Keywords
Summary

Keywords

++++

1. Fisheries ° Common structural policy ° Multiannual guidance programmes ° Implementation by the United Kingdom ° Limitation of the number of days spent at sea by vessels over 10 metres in length ° Whether permissible

(EC Treaty, Arts 6, 34, 39, 40(3), second para.; Council Regulations No 4028/86, No 3759/92 and No 3760/92; Commission Decision 92/593)

2. Community law ° Principles ° Equal treatment ° Discrimination on grounds of nationality ° Definition

(EC Treaty, Art. 6)

3. Agriculture ° Common organization of the markets ° Prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and measures having equivalent effect ° Limits ° National measures authorized by Community legislation

(EC Treaty, Arts 30 and 34)

4. Community law ° Principles ° Fundamental rights ° Restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights justified in the general interest

5. Member States ° Implementation of Community law ° Provision of Community law leaving national authorities considerable freedom of evaluation ° Review by the Court of the national measures adopted ° Limits

Summary

1. Decision 92/593 on a multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of the United Kingdom for the period 1993 to 1996 pursuant to Regulation No 4028/86 must be interpreted as empowering the United Kingdom to limit the number of days a year that vessels over 10 metres in length may spend at sea in so far as a maximum of 45% of the overall target set in that decision may be achieved by measures other than reductions in the capacity of the fishing fleet. The decision does not preclude that Member State from adopting technical conservation measures, provided that they have been approved by the Commission.

In this respect it is irrelevant that the Member State concerned did not achieve the targets set by the previous multiannual guidance programme.

Neither Articles 6, 34, 39 and 40(3) of the Treaty, nor Regulations No 3759/92 on the common organization of the market in fishery and aquaculture products, and No 3760/92 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture, the principle of equal treatment, the right to property, the freedom to pursue a trade or professional activity and the principle of proportionality, preclude a Member State from making use of that power.

Neither the nature of the stock caught by a vessel, nor the extent to which the restrictions in question affect normal fishing, other operations of individual fishermen and the market in fish, nor the opportunity given to a national authority to make derogations in favour of particular sectors of the national fishing fleet can call in question that power or the right to exercise it.

2. The application of national legislation cannot be held to be contrary to the principle of non-discrimination merely because other Member States allegedly apply rules which are less strict.

3. The fact that Articles 30 and 34, which prohibit quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect on imports and exports, are regarded as an integral part of the common organization of the markets in agriculture does not prevent the competent authorities of a Member State from adopting national measures on the terms provided for by Community legislation forming part of such an organization.

4. The fundamental rights which form part of the general principles of Community law are not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, the exercise of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession may be restricted, particularly in the context of a common organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute in relation to the aim pursued a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed.

5. Where a provision of Community law leaves the national authorities responsible for its implementation considerable freedom in their evaluation, a court cannot, when considering whether the exercise of such freedom is lawful, substitute its own evaluation for that of the competent authority, but must restrict itself to examining whether the evaluation of the latter contains a patent error or constitutes a misuse of power.