ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

22 July 2026 (*)

( Interim measures – Public procurement – Negotiated tender procedure – Sole tenderer – Rejection of the tender – Application for suspension of operation and interim measures – No urgency )

In Case T‑17/26 R,

Indra Sistemas, SA, established in Alcobendas (Spain), represented by L. Lence de Frutos and M. Troncoso Ferrer, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European External Action Service (EEAS), represented by E. Georgieva and P. Reynolds, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

makes the following

Order

1        By its application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Indra Sistemas, SA, seeks, first, suspension of the operation of the decision of the European External Action Service (EEAS) rejecting its tender in the procurement procedure bearing the reference EEAS/2025/NP/0073 and, second, an order requiring the EEAS to refrain from launching a new procurement procedure with the same object or from fragmenting the contract into several procurement procedures.

 Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties

2        On 18 March 2025, the EEAS launched a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice, bearing the reference EEAS/2025/NP/0073. The applicant was the only operator invited to tender.

3        The applicant submitted its tender on 6 May 2025.

4        After two rounds of negotiations launched by the evaluation committee, the applicant submitted, on 22 September 2025, a second, revised tender (‘the final tender’).

5        The evaluation committee concluded that the final tender did not comply with certain minimum technical requirements set out in the tender specifications. Consequently, it proposed to the contracting authority not to award the contract at issue to the applicant.

6        By letter of 30 October 2025, the EEAS informed the applicant that the final tender had been rejected.

7        By letter of 7 November 2025 sent to the EEAS, the applicant challenged the legality of the decision of 30 October 2025.

8        By letter of 21 November 2025, the EEAS informed the applicant that it had instructed the evaluation committee to reassess the final tender, taking into account the points raised by the applicant in its letter of 7 November 2025.

9        By letter of 23 December 2025, the EEAS informed the applicant that, following the review of the final tender, the evaluation committee had maintained its assessment that the tender was irregular because it did not comply with the minimum requirements set out in the tender specifications, which prevented the contracting authority from continuing the procedure (taken together with the letter of 30 October 2025, ‘the decision not to award the contract’).

10      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 9 January 2026, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the decision not to award the contract.

11      By a separate document, lodged at the Court Registry on 17 March 2026, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which it claims, in essence, that the President of the General Court should:

–        order the suspension of the operation of the decision not to award the contract;

–        order the EEAS to refrain from launching a new procurement procedure with the same object as the procurement procedure bearing the reference EEAS/2025/NP/0073 or from fragmenting the contract into several smaller procurement procedures that would allow the participation of new tenderers;

–        order the EEAS pay the costs.

12      In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Court Registry on 31 March 2026, the EEAS contends that the President of the General Court should:

–        dismiss the application for interim measures;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

 General considerations

13      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (see order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).

14      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.

15      Accordingly, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently applications for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

16      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

17      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim measures, without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.

18      In the circumstances of the present case, and without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the application for interim measures or on the applicant’s heads of claim requesting that the President of the General Court order the EEAS to refrain from launching a new procurement procedure with the same object as that of the procurement procedure bearing the reference EEAS/2025/NP/0073 or from fragmenting the contract into several smaller procurement procedures that would allow the participation of new tenderers, it is appropriate to examine first whether the condition relating to urgency is satisfied.

 The condition relating to urgency

19      In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU judicature. It is for the purpose of attaining that objective that urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such damage. While it is true that, in order to establish the existence of serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary for the occurrence and imminence of the damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the party seeking interim measures is nevertheless required to prove the facts forming the basis of its claim that serious and irreparable damage is likely (see order of 16 July 2021, Symrise v ECHA, C‑282/21 P(R), not published, EU:C:2021:631, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

20      It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has succeeded in satisfying the condition relating to urgency.

21      In that regard, the applicant submits, as a preliminary point, that it should benefit from the easing of the condition relating to urgency that is applicable to public procurement procedures.

22      First, the applicant submits that the procedure is still in the pre-contractual phase. It was the only tenderer which participated in the procurement procedure at issue and, although its tender was not successful, there was no formal decision to annul the procedure for the award of the contract at issue.

23      Furthermore, it is apparent, according to the applicant, from the case which gave rise to the order of 22 November 2022, Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑478/22 P(R), EU:C:2022:914), that the expiry of the standstill period is irrelevant when assessing whether the easing of the condition of urgency is applicable in the present case and that, in that regard, what matters is whether the contract has been signed by the contracting authority and the successful tenderer. Since no contract has been concluded in the present case, the procurement procedure is still in the pre-contractual stage, and therefore the applicant is entitled to rely on the easing of the condition relating to urgency.

24      Second, the applicant submits that the easing of the criteria for assessing the condition relating to urgency is necessary in order to guarantee that it enjoys effective judicial protection. Without the interim measures sought in the applicant’s application for interim measures, the EEAS could annul the procurement procedure and launch one or more new procedures with, in essence, the same object, which would have the effect of depriving the applicant of a commercial opportunity and enable its competitors to take advantage of its unique know-how in the field of the contract concerned.

25      The EEAS, for its part, contends that the requirements for easing the assessment of the condition relating to urgency are not met.

26      First, having regard to the requirements which follow from the effective protection which must be guaranteed in public procurement matters, when an unsuccessful tenderer is able to show that there is a particularly serious prima facie case, it cannot be required to establish that the rejection of its application for interim measures would risk causing it irreparable damage, otherwise the effective legal protection which it enjoys pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union would be undermined in a manner that is both excessive and unjustified (orders of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275, paragraph 41, and of 8 August 2024, Geos Atlas v EUCAP Somalia, T‑300/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:563, paragraph 21).

27      Thus, the Court of Justice has held that effective legal protection requires that the interested parties be informed of an award decision a reasonable length of time before the contract is concluded so that they have a real possibility of bringing proceedings and, in particular, of applying for interim measures pending conclusion of the contract (order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275, paragraph 29).

28      In the case which gave rise to the order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits (C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275), the Court of Justice wished to ensure that unsuccessful tenderers had a real possibility of applying for interim measures pending conclusion of the contract, since the application of the previous case-law, which had required a demonstration of the occurrence of irreparable damage, made it, for systemic reasons, almost impossible for an unsuccessful tenderer to obtain a suspension of operation of a contract award decision in order to prevent the contracting authority from creating a fait accompli by concluding the contract with the successful tenderer (order of 21 September 2022, Xpand Consortium and Others v Commission, T‑281/22 R, not published, EU:T:2022:569, paragraph 36).

29      In the present case, it should be noted that, after finding that there was no competition for technical reasons, the EEAS used a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice, in accordance with point 11.1(b)(ii) of Annex I to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509).

30      It is also common ground that the applicant was the only economic operator invited by the EEAS to submit a tender in the procurement procedure at issue in the main proceedings and that the final tender which it submitted was rejected by the EEAS. The present case, which involves only one tenderer, can therefore be distinguished from the case which gave rise to the order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits (C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275), in which several tenderers had submitted tenders and one of those tenders had been successful, to the detriment of that submitted by the applicant.

31      In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant’s situation is fundamentally different from that of an unsuccessful tenderer which risks seeing the public contract awarded by the contracting authority to another tenderer and which seeks suspension of the signature of that contract in order to preserve its chances of being able effectively to challenge its exclusion. Classification as an ‘unsuccessful tenderer’, within the meaning of the order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits (C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275), necessarily implies the participation of several tenderers in the procurement procedure and the award of the contract at issue to another tenderer.

32      Second, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the easing of the conditions is necessary in order to guarantee its effective judicial protection in so far as the EEAS could, in the absence of the suspension of operation and the interim measures sought, annul the procurement procedure and launch one or more new procurement procedures with, in essence, the same object.

33      The EU judicature does not recognise the existence of a general principle of EU law based on the right to effective legal protection, under which an unsuccessful tenderer must be able to obtain not only damages but also interim measures, without limiting that finding to the period preceding the conclusion of the contract by the contracting authority and the successful tenderer (see, to that effect, order of 21 May 2021, Inivos and Inivos v Commission, T‑38/21 R, not published, EU:T:2021:287, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

34      That consideration must apply in the present case in view of the fact that, as stated in paragraph 31 above, the applicant cannot validly rely on classification as an ‘unsuccessful tenderer’, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 26 above, and, where there is no successful tenderer selected by the contracting authority, the contract relating to the procurement procedure at issue will not be concluded.

35      Moreover, it cannot be inferred, at this stage, from the material in the case file that the EEAS will, in the absence of interim measures, annul the procurement procedure at issue or launch one or more new procedures with the same object.

36      On the contrary, in so far as the EEAS envisaged annulling the procedure at issue and launching one or more new procedures with an identical or similar object to the contract at issue, it must be stated that it would have been free to do so during the months that passed between 9 January 2026, when the action for annulment was brought, and 17 March 2026, when the present application for interim measures was lodged.

37      Furthermore, if the EEAS were to decide to launch a new procurement procedure with an identical or similar object to that at issue, it cannot be ruled out, at this stage, that the contract might be awarded to the applicant at the end of that new procedure.

38      In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicant cannot benefit from the easing of the conditions applicable to the assessment of urgency in public procurement matters.

39      It is therefore necessary to examine whether the operation of the decision not to award the contract would cause the applicant serious and irreparable damage within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 19 above.

40      In that regard, the applicant claims, in the first place, that the value of the framework contract at issue, which it estimates to be EUR 77 800 000, must be regarded as objectively not insignificant and, therefore, capable of causing serious damage, irrespective of the applicant’s size or financial capacity. Furthermore, that value constitutes, according to the applicant, a significant proportion of its turnover, in that it represents approximately 4.9% of the applicant’s total annual turnover.

41      In addition, the applicant compares the value of the contract in the present case with that of another contract which it concluded with the EEAS on 25 July 2024, with a total value of EUR 321 386.98 (‘the previous contract’), in order to conclude that the contract at issue is of an exceptional nature. According to the applicant, that exceptional nature stems from the fact that the value of the contract at issue is more than 200 times higher than that of the previous contract and that, since the applicant is the sole tenderer in the present case, the entire value of that contract is exclusively at stake for the applicant, in the sense that it would not be shared with other successful tenderers.

42      In the second place, the applicant alleges a loss of market share, in that the contract at issue not only represents a significant financial opportunity, but also places the applicant in a unique position in a highly specialised market. In view of the specific features of the contract at issue, the applicant would not be able to regain such a position through future tenders.

43      In the third place, the applicant claims that the consequences of the decision not to award the contract are not limited to pecuniary damage, given that its participation in the contract at issue stems from the previous contract and that the know-how and deliverables which it has developed form the basis of the present procurement procedure. As a result of the decision not to award the contract, the applicant would lose the position of ‘reference provider’ which it earned through years of collaboration with the EEAS. Moreover, the decision not to award the contract also has the effect of eliminating the applicant’s chances of participating in the future stages of a contract or of obtaining additional contracts.

44      In addition, the applicant claims that, in the absence of interim measures, it may be exposed to an ‘independent source of irreparable harm’, in the form of a loss of sensitive know-how to the benefit of its competitors. It argues, in that regard, that, if the EEAS were to decide to annul the procurement procedure at issue and to launch a new procurement procedure with the same or a similar object, the technical and security information that the applicant had already supplied in the procurement procedure at issue could be reused to define the scope, requirements or technical baseline of that new procedure, which would allow third-party operators, which have not incurred the costs, risks or investments borne by the applicant, to benefit from that know-how and to align their offers accordingly.

45      The EEAS disputes the applicant’s arguments.

46      In that regard, in the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the value of the public contract, which it estimates to be EUR 77 800 000, represents both an objectively not insignificant amount and a significant proportion of its turnover and that the contract at issue is exceptional, in particular because it is exclusively at stake for the applicant, it should be noted that the loss of an opportunity to be awarded and to perform a public contract is inherent in the rejection of a tender submitted in an award procedure and cannot be regarded as constituting, in itself, serious damage, irrespective of a specific assessment of the seriousness of the specific damage alleged in each individual case. Therefore, the applicant’s loss of an opportunity to be awarded and to perform the contract in the tendering procedure would constitute serious damage if it has shown to the requisite legal standard that it would have been able to derive sufficiently sizeable benefits from the award and performance of that contract (see order of 26 May 2021, OHB System v Commission, T‑54/21 R, not published, EU:T:2021:292, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

47      Moreover, it is true that, according to the case-law, financial damage which is objectively considerable, or even not insignificant, may be considered serious, without it being necessary in every case to relate that damage to the turnover of the undertaking which fears suffering that damage (see order of 6 December 2022, Westpole Belgium v Parliament, T‑640/22 R, not published, EU:T:2022:771, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

48      However, it is also clear from settled case-law that the party requesting the grant of an interim measure must submit to the judge hearing the application for interim measures specific and precise information, supported by detailed documentation, showing the situation relied on and allowing the consequences that would probably ensue, in the absence of the measure requested, to be assessed. That party is thus required to provide, with supporting documents, information capable of producing an accurate and comprehensive picture of the situation which is claimed to justify the grant of that measure (see order of 6 December 2022, Westpole Belgium v Parliament, T‑640/22 R, not published, EU:T:2022:771, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

49      Moreover, according to the second sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure, an application for interim measures ‘shall contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures’.

50      In the present case, first, it must be stated that the applicant merely asserts that, had the final tender been accepted by the contracting authority, it would have received a sum equivalent to the value of the framework contract. As the EEAS correctly points out, the award of the framework contract at issue does not, in itself, entail payment of the total value to the successful tenderer, since the payments to be made remain subject to the conclusion of specific contracts between the contracting authority and the successful tenderer.

51      Second, the applicant claims, without providing further explanations in its application for interim measures, that the Indra group, to which it belongs, recorded an annual turnover of EUR 1 591 120 000 in 2024 and that the value of the contract at issue thus represents approximately 4.9% of the Indra group’s total annual turnover. In support of the foregoing, the applicant merely provides, by means of a footnote in the application for interim measures, a hyperlink leading to a website where the group’s annual accounts and management report for 2024 are published.

52      A hyperlink inserted in a footnote to the application for interim measures cannot satisfy the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above and disregards the requirement laid down in the second sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure.

53      In any event, the percentage put forward by the applicant must be disregarded in so far as, the calculation which it made takes as the reference value the total value of the contract, whereas, as stated in paragraph 50 above, the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that it would necessarily have been entitled to the total value of the contract if the final tender had been accepted. Moreover, that percentage does not take into consideration the fact that the framework contract at issue provides for an initial period of four years, which may be extended by an additional three years, or the fact, correctly pointed out by the EEAS, that the payments made under that contract will be spread over the entire contractual period.

54      Third, the applicant’s argument that it has already concluded a comparable previous contract, albeit of a lower value, and that the contract at is exclusively at stake for it is entirely irrelevant for the purpose of analysing the seriousness of the alleged financial damage as a result of the decision not to award the contract.

55      In the second place, as regards the alleged risk associated with a potential loss of market share, in that the award of the contract at issue would place the applicant in a unique position in a highly specialised market, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where the party applying for interim relief claims loss of its market share, it must demonstrate that obstacles of a structural or legal nature prevent it from regaining a significant proportion of that market share (see order of 2 February 2024, Mylan Ireland v Commission, C‑604/23 P(R), not published, EU:C:2024:117, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).

56      In the present case, the applicant does not describe the market in question, does not indicate the market share which it holds or the market share which it would lose as a result of not being awarded the contract at issue, and has not adduced any evidence to demonstrate that there are obstacles of a structural or legal nature that would prevent it from regaining a significant proportion of that market share.

57      In the third and last place, as regards, first, the applicant’s argument that, as a result of the decision not to award the contract, it would lose its position as a ‘reference supplier’, it is sufficient to recall that, according to the case-law, the essential and main elements of the contract concluded following a tendering procedure for the award of a public contract are, on the one hand, performance of the contract by the successful tenderer and, on the other, payment of the contractually agreed sum by the contracting authority. By contrast, considerations relating to the reputation of the successful tenderer and the opportunity for it to use the award of a prestigious public contract as a reference in the context of a future tender or in other competitive contexts relate only to accidental and incidental elements of that contract. If the fact that an unsuccessful tenderer suffers a serious loss of profits by failing to obtain the contractually agreed sum, which is the essential and principal element of the public contract at issue, cannot justify the grant of an interim measure, this should also apply, and even more so, as regards the loss of those accidental and incidental elements (see order of 6 December 2024, Alhares for Security Services and Occupational Safety v EUBAM Libya, T‑493/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:886, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

58      In the present case, assuming that the applicant was granted, under the previous contract, the status of ‘reference supplier’, that status is an incidental element of that contract. Consequently, the loss of that status as a result of the decision not to award the contract cannot, in itself, justify suspension of the operation of that decision.

59      Second, the argument that the fact that the applicant was not awarded the contract at issue would deprive it of an opportunity to participate in future procurement procedures must be rejected.

60      It should be observed that, according to well-established case-law, there is urgency only if the serious damage feared by the party requesting the interim measures is so imminent that its occurrence can be foreseen with a sufficient degree of probability. That party remains, in any event, required to prove the facts that form the basis of its claim that such damage is likely, it being clear that purely hypothetical damage, based on future and uncertain events, cannot justify the granting of interim measures (see, to that effect, order of 27 February 2015, Spain v Commission, T‑826/14 R, EU:T:2015:126, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

61      Failing any evidence capable of supporting the applicant’s arguments, it is impossible, at this stage, to anticipate the outcome of any procurement procedures with the same or a similar object as the contract at issue that might be launched by the EEAS in the future, and therefore the argument put forward by the applicant is hypothetical.

62      Third, as regards the ‘independent source of irreparable harm’ alleged by the applicant, it should be noted that the applicant refers to the previous contract and the use of the information relating thereto, without, however, providing useful indications as to the seriousness of the damage that would result from the decision not to award the contract or as to the extent to which any future procurement procedure, which remains, at this stage, hypothetical, would lead to the disclosure of that information.

63      In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicant has not demonstrated, to the requisite legal standard, the seriousness of the damage suffered.

64      In those circumstances, since the conditions for ordering suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures are cumulative, the application for interim measures must be dismissed for lack of urgency, without there being any need to examine in more detail the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case or to weigh up the interests involved.

 Costs

65      Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, it is appropriate to reserve the costs.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

hereby orders:

1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.      The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 22 July 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.