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Document 62021TO0135

Despacho do Tribunal Geral (Oitava Secção) de 11 de fevereiro de 2026.
Trasta Komercbanka AS contra Banco Central Europeu (BCE).
Responsabilidade extracontratual — Política económica e monetária — Supervisão prudencial das instituições de crédito — Atribuições específicas de supervisão conferidas ao BCE — Decisão de revogação da autorização de uma instituição de crédito — Prejuízo material — Nexo de causalidade — Recurso manifestamente desprovido de fundamento jurídico.
Processo T-135/21.

ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:T:2026:123

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

11 February 2026 (*)

( Non-contractual liability – Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Specific supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB – Decision to withdraw a credit institution’s authorisation – Material damage – Causal link – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law )

In Case T‑135/21,

Trasta Komercbanka AS, established in Riga (Latvia), represented by O. Behrends, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Central Bank (ECB), represented by C. Hernández Saseta, A. Witte and A. Pizzolla, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Republic of Latvia, represented by J. Davidoviča and K. Pommere, acting as Agents,

and by

European Commission, represented by D. Triantafyllou and A. Steiblytė, acting as Agents,

interveners,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of I. Gâlea, President, M.J. Costeira (Rapporteur) and T. Tóth, Judges,

Registrar: T. Henze, Deputy Registrar,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:

–        the decisions of 1 September 2021 and of 1 December 2022 to stay the proceedings,

–        the reassignment of the case to the Eighth Chamber of the General Court,

makes the following

Order

1        By its action under Article 268 TFEU, the applicant, Trasta Komercbanka AS, seeks compensation for the damage it claims to have suffered following Decision ECB/SSM/2016 – 529900WIP0INFDAWTJ81/1 WOANCA‑2016‑0005 of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 3 March 2016 withdrawing its authorisation for access to the activity of credit institutions (‘the decision of 3 March 2016’) and the conduct of the ECB related to that decision.

 Background to the dispute

2        By the decision of 3 March 2016, the ECB withdrew the authorisation of the applicant as a credit institution and rejected the applicant’s request for suspension of the effects of that decision for a period of one month. Among the grounds for the withdrawal of the authorisation, the ECB referred, inter alia, to the applicant’s failure to meet capital requirements, the breach of limits to large exposures to a client or a group of connected clients and the failure to comply with requirements concerning the functioning of the internal control systems of credit institutions, anti-money laundering and the pursuit of a prudent strategy.

3        By application of 13 May 2016, registered as Case T‑247/16, an action for annulment of the decision of 3 March 2016, lodged on behalf of the applicant and some of its shareholders, was brought before the General Court.

4        On 11 July 2016, following a request for a review of the decision of 3 March 2016, the ECB adopted decision ECB/SSM/2016 – 529900WIP0INFDAWTJ81/2 WOANCA-2016-0005, by which it took a new decision to withdraw the applicant’s authorisation for access to the activity of credit institutions (‘the decision of 11 July 2016’). That decision replaced the decision of 3 March 2016 in its entirety.

 Events subsequent to the bringing of the present action

5        By order of 17 November 2021, Trasta Komercbanka v ECB (T‑247/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:809), the General Court ruled that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the applicant’s action for annulment of the decision of 3 March 2016 as a result of the disappearance of the subject matter of the proceedings, given that that decision had been replaced, with retroactive effect, by the decision of 11 July 2016 (order of 17 November 2021, Trasta Komercbanka v ECB, T‑247/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:809, paragraphs 56 to 59). Since no appeal was lodged against it, that order became final.

6        Following an appeal brought against the judgment of 30 November 2022, Trasta Komercbanka and Others v ECB (T‑698/16, not published, EU:T:2022:737), by which the General Court had dismissed an application for annulment of the decision of 11 July 2016, the Court of Justice held, inter alia, that that decision had had the effect of abrogating and replacing the decision of 3 March 2016, without, however, having eliminated that decision retroactively (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 May 2025, Trasta Komercbanka v ECB, C‑90/23 P, not published, EU:C:2025:369, paragraphs 105 to 111).

 Forms of order sought

7        The applicant claims that the General Court should:

–        order the ECB to pay compensation in respect of the harm suffered as a result of the decision of 3 March 2016 and the ECB’s conduct related to that decision;

–        order the ECB to pay the costs pursuant to Articles 134 or 135 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

8        The ECB, supported in that respect by the Commission, contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the application;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

9        Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, it may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.

10      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information available to it from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.

 The scope of the claim for compensation

11      As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the proceedings before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, and to Article 76(e) of the Rules of Procedure, the application initiating proceedings must contain the form of order sought by the applicant. The form of order sought must be set out in a precise and unequivocal manner, since otherwise the Court would risk giving a ruling infra petita or ultra petita and disregarding the rights of the defendant. Thus, subject to the existence of certain circumstances provided for in Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, only the form of order set out in the originating application may be taken into consideration and the substance of the application must be examined solely with reference to the order sought in the application initiating proceedings (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

12      Further, in accordance with Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law. Those elements must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, if an action is to be admissible, for the basic legal and factual particulars relied upon to be stated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see order of 16 May 2024, Versobank v ECB, T‑421/23, not published, EU:T:2024:322, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

13      In order to meet those requirements, an application seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by the ECB must contain, inter alia, information identifying the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution, the reasons why it considers there to be a causal link between that conduct and the damage allegedly suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage (see, to that effect, order of 16 May 2024, Versobank v ECB, T‑421/23, not published, EU:T:2024:322, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

14      As regards the nature and extent of the alleged damage, an applicant may not have put in figures the amount of the loss which it submits it has suffered, while clearly indicating the evidence which enables its nature and extent to be assessed, so that the defendant is in a position to conduct its defence. In such circumstances, the absence of precise figures in the application does not affect the other party’s rights of defence (order of 22 July 2005, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council and Commission, T‑376/04, EU:T:2005:297, paragraph 55).

15      However, a claim for any unspecified form of damages is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as manifestly inadmissible (see order of 10 July 2020, KF v SatCen, T‑619/19, not published, EU:T:2020:337, paragraphs 54 to 58 and the case-law cited).

16      In the present case, it must be held that the applicant’s claim for compensation are sufficiently precise only in so far as they seek compensation for alleged material damage corresponding to the value of the shortfall alleged by the applicant, estimated to be at least EUR 162 million, plus appropriate compensatory interest and default interest, as set out in paragraph 2 of the form of order sought in the application.

17      Although the applicant stated in the application that it reserves the right to specify or quantify later other heads of damage resulting from the decision of 3 March 2016 and from the ECB’s conduct related to that decision, including a future loss of earnings and loss of reputation, the fact remains that the application does not contain any details that would enable the Court to assess the existence or extent of such damage. It follows that the claim for compensation for that damage is, on any view, manifestly inadmissible, in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 above.

18      Consequently, only the claims seeking compensation for the material damage referred to in paragraph 16 above will be examined below.

 Substance

19      As regards the damage for which compensation is sought, it should be borne in mind that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, the ECB is, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, to make good any damage caused by it or by its servants in the performance of their duties.

20      In order for the ECB to incur non-contractual liability, within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, a number of cumulative conditions must be satisfied, namely the ECB’s conduct must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered and there must be a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage pleaded. Given the cumulative nature of those conditions, the action must be dismissed in its entirety where one of those conditions is not satisfied (see order of 25 July 2023, D’Agostino and Dafin v ECB, T‑424/22, not published, EU:T:2023:443, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

21      As regards the condition relating to the damage pleaded, it is important to emphasise that that damage must be actual, certain and quantifiable. By contrast, purely hypothetical and indeterminate damage does not give rise to compensation. It is for the applicant to produce to the Court the evidence to establish the existence and the extent of the damage suffered (see judgment of 26 October 2011, Dufour v ECB, T‑436/09, EU:T:2011:634, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

22      As regards the condition relating to a causal link, that condition concerns a sufficiently direct causal nexus between that institution’s alleged conduct and the damage, the burden of proof of which rests on the applicant, so that the conduct complained of must be the determining cause of the damage (see order of 25 July 2023, Nardi v ECB, T‑131/23, not published, EU:T:2023:444, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

23      In the present case, in relation to the alleged damage, the applicant claims that the withdrawal of its authorisation prevented it from carrying out any banking business, which had the direct and foreseeable consequence of triggering its liquidation. According to the applicant, that led to its insolvency, due to the complete destruction of its assets, which resulted in a shortfall of EUR 108 million.

24      As regards the calculation of the compensation sought, estimated to be at least EUR 162 million, the applicant claims that the amount of its shortfall of EUR 108 million, consisting of EUR 21.7 million of share capital and EUR 86 million of unpaid debts, must be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 on the ground that the accounting valuation of its assets does not reflect their value as a whole.

25      In that regard, it must be noted that the applicant has not produced evidence of the existence and the extent of the damage alleged, as the ECB rightly points out.

26      First, the existence and the extent of the damage alleged cannot be established solely on the basis of the assertion made in paragraph 50 of the application, concerning the information provided to the applicant by its liquidator on 8 December 2020, since that assertion is not supported by any evidence which would enable the Court to assess its veracity.

27      Second, the applicant has failed to explain the need to multiply the amount of its alleged damage by a factor of 1.5, merely alleging, without adducing any evidence, that the accounting valuation of its assets is underestimated as regards their value as a whole.

28      Next, as regards the causal link between the decision of 3 March 2016 and the alleged damage, it must be noted that the applicant does not adduce any evidence of such a link, as the ECB rightly observes.

29      In that regard, the applicant states, in paragraph 49 of the application, that it is assumed that the alleged causal link is not controversial since the termination of its business, its liquidation and the loss of its reputation are the direct and foreseeable consequences of the withdrawal of its authorisation.

30      However, the ECB and the Commission dispute the alleged causal link, submitting, inter alia, that the applicant’s alleged shortfall cannot be attributed to the decision of 3 March 2016, but rather to the way in which the applicant had conducted its business in the period prior to the withdrawal of its authorisation.

31      Furthermore, the applicant does not substantiate, in the application, the reasons why it should be held that the decision of 3 March 2016 is the determining cause, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, of the alleged deterioration of its balance sheet, when that decision was based, as set out in paragraph 2 above, inter alia, on failures to meet capital requirements and limits to large exposures and the bank’s lack of a prudent strategy.

32      In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant, which did not lodge a reply, has not adduced any evidence to contradict the Commission’s contention that there was a capital shortfall prior to the adoption of the decision of 3 March 2016.

33      It follows that the applicant has not established, as required by the case-law cited in paragraphs 19 to 21 above, the existence and extent of the alleged damage, or the causal link between the decision of 3 March 2016 and that damage.

34      It must therefore be concluded that the conditions for the ECB to incur non-contractual liability are not satisfied, and it is not necessary to assess the legality of the decision of 3 March 2016 and the conduct of the ECB related to that decision.

35      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

 Costs

36      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

37      Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs.

38      In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered, pursuant to Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the ECB, in accordance with the form of order sought by the ECB. There are no reasons connected to equity or unreasonable or vexatious costs, as referred to in Article 135 of those rules, for granting the applicant’s request that the ECB be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with that article.

39      In addition, in accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Republic of Latvia and the Commission are each to bear their own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

hereby orders:

1.      The action is dismissed.

2.      Trasta Komercbanka AS shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB).

3.      The Republic of Latvia and the European Commission shall each bear their own costs.

Luxembourg, 11 February 2026.

T. Henze, Deputy Registrar

 

I. Gâlea

Registrar

 

President


*      Language of the case: English.

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