If the preparation of non-confidential versions of all the documents proves difficult, it should send the parties concerned a sufficiently precise list of the documents posing problems so as to enable them to ascertain whether it is appropriate to seek access to specific documents (see, to that effect, Case T-30/91 Solvay v Commission [1995] ECR II-1775, paragraphs 88 to 94). | |
| 47. In the present case, it is clear from Zicuñaga’s written pleadings that it criticises in particular the fact that the Commission refused it access to detailed information, referred to in recital 288 of the decision, relating to country-by-country sales in the EEA territory during the reference period of the cartel by several undertakings accused of the infringement, including Zicuñaga. According to Zicuñaga, that information probably contained evidence which would have enabled it to show that it did not apply a policy of concerted pricing together with the European carbonless paper producers. | |
| 48. In that regard, the list of documents comprising the file in Case T‑136/02, produced by the Commission in reply to a question from the Court, shows that the Commission made available to the parties, during the administrative procedure, a non-confidential version of the documents corresponding to the information referred to in recital 288 where those documents were classified as non-accessible. Zicuñaga was therefore in a position to ascertain whether it was appropriate to seek access to specific documents. | |
| 49. It should be recalled, in this regard, that in a proceeding finding an infringement of Article 81 EC, the Commission is not required to make available, of its own initiative, documents which are not in its investigation file and which it does not intend to use against the parties concerned in the final decision. An applicant who learns during the administrative procedure that the Commission has documents which might be useful for its defence must make an express request to the Commission for access to those documents. If the applicant does not do so during the administrative procedure, his right to do so is barred in any action for annulment brought against the final decision (Joined Cases T‑25/95, T‑26/95, T‑30/95 to T‑32/95, T‑34/95 to T‑39/95, T‑42/95 to T‑46/95, T‑48/95, T‑50/95 to T‑65/95, T‑68/95 to T‑71/95, T‑87/95, T‑88/95, T‑103/95 and T‑104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission [2000] ECR II‑491, ‘ Cement ’, paragraph 383). | |
| 50. However, Zicuñaga did not, during the administrative procedure, make a formal request for access to the confidential version of the information referred to above. Although it refers, in its reply to a question from the Court, to a written request for access to that information and produces the Commission’s letter rejecting that request, it must be pointed out that that request is dated 3 April 2002 and therefore after the date on which the administrative procedure was closed and the decision adopted. Since Zicuñaga failed to make such a request during the administrative procedure, its right to do so is barred in the action for annulment. | |
| 51. It is therefore appropriate to reject this plea in law put forward by Zicuñaga. | |
| 2. The second plea, alleging infringement of the right of access to the file on account of the failure to produce documents not included in the investigation file communicated via CD-ROM | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 52. Koehler accuses the Commission of failing to grant it access to certain documents which were not part of the investigation file communicated via CD-ROM to the addressees of the SO on 1 August 2000. It refers, in particular, to the replies to the SO from other addressees of that document, and to the annexes to those replies, in particular the expert’s report, mentioned in the footnote on page 365 of the decision, sent by AWA to the Commission. It maintains that a number of references to the replies to the SO contained in the decision show that the Commission based its factual analysis and its calculation of the fines on those replies. Koehler adds that Mougeot’s reply to the SO shows that the file also clearly contained information which would have been useful for its defence. | |
| 53. The Commission replies that, while it is true that it can only base its findings on facts on which the undertakings concerned had the opportunity to submit comments, the replies to the SO do not form part of the investigation file to which access has to be granted. The administrative procedure must be deemed to be closed as soon as those replies are received and cannot be pursued ad infinitum, with each undertaking wishing to make comments on the observations of the others. Koehler has not pointed to any inculpatory evidence on which the Commission based its objections against it and on which it was unable to comment. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 54. The arguments of Koehler may be said to comprise two aspects. First, certain documents not contained in the investigation file to which it had access were used by the Commission as inculpatory evidence in the decision, without Koehler having had access to that evidence during the administrative procedure and without being able to comment on it. Secondly, the Commission failed to disclose to Koehler documents not contained in the investigation file to which it had access and which might have contained exculpatory evidence. These two points should be the subject of separate analysis. | |
| 55. As regards, first of all, the failure to disclose supposed inculpatory evidence not contained in the investigation file to which Koehler had access, it should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that a document can be regarded as a document that incriminates an applicant only where it is used by the Commission to support a finding of an infringement in which that party is alleged to have participated ( Cement , paragraph 284). | |
| 56. Since documents that have not been communicated to the parties concerned during the administrative procedure are not admissible evidence (see, to that effect, Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, paragraph 21; Case T-11/89 Shell v Commission [1992] ECR II-757, paragraphs 55 and 56; and T-13/89 ICI v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021, paragraphs 34 and 35), it will be necessary, if it should prove that the Commission relied in the contested decision on documents that were not in the investigation file and were not communicated to the applicants, to exclude those documents as evidence ( Cement , paragraph 382; see also, to that effect, Case 107/82 AEG v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, paragraphs 24 to 30; Solvay v Commission , paragraph 46 above, paragraph 57; and ICI v Commission , paragraph 36). | |
| 57. It follows that, if the Commission intends to rely on a passage in a reply to a SO or on a document annexed to such a reply in order to establish the existence of an infringement in a proceeding under Article 81(1) EC, the other parties involved in that proceeding must be able to comment on such evidence (see, that effect, AKZO v Commission , paragraph 56 above, paragraph 21; Shell v Commission , paragraph 56 above, paragraph 55; and ICI v Commission , paragraph 56 above, paragraph 34). | |
| 58. In the present case, the applicant submits, generally, in its request that, ‘[o]wing to a number of references in the footnotes, there can be no doubt that the Commission used the observations of the other parties to the proceeding in order to substantiate both its account of the facts and the calculation of the amount of the fine’. Such a general assertion does not, however, allow the Court to ascertain which particular documents were supposedly used as evidence against Koehler in the decision. At the hearing, moreover, Koehler admitted that there was no inculpatory document to which it did not have access. | |
| 59. As regards, secondly, the failure to disclose supposedly exculpatory evidence not contained in the investigation file to which it had access, Koehler refers to the replies of other addressees of the SO and the annexes to those replies. However, it fails to prove that it expressly requested the Commission to disclose that evidence; it even admitted at the hearing that it did not file a request for access to those documents. Koehler is therefore barred from disputing before the Court the fact that it did not have access to that evidence (see, to that effect, Cement , paragraph 283; see also paragraph 49 above). | |
| 60. For the sake of completeness the Court notes that Koehler has not shown that, if it had had access to the replies of other addressees of the SO and to the annexes to those replies, it would have been able to invoke arguments such as to affect the outcome of the decision (see, to that effect, Case 30/78 Distillers v Commission [1980] ECR 2229, paragraph 26, and Case T‑7/90 Kobor v Commission [1990] ECR II-721, paragraph 30). | |
| 61. In fact, in relation, first of all, to the expert’s report annexed by AWA to its response to the SO, in so far as the reference made by Koehler to that report seeks to identify a document not contained in the investigation file to which it had access and which might have been useful for its defence, it is clear from the decision (recitals 390, 392 and 396) that the Commission explicitly rejected the arguments made by AWA during the administrative procedure, on the basis of that report, alleging that the infringement did not have any concrete impact on the market. Koehler’s contention that the fact of not having access to that report during the administrative procedure damaged its defence cannot therefore succeed. | |
| 62. In relation, next, to Mougeot’s reply to the SO, Koehler submits in its reply that Mougeot’s reply shows that the file clearly contained information useful for its defence. It refers in that regard to the passage in that reply cited in recital 293 of the decision in which Mougeot, retracting a statement made earlier to the Commission, claims that ‘the [SO] does not prove that the AEMCP [Association of European Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper] meetings would have served as a framework for collusive mechanisms before restructuring of the association in September 1993’. However, in recital 295 of the decision, the Commission explicitly rejects that argument, claiming that the statements of Sappi, Mougeot and AWA, read together, prove that general cartel meetings were held from at least 1992 onwards. Referring to recitals 112 and 113 of the decision, it adds that the evidence provided by Sappi confirms that collusion took place at the meetings of the AEMCP or that meetings were held on the occasion of these meetings before September 1993. The passage in Mougeot’s reply to the SO cited by Koehler does not show, contrary to what Koehler maintains, that the replies to the SO and the documents annexed to those replies would have enabled that undertaking to make arguments capable of altering the outcome of the administrative procedure. | |
| 63. In the light of all the preceding considerations, the Court must reject this plea. | |
| 3. The third plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the adversarial principle resulting from a lack of consistency between the SO and the decision | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 64. Bolloré maintains that, at the stage of the SO, the Commission established its participation in the infringement merely on the basis of its liability as a parent company for the personal conduct of its subsidiary Copigraph. Conversely, the decision contains a new objection against Bolloré, alleging its personal and independent involvement in the cartel. Bolloré submits that, by not offering it the opportunity to comment on that objection at the time of the administrative procedure, the Commission infringed its rights of defence. | |
| 65. The Commission disputes that, in the decision, Bolloré is considered to be personally involved in the infringement. The conduct of its subsidiary was attributed to the applicant on the ground that, together, they formed one and the same undertaking. This plea can only therefore be upheld if it is proved that the attribution of the infringement to the applicant on this ground was not apparent in the SO or if it were established that the Commission, in its decision, had based its assessment on facts on which Bolloré could not have commented during the pre-litigation procedure. However, this is not the case here. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 66. On this point, it must be borne in mind that in order to respect the rights of the defence, which constitutes a fundamental principle of Community law and must be observed in all circumstances, in particular in all proceedings liable to give rise to penalties, including administrative procedures, the undertaking concerned must be in a position to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts, complaints and circumstances relied on by the Commission (Joined Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie v Commission [2003] ECR II‑5761, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). | |
| 67. According to the case-law, the SO must be couched in terms that, albeit succinct, are sufficiently clear to enable the parties concerned properly to identify the conduct complained of by the Commission. It is only on that basis that the SO can fulfil its function under the Community regulations of giving undertakings and associations of undertakings all the information necessary to enable them properly to defend themselves, before the Commission adopts a final decision (Joined Cases C‑89/85, C‑104/85, C‑114/85, C‑116/85, C‑117/85 and C‑125/85 to C‑129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I‑1307, paragraph 42, and Case T-352/94 Mo och Domsjö v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1989, paragraph 63). | |
| 68. In addition, an infringement of the rights of the defence must be examined in the light of the objections established by the Commission in the SO and in the decision (Case T-36/91 ICI v Commission [1995] ECR II-1847, paragraph 70, and Solvay v Commission , paragraph 46 above, paragraph 60). In those circumstances, the finding of an infringement of the rights of the defence presupposes that an objection – which the undertaking maintains it was not accused of in the SO – is established by the Commission in the contested decision. | |
| 69. In the light of the case-law set out in the previous three paragraphs, it is appropriate, in the present case, to ascertain first of all the basis on which the Commission, in its decision, established Bolloré’s liability for the infringement. The relevant information is to be found in recitals 353 to 356 of the decision (part II (Legal assessment), section 2.3 (Liability for the infringement) 2 (Copigraph and Bolloré)). | |
| 70. Those recitals read as follows: | |
| ‘(353) Copigraph SA was a wholly owned subsidiary of [Bolloré] (formerly known as Bolloré Technologies SA) during the time of the infringement and was acquired by AWA in November 1998. Copigraph ceased activity on 2 February 2000 with effect from 30 December 2000. Bolloré claims that it cannot be held responsible for Copigraph’s behaviour, because Copigraph had complete economic autonomy. According to Bolloré this autonomy stems from the following: the management structures of Copigraph and Bolloré were strictly separate; Copigraph had its own infrastructure and Copigraph’s commercial policy was independent because it acquired almost 35% of its raw-material requirement from outside the Bolloré group, one of the sources being a competitor. | |
| (354) Copigraph belonged to Bolloré’s special papers division and the then head of division, [Mr V.], was simultaneously the Managing Director of Copigraph. In addition, the then Commercial Director of Copigraph, [Mr J.B.], had also held a sales position at the Thonon mill since 1994. [Bolloré] was necessarily informed of its subsidiary’s participation in the cartel. | |
| (355) There is also evidence implicating the parent company, [Bolloré] directly in the cartel activities. Bolloré was a member of the AEMCP, whose official meetings also served as cartel meetings from January 1992 until September 1993. Bolloré’s representative, the head of its special papers division [Mr V.], attended these cartel meetings together with the Commercial Director of Copigraph. The head of Bolloré’s special papers division also participated in the French market cartel meeting of 1 October 1993. In all subsequent cartel meetings where individual representatives of Copigraph are identified the meeting was attended by the Commercial Director of Copigraph. All these meetings took place in 1994 and, as mentioned, the Commercial Director of Copigraph also held simultaneously a sales position in Bolloré. | |
| (356) On that basis, the Commission concludes that Bolloré should be held responsible not only for its own conduct but also for the conduct of Copigraph in relation to the cartel, for the whole of the specified period.’ | |
| 71. It is clear from the extract of the decision reproduced above that liability for the infringement was attributed to Bolloré on the ground that, first, it should be deemed liable for the participation of its subsidiary Copigraph in the cartel, and, secondly, there was evidence of its direct involvement in the cartel activities. | |
| 72. Bolloré does not dispute the fact that the SO enabled it to understand, and comment on, the fact that, in the SO, the Commission held it liable for the infringement on account of its responsibility as the 100% parent company of Copigraph at the time of the infringement, for Copigraph’s participation in the cartel. Its objection relates to the absence of information in the SO as to the Commission’s intention to hold it liable for the infringement on the basis of its direct involvement in the cartel activities as well. | |
| 73. The relevant passages of the SO are contained in paragraphs 240 to 245 and 248 (part II (Legal assessment), part B (Application of the competition rules) 8 (Liability for the infringement)). | |
| 74. It must be borne in mind, first of all, that in those paragraphs of the SO the Commission in no way mentions that Bolloré is directly involved in the cartel, unlike the information relating to other parent companies referred to in the SO, such as AWA and Torraspapel, in respect of which the Commission states, as regards AWA, that ‘[it] participated directly and autonomously in the cartel through its division Arjo Wiggins Carbonless Paper Operation’ and, in relation to Torraspapel, that ‘[t]here is also evidence implicating the parent company directly in the collusive activities’. | |
| 75. Next, as Bolloré correctly points out, it is clear from paragraph 243 of the SO that the Commission distinguished between two types of situation: | |
| ‘In relation to the relationships between parent companies and their subsidiaries, the Commission addresses this SO to the parent company where | |
| – two or more subsidiaries participated in the infringement, | |
| – the parent company was involved in the infringement. | |
| For other cases where a subsidiary has participated, the statement is addressed to that subsidiary and its parent company.’ | |
| 76. As regards the Bolloré and Copigraph group, the SO was addressed not only to Bolloré, but also to Copigraph, which, in the light of the criteria set out in paragraph 243 of the SO, was such as to reassure Bolloré that the Commission did not take the view, at the stage of the SO, that Bolloré, the parent of the group, was directly involved in the infringement. | |
| 77. It should therefore be noted that, as set out in the SO, the Commission intended to hold Bolloré liable for the infringement solely on the ground that, as the parent company of the group comprising Bolloré and Copigraph at the time of the infringement, it had to be held liable for the unlawful conduct of Copigraph, its wholly-owned subsidiary. By reading the SO, Bolloré could not foresee that, in order to hold it liable for the infringement, the Commission also intended to rely on its own direct involvement in the cartel activities, as it does in its decision. | |
| 78. It should be added that the facts referred to by the Commission in recital 355 of the decision, in support of its argument relating to Bolloré’s direct involvement in the infringement, namely that Bolloré was a member of AEMCP and represented by Messrs V. and J.B. at several cartel meetings, was not mentioned in the SO. In fact, even if it were accepted that, following the Commission’s line of argument, Bolloré’s membership of AEMCP was apparent from documents attached to the SO, clearly the Commission only referred to Copigraph as being a member of AEMCP, and never to Bolloré. As regards Messrs V. and J.B., they were consistently referred to in the SO as the representatives of Copigraph, and not of Bolloré, at the cartel meetings. In addition, at no point in the SO did the Commission mention Bolloré as being one of the undertakings represented at such meetings. | |
| 79. Accordingly, the SO did not enable Bolloré to acquaint itself with the objection based on its direct involvement in the infringement, or even with the facts established by the Commission in the decision in support of that objection, so that Bolloré was unable, as is clear from reading its reply to the SO, properly to defend itself during the administrative procedure vis-à-vis the objection and the facts in question. | |
| 80. However, even if the decision contains new allegations of fact or law on which the undertakings concerned have not been given the opportunity to comment, the defect will only entail the annulment of the decision in that respect if the allegations concerned cannot be substantiated to the requisite legal standard on the basis of other evidence in the decision on which the undertakings concerned were given the opportunity to comment (Joined Cases T‑191/98, T‑212/98 to T‑214/98 Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II‑3275, paragraph 196; see also, to that effect, Case T-86/95 Compagnie générale maritime and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1011, paragraph 447). Moreover, infringement of Bolloré’s rights of defence is only capable of affecting the validity of the decision relating to Bolloré if the decision is based purely on the fact of Bolloré’s direct involvement in the infringement (see, to that effect, Mo och Domsjö v Commission , paragraph 67 above, paragraph 74). In that case, since the new objection in the decision relating to Bolloré’s direct involvement in the cartel activities could not be upheld, Bolloré could not be held liable for the infringement. | |
| 81. Conversely, if it transpires, when examining the substance (see paragraphs 123 to 150 below), that the Commission was correct to hold Bolloré liable for the participation of its subsidiary Copigraph in the cartel, the fact that the Commission erred in law cannot be sufficient to justify annulment of the decision because it could not have had a decisive effect on the operative part adopted by the Commission (see, to that effect, Case T‑126/99 Graphischer Maschinenbau v Commission [2002] ECR II‑2427, paragraph 49, and Case T‑209/01 Honeywell v Commission [2005] ECR I-5527, paragraph 49). According to settled case-law, in so far as certain grounds of a decision in themselves provide a sufficient legal basis for that decision, any errors in other grounds of the decision have no effect in any event on its operative part (Case T‑87/05 EDP v Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, paragraph 144; see also, to that effect, Joined Cases C-302/99 P and C-308/99 P Commission and France v TF1 [2001] ECR I-5603, paragraphs 26 to 29). | |
| 4. The fourth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, of the right to a fair hearing and of the principle of the presumption of innocence | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 82. Zicuñaga maintains, first of all, that the Commission infringed the principle of the presumption of innocence by establishing its participation in the cartel on the basis of mere assumptions and indirect statements. It maintains that the absence of a sufficiently clear penalty for submission of inaccurate or incomplete information may encourage undertakings to provide the Commission with information that has been reconstructed or distorted in order to emphasise their cooperation. Zicuñaga goes on to state that, while at the outset an undertaking only expected to benefit from leniency on the part of the Commission where it provided decisive evidence, the Commission then softened its approach. It claims that, in those circumstances, the statements of Sappi should be considered with caution and can only be deemed reliable to the extent they are corroborated by other evidence. | |
| 83. Secondly, Zicuñaga asserts that the Commission cannot base its findings on the testimonies of a person whose identity is not known, lest it should prejudice the rights of the defence by not allowing the defendant to refute the claims made by that witness in the course of the hearing. Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it maintains that it is essential to be able to put to a witness his own statements so as to measure the level of credibility of the testimony and of the person concerned, and to permit the defendant to dispute evidence against him and to question the author of that evidence about it either at the time of submitting the evidence or afterwards. | |
| 84. The Commission disputes the characterisation as mere assumptions or indirect statements of the evidence on which it relies to establish Zicuñaga’s participation in the infringement. It points out the Community judicature has never called into question the lawfulness of the Leniency Notice nor the probative value of statements made by undertakings on that basis. Moreover, Regulation No 17 does not provide for the possibility of questioning witnesses in the course of the administrative procedure and the applicant did not make any request to this effect before the Court. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 85. In so far as Zicuñaga’s argument seeks to deny the probative value of the statements of non-identified persons relied on by the Commission in support of the objections made against Zicuñaga in the decision, that argument falls within the examination of the substance and will be dealt with later, when ascertaining whether those objections have been sufficiently established. | |
| 86. In so far as this line of argument also alleges infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to a fair hearing in that the failure to mention in the SO the identity of the author or authors of the statements in support of the Commission’s findings in relation to Zicuñaga prevented Zicuñaga from disputing those findings by requesting that the author or authors be heard in the course of the administrative procedure, it should be recalled that, whereas Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) states that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: … to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him’, it is clear from settled case-law that the Commission cannot be described as a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR (Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, paragraph 81, and Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 7). Moreover, Article 15(4) of Regulation No 17 specifically provides that Commission decisions imposing fines for breach of competition law are not to be of a criminal law nature (Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission [1994] ECR II‑755, paragraph 235). | |
| 87. Nevertheless, the Commission is bound to observe the general principles of Community law in the course of the administrative procedure ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 8). However, it must be pointed out, first, that although the Commission may hear natural or legal persons where it deems it necessary to do so, it is not entitled to call witnesses to testify against the undertaking concerned without their agreement, and, secondly, the fact that the provisions of Community competition law do not place the Commission under an obligation to call witnesses whom the undertaking concerned wishes to give evidence on its behalf is not contrary to those principles (Case T-9/99 HFB and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1487, paragraph 392). | |
| 88. In the present case, it is apparent moreover that Zicuñaga does not provide any information showing that, during the administrative procedure, it asked the Commission for details as to the identity of the persons who made the statements relied on by the Commission in support of the objections made against it in the SO in order for those persons to be heard in its presence. It also fails to establish that it requested the Commission to call witnesses to give evidence on its behalf during the administrative procedure. | |
| 89. In the light of the foregoing, the present plea, in so far as it is based on an infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to a fair hearing, must be rejected. In so far as it is aimed at disputing the probative value of the evidence relied on by the Commission in support of the objections made against Zicuñaga in the decision, that aspect will be considered in the examination of the substance. | |
| 5. The fifth plea, alleging breach of the principle of sound administration when investigating the case and a failure to state the grounds in the decision | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 90. Zanders accuses the Commission of having investigated the case in a manner purely adverse to it. It maintains that the Commission should have taken into account the information which Zanders provided to it, in December 2000 and March 2001, as to its decisive role in ending the cartel or that it should have investigated this information further if it had any doubts as to its value. It also criticises the fact that the Commission did not take into account an expert report which it submitted in March 2001 in order to show that the impact of the attempts to form cartels on prices was minimal or non-existent. In addition, the decision does not contain any reasoning as to the failure to take those two factors into account or any examination of Zanders’ individual role. | |
| 91. The Commission contends that Zanders does not substantiate its claim that it played a special role in ending the infringement. As to the impact of the price agreements on the market, the Commission devoted a whole section to this in the decision (recitals 382 to 402) in the course of its assessment of the concrete effects of the infringement. The decision fully respects the obligation to state reasons by examining the applicant’s conduct in conjunction with that of five other undertakings in recitals 263 to 271. Moreover, in its reply to the SO, Zanders did not argue that its role was purely a passive one. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 92. It should be recalled that, in cases such as this one, where the Community institutions have a power of appraisal in order to be able to fulfil their tasks, respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance; those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I-5469, paragraph 14; Case T-44/90 La Cinq v Commission [1992] ECR II-1, paragraph 86; and Joined Cases T‑528/93, T‑542/93, T‑543/93 and T‑546/93 Métropole télévision and Others v Commission [1996] ECR II‑649, paragraph 93). | |
| 93. Moreover, it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63, and Case T-16/99 Lögstör Rör v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1633, paragraph 368). | |
| 94. In this respect, it must be held that the decision discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Commission and enables Zanders to ascertain the reasons for the adopted measure and the Court to exercise its power of review. In fact, in recitals 263 to 271 of the decision, the Commission examines Zanders’ participation in the cartel, together with that of AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora and Torraspapel. | |
| 95. Zanders asserts, more specifically, that its role in ending the infringement and the expert’s report which it provided were not taken into account. | |
| 96. As regards Zanders’ role in ending the infringement, it must be pointed out that, in its reply of 12 December 2000 to the SO, Zanders referred to the letter of 1 April 1996 from the CEO of International Paper addressed to all employees in the group, drawing their attention to the fact that the group attached the highest importance to observing laws and ethics in relation to contacts with customers, commercial partnerships, administrations and other bodies. It also referred to the meeting held at its premises with the aim of impressing upon its managerial staff the need to observe competition law and drawing up a compliance programme. It further referred to the fact that the president of its division, who became the president of the AEMCP on 1 January 1996, had made an unequivocal declaration in public, after his accession to the presidency of the association, that the undertaking had ceased any collusive activities. | |
| 97. Clearly, the evidence referred to in the previous paragraph was submitted by Zanders in its response to the SO in support of its observations for the purposes of refuting the Commission’s objection in the SO that collusive contacts continued after autumn 1995. More precisely, the presentation of such evidence formed part of Zanders’ argument seeking to establish that, as from autumn 1995, it no longer participated in secret cartel meetings or concerted practices on pricing with its competitors, its pricing policy was set independently, and, in particular, the price increase which it applied in September 1996 was not the product of a collusive meeting. | |
| 98. There can be absolutely no doubt, however, that Zanders argument set out in the previous paragraph was taken into account by the Commission in the course of the administrative procedure. In the decision, the end of the infringement established in relation to Zanders is in fact September 1995, and not, as stated in the SO, March 1997. | |
| 99. However, neither Zanders’ reply of 12 December 2000 to the SO, nor the supplementary observations sent by Zanders to the Commission on 2 March 2001 show that the evidence referred to in paragraph 96 above, or any other evidence, was presented by Zanders in the course of the administrative procedure with a view to proving, as Zanders is now seeking to do, that it played a decisive role in ending the unlawful cartel, such that this warranted recognition as a mitigating circumstance when setting the fine. In those circumstances, Zanders cannot accuse the Commission of infringing the principle of sound administration by failing to take into account both the evidence mentioned above and evidence allegedly intended to establish that it contributed decisively to ending the collusion before the Commission began its initial investigations. | |
| 100. Similarly, it must be pointed out that, in its reply to the SO Zanders did not contend that it had played an exclusively passive role in the cartel. It therefore cannot rely on a failure to state reasons in the decision in this respect. In addition, in relation to the period from 1992 until autumn 1995, in its reply to the SO Zanders denied having played the key or leading role that was attributed to it in paragraphs 187 and 199 of the SO. Zanders was thus arguing that there were no aggravating circumstances. However, the Commission did not establish any such circumstances in relation to Zanders. | |
| 101. The expert’s report commissioned by Koehler, MHTP and Zanders from PricewaterhouseCoopers, dated 2 March 2001, is entitled ‘The competitive situation on the European carbonless paper market from summer or autumn 1995 to February or March 1997’ (‘the PricewaterhouseCoopers report’). | |
| 102. It is apparent from the letter accompanying the PricewaterhouseCoopers report sent to the Commission that the main aim of this report was to refute the allegations made by the Commission in the SO in relation to the operation of the cartel on the carbonless paper market during the period from summer or autumn 1995 to February or March 1997 inclusive. Moreover, the conclusion of that report expressly mentions the fact that the economic analysis shows that the conduct of the three producers in question between summer or autumn 1995 and February or March 1997 was not concerted. | |
| 103. It must be stated that the PricewaterhouseCoopers report relates to a period which falls outside the infringement period established in the decision. To that extent, the report is not relevant. | |
| 104. However, on reading the application it becomes apparent that Zanders’ criticism concerns the Commission’s failure to take into account the information, also contained in the PricewaterhouseCoopers report, which seeks to show that the impact of the attempts at forming a cartel on prices during the period from January 1992 to autumn 1995 inclusive was minimal or non-existent. | |
| 105. In that respect, even if it were considered appropriate to take into account supplementary information provided in support of an entirely irrelevant factor, the Commission cannot be accused of failing to take into account Zanders’ arguments as to the allegedly limited impact of the cartel. | |
| 106. In fact, recital 388 of the decision states as follows: | |
| ‘AWA, Carrs, MHTP (Stora), Koehler, Sappi and Zanders claim that the actual impact of the cartel on the carbonless paper market in the EEA was very limited or that the cartel had no negative impact at all. In this respect, they concentrate on arguing that there was limited or no impact on prices, because the prices actually realised on the market were lower than the agreed or announced increases. According to these cartel participants, this shows that the agreed price increases were not implemented in practice. They have put forward many arguments to support this assertion, which include in particular the following claims: prices and producers’ margins have fallen substantially; carbonless paper prices essentially reflect changes in pulp costs and demand, and during the later phases of the cartel the capacity constraints; competition between the producers continued; and producers had to negotiate price increases with customers on individual basis.’ | |
| 107. While it makes no explicit reference to the PricewaterhouseCoopers report sent by Zanders to the Commission in the course of the administrative procedure, that extract from the decision proves without a doubt that the Commission took into account during the procedure the information provided, in particular by Zanders, with a view to proving that the impact of the attempts to form a cartel on prices during the infringement period was negligible or non-existent. The Commission’s rejection of the undertakings’ arguments supported by that information indicates that the Commission considered that those arguments were not such as to alter its point of view, set out in recitals 382 to 387 of the decision, as to the actual impact of the infringement on the market. On the other hand, that extract cannot be interpreted as establishing that the Commission failed, when assessing the case, to afford proper consideration to the arguments which Zanders set out in its defence (see, to that effect, Case T-141/94 Thyssen Stahl v Commission [1999] ECR II-347, paragraph 118). | |
| 108. Following that analysis, the fifth plea in law must be rejected. | |
| 6. The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration, of the right of access to the file and of the rights of the defence, resulting from the fact that certain documents in the investigation file were difficult to find and the list of documents comprising that file was unusable | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 109. AWA maintains that the list of documents put onto the CD‑ROM by the Commission which was given to it in the course of the administrative procedure was unusable. It submits, in fact, that the list did not contain either an index or a description of the documents concerned, but merely indicated why some of those documents were allegedly confidential and the place of any corresponding non-confidential version. | |
| 110. Koehler maintains that, before sending the CD-ROM to the addressees of the SO, the Commission removed certain confidential documents from the file and replaced them with non-confidential versions which were inserted elsewhere on the file. However, neither in the SO nor in the decision did the Commission take the trouble to make the consequential amendments to the references to the documents it had moved. In addition, it failed to mention that those non-confidential versions existed or where to find them in the file. The list of documents put together by the Commission only enabled the relevant documents to be identified very approximately. Occasionally, it was even impossible to find the document in question. | |
| 111. The Commission considers that it cannot be accused of any infringement of the rights of the defence. First, a list of the various documents on the file was made available to the undertakings, at the same time as the CD-ROM, using the normal classification of accessibility of the documents. Secondly, the documents referred to in the SO were already attached to that document, with a list indicating the connection between the confidential and non-confidential versions. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 112. It is clear from the information provided by the Commission in the two cases at issue (T‑118/02 and T‑125/02) that, on 26 July 2000, it sent the addressees of the SO, at the same time as sending that SO and the documents referred to therein, a list of documents annexed to the SO. That list was produced by the Commission as an annex to its defence in Case T‑125/02. On the Court’s request, the Commission also produced that list in Case T‑118/02. | |
| 113. The list in question includes for each document referred to in the SO, according to the order of reference in the SO, a brief description of the document, the identity of the undertaking at whose premises the document was found or who sent it, the number of the document, and, where appropriate, the number of the non-confidential version. | |
| 114. On 1 August 2000, the addressees of the SO also received from the Commission, at the same time as the CD-ROM containing the Commission’s investigation file in its entirety, a list entitled ‘List of documents’, setting out in respect of each document, according to the numbering order of the file, the document’s accessibility code (A for accessible; PA for partially accessible; NA for not accessible). In relation to the documents classed as non-accessible and the non-accessible parts of the documents classed as partially accessible, the list indicated where in the file the non-confidential version of the document or of the part of the document concerned and/or a summary of the content of the document or part of the document concerned could be found. In so doing, the Commission fully respected the provisions under section II A 1.4 of its notice on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file in cases pursuant to Articles [81] and [82] of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (OJ 1997 C 23, p. 3). | |
| 115. Having both the list of documents attached to the SO and the ‘List of documents’ referred to in the previous paragraph, AWA and Koehler were perfectly able, as were the other addressees of the SO, to locate the documents they sought in the investigation file, whether in the original version or in the non-confidential version according to the accessibility code indicated on those lists. | |
| 116. Admittedly, as the Commission itself states in its written pleadings relating to Case T‑125/02, as regards the documents – inter alia those, specifically referred to by Koehler, cited in the SO – which were classed as non-accessible or partially accessible, the addressees of the SO did not find straightaway the non-confidential version or the summary of the content of those documents in the place corresponding to their number in the file, and they had to refer to a list in order to locate that non-confidential version or summary in the file. However, the limited degree of inconvenience and the slight loss of time which such a situation might have caused the addressees of the SO clearly cannot be regarded as affecting the lawfulness of the decision. | |
| 117. It follows that the sixth plea must be rejected. | |
| 7. The seventh plea, alleging breach of the principle of sound administration and of the rights of the defence on account of the late notification of the decision | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 118. AWA submits that, while the decision was apparently adopted on 20 December 2001, it was only notified to it on 8 February 2002. It goes on to state that, whatever the reasons for such late notification, for a month and a half following the adoption of the decision it was unable to explain, particularly to its customers, why it had received the highest individual fine ever imposed. | |
| 119. The Commission replies that on 5 February 2002 it adopted a short corrigendum to its decision of 20 December 2001 because of the change in the applicant’s company name. The notification of the decision on 8 February 2002 coupled with a corrigendum explaining the changes made cannot therefore be deemed to be late. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 120. It is apparent from the letter of 7 February 2002, by which the member of the Commission in charge of competition matters notified the decision to its addressees, including AWA, that the decision was adopted on 20 December 2001 and a corrigendum was made on 5 February 2002 by written procedure E/177/2002. The existence of that corrigendum explains why the decision was notified to its addressees a month and a half after its adoption. The period between adoption of the decision and the corrigendum cannot be considered to be excessive. | |
| 121. In so far as AWA’s argument is to be understood as a criticism of the fact that the Commission made the decision public before notifying it to its addressees and thus prevented AWA from providing an explanation as to the reasons for that decision to third parties, it should be pointed out that AWA does not provide any evidence to the effect that the Commission revealed the content of the decision before notifying it to its addressees. In any event, even if that were the case, it must be stated that, however regrettable such conduct might be, the decision had already been adopted and its validity cannot be affected by acts subsequent to its adoption (Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, paragraph 16). | |
| B – The pleas alleging breach of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and errors of assessment by the Commission in relation to the participation of certain undertakings in the infringement | |
| 122. Three undertakings, namely Bolloré, Divipa and Zicuñaga, dispute the substance of the Commission’s findings relating to their participation in the infringement. | |
| 1. Bolloré’s situation | |
| 123. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that in the decision (recitals 353 to 356), the Commission holds Bolloré liable for the infringement, first, on the basis of its direct, personal involvement in the cartel activities, and, secondly, because of its liability for the participation of its subsidiary, Copigraph, in the cartel. It has been held, however (see paragraphs 66 to 81 above), that the SO did not enable Bolloré to acquaint itself with the objection alleging its personal involvement in the cartel, nor with the facts alleged by the Commission in the decision in support of that objection. That finding means that there is no purpose in appraising Bolloré’s substantive argument contesting the validity of its personal, direct involvement in the cartel. | |
| 124. It is therefore appropriate to examine Bolloré’s argument that the Commission was wrong to hold it liable for the offending conduct of its subsidiary Copigraph in the cartel. | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 125. Bolloré points out that, in the decision, in order to hold it liable for the conduct of Copigraph the Commission relies on two factors, namely, first, that Copigraph was its wholly owned subsidiary at the time of the infringement, and, secondly, that it was bound to be informed of Copigraph’s participation in the cartel. | |
| 126. It maintains that the first factor is not sufficient to hold it liable for Copigraph’s infringement. Further evidence is required to enable the Commission to assume that the parent company exercised decisive influence over the actions of its subsidiary. However, in the present case, such further evidence is missing. Bolloré in fact explained in its reply to the SO that Copigraph enjoyed great autonomy in the conduct of its commercial policy, which the Commission does not dispute. Furthermore, Copigraph accounted for only one third of the turnover of the Bolloré de Thonon‑les-Bains papermill and the business relations between Bolloré and Copigraph at that mill did not entail any limitation to Copigraph’s commercial autonomy. | |
| 127. Bolloré observes out that the Commission deduces the second element from three facts, that is, the fact that Copigraph was part of its special papers division, the fact that Mr V., director of that division, was also the managing director of Copigraph and the managing director of the Bolloré papermill at Thonon‑les-Bains, and the fact that Mr J.B., commercial director at Copigraph at that time, also held a sales position at the Thonon‑les-Bains papermill since 1994. However, those three facts do not warrant the conclusion that Bolloré was necessarily informed of Copigraph’s participation in the cartel. | |
| 128. According to the Commission, it is not disputed that Copigraph was Bolloré’s wholly-owned subsidiary from 1990 to 1998. On the basis of case-law, that is sufficient to warrant the assumption that Bolloré exercised a controlling influence over the conduct of its subsidiary. That assumption is also corroborated by the evidence set out in recitals 353 to 355 of the decision. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 129. As a preliminary point it must be observed that, while disputing the duration of the infringement, Bolloré does not deny the fact of Copigraph’s involvement in the cartel activities. | |
| 130. Its argument consists essentially of suggesting that the evidence relied on by the Commission in its decision does not enable it to hold Bolloré liable for the participation of its subsidiary, Copigraph, in the cartel. | |
| 131. According to settled case-law the fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of its conduct being imputed to the parent company, especially where the subsidiary does not independently decide its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company (Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 132 and 133; Case 52/69 Geigy v Commission [1972] ECR 787, paragraph 44; and Case C‑286/98 P Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9925, paragraph 26). | |
| 132. In that regard, although the evidence relating to the 100% shareholding in its subsidiary provides a strong indication that the parent is able to exercise a decisive influence over the subsidiary’s conduct on the market, this is not in itself sufficient to attribute liability to the parent for the conduct of its subsidiary (see, to that effect, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission , paragraph 131 above, paragraphs 27 to 29, and the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in that case, ECR I‑9928, points 17 to 62). Something more than the extent of the shareholding must be shown, but this may be in the form of indicia. It need not necessarily take the form of evidence of instructions given by the parent company to its subsidiary to participate in the cartel (see, to that effect, the Opinion cited above, points 40, 48 and 51). | |
| 133. In the present case, it is clear from recitals 353 and 354 of the decision that, in holding Bolloré liable for Copigraph’s participation in the cartel, the Commission did not rely exclusively on Bolloré’s undisputed 100% shareholding in Copigraph at the time of the infringement, but also on other factual matters, referred to in paragraph 127 above, for the purposes of establishing that Copigraph carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by Bolloré. | |
| 134. Referring to the arguments set out in its reply of 28 November 2000 to the SO (recital 353 of the decision), Bolloré advances various arguments to show that Copigraph enjoyed complete commercial autonomy at the time of the infringement. In those circumstances, it must be examined whether those contentions are well founded or whether there are instead indications that Bolloré exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary. | |
| 135. In the first place, Bolloré submitted during the administrative procedure that its management body and that of Copigraph were completely separate. | |
| 136. However, the footnote on page 1 of Bolloré’s reply to the SO states the following: | |
| ‘Until 1993, Bolloré and Copigraph shared a common director, Ms [G.], who represented Bolloré Participation on the board of Bolloré Technologie, and was Copigraph Holding’s permanent representative within Copigraph. She resigned these posts on 25 October 1993.’ | |
| 137. Thus, without prejudice to the further examination as to whether Bolloré’s argument disputing Copigraph’s participation before September or October 1993 is well founded, Copigraph’s management body included, for a part of the infringement period established by the Commission, one member of Bolloré’s board of directors. | |
| 138. In addition, it is clear from the information provided by Bolloré in its reply to the SO that, while not sitting on Bolloré’s board of directors, the four persons comprising Copigraph’s board from September 1993 to March 1997 all had, for the most part, management-level positions (financial, accounting or management) within Bolloré. In addition, as the Commission correctly points out in recital 354 of the decision, Mr V., Copigraph’s CEO during the infringement period was, according to Bolloré’s reply to the SO, employed by Bolloré and managed its mill at Thonon‑les-Bains. According to the information set out in that recital – information which Bolloré confirms in its written pleadings – Mr V. was also the director of Bolloré’s special papers division. This very significant presence of members of Bolloré’s management at the helm of Copigraph shows the extent of Bolloré’s involvement in the management of its subsidiary. This necessarily put Bolloré in a position to exercise decisive influence over Copigraph’s commercial policy on the market. | |
| 139. This analysis is further strengthened, in relation to the infringement period from February to September 1995 inclusive, by the information contained in the statement made on 2 April 2002 by Mr J.B., annexed to the application, that he, Copigraph’s commercial director from the end of September 1992 to March 1997, also held a commercial position within Bolloré from February 1995. | |
| 140. It should be added, in that respect, that the fact that the Court held in Case T‑309/94 KNP BT v Commission [1998] ECR II-1007, paragraphs 47 and 48, that the participation of a member of the parent’s management board in the collusive meetings amounted to evidence that the parent company necessarily knew and approved of its subsidiary’s participation in infringement cannot be interpreted as meaning that the member or members of the parent company holding management positions within the subsidiary must necessarily have authority as agents of the parent company for it to be concluded that the subsidiary is not commercially independent from the parent company (see, to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission , paragraph 132 above, point 58). The fact that a person who is a member of the parent company does not have authority as its agent does not prevent him from ensuring, when exercising his management functions within the subsidiary, that the subsidiary’s course of action on the market is consistent with the line laid down at management level by the parent company. | |
| 141. Secondly, Bolloré pointed out during the adminis trative procedure that Copigraph had its own infrastructure. | |
| 142. It is true that, as Bolloré submitted in its response to the SO, the fact that a subsidiary is neither the owner of the production installations nor the employer of its staff and that its turnover is entered into the parent company’s annual accounts may help to show that the subsidiary was not independent of its parent (see, to that effect, Mo och Domsjö v Commission , paragraph 67 above, paragraphs 89 to 94). However, the fact that in the present case Copigraph had, as Bolloré stated in its reply to the SO without challenge by the Commission, its own production installations and its own staff and that it entered its turnover into its own annual accounts does not in itself prove that Copigraph defined its conduct on the market entirely independently from its parent, Bolloré. | |
| 143. Finally, during the administrative procedure, Bolloré relied on a series of factors which, it submitted, showed that Copigraph defined its commercial policy independently. First, the paper-related activities were minor and Copigraph’s turnover as a proportion of the group’s turnover was negligible. Secondly, even after being taken over by Bolloré, Copigraph continued to acquire almost 35% of its raw material requirement from outside the Bolloré group, including from a direct competitor of Bolloré. | |
| 144. Nevertheless, even if it were true, Bolloré’s contention that its activities in the paper sector and Copigraph’s turnover as a proportion of the group turnover are both insignificant does not in any way prove that Bolloré allowed Copigraph complete autonomy in defining its conduct on the market. No conclusion to this effect can be drawn from the fact that Copigraph’s supplies of raw materials were provided, during the infringement period, in part by suppliers outside the Bolloré group. That finding does not rule out that, by participating in the cartel, Copigraph carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given by its parent. | |
| 145. In that regard, it should be pointed out that, as stated in recital 354 and not contested by Bolloré, Copigraph was part of Bolloré’s special papers division. | |
| 146. In addition, Bolloré’s response to the SO includes the following information concerning the circumstances of Bolloré’s acquisition of Copigraph: | |
| ‘In 1990, the Bolloré paper factory at Thonon‑les-Bains (Haute-Savoie) was up against very stiff competition on a paper market marked by four consecutive years of increases in the price of wood pulp. | |
| [Copigraph] undertook conversion and distribution of carbonless paper, and as such was one of the Thonon factory’s principal customers. Copigraph accounted for more than [a third] of the factory’s turnover and more than half of its volumes. | |
| The main reason for Bolloré’s acquisition of all the shares in [Copigraph] was to ensure that the Thonon factory had markets for its products and that this industrial establishment (with 340 persons in its employ at the time) remained open. | |
| This vertical integration seemed all the more judicious at the time given that the Thonon factory had to cope with a very sensitive situation given the overcapacity affecting the market.’ | |
| 147. As the Commission correctly points out in its written pleadings, it is apparent from the extract set out above that Copigraph’s incorporation in the special papers division was part of a vertical integration scheme in which the Bolloré factory at Thonon‑les-Bains was responsible for carbonless paper production and Copigraph for conversion and distribution of the product. The same extract also shows that Bolloré’s acquisition of Copigraph was aimed essentially at ensuring that the Bolloré factory at Thonon‑les-Bains had markets to sell to and remained open in a time of economic difficulties arising from the stiff competition on the market. The Commission was justified in seeing in those circumstances evidence which contributed to proving that Copigraph’s participation in the price cartel had originated from the application of a general policy defined by Bolloré for the purposes, inter alia, of seeking to maintain the position of its factory at Thonon‑les-Bains on the market. | |
| 148. It follows from the foregoing that the evidence advanced by Bolloré does not support its contentions as to Copigraph’s independence. On the contrary, the evidence set out in paragraphs 136 to 140 and 145 to 147 above, together with that relating to Bolloré’s ownership of the entire share capital in Copigraph during the infringement period, lead to the conclusion that Copigraph’s participation in the price-fixing cartel was the result of Bolloré’s exercise of decisive influence over its subsidiary. The Commission was therefore correct in holding Bolloré liable for Copigraph’s participation in the agreement. | |
| 149. In addition, the fact that Copigraph was taken over by AWA in November 1998 is not such as to relieve Bolloré, which still exists, of liability for Copigraph’s offending conduct prior to the acquisition (see, to that effect, C‑49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I‑4125, paragraph 145, and Case C‑297/98 P SCA Holding v Commission [2000] ECR I‑10101, paragraph 25). | |
| 150. In the light of the foregoing, the Court must dismiss Bolloré’s plea alleging breach of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in so far as the Commission holds it liable for the infringement of its subsidiary Copigraph. Irrespective of any direct involvement in the infringement, which the Court has ruled out (see paragraphs 66 to 81 above), Bolloré’s liability for the infringement is therefore established. | |
| 2. Situation of Divipa and Zicuñaga | |
| a) Arguments of the parties | |
| 151. Divipa and Zicuñaga submit that the Commission was wrong to find that they participated in cartel meetings on the Spanish market. They dispute the probative value of several documents relied on by the Commission. They also argue that it was inappropriate to consider that they knew or should have known that the cartel was Europe-wide. | |
| 152. Both applicants submit that the Commission failed to take their particular characteristics into account. They both point out that they are not members of the AEMCP. Divipa goes on to state that it is a small-scale family business operating exclusively on the Spanish market which does not produce, but only converts and distributes carbonless paper. Its prices depend on those of its principal supplier, Koehler, and those of its competitors. Zicuñaga emphasises that it has never sold carbonless paper. | |
| 153. Zicuñaga submits further that the Commission was wrong to find that it participated in a worldwide plan which included concerted practices to increase prices and agreements fixing sales quotas and market shares. | |
| 154. The Commission contests the applicants’ criticisms as to the probative value of the evidence on which it relies in support of its arguments. It states that the evidence must be assessed in its entirety, taking into account all relevant circumstances of fact. This evidence shows that Divipa and Zicuñaga participated in the cartel on the Spanish market. In order to be able to hold them liable for participation in the European cartel, the Commission need not demonstrate knowledge of every single detail of the cartel, but merely the existence of a series of objective circumstances warranting the finding that they knew or could reasonably have foreseen that the cartel had a European dimension. The Commission adds that, in the decision, the status of membership of the AEMCP as such was not considered to be proof of the infringement. Moreover, the size or status as wholesaler, distributor or converter cannot relieve the undertaking concerned of liability where it has infringed the competition rules. The fact that the cartel was not always successful or that the undertaking in question did not observe the terms of the agreement at all times does not preclude the Commission from making a finding of participation in the cartel. It is not necessary to show that the undertaking concerned participated in every aspect of the cartel. | |
| b) Findings of the Court | |
| 155. It should be observed first of all that the evidence of participation in a cartel must be assessed in its entirety, taking into account all relevant circumstances of fact (see, to that effect, the Opinion of Judge Vesterdorf, acting as Advocate General, in Case T-1/89 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission [1991] ECR II-867, II-869 – joint Opinion in the Polypropylene judgments). The Commission must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place. However, it is important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement; it is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T‑71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501, paragraphs 179 and 180, and the case-law cited). | |
| 156. In the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision, the Commission accuses Divipa and Zicuñaga of having participated, in breach of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, in ‘a complex of agreements and concerted practices in the sector of carbonless paper’. The infringement started in respect of Divipa in March 1992 and in respect of Zicuñaga in October 1993 and ended for both parties in January 1995. | |
| 157. By reading together recitals 77 to 81, 252, 253, 327, 328, 333 and 334 of the decision, it is apparent that the Commission found that the complex of agreements and concerted practices amounted to an anti-competitive global plan which extended essentially to price increases and the timing of their implementation, and, on occasion, fixing common sales quotas and market shares and exchanging information in order to facilitate the conclusion of agreements for increasing prices or to guarantee the implementation of the price increases agreed. | |
| 158. In recitals 153 to 176 of the decision, the Commission presents a number of items of evidence showing, in its view, that collusive meetings on the Spanish market were held between February 1992 and October 1994 and that Divipa and Zicuñaga participated in a number of those meetings. | |
| 159. Next, the Commission asserts, in recital 286 of the decision, that, although Divipa and Zicuñaga were found to have participated only in cartel meetings concerning the Spanish market, they must have understood that the cartel covered the whole territory that became the EEA in 1994. In support of that assertion, it relies on recital 287, by referring to recitals 89 to 94 and recitals 197, 211, 277 and 280 of the decision, in particular the fact that the two levels of meetings were closely intertwined and that no participants to the national meetings could ignore the fact that the purpose of these meetings was complementary to the general cartel meetings. | |
| 160. It is therefore appropriate, first of all, to ascertain the validity of the Commission’s allegations as to the existence of a cartel on the Spanish market and the participation of Divipa and Zicuñaga in that cartel. If those allegations prove to be well founded, it will then be necessary to examine whether proof of such participation, combined with the evidence set out in recitals 286 to 289 of the decision, shows that Divipa and Zicuñaga also participated in the general cartel established in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. | |
| The existence of collusive meetings on the Spanish market | |
| 161. Clearly, a number of factors combine to show that there was a cartel on the Spanish market for carbonless paper from February1992 to 1995. | |
| 162. In the first place, Sappi admitted having participated in the cartel meetings concerning the Spanish market from February 1992 and supplied various pieces of information in that regard. In its reply of 18 May 1999 to the Commission (Documents Nos 15193 to 15206), Sappi refers to various collusive meetings concerning the Spanish market held on 17 and 27 February 1992, 30 September and 19 October 1993, and 3 May and 29 June 1994. In relation to the period from 1993 to 1995, an employee of Sappi stated (Documents Nos 15179 and 15180) that it had attended six or seven meetings in Barcelona with other suppliers. Those meetings took place around four or five times per year. He thought he first attended on 19 October 1993 and for the last time in 1995. According to him, the aim of those meetings was to fix prices for the Spanish market. The meetings lasted around two hours and generally ended in a decision to raise prices by a given percentage. The participants were Copigraph, Arjo Wiggins, Torraspapel, Zicuñaga, Koehler, Stora‑Feldmühle (now MHTP), Zanders and Divipa. The extracts of Sappi’s statements contained in the various documents are part of the documents attached to the SO, so that all the applicants had access to them. The Commission also produced them before the Court. | |
| 163. Secondly, AWA admitted participating in multilateral cartel meetings between the carbonless paper producers and gave the Commission a list of meetings between competitors held between 1992 and 1998. Document No 7828, which is an extract of the reply of 30 April 1999 sent by AWA to the Commission, includes a general statement by AWA as to the organisation of several meetings, inter alia, in Lisbon and Barcelona between 1992 and 1994, which it thinks were attended by representatives of Sarrió, Binda, Stora‑Feldmühle (now MHTP) and Divipa or by some of those undertakings and, probably for one meeting only, by Zicuñaga. The collusive nature of some of those meetings is clear from AWA’s statement, reproduced in Document No 7829, that some of those meetings were ‘improper’, in that they functioned as discussions on the prices of carbonless paper, including exchanges of intentions regarding announcements of price increases. AWA’s statements contained in those two documents (Nos 7828 and 7829), produced before the Court, also formed part of the documents attached to the SO to which Divipa and Zicuñaga had access. | |
| 164. AWA then supplied, in its reply to the SO, a list of ‘improper’ meetings between competitors the existence of which AWA claims it helped to prove. That list includes, for the Spanish market alone, the meetings of 17 February and 5 March 1992, 30 September 1993, 3 May, 29 June and 19 October 1994. That list, referred to in recital 170 of the decision and which the Court asked to be produced in Case T‑132/02, does not show which undertakings attended those meetings. Neither Divipa nor Zicuñaga nor any other applicant identified that list as being an inculpatory document to which they did not have access or for which they did not make a request for access. | |
| 165. Thirdly, in its statements of 14 April 1999 (Documents Nos 7647 to 7655), Mougeot, which also admitted its participation in multilateral cartel meetings between carbonless paper producers, lists a number of meetings, indicating for each one, its object, content and the persons who were present. Those meetings include, in respect of the Spanish market, the one of 19 October 1994, to which Copigraph, Stora, Torraspapel, Divipa, Ekman, Zicuñaga, Koehler, AWA and Mougeot, according to the latter, sent a representative. According to those documents, the object of that meeting was the organisation of the Spanish market and under the heading ‘Content of the meeting’, it was stated ‘Price-fixing on the Spanish market depending on the size of the customers …’. Mougeot’s statements also formed part of the documents attached to the SO and were produced before the Court. | |
| 166. Admittedly, Mougeot gave its statements after the material events and for the purpose of application of the Leniency Notice. They cannot however be regarded as devoid of probative value. Statements which run counter to the interests of the declarant must in principle be regarded as particularly reliable evidence ( JFE Engineering v Commission , paragraph 155 above, paragraph 211). | |
| 167. However, according to the case-law of the Court of First Instance, an admission by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested by several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an infringement committed by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence ( JFE Engineering v Commission , paragraph 155 above, paragraph 219; see also, to that effect, Case T‑337/94 Enso-Gutzeit v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1571, paragraph 91). | |
| 168. In that respect, it should be noted that, first, the statements of Sappi, AWA and Mougeot support each other on a number of points, such that they substantiate each other. Secondly, it is apparent in the present case that their statements are corroborated by other evidence contemporaneous with the facts at issue. Thus, the existence of each of the collusive meetings referred to by AWA is confirmed by another item of evidence dating from the time of the infringement and from another undertaking present at the particular meeting. | |
| 169. First, in relation to the meeting of 17 February 1992, in a fax (Document No 4588, cited in recital 157 of the decision and in paragraph 61 of the SO) dated 17 February 1992, Mr W. (Sappi) informs his line manager, Mr J., that the situation is uncertain, at the very least, because of Koehler’s and Sarrió’s conduct and that a meeting of the interested parties concerned took place that day. | |
| 170. Secondly, as regards the meeting of 5 March 1992, in a note of 27 February 1992 (Document No 4589, referred to in recital 158 of the decision and paragraph 60 of the SO), Mr W. (Sappi) informs the same person again that he made arrangements to attend a meeting the following week in Barcelona with other interested parties to discuss recent developments on the Spanish market. He goes on to say that the meeting is to be held on 5 March 1992. Both these documents were annexed to the SO. | |
| 171. The note of 9 March 1992 (Documents Nos 4703 and 4704, referred to in recital 156 of the decision and paragraph 60 of the SO) from Sappi’s Spanish agent to Sappi Europe, while not being a complete account of the meeting, is very precise as to the conduct of the undertakings referred to, including Divipa. The parties discussed the matter of a price increase of 10 Spanish pesetas (ESP), being the objective set by the distributors but which was not fully achieved. The author of that note states that Divipa did not raise its prices at all. According to him, it is obvious that Sappi Europe cannot increase its prices if the other suppliers do not follow suit. He refers further to the fact that Zicuñaga announced the launch of a project to produce carbonless paper on the French side of the Spanish border, a move which should strengthen competition. | |
| 172. Thirdly, in relation to the meeting of 30 September 1993 in Barcelona, a note (Documents Nos 5 and 9972, cited in recital 163 of the decision) drawn up on that date by the representative of Sappi sets out the sales announced for 1992 and 1993 by AWA, Binda, Copigraph, Sappi, Divipa, Stora-Feldmühle, Koehler, Sarrió and Zanders together with a quota for the fourth quarter of 1993. The participants agreed to announce a price increase of 10% for reels and sheets of paper. They also agreed to meet again to confirm compliance with the quotas. That note was referred to in full in paragraph 80 of the SO. | |
| 173. Fourthly, in relation to the meeting of 19 October 1993, according to a note (Document No 4474, referred to in recitals 165 and 192 of the decision) drawn up in Spanish by an employee of Sappi and headed ‘Report of the visit’ (informe vista), a meeting was held on 19 October 1993 attended by all the distributors except Copigraph. At that meeting the participants agreed that the reels price increase for end-users should be 8%. They also agreed to notify the manufacturer that they would accept only a 7.5% increase in the manufacturer’s prices, which would lead to a 0.5% increase in the distributor’s margin. Even if that note is undated, it should be borne in mind that the reference to ‘today’s’ prices proves that the note is contemporaneous with the recorded facts. The fact that the note is unsigned and undated is quite normal since it is a note relating to a meeting the anti-competitive object of which was a reason for its author to leave the least trace possible (see, to that effect, Shell v Commission , paragraph 56 above, paragraph 86). Secondly, given the language in which that note was drawn up and the other information supplied by Sappi there can be no doubt that the note concerned the Spanish market. Apart from the last sentence, that note was reproduced in paragraph 84 of the SO. | |
| 174. Fifthly, with regard to the meeting of 3 May 1994, the file includes a note (Document No 14535) of the same date, also drawn up by an employee of Sappi and headed ‘Report of the visit’. That note has as its subtitle ‘Meeting of manufacturers to analyse price situation’. It states, in respect of each participating undertaking, namely, Copigraph, AWA, Torraspapel, Zicuñaga, Koehler, Stora, Zanders, Sappi and Divipa, the name of the person representing it. The note also contains a table setting out the current prices and those – increased – prices envisaged for 16 May, stating that those prices were the result of agreements between the distributors. That note was attached to the SO and its contents detailed in paragraphs 110 to 112 thereof. | |
| 175. Sixthly, as regards the meeting of 29 June 1994, a note (Document No 4476, referred to in recitals 164 and 166 of the decision) dated that day is headed ‘Meeting of carbonless paper manufacturers’. It also states the name of the person representing each participating undertaking, namely Torraspapel, Reacto, Divipa, Stora, AWA, Sappi and Zicuñaga. The note begins with the term ‘[r]eels’, followed by the wording ‘[a]ll provided with full order books and quotas’. It refers, in respect of the reels, to a price increase of 10% to be applied from 1 September. Various indicative prices are mentioned for direct sales to printers, distinguishing between three categories of customers and according to the type of products. The note indicates that since the price agreed for sheets was not complied with, it returned to its former level. It was decided to increase that price in two stages, on 1 July and 1 September 1994, by 5% each time. The note ends with the wording ‘Next meeting: 23 September at 12.30’. The document was attached to the SO and its content set out in paragraphs 121 to 123 thereof. | |
| 176. In addition, an internal fax (Document No 4565, cited in recital 166 of the decision) of Sappi, dated 4 November 1994, refers to the fact that the leader on the Spanish market, Torraspapel, announced a price reduction of ESP 10, and that everything suggests that the November increases will have no effect, since so far no distributor has announced them. That fax was referred to in paragraph 130 of the SO and attached thereto. | |
| 177. Seventhly, and finally, regarding the meeting of 19 October 1994, it is clear from the manuscript note (Document No 1839, referred to in recitals 167, 222 and 223 of the decision) of 21 October 1994, drawn up by Mougeot and relating to the Spanish market, that the participants agreed on the prices to be applied on 3 January 1995. Zicuñaga and Mougeot were ‘authorised to sell [below] 5 [ESP]/kg’. The author of the note states that it ‘seems Utopian to ask Zicuñaga to sell at 2% below the prices of the large producers without consideration of volumes’. The next meeting was set for 24 November 1994 at the same time in the same place. That manuscript note was attached to the SO. | |
| 178. It is therefore apparent that, of the meetings referred to by Sappi – and not mentioned by AWA – namely, those of 27 February 1992 and 19 October 1993, only the first of these is not supported by other evidence. However, there is no need to verify the Commission’s findings on the holding of the meeting of 27 February 1992, which in any event falls outside the infringement period of which Divipa and Zicuñaga are accused. | |
| 179. Finally, in addition to the meetings of 17 February and 5 March 1992, 30 September and 19 October 1993 and 3 May, 29 June and 19 October 1994, the Commission also refers, in Table 3 contained in recital 129 of the decision and in Annex II thereto, to a meeting held in Barcelona on 16 July 1992 concerning the Spanish and Portuguese markets and a meeting held on 23 September 1994 relating to the Spanish market alone. | |
| 180. As regards the meeting of 16 July 1992, it is clear from recital 159 of the decision that the Commission’s findings relating to the holding and anti-competitive object of that meeting are based on the information contained in Documents Nos 4484, 4501 to 4503 and 4520, cited in footnotes Nos 167 and 168 of the decision and attached to the SO. | |
| 181. In its oral statement (Document No 4484), Mr B.G. of Unipapel, Sappi’s agent in Portugal, stated that on 16 July 1992 he went to Barcelona for a meeting, the object of which was to ‘discuss the situation of the carbonless paper market in Portugal and Spain’. | |
| 182. That statement is supported by copies of notes of travel expenses (Documents Nos 4501 to 4503) which prove that Mr B.G. made a return trip from Lisbon to Barcelona on 16 July 1992. | |
| 183. In another oral statement (Document No 4520), Mr B.G. stated that the purpose of the 16 July 1992 meeting was to discuss price increases and market shares. He added that the agreements had in the main related to reels. He also admitted, without being able to corroborate it, that there were similar agreements for sheets. He stated further that during that meeting information was exchanged as to the quantities sold and the prices applied by each undertaking. | |
| 184. In the light of the information set out in the previous three paragraphs, the Commission was justified in finding that a meeting was held on 16 July 1992 during which agreements were concluded for price increases and allocation of market shares relating to Spain and Portugal, at the very least in relation to reels. It should be pointed out, however, that the Commission does not contend that Divipa attended that meeting, as Mr B.G. was not mentioned as one of the participants. | |
| 185. In relation to the meeting of 23 September 1994, the note (Document No 4476) referred to in paragraph 175 above admittedly corroborates the fact that that meeting had been arranged. However, no document or statement confirms that the meeting was in fact held on that date. It must therefore be held that the Commission has not established that a meeting relating to the Spanish market was held on 23 September 1994. | |
| 186. The fact remains that, on the basis of precise and coherent evidence, the Commission established to the requisite legal standard the existence of an agreement on the Spanish market, at least from March 1992 until January 1995. In fact, the agreement had continued to produce its effects after the collusive meetings had formally ceased in October 1994, since the price increases planned during the meeting of 19 October 1994 (see paragraph 177 above) were to be applied on 3 January 1995 (see, to that effect, Case 243/83 Binon [1985] ECR 2015, paragraph 17, and Case T-14/89 Montedipe v Commission [1992] ECR II‑1155, paragraph 231). | |
| 187. That agreement took the form of repeated meetings between competing undertakings during which they agreed in essence on price increases and the timing of those increases. On one occasion, that is, the meeting of 30 September (see paragraph 172 above), quotas were fixed. | |
| Participation of Divipa and Zicuñaga in the cartel on the Spanish market | |
| 188. According to settled case-law, it is sufficient for the Commission to show that the undertaking concerned participated in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without manifestly opposing them, to prove to the requisite standard that the undertaking participated in the cartel. Where participation in such meetings has been established, it is for that undertaking to put forward evidence to establish that its participation in those meetings was without any anti-competitive intention by demonstrating that it had indicated to its competitors that it was participating in those meetings in a spirit that was different from theirs (Case C‑199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I‑4287, paragraph 155; Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 96; and Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 81). | |
| 189. Having participated in the meeting without publicly distancing itself from what was discussed, the undertaking has given the other participants to believe that it subscribed to what was decided there and would comply with it ( Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 188 above, paragraph 82). | |
| 190. In the present case, it is apparent that, first of all, the table (Document No 15199) setting out the various meetings, and the date, object and participants of those meetings as contained in Sappi’s reply of 18 May 1999, referred to in paragraph 162 above, mentions Divipa and Zicuñaga as having participated in the collusive meeting of 19 October 1993. That assertion is supported by the reference, in the note referred to in paragraph 173 above, to the fact that all the distributors apart from Copigraph participated in that meeting. | |
| 191. Secondly, it is apparent from the statements of Sappi’s employee, referred to in paragraph 162 above, that Divipa and Zicuñaga were present at the meetings which he attended between October 1993 and 1995. In relation to the meetings of 3 May and 29 June 1994, that employee even says that Divipa was represented by Mr A. and Mr C. and Zicuñaga by Mr E. Those statements are supported, in respect of each of those meetings, by notes of the Sappi employee, referred to in paragraphs 174 and 175 above, which were contemporaneous with the facts at issue. | |
| 192. Thirdly, according to AWA’s statements referred to in paragraph 163 above, Divipa participated in the meetings on the Spanish market which were held between 1992 and 1994, or, at the very least, at some of those meetings. Zicuñaga, on the other hand, probably only attended one of those meetings. In that respect, it should be pointed out that the rather cautious nature of that statement made several years after the facts at issue cannot cast doubt on the probative value of the precise information contained in the documentary evidence drawn up by Sappi at the time of the infringement, which refers expressly to Zicuñaga’s presence at the meetings of 19 October 1993, 3 May and 29 June 1994. | |
| 193. Fourthly, it is apparent from Mougeot’s statements, referred to in paragraph 165 above, that Divipa and Zicuñaga were present at the meeting of 19 October 1994. Zicuñaga’s participation in that meeting is also supported by Mougeot’s handwritten note of 21 October 1994, referred to in paragraph 177 above, containing the wording ‘Zicuñaga and Mougeot authorised to sell [below] 5 [ESP]/kg’. Combined with AWA’s statements referred to in the previous paragraph, Mougeot’s precise statements as to the presence of Mr A. (Divipa) at that meeting allowed the Commission to conclude that Zicuñaga had attended the meeting of 19 October 1994. | |
| 194. The fact, argued by Divipa in its reply of 18 May 1999, that Sappi does not mention that a meeting concerning the Spanish market was held on 19 October 1994 is explained by the fact that Sappi did not attend that meeting, as is proved by the list of participants at the meeting drawn up by Mougeot. In any event, that fact cannot invalidate the bundle of consistent evidence proving that that meeting was held and attended by Divipa. | |
| 195. It follows from all of the above evidence that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that Divipa and Zicuñaga participated in collusive meetings held on a continuous basis between 19 October 1993 and 19 October 1994. | |
| 196. Even though those undertakings did not participate in all the meetings forming part of a scheme of periodic meetings as alleged by the Commission, neither Divipa nor Zicuñaga referred to evidence showing that they distanced themselves publicly from what was discussed at the meetings which they attended. They are therefore still liable for the infringement. Since it has been established that the applicants took part in those meetings and that their object was inter alia to fix prices, the applicants at least gave their competitors the impression that they were participating in them in the same spirit as the others (see, to that effect, Case T‑7/89 Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, paragraph 232, and Case T‑12/89 Solvay v Commission [1992] ECR II-907, paragraph 98). It must be borne in mind that that scheme of meetings was part of a series of efforts made by the undertakings in question, in pursuit of a single economic aim, namely to distort the normal movement of prices on the market in carbonless paper. It would therefore be artificial to split up such continuous conduct, characterised by a single purpose, by treating it as consisting of a number of separate infringements ( Rhône‑Poulenc v Commission , paragraph 155 above, paragraph 126). | |
| 197. Divipa’s participation in the cartel from March 1992 onwards is clear, first of all, from AWA’s statements referred to in paragraphs 163 and 192 above. Those statements are further supported by Divipa’s words in the note of 9 March 1992 referred to in paragraph 171 above. In that note, Sappi’s Spanish agent clearly examines the application by various undertakings of the price increase of ESP 10, the objective previously set by the distributors. The agent expressly mentions the fact that Divipa did not increase its prices. However, the monitoring of Divipa’s pricing policy, next to that of Sarrió and AWA which had their own trading company on the Spanish market, constitutes a strong indication of its participation in the cartel at that time. | |
| 198. Those findings as to Divipa’s and Zicuñaga’s participation in the cartel on the Spanish market from March 1992 and from October 1993 respectively, until January 1995 in the case of both undertakings, cannot be called into question by considerations relating to the individual characteristics of those undertakings. | |
| 199. It is clear from recitals 17 and 330 of the decision that the Commission duly took into account the fact that neither Divipa nor Zicuñaga were members of the AEMCP. Moreover the Commission did not consider the status of member of the AEMCP as a constituent element of the infringement. | |
| 200. As regards the differences highlighted by Divipa and Zicuñaga between the price increases decided during the meetings which they attended and the evolution of prices during the period in which those decisions were meant to have been applied, even if the accuracy of the figures produced by those undertakings in order to illustrate their pricing policy during that period is accepted, those differences are capable of showing at most that the undertakings concerned did not comply with the decisions on price increases made during the meetings in question. Under the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3) (‘the Guidelines’), non-implementation in practice of the agreements may constitute an attenuating circumstance; it will therefore be appropriate to appraise the arguments of the parties in this regard in the context of the pleas for annulment or reduction of the fine (see paragraphs 594 to 635 below). On the other hand, it must be stated that non-observance of the agreed prices does not change the fact that the object of those meetings was anti-competitive and that, therefore, the applicants participated in the agreements (Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission [1995] ECR II-1063, paragraph 79). Those differences, even if they are proved, are not grounds for discounting the evidence of Divipa and Zicuñaga’s participation in those collusive meetings. | |
| 201. The fact alleged by Zicuñaga that production and distribution of carbonless paper were carried out, within its group, by the Papeteries de l’Atlantique SA is not such as to call into question the participation of Zicuñaga, the only undertaking referred to in the statements of the other members of the cartel, in the infringement. It should be pointed out that, although Zicuñaga only held 50% of the capital in Papeteries de l’Atlantique at the material time, the Commission holds Zicuñaga responsible for the infringement in respect of its own conduct and not as the parent of Atlantique. First, the documentary evidence relating to the meetings of 3 May and 29 June 1994 (see paragraphs 174 and 175 above) expressly refer to the presence of a representative from Zicuñaga at those two collusive meetings concerning the Spanish market. Secondly, the handwritten note of 21 October 1994 drawn up by Mougeot (see paragraph 177 above) expressly refers to Zicuñaga. At no point does it mention the Papeteries de l’Atlantique. In addition, even if the decision does not correctly reflect the exact nature of Zicuñaga’s activities within the group, Zicuñaga did not dispute the assertion contained in recital 365 of the decision that it was responsible for setting price policies for all paper products of the group. | |
| 202. Divipa also argues that there are differences between the data on its declared sales contained in Sappi’s notes and the data attached to its application. Those differences allegedly show that Divipa did not supply the data contained in Sappi’s notes. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the data attached by Divipa to its application is not substantiated by any document capable of establishing that it reflects reality. In any event, even if it is accurate, the difference that is apparent between that data and that contained in Sappi’s notes only proves that the latter data did not reflect reality. It does not, however, permit the inference that the sales averages referred to in Sappi’s notes were not announced by Divipa at the meeting of 30 September 1993. | |
| 203. Divipa also argues that for a small distributor such as itself to have attended meetings of producers defies all logic. It should be pointed out that its capacity as a distributor is not such as to cast doubt on the series of indicia proving Divipa’s participation in the cartel on the Spanish market. Its capacity as such does not mean, moreover, that it had no interest in participating in the cartel, which, according to the Commission’s analysis set out in recitals 153 and 165 of the decision and not contested by Divipa, necessarily had to include the distributors in order to operate properly on the Spanish market, which was characterised by extensive, integrated networks of production and distribution, such that a number of producers were also distributors. In addition, according to the note dated 29 June 1994 (Document No 4476, referred to in paragraph 175 above), the agreement reached at that meeting related to prices applicable to consumers, which, in the light of Divipa’s status as distributor, suffices to explain that undertaking’s presence at the meeting. | |
| 204. Finally, the fact that Divipa purchases between 60 and 70% of its carbonless paper requirement from Koehler and the remainder from other manufacturers implies a certain dependence vis-à-vis its suppliers in relation to the purchase price. However, first, that dependence cannot be regarded as complete. The table provided by Divipa as an annex to its application shows that in 1993 Divipa did not always pass on certain reductions in its purchase price straightaway, so that its margin thus remained significant. Secondly, and in any event, that fact also does not mean that it had no interest in participating in the cartel, since every price increase decided in that context and applied to the customer could result in an increase in its profit margin. It is also clear from the table that between January and December 1994 Koehler’s purchase prices went from 159.25 to 195.70 and Divipa’s margin from 20.38 to 43.81. Finally, it is clear from the note relating to the meeting of 19 October 1993, referred to in paragraph 173 above, that the negotiations related, first, to prices that the distributor had to pay the manufacturer, and, secondly, to the increase applied by the distributors to their clients, this incorporating an increase in the distributor’s margin. | |
| Divipa’s and Zicuñaga’s participation in the cartel on the European market | |
| 205. It is clear from recital 286 of the decision that the Commission only found Divipa and Zicuñaga to have participated in collusive meetings concerning the Spanish market. It asserts, however, that ‘they must have understood that the cartel covered the whole territory that became the EEA in 1994’. | |
| 206. The Commission relies, in this regard, on the fact that the general European cartel meetings and the national collusive meetings, in particular the Spanish ones, were inextricably linked, the fact that the large European carbonless paper producers took part in collusive activities on the Spanish market, and the fact of significant intra-Community trade flows in the carbonless paper sector during the reference period. | |
| 207. According to the case-law, an undertaking which has participated in a multiform infringement of the competition rules by its own conduct, which met the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may also be responsible for the conduct of other undertakings followed in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement, where it is proved that the undertaking in question was aware of the unlawful conduct of the other participants, or could reasonably foresee such conduct, and was prepared to accept the risk ( LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 158 and the case-law cited). | |
| 208. In the present case, it is clear inter alia from paragraph 187 above that the object of the agreements relating to the Spanish market in which Divipa and Zicuñaga participated was to fix common price increases. In addition, on one occasion, namely the meeting of 30 September 1993 – which Zicuñaga, not yet participating in the cartel, did not attend – sales quotas on that market were allocated on the basis of an exchange of information on the sales made. Those agreements were therefore in line with the general European cartel, the object of which was mainly to increase the prices of carbonless paper, and, in some cases, to fix common sales quotas or market shares and to exchange confidential information in order to facilitate the conclusion or application of price-fixing agreements. | |
| 209. However, according to the case-law, the mere fact that there is identity of object between an agreement in which an undertaking participated and a global cartel does not suffice to render that undertaking responsible for the global cartel. It is only if the undertaking knew or should have known when it participated in the agreement that in doing so it was joining in the global cartel that its participation in the agreement concerned can constitute the expression of its accession to that global cartel (Case T-28/99 Sigma Tecnologie v Commission [2002] ECR II-1845, paragraph 45). | |
| 210. The Commission asserts, in its decision, that this was the case with Divipa and Zicuñaga, which these undertakings dispute. | |
| 211. Admittedly, it is common ground that Divipa and Zicuñaga were not members of the AEMCP and that they never took part in the official meetings of that association – which, according to the Commission functioned as the framework for the European cartel until September 1993 – or in the general cartel meetings which were held at the margins of the official AEMCP meetings from September 1993. Moreover, none of the evidence relating to the participation of Divipa and Zicuñaga in collusive meetings on the Spanish market shows that a price-fixing cartel operating at European level was discussed at either of those meetings. | |
| 212. However, neither Divipa nor Zicuñaga provide evidence capable of rebutting the Commission’s findings in recitals 89 to 94 and 211 of the decision and Mougeot’s statements set out in recital 90. According to those statements, ‘AWA felt that unless the managers responsible for local markets were involved there was little chance of achieving the results hoped for, which explained the holding of meetings market by market’ and ‘the local managers were told by their superiors that they wanted a price rise, and had to decide between themselves how the rise should be secured in practice’. Those statements clearly show that, in order to ensure the success of the decisions to raise prices made at the general cartel meetings, the participants in those meetings sought to ensure that those decisions were applied generally over the various regional and national markets. In the light of the significant volume of trade flows between Member States in relation to the product concerned, it was not particularly effective to take measures restricting competition only at the level of a single Member State. | |
| 213. The Commission thus produced two tables (Tables 5 and 6, contained in recitals 207 and 217 of the decision and in paragraph 117 and 127 of the SO) found at Sappi’s premises showing the price increases agreed for various countries at the two general meetings of 21 June and 22 September 1994. In relation to Spain, those tables do not contain any figures, only the wording ‘to be specified’. However, the minutes of the meeting of 29 June 1994 (Document No 4476, referred to in paragraph 175 above) concerning the Spanish market and Mougeot’s handwritten note of 21 October 1994 (Document No 1839, referred to in paragraph 177 above; see also paragraph 235 below) following the meeting of 19 October 1994 also relating to the Spanish market, show that each of those general meetings was followed by a national meeting during which price increases for the Spanish market were in fact specified. In addition, as the Commission points out in its written pleadings, the fact that Mougeot’s handwritten note mentions the words ‘in light of the AEMCP volumes announced in respect of Spain’ and describes a discussion revolving around those figures lends credence to the argument that Divipa and Zicuñaga were necessarily aware of the wider framework, at European level, of which the meetings relating to the Spanish market formed part and in which they participated. | |
| 214. In addition, the various documents relied on by the Commission in relation to the Spanish meetings (in recitals 154 to 171 of the decision, Annex II to the decision and the corresponding footnotes) show unequivocally that a certain number of representatives of European carbonless paper producers were present at those meetings and whose participation in the general cartel meetings, in the light of the evidence cited by the Commission in recitals 263 to 276 of the decision, cannot be disputed, nor, in the majority of cases, was it disputed. | |
| 215. It seems scarcely conceivable that, while, as the Commission points out in recital 176 of the decision, it is clear from the indicia provided by a representative of Unipapel during the investigations (Document No 4525, the relevant extract of which is set out in paragraph 74 of the SO) that the Portuguese customers suspected that a European-wide cartel underpinned the conduct of Portuguese operators in relation to price increases, Divipa and Zicuñaga, which, at the meetings on the Spanish markets, rubbed shoulders with representatives of major European carbonless paper producers involved in the general cartel meetings, were unaware that, by participating in collusive agreements on that market, they were part of a European-wide cartel. | |
| 216. In those circumstances, it must be held that Divipa and Zicuñaga must have been informed of the existence and content of the European cartel (see, to that effect, Cement , paragraph 4097) and that, by participating in agreements on the Spanish market having the same object as the European cartel they were necessarily aware that in doing so they were taking part in that cartel (see, to that effect, Cement , paragraph 4099). | |
| 217. The fact, as claimed by Zicuñaga, that the file does not contain any evidence showing that the prices relating to markets other than the Spanish market were discussed at the Spanish meetings or were brought to its knowledge by other undertakings is fully in line with the cartel’s general system of organisation, namely that the discussions held, particularly in the context of meetings at national or regional level, were intended to establish the practical arrangements for applying the price increases decided on at European level to the prices charged on the local market concerned. This is not capable of undermining the analysis set out above. | |
| 218. Zicuñaga bases another argument on its lack of participation in the meetings and allegedly collusive activities taking place on the French and Italian markets, despite its commercial interests in the latter. It is appropriate to recall in this respect Zicuñaga’s statement at the hearing that ‘it was responsible for setting price policies for all paper products of the group and … consequently, took all price decisions also concerning Papeteries de l’Atlantique products’ (recital 365 of the decision). Therefore, the assertion that Zicuñaga had commercial interests not only in Spain but also in France and Italy through the activities of its subsidiary, Papeteries de l’Atlantique, could be understood as meaning that Zicuñaga, which could not have been unaware that certain undertakings represented in the Spanish meetings were active on the French and Italian markets, when defining the pricing policy of its group must have enquired whether the agreements in which it participated were part of a European cartel, and thus must necessarily have been informed of the existence of such a cartel. | |
| 219. In any case, the circumstance referred to in the previous paragraph is not capable of casting doubt on the analysis set out in paragraphs 205 to 217 above. Furthermore it might also be understood as proof that Zicuñaga was aware that the agreements in which it participated on the Spanish market were part of a European cartel and therefore thought it unnecessary to take part in meetings and collusive activities anywhere other than in Spain. | |
| 220. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Zicuñaga’s situation is different in several respects from that of the undertaking Sigma Tecnologie di rivestimento in Sigma Tecnologie v Commission , paragraph 209 above, to which Zicuñaga refers in its written pleadings. Indeed, unlike the applicant in that case, in the sector in question Zicuñaga operated on several national markets. Furthermore, even accepting Zicuñaga’s argument that it was perceived by its Spanish competitors as applying an aggressive pricing policy, Zicuñaga did not provide any evidence capable of proving that, like Sigma Tecnologie di rivestimento, it was excluded from certain meetings or collusive activities because it was a ‘troublemaker’ ( Sigma Tecnologie v Commission , paragraph 209 above, paragraph 42 and 46). On the contrary, Mougeot’s note relating to the meeting of 19 October 1994, referred to in paragraph 177 above, shows that Zicuñaga was considered to be a full member of the Spanish cartel, in which it was allowed to sell at prices slightly lower than those which had to be applied by the other members of the cartel. | |
| 221. In the context of its argument seeking to prove that it did not implement the price-fixing agreements at issue, Zicuñaga complains that the Commission, during the administrative procedure, refused it access to the detailed information referred to in recital 288 of the decision. In that respect, it is appropriate to refer back to the arguments set out in paragraphs 45 to 51 above. | |
| Zicuñaga’s participation in agreements fixing sales quotas and market shares | |
| 222. Finally, as set out in paragraph 153 above, Zicuñaga denies its participation in agreements fixing sales quotas and market shares. | |
| 223. In that respect, it is clear from reading together recitals 77, 81, 252, 253, 326 to 331, 376, 382 and 383 of the decision that the Commission found there to be agreements fixing sales quotas and market shares not as separate infringements, but as constituent elements of a single infringement, referred to in Article 1 of the decision and imputed to Zicuñaga, whose general purpose was to increase carbonless paper prices in the whole territory that became the EEA in 1994 (recital 327 of the decision), the central plank of which was the conclusion of agreements to increase prices (recital 383 of the decision). | |
| 224. It is appropriate, first, to ascertain whether the Commission correctly established the existence of agreements fixing sales quotas and market shares and whether it was justified in forming the view that those agreements formed part of the overall anti-competitive plan constituting the infringement established in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. In that respect, the Commission distinguishes in recitals 241 to 251 of the decision between the evidence which, in its view, proves the existence of agreements allocating sales quotas and those which, according to the Commission, prove the existence of market-sharing agreements. | |
| 225. As regards, first of all, the Commission’s contentions as to the allocation of sales quotas, it should be pointed out, first, that the document drawn up by Sappi concerning the meeting held on 30 September 1993 in Barcelona (Document No 5 referred to in paragraph 172 above) shows that the participants in that meeting declared at the outset their monthly sales averages in 1992 and 1993 and proceeded to allocate sales quotas for the fourth quarter of 1993 before agreeing to announce a 10% increase in the price of reels and sheets on 1 January 1994, and, finally, decided to convene again on a date to be fixed at a later stage for the purposes of checking compliance with the quotas. | |
| 226. Secondly, it should be noted that Zicuñaga does not call into question the Commission’s findings in recitals 138, 242 and 243 of the decision that a ‘meeting note’ (Document No 6, set out in paragraph 87 of the SO) drawn up by Sappi at a meeting held on 1 October 1993 concerning the French market indicates that the participants at that meeting agreed to both a price increase and an allocation of quotas for the fourth quarter of 1993 ‘to allow price increases’. | |
| 227. In relation, next, to the Commission’s contentions as to the market-sharing agreements, Zicuñaga does not put forward any evidence casting doubt on the Commission’s findings in recitals 141 and 246 of the decision that the meeting which was held in spring 1994 at Nogent‑sur-Marne concerning the French market functioned both as an agreement to increase prices and as a market-sharing agreement (Document No 7651, referred to in paragraphs 113 to 115 of the SO and attached thereto). | |
| 228. The facts set out above permit the finding that the Commission was correct to state in recital 241 of the decision that ‘to support the implementation of the agreed price increases, in some national cartel meetings sales quotas were allocated and market shares were fixed for each participant’. The Commission was therefore able to take the view that the agreements to increase prices and fix common sales quotas and markets shares were inextricably linked aspects of the same overall anti-competitive plan constituting the infringement found in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. | |
| 229. Secondly, it should be examined whether the Commission was right to accuse Zicuñaga of the aspects of the single infringement relating to the agreements on sales quotas and market shares. | |
| 230. The term ‘[r]eels’, followed by the wording ‘[a]ll provided with full order books’ contained in Sappi’s note of 29 June 1994, referred to in paragraph 175 above, does not necessarily prove that an agreement on sales quotas was concluded during the meeting of 29 June 1994. It does show, however, that at the time of holding that meeting, all those attending, including Zicuñaga, were party to an agreement allocating sales quotas in relation to the reels market. | |
| 231. It should be pointed out that the evidence, referred to in the previous paragraph, relating to the meeting of 29 June 1994 constitutes the only evidence capable of being used against Zicuñaga as evidence of its direct participation in an agreement allocating sales quotas. The Commission did not find that Zicuñaga had participated in the meeting of 30 September 1993 in Barcelona in which an agreement on sales quotas for the fourth quarter of 1993 was entered into. With regard to the other meetings, Zicuñaga’s attendance at which was correctly established by the Commission, the Commission does not claim in its decision that those meetings served as a framework for sales quotas agreements. | |
| 232. In its defence, the Commission argues, however, that sales quotas were also discussed at the meeting of 19 October 1994. | |
| 233. In that respect, Mougeot’s handwritten note of 21 October 1994 relating to a meeting held on 19 October 1994 concerning the Spanish market (see paragraph 177 above) contains the following information: | |
| ‘I asked in light of the AEMCP volumes announced for Spain (except for Zicuñaga) at the end of August 94, [up by] 4 300 [tonnes], where our 93 volumes had got to ([down by] 50%)? | |
| – Sarrió’s reply: volumes go up and down! | |
| – Koehler’s reply: the AEMCP figures are incorrect!’ | |
| 234. This could mean, as the Commission submits in its defence, that at the meeting of 19 October 1994 discussions took place concerning sales quotas or volumes. It is apparent, however, that the Commission does not refer, either in the part of the decision concerning the meetings on the Spanish market or in that concerning sales quotas and market shares, to those assertions in support of its allegations concerning the conclusion of agreements on sales quotas or market shares during the reference period. In those circumstances, those assertions cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of establishing Zicuñaga’s participation in sales quotas agreements. | |
| 235. This being so, the fact remains that the indication set out in paragraph 230 above establishes that Zicuñaga was informed of the existence of an agreeement on sales quotas during the meeting of 29 June 1994. | |
| 236. In those circumstances, and since it has been established that Zicuñaga participated in agreements to raise prices on the Spanish market when it knew, or must have known, that in so doing it was part of a European cartel, the Commission was also able to hold it liable for sales quotas agreements entered into during the period of its participation in the agreements to increase prices. It s hould be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, an undertaking that has participated in a multiple infringement of the competition rules by virtue of its own conduct, which falls within the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and is intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may also be responsible for the conduct of other undertakings followed in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement, where it is proved that the undertaking in question is aware of the unlawful conduct of the other participants, or can reasonably foresee such conduct, and is prepared to accept the risk ( Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 203). | |
| 237. Accordingly, Zicuñaga must be held liable for the agreement to allocate sales quotas referred to in the meeting of 29 June 1994. | |
| 238. As regards the market-sharing agreements, it is clear from recitals 246 to 251 of the decision that the Commission bases its findings as to the existence of such agreements, first of all, on assertions relating to two meetings on the French market organised in spring 1994 and 6 December 1994. However, the decision does not contain any evidence from which it may be inferred that Zicuñaga was aware of the fact, or could reasonably foresee, that meetings on the French market functioned as market-sharing agreements. In that respect, contrary to its findings concerning agreements to increase prices, the Commission did not find in the decision that the market-sharing agreements observed on the French market were in the nature of the decentralised application of an alleged European agreement on market-sharing whose members informed the local managers of the various markets concerned. In those circumstances, it cannot be held that Zicuñaga, which, it is common ground, did not take part in collusive meetings on markets other than the Spanish market, knew of or could reasonably foresee, the existence of the market-sharing agreements referred to above. | |
| 239. According to the Commission, it is then apparent that the market shares appeared on the agenda of the general cartel meetings (recital 250 of the decision). It should be recalled, however, that it is common ground that Zicuñaga never attended general cartel meetings. In addition, the evidence advanced by the Commission in recitals 250 and 251 of the decision in support of its contention related to the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995, that is, a meeting taking place after the end of the infringement period upheld against Zicuñaga in the second paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. | |
| 240. It follows that Zicuñaga’s participation in market-sharing practices has not been established. | |
| 241. In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the Commission was justified in holding Zicuñaga liable for practices allocating sales quotas during the period of its participation in the infringement. On the other hand, it must be held that the Commission was wrong to accuse Zicuñaga of the aspect of the single infringement relating to market-sharing agreements. | |
| 242. However, that error of assessment is not such as to undermine the findings that Zicuñaga, in the course of meetings concerning the Spanish market, participated in agreements to raise prices, or the analysis that, through those agreements, Zicuñaga took part in the European cartel fixing prices for carbonless paper which constituted the main aspect of the infringement established in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. The considerations set out above relating to market-sharing are not such as to call into question Zicuñaga’s participation in that infringement. It must be held that Zicuñaga, having participated for over a year in those price initiatives, could reasonably foresee that the participating undertakings were seeking to ensure the success of those initiatives by various mechanisms and Zicuñaga was prepared to accept that possibility. For the purposes of examining the alternative claims made by Zicuñaga with a view to securing a reduction in the fine imposed on it under Article 3 of the decision, it must be established, however, whether, and, as appropriate, to what extent Zicuñaga’s lack of responsibility for the market-sharing practices justifies a reduction in the fine imposed on it. | |
| 243. On the basis of all those considerations, it is appropriate to dismiss Divipa’s plea alleging breach of Articles 81 EC and 53 of the EEA Agreement, and Zicuñaga’s plea, alleging errors of assessment. | |
| C – The pleas relating to the duration of the infringement | |
| 244. A number of applicants, namely Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot, Torraspapel, Divipa and Zicuñaga, dispute the Commission’s findings as to the duration of their participation in the infringement. Some of those applicants (MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel) make their arguments in the context of claims for partial annulment of Article 1 of the decision and reduction in the fine imposed on them under Article 3 of the decision, while others (Bolloré, Divipa and Zicuñaga) do so in the context of their alternative claims for a reduction of the fine. As regards the latter undertakings, it is clear from their written pleadings that they essentially dispute the lawfulness of the contested decision in that, in the second paragraph of Article 1, it establishes the duration of the infringement of which each of them is accused. It is therefore appropriate to re-classify their claim as also seeking annulment in part of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the decision relating to the duration of the infringement. | |
| 245. Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel make largely the same argument, namely that the Commission has not proven their participation in the cartel during the period before September or October 1993 or during the period before January 1993 in the case of MHTP. Save for certain specificities linked to their respective situations, the essence of their arguments is that, first, contrary to the Commission’s contentions, it is not proved that the meetings held at European level within the AEMCP before September or October 1993 functioned as collusive pricing agreements, and, secondly, it is not proved that they participated in collusive meetings at national or regional level before that period. It is appropriate, first of all, to examine together the respective arguments of the various undertakings referred to above, and Mougeot’s additional argument that the Commission has not proved its participation in the agreement after July 1995. It will then be appropriate to examine the pleas advanced by Divipa and Zicuñaga respectively. | |
| 1. The pleas advanced by Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel | |
| a) Participation of the applicants in the infringement before September or October 1993 | |
| Arguments of the parties | |
| 246. In the context of a plea alleging breach of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, Bolloré submits that the Commission failed to prove its liability in respect of the cartel between January 1992 and September or October 1993. In support of its claim, it submits, first, that Copigraph denied participating in any cartel before September 1993. Secondly, it denies that AWA’s statements of 5 May 1999, those of Mougeot of 14 April 1999 and those of Sappi of 6 January 1998 – on which the Commission relies to prove that Copigraph participated in the cartel before September 1993 – had any probative value. It also points to the contradictory nature of the various statements, submitting that those of Mougeot relate to alleged general cartel meetings while those of AWA concern an alleged cartel relating to the French market. It also asserts that the first price increase applied by Copigraph dates from December 1993, which rules out the possibility of its involvement in a cartel before September or October 1993. | |
| 247. In the context of a plea alleging lack of evidence, MHTP submits that the Commission did not prove its participation in an infringement before January 1993. In support of that claim, it submits, first of all, that the statements of AWA, Sappi and Mougeot cited in recitals 107 and 108 of the decision fail to prove that the AEMCP meetings organised in 1992 functioned as a cartel. Secondly, it contends that, contrary to the Commission’s findings, its participation in the meeting of 5 March 1992 relating to the Spanish market, the meeting in spring 1992 relating to the French market and that of 16 July 1992 relating to the Spanish and Portuguese markets has not been proven. | |
| 248. In the context of a plea alleging lack of evidence, Koehler submits that the Commission has not proved its participation in an anti-competitive agreement prior to October 1993. In support of that claim, it submits, first of all, that the statements of Mougeot and Sappi relied on by the Commission do not prove that collusive agreements were entered into within the framework of the AEMCP before October 1993. It goes on to state that the fact that collusive meetings took place concerning a number of national or regional markets before October 1993 does not show that there was Europe-wide coordination at that time. Secondly, Koehler asserts that, contrary to the Commission’s findings, its participation in the meetings of 17 February and 5 March 1992 relating to the Spanish market, the meeting in spring 1992 relating to the French market and that of 16 July 1992 relating to the Spanish and Portuguese markets, the meeting of 14 January 1993 concerning the United Kingdom and Irish markets, the meeting in spring 1993 concerning the French market and the meeting of 30 September 1993 concerning the Spanish market, has not been proven. | |
| 249. In the context of a plea alleging manifest error of assessment, Mougeot submits that the Commission has not established its participation in a cartel before October 1993. It points out that Sappi’s statements relied on by the Commission do not refer to it as one of the participants in the collusive meetings organised in 1992 and 1993. It adds that, since it was not a member of the AEMCP in 1992, it attended the meetings held by that association on 26 May and 10 September 1992 merely as an observer member and that it should be borne in mind that the participants in the AEMCP meeting of 9 February 1993 – which is the first meeting of that association in which it participated as a member – did not discuss the existence or the desirability of a cartel in its presence. | |
| 250. Mougeot further maintains that, in recital 111 of the decision, the Commission distorts the content of its statements of 14 April 1999. It also denies that Sappi’s statement – cited by the Commission in recital 112 of the decision in support of its argument that the official AEMCP functioned as collusive meetings on prices before the association was restructured in September 1993 – has any probative value. | |
| 251. In the context of a plea alleging erroneous application of Article 81(1) EC and infringements of the principle of presumption of innocence and of an essential procedural requirement, Torraspapel submits that there is no evidence of its alleged participation in an infringement before the period between January 1992 and September 1993 inclusive. Torraspapel makes several preliminary comments as to the risks of strategic denunciation linked to the Commission’s new leniency policy and the lack of probative value of the statements of AWA, Sappi and Mougeot relied on by the Commission in support of its argument. It then denies, first, that the official AEMCP meetings functioned as cartel meetings until September 1993. Secondly, it asserts that, contrary to the Commission’s findings, it did not participate in the meetings of 17 February and 5 March 1992 relating to the Spanish market, the meetings in spring 1992 and spring 1993 concerning the French market and the meeting of 16 July 1992 concerning the Spanish and Portuguese markets. | |
| 252. The Commission disputes the criticisms concerning the probative value of the statements of AWA, Sappi and Mougeot. Those statements explain the cartel’s organisation, including in 1992. The Commission also answers point by point the applicants’ arguments relating to their lack of participation in the various national or regional meetings at issue. | |
| Decision | |
| 253. According to the second paragraph of Article 1 of the decision, Bolloré, MHTP, Koehler and Torraspapel participated in the infringement from January 1992 to September 1995, whereas, according to that same provision, Mougeot participated in the infringement from May 1992 to September 1995. | |
| 254. The relevant passages of the decision in respect of the participation of the five applicants involved in the infringement during the period between January or May 1992, as appropriate, and September or October 1993 inclusive, are the following: | |
| ‘(83) The EEA-wide planning and coordination of the cartel took place at the general cartel meetings convened under the cover of the official meetings of the trade association, the AEMCP. | |
| (84) At the general cartel meetings the participants decided in principle on timing and the amount (in percentage form) of the price increases for each EEA country. They agreed on several consecutive price increases and for some months ahead. | |
| (85) The AEMCP meetings functioned as cartel meetings at least from January 1992 until September 1993 … | |
| (87) The AEMCP meetings were normally well attended, and at the time of the infringement all the then AEMCP members participated in those meetings: AWA, Binda, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel/Sarrió and Zanders.’ | |
| 255. In addition, it is clear from recitals 107 to 113 that Sappi admitted that competing manufacturers colluded during the regular meetings which took place at least from the beginning of 1992 onwards. A Sappi employee stated that those meetings were held ‘Community-wide’ from 1991. AWA also admitted that such meetings were held from the beginning of 1992. Mougeot, which joined the AEMCP at the end of 1992, gave a statement (Document No 7647, referred to in paragraph 165 above) concerning the content of an official AEMCP meeting held in 1993, on the basis of which the Commission inferred that the reconstitution of the association also involved a restructuring of the cartel. Mougeot stated: | |
| ‘Probably on the occasion of the official AEMCP meeting in Frankfurt on 14 September 1993, or at the meeting before that, but certainly when [Mr B.] became head of AWA’s self-copying division [Mr B.] clearly decided to invite the main self-copying manufacturers on each market to these unofficial meetings, and to change the organisation of the official AEMCP meetings. [Mr B.] decided that from now on there would be a lawyer present at all AEMCP meetings in order to give them an official character and ensure that the proceedings were not open to criticism. However, anything to do with prices would no longer be discussed at those meetings but only at “unofficial” meetings.’ | |
| Findings of the Court | |
| 256. First of all, it should be pointed out that, in relation to adducing evidence of an infringement of Article 81(1) EC, it is incumbent on the Commission to prove the infringements which it has found and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of circumstances constituting an infringement (Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 58, and Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 86). | |
| 257. Therefore, the Commission has to provide sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to give grounds for a firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place (see Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). | |
| 258. However, it is important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement; it is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I‑8375, paragraphs 513 to 520). Moreover, as the Court has already stated in paragraphs 155 and 166 above, the evidence must be assessed as a whole and statements made for the purposes of the Leniency Notice cannot for that reason alone be considered to be devoid of probative value. | |
| 259. It is clear from the decision that the Commission bases the liability of the five applicants concerned during the period between January 1992, or May 1992 in the case of Mougeot, and September or October 1993, on their participation in collusive contacts and a system of collusive meetings interlinking, on the one hand, official AEMCP meetings, which, it maintains, functioned as pricing collusion meetings and, on the other, national or regional cartel meetings. | |
| 260. It is appropriate to analyse, first of all, the alleged system of collusive meetings, consisting of official AEMCP meetings and national or regional cartel meetings and, secondly, the participation of the undertakings concerned in those meetings before September or October 1993. | |
| – The alleged system of collusive meetings | |
| Official AEMCP meetings before September or October 1993 | |
| 261. Recitals 107 to 113, 254 to 256 and 295 of the decision show that, to support its contention concerning the holding, before September or October 1993, of general (European) cartel meetings in the framework of official AEMCP meetings, the Commission relies, first of all, on Mougeot’s declarations contained in Document No 7647 (see paragraph 255 above), secondly, the testimony of a Sappi employee and the admissions of Sappi and AWA, and, thirdly, the existence of numerous pieces of evidence showing that national or regional cartel meetings were organised from January 1992, as discussed in paragraph 281 et seq. below. | |
| 262. First of all, on reading recitals 113 and 254 of the decision, it is apparent that Mougeot’s statements (Document No 7647) set out in recital 108 of the decision and referred to in paragraph 255 above, constitute the key aspect of the Commission’s case on this point. | |
| 263. In this regard, it is appropriate, first of all, to dismiss Mougeot’s contention that the Commission distorted the content of its statements. A comparison of recital 108 of the decision with Document No 7647, which contains the statements in question, shows that the Commission, in its decision, literally and faithfully reproduced Mougeot’s statements contained in the document mentioned above. | |
| 264. In addition, in reply to an argument raised by Koehler, the particularly clear terms of Mougeot’s statements explains why, as is apparent from recital 295 of the decision, the Commission did not set any store by Mougeot’s later denial contained in its response to the SO. | |
| 265. It is also approp riate to dismiss Torraspapel’s argument that footnote 97 of the decision shows that the Commission itself has doubts as to the probative value of Mougeot’s statements. The fact that, in that footnote, the Commission, in the light of the content of the documentary evidence contained in the file, dismissed Mougeot’s assertion that it attended an AEMCP meeting for the first time on 9 February 1993, cannot be interpreted as an expression of general doubt on the part of the Commission as to the probative value of Mougeot’s assertions. In addition, unlike Mougeot’s assertion referred to in footnote 97 of the decision, the statements set out in recital 108 of the decision are not contradicted by any evidence capable of casting doubt on the probative value of those statements. | |
| 266. It is clear from Mougeot’s statements that, at an official AEMCP meeting it was decided by Mr B., when he became managing director of AWA self-copying division, to reorganise the activities of the AEMCP by holding, from that point onwards, official meetings of the association with a lawyer present in order to ensure that they were ‘not open to criticism’, by no longer discussing ‘any pricing issues’ at those meetings and from then on by calling ‘unofficial’ meetings to deal with those aspects. Mougeot’s statements indicate clearly that, before the reorganisation of the activities of the AEMCP decided on by Mr B. (AWA), the official AEMCP meetings functioned as pricing discussions. Those discussions were precisely the aspect of those meetings open to criticism. | |
| 267. None of the applicants concerned disputes the assertion, contained in recital 110 of the decision, that the first official AEMCP meeting held with a lawyer present took place on 18 November 1993. In those circumstances, the Commission was justified in concluding that Mr B.’s decision to restructure the activities and meetings of the AEMCP was taken at the official meeting of that association which immediately preceded the meeting of 18 November 1993, that is, the meeting of 14 September 1993. The Commission was therefore correct in taking the view that pricing discussions took place in the context of the official AEMCP meetings up until the meeting of 14 September 1993. | |
| 268. That view is reinforced by recitals 115 to 121 of the decision, from which it is apparent that, after that decision to restructure, unofficial meetings – whose object was to agree price increases in the EEA – were held at the margins of official AEMCP meetings. | |
| 269. Secondly, the Commission relies on the extract, set out in recital 112 of the decision, of the testimony (Document No 5407, annexed to the SO) of a person employed by Sappi in February 1993 recalling that his colleagues ‘would come back from meetings, including AEMCP meetings, with a very definite view on the price increases that were to be implemented and that they were relatively unconcerned by competitor reactions’. | |
| 270. Contrary to the assertions of some of the applicants, the recollections of the Sappi employee were not expressed with any hint of doubt or caution. In the absence of any assertions to the contrary, those statements should be understood as referring equally to the period before as to the period after September 1993. They confirm the fact that, in respect of the period between February and September 1993 inclusive, collusive meetings relating to European-wide price increases took place in the context of official AEMCP meetings which, moreover, was not disputed by the undertakings which admitted their participation in the cartel from 1992 onwards. | |
| 271. It is therefore apparent at this stage of the analysis that the Commission was correct in taking the view that, before September 1993, price agreements were agreed in the context of official AEMCP meetings. It must now be ascertained whether the Commission was justified in finding that the official AEMCP meetings were used as a framework for such agreements as from January 1992 at the latest and were continuously used as such until September 1993. | |
| 272. In that regard, it is clear from recitals 86 and 113 of the decision that, in support of its findings, the Commission contends that the first official AEMCP meeting of which it has written evidence is that of 23 January 1992. By comparing that assertion, on the one hand, with the consistent statements of AWA and Sappi, referred to in recital 107 of the decision, which demonstrate that collusive meetings were held at a European level from the beginning of 1992, and, on the other, evidence that the organisation of regular meetings and contacts at national or regional level began in January 1992 (the same recital), the Commission takes the view that the European cartel on pricing began in January 1992 at the latest. The Commission goes on to state, in recital 113 of the decision, that the documents in its possession show that eight AEMCP meetings were held between January 1992 and the meeting of 14 September 1993, all in Zurich. | |
| 273. It should be pointed out, first of all, that none of the applicants casts doubt on the accuracy of the assertions in the decision concerning the holding of an official AEMCP meeting on 23 January 1992. | |
| 274. Next, it should be borne in mind, first, that in its statement (Documents Nos 7828 and 7829, see paragraph 163 above) referred to by the Commission in recital 107 of the decision, AWA admitted to having participated, from the beginning of 1992, in certain ‘improper’ meetings with competitors which functioned as exchanges of intentions regarding announcements of price increases. AWA’s statement, according to its reply to the Commission’s request for information (Document No 7829), relates to meetings in which Sarrió, Mougeot, Stora-Feldmühle, Copigraph, Koehler and Zanders participated, and which took place between 1992 and 1995 in Paris, Zurich and Geneva. However, Zurich is the city which, as is apparent from Table A of Annex I to the decision, was host to all the official AEMCP meetings organised between January 1992 and September 1993. | |
| 275. However, according to AWA’s reply (Document No 7827), the extract referred to in recitals 61 and 107 of the decision relates to the particular circumstances of the meetings which took place from 1 January 1992 until the date on which that reply was made, but not the official AEMCP meetings, so that it can be inferred that the reply excluded all the AEMCP meetings, as not being collusive. Since, according to the principle of the benefit of doubt, the existence of reasonable doubt should benefit the applicants, it must be held that AWA’s statements in themselves do not permit the inference that the official AEMCP meeting of 23 January 1992 functioned as a framework for collusion on prices. Nevertheless, those statements, are a substantial indication of the existence of a cartel at European level from the beginning of 1992. | |
| 276. Secondly, in relation to Sappi’s declarations referred to in recital 107 of the decision, it is clear from recital 73 of the decision that the Commission refers to ‘statements made by Sappi [suggesting] that there were contacts of a collusive nature between the European carbonless producers as long ago as the founding of their trade association, the AEMCP, in 1981, and in particular from the mid-1980s onward’. | |
| 277. In footnote 64 of the decision (Document No 4656), the Commission states: | |
| ‘Sappi has provided to the Commission a statement made by one of its employees who has been in sales of carbonless paper since the 1970s, saying that “[h]e had first suspected that there was collusion in carbonless paper in about the mid 1980[s] because of comments made by senior management … [h]e would have believed that the collusion involved Arjo Wiggins, Köhler and Stora Feldmühle, among others [and he] had been aware of bilateral exchanges of information from about the mid/late 1980s”.’ | |
| 278. A statement of another Sappi employee shows that there were Community-wide contacts and collusive meetings between competitors from 1991 to 1993. That employee of Sappi states that he believed that those contacts led to collusion and that the suppliers discussed Community-wide pricing between themselves. | |
| 279. The statements of the Sappi employees referred to in the previous paragraphs are such as to establish the existence of a Europe-wide cartel on pricing involving several producers from the end of the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, those statements support those of AWA as to the existence of a cartel at European level from the beginning of 1992. However, they do not permit the inference that the official AEMCP meeting of 23 January 1992 functioned as a framework for collusive contacts. No more than AWA’s statements do they therefore in themselves permit the inference that the Commission was correct in establishing that collusive agreements on prices were entered into from January 1992 in the framework of the official AEMCP meetings. | |
| 280. It is therefore appropriate to examine the third factor advanced by the Commission, that is, the organisation of meetings and collusive contacts at national or regional level at the margins of the official AEMCP meetings from the beginning of 1992. | |
| Meetings at national or regional level before September or October 1993 | |
| 281. It is clear from Table 3, headed ‘National and regional cartel meetings from February 1992 until spring 1995’ and set out in recital 129 of the decision, that the Commission found that seven national or regional meetings were held between February 1992 and 30 September 1993. According to the details of those meetings provided in Annex II to the decision: | |
| – on 17 February 1992 a meeting concerning the Spanish market was held, attended among others by Koehler and Torraspapel; | |
| – on 5 March 1992 a meeting on the Spanish market was held, attended among others by Stora (MHTP), Koehler and Torraspapel; | |
| – in spring 1992, probably in April, a meeting was held on the French market attended among others by Copigraph (subsidiary of Bolloré), Stora (MHTP), Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel; | |
| – on 16 July 1992 a meeting was held concerning the Spanish market, attended among others by Stora (MHTP), Koehler and Torraspapel; | |
| – on 14 January 1993 a meeting was held on the United Kingdom and Irish markets, attended among others by Stora (MHTP) and Koehler; | |
| – in spring 1993, probably in April, a meeting was held on the French market attended among others by Copigraph (subsidiary of Bolloré), Stora (MHTP), Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel; | |
| – on 30 September 1993, a meeting was held on the Spanish market, attended among others by Copigraph (subsidiary of Bolloré), Stora (MHTP), Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel. | |
| 282. It is appropriate to assess the validity of the Commission’s findings relating to the holding of those meetings and their anti-competitive object. | |
| 283. As regards, first, the meeting of 17 February 1992 relating to the Spanish market, the Court has already held in paragraphs 161 to 169 above that the purpose of that meeting, to ensure that an agreement on a price increase on the Spanish market was observed, was collusive and consistent with the general object of the infringement. | |
| 284. Secondly, in relation to the meeting of 5 March 1992, it is also clear from the Court’s findings in paragraphs 161 to 170 above that both the holding and the collusive object of that meeting have been established. | |
| 285. Thirdly, the holding and the anti-competitive object of the meetings in spring 1992 and spring 1993 concerning the French market are apparent from the statements of Sappi employees contained in Documents Nos 15026, 15027 and 15272, referred to in recital 137 of the decision and attached to the SO. | |
| 286. The extract of Sappi’s statement contained in Document No 15272 is worded as follows: | |
| ‘The director (at the time) of sales of Sappi (UK) Ltd in France stated that he attended two meetings with competitors in France with his boss, Mr W. The first took place in spring 1992 and the second a year after. One was held in a hotel in Charles-de-Gaulle airport and the other in the centre of Paris. Those are the only meetings of this kind in which he participated and he does not know whether there were others in France. | |
| During those meetings, the discussion mainly concerned sheets, which Sappi did not sell in France at the time. The meetings did not lead to a consensus or any agreement on sheets. In relation to reels, the discussion concerned past and present pricing levels and not future pricing levels.’ | |
| 287. In addition, in the table (Document No 15200, attached to the SO) contained in its reply of 18 May 1999 to an information request from the Commission, Sappi states that meetings were held at various dates in spring 1992 and spring 1993, probably April, in Paris, at Charles‑de‑Gaulle airport and in a hotel close to place de l’Étoile. According to that table, the purpose of those meetings was to exchange information and discuss customers and the prices they were charged. Sappi states that representatives of Sappi, AWA, Sarrió, Zanders, and Zanders’ agent in France, Europapier and Feldmühle participated in those meetings. It claims that it cannot recall whether a representative of Koehler was also present. | |
| 288. The information set out in the previous paragraphs shows that the Sappi employee who provided that information and who personally attended those events recalls precisely that two meetings between competitors were held in spring 1992 and spring 1993 in Paris, the object of which was, inter alia, to discuss customers and the prices they were charged. The absence of precise information as to exactly when those meetings were held can probably be explained by the significant lapse in time between the events at issue and the time when that employee was asked about them and this is not such as to detract from the precision of his testimony as regards the period in which the meetings concerned were held, their location and their object. Therefore, those various aspects of the Sappi employee’s statements cannot be considered to be devoid of probative value. | |
| 289. As regards the meeting of spring 1993, it should be added that Documents Nos 4798, 4799 and 5034, cited by the Commission in footnote 135 of the decision, correspond to notes of travel expenses and show that Mr F. (Koehler) and Mr W. (Stora-Feldmühle) both went to Paris on 14 April 1993. Such evidence supports the Commission’s argument that the meeting of spring 1993 took place in April. | |
| 290. It is clear from the Sappi employee’s statements, referred to in paragraph 286 above, that according to his recollection no agreement on prices was entered into at the meetings of spring 1992 and spring 1993. However, the assertion that the participants in those meetings did not arrive at a consensus or an agreement of any nature in respect of sheets must be interpreted as meaning that attempts were made to that effect at those meetings as regards sheets, thereby rendering those meetings unlawful. | |
| 291. In fact, in the course of those attempts the participants were moved to exchange individual information on their prices and/or sales volumes in respect of sheets. According to the case-law ( Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraphs 117 and 121), the requirement that every economic operator determine its own policy, which is inherent in the Treaty provisions on competition, strictly precludes any direct or indirect contact between such operators, whose object or effect is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which one has decided to adopt or contemplates adopting on the market, where the object or effect of such contact is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question. In that regard, subject to proof to the contrary, which it is for the economic operators concerned to adduce, there must be a presumption that the undertakings participating in collusion and remaining active on the market take account of the information exchanged with their competitors when determining their conduct on that market. In the light of that case-law, it must be accepted that the meetings of spring 1992 and spring 1993, in relation to the market for sheets, functioned as a framework for concerted action contrary to Article 81(1) EC. | |
| 292. Furthermore, the statements of the Sappi employee referred to in paragraph 286 above describe, in relation to reels, information exchanges and discussions during the meetings on customers and the prices they were charged, which, in the light of the case-law referred to in the preceding paragraph, shows the existence of concerted action prohibited under Article 81(1) EC. | |
| 293. The holding of meetings between competitors in spring 1992 and spring 1993 in Paris and the anti-competitive object of those two meetings are therefore established. | |
| 294. For the sake of completeness, even if it were to be held that those meetings merely gave rise to information exchanges which only breach the competition rules in so far as they are aimed at facilitating the conclusion of agreements on price increases and sales quotas and monitoring adherence to the agreements (recital 97 of the decision), the outcome would be unchanged. | |
| 295. Having regard, first of all, to the extract of Sappi’s statement showing that at the meetings in question attempts were made to reach an agreement on the market for sheets, secondly, to the evidence to the effect that since at least January 1992, price increases were agreed at European level in the context of the official AEMCP meetings, and, thirdly, to the presence both at the meeting of spring 1992 and that of spring 1993 of a number of undertakings which were represented at those official meetings (among others, Sappi, AWA and Zanders), the Commission is justified in taking the view that the object of exchanging commercial information at the meetings in France was necessarily linked to an agreement to increase prices of carbonless paper. | |
| 296. In relation, fourthly, to the meeting of 16 July 1992, it is clear from the Court’s findings in paragraphs 180 to 184 above that the holding and collusive object of that meeting are established. | |
| 297. Fifthly, in order to establish the holding and anti-competitive object of the meeting of 14 January 1993, the Commission relies on the non-confidential Documents Nos 15026, 15175 and 15176, 15271 and 15272 and 4752 attached to the SO. | |
| 298. Document No 15026 includes the following information: | |
| ‘The first employee told us that … he thought that two meetings had taken place at the Heathrow Business Centre and one at the Intercontinental in London, but he could not recall which … The second employee told us that … an entry in his diary, dated 14 January 1993, referred to a meeting at the Heathrow Business Centre in terminal 2 at 10 o’clock. He could see no other reason for being there than to take part in a meeting with competitors …’ | |
| 299. Documents Nos 15175 and 15176 contain the following information: | |
| ‘The items of evidence which … was able to provide are the following … As set out in the statements of 11 November and 20 December 1996, he attended a meeting with competitors in the United Kingdom, probably on Thursday 14 January 1993 at the Heathrow Business Centre in terminal 2 at 10 o’clock. A copy of the relevant page of his diary is attached at annex 5. [Mr I.], the sales and marketing director of Sappi (UK) Ltd, asked him to take part. The meeting concerned in the main the exchange of information as to which supplier supplied which customers, the trends and expectations of the markets. No agreement was reached … Arjo Wiggins directed the meeting. It was rather a case of exchanging information than concluding agreements as to the future conduct to be adhered to.’ | |
| 300. Documents Nos 15271 and 15272 include the following statements: | |
| ‘The first employee said that … On occasion, however, informal ad hoc meetings had taken place in the United Kingdom between competitors, the purpose of which was to ascertain the market, in particular concerning past activities, and to obtain the views of competitors rather than to achieve a consensus or engage in a concerted practice aimed at agreeing an increase in prices. Sappi’s purpose in participating in those meetings was to obtain information, even if others may have used those meetings to communicate data or seek to distort the market; the discussions at those meetings were not aimed at sharing the market or allocating customers; … he confirmed that he took part in such meetings, one a year in 1992, 1993 and 1994. He may also have attended one or two other meetings (but no more). He did not attend any meeting in 1995 or 1996. The industry had already begun the practice of organising such meetings when it started to be concerned with carbonless paper sales … The meetings generally took place at Heathrow airport or in a London hotel …’ | |
| 301. Document No 4752 corresponds to the extract of the diary of a Sappi employee and contains the following entry for 14 January 1993: ‘T2 Heathrow 10 o’clock Bus. Centre’. | |
| 302. In the light of the various matters referred to in paragraphs 298 to 301 above, the Commission was justified in finding that the meeting between competitors took place at Heathrow airport on 14 January 1993 at 10 o’clock in the morning. Admittedly, the extract set out in paragraph 299 above shows that the participants at that meeting did not come to an agreement. However, besides the fact that that extract may be interpreted as showing that an attempt was made to reach an agreement contrary to Article 81(1) EC, which, for the reasons set out in paragraph 291 above, is such as to render the meeting in question unlawful, the extract from Sappi’s statement set out in paragraph 299 above shows that the meeting functioned as an exchange of information on the respective customers of the various participants in that meeting. | |
| 303. It should be recalled that the Commission considered the information exchanges to be such as to breach the competition rules on the ground that they contributed to the conclusion of, or compliance with, an agreement to increase prices. | |
| 304. A number of indicia support the argument that the object of exchanging information at the UK meeting was linked to an agreement to increase prices. First, the extract of Sappi’s statement shows that an attempt to reach an agreement was made at the meeting concerned. Secondly, there is evidence to show that agreements to increase prices were concluded at European level in the context of the official AEMCP meetings from at least January 1992. Thirdly, the meeting of 14 January 1993 brought together a number of undertakings which were represented at the official AEMCP meetings in the context of which general cartel meetings concerning agreements to increase prices took place. | |
| 305. It should also be pointed out that, according to recital 183 of the decision, AWA confirmed in its reply to the SO that that meeting of 14 January 1993 was part of the ‘improper’ meetings between competitors (see, also, paragraph 164 above). | |
| 306. As regards, sixthly, the meeting of 30 September 1993 in Barcelona, referred to in recital 163 of the decision, the Court has already held in paragraph 172 above that the Commission was correct in finding that that meeting was held and that it functioned as a framework for exchanges of commercial information on individual sales in 1992 and 1993 and for agreements on the allocation of sales quotas for the fourth quarter of 1993 and a price increase to be implemented on 1 January 1994. In addition, the fact that, at that meeting of 30 September 1993 the participants first exchanged commercial information concerning their respective average sales before agreeing on the distribution of sales quotas, deciding on a collective price increase and then agreeing to convene again to ascertain compliance with those sales quotas, supports the Commission’s argument that information on sales was exchanged and sales quotas agreed on certain occasions in order to facilitate the conclusion of agreements to increase prices and to ensure that those agreements were implemented. | |
| 307. Accordingly, the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard the holding of collusive meetings on the Spanish market on 17 February, 5 March and 16 July 1992 and 30 September 1993, on the French market in spring 1992 and spring 1993, and on the United Kingdom and Irish markets on 14 January 1993. The holding of those collusive meetings at national or regional level, in the light of Mougeot’s statement, contained in recital 90 of the decision, that the reason for those meetings was to ensure that the price increases decided at European level were generally applied, reinforces the Commission’s description of the infringement in recital 77 of the decision, in particular the fact that the means of achieving the objective of the cartel was to hold meetings at various levels (general, national or regional). | |
| 308. In respect of the start of the infringement, the Commission was therefore justified in finding that collusive contacts were made in Spain, contemporaneously with the official AEMCP meeting of 23 January 1992, which had the same object as those of the general cartel meetings which were organised in the context of the official AEMCP meetings until September 1993. That finding, together with the statements of several undertakings concerning their participation in a European cartel from January 1992 and AWA’s assertion as to its participation in ‘improper’ meetings, from January 1992 onwards, on various national or regional markets relating to exchanges of intentions as to announcements of price increases (Document No 7828), leads the Court to conclude that the Commission was right in considering that the official AEMCP meeting of 23 January 1992 functioned as a general cartel meeting and served to fix, in respect of the participating undertakings, the starting point of the infringement as January 1992. | |
| 309. As was pointed out in paragraph 272 above, according to recital 113 of the decision, the documents in the Commission’s possession show that between January 1992 and the meeting of 14 September 1993 eight AEMCP meetings took place, the exact dates of which are referred to in Table A of Annex I to the decision, all in Zurich. Having regard to that information, which the applicants have not challenged, and in the light of the admissions of Sappi, AWA, and that of Mougeot contained in recital 108 of the decision – from which it is clear that until September 1993 the general cartel meetings were held in the context of the official AEMCP meetings, that statement being supported, in relation to the period from February to September 1993 inclusive, by those of a Sappi employee (see paragraph 269 above) – the Commission was justified in finding that the European cartel on prices continued between January 1992 and September 1993, even if it were accepted that only some of the eight official meetings referred to above functioned as collusive agreements on prices at European level. | |
| 310. The Court therefore holds to be sufficiently established the Commission’s findings that, from January 1992 until September 1993, collusive agreements to increase prices Europe-wide were entered into in the context of official AEMCP meetings, these being followed by a series of regional or national meetings whose object was to ensure implementation of those agreements on a market-by-market basis. | |
| 311. It must still be ascertained whether the Commission correctly established, for the period before September or October 1993, the participation of the five applicants in the global anti-competitive plan whose main objective was to reach agreement on price increases and the timing of their implementation through the holding of meetings at various levels. | |
| – Participation of the applicants in meetings before September or October 1993 | |
| 312. It should be recalled at the outset that it is sufficient for the Commission to show that the undertaking concerned participated in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without manifestly opposing them, to prove to the requisite standard that the undertaking participated in the cartel. Where that scheme of meetings was part of a series of efforts made by the undertakings in question in pursuit of a single economic aim, namely to distort the normal movement of prices on the market in question, it would be artificial to split up such conduct, characterised by a single purpose, by treating it as consisting of a number of separate infringements (see the case-law referred to in paragraphs 188 and 196 above). | |
| 313. The Court notes that neither Koehler nor Torraspapel disputes the statement, in Table B of Annex I to the decision, that they both attended all the official AEMCP meetings which were held over the period between January 1992 and September 1993. Even if it were accepted that only some of the meetings referred to above functioned as collusive agreements on prices, that suffices for a finding that the Commission rightly established their continued participation in collusive agreements on prices, and, therefore, in the infringement found in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision from January 1992 to September 1993 inclusive. | |
| 314. MHTP, in turn, does not dispute the statements, in the table referred to in the preceding paragraph, that undertakings in the Stora group took part in various official AEMCP meetings which were held during the period between January 1992 and September 1993. Since MHTP does not, moreover, dispute the Commission’s findings in recitals 360 to 362 of the decision that it must be held liable for the unlawful behaviour of the undertakings in the Stora group, the Commission correctly established MHTP’s participation in collusive agreements on prices and, therefore, in the infringement found in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision during the period between January 1992 and September 1993. | |
| 315. In addition, MHTP does not dispute its liability for the infringement from January 1993. By not contesting the facts which underlie the finding of the infringement for the period between January 1993 and the middle of 1995 – which permitted it to secure a 10% reduction in the fine imposed on it – (recitals 456 and 458 of the decision) – MHTP admits that collusive meetings were held at European level between January 1993 and September or October 1993. At the hearing, it also said that the existence of those European cartel meetings at that time was entirely plausible. It also accepted at the hearing that it was entirely credible, taking Mougeot’s statement literally, that the AEMCP meeting constituted the forum for the cartel at that time. However, neither MHTP nor the other undertakings disputing the collusive nature of the AEMCP meetings before its restructuring in September or October 1993 furnished evidence capable of proving any change in the organisation or structure of the AEMCP in January 1993. Furthermore, MHTP did not provide any alternative explanation to that given by the Commission as to the location and holding of the collusive meetings of the European cartel before the restructuring of the AEMCP in September/October 1993. | |
| 316. Bolloré does not dispute the statements, in Table B of Annex I to the decision, that Copigraph attended the official AEMCP meeting of 23 January 1992, then four of the seven subsequent meetings which took place before the 14 September 1993 meeting. The indication of Copigraph’s presence at the official AEMCP meeting of 23 January 1992 gives grounds for considering that on that date Copigraph participated in a collusive agreement on prices at European level. | |
| 317. Even if it is not certain that all the official AEMCP meetings which were held between January 1992 and September 1993 functioned as a framework for the conclusion of a collusive agreement on prices, the finding that Copigraph participated in five of the eight official meetings warrants the conclusion that that undertaking participated continuously in collusive Europe-wide pricing agreements between January 1992 and September 1993. Copigraph did not in fact distance itself overtly from the meetings which it attended (see the case-law referred to in paragraphs 188 and 196 above). | |
| 318. Finally, as regards Mougeot, it is common ground that it did not attend the meeting of 23 January 1992 and that the first AEMCP meeting in which it participated was that of 26 May 1992. Mougeot then took part in all the AEMCP meetings until September 1993, that is, six of the eight meetings which preceded the 14 September 1993 meeting. Mougeot did not, any more than Copigraph, distance itself publicly from the meetings which it attended (see the case-law referred to in paragraphs 188 and 196 above). Even when it took part in those meetings as an observer, Mougeot failed to demonstrate that it had indicated to its competitors that it was participating in those meetings in a spirit that was different from theirs (see, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 188 above, paragraph 81). It is not clear from any evidence adduced that Mougeot was accepted in the AEMCP with difficulty or that it was marginalised. On the contrary, according to the minutes of the AEMCP meeting of 26 May 1992, it had been decided at the previous meeting to invite Mougeot to join the AEMCP. Furthermore, at that meeting, the president of the AEMCP asked the Mougeot representative to introduce its company as a new member and not as a mere guest. The minutes of the AEMCP meetings of 10 September and 25 November 1992 show that the Mougeot representative was present as one of the participants without distinguishing that undertaking from the others. The minutes of the meeting of 25 November 1992 state that the Mougeot representative informed the participants that the company should be able to add its figures to those of the association in December, figures which would cover the second semester of 1992. Even if Mougeot did not acquire the status of member of the AEMCP until 1993, its presence at the collusive AEMCP meetings in the same capacity as the other members from May 1992 onwards together with the supply of information covering the second semester of 1992 show, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that Mougeot participated in the cartel from 26 May 1992. | |
| 319. Those findings as to the participation of the applicants concerned in the Europe-wide cartel before September or October 1993 are sufficient to hold them liable for the infringement for that period. | |
| 320. For the sake of completeness, the Court finds that evidence as to the participation of a number of those undertakings at meetings at national or regional level serves to underline the continuous nature of their participation in the infringement. | |
| 321. Accordingly, the Commission found that Koehler and Torraspapel had participated in the meeting of 17 February 1992. To that end, it relies on Sappi’s internal note of the same date (Document No 4588), describing a meeting of the ‘interested parties’. That reference – read in conjunction with those contained in the note relating to the uncertainties caused by the conduct of Koehler and Sarrió on the Spanish market – enabled the Commission to find that Koehler and Sarrió were among the ‘interested parties’ attending that meeting, the purpose of which was to examine the problems connected with the failure of those two undertakings to comply with the agreement referred to above. As is clear from the note of 9 March 1992 (Documents Nos 4703 and 4704, referred to in paragraph 171 above), they were party to that agreement in their capacity as carbonless paper distributor or supplier on the Spanish market. | |
| 322. Since Torraspapel did not deny either the Commission’s assertion, in recital 363 of the decision, that Sarrió was and still is its wholly-owned subsidiary, or the Commission’s claim, in the same recital, that its liability for Sarrió’s conduct had not been disputed during the administrative procedure, the Commission was justified in holding it liable for Sarrió’s participation in the collusive meeting of 17 February 1992. | |
| 323. As regards the meeting of 5 March 1992, it is clear from footnotes 7 and 10 in Annex II to the decision that, for the purposes of establishing the participation of Koehler and Torraspapel in that meeting, the Commission relies on the internal Sappi note of 9 March 1992, referred to in recital 156 of the decision (Documents No 4703 and 4704, referred to in paragraph 171 above). However, while it may be inferred from that note that the two undertakings in question were party to an agreement to increase prices by ESP 10 per kilo at the beginning of February 1992 on the Spanish market, it does not contain any information to show that they took part in a collusive meeting on 5 March 1992. | |
| 324. However, it is clear from AWA’s reply of 30 April 1999 to a Commission request for information (Document No 7828, referred to in paragraph 163 above) that representatives of Sarrió (Torraspapel), Koehler and Stora (MHTP) were present at the ‘improper’ meetings, of which the meeting of 5 March 1992 was part, as AWA confirmed in its reply to the SO (recital 170 of the decision). | |
| 325. Furthermore, the Commission finds that the five applicants concerned attended the two meetings relating to the French market. | |
| 326. Sappi’s statements referred to in paragraphs 276 to 279 and 285 to 293 above, combined with AWA’s assertion, in Document No 78 28, that representatives of that undertaking participated in ‘improper meetings’ between 1992 and 1995, in particular in Paris, involving representatives of Sarrió, give grounds for concluding that the Commission correctly established Sarrió’s (Torraspapel’s) participation in the two meetings concerned. The doubts expressed by the Sappi employee (Document No 15027, annexed to the SO) as to whether or not the Sarrió representative who attended that meeting was the sales manager of that undertaking in France cannot obscure the fact that, contrary to the cautious tone it adopted with regard to the presence of a Koehler representative at those meetings, it expresses no reservations as to Sarrió’s representation at them. | |
| 327. As regards Stora (MHTP), the assertion, contained in the statement referred to in paragraph 287 above, that Feldmühle was represented at the meeting of spring 1992, combined with AWA’s assertion, contained in Document No 7828, concerning the participation of representatives of that undertaking in ‘improper meetings’ between 1992 and 1995, in particular in Paris, alongside representatives of Stora-Feldmühle, supports the Commission’s argument that Stora-Feldmühle attended the meeting of spring 1992 and, thus, the attribution to MHTP of liability for that participation. | |
| 328. In its written pleadings, MHTP points out that the Sappi employee, who is the source of the information referred to in the previous paragraph, also states that Stora-Feldmühle did not attend the meeting of spring 1993 in Paris, while the Commission claims that it has evidence of that undertaking’s participation in the meeting. It maintains that in those circumstances it cannot be ruled out that the Sappi employee erred in its identification of the French meeting which Stora-Feldmühle attended. However, the firm nature of the Sappi employee’s assertion as to Stora-Feldmühle’s presence at the first of the two French meetings described in his testimony renders MHTP’s contention wholly improbable. | |
| 329. In relation to the meeting of spring 1993, MHTP does not dispute its participation in the infringement from January 1993 and does not criticise the Commission’s findings as to the meeting of spring 1993 in Paris and its participation in that meeting. There is no reason, in those circumstances, to investigate the validity of the Commission’s finding as to Stora‑Feldmühle’s participation in the meeting of spring 1993 in Paris. | |
| 330. The Sappi employee does not refer to the presence of Mougeot and Copigraph (Bolloré’s subsidiary) at those two meetings. However, the general assertion in AWA’s statement, in Document No 7828, as to the organisation between 1992 and 1995 of ‘improper’ meetings in Paris, Zurich and Geneva between representatives of AWA, Sarrió, Mougeot, Stora-Feldmühle, Copigraph, Koehler and Zanders, constitutes an indicium of Mougeot’s and Copigraph’s participation in the meetings of spring 1992 and spring 1993 in France. | |
| 331. That indicium cannot by itself prove their participation in those two meetings. However, since Mougeot and Copigraph were two of the major players on the French market for carbonless paper, the reference to those two undertakings in AWA’s general assertion as to the holding of meetings between competitiors between 1992 and 1995, particularly in Paris, necessarily implies that they were perceived – at least by the European market leader – as being party to unlawful conduct on the French market over the entire period, irrespective of their presence at or absence from the two meetings mentioned above. That indicium of participation in the cartel on the French market at that time is reinforced by Mougeot’s statements that it ‘received phone calls from one company or another, most often from AWA, announcing the details of price increases by market’ essentially ‘until mid-1995’ (Document No 11598, recital 95 of the decision and paragraph 41 of the SO). | |
| 332. As regards the meeting of 16 July 1992, Mr B.G. submitted (see Document No 4484, referred to in paragraph 180 above) that Sarrió (Torraspapel), AWA (Messrs F. and B.) and Koehler (Mr F.) were present at that meeting. That statement, which supports AWA’s general assertion, contained in Document No 7828, as to its participation between 1992 and 1994 in ‘improper’ meetings in Barcelona alongside representatives, among others, of Sarrió (Torraspapel) and Koehler, establishes those two undertakings’ participation in the collusive meeting of 16 July 1992 concerning the Spanish and Portuguese markets. | |
| 333. In relation to Stora (MHTP), in establishing that undertaking’s participation in the meeting of 16 July 1992, the Commission relies on AWA’s statements (Document No 7828) that the latter participated between 1992 and 1994 in a number of meetings in Lisbon and Barcelona alongside representatives of Sarrió, Unipapel, Koehler, Ekman and Stora-Feldmühle or some of those undertakings. | |
| 334. It should be pointed out that Mr B.G., in his detailed statements regarding the meeting of 16 July 1992, does not mention Stora as being one of the participants in that meeting. In that context, AWA’s general assertion might seem insufficient for the purposes of establishing Stora’s (MHTP’s) participation in the meeting of 16 July 1992. | |
| 335. It should be recalled, however, as the Commission points out in its written pleadings in Case T‑122/02, that it is clear from Mr B. G.’s statements that the holding of the meeting of 16 July 1992 was manifestly explained by the fact that Sarrió and Stora-Feldmühle were charging very low prices – below the cost of the paper – in Portugal. As the Commission rightly points out, that reference to the policy of charging very low prices, particularly by Stora-Feldmühle, may be understood as meaning that that undertaking was not adhering to the pricing discipline required of it under an agreement on the market. In other words, such an assertion, combined with AWA’s statement contained in Document No 7828, may be regarded as proving that, despite not attending the meeting on 16 July 1992, Stora‑Feldmühle was at that time party to a pricing agreement on the Iberian markets. | |
| 336. The Commission finds that Stora (MHTP) and Koehler participated in the meeting of 14 January 1993. MHTP does not dispute its participation in the infringement from the beginning of January 1993. In those circumstances, there is no need for the Court to examine the validity of the Commission’s finding as to the participation of that undertaking in the meeting of 14 January 1993. | |
| 337. As regards Koehler’s participation in that meeting, it is clear from the extract from Sappi’s statement in Document No 15026 that, according to the first employee whose testimony was the subject of that statement, ‘[Mr D.] (Koehler)’ was present for the entirety or part of the meetings held in the United Kingdon at Heathrow airport or in a London hotel. The second employee, whose testimony was also the subject of the statement mentioned above, stated in turn that he thought that ‘[Mr D.] (Koehler)’ had attended the meeting of 14 January 1993. The statement referred to above, and the one that ‘as well as the names of competitors provided to the Commission in December 1996, [the employee concerned] was able to identify … [Mr K.] of Koehler as one of the participants’ are also contained in Documents Nos 15176 and 15178, which correspond to another statement of Sappi. Finally, AWA stated (Document No 7828) that between 1992 and 1994, its representatives in the United Kingdom participated in ‘improper’ meetings involving, in particular, representatives of Koehler. | |
| 338. In the light of that body of indicia, the Commisison was correct in finding that Koehler was represented at the meeting of 14 January 1993. | |
| 339. As regards the participation of Copigraph, Koehler, Stora‑Feldmühle and Torraspapel in the meeting of 30 September 1993, it is clear from footnotes 40, 42, 44 and 45 of Annex II to the decision that the Commission bases it findings on Documents Nos 5 and 7828. The mention, contained in Sappi’s ‘notes for file’ on that meeting, of ‘declared’ sales, and the information, based on those notes, relating to the allocation of precise sales quotas for the fourth quarter of 1993 (see paragraph 172 above), are strong evidence of the presence of the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 of those notes, namely Copigraph, Stora-Feldmühle, Koehler and Sarrió. | |
| 340. In addition, in relation to Sarrió, Koehler and Stora-Feldmühle, that strong evidence is corroborated by the general assertion, contained in AWA’s statement in Document No 7828, that managers of AWA in Spain attended several ‘improper’ meetings between 1992 and 1994, particularly in Barcelona, at which AWA believes that representatives of Sarrió, of Koehler and its agent, Ekman, and of Stora-Feldmühle were also present. | |
| 341. As regards Koehler, it must again be pointed out that, as set out in footnote 186 of the decision, the Commission has an expenses note, an airplane ticket and a hotel bill belonging to Mr F. (Koehler), which prove that he was in Barcelona on 30 September 1993. At the Court’s request, the Commission produced those documents in Case T‑125/02. | |
| 342. Furthermore, even assuming that some of the applicants concerned did not in fact attend the meeting of 30 September 1993, the evidence that they were allocated sales quotas for the last quarter of 1993, in the light of their declared sales for 1992 and 1993, proves that on that date they were part of the cartel on the Spanish market involving the anti-competitive conduct shown by Sappi’s ‘notes for file’. | |
| 343. Finally, as Koehler correctly points out in its written pleadings, it is clear from Annex II to the decision that, in order to establish that undertaking’s participation in the meeting referred to above, the Commission relies on the finding that Ekman was present at that meeting. The Commission finding in question appears to be based on the extract from AWA’s statement contained in Document No 7828 that ‘Ekman (Koehler’s agent)’ was one of the participants at the Spanish meetings which AWA attended between 1992 and 1993. | |
| 344. In its written pleadings, Koehler maintains that Ekman was an independent distributor, so that Ekman and Koehler cannot be considered to form one and the same economic entity, and therefore that Koehler cannot be held liable for Ekman’s conduct. However, it is clear from AWA’s statement referred to in the previous paragraph that Ekman was perceived by the other participants as attending the meeting as Koehler’s agent, and not as an independent distributor. Next, Sappi’s ‘notes for file’ on the meeting of 30 September 1993 (Document No 5, referred to in paragraph 172 above) refer to ‘Koehler’s declared sales’. This shows that Ekman was accompanied at that meeting by an employee of Koehler – as AWA’s statement referred to above seems to indicate, together with the documentary evidence attesting to Mr F.’s (Koehler) presence in Barcelona on 30 September 1993 – or that Ekman attended the meeting as Koehler’s representative acting according to Koehler’s instructions, as is shown by AWA’s perception of the capacity in which Ekman took part in that meeting. In any event, the Commission was justified in establishing Koehler’s participation in the meeting of 30 September 1993. | |
| 345. In conclusion, the Commission has proved to the requisite legal standard that Bolloré (through the intermediary of Copigraph), Koehler, Mougeot and Torraspapel participated in the infringement before September or October 1993 and that MHTP did so before January 1993. | |
| b) Mougeot’s participation in the infringement after 1 July 1995 | |
| 346. In the context of a plea alleging manifest error of assessment, Mougeot maintains that it has not been established that it participated in the infringement after 1 July 1995. It denies that it participated in the unofficial AEMCP meeting of 2 February 1995, referred to in recital 273 of the decision. It further submits that the evidence relied on by the Commission does not prove that it adhered to the agreement to raise prices allegedly entered into at that meeting. It adds that the Commission’s contention, set out in recital 273 of the decision, concerning its adherence to price increases on the Italian market in September 1995 is not supported by any evidence referred to in the decision. | |
| 347. The Commission finds that Mougeot participated in the infringement until September 1995. It is clear from recitals 126, 237, 250, 251 and 273 of the decision that that finding relies, first, on the consideration, at the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995, of Mougeot’s volume requirements, and, secondly, on its adherence to the agreements concluded at that meeting. | |
| 348. It must be borne in mind, first, as regards the holding and collusive object of that meeting, that the Commission produced the minutes of that meeting (Document No 7, attached to the SO and paragraphs 144 to 146 thereof). According to those minutes, on 2 February 1995 a general cartel meeting was held in Frankfurt at which a series of price increases was agreed for different EEA markets (France, Germany, Austria, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Italy, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and Iceland) in relation to reels and sheets and the date of implementation of the various price increases. Those dates were between 1 February 1995 (10% increases in the price of reels and 5% in the price of sheets on the Spanish market) and 1 September 1995 inclusive (8% increases in the price of reels and 5% in the price of sheets on the United Kingdom market; 10% increase in the prices of reels and sheets on the Italian market). | |
| 349. It is apparent, secondly, as regards Mougeot’s participation in that meeting, that the list of participants at that meeting, as contained in the minutes and partially set out in recital 124 of the decision, included Mr P.B. (Mougeot). He is also referred to as a participant in that meeting by Sappi in its statements of 18 May 1999 (Document No 15200 in the non-confidential version, referred to in paragraph 162 above). | |
| 350. However, Mougeot produced Mr P.B.’s boarding card for 15.30 proving that, in its view, its representative left Frankfurt immediately after the official AEMCP meeting held that day. | |
| 351. It should be pointed out, in that regard, that it follows from recital 123 of the decision that, as the Commission notes, this does not rule out the possibility that Mougeot’s representative participated in the beginning of the meeting held at 14.00 at the airport. | |
| 352. However, even though Mougeot was not present at that general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995, a number of pieces of evidence, taken as a whole, prove that Mougeot was associated with the decisions adopted and adhered to them. | |
| 353. First of all, even if the reference to the Mougeot representative on the list of participants at that meeting should be regarded as erroneous, it nevertheless shows that Mougeot was perceived as having participated in the meeting or as being part of the limited group of participants in the cartel. | |
| 354. Secondly, it is apparent that Mougeot’s volume requirements were discussed at that meeting, as establised by the minutes of the meeting. According to those minutes ‘Mougeot needs a market share’ and AWA ‘will propose to allocate it a certain tonnage’. The consideration, in the general meeting, of Mougeot’s needs and the proposed solution lends credence to Mougeot’s continued participation in the cartel. They do not support the contention that there was merely a bilateral discussion between Mougeot and AWA. | |
| 355. Thirdly, as the Court has already held in paragraph 331 above, Mougeot itself stated (Document No 11598) that it ‘received phone calls from one company or another, most often from AWA, announcing the details of price increases by market … until mid-1995’. This was therefore the case in February1995. | |
| 356. Fourthly, in a fax dated 2 February 1995 (Document No 1378, recital 237 of the decision) and sent the following day to a British distributor, J & H Paper, Mougeot states that ‘[t]he U.K. market will increase by 8% the 6th of March so we propose you our best offer.’ That statement, read in conjunction with that contained in the minutes of the meeting of 2 February 1995 relating to an increase of 8% in the price of reels on the UK market from 1 March 1995 leads to the conclusion that that undertaking must have been informed on the day of the meeting of the adoption, during that meeting, of a 8% increase in the price of reels on the UK market from the beginning of March 1995, and immediately passed that increase in the proposed prices to the distributor to which the above mentioned fax was addressed. | |
| 357. As the Commission correctly contends in its written pleadings, it is appropriate to dismiss Mougeot’s argument that that fax does not reflect the application of an agreement to increase prices, but a unilateral decision adopted by Mougeot prior to the meeting of 2 February 1995. | |
| 358. Admittedly, the fax in question begins with the words ‘[a]s I told you last week, we have to increase our prices because of an increase [in the price] of the pulp in January’. However, as the Commission correctly points out, it is clear from that extract of the fax that Mougeot’s annoucement to J & H Paper during the week which preceded the despatch of that fax dealt only with the need for a price increase. The fact that Mougeot communicated the exact amount of that increase (8%) only on 3 February 1995 leads to the conclusion that Mougeot, first of all, intended to warn J & H Paper of an imminent increase in the price of paper, and, secondly, told it of the amount of that increase on the basis of information received regarding the price increase agreed at the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995 for the UK market from 1 March 1995. In addition, the fax at issue refers to an 8% increase in the prices implemented as from 6 March 1995 on the ‘British market’, and not only by Mougeot, therefore confirming the collusive origin of that decision to raise prices. | |
| 359. Finally, clearly Mougeot did not distance itself from the cartel and thus the decisions taken during that general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995. On the contrary, Mougeot does not deny having participated in the cartel up to July 1995. It admits its presence at a meeting of spring 1995, the object of which was to fix the prices for July. | |
| 360. It is clear from all those matters that the Commission was justified in taking the view that Mougeot had adhered to the agreements concluded at the general meeting of 2 February 1995, including the decision to increase prices in the United Kingdom and Italy. It should be added that the question whether Mougeot implemented those price increases cannot affect its liability for the infringement. Nor is the fact that an undertaking does not act on the outcome of a meeting having an anti-competitive object such as to relieve it of responsibility for its participation in a cartel, unless it has publicly distanced itself from what was agreed in the meeting (see Case C-291/98 P Sarrió v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9991, paragraph 50, and Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 188 above, paragraph 85). | |
| 361. Accordingly, pursuant to the settled case-law, referred to in paragraph 186 above, that Article 81 EC also applies to agreements which continue to produce effects after they have formally ceased, the Commission correctly found that Mougeot participated in the cartel until September 1995, the date of the last price increase planned at the meeting of 2 February 1995. | |
| 362. The Court must therefore reject Mougeot’s plea alleging that it did not participate in the cartel after 1 July 1995. | |
| 2. The plea raised by Divipa | |
| 363. In the context of pleas alleging erroneous application of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and error of assessment, Divipa maintains that the Commission was wrong to impose a fine on it for the period between March 1992 and January 1995. It submits that it did not take part in any of the meetings in which the Commission accuses it of having partipated between March 1992 and October 1994. It adds that the prices which it applied in January 1995 are not the same as those which were agreeed at the meeting of 19 October 1994. It cannot therefore be found to have adhered to the cartel any time after that meeting. | |
| 364. In that respect, it follows from paragraph 185 above that the Commission’s findings that there was a collusive meeting of 23 September 1994 on the Spanish market and that Divipa participated in that meeting are therefore not established. On the other hand, following the assessment in paragraphs 170 to 195 above, it must be held that the Commission’s findings as to Divipa’s participation in the collusive meetings on the Spanish market held on 30 September and 19 October 1993, and on 3 May, 29 June and 19 October 1994 are established. | |
| 365. Even though Divipa’s participation in the collusive meeting of 5 March 1992 has not been proved directly, it follows from a body of consistent indicia (see, in particular, paragraphs 170 to 195 and 205 to 215 above) that Divipa was a member of the cartel from March 1992. The Commission was therefore justified in finding Divipa’s participation in the infringement from that date. | |
| 366. As regards the end of the period of Divipa’s participation in the infringement, it is clear from paragraphs 162 and 177 above that the Commission correctly established Divipa’s participation in a meeting on the Spanish market on 19 October 1994 at which prices were fixed for implementation on 3 January 1995. In those circumstances, even if Divipa’s contention – that the prices which it applied in January 1995 were not the same as those which were agreed at the meeting referred to above – were to be believed, that contention is at most such as to demonstrate that in January 1995 Divipa did not comply with the agreement concluded on 19 October 1994, which, together with the absence of evidence concerning Divipa’s participation in a collusive agreement after January 1995, leads to the conclusion that Divipa’s participation in the infringement, as the Commission finds in its decision, ceased in January 1995. On the other hand, that contention does not undermine the finding that Divipa, at the meeting of 19 October 1994, participated in a price-fixing agreement and agreed with the other participants to implement that agreement on 3 January 1995, which reflects its adherence to the agreement until that date. The Commission was therefore right in finding that Divipa participated in the infringement until January 1995. | |
| 367. It must be held that Divipa’s participation in collusive meetings concerning the Spanish market reflects its adherence to the general European cartel (see paragraphs 205 to 215 above), and, therefore, its participation in the infringement found in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. | |
| 3. The plea raised by Zicuñaga | |
| 368. In the context of a plea alleging errors of assessment, Zicuñaga maintains that the Commission’s claims concern only its alleged participation in meetings organised between October 1993 and October 1994. It goes on to state that no evidence establishes its participation in the meeting of October 1993 and its participation therefore lasted five months at most. | |
| 369. In that respect, it is clear from the Court’s findings in paragraphs 161 to 201 above that the Commission was justified in finding that Zicuñaga participated in the collusive meetings relating to the Spanish market held on 19 October 1993, 3 May, 29 June and 19 October 1994. It must be held that Zicuñaga’s participation in the various meetings shows its participation in the infringement found in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the decision. | |
| 370. In relation to the meeting of 19 October 1994, it has been pointed out in paragraph 193 above that at that meeting Zicuñaga participated in an agreement to fix prices and agreed with the other participants to implement that agreement on 3 January 1995, which, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 188 above, shows its adherence to the cartel until that date. | |
| 371. In the light of the foregoing, the Court must hold that the Commission was justified in finding in the second paragraph of Article 1 of the decision that Zicuñaga participated in the infringement during the period from October 1993 until January 1995. The plea examined must therefore be dismissed. | |
| II – The pleas for cancellation or reduction of the fines set in the first paragraph of Article 3 of the decision | |
| 372. All the applicants submit heads of claim seeking a reduction of the fine imposed. For its part AWA contends, principally, that the fine which it was ordered to pay should be annulled. The applicants’ arguments can essentially be broken down into eight pleas or series of pleas. | |
| A – The plea alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations on account of the incomplete and imprecise nature of the SO in relation to the fines | |
| 1. Arguments of the parties | |
| 373. This plea can be subdivided into three parts. First, AWA submits that the Commission set its fine on the basis of a series of factors which were not announced in the SO and on which it did not therefore have the opportunity to comment during the administrative procedure. Second, it complains that the Commission imposed on it a fine higher than those imposed in previous decisions. Third, AWA claims that the Commission set the fine in disregard of the Guidelines and did not announce its intention in the SO that it would be departing from them. | |
| 374. The Commission submits that the SO enabled AWA to know the factors considered relevant for the purpose of determining its fine. The Commission maintains, moreover, that it complied fully with the Guidelines. Lastly, the fact that the Commission in the past imposed fines of a certain level for particular types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17. | |
| 2. Findings of the Court | |
| 375. This plea will be addressed by examining, initially, the second and third parts, in which AWA claims that the Commission, by departing from its earlier practice and the Guidelines, infringed AWA’s right to be heard and its legitimate expectations. | |
| a) Infringement of the right to be heard and failure to observe the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in so far as the Commission departed from its previous practice | |
| 376. As regards previous decisions it should be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, the fact that the Commission in the past imposed fines of a certain level for particular types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17, if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 109; Case T‑7/89 Solvay v Commission , paragraph 196 above, paragraph 309; and Case T‑304/94 Europa Carton v Commission [1998] ECR II‑869, paragraph 89). The proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission be able at any time to adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 109, and LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 237). | |
| 377. Moreover, according to settled case-law, economic operators are not justified in having a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained (Case 245/81 Edeka [1982] ECR 2745, paragraph 27, and Case C‑350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I‑395, paragraph 33). Consequently, undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed (Joined Cases T‑202/98, T‑204/98 and T‑207/98 Tate & Lyle and Others v Commission [2001] ECR II‑2035, paragraph 146, and LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 243). | |
| 378. Consequently, AWA cannot base an argument on the fact that the Commission exceeded the level of fine applied in its previous practice. Indeed, AWA appears to admit, in its reply, that the Commission’s previous practice could not give rise to legitimate expectations on its part. | |
| b) Infringement of the right to be heard and of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in so far as the Commission departed from the Guidelines | |
| 379. AWA submits that the Commission departed from the Guidelines without announcing its intention to do so, thus prejudicing the legitimate expectations which AWA had placed in those provisions. The Commission departed from the Guidelines, first of all, by ignoring the fact that the infringement in question had no effect or, at the most, had a limited effect. Next, its assessment of the gravity of the infringement led it to set the starting amount of the fine at EUR 70 million, that is to say an amount 3.5 times higher than the starting point referred to in the Guidelines for ‘very serious infringements’, namely EUR 20 million. Lastly, AWA asserts that the Commission should have announced its intention to impose a fine the amount of which, before the reduction applied under the Leniency Notice, was 2.5 times higher than the maximum amount ever imposed by the Commission on one single undertaking. | |
| 380. It should be recalled that the Guidelines were published in January 1998, that is to say after the infringement but before the SO was sent on 26 July 2000. | |
| 381. According to AWA, the Commission would have been free to depart from the Guidelines and impose higher fines if it had amended the Guidelines or, at the very least, if it had announced such an intention in the SO, which it did not do. | |
| 382. However, it must be stated that AWA has failed to demonstrate how the Commission departed from the Guidelines when setting the fine. By putting forward its plea, AWA errs in its reading of both the Guidelines and the decision. | |
| 383. First, as regards the impact of the infringement, the Commission explained, at recitals 382 to 409 of the decision, the manner in which it took into account, in the assessment of the gravity of the infringement, the actual impact of the infringement on the market and the real effect of the unlawful conduct of each participant on competition. The Commission considered the argument, put forward by some of the undertakings, including AWA, during the administrative procedure, that the actual impact of the infringement on the market was very limited. The Commission then explained why it was necessary to reject such an argument. The Commission thus found in its decision that the infringement had indeed had an impact and set the fine accordingly. AWA cannot therefore claim that the Commission did not take account of the impact of the infringement. The fact that that impact was taken into account also means that it cannot be complained that the Commission failed to announce its intention not to take into consideration the non‑existent or limited impact of the infringement. | |
| 384. Assuming that AWA in actual fact disputes the Commission’s assessment of the impact of the infringement on the market, its criticism merges in that respect with that underlying its plea concerning the gravity of the infringement and will be examined in that context. | |
| 385. Moreover, the Commission had announced its intention to take account of the impact of the infringement. It had stated in the SO that it would take into consideration, in its assessment of the gravity of the infringement, its ‘actual impact on the market’ (paragraph 262). | |
| 386. Secondly, in so far as AWA asserts that the Commission exceeded the starting amount referred to in the Guidelines, it should be recalled that they provide, in respect of ‘very serious infringements’, like ‘horizontal restrictions such as price cartels and market-sharing quotas’, for ‘[l]ikely fines’ which can go ‘above ECU 20 million’. In view of the fact that the Commission left open the possibility of opting for a starting amount in excess of EUR 20 million, it cannot be claimed that the Commission departed from the Guidelines on that point. | |
| 387. It must be added that the Commission took as a basis, when setting the starting amount of EUR 70 million determined for AWA, the specific weight of the undertaking and the real impact of its unlawful conduct on competition, as reflected in the applicant’s turnover for the relevant product in the EEA. It should be recalled in this respect that the Commission announced, in paragraph 266 of the SO, that it was going to take account of the importance of each participating undertaking on the market concerned and the impact of its offending conduct on competition. | |
| 388. Thirdly, so far as concerns the level of the fine determined before the reduction applied under the Leniency Notice, AWA fails to demonstrate how the Guidelines preclude the imposition of a fine of such a level. Furthermore, it is necessary to recall the case‑law referred to in paragraph 377 above, according to which AWA was not entitled to entertain any legitimate expectation that the Commission would not exceed the level of fines previously imposed. | |
| 389. AWA also raises a more general argument, according to which the Commission should have announced its intention to apply its ‘new fining policy’. | |
| 390. It is difficult to discern how the calculation method used in the decision would be new in relation to previous practice, if not through the application of the Guidelines which themselves reflect a calculation method which differs from the previous practice in calculating the amount of fines. Unlike the applicants in the ‘Pre‑insulated Pipes’ judgments (in particular Sigma Tecnologie v Commission , paragraph 209 above), AWA does not call in question the changes brought about by the Guidelines in relation to previous practice. It appears to object only to the application, in its case, of a method for calculating fines which contradicts, in its opinion, both the administrative practice and the Guidelines of the Commission. | |
| 391. According to the case‑law, where it had indicated the elements of fact and of law on which it would base its calculation of the fines, the Commission was under no obligation to explain the way in which it would use each of those elements in determining the level of the fine ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 21, and Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 19). | |
| 392. Even if the method followed by the Commission in this case were to be regarded as innovative in relation to existing administrative practice, the Commission was not therefore bound to inform the undertakings concerned, during the administrative procedure, that it intended to use a new method to calculate the amount of the fines ( LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 207). | |
| 393. Moreover, it should be recalled that, in view of the Commission’s margin of assessment when imposing fines, the applicant could not acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission would not exceed the level of fines previously imposed ( LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 243). | |
| 394. Lastly, it must also be observed that the reference that AWA makes in this context to Case T‑334/94 Sarrió v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1439, relying on the fact there was no announcement in the SO that there would be a radically new and more severe policy for setting fines, is irrelevant, given that that judgment does not deal with the content of a statement of objections, but the statement of reasons for the decision. | |
| 395. Consequently, it cannot be found that there was an infringement of the right to be heard or of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations so far as concerns the manner in which the Commission applied the Guidelines. | |
| c) Infringement of the right to be heard in so far as the Commission set the fine on the basis of factors which were not announced in the SO | |
| 396. The argument that the Commission set AWA’s fine on the basis of a series of factors which were not announced in the SO and on which AWA did not therefore have the opportunity to comment during the administrative procedure still remains to be considered. AWA complains that the Commission did not announce its intention to increase the starting amount of the fine for deterrence and that it did not explain how it would take deterrence into consideration, in particular on the basis of AWA’s size. Nor did the Commission announce how it would take account of the leadership of the undertakings involved. | |
| 397. In this regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, provided that the Commission indicates expressly in the statement of objections that it will consider whether it is appropriate to impose fines on the undertakings concerned and that it sets out the principal elements of fact and of law that may give rise to a fine, such as the gravity and the duration of the alleged infringement and the fact that it has been committed intentionally or negligently, it fulfils its obligation to respect the undertakings’ right to be heard. In doing so, it provides them with the necessary elements to defend themselves not only against a finding of infringement but also against the fact of being fined ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 21, and LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 199). | |
| 398. It follows that, so far as concerns the determination of the amount of the fines, the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned are guaranteed before the Commission by virtue of the fact that they have the opportunity to make their submissions on the duration, the gravity and the anti-competitive nature of the matters of which they are accused. Moreover, the undertakings have an additional guarantee, as regards the setting of that amount, in that the Court of First Instance has unlimited jurisdiction and may in particular cancel or reduce the fine pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation No 17 ( Tetra Pak v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 235, and LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 200). | |
| 399. In the present case, it is necessary to examine the two points on which the Commission, in AWA’s view, infringed its right to be heard. | |
| 400. As regards AWA’s principal role in the cartel, it must be pointed out that the SO did in fact announce that such a factor was going to be taken into account. The Commission gave details, at paragraph 198 of the SO, of ‘AWA’s role as the cartel leader’ whilst it stated, in the part of the SO dealing with the fine, that the individual fine to be imposed on each of the participating undertakings would reflect inter alia the role played by each of them in the collusive arrangements ‘as described above’. Moreover, it is apparent from the decision that, during the administrative procedure, AWA disputed having played a principal role in the cartel, which demonstrates that it correctly understood the charge made against it in this regard in the SO, and that it expressed a view on that point. | |
| 401. As regards deterrence, the Commission expressly announced, at paragraph 264 of the SO, its intention ‘to set any fines at a level sufficient to ensure deterrence’. Moreover, in accordance with the case‑law, the Commission stated, at paragraphs 262 to 266 of the SO, the principal elements of fact and law on which it was going to base the calculation of the amount of the fine to be imposed on the applicant, so that, in this respect, the applicant’s right to be heard was duly observed. | |
| 402. In such a context, AWA cannot reasonably submit that the Commission should have announced in a more detailed manner the factors which it was going to take into account in order to ensure that the fine had a sufficiently deterrent effect. As the Commission could set the amount of the fine only after hearing the undertakings and finalising the administrative procedure, it was unable during the administrative procedure to predict the amounts of the fines to be imposed on the undertakings concerned or evaluate the deterrent effect of those amounts and comment on the possible need for adjustments in order to ensure that the fines had such an effect. | |
| 403. In that regard, it is settled case‑law that, where it has indicated the elements of fact and of law on which it will base its calculation of the fines, the Commission is under no obligation to explain the way in which it would use each of those elements in determining the level of the fine. To give indications of the level of the contemplated fines, when the undertakings have not been in a position to put forward their observations on the objections held against them, would in effect inappropriately anticipate the Commission’s decision ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 21, and Michelin v Commission , paragraph 391 above, paragraph 19). | |
| 404. For all those reasons, AWA’s plea alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations must be rejected in its entirety. | |
| B – The plea alleging breach of the principle of non‑retroactivity | |
| 1. Arguments of the parties | |
| 405. The claim that the Commission applied, in this case, a new fining policy also constitutes the basis of AWA’s plea alleging a breach of the principle of non‑retroactivity. AWA submits that the breach of the principle of non‑retroactivity stems from the fact that the fine imposed on it was much higher than the fines imposed at the time of the infringement. According to AWA, the Commission was not entitled to apply a new fining policy without first warning undertakings of such a change in its policy. | |
| 406. The Commission maintains that it complied fully with the Guidelines, so that in the present case it cannot be charged with applying retroactively a new fining policy. | |
| 2. Findings of the Court | |
| 407. It should be recalled that undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or will apply a particular method of calculating the fines. Consequently, the undertakings in question must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines above that applied in the past. That is true not only where the Commission raises the level of the amount of fines in imposing fines in individual decisions but also if that increase takes effect by the application, in particular cases, of rules of conduct of general application, such as the Guidelines. | |
| 408. It must be concluded that the Guidelines and, in particular, the new method of calculating fines contained therein – on the assumption that this new method had the effect of increasing the level of the fines imposed – were reasonably foreseeable for undertakings such as the applicants at the time when the infringements concerned were committed. | |
| 409. Accordingly, in applying the Guidelines in the contested decision to infringements committed before they were adopted, the Commission did not infringe the principle of non-retroactivity (Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraphs 228 to 232). | |
| 410. In so far as AWA submits, in reality, that the Commission infringed the principle of non‑retroactivity, not by applying the Guidelines, but by departing from them when imposing the fine on the applicant, reference should be made to paragraphs 379 to 395, from which it follows that this plea must be rejected. | |
| 411. Lastly, in so far as the plea alleging breach of the principle of non‑retroactivity must be construed as also criticising the fact that the Commission departed from its previous decisions, reference should be made to paragraphs 376 to 378 above in which the Court held that that plea must be rejected. | |
| 412. For all those reasons, the plea alleging breach of the principle of non‑retroactivity must be rejected. | |
| C – The pleas alleging insufficient evidence, breach of the principles of the presumption of innocence, of proportionality and of equal treatment, and errors of assessment as regards the Commission’s findings in relation to the participation of certain undertakings in the European cartel | |
| 413. Divipa and Zicuñaga claim that the amounts of their fines should be reduced, and submit that the Commission assumed that they participated in a European cartel whereas in actual fact they participated only in a cartel at national level. They repeat, in this respect, the argument they that they also put forward as a substantive plea in connection with their claim that the decision should be annulled. By the same plea, Divipa also complains that when setting its fine the Commission did not find that it had not participated in an unlawful cartel and had not participated directly in pricing decisions. | |
| 414. As regards participation in the European cartel, reference should be made to paragraphs 205 to 215 above from which it follows that neither Divipa nor Zicuñaga could have been unaware that their participation in the cartel at national level was part of a wider European cartel. They cannot therefore claim that their fines should be reduced on that basis. | |
| 415. As regards Divipa’s participation in the cartel, it is apparent from paragraphs 155 to 204 above that the Commission provided sufficient proof, as regards the Spanish market, that Divipa participated in the cartel for the period from March 1992 to January 1995, which is clear in particular from its participation in a series of meetings during which the undertakings active on the Spanish market agreed on price rises and, at the meeting of 30 September 1993, on an allocation of sales quotas. Divipa cannot therefore claim that its fine should be reduced on the ground that it did not participate in an unlawful cartel. | |
| 416. Concerning Divipa’s argument that it did not participate directly in pricing decisions, it must be stated that Divipa fails to demonstrate that it publicly distanced itself from what was discussed at the meetings which it attended. It therefore gave the other participants to believe that it subscribed to what was decided there and would comply with it ( Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 188 above, paragraph 82). In so far as that argument amounts to claiming a passive role, it will be examined in the assessment of the attenuating circumstances (see paragraphs 596 to 635 below). | |
| 417. As regards Zicuñaga, it remains to be determined whether and, if so, to what extent its unproven participation in market-sharing practices (see paragraphs 238 to 240 above) justifies a reduction of its fine. | |
| 418. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the summary of the infringement in the introductory part of the decision refers to ‘[an] agreement and/or concerted practice … by which [the producers and distributors concerned] fixed price increases, allocated sales quotas and fixed market shares and set up machinery to monitor the implementation of the restrictive agreements’ (recital 2 of the decision). In the description of the nature of the infringement, the Commission refers, at recital 376 of the decision, to an infringement which ‘consisted of price fixing market sharing practices, which are by their very nature the worst kind of violations of Article 81(1) [EC] and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement’. | |
| 419. However, the operative part of the decision describes the infringement that the applicant was alleged to have committed only in general terms, as a ‘complex of agreements and concerted practices in the sector of carbonless paper’ (first paragraph of Article 1 of the Decision). | |
| 420. Moreover, it is apparent from the decision that the agreement on price increases is the ‘principal objective’ (recital 77) and the ‘corner stone’ (recital 383) of the cartel. In the description of the objectives of the cartel, at recitals 77 to 81 of the decision, the Commission refers to ‘an overall anti-competitive plan aiming essentially at improving the profitability of the participants by collectively increasing prices’ and states that ‘[i]n the framework of this global plan, the principal objective of the cartel was to agree price increases and also the schedule for the increases’. According to recital 81 of the decision, the allocation of sales quotas and market shares in some national cartel meetings aimed to ‘ensure the implementation of the agreed price increases’, to ‘avoid departures from the common scheme’ and to ‘refrain from competition on other commercial aspects’. | |
| 421. It should be observed in this regard that the agreements and concerted practices referred to in Article 81(1) EC necessarily result from collaboration by several undertakings. They are all co-perpetrators of the infringement but their participation can take different forms according, in particular, to the characteristics of the market concerned and the position of each undertaking on that market, the aims pursued and the means of implementation chosen or envisaged. | |
| 422. However, the mere fact that each undertaking takes part in the infringement in ways particular to it does not suffice to exclude its responsibility for the entire infringement, including a course of action implemented in practical terms by other participating undertakings but sharing the same anti-competitive object or effect. | |
| 423. It must moreover be remembered that Article 81 EC prohibits agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings, including conduct which constitutes the implementation of those agreements or decisions and concerted practices, when they may affect intra-Community trade and have an anti-competitive object or effect. It follows that infringement of that article may result not only from an isolated act but also from a series of acts or from continuous conduct. That interpretation cannot be challenged on the ground that one or several elements of that series of acts or continuous conduct could also constitute in themselves an infringement of Article 81 EC ( Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraphs 79 to 81). | |
| 424. In this instance, the Court finds that, in the circumstances of the case, because of their identical object and their close synergies, the agreements and concerted practices found to exist formed part of an overall plan which was in turn part of a series of efforts made by the undertakings in question in pursuit of a single economic aim, namely to distort the normal movement of prices. As the Commission correctly states at recital 253 of the decision, it would be artificial to split up such continuous conduct, characterised by a single purpose, by treating it as consisting of several separate infringements, when what was involved was a single infringement which progressively manifested itself in both agreements and concerted practices. The infringement constitutes a single infringement by virtue of the identical nature of the objective pursued by each participant in the agreement, not by virtue of the methods of implementing that agreement ( Cement , paragraph 4127). | |
| 425. In such circumstances, an undertaking which has participated in such an infringement by its own conduct, which met the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and was intended to contribute towards the implementation of the infringement as a whole, was also responsible, throughout the period of its participation in that infringement, for the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement. That is the case where it is proved that the undertaking in question was aware of the unlawful conduct of the other participants, or could reasonably foresee such conduct and was prepared to accept the risk. | |
| 426. It must be held that the Commission established to the requisite legal standard Zicuñaga’s participation in the system of cartel meetings, the price increases and certain measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price increases for the entire duration of its participation in the infringement (see paragraphs 155 to 243 above). | |
| 427. The fact that Zicuñaga thus intended to contribute towards the implementation of the infringement as a whole is such as to give rise to its responsibility for the conduct planned or followed by the other undertakings and within the scope of the various elements of the infringement. It was aware of all those elements or could reasonably foresee them by virtue of its participation in the regular meetings of carbonless paper producers and distributors for more than one year. | |
| 428. With regard to the measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price increases, it need merely be stated that the various forms of conduct referred to at recital 2 of the decision were all secondary to the price increases, in that they sought to create conditions favourable to the achievement of the price objectives fixed by the carbonless paper producers and distributors. It must be held that Zicuñaga, having participated for over a year in those price initiatives, could reasonably foresee that the participating undertakings were seeking to ensure the success of those initiatives by various mechanisms and Zicuñaga was prepared to accept that possibility. Therefore, even if it has not been proved that Zicuñaga actually participated in the adoption or implementation of all those measures, it is nevertheless responsible for the actual course of action followed in that context by the other undertakings as part of a single infringement in which it participated and to which it contributed (see, to that effect, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraphs 205 to 207). | |
| 429. However, it should be recalled that the Commission has not established Zicuñaga’s participation in market-sharing practices (see above, paragraphs 238 to 240). Whilst the fact that an undertaking has not taken part in all aspects of an anti-competitive scheme is not material to the establishment of the existence of the infringement, such a factor must be taken into consideration when the gravity of the infringement is assessed and if and when the fine is determined (see, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 188 above, paragraph 292). Since the Commission has failed to demonstrate that Zicuñaga’s non-participatation in the market‑sharing practices was not taken into account in respect of all the parameters which led to the determination of the final amount of the fine imposed on Zicuñaga, the Court thus holds, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, that Zicuñaga’s final fine must be reduced by 15%. | |
| D – The pleas alleging insufficient evidence, infringement of Article 253 EC, of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and of the principles of proportionality and equal treatment, lack of individual determination of the fines, erroneous factual findings, errors of assessment and errors of law in the assessment of the gr avity of the infringement | |
| 430. Several undertakings dispute the assessment of the gravity of the infringement that the Commission carried out on the basis of the factors relied on its decision, namely the nature of the infringement and its actual impact, and the classification of the participants in the cartel according to the gravity of the infringement and the increase in the fine for deterrence. | |
| 1. Nature of the infringement | |
| 431. The Commission took the view that the infringement consisted of price‑fixing and market‑sharing practices, which are by their very nature the worst kind of violations of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement. | |
| 432. AWA disputes the gravity of the agreements in question, asserting that they were essentially limited to discussions concerning the timing and amount of announcements of price increases and did not relate to market sharing or sales quota allocations, or did so only insignificantly and largely ineffectively. In its submission, certain statements by Sappi confirm that the meetings did not serve as a framework for market‑sharing arrangements. AWA adds that the cartel in the paper market was not fully institutionalised and did not have an effective system for enforcing the agreements. All those factors make the infringement less serious than those found in other cases. | |
| 433. Torraspapel claims that the Commission was wrong to find that the cartel related to price‑fixing and market‑sharing practices and that, consequently, it wrongfully categorised that cartel as very serious. | |
| 434. It must be borne in mind, first, that, according to settled case‑law, the gravity of an infringement is to be appraised by taking into account in particular the nature of the restrictions on competition (see Joined Cases T‑213/95 and T‑18/96 SCK and FNK v Commission [1997] ECR II‑1739, paragraph 246, and the case-law cited). | |
| 435. Furthermore, ‘infringements involving price‑fixing and market‑sharing … must be treated as particularly serious since they involve direct interference with the essential parameters of competition on the market in question’ ( Thyssen Stahl v Commission , paragraph 107 above, paragraph 675). | |
| 436. The Court clarified the concept of a very serious infringement in particular in Case T‑224/00 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2003] ECR II‑2597 (‘ ADM v Commission ’), paragraphs 117 to 131. It is apparent from that judgment that the classification of an infringement as very serious is not conditional on a partitioning of the markets. On the contrary, horizontal agreements relating to price cartels or market-sharing quotas are presumed to jeopardise the proper functioning of the internal market, and other practices likely to have the same effect may also be classified as very serious infringements. | |
| 437. It does not follow from that case‑law or from the Guidelines that the classification of an infringement as very serious presupposes that several of those practices must be present. A horizontal pricing agreement may in itself constitute such an infringement if it undermines the proper functioning of the market. It is established that in the present case the undertakings concerned agreed on prices and its effect was to undermine the proper functioning of the market. That is sufficient to justify the classification of the infringement as very serious in the present case, even if the agreements in question related only to price‑fixing practices. | |
| 438. For the sake of completeness, it must be observed that AWA does not really dispute the existence of agreements on market sharing or on allocations of sales quotas, but submits rather that those activities were relatively insignificant and largely ineffective. | |
| 439. Lastly, as regards the alleged non-institutionalised nature of the cartel and the absence of any monitoring system, it must be stated that the structure put in place proved to be sufficient for the cartel to function for several years. It is apparent from several passages in the decision that the participants in the cartel meetings exchanged detailed, individual information on their prices and sales volumes and that the implementation of the agreements was monitored, in particular by AWA. Thus, the account of the meeting of 1 October 1993 drawn up by Mougeot (document No 7648, cited at recital 104 of the decision and attached to the SO) indicates that there were sanctions for failure to comply with the agreements: (‘[Mr B.] said quite expressly that he would not tolerate any failure to follow this price increase and that he would “personally look after” anyone who did not “play the game”’). When asked to describe the monitoring system and the reasons for the authority of Mr B. and AWA, Mougeot replied (document No 11494, cited at recital 104 of the decision and attached to the SO): | |
| ‘As far as we know there were no contracts, documents or legal circumstances which gave AWA any sort of authority. But they had a position of moral and economic leadership on the market … AWA’s financial and industrial weight enabled [M.B.] to say that if any of these increases were not passed on AWA would make it its business to push the market right down by applying a price policy that would leave most people high and dry. He showed quite clearly what he was capable of by crushing Binda in Italy.’ | |
| 440. Mougeot was also reproached by AWA for failing to comply with its instructions (recital 143 of the decision). Moreover, the fact that Sappi also monitored quite attentively the price movements and quotas of the cartel members in relation to the targets set is apparent from the note of 9 March 1992 and the note concerning the meeting of 30 September 1992, referred to in paragraphs 171 and 172 above respectively. | |
| 441. In any event, it does not follow either from the Guidelines or from the case‑law that, in order to be classified as a very serious infringement, the cartel must include particular institutional structures. | |
| 442. In the light of the foregoing, the Commission was right to classify the cartel in question as an infringement of a very serious nature. | |
| 2. Actual impact of the infringement | |
| 443. Several applicants (AWA, MHTP, Zanders and Torraspapel) claim that the actual impact of the cartel on the carbonless paper market was very limited. The Commission did not examine correctly the price movements in relation to that product and took account only of increases and not of decreases. According to the applicants, the prices actually obtained on the market were lower than the agreed or announced increases. This shows that those increases were not implemented in practice. Furthermore, certain applicants refer to the unfavourable development of the carbonless paper prices and to their decreasing margins or derisory profits. Carbonless paper prices essentially reflect changes in pulp costs and demand. | |
| 444. AWA submitted two reports by National Economic Research Associates (‘the Nera reports’). The first, dated December 2000, was submitted in the context of the administrative procedure. The second, dated April 2002, was compiled for the purposes of the judicial proceedings. They both seek to demonstrate that the prices resulting from the offending agreements could not have exceeded those which would have been observed under normal conditions of competition. Koehler and Zanders submitted during the administrative procedure and produced before the Court the PricewaterhouseCoopers report, which describes the situation of the European carbonless paper market from summer or autumn 1995 to February or March 1997 (see paragraphs 101 to 103 above). | |
| 445. In the decision, at recitals 382 to 402, the Commission rejects the arguments of the undertakings concerned, contending in essence that the very fact that price increases and their timing were announced following concertation suffices to show an impact on the market. Whilst recognising that the carbonless paper market was in decline, the Commission considers that this does not exclude the fact that the cartel managed to control or limit the price decrease. According to the Commission, the examples of differences of opinion do not show a complete failure to implement the agreements. Certain agreed increases were postponed and sometimes increases smaller than foreseen were applied. | |
| 446. It must first be recalled that, when determining the gravity of an infringement, particular account should be taken of the legislative background and economic context of the conduct complained of (Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, paragraph 612, and Case C‑219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I‑4411, paragraph 38). According to the case‑law, in order to assess the actual effect of an infringement on the market the Commission must take as a reference the competition that would normally exist if there were no infringement (see, to that effect, Suiker Unie and Others v Commission , cited above, paragraphs 619 and 620; Case T‑347/94 Mayr-Melnhof v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1751, paragraph 235; and Thyssen Stahl v Commission , paragraph 107 above, paragraph 645). | |
| 447. The Guidelines state in this respect that, in assessing the gravity of the infringement, account must be taken of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant geographic market. Under the heading of ‘very serious infringements’, the Guidelines give examples of types of infringements and their object, without mentioning their actual impact other than by very general reference to jeopardising the proper functioning of the internal market. They do not directly link the gravity of the infringement to its impact. Actual impact is one factor among others and should not even be taken into account where it cannot be measured. | |
| 448. In assessing the gravity of the infringement, the Commission none the less relied on the fact that the infringement had, in its view, had an actual impact on the EEA carbonless paper market (recitals 382 to 402 of the decision), as it must now do in accordance with the first paragraph of Section 1A of the Guidelines where it is apparent that that impact can be measured. | |
| 449. It must be stated that the specific evidence put forward by the Commission indicates with reasonable probability that the cartel had an appreciable impact on the market in question. | |
| 450. First, it is apparent in particular from recitals 203, 204, 213, 214, 215, 225, 227, 235, 236, 237 of, and Annex 5 to, the decision that the price agreements were often implemented by announcing to clients the price increases agreed at the meetings. According to Mougeot’s statements of 14 April 1999 (document No 7649, attached to the SO), Mr B. stated, during the meeting of 1 October 1993, that the ‘price increases were to be notified by circular letters sent to clients in order to render those increases effective’. As recital 384 of the decision indicates, the agreed increases thus necessarily served as a basis for fixing individual transaction prices. | |
| 451. The fact that the undertakings actually announced the agreed price increases and that the prices so announced served as a basis for fixing individual transaction prices suffices in itself for a finding that the collusion on prices had both as its object and effect a serious restriction of competition (Case T‑308/94 Cascades v Commission [1998] ECR II‑925, paragraph 194). The Commission was not therefore required to examine the details of the parties’ arguments seeking to establish that the agreements in question did not have the effect of increasing prices beyond those which would have been observed under normal conditions of competition and to respond point by point to those arguments. In particular, it was not obliged to refute the analysis in support of this in the first Nera report submitted by AWA, as the Commission explains at recitals 390 to 401 of the decision. Contrary to what AWA appears to claim, the Commission cannot be criticised in this respect for not stating reasons. | |
| 452. Furthermore, the fact that certain applicants’ price instructions did not always strictly correspond to the target prices set at the meetings is not such as to undermine the finding that there was an impact on the market through the taking into account of the agreed price announcements when individual prices were set. The effects taken into account by the Commission when setting the general level of fines are not those resulting from the actual conduct which a particular undertaking claims to have adopted but those resulting from the whole of the infringement in which the undertaking participated with others (see, to that effect, Hercules Chemicals v Commission , paragraph 196 above, paragraph 342). | |
| 453. That finding of an impact on the market through the announcement of agreed prices and the fact that those prices impacted on clients cannot be called in question by the fact that the relevant documentary evidence gathered by the Commission does not cover the entire period referred to. First, it is clear from recitals 383 and 384 of the decision that the Commission expressly took into consideration that factor when measuring the impact on the market. Second, it took account of other factors in its analysis of the impact on the market and, beyond that, of the gravity of the infringement. | |
| 454. Second, the Commission relies on occasional quota and market‑sharing agreements which were respected at least to a certain extent. | |
| 455. It is apparent from the file that the sales quotas were allocated at the meeting of 30 September 1993 in Barcelona (document No 5 referred to in paragraph 172 above) and at the meeting of 1 October 1993 in Paris (document No 6). The information provided by certain undertakings on their real sales figures for 1992 and 1993 shows a close correlation between the quotas agreed and the sales volume information exchanged at those meetings (see Annex III to the decision). The report of the meeting of 29 June 1994 (see paragraph 175 above) also refers to quotas. Furthermore, it follows from Mougeot’s statements of 14 April 1999 (documents Nos 7651 to 7653, referred to in paragraph 165 above) and the annexes thereto (documents Nos 7657 and 7658, attached to the SO) that agreements on market shares were concluded at the meeting of 31 May 1994 in Nogent‑sur‑Marne and at the meeting of 6 December 1994 in Geneva. The Commission is therefore correct to submit that those sales quota allocations and that market sharing constitute additional evidence of the impact of the infringement on the market. | |
| 456. Third, the Commission submits that the finding relating to the actual impact of the cartel is reinforced by the fact that the implementation of the price increases was monitored and controlled. | |
| 457. It must be stated that the points put forward by the Commission at recitals 97 to 106 do indeed demonstrate the existence of such control, exercised in particular by AWA. That is apparent in particular from Mougeot’s statements of 14 April 1999, set out at recital 104 of the decision and already referred to in paragraph 439 above, according to which ‘[Mr B.] said quite expressly that he would not tolerate any failure to follow this price increase and that he would “personally look after” anyone who did not “play the game”’. Several notes by Sappi (see paragraphs 169, 171, 175 and 176 above) also demonstrate that the conduct of the cartel members was monitored, in particular as regards the implementation of the agreed price increases. | |
| 458. It must be stated that, for the purposes of the assessment of the gravity of the infringement, only the question whether the agreements were controlled or monitored is relevant, and it is immaterial that any specific undertaking played a predominant role in that control or monitoring. The control of the implementation of the agreed prices was part of the plan to which the cartel members subscribed. Torraspapel cannot therefore criticise the Commission for taking account of those monitoring systems at the stage when it assessed the nature of the infringement, given that the individual responsibility of each participant is then examined at a later stage. | |
| 459. As regards the last indicium of the impact of the cartel put forward by the Commission, namely the long duration of the infringement notwithstanding the risks involved, it must be pointed out that, since the practices in question lasted three years in most cases, it was hardly likely that, at that time, the producers considered them wholly ineffective (Joined Cases T‑305/94 to T‑307/94, T‑313/94 to T‑316/94, T‑318/94, T‑325/94, T‑328/94, T‑329/94 and T‑335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II‑931, paragraph 748). | |
| 460. All those factors lead the Court to the conclusion that the Commission was right to find that the infringement in question had an actual impact on the market. | |
| 461. It should be added that the Commission cannot be criticised for not taking into account at that stage the fact that the carbonless paper market was in decline. The Commission refers to that fact at recital 392 of the decision, specifically in the examination of the actual impact of the infringement, and explains clearly the reasons why that decline does not exclude the cartel’s impact on the market. Whilst accepting that in such a situation the prices could be expected to decrease, the Commission considers that that ‘this does not exclude that the cartel managed to control or limit the price decrease’. Consequently, in its view, ‘the cartel may have impeded the production capacity to adjust naturally to the demand by maintaining inefficient competitors in the market longer than they would have stayed under normal conditions of competition’. | |
| 462. In this respect, it should be stated that the mere fact that the market in question was in decline and that certain undertakings were suffering losses cannot preclude the setting up of a cartel or the application of Article 81 EC. On the contrary, by their own admission, certain undertakings asserted that that state of affairs encouraged them to join the cartel. It should be added that, even assuming that they are proven, the poor market conditions do not mean that the cartel had no impact. As the Commission states, the agreed price increases made it possible to control or limit the decrease in prices, thereby distorting competition. The fact that the market conditions may have led to price decreases in no way detracts from the complaint alleging concerted price increases. The fact that the increase of the price of pulp may have encouraged the undertakings to raise the price of carbonless paper has no bearing on the complaint that they did not do so independently, but by colluding with each other and entering into agreements. Moreover, the fact that, in a market in decline characterised by significant structural overcapacity where one would expect to see prices decrease, the price of carbonless paper was able to follow the increases in the price of pulp could precisely be regarded as evidence of a cartel. | |
| 463. By way of conclusion regarding the gravity of the infringement, the Court considers that the Commission was right to classify the agreements in question as a very serious infringement. The infringement is by its nature very serious, had an impact on the market and covered the whole of the common market and, following the creation of the EEA, the whole of that area. | |
| 3. Classification of the participants in the cartel for the purposes of setting the amounts of the fines | |
| 464. According to the Guidelines, within each of the categories of infringement provided for, and in particular as far as serious and very serious infringements are concerned, ‘the proposed scale of fines will make it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings according to the nature of the infringement committed’. | |
| 465. Taking as a basis the EEA-wide product turnover in 1995, the Commission put the undertakings concerned into five categories according to their relative importance in the market concerned in the EEA. AWA, which is the largest carbonless paper producer, alone makes up the first category. The second category includes MHTP, Zanders and Koehler, the third, Torraspapel and Bolloré, the fourth, Sappi and Mougeot, and the fifth, Divipa, Zicuñaga and Carrs. | |
| 466. The arguments put forward by the applicants in this connection relate to several points, namely the choice of the reference year, the taking into account of incorrect turnover figures and the disproportionate result to which the Commission’s method leads. | |
| 467. Before analysing those points, it is necessary to recall the case‑law cited in paragraph 376 above from which it is apparent that, in the context of Regulation No 17, the Commission has a margin of discretion when fixing fines, in order that it may channel the conduct of undertakings towards compliance with the competition rules. The proper application of those rules requires that the Commission be able at any time to adjust the level of fines to the needs of Community competition policy, if necessary by raising that level. | |
| 468. It is in addition settled case-law that the criteria for assessing the gravity of an infringement may, depending on the circumstances, include the volume and value of the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the market. It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing a fine, to have regard both to the overall turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or other of those figures an importance which is disproportionate in relation to other factors and that the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple calculation based on overall turnover ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraphs 120 and 121; Case T‑77/92 Parker Pen v Commission [1994] ECR II‑549, paragraph 94; Case T‑327/94 SCA Holding v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1373, paragraph 176; and ADM v Commission , paragraph 436 above, paragraph 188). | |
| a) Choice of the reference year | |
| 469. The choice of the reference year is criticised by Torraspapel and Divipa. The latter submits that the Commission should have taken as a basis the turnover for 1994. Several undertakings, including Divipa, were not involved in the cartel in 1995. For its part, Torraspapel claims that its turnover for 1995 was exceptionally high in relation to that of previous years and did not therefore accurately reflect its real importance on the market during the infringement period. | |
| 470. It should be recalled that, as Divipa itself accepts, according to the settled case‑law of the Court, the Commission is not required to calculate the amount of fines according to the gravity on the basis of amounts founded on the turnover of the undertakings involved, since the gravity of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the deterrent effect of fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has been drawn up (order in Case C‑137/95 P SPO and Others v Commission [1996] ECR I‑1611, paragraph 54; Ferriere Nord v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 33; and Case T‑295/94 Buchmann v Commission [1998] ECR II‑813, paragraph 163). | |
| 471. According to recital 407 of the decision, the Commission used the EEA‑wide product turnover in 1995 – the last year of the period of the infringement found – as the basis for comparing the relative importance of the undertakings in the market concerned and for classifying them in different categories in relation to the capacity of each of them to distort competition. | |
| 472. It must be stated in this respect that, whatever the merits of their claims, the result would not have been different for Torraspapel and Divipa if the Commission had taken their turnover for 1994 as a basis. It follows from table 1(b) set out at recital 18 of the decision that, with turnover and market share comparable to those of Bolloré (Copigraph), Torraspapel would remain in the third category and Divipa would still be in the last category. The decision cannot therefore be called into question on that point. The Court therefore finds that that complaint is irrelevant. | |
| b) Taking into account of an incorrect overall turnover figure | |
| 473. AWA and Koehler submit that the Commission took into account the turnover of each of their respective groups, while for MHTP and Zanders it took account only of the turnover specific to the undertaking concerned. | |
| 474. AWA asserts that if the Commission had taken into account only the turnover specific to AWA, it would not have concluded that there was a very substantial difference in size between it and the other undertakings involved, the starting amount of the fine would therefore have been lower and the final fine would have been EUR 141.75 million less. Koehler claims that, by not taking into account the differences in economic weight between the groups to which MHTP, Zanders and it belong, the Commission wrongly placed it in the same category as those two undertakings. | |
| 475. In so far as AWA and Koehler criticise the classification of the participants in the cartel on the basis of an incorrect overall turnover figure, their plea cannot succeed. | |
| 476. It is clear from recitals 406 to 409 of the decision that the Commission separated the undertakings in question ‘according to their relative importance in the market concerned’ taking as the basis the ‘EEA-wide product turnover’. The total turnover of the companies or groups of companies was not therefore a factor at that stage. | |
| 477. For the sake of completeness, it must be observed that the complaint of AWA and Koehler relates less to their own turnover than to the fact that the turnover of the groups to which MHTP and Zanders belong was not taken into account. However, even if the Commission made a mistake in the case of MHTP and Zanders, a person may not rely, in support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party (Case C-297/98 P SCA Holding v Commission , paragraph 468 above, paragraph 160). The argument that the fine imposed on MHTP and Zanders was too low cannot lead to a reduction of AWA’s or Koehler’s fine. To that extent, their plea must be rejected. | |
| 478. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence that the groups to which Zanders and MHTP belong were involved in the infringement, the Commission was justified in not using the total turnover of those groups. Since the Commission did not find sufficient evidence to attribute the infringement to those groups, it was for the applicants, in so far as they considered that the involvement of those groups was evident from the file, to adduce evidence (see, to that effect, Case T‑31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1881 (‘ ABB v Commission ’), paragraph 181). In the present case, neither AWA nor Koehler adduces that evidence. Their plea must therefore be rejected. | |
| c) Disproportionate result of the application of the Commission’s method | |
| 479. Several undertakings submit that the amount of the fine set by the Commission according to the gravity of the infringement is disproportionate in relation to their own turnover, to the other participants in the cartel or in relation to the amounts imposed in other decisions, or to several of those factors combined, as the case may be. The method of calculating the basic amount of the fine thus infringes the principle of proportionality and the principle of equal treatment. | |
| Breach of the principle of proportionality | |
| 480. MHTP asserts that it is not apparent that the Commission took account of its turnover on the relevant market. The Commission put the undertakings concerned into different categories according to their shares of the relevant market. However, recourse to market shares to distinguish between the undertakings involved in an infringement does not automatically comply with the principle of proportionality. By relying exclusively on market shares, the Commission takes account only of the relative differences between turnover and not of the absolute level of turnover on the relevant product market. | |
| 481. It should first be recalled that the gravity of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the deterrent effect of fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has been drawn up (see HFB and Others v Commission , paragraph 87 above, paragraph 443, and the case-law cited). | |
| 482. Furthermore, the mere fact that, in that context, the Commission did not rely exclusively on each undertaking’s turnover on the relevant market but took into consideration other factors relating to the significance of the undertakings on that market cannot lead to the conclusion that the Commission imposed a disproportionate fine. It follows from the case‑law that it is important not to confer on an undertaking’s total turnover or on its turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed an importance which is disproportionate in relation to the other factors ( LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 303). | |
| 483. The factors taken into account by the Commission in the present case are clearly set out in the decision at recitals 372 to 408. They include turnover on the relevant market. In addition, the fact that the starting amounts set by the Commission are not based on a given percentage of turnover, as in Case T‑354/94 Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission [1998] ECR II‑2111, cannot in itself render them disproportionate. | |
| 484. Lastly, the Commission is not required, when assessing fines in accordance with the gravity and duration of the infringement in question, to calculate the fines on the basis of the turnover of the undertakings concerned, or to ensure, where fines are imposed on a number of undertakings involved in the same infringement, that the final amounts of the fines resulting from its calculations for the undertakings concerned reflect any distinction between them in terms of their overall turnover or their turnover in the relevant product market ( LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 278). | |
| 485. MHTP’s complaint must therefore be rejected. | |
| 486. Koehler submits that the Commission infringed the principle of proportionality by imposing on it a fine which was totally disproportionate in the light of its economic power and the profit deriving from the cartel. It submits that the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have confirmed on numerous occasions the essential role played by the criterion of the economic power of the undertaking concerned for the purpose of assessing the gravity of the infringement. The Guidelines also attach great importance to the size of the undertaking concerned. | |
| 487. It should be recalled in this respect that, in order to take account of the specific weight and therefore the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition, the Commission put the undertakings concerned into five categories according to their relative importance in the market concerned (recital 406 of the decision). The Commission therefore differentiated according to the size of the undertakings. | |
| 488. Koehler moreover recognises this, while maintaining that the Commission correctly states that a differentiated calculation of the fine is required but does not manage to apply convincingly to the specific case the Guidelines which it has imposed on itself. It adds in its reply that the Commission did not make the necessary differentiations required by virtue of its own method for setting the fine. | |
| 489. Koehler’s principal argument seems to consist in the fact that it is a family business which does not have access to the capital market and which, both from the point of view of its size and of its resources, is a small undertaking in comparison with the other participants which were penalised. | |
| 490. In order to establish breach of the principle of proportionality, Koehler compares its fine with those imposed on MHTP, Zanders and AWA. | |
| 491. However, it must be stated that, in making its point, Koehler includes in the overall turnover of MHTP and Zanders that of the groups of which, in its opinion, those undertakings form part. The Court has held in paragraph 478 above that the Commission was right not to take account of the total turnover of the groups to which those two undertakings belong. | |
| 492. As regards the comparison of Koehler’s fine with that of AWA, it should be recalled that the starting amount set at recital 409 of the decision expressly takes into account the relative importance of the undertakings in the market concerned, taking as the basis the EEA-wide product turnover. Thus, at that stage, the starting amount of the fine of each of those two undertakings reflects overall the differences in their turnover on the carbonless paper market. | |
| 493. The Commission then doubles the starting amount of AWA, Sappi and Bolloré for deterrence in order to take account of their size and overall resources. By doubling AWA’s fine on that basis but not that of Koehler, the Commission thus takes into consideration the difference in size and overall resources which separate those two undertakings. | |
| 494. It should be added that a mere comparison of the percentage that the fines represent in relation to the overall turnover of the undertakings concerned is not sufficient to establish the disproportionate nature of Koehler’s fine. The fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple calculation based on overall turnover (see the case‑law cited in paragraph 468 above). | |
| 495. Furthermore, those comparisons do not establish that the basic amount of Koehler’s fine is disproportionate, given the size of the undertaking and its overall resources. The applicant does not adduce any evidence capable of proving that the basic amount of the fine is excessive in relation to its specific weight. Although it is true that Koehler is a family business, its turnover relating to carbonless paper, in particular, is such that it cannot be classified as one of the small undertakings of the sector. | |
| 496. Lastly, the Commission is not required, when determining the amount of fines, to ensure, where fines are imposed on various undertakings involved in the same infringement, that the final amounts of the fines reflect all differentiation between the undertakings concerned as regards their total turnover (Joined Cases T‑236/01, T‑239/01, T‑244/01 to T‑246/01, T‑251/01 and T‑252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‑1181, paragraph 217). | |
| 497. Koehler’s complaint alleging breach of the principle of proportionality must therefore be rejected. | |
| Breach of the principle of equal treatment | |
| 498. AWA claims that the amount of the fine set in its case according to the gravity of the infringement is excessive in relation to that set for the other participants in the cartel. The Commission complied with the Guidelines as regards MHTP, Zanders and Koehler but it applied the former system to AWA, which was based on the respective importance of the undertakings concerned on the market. | |
| 499. Zanders claims that the Commission’s classification discriminated against it in relation to its competitors who were considerably more active in the cartel, such as Koehler, MHTP and Torraspapel. | |
| 500. Koehler submits that the general principle of equal treatment is infringed where, in view of the economic power of the undertaking in question, a fine affects that undertaking to a much greater extent than the other undertakings concerned. As a family business, it disputes its classification in the same category as MHTP and Zanders. Its arguments reflect substantially those already examined in connection with breach of the principle of proportionality. To that extent, reference should be made to paragraphs 486 to 497 above. | |
| 501. As has been consistently held, the principle of equal treatment is infringed only where comparable situations are treated differently or different situations are treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (see Case T‑311/94 BPB de Eendracht v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1129, paragraph 309, and the case‑law cited). | |
| 502. The Guidelines provide that, where an infringement involves several undertakings (cartels), it may be necessary in some cases to apply weightings to the amounts determined within the category selected in order to take account of the specific weight and, therefore, the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition, particularly where there is considerable disparity between the sizes of the undertakings committing infringements of the same type. | |
| 503. In that case, the Guidelines add that ‘the principle of equal punishment for the same conduct may, if the circumstances so warrant, lead to different fines being imposed on the undertakings concerned without this differentiation being governed by arithmetical calculation’. | |
| 504. According to the case-law, where the Commission divides the undertakings concerned into categories for the purpose of setting the amount of the fines, the thresholds for each of the categories thus identified must be coherent and objectively justified ( Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission , paragraph 496 above, paragraph 220). | |
| 505. On that basis, it is necessary to ascertain whether the Commission’s classification observes the principle of equal treatment. | |
| 506. It should be recalled that, ‘in order to take account of the specific weight and therefore the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition’ the Commission put, in the decision (recitals 406 and 407), the undertakings concerned into categories ‘according to their relative importance in the market concerned’. To that end, it took ‘as the basis for the comparison of the relative importance of an undertaking in the market concerned … the EEA-wide product turnover’. Recital 408 also refers to their market shares. The reasoning for the classification is therefore clear. | |
| 507. Since they are such as to indicate the importance of the undertaking, those factors, namely its EEA-wide product turnover and its market shares, can be taken into account by the Commission in that connection, in accordance with the case‑law cited in paragraph 468 above. | |
| 508. As recital 407 of the decision indicates, the Commission used, in order to establish the different categories, the figures in table 1(b) in recital 18 of the decision. | |
| 509. In this respect, it must be stated that the turnover indicated in that table is based on information provided by the undertakings in their answers to the requests for information. AWA cannot therefore argue, in these proceedings, that it provided inaccurate information. In any event, it is apparent that the new figures put forward in its application remain in the same order of magnitude and would not therefore have led to a different result. | |
| 510. Furthermore, contrary to what AWA asserts, it is not apparent from the comparison of the figures in the table in question and the categories established by the Commission that the latter applied to AWA a system different from that applied to the other undertakings. | |
| 511. It is true that recourse to market shares among other factors in order to differentiate between the undertakings would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment if it did not apply to all the undertakings concerned. However, AWA itself provides a table in its application from which it is apparent, on its own assertions, that ‘the amounts determined for gravity are, broadly speaking, correlated with the participants’ shares of the affected market’. Contrary to what AWA claims, the principle of equal treatment has therefore been observed. | |
| 512. Zanders submits, for its part, that it was the subject of discrimination in being classed in the same category as MHTP and Koehler, even though their involvement in the cartel was considerably more active than its own, or in not being classed in the same category as Torraspapel, even though there was no objective reason to treat it differently. | |
| 513. It should be stated that, according to the figures taken into account by the Commission, Zanders’ market share was approximately 12% in 1994 and 1995, MHTP’s approximately 14% and Koehler’s approximately 10%, whilst Torraspapel’s amounted to 5.4% in 1994 and 6.9% in 1995. In relation to that criterion, the categories established by the Commission do not therefore discriminate against Zanders, nor do they discriminate against Koehler, despite its claim to be a family business (see also paragraph 487 et seq. above). | |
| 514. Zanders is however seeking to establish that its market share was less important than Torraspapel’s on certain markets, in particular in France, Spain and the United Kingdom. | |
| 515. It must be stated in this regard that the Commission relied, in respect of all the participants in the cartel, on their EEA‑wide product turnover and market shares. It found that the cartel covered the whole of the common market and, following its creation, the whole of the EEA (recital 403 of the decision). The evidence adduced by Zanders is therefore irrelevant as it applies only to certain markets. | |
| 516. Zanders’ alleged lesser involvement in the cartel – disputed by the Commission – could possibly be taken into account as an attenuating circumstance under the Guidelines. It does not however fall to be considered when setting the starting amount of the fine by reference to the gravity of the infringement where the weighting is determined on the basis of objective elements designed to ‘take account of the specific weight … of each undertaking on competition’. | |
| 517. Lastly, it is necessary to examine AWA’s argument that the general level of the fines set according to gravity for this cartel is too high by comparison with those set in other recent cases. | |
| 518. AWA asserts that, with the very notable exception of the amount set in its case, the starting amounts in the present case and those set for each infringement in other cases involving very serious infringements are broadly similar. According to AWA, they should have been considerably lower because the agreements did not have the effect of increasing prices in relation to normal conditions of competition, did not prevent the participants from making minimal profits, were limited to discussions on prices and did not include any monitoring system. | |
| 519. It must be stated that AWA’s argument amounts to disputing the classification of the infringement as very serious in the present case and not the amounts set by reference to the classification of the infringement as very serious, amounts which AWA describes as broadly similar to those set in other cases for the same type of infringement. | |
| 520. Since the Commission was right to classify the infringement as very serious (see paragraphs 431 to 442 above), the complaint of unequal treatment in relation to other recent cases cannot succeed, since AWA accepts that the amount is that applied in other cases for that type of infringement. | |
| 521. As regards, moreover, the amount set in the case of AWA, it should be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, the fact that the Commission in the past imposed fines of a certain level for particular types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17, if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy. | |
| 522. The pleas disputing the classification of the participants in the cartel and the starting amounts set on that basis must therefore be rejected. | |
| 4. Increase in the fine for deterrence | |
| 523. AWA and Bolloré contest the doubling of the starting amount of the fines for deterrence. That increase leads to a fine which is highly disproportionate to the volume of sales concerned by the cartel and does not take account of the gravity of the infringement imputable to the various undertakings and their specific roles. AWA also claims that there is no statement of reasons for that increase for deterrence either in the SO or in the decision and that it is incompatible with the application of the Leniency Notice. | |
| 524. The Commission stated, at recitals 410 to 412 of the decision, that, in order to ensure that the fine had a sufficient deterrent effect, it considered, in the case of AWA, Sappi and Bolloré, ‘that the appropriate starting amount for a fine resulting from the criterion of the relative importance in the market concerned require[d] further upward adjustment to take account of their size and their overall resources’. The Commission had already announced in the SO its intention to set any fines at a level sufficient to ensure deterrence. | |
| 525. The Guidelines provide that it is necessary ‘to set the fine at a level which ensures that it has a sufficiently deterrent effect’. In addition, account may be taken of the fact that ‘large undertakings usually have legal and economic knowledge and infrastructures which enable them more easily to recognise that their conduct constitutes an infringement and be aware of the consequences stemming from it under competition law’. | |
| 526. It should be recalled that the Commission may raise the level of fines in order to strengthen their deterrent effect ( Solvay v Commission , paragraph 196 above, paragraph 309). Furthermore, the Commission may impose a heavier fine on an undertaking which occupies a decisive position within the market and where the impact of its actions on the market is more significant than that of the actions of other undertakings committing the same infringement, without violating the principle of equal treatment by so doing. Calculating the amount of the fine in such a way also satisfies the requirement that it be sufficiently dissuasive (Case T‑66/99 Minoan Lines v Commission [2003] ECR II‑5515, paragraph 284; see also, to that effect, Joined Cases T‑24/93 to T‑26/93 and T‑28/93 Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission [1996] ECR II‑1201, paragraph 235). | |
| 527. As is apparent from Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 106, deterrence must be both specific and general. Whilst punishing an individual infringement, the fine also forms part of a general policy to ensure that undertakings comply with the competition rules. Even in relation to the undertaking concerned, deterrence cannot be limited only to the market concerned but must apply to all its activities. Bolloré cannot therefore claim a reduction of its fine on account of the sale of its ‘carbonless paper’ division and the fact that it cannot re‑offend in that sector. | |
| 528. In response to AWA’s objection to the deterrent effect erga omnes of the fine, it must be stated that, whilst it is true that the fine is intended to have a deterrent effect both in relation to the undertaking fined and other undertakings which might be tempted to infringe the competition rules, the fine was calculated in the present case by taking into account the specific situation of the undertaking concerned and all the circumstances of the case. To that extent, if it is not disproportionate in relation to the undertaking concerned, it cannot become disproportionate merely because it has at the same time a deterrent effect erga omnes . | |
| 529. However, in this instance, the applicants dispute above all the size of the increase for deterrence in their case, which they consider to be disproportionate and unexplained. | |
| 530. As regards the allegedly disproportionate nature of the multiplier applied in the present case for deterrence, the Court approved, in ABB v Commission , paragraph 478 above, paragraph 162, the Commission’s doubling of the fine for deterrence in order to reflect the applicant’s importance in the pre‑insulated pipe sector so as to take account of its position as one of the principal European groups. | |
| 531. If reference is made to table 1(b) in recital 18 of the decision, AWA, Bolloré and Sappi are the principal European groups. Their total turnover, which is in the same range, quite clearly exceeds that of the other undertakings concerned. It follows from this that the doubling of AWA’s and Bolloré’s fines cannot be regarded as disproportionate in relation to the position of their groups. | |
| 532. It should be stated in this respect that, contrary to the apparent premiss of AWA and Bolloré, according to which the Commission relied, for that increase for deterrence, on the worldwide turnover of their groups, the multiplier was not calculated according to a mathematical formula and has no proportional link with the applicant’s overall turnover (see, to that effect, ABB v Commission , paragraph 478 above, paragraph 180). If the overall turnover of AWA, Sappi, Bolloré and Torraspapel are compared by order of importance, in table 1(b), it is apparent that Bolloré’s and AWA’s turnover is between five and seven times higher than Torraspapel’s, although the Commission applied only a multiplier of 2, without distinguishing between AWA and Bolloré. | |
| 533. As regards the argument that that increase is highly disproportionate to the turnover concerned by the infringement, it must be observed that the starting amount of the fine according to the gravity of the infringement was calculated on the basis of the turnover from sales of the product on the market concerned. That factor was therefore taken into consideration by the Commission at the start. The increase for deterrence is intended to take account at a later stage of the size and overall resources of the undertaking. | |
| 534. It should be recalled in this respect that the Commission may have regard both to the overall turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed ( Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 86 above, paragraph 121). | |
| 535. AWA complains however that the Commission already applied a multiplier of 3.5 when setting the starting amount on account of the applicant’s importance on the carbonless paper market, and then went on to apply a deterrent multiplier of 2. | |
| 536. As stated above, the two increases do not take account of the same factors. The first relates to the importance of the undertaking on the relevant product market and the second relates to all the activities of the undertaking or of the group to which it belongs, in order to take account of its overall resources. | |
| 537. As regards the unexplained nature of the increase for deterrence, it must be pointed out that, in the decision, the Commission states that, in the case of AWA, Sappi and Bolloré, ‘the appropriate starting amount for a fine resulting from the criterion of the relative importance in the market concerned requires further upward adjustment to take account of their size and their overall resources’. Contrary to what AWA maintains, the increase in question is therefore properly reasoned. | |
| 538. However, AWA disputes that the size and overall resources of the undertaking should be taken into account for deterrent purposes. It maintains that, according to a rational economic theory of deterrence, fines should be set in relation to the expected profits from the infringement on the relevant product market and to the probability of detection. In its view, the issue of deterrence has no rational link to the group’s turnover at the worldwide level. | |
| 539. As regards the taking into account of the size and overall resources of the undertakings concerned, the Court considers that the Commission did not commit an error of assessment in taking the view that large undertakings generally have resources which make them better able than smaller undertakings to be aware of the requirements and the consequences of competition law ( ABB v Commission , paragraph 478 above, paragraph 169). | |
| 540. Moreover, since the deterrent effect of a fine is one of the factors which, according to the case-law, must be taken into account in determining the gravity of the infringement, AWA cannot criticise the Commission for having taken the deterrent effect of the fines into account when setting the starting amount corresponding to the gravity of its infringement. The taking into account of the deterrent effect of the fines forms an integral part of weighting the fines to reflect the gravity of the infringement ( ABB v Commission , paragraph 167). AWA is not therefore justified in claiming that the Commission was required to apply an increase for deterrence only at the last stage of the calculation of the fine. | |
| 541. As regards the alleged incompatibility of the increase for deterrence with the application of the Leniency Notice, it should be stated that those two steps are manifestly different and the simultaneous application of those two elements cannot be held to be contradictory. The increase of the fine for deterrence is part of the phase in which the fine sanctioning the infringement is calculated. Once that amount has been determined, the application of the Leniency Notice is then intended to reward undertakings which have decided to cooperate with the Commission. Contrary to what AWA maintains, the fact that an undertaking decides to cooperate with an investigation in order to obtain a reduction of its fine in this context in no way guarantees that it will refrain from committing a similar infringement in the future. | |
| 542. As regards the factors which could lead to a reduction in the fine of an undertaking on the basis of the attenuating circumstances specific to it, they must, if there are any, be taken into account in the examination of the attenuating circumstances and do not have to be considered at the stage of the increase for deterrence. That is the case, for example, in respect of the role of follower allegedly played by Copigraph (Bolloré) and of its termination of the infringement before the start of the investigation. | |
| 543. Lastly, before completing this examination of the applicants’ arguments on the increase of the fine for deterrence, it is necessary to consider once again in this respect the unequal treatment which results, according to certain undertakings, from the fact that in their cases the turnover of the groups to which they belong was taken into consideration, whereas for other participants in the cartel the Commission did not take such turnover into account. Since the Commission states that it wishes to take account of the size and overall resources of the undertakings concerned (recital 411 of the decision) in connection with the increase of the fines for deterrence, the issue of whether or not an undertaking belongs to a group can be decisive. | |
| 544. In the case of AWA, it should be recalled that since the parent company of the group participated directly and autonomously in the cartel and moreover does not challenge this, the turnover of the group was rightly taken into account. | |
| 545. As regards Bolloré, the Court held, at paragraphs 66 to 81 above, that it was necessary to reject the objection based on its direct involvement since the SO had not enabled Bolloré to acquaint itself with that objection and to properly defend itself on that point. However, at the end of the examination of Bolloré’s position (see paragraphs 129 to 150 above), the Court held that the Commission was correct to find that that undertaking was liable for the participation of its subsidiary Copigraph in the agreement. | |
| 546. It follows that the two companies could be regarded as jointly and severally liable for the conduct alleged against them, the acts of one being imputable to the other (see, to that effect, HFB and Others v Commission , paragraph 87 above, paragraphs 54, 524 and 525). It is apparent from table 1(b) in recital 18 of the decision that the turnover relating to carbonless paper taken into account in Bolloré’s case is that of Copigraph, since only that company had such a turnover. The Commission therefore correctly set the starting amount of Bolloré’s fine by taking into account Copigraph’s turnover. Since Copigraph and Bolloré form one and the same undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC, the Commission was therefore justified in taking into consideration the overall resources of the group in order to ensure that the fine had a sufficiently deterrent effect. | |
| 547. At the end of this analysis, it must be concluded that the Commission was justified in increasing the starting amount of the fine in the case of AWA and Bolloré in order to ensure that it had a sufficiently deterrent effect. | |
| 548. In addition, the Commission was right to apply to Bolloré’s worldwide turnover the maximum amount of 10% of turnover laid down by Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17. That maximum amount must be calculated on the basis of the total turnover of all the companies constituting the economic entity acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC (see, to that effect, HFB and Others v Commission , paragraph 87 above, paragraph 528). | |
| 549. It is therefore necessary to reject all the pleas alleging insufficient evidence, infringement of Article 253 EC, of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and of the principles of proportionality and equal treatment, failure to determine the fines individually, erroneous findings of fact, errors of assessment and errors of law in the assessment of the gravity of the infringement | |
| E – The pleas relating to the duration of the infringement | |
| 550. It should be recalled that Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 provides that the duration of the infringement is one of the factors that must be taken into account in determining the amount of the fine to be imposed on undertakings which infringe the competition rules. | |
| 551. In relation to the duration of the infringement, the Guidelines distinguish between infringements of short duration (in general, less than one year), where no increase should be made to the starting amount determined for gravity, infringements of medium duration (in general, one to five years), where that amount may be increased by up to 50%, and infringements of long duration (in general, more than five years), where that amount may be increased by up to 10% per year (first to third indents of the first paragraph of Section 1.B). | |
| 552. At recitals 414 to 416 of the decision, the Commission states that: | |
| ‘(414) … the infringement was of medium duration (one to five years) for every undertaking involved. | |
| (415) AWA, Copigraph (Bolloré), Koehler, Sappi, MHTP (Stora), Torraspapel and Zanders committed an infringement of three years and nine months. The starting amounts of the fines determined for gravity … are therefore increased for each of them by 35% in total. | |
| (416) In the case of Mougeot, Carrs, Divipa and Zicuñaga, the duration of the infringement varied between one year and four months and three years and five months. The starting amounts of the fines determined for gravity are therefore increased by 30% for Mougeot, by 25% for Carrs, by 25% for Divipa and by 10 % for Zicuñaga.’ | |
| 553. Several applicants disputed the Commission’s findings in relation to the duration of the infringements committed by them. Reference should be made in this respect to paragraphs 256 to 371 above from which it is apparent that the increases made by the Commission on account of the duration of the infringement are well founded. | |
| 554. In addition, still concerning the increase connected with the duration of the infringement, AWA claims that the Commission applied the increase of the fine in respect of the duration of the infringement, not, as was indicated at recital 415 of the decision, to the starting amount, but to a sum equivalent to double that amount. | |
| 555. It is true that recital 415 of the decision refers to the ‘starting amounts of the fines determined for gravity’ and adds between brackets a reference to recital 409, which contains the starting amounts of the fines established according to the gravity of the infringement before the increase for deterrence. | |
| 556. The Commission admits that it is a typing error and that it should have referred to recital 412, which refers to the amount including the increase for deterrence. | |
| 557. In any event, the final result is the same. It is true that, in order to be consistent with the rest of the decision, it would have been preferable to refer to the starting amount already increased for deterrence. However, the result would not have been different if the calculation had been made the other way round, that is to say by increasing by 35%, on account of the duration of the infringement, the starting amount of EUR 70 million, then doubling that amount for deterrence. The basic amount of AWA’s fine would still be that set out at recital 417. | |
| 558. The pleas relating to the duration of the infringement must therefore be rejected. | |
| F – The plea alleging breach of the principles of proportionality and of equal treatment and a factual error of assessment | |
| 559. The Commission increased the basic amount of AWA’s fine by 50% because of the aggravating factor constituted by the role of ringleader in the infringement (recital 424 of the decision). | |
| 560. It should be pointed out first of all that the taking into consideration of the role of ringleader is consistent with the case‑law and the Guidelines. | |
| 561. As is apparent from the case‑law, where an infringement has been committed by several undertakings, it is appropriate, when setting the amount of the fines, to consider the relative gravity of the participation of each of them ( Suiker Unie and Others v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 623), which implies in particular that the roles played by each of them in the infringement for the duration of their participation in it should be established (see Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 150, and Case T‑6/89 Enichem Anic v Commission [1991] ECR II‑1623, paragraph 264). It follows, in particular, that the role of ‘ringleader’ played by one or more undertakings in a cartel must be taken into account in setting the fine, in so far as undertakings which have played such a role must for that reason bear a special responsibility by comparison with other undertakings ( IAZ and Others v Commission , paragraph 121 above, paragraphs 57 and 58; Case C‑298/98 P Finnboard v Commission [2000] ECR I‑10157, paragraph 45; and Mayr-Melnhof v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 291). In accordance with those principles, Section 2 of the Guidelines sets out, under the heading of ‘aggravating circumstances’, a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which can give rise to an increase in the basic amount of the fine and includes in particular the ‘role of leader in or instigator of the infringement’ ( ADM v Commission , paragraph 436 above, paragraphs 238 to 240). | |
| 562. However, AWA claims that there is little or no evidence of its leadership in the infringement and that, in any event, an increase of 50% is disproportionate and contrary to the principle of equal treatment in relation to other undertakings which took on the role of leader in the infringement. | |
| 1. Factual error of assessment | |
| 563. According to recitals 418 and 419 of the decision, a body of evidence shows that AWA took on the role of leader in the infringement, including in particular the convening and conducting of certain meetings, its role of instigator of the restructuring of the cartel, the launching of price increases and the monitoring of the implementation of the cartel. | |
| 564. AWA responds point by point to each of those allegations: The fact that it took charge of the physical organisation of some meetings does not make it the leader of the cartel, especially since other undertakings booked rooms for general or local meetings of the cartel. Assuming, in the absence of more precise evidence, that its alleged role of instigator should be placed in the context of the position in the AEMCP held by Mr B. at the time, AWA asserts that that position cannot be evidence of leadership of any kind by it. The price increases which it allegedly initiated are uncorroborated by any evidence and are based on statements by Mougeot which are unreliable. AWA was not the only one to announce price increases and the fact that it was the first is explained by its position as market leader, a position which cannot be criticised and does not make it the leader in the infringement. AWA denies exerting pressure on any producer and asserts that there is no proof that it actually used its position as leader on the market, or at least that it threatened to do so, in order to secure compliance with the agreements. Even if Mougeot’s statements are accepted as true, they prove at the most that AWA sometimes used firm language towards other producers. | |
| 565. It must be stated that certain evidence is not in itself disputed by AWA but rather the Commission’s interpretation of that evidence. Thus, AWA does not dispute that it took charge of the physical organisation of some meetings, nor that Mr B. directed AEMCP at the time of its restructuring, nor even that it announced price increases and that it was the first to do so, nor finally that it asked for and was given authorisation to verify information concerning Sarrió’s sales volumes on the latter’s premises. | |
| 566. It is clear from recital 423 that it is that evidence as a whole which led the Commission to find that AWA played the role of ringleader: | |
| ‘A coherent set of evidence shows that AWA, which had an economic leadership in the carbonless paper market and was in a position to exercise pressure on its competitors due to the fact that it acquired or distributed large proportions of some small producers[’] output, had also a key role in monitoring and ensuring the compliance with the agreements.’ | |
| 567. In the SO, the Commission stated: | |
| ‘There is no doubt that AWA, which is the leading producer of carbonless paper in Europe, was the principal leader of the cartel throughout the EEA, except in Spain. The factual evidence on meetings … shows that numerous cartel meetings were convened and conducted by representatives of AWA. … There are also indications that the price increases agreed by at least two general cartel meetings and several national meetings originated from AWA, and that AWA demanded that the other participants make the same increases. AWA’s position as the cartel leader is further corroborated by documents which show that AWA was the first to announce the price increases to the market, and that other competitors followed those announcements. In the minutes of the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995 it is explicitly stated that AWA will lead the announcements of the price increases agreed at the meeting.’ | |
| 568. It must be stated, first, that even if, as AWA maintains, other undertakings were able to book rooms on specific occasions, convene certain meetings or announce price increases, there is no other undertaking in respect of which there is so much evidence pointing to a leadership role. In this respect, for example, whilst it is true that Koehler also presided over the AEMCP from January 1995, the role of M. F. (Koehler) cannot be compared to that of Mr B. (AWA) who changed the manner in which the cartel functioned. | |
| 569. It is apparent, second, that the cartel members did not put forward any evidence casting doubt on AWA’s leadership role. On the contrary, Mougeot’s statements referred to at recitals 95, 97, 104, 108, 120, 141, 143, 193, 194, 210, 234 and 246 of the decision, and in particular those referred to in paragraph 439 above, tend to corroborate AWA’s leadership role. | |
| 570. AWA disputes, however, the evidential value of Mougeot’s statements, which it claims were motivated by Mougeot’s interest in appearing as the victim of pressure from AWA and in being treated leniently by the Commission in exchange for such information. | |
| 571. In this respect, it must be stated that, even if there are certain differences between Mougeot’s and AWA’s accounts, Mougeot’s statements broadly coincide on numerous points, in particular on the structure and the history of the cartel, with those of AWA, which were also made with a view to benefiting from the provisions of the Leniency Notice (see, in particular, paragraphs 163 to 168 and 261 above). The credibility of Mougeot’s statements cannot therefore be called into question solely with regard to the leadership role played by AWA, especially since that ringleader role is corroborated by a body of consistent and convergent evidence. | |
| 572. Moreover, it must be stated that, in addition to Mougeot’s statements, that body of evidence includes documents found by the Commission at Sappi’s premises (recital 103 of the decision) and statements and communications by Sappi (see recital 181 and the reference, at recitals 228 and 233, to page 7 of the Commission’s file containing statements by Sappi). It cannot therefore be claimed that the Commission’s proposition is substantiated only by Mougeot’s statements. | |
| 573. Lastly, as regards the pressure put on other undertakings by AWA, the Commission states, in its defence, that it did not accuse AWA of having pushed other undertakings to participate in the cartel, even though some of them, such as Carrs and Torraspapel, claimed in their responses to the SO that they had acted under pressure from AWA. | |
| 574. It is true that at recital 425 of the decision, in the examination of the attenuating circumstances of an exclusively passive role, the Commission refers to the fact that ‘Carrs, Copigraph and Torraspapel claim that they played an exclusively passive role in the infringement and that they were forced to participate in the cartel due to the pressure exercised on them by the cartel leader AWA’ and that ‘Koehler also submits that threats by AWA were a factor pushing it to take part in the collusion’. However, they are arguments put forward by the parties in response to the SO in order to claim attenuating circumstances, arguments which the Commission then rejects at recitals 426 and 427 of the decision. | |
| 575. It must also be stated that the evidence put forward by the Commission at recitals 418 to 423 of the decision in order to establish AWA’s ringleader role makes no reference to such inducements or threats by it aimed at making the undertakings participate in the cartel. AWA cannot therefore claim that it was wrongly accused of such threats or that it did not have access to the statements of the undertakings referring to those threats. It follows from recitals 420 to 422 of the decision and from AWA’s pleadings that AWA addressed the complaint that it was the leader in every respect and exercised its rights of defence by disputing it. It cannot plead infringement of its rights of defence in this respect. | |
| 576. All the foregoing leads the Court to find that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in finding, on the basis of a set of consistent and convergent evidence, that AWA took on the role of ringleader in the infringement. | |
| 577. It must now be determined whether that role justified an increase of 50% in AWA’s fine. | |
| 2. Breach of the principle of proportionality | |
| 578. AWA argues that even if it was the leader in the infringement, this did not justify a 50% increase in the fine. In order to establish the disproportionate nature of that increase, it relies on the Commission’s previous decisions and compares its position with that of the other undertakings whose fines were increased in the same way. | |
| 579. However, the argument that an increase of 50% is higher than that generally applied in other Commission decisions is not capable of proving an infringement of the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, ADM v Commission , paragraph 436 above, paragraph 248). | |
| 580. In this respect, it is sufficient to recall that, according to settled case‑law, when determining the amount of each fine, the Commission has a discretion and is not required to apply any particular arithmetical formula (Case T‑150/89 Martinelli v Commission [1995] ECR II-1165, paragraph 59, and Mo och Domsjö v Commission , paragraph 67 above, paragraph 268, upheld, on appeal, in Case C‑283/98 P Mo och Domsjö v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9855, paragraph 47). | |
| 581. For the sake of completeness, and in response to the argument that the rate of 50% represents, in percentage terms, the highest increase ever imposed on account of a ringleader role and, in absolute terms, the second highest increase based on such a reason, it must be observed that that rate cannot be regarded as exceptional. | |
| 582. In its Decision 2002/271/EC of 18 July 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/36.490 − Graphite electrodes) (OJ 2002 L 100, p. 1), the Commission imposed on SGL Carbon AG an increase of 85% on account of aggravating circumstances. It is however true that the role of ringleader was not the only aggravating circumstance, since SGL Carbon was also accused of obstructing the Commission’s investigation and refusing to terminate the infringements. In the case of UCAR International Inc., the increase was 60% for its role as ringleader and instigator and for continuing the infringement after the investigations. In Commission Decision 1999/210/EC of 14 October 1998 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty Case IV/F-3/33.708 − British Sugar plc, Case IV/F-3/33.709 − Tate & Lyle plc, Case IV/F-3/33.710 − Napier Brown & Company Ltd, Case IV/F-3/33.711 − James Budgett Sugars Ltd (OJ 1999 L 76, p. 1) the increase was 75%. British Sugar plc was penalised for its role as instigator and for being the ‘driving force behind the infringement’, but also because it had infringed its Community competition law compliance commitments and had committed two infringements of the competition rules on the same market. | |
| 583. Furthermore, a rate of increase of 50% has been applied to other undertakings for their role as ringleader, for example to F. Hoffman-La Roche AG by Commission Decision 2003/2/EC of 21 November 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins) (OJ 2003 L 6, p. 1) and to Archer Daniels Midland and Ajinomoto by Commission Decision 2001/418/EC of 7 June 2000 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/36.545/F3 – Amino Acids) (OJ 2001 L 152, p. 24). | |
| 584. However, AWA submits that, according to the Commission’s previous decisions, the application of that rate of 50% requires an element of instigation or coercion. | |
| 585. As regards the element of instigation, it must be observed that, in Decision 2001/418, an increase of 50% was imposed on ADM whereas the instigator role was clearly attributed to Ajinomoto. That example therefore militates against AWA’s contention that an element of instigation is needed for a rate of 50% to be applied. | |
| 586. However, even accepting AWA’s contention that the application of a rate of increase of 50% requires an element of instigation, that element is present in this instance. AWA convened and conducted several cartel meetings, was the ‘instigator of the restructuring of the cartel’ (recital 418 of the decision), initiated several price increases and was often the first to announce the price increases on the market. The increase of 50% cannot therefore be considered to be disproportionate (see paragraphs 568 to 576 above). | |
| 587. For the sake of completeness, as regards the element of coercion, it must be observed that the Guidelines also refer, amongst the aggravating circumstances, to retaliatory measures against other undertakings with a view to enforcing practices which constitute an infringement. Those measures are therefore in themselves an aggravating circumstance different from that of the role of leader in or instigator of the infringement. | |
| 588. Furthermore, in this instance, according to recital 104 of the decision, Mougeot’s statements refer to threats, since ‘[Mr B.] said quite expressly that he would not tolerate any failure to follow this price increase and that he would “personally look after” anyone who did not “play the game”’. | |
| 589. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that AWA’s indisputable economic leadership on the carbonless paper market provided it with a certain coercive power. Mougeot’s statements referred to in paragraph 439 above support that view. | |
| 590. Accordingly, the increase of 50% in AWA’s fine on account of its ringleader role does not infringe the principle of proportionality. | |
| 3. Breach of the principle of equal treatment | |
| 591. In AWA’s submission, the increase of 50% in the fine on account of its ringleader role also infringes the principle of equal treatment in so far as several undertakings played an identical part in the cartel. Koehler organised several meetings. Torraspapel, Mougeot and MHTP played a leading part in the national agreements by taking responsibility for the practical organisation of meetings. The decision describes Torraspapel as the cartel leader in the Spanish market. The fact that those undertakings’ fines were not also increased therefore constitutes unjustified discrimination. | |
| 592. It must be observed that there is no set of consistent and convergent evidence in respect of those undertakings of the same nature and importance as that which points to AWA’s being the ringleader of the infringement concerned. The fact that one or other of those undertakings may have had a specific function in the cartel does not make it a ringleader. It is the combination of a number of factors, corroborated by the statements of several undertakings, which confers that quality on AWA (see paragraphs 568 to 576 above). | |
| 593. The Commission was therefore correct to increase AWA’s fine by 50% on account of aggravating circumstances. | |
| G – The pleas alleging infringement of Article 253 EC, of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and of the principles of proportionality and equal treatment, failure to determine the fines individually, excessively restrictive interpretation of the Guidelines on fines, and manifest errors of assessment, resulting from failure to take account of certain aggravating circumstances | |
| 1. Exclusively passive or ‘follow-my-leader role’ in the cartel | |
| 594. Several applicants (Bolloré, Zanders, Mougeot, Divipa and Zicuñaga) assert that they played only a passive, ‘follow‑my-leader’ or marginal role in the cartel. The Commission should therefore have reduced their fines on account of attenuating circumstances. | |
| 595. The Commission rejects their arguments on the ground that all the participants in the cartel were active members of it. | |
| 596. It must be recalled that where an infringement has been committed by several undertakings, the relative gravity of the participation of each of them must be examined ( Suiker Unie and Others v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 623, and Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 150) in order to determine whether there are any aggravating or attenuating circumstances relating to them. | |
| 597. Sections 2 and 3 of the Guidelines provide for adjustment of the basic amount of the fine by reference to certain aggravating and attenuating circumstances. In particular, in accordance with the first indent of Section 3 of the Guidelines, ‘an exclusively passive or follow‑my‑leader’ role in the infringement will, where it is established, constitute an attenuating circumstance. A passive role implies that the undertaking adopts a ‘low profile’, that is to say does not actively participate in the creation of any anti-competitive agreements (Case T‑220/00 Cheil Jedang v Commission [2003] ECR II‑2473, paragraphs 165 to 167). | |
| 598. Furthermore, the applicants cannot submit that the fact they were not one of the cartel ringleaders should have led to a reduction in the amount of their fines. By claiming that they did not play an active role, they are asserting only that there are no aggravating circumstances (see, to that effect, Lögstör Rör v Commission , paragraph 93 above, paragraph 322, and Case T‑21/99 Dansk Rørindustri v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1681, paragraph 230). | |
| 599. According to Bolloré, the Commission inferred from Copigraph’s regular participation in the cartel meetings and the price increase initiatives that it had not played an exclusively passive role. However, in Bolloré’s opinion, regular participation in the meetings and the price increase measures does not preclude the undertaking concerned from playing only a follow-my-leader role in the cartel. The Commission is required to verify in concrete terms the degree of participation by the undertaking concerned in the cartel, from a quantitative and qualitative point of view. Bolloré was the least assiduous member of AEMCP at the meetings. | |
| 600. It must be stated in this regard that Copigraph’s attendance rate, as Bolloré recognised in its application, namely 15 out of 21 AEMCP meetings, 8 out of 11 of the meetings held between 14 September 1993 and September 1995 and 3 out of 4 of the general meetings, not to mention its attendance at the national meetings on the French market and at 4 of the 6 meetings relating to the Spanish market, is not negligeable. It does not in any case establish that its participation in cartel meetings is significantly more sporadic than that of the ordinary members of the cartel for the purposes of BPB de Eendracht v Commission , paragraph 501 above, paragraph 343. Its participation in those meetings and in those price increase initiatives, together with the admission of its participation in the cartel, do not therefore show an exclusively passive or follow‑my‑leader role. | |
| 601. However, Bolloré appears to assert that where an undertaking pleads that it played a passive role, the Commission should recognise attenuating circumstances for it and reduce the amount of its fine, except where the Commission demonstrates that the undertaking actually had an active role. That argument cannot succeed. | |
| 602. The Guidelines do not state that the Commission must always take account of each of the individual attenuating circumstances set out at Section 3. Although the circumstances in the list at Section 3 of the Guidelines are certainly among those which may be taken into account by the Commission in a specific case, it is not required to grant a further reduction as a matter of course when an undertaking puts forward evidence of the existence of one of those circumstances. Whether it is appropriate to grant a reduction of the fine on grounds of attenuating circumstances must be determined on the basis of a global assessment which takes account of all the relevant circumstances. In the absence of a mandatory indication in the Guidelines of the attenuating circumstances which may be taken into account, it must be held that the Commission retained a certain discretion when making a global assessment of the size of any reduction in the fines to reflect attenuating circumstances. | |
| 603. In any event, the Guidelines cite as an example of attenuating circumstances an ‘exclusively’ passive or follow‑my‑leader role in implementing the infringement. Participation in the majority of the collusive meetings is already sufficiently active not to be classified as ‘exclusively’ passive or follow‑my‑leader. | |
| 604. Mougeot claims that its fine is disproportionate in the light of its level of responsibility in the cartel. However its arguments do not establish that it played an exclusively passive or follow‑my‑leader role, and it does not claim that it did so. Nor can the fact that it did not play a leadership role result in a reduction in the fine, for the reason stated at paragraph 598 above. | |
| 605. Divipa submits that the Commission did not take account of its exclusively passive and subordinate role in the cartel. It asserts that it did not participate in any meetings of, or decisions taken by, the carbonless paper producers and, as a simple distributor, maintained with those producers only relations of a purely vertical nature. However, the Court has held that it was necessary to reject Divipa’s plea disputing its participation in the infringement (see paragraphs 155 to 221 above). Since its participation in collusive meetings on the Spanish market has been established, its role cannot be classified as exclusively passive. The question whether or not it participated in those meetings as a distributor cannot change that finding. | |
| 606. Zicuñaga cites its exclusively passive or follow‑my‑leader role in the cartel as one of the attenuating circumstances which the Commission should have taken into account when calculating its fine. In support of that claim, it relies only on Commission decisions in which the Commission treated ringleaders differently from ordinary members. | |
| 607. However, since the Commission has established Zicuñaga’s participation in collusive meetings concerning the Spanish market (see paragraphs 155 to 243 above), Zicuñaga is not justified in seeking a reduction in its fine by arguing merely that it played an exclusively passive or follow‑my‑leader role without adducing evidence capable of proving that. | |
| 608. Zanders does not dispute that it was a member of the cartel for the period between January 1992 and September 1995, which indeed enabled it to obtain a reduction in its fine under the Leniency Notice, but denies playing the active or even key role of which the Commission accuses it. It disputes that it was present at certain meetings and adds that the direct proof available to the Commission establishes that it did not participate in important aspects of the cartel or, at least, that it participated to a lesser extent than other undertakings by confining itself to a follow‑my‑leader role. Zanders denies in particular that it participated in unofficial AEMCP meetings following the restructuring of that organisation in autumn 1993. | |
| 609. The fact that Zanders’ participation in certain meetings cannot be established and that it was more active in the collusive agreements at the national level than at the European level does not prove that it had an exclusively passive or follow-my-leader role. Zanders itself states that it does not deny in principle that collusion took place with it after certain meetings at which it was not present. Moreover, despite its decision no longer to participate in unofficial AEMCP meetings after the restructuring of AEMCP, Zanders admitted at the hearing that it had not informed the other members that it was distancing itself from, or no longer participating in, the cartel. It therefore continued to be perceived as a fully‑fledged member by the other participants and to be informed of the results of the collusive meetings. Lastly, it is apparent from Zanders’ statements at the hearing that it applied the decisions taken at the meetings at which it was not represented, except in a few cases where it did not adhere to them. Those elements therefore cast doubt on the argument that Zanders adopted an exclusively passive approach. | |
| 610. Zanders seems above all to be seeking to establish that it did not play a ‘key role’. However, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 598 above, by that claim, it asserts only that there are no aggravating circumstances. | |
| 611. As regards the alleged discrimination against Zanders in relation to other undertakings which in its view were considerably more active in the cartel, the assessment of an exclusively passive or follow-my-leader role in the cartel must be carried out in respect of each undertaking individually. The fact that other undertakings may have been more active does not automatically mean that Zanders had an exclusively passive or follow-my-leader role. Only total passivity on its part could be taken into account as a factor, but this has not been established. | |
| 612. In conclusion, the Commission is right to maintain that all the undertakings participating in the cartel were active members of it in so far as they participated in meetings during which they exchanged information and agreed on price increases which were then announced to customers. Whilst it is true that they were not necessarily all as active in every aspect of the infringement and on the whole of the market, none played, strictly speaking, an exclusively passive or follow-my-leader role. The Commission therefore correctly applied the Guidelines which do not provide for gradations between the role of leader and an exclusively passive or follow-my-leader role. | |
| 2. Size and influence on the market of the offending undertaking | |
| 613. Divipa submits that it should not have been classed in the same category as Carrs and Zicuñaga because it is a small-scale family business which carries out its conversion and distribution activities only at a local level. The infringement which it was found to have committed had no restrictive effect on competition. | |
| 614. The Commission maintains that it took account of Divipa’s limited influence by placing it in the fifth category. Since all the undertakings which were members of the cartel infringed the competition rules, Divipa’s argument cannot lead to its being placed in a category lower than that of Carrs and Zicuñaga. | |
| 615. In this respect, it must be stated, first, that Divipa’s small size was duly taken into account, since it was placed in the last category with a fine whose starting amount was set at EUR 1.4 million, whilst, for an infringement categorised as very serious, that amount could have been over EUR 20 million. Second, the Court has already held that the fact that the applicant is a medium-sized family undertaking does not constitute a mitigating circumstance ( LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 338). | |
| 616. As regards the argument that the infringement which Divipa was found to have committed had no restrictive effect on competition, the assessment of the effects of the cartel cannot be limited only to the market on which Divipa claims to operate, when the cartel covered the whole of the common market and then the EEA. Trade between Member States has therefore been affected, so that Article 81 EC is applicable. If that argument should be interpreted as claiming that the infringement it was found to have committed had no actual impact on competition, reference is made to paragraphs 445 to 459 above. | |
| 617. There was therefore no reason to grant Divipa the benefit of an attenuating circumstance on account of its size and limited influence. | |
| 3. Conduct on the market during the infringement period | |
| 618. Divipa claims that it never applied the agreements allegedly concluded at the meetings in which it did not participate. Its commercial conduct was the opposite of the content of those agreements. The impact of its conduct on the market was therefore minimal, or even non‑existent. | |
| 619. Torraspapel claims that the Commission failed to take account of the fact that it did not comply with the price agreements notwithstanding the pressure brought to bear on it. The development of its pricing policy does not correspond to the alleged price agreements. Its pricing behaviour regularly hindered the anti‑competitive effects of the cartel, which is sufficient for a finding by the Commission that it should have the benefit of an attenuating circumstance. | |
| 620. Zicuñaga claims that, by reason of the Guidelines and the Commission’s practice, account must be taken, as an attenuating circumstance, of the fact that the prohibited agreement was not applied or was applied only in part. | |
| 621. The Commission asserts that it is not required to take non‑compliance with an illicit agreement into account as an attenuating circumstance. It relies in this respect, in particular, on Case T-327/94 SCA Holding v Commission , paragraph 468 above, paragraph 142. | |
| 622. As already noted, where an infringement has been committed by several undertakings, the relative gravity of the participation of each of them must be examined ( Suiker Unie and Others v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 623, and Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 150) in order to determine whether there are any aggravating or attenuating circumstances relating to them. | |
| 623. Section 3 of the Guidelines entitled ‘Attenuating circumstances’ sets out a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which may lead to a reduction in the basic amount of a fine, one of which is the non-implementation in practice of the agreements (Section 3, second indent). | |
| 624. It should be noted that the Guidelines do not list the attenuating circumstances that the Commission must take into account. Consequently, the Commission retains a certain discretion when making a global assessment of the size of any reduction in the fines to reflect attenuating circumstances. | |
| 625. It is necessary to check, in that connection, whether the circumstances relied on by the applicants are capable of showing that during the period in which they were parties to the infringing agreements they actually avoided applying them by adopting competitive conduct in the market ( ADM v Commission , paragraph 436 above, paragraph 268; see also, to that effect, Cement , paragraph 49 above, paragraphs 4872 to 4874). | |
| 626. In the present case, the evidence adduced by the applicants does not demonstrate that they actually avoided applying the infringing agreements in question by adopting competitive conduct in the market. | |
| 627. As regards Torraspapel, whilst it is true that it can be inferred from recitals 157, 166 and 216 of the decision that that undertaking did not always follow the price increases agreed or followed them late, numerous other factors (see, in particular, recitals 204, 206, 215, 225 to 227, 236 to 238 of the decision) show that, to a large extent, it implemented those agreements. It is apparent, for example, from recitals 204 and 206 that AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora and Torraspapel announced, during the period January to May 1994, price increases identical to those agreed at the general meeting of 19 January 1994. Similarly, for September and October 1994 AWA, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and Zanders announced price increases identical to those agreed at the meeting of 21 June 1994 (recital 215). As regards the period from December 1994 to February 1995, the Commission states at recital 225 that it discovered that all the participants at the general cartel meeting of 22 September 1994 − AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and Zanders − announced price increases identical to those agreed at that meeting. Lastly, in a document dated 16 February 1995 received from Sappi and cited at recital 238, it is stated that ‘the increase of 6% [reels] on 1.3.1995 is announced by the markets leaders Sarrio/Stora/AWA’. It is also apparent from the documents submitted by the Commission that Torraspapel sometimes concluded separate agreements for certain large customers by postponing the agreed price increase. In the figures which it submitted in support of its argument that the agreed price increases were not applied, the applicant compares the average monthly prices without explaining those delays or the rescheduling in implementation. | |
| 628. As for Divipa, its claim that it is a simple distributor which is not in competition with the other undertakings involved is unfounded. Even if it bought large reels from manufacturers, it itself manufactured sheets and small reels which it supplied, like the other undertakings involved, to third parties. On the Spanish and Portuguese markets, certain manufacturers distributed their products themselves and others operated through independent distributors (recital 153 of the decision). The integrated producers controlled the whole process and imposed their prices on the printers, whilst the producers which were not vertically integrated had to negotiate sale prices with the distributors. It was necessary in that case to set two levels of price: that which the producer asked the distributor to pay and that which the distributor required third parties to pay. The note on the meeting of 19 October 1993 in Barcelona (document No 4474, referred to at recital 192 and in paragraph 172 above) shows that the cartel also covered that latter price. By participating in the cartel, Divipa was therefore able to influence its profit margin. | |
| 629. Furthermore, the Commission established that Divipa had participated in collusive meetings on the Spanish market during which price increases were agreed. Divipa claims however that it did not apply those agreements. In the present case, the evidence adduced by the applicant does not however demonstrate that it did not apply the agreements in question by adopting conduct on the market which was liable to impede the anti-competitive effects of the infringement found to have occurred. The tables provided by Divipa annexed to its application show, for example, that in 1994 its margins and sales prices increased considerably notwithstanding structural overcapacities and a market in decline. In addition, the mere fact that it may not have complied fully with the agreements entered into – if established – is not sufficient to oblige the Commission to make a finding of attenuating circumstances in its favour. The applicant could, through its more or less independent policy on the market, simply be trying to exploit the cartel for its own benefit (Case T-327/94 SCA Holding v Commission , paragraph 468 above, paragraph 142, and Cascades v Commission , paragraph 451 above, paragraph 230). | |
| 630. The same considerations as those set out in the preceding paragraph in the case of Divipa apply to Zicuñaga. The Commission established that Zicuñaga participated in the collusive meetings on the Spanish market during which price increases were agreed. Whilst it is true that Zicuñaga puts forward as an attenuating circumstance the fact that those agreements were not implemented, it fails to establish as much. In its argument on the attenuating circumstances, it merely refers to several Commission decisions, most of which precede the application of the Guidelines. It relies on the fact that, in those decisions, the Commission took account, when assessing the gravity of the infringement, of whether the agreements in question had or had not been implemented. However, in order to assess any attenuating circumstances, the Commission must, in accordance with the principle that penalties and sanctions are specific to the individual undertaking, examine the relative seriousness of the undertaking’s participation in the infringement ( ADM v Commission , paragraph 436 above, paragraph 265). | |
| 631. In any event, the information provided by Zicuñaga in other parts of its application which do not relate to the issue of attenuating circumstances confirms that Zicuñaga’s and Divipa’s prices moved in parallel. It is apparent, moreover, also from the application that Zicuñaga’s prices rose from ESP 174.99 in November 1993 to ESP 210.99 in December 1994. The fact that the prices charged by Zicuñaga do not tally exactly with those agreed at the various collusive meetings cannot in itself prove that Zicuñaga did not implement the agreements in question. | |
| 632. In this respect, it must be pointed out that the Commission states, at recital 397 of the decision, that ‘[t]he evidence on the meetings and price increases … shows that occasionally the agreed increases were postponed to later dates, somewhat smaller increases were implemented … or further meetings were arranged to revise the agreement’. The Commission infers from this that the cartel had ‘an impact on the pricing policies of the cartel members even if the implemented increases occasionally fell short of the agreed levels or they were implemented later’. | |
| 633. The Commission did not therefore contend that all the price increases agreed had been implemented according to the amount set at the meeting in question. The fact that the exact amount of the increase agreed during a specific meeting was not applied cannot prove that the cartel did not have an impact on the pricing policies of the members of the cartel of which Zicuñaga was a part. It cannot moreover be excluded that, by charging prices which did not tally with those which were supposed to flow from the implementation of the agreements whilst continuing to participate in the collusive meetings on the Spanish market, Zicuñaga sought to obtain from the other members of the cartel permission to sell at prices lower than those referred to by the general decision (see, to that effect, LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 342, upheld, on appeal, by Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-200/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 409 above). Mougeot’s handwritten note of 21 October 1994, referred to in paragraph 177 above, attests in any case to the fact that Zicuñaga obtained that permission, which may amount to another means of exploiting the cartel. | |
| 634. In those circumstances, the Court considers itself to be sufficiently informed by the evidence adduced in the decision and the information supplied by Zicuñaga to confirm, without requesting further information from the Commission, that Zicuñaga should not benefit from an attenuating circumstance on the basis that the agreements or unlawful practices were not in fact implemented. | |
| 635. The Commission was therefore right to decide not to find attenuating circumstances in favour of the applicants on the basis that the agreements or infringing practices were not implemented in practice. | |
| 4. Existence of threats and pressure | |
| 636. Several applicants (Koehler, Bolloré for Copigraph and Torraspapel) claim that the Commission did not take account of the threats and pressure brought to bear on them, essentially by AWA. | |
| 637. Whilst it is true that, at recitals 104, 106 and 425 of the decision, the Commission refers to the threats by AWA, it states, at recital 427: | |
| ‘[T]he threats (in this case from the cartel leader) cannot justify infringements of the Community and EEA competition rules. Instead of joining the cartel, the companies should have informed the competent authorities, including the Commission, of the illegal behaviour of their competitors in order to put an end to it.’ | |
| 638. It must be pointed out that the existence of threats and pressure is not one of the attenuating circumstances listed, albeit non‑exhaustively, in the Guidelines. | |
| 639. That pressure, whatever its extent, cannot amount to an attenuating circumstance. The existence of such pressure does nothing to alter the reality and the gravity of the infringement (Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-200/02 P, C-205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 409 above, paragraph 370). The applicants could have reported the pressure to the competent authorities and lodged a complaint with the Commission under Article 3 of Regulation No 17 rather than participate in the cartel (see, to that effect, LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 339). That is true of all the undertakings concerned in the present case, and there is no need to distinguish between them by reference to the alleged intensity of the purported pressure. | |
| 640. The Commission was not therefore required to take the threats alleged by certain applicants into account as an attenuating circumstance. | |
| 5. Termination of the infringement | |
| 641. Bolloré, MHTP and Zanders claim that the Commission did not take account, as an attenuating circumstance in their case, of termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission intervened. For its part, Zicuñaga claims that in several earlier Commission decisions the Commission reduced the amount of the fine on the ground that the infringement had ceased before the adoption of the final decision. | |
| 642. The Commission responds to MHTP, at recital 429 of the decision, by stating that it took into account for the assessment of the infringement only the limited period of time for which it considered it had sufficient evidence. It adds that since this is an obvious infringement, the claim of MHTP to have early termination considered as an attenuating circumstance must be rejected. | |
| 643. It must be stated that termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes is one of a number of attenuating circumstances expressly set out in Section 3 of the Guidelines. | |
| 644. None the less, it must be stated that the Commission cannot be required, as a general rule, either to regard a continuation of the infringement as an aggravating circumstance or to regard the termination of an infringement as a mitigating circumstance ( ABB v Commission , paragraph 478 above, paragraph 213). | |
| 645. It is apparent in the present case that the time at which the applicants concerned are alleged to have terminated the infringement, namely September 1995 at the latest, is before the first intervention or investigations by the Commission, which were in January 1997. | |
| 646. In this case, the application of a reduction would duplicate the taking into account of the duration of the infringements, which, in accordance with the Guidelines, is applied in calculating the fine. Duration is taken into account for the specific purpose of imposing a heavier penalty on undertakings which infringe the competition rules over a prolonged period than on those whose infringements are of short duration. Thus, a reduction in the amount of a fine on the ground that an undertaking terminated its unlawful conduct before the Commission first intervened would have the effect of benefiting for a second time those responsible for infringements of short duration. | |
| 647. However, it is apparent from recital 348 of the decision that the Commission was unable to establish the date on which the cartel ceased. It found that the infringement ended in September 1995 because it had a body of documentary evidence until that time. The Commission does not however exclude that the collusion continued after that time. Events after September 1995 were nevertheless not taken into account in the calculation of the amount of the fines in question, so that any request for a reduction of the fines on this ground must be rejected. | |
| 648. For the sake of completeness, if it were necessary to consider the parties’ arguments seeking a reduction of the fine because the infringement finished before the Commission intervened, the outcome would be no different. | |
| 649. In order to substantiate its request for a reduction in its fine because the infringement finished before the Commission intervened, Zicuñaga merely cites Commission decisions to that effect. | |
| 650. It should be pointed out that, according to settled case‑law, the Commission is not bound by its previous decisions. This is a fortiori the case here since the decisions relied on all precede the application of the Guidelines. Moreover Zicuñaga has not put forward any evidence specific to its situation which would justify a reduction in its fine on account of the early termination of the infringement. The fact that the duration of the infringement alleged against it is shorter than that attributed to the other undertakings has already been taken into account in so far as the increase applied to it for duration is lower than that of the other undertakings. | |
| 651. Nor do Bolloré and MHTP adduce evidence such as to establish that, in relation to the termination of the infringement, they are in a particular situation which would justify a reduction of their fines. | |
| 652. Zanders, on the other hand, relies not only on the termination of the infringement but also on the active role it played in this respect. It puts forward several matters. At a meeting in autumn 1995 with the relevant executives of the undertaking its board insisted that the rules of competition law be strictly observed. That meeting marked the start of an important compliance programme as part of which the employees of the undertaking received training in competition law. In spring 1996, the chairman of the board of International Paper sent a letter (Annex 8 to the application) to all the employees of the company calling on them to abide by the competition rules, a letter to which guidelines on how to comply with European Compeition law were attached. In addition, in relation to the outside world, the chairman of the board of Zanders, who became chairman of the AEMCP on 1 January 1996, indicated to competitors in this connection, without the slightest possibility of misunderstanding, that Zanders had ‘turned its back’ on the cartel. The number of AEMCP meetings dropped in 1996 and Zanders was no longer represented at the secret meetings. | |
| 653. However, although it was important that the applicant took measures to prevent future infringements of Community competition law by its personnel, that fact did not alter the reality of the infringement found in the present case. That fact did not in itself mean that the Commission was obliged to reduce the applicant’s fine on account of an attenuating circumstance (Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 409 above, paragraph 373, upholding, on appeal, LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 345). That conclusion is all the more applicable in the present case because the Commission did not take into account, in its calculation of the fine, the period during which Zanders claims to have taken measures to terminate the infringement. | |
| 654. Moreover, again for the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that the active role that Zanders played in the termination of the infringement, in particular in its capacity as chair of the AEMCP, seems difficult to reconcile with the exclusively passive or follow-my-leader role which it claims to have had in the infringement. | |
| 655. Lastly, and in any event, in respect of all the undertakings relying on that plea, the Commission is under no obligation, in the exercise of its discretion, to reduce a fine for the termination of a manifest infringement, whether that termination occured before or after its investigation. | |
| 656. In the present case, since the fixing of prices in the carbonless paper sector was unquestionably a manifest infringement, correctly described by the Commission as ‘very serious’ (see paragraphs 434 to 442 above), the applicants are wrong to criticise the Commission for not reducing their fines because they terminated their involvement in that infringement before the investigation began. | |
| 6. Economic situation of the carbonless paper sector | |
| 657. A number of applicants (Bolloré, Zanders, Mougeot, AWA supported by the Kingdom of Belgium, Koehler) complain that the Commission did not, in contrast to its previous established practice, take account of the crisis which the carbonless paper sector was going through at the material time. | |
| 658. At Section 5, entitled ‘General comments’, the Guidelines provide that, depending on the circumstances, account should be taken of ‘certain objective factors such as a specific economic context’. | |
| 659. It is apparent from recitals 24, 25 and 392 of the decision that the carbonless paper market was characterised by structural over-capacity and reduced demand on account of the use of electronic media. Several undertakings claimed to have suffered significant losses during the period in question. | |
| 660. The Commission itself accepts, at recital 392 of the decision, that, during the period covered by the decision, ‘the carbonless paper market was declining’. It finds, however, at recital 431, that the information received in the replies to the SO and the Mikulski Hall Associates report (‘the MHA report’) commissioned by the AEMCP does not support the conclusion that during the infringement period, 1992 to 1995 the carbonless paper sector was in a serious crisis comparable to the sectors concerned in the previous cartel cases mentioned by the undertakings. | |
| 661. The Commission maintains that cartels often originate at times of economic crisis, so that the possibility of taking into account the economic difficulties of the sector concerned can be envisaged only in entirely exceptional circumstances. However, the infringement period cannot be described as a particularly serious period of crisis. Notwithstanding the start of a period of decline, sales were maintained at a high level. | |
| 662. The Commission contends that the issue of the existence and of the possible extent of a crisis in the sector concerned involves the assessment by it of complex economic data. Review of that assessment by the Community judicature is limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers. | |
| 663. With respect to the situation of the carbonless paper sector, it is sufficient to note that in Lögstör Rör v Commission , paragraph 93 above, paragraphs 319 and 320, the Court of First Instance held that the Commission was not required to regard the poor financial state of the sector in question as an attenuating circumstance. The Court of First Instance has also stated that just because in earlier cases the Commission had taken the economic sector into account as an attenuating circumstance it did not necessarily have to continue to observe that practice (Case T-13/89 ICI v Commission , paragraph 56 above, paragraph 372). As the Commission properly observed, as a general rule cartels come into being when a sector encounters problems. If the applicants’ reasoning were to be followed, the fine would have to be reduced as a matter of course in virtually all cases. It is therefore unnecessary to investigate further whether the facts of this case and those forming the background to other decisions in which structural crises were regarded as attenuating circumstances were in fact comparable ( Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission , paragraph 496 above, paragraph 345). | |
| 664. For the sake of completeness, it must be stated that the Commission took account of the situation of the carbonless paper sector and that the applicants have not showed that the analysis of the market situation carried out by the Commission was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the case‑law of the Court of Justice (Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 34, and Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, paragraph 62) according to which, although as a general rule the Community judicature undertakes a comprehensive review of the question whether or not the conditions for the application of Article 81(1) EC are met, its review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers (Case C‑7/95 P John Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I‑3111, paragraph 34). | |
| 665. Furthermore, again for the sake of completeness, it is apparent from the MHA report (recitals 25 to 28 of the decision) that, although the growth in demand slowed from 1990/1991, the real decrease occured during 1995, that is to say towards the end of the infringement established in the decision. The parties have adduced no evidence such as to cast doubt on that data. However, that data suggests that, whilst it is true that the market was in decline, the start of the crisis coincided with the end of the infringement. | |
| 666. The Commission was therefore right to find that the situation of the carbonless paper sector did not constitute an attenuating circumstance. | |
| 7. Absence of profit from the infringement and the offender’s financial situation | |
| 667. Several applicants assert that, throughout the infringement, they made minimal profits and even suffered losses. | |
| 668. Mougeot and Bolloré refer to their losses in a plea alleging that no account was taken of the difficult economic context. Reference should therefore be made in this respect to paragraphs 657 to 666 above. | |
| 669. For Koehler, the collorary of the taking into account of the profits derived from the cartel is the taking account of the losses suffered. It follows, in its submission, that, for reasons of equity, the Commission should have reduced its fine, since it suffered considerable losses during practically the whole of the infringement and therefore derived a very limited profit, if any, from its participation in the cartel. | |
| 670. That plea cannot be upheld. | |
| 671. The Court held in the Cement judgment, paragraph 49 above, paragraph 4881, that the fact that an undertaking has derived no profit from the infringement cannot prevent it from being fined, as otherwise the fine would lose its deterrent effect. It follows that the Commission is not required, for the purpose of setting fines, to establish that the infringement secured an improper advantage for the undertakings concerned, or to take into consideration, where applicable, the fact that no profit was derived from the infringement in question. | |
| 672. It should be added that, as the Commission correctly maintains, the fact that the figures advanced by the applicant indicate losses in the carbonless paper sector during the infringement period does not however exclude that its position would have been worse in the absence of the cartel and that, despite everything, it derived a certain profit from it. According to the figures provided by Koehler in its application, its losses were considerable in 1992 but decreased significantly in 1993. The applicant subsequently made a profit in 1994 then suffered losses again in 1995, but less than in 1993. It cannot therefore be ruled out that the cartel enabled Koehler to limit its losses. | |
| 673. It follows that the Commission did not err in finding that there were no attenuating circumstances in the present case. | |
| H – The pleas alleging breach of the principles of protection of legitimate expectations, of proportionality and of equal treatment in the application of the Leniency Notice, and misapplication of that notice | |
| 674. Several applicants (Zicuñaga, MHTP, Mougeot, AWA and Koehler) criticise the Commission’s application of the Leniency Notice, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment. | |
| 1. Zicuñaga | |
| 675. Zicuñaga asserts that the use of that system of reducing or annulling the fine on the basis of collaboration with the Commission constitutes an infringement of the principle of equal treatment which requires equal punishment for the same conduct. | |
| 676. It should be observed, first, that although Zicuñaga seeks by that to dispute the lawfulness of the Leniency Notice, it did not plead that that notice was inapplicable on the basis of Article 241 EC. | |
| 677. It must be stated next that a reduction in the fine for cooperation during the administrative procedure is justified only if the conduct of the undertaking concerned enabled the Commission to establish the infringement more easily and, where relevant, to bring it to an end (Case C-297/98 P SCA Holding v Commission , paragraph 149 above, paragraph 36). It follows that there can be no discrimination as between an undertaking which chooses freely to cooperate and one which refuses to do so, since the conduct of the first one is different from that of the second, thus justifying the different punishment. | |
| 678. It should be pointed out in this respect that the cooperation route was also open to Zicuñaga (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 409 above, paragraph 419). However, it did not make use of it. It cannot therefore plead that it was discriminated against in this respect. | |
| 679. The plea put forward by Zicuñaga in this respect must therefore be rejected. | |
| 2. MHTP | |
| 680. MHTP claims that the Commission infringed the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and of equal treatment by reducing its fine by only 10% although it had admitted the facts and the infringement. It states that at the time when it cooperated with the Commission, decisions applying the Leniency Notice granted a reduction of the fine of at least 20%, the reduction of 10% being reserved to undertakings which did not admit the infringement. It could therefore legitimately expect to enjoy a 20% reduction, since it had waived the exercise of the rights of the defence and had admitted its participation in the infringement before the SO was sent. | |
| 681. It should be observed that MHTP’s case falls within Section D of the Leniency Notice, according to which ‘[w]here an [undertaking] cooperates without having met all the conditions set out in Sections B or C, it will benefit from a reduction of 10% to 50% of the fine that would have been imposed if it had not cooperated’. That notice states: | |
| ‘Such cases may include the following: | |
| – before a statement of objections is sent, an [undertaking] provides the Commission with information, documents or other evidence which materially contribute to establishing the existence of the infringement; | |
| – after receiving a statement of objections, an [undertaking] informs the Commission that it does not substantially contest the facts on which the Commission bases its allegations.’ | |
| 682. In the present case, the Commission granted MHTP, under the second paragraph of Section D of the Leniency Notice, a 10% reduction for not substantially contesting the facts (recital 458 of the decision). The Commission did not grant it a reduction under the second paragraph of Section D of that notice. Although the Commission accepts, at recital 446 of the decision, that MHTP sent it the information before the SO, it states at recital 450: | |
| ‘MHTP (Stora)’s reply was the most obscure; it admitted discussions between competitors on prices, but claimed that no agreement on increases was reached. This vague and unsubstantiated indication cannot be qualified as information or documents that contributed to establishing the existence of the infringement and therefore does not justify any reduction on fine.’ | |
| 683. It must be pointed out that MHTP has not put forward any evidence such as to establish that the information which it had provided to the Commission before the SO materially contributed to establishing the existence of the infringement. | |
| 684. As regards a comparison between the present case and the Commission’s previous practice, the mere fact that the Commission has in its previous decisions granted a certain rate of reduction for specific conduct does not imply that it is required to grant the same proportionate reduction when assessing similar conduct in a subsequent administrative procedure Mayr-Melnhof v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 368, and ABB v Commission , paragraph 478 above, paragraph 239). | |
| 685. In ABB v Commission , the Court of First Instance adopts that statement of the law in finding that there was no breach of the principle of equal treatment in relation to previous decisions of the Commission and does not examine those decisions. The detailed examination, at paragraphs 240 to 245 of that judgment, of the observance of the principle of equal treatment, relates only to the comparison of the situation of the various participants in the cartel. | |
| 686. MHTP cites the judgment in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraph 459 above (paragraph 1232), in order to argue that the Court of First Instance has already examined applications based on unequal treatment in relation to other cases. Whilst it is true that that judgment deals with that question, it does so in order to reject the argument alleging that the Commission infringed the principle of equal treatment in relation to its previous practice. According to the Court, the amount of the fines depends on a variety of criteria, which must be assessed on a case‑by‑case basis with reference to the circumstances of the case, and the fact that the Commission imposed fines in the past of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of competition policy. That judgment does not therefore support MHTP’s claims. | |
| 687. In any event, it must be stated that the range provided for by Section D of the Leniency Notice extends from 10 to 50% and does not set particular criteria for adjusting the reduction within that range. It does not therefore give rise to any legitimate expectation of a specific percentage reduction. | |
| 688. All those considerations lead the Court to reject that plea. | |
| 3. Mougeot | |
| 689. It should be recalled at the outset that it is settled case‑law that in appraising the cooperation shown by the cartel members the Commission is not entitled to disregard the principle of equal treatment (see Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission , paragraph 496 above, paragraph 394, and the case-law cited). The Commission nevertheless has a wide discretion in assessing the quality and usefulness of the cooperation provided by the various members of a cartel, and only a manifest abuse of that discretion can be censured. | |
| 690. Mougeot claims that it was discriminated against in relation to Sappi, which obtained a reduction of 100% in the fine, and that the Commission should have granted it the benefit of Section D of the Leniency Notice and thus a reduction of 75%. | |
| 691. It must be found, as is apparent from recitals 436 to 445 of the decision, that Sappi, which reported the cartel, was the only undertaking to fulfil the cumulative conditions of Section B of the Leniency Notice. Since it adduced evidence of the existence of the cartel only after the Commission undertook investigations ordered by decision, Mougeot could not rely on the provisions of Section B. In order to fall within the provisions of Section C, Mougeot had to fulfil the conditions set out in Section B(b) to (e). Mougeot itself recognises, in its application, that it was not the first undertaking to send to the Commission evidence relating to the cartel. Moreover, unlike Sappi which informed the Commission of the cartel in autumn 1996 on its own initiative, Mougeot cooperated only in response to the request for information which the Commission had sent to it in March 1999. | |
| 692. In this respect, it is clear from the express wording of Section B(b) of the Leniency Notice that the ‘first’ undertaking does not have to have provided all the evidence demonstrating every detail of the operation of the cartel, provided that it adduces ‘some’ decisive evidence. In particular, that section does not require that the evidence adduced is sufficient in itself in order to draw up the statement of objections or for the adoption of a final decision establishing the existence of an infringement. Consequently, the mere fact that Mougeot was later able to provide evidence which appeared to be decisive in enabling the Commission to prove the infringement cannot detract from the fact that Sappi was the first undertaking to have reported the cartel and cannot result in the application to Mougeot of a provision reserved for that first undertaking, which reported the cartel prior to the Commission’s investigations. | |
| 693. The Commission was therefore right to apply to Mougeot Section D of the Leniency Notice. By granting it a reduction of 50% on that basis, that is to say the maximum reduction provided for, the Commission took proper account of the significance of the evidence that Mougeot had sent and of its cooperation at the on‑the‑spot checks and during the investigation. | |
| 4. AWA | |
| 694. AWA submits, for its part, that it ought to have received a reduction as large as Mougeot’s because it contacted the Commission before Mougeot and the evidence which it gave the Commission was more helpful than that provided by Mougeot. | |
| 695. It must therefore be ascertained, in the light of the case‑law cited in paragraph 689 above, whether, by granting a reduction of 35% to AWA as opposed to 50% to Mougeot, the Commission manifestly exceeded its wide discretion in this area. | |
| 696. As regards the chronology of the provision of information to the Commission, it is true that AWA announced its intention to cooperate with the Commission before Mougeot. However, Mougeot was the first of the two actually to send the information to the Commission, on 14 April 1999. AWA’s actual contribution is dated 30 April 1999. | |
| 697. In this respect, it must be stated that the Commission was not obliged to regard as decisive the fact that one of the undertakings was somewhat faster in coming forward than the other undertakings. It is clear from the Leniency Notice that being the first undertaking to adduce decisive evidence is what matters for the application of Sections B and C. In the present case, that condition was fulfilled by Sappi (see paragraphs 691 and 692 above). AWA and Mougeot therefore both fell within Section D which makes no reference to and attaches no importance to whether the cooperation of one undertaking preceded that of another. | |
| 698. Furthermore, the fact that AWA may have informed the other cartel members of its intention to cooperate before contacting the Commission has no bearing on its cooperation with the Commission. | |
| 699. On the other hand, since AWA’s and Mougeot’s contributions were sent to the Commission after those of Sappi and after the investigations carried out by the Commission, it is necessary to ascertain whether they are of ‘similar quality’. | |
| 700. In this respect, reference should be made to recitals 447 and 448 of the decision: | |
| ‘Mougeot voluntarily provided statements and documents giving detailed information on cartel meetings (mainly concerning its home market France), including information on dates of the meetings, participants, contents of the meetings and agreements reached. | |
| AWA voluntarily submitted to the Commission information on cartel meetings detailing the periods during which in various Member States of the Community such meeting[s] were held and listing participating companies. On the contents of the meetings AWA stated that “at some of these meetings ... carbonless paper prices were discussed ... extending to an exchange of intentions regarding announcements of price increases”.’ | |
| 701. Furthermore, at recital 252 of the decision, the Commission lists the evidence relating to the cartel as a whole. Amongst those items of evidence are the statements of Mougeot and Sappi and the evidence provided by AWA on ‘improper’ meetings in its reply to the Commission request for information, and the detailed reports and statements concerning the national/regional cartel meetings obtained from Mougeot and Sappi. | |
| 702. It is apparent from a comparison of those recitals that Mougeot’s information was detailed in a way that AWA’s was not. Mougeot stated inter alia the dates of the meetings whilst AWA indicated only periods. However, even if AWA’s original statement was not as precise as that of Mougeot, according to recital 61 of the decision, AWA, in its response to the request for information, gave the Commission ‘a list of “improper” meetings or groups of meetings between competitors from 1992 to 1998’. It lists meetings held on precise dates whose existence AWA helped to establish. Moreover, the period covered by AWA’s statements is longer than that concerned by those of Mougeot. The meetings to which the latter refers in its statement of 14 April 1999 (documents Nos 7647 to 7655, referred to in paragraph 165 above) are between 1 October 1993 and summer 1995. There is therefore no clear difference between Mougeot and AWA in terms of the information obtained on the holding of the collusive meetings. | |
| 703. As regards the participants in the collusive meetings, the provision by Mougeot of the ‘[identity of the] participants’ scarcely differs from AWA’s indication of the ‘[names of] participating companies’. In any event, it is apparent from Annex II to the decision that AWA’s statements (document No 7828) were very helpful to the Commission in establishing each undertaking’s participation in the meetings. The fact that that document is by far the most cited document in the footnotes in support of the list of meetings and their participants confirms this. | |
| 704. Lastly, recitals 447 and 448 explain that Mougeot’s statements are limited mainly to the ‘home market France’, whilst AWA’s information relates to meetings in ‘various Member States of the Community’. The fact that several undertakings disputed the cartel at the European level accentuates the importance of the information provided by AWA in this respect. | |
| 705. The Commission therefore committed a manifest error of assessment by granting a reduction of 50% to Mougeot and of 35% to AWA. Even if, unlike AWA, Mougeot provided documents dating back to the material time and if, on certain points, its statements are more detailed, the information given by AWA relates to a longer period and covers a wider geographical area. It must therefore be held that the cooperation of AWA and of Mougeot is of similar quality. Nor can it be maintained that their cooperation can be distinguished on the basis of its usefulness to the Commission. It is apparent moreover from the examination carried out above by the Court concerning the Spanish market (see paragraphs 161 to 168 above) or the collusive nature of the official AEMCP meetings before September or October 1993 (see paragraphs 256 to 310 above) that the items of information provided by AWA and Mougeot support each other to a large extent and form, with those of Sappi, a body of evidence which is essential for understanding the functioning of the cartel and establishing its existence. | |
| 706. It follows that AWA’s plea alleging that its reduction on account of its cooperation is insufficient and discriminatory must be upheld. | |
| 707. In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court holds that, since the evidence adduced by Mougeot and AWA is of similar quality, AWA must be granted the same reduction on account of its cooperation as Mougeot, namely 50%. AWA’s fine must therefore be reduced as a result. | |
| 5. Koehler | |
| 708. Koehler submits that the Commission did not take account of its full cooperation both before and after the SO was sent. It is contrary to the principle of equal treatment that Carrs, MHTP and Zanders should enjoy leniency whilst it does not. | |
| 709. According to recitals 457 and 458 of the decision: | |
| ‘(457) Koehler states that it does not contest some of the facts set out in the Statement of Objections. However, Koehler contests substantial parts of the factual evidence on its participation in the cartel throughout the whole period. In particular, Koehler contests the description made by the Commission of agreements on sales quotas and market shares and the existence of a monitoring system. The Commission concludes therefore that there is no effective cooperation on the part of Koehler. | |
| (458) The Commission grants Carrs, MHTP and Zanders a 10% reduction for not substantially contesting the facts.’ | |
| 710. As regards the period before the SO was sent, Koehler asserts that it cooperated fully with the Commission. It adds that ‘it is thus that the investigation at Koehler’s premises on 9 and 10 December 1997 was carried out without resort to force since Mr F., member of the board, had given his prior agreement’. | |
| 711. In this respect, the mere fact of agreeing to an investigation cannot be regarded as proof of full cooperation. The Leniency Notice provides for a significant reduction of the fine where, before a statement of objections is sent, an undertaking provides the Commission with information, documents or other evidence which materially contribute to establishing the existence of the infringement. Koehler has provided no such elements and does not moreover claim to have done so. Koehler’s argument cannot therefore succeed. | |
| 712. As regards the period following receipt of the SO, the Leniency Notice provides for a significant reduction of the fine where an undertaking informs the Commission that it does not substantially contest the facts on which the Commission bases its allegations. It must be assessed whether, as it claims, Koehler did so in this case, and do this also by comparison with the other undertakings which benefited from that provision. | |
| 713. In its comments on the SO, Koehler stated that it admitted the ‘facts and complaints duly investigated and proved by the Commission’. It adds in its application that ‘[i]n so far as [it] made that admission subject to a reservation, it did so because it deemed it unacceptable to have to declare true what was untrue for the sole purpose of obtaining a reduction of the fine’. | |
| 714. However, it must be stated that, even if Koehler attempts then to justify some of its reservations by a subsequent change in the Commission’s position, it admits that it expressed reservations and ‘qualified the Commission’s findings in relation to the agreements on sales quotas and market shares’. In addition, when Koehler admits that information was exchanged on the quantities sold at the regional level – whilst denying any such exchange at European level – it adds that these are exceptions relating to completed periods. | |
| 715. Moreover, although Koehler claimed at the hearing that its contestation related only to the period before October 1993 and that, for the period afterwards, notwithstanding some perhaps unclear or vague wording, it had cooperated with the Commission, it is not apparent from its observations on the SO that Koehler expressly limited its contestation to the former period. On the contrary, in its introductory comments, it states that it will not dispute certain facts, namely those that the Commission found and assessed correctly in the SO. Next, Part III, relating to the contestation of the alleged facts, contains a paragraph 3 entitled ‘No agreements on sales quotas or market shares at the European level’ and a paragraph 4 entitled ‘No monitoring system’. Those contestations which are not limited in time cannot be considered vague or inaccurate. | |
| 716. It should be recalled that a reduction of the fine is justified only if the conduct of the undertaking concerned enabled the Commission to establish the infringement more easily and, where relevant, bring it to an end (see Joined Cases T‑45/98 and T‑47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless and Acciai speciali Terni v Commission [2001] ECR II‑3757, paragraph 270, and the case-law cited). The Commission has a discretion in that regard, as may be seen from the wording of Section D2 of the Leniency Notice and, in particular, from the introductory words ‘Such cases may include …’. Furthermore, and above all, a reduction under the Leniency Notice can be justified only where the information provided and, more generally, the conduct of the undertaking concerned might be considered to demonstrate genuine cooperation on its part (Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 409 above, paragraphs 394 and 395). | |
| 717. Admissions made subject to reservations or equivocal statements do not however convey real cooperation and are not capable of facilitating the Commission’s task, since they require investigation. That is all the more true where those reservations relate to aspects such as, in the present case, the duration of the infringement, sales quotas, market shares or information exchanges. | |
| 718. Since, by those reservations, Koehler disputed numerous aspects of the cartel, or at least did not assist the Commission in its task of investigating and penalising the cartel, it cannot claim a significant reduction in its fine for not substantially contesting the facts. | |
| 719. Lastly it must be ascertained whether, as Koehler claims, the refusal to grant it a reduction on that basis infringes the principle of equal treatment, as Carrs, MHTP and Zanders obtained a reduction in the fine of 10%. | |
| 720. In so far as Koehler thereby criticises the rate of reduction granted to those other undertakings for not having contested the alleged facts, even supposing that the Commission granted too high a reduction of the fine to those other undertakings, the Court points out that respect for the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which a person may not rely, in support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party (Case T-327/94 SCA Holding v Commission , paragraph 468 above, paragraph 160, Mayr-Melnhof v Commission , paragraph 446 above, paragraph 334, and LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, paragraph 367). | |
| 721. Moreover, in so far as Koehler’s contestation relates to the fact that it did not obtain a reduction of the fine under the Leniency Notice, reference should be made to paragraphs 708 to 718 above, from which it is apparent that, in the circumstances of the present case, it cannot claim such a reduction. | |
| 722. For the sake of completeness, as regards substantial contestation of the facts by the other undertakings which obtained a 10% reduction of their fine, it should be pointed out that Carrs admits the existence of the cartel and its participation in it during the entire period of the infringement specified in the decision. It states however that it did not participate in the meetings relating to the United Kingdom and Ireland markets and that it was not aware of the cartel at European level. In so doing, it does not substantially contest the facts. Nor is Carrs’ claim that the cartel had limited effects inconsistent with substantially admitting the facts. | |
| 723. As regards Zanders and MHTP, Koehler maintains that recitals 455 and 456, according to which they did not contest the facts, are not consistent with the finding, at recital 395, that MHTP and Zanders denied that attempted price and quota agreements were implemented. | |
| 724. It must be observed that the arguments of MHTP and Zanders set out at recital 395 seek to contest the effectiveness of the agreements in order to have them classified as less serious. They do not call in question the existence of the cartel and are not therefore inconsistent with not contesting the facts. | |
| 725. As regards the fact that MHTP admitted participating in the cartel only from the end of 1992 (recitals 270 and 271), it should be pointed out that the Commission took account of this. According to recital 456 of the decision ‘MHTP states that it does not contest the facts on which the finding of an infringement from 1992 to mid-1995 is based’. | |
| 726. Furthermore, the attitude of MHTP, which disputed only the starting date of the infringement, cannot be held to be comparable to that of Koehler, whose reservations related to several aspects of the cartel. | |
| 727. In those circumstances, Koehler has not established that it was the subject of unequal treatment. It follows from those considerations that the Commission was right not to reduce its fine under the Leniency Notice. | |
| III – AWA’s request for production of documents | |
| 728. AWA asks the Court to request the Commission to produce internal documents relating to the calculation of its fine and all the documents referred to in the contested decision, other than those sent to the applicant on 1 August 2000. | |
| 729. It should be recalled at the outset, that, according to Article 49 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance may, at any stage of the proceedings, prescribe any measure of organisation of procedure or any measure of enquiry referred to in Articles 64 and 65 of the Rules of Procedure. The request for production of documents is such a measure. | |
| 730. To enable the Court of First Instance to determine whether it is conducive to proper conduct of the procedure to order the production of certain documents, the party requesting production must identify the documents requested and provide the Court with at least minimum information indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings ( Baustahlgewebe v Commission , paragraph 256 above, paragraph 93). | |
| 731. It must be stated that, in the terms of the application, neither the request for production of internal documents relating to the calculation of the fine nor that relating to all the documents relied on in the decision, other than those sent to AWA on 1 August 2000, identifies the documents sought with sufficient precision to enable the Court to assess their usefulness for the purpose of these proceedings. | |
| 732. Both requests must therefore be rejected. | |
| 733. For the sake of completeness, AWA has not demonstrated the usefulness of those documents for the purpose of these proceedings. | |
| 734. As regards its request for production of internal documents of the Commission relating to the calculation of its fine, the mere fact, relied on by AWA, that, in particular in several cases which gave rise to the ‘ Cartonboard ’ judgments (in particular, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission , paragraph 483 above), the Court of First Instance requested the Commission to produce such documents cannot prove their usefulness in the circumstances of this case and oblige the Court to order the same measures. | |
| 735. Furthermore, as the Commission states, the ‘ Cartonboard ’ judgments predate the application of the Guidelines. Those guidelines seek precisely to ensure the transparency and impartiality of the Commission’s decisions by setting out the framework of the new method applicable to the calculation of the amount of the fine. In the present case, the decision, which clearly applies those guidelines, explains in a detailed manner the calculation of the fine. | |
| 736. Lastly, it is settled case-law that internal documents of the Commission are not revealed to the parties unless the exceptional circumstances of the case concerned so require, on the basis of sound evidence which it is up to them to provide (order in Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1986] ECR 1899, paragraph 11; Krupp Thyssen Stainless and Acciai speciali Terni v Commission , paragraph 716 above, paragraph 34; see also, to that effect, Case T‑35/92 John Deere v Commission [1994] ECR II‑957, paragraph 31). AWA has not provided sound evidence to that effect. | |
| 737. As regards the request to produce all the documents relied on in the decision other than those sent to AWA on 1 August 2000, AWA states that it is intended to enable it to see and examine the evidence that the Commission relied on in the decision. | |
| 738. In this respect, even if it criticises the unusable nature of the index (see paragraphs 109 to 117 above), AWA has not disputed that it had access to the Commission’s file during the administrative procedure. In so far as it does not make use of documents other than those to which the undertaking had access during the administrative procedure in order to inculpate an undertaking in the decision, the Commission cannot be required to give AWA access to all the documents cited in the decision (see, to that effect, LR AF 1998 v Commission , paragraph 45 above, and the case-law cited). | |
| 739. The request addressed to the Court relates to all the documents relied on in the decision other than those sent to AWA on 1 August 2000. Unlike the letter that AWA had sent to the Commission on 22 February 2002, that request does not explain that it relates in particular to the responses of the other addressees of the SO and the PricewaterhouseCoopers report. | |
| 740. However, even supposing that it were necessary to take account of that explanation also in relation to the general request addressed to the Court of First Instance, and that a request directed globally at the responses of the other addressees of the SO could be regarded as identifying with sufficient precision the documents sought, AWA has not in any event established that those documents are useful for the purpose of these proceedings. | |
| 741. The request for a measure of organisation of procedure addressed to the Court by AWA must therefore be rejected. | |
| 742. On the basis of all those considerations, the actions brought in Cases T‑109/02, T‑122/02, T‑125/02, T‑126/02, T‑128/02, T‑129/02 and T‑132/02 and T‑136/02 must be dismissed. In Case T‑118/02, the fine imposed on AWA is reduced to EUR 141.75 million. In Case T‑136/02, the fine imposed on Zicuñaga is reduced to EUR 1.309 million. | |
| Costs | |
| 743. Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs. Under the first subparagraph of Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, order costs to be shared. | |
| 744. In Cases T‑109/02, T‑122/02, T‑125/02, T‑126/02, T‑128/02, T‑129/02 and T‑132/02, the applicants have been unsuccessful. Consequently they will pay the costs in full, in accordance with the form of sought by the defendant. | |
| 745. In Case T‑118/02, since the action has been only partially successful, the Court will make an equitable assessment of the case in holding that the applicant is to bear two thirds of its own costs and pay two thirds of the costs incurred by the Commission and that the Commission is to bear a third of its own costs and pay a third of the costs incurred by the applicant. Since the Kingdom of Belgium intervened in support of the form of order sought by the applicant for a reduction of the fine on account of attenuating circumstances connected with the difficulties experienced by the carbonless paper sector, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and pay those of the Commission relating to its intervention, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. | |
| 746. In Case T‑136/02, as the action has been successful in part, the Court will make an equitable assessment of the case in holding that the applicant is to bear two thirds of its own costs and pay two thirds of the costs incurred by the Commission, and that the Commission is to bear one third of its own costs and pay one third of those incurred by the applicant. | |
Operative part | |
| On those grounds, | |
| THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fifth Chamber) | |
| hereby: | |
| 1. In Case T‑109/02 Bolloré v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 2. In Case T‑118/02 Arjo Wiggins Appleton v Commission: | |
| – sets the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 3 of Commission Decision 2004/337/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/36.212 − Carbonless paper) at EUR 141.75 million; | |
| – dismisses the remainder of the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to bear two thirds of its own costs and pay two thirds of the costs incurred by the Commission and the Commission to bear one third of its own costs and pay one third of those incurred by the applicant; | |
| – orders the intervener to bear its own costs and those of the Commission related to the intervention. | |
| 3. In Case T‑122/02 Mitsubishi HiTec Paper Bielefeld v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 4. In Case T‑125/02 Papierfabrik August Koehler v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 5. In Case T‑126/02 M‑real Zanders v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 6. In Case T‑128/02 Papeteries Mougeot v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 7. In Case T‑129/02 Torraspapel v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 8. In Case T‑132/02 Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles v Commission: | |
| – dismisses the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to pay the costs. | |
| 9. In Case T‑136/02 Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga v Commission: | |
| – sets the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 3 of Commission Decision 2004/337/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/36.212 − Carbonless paper) at EUR 1.309 million; | |
| – dismisses the remainder of the action; | |
| – orders the applicant to bear two thirds of its own costs and pay two thirds of the costs incurred by the Commission and the Commission to bear one third of its own costs and pay one third of those incurred by the applicant. |