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Document 62003TO0272
Streszczenie postanowienia
Streszczenie postanowienia
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
16 September 2003
Case T-272/03 R
Maria Dolores Fernández Gómez
v
Commission of the European Communities
‛Interim measures — Application for suspension of operation — Urgency — None’
Full text in French II-979
Application for:
suspension of the operation of the Commission's decision of 12 May 2003 rejecting the application to renew the applicant's temporary staff contract.
Held:
The application for interim measures is dismissed. Costs are reserved.
Summary
Applications for interim measures — Conditions for admissibility — Consideration of the admissibility of the main application — Inappropriate — Limits
(Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(1))
Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation — Conditions for granting — A prima facie case — Urgency — Cumulative nature — Order and manner in which conditions are to be examined — Discretion of the judge hearing the application
(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Strictly financial damage — Expiry of a temporary staff contract — None
(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
In principle the issue of the admissibility of the main action should not be examined in proceedings for interim relief so as not to prejudge the substance of the case. However, where it is contended that the main action to which the application for interim relief relates is manifestly inadmissible, it may prove necessary to establish whether there are any grounds for concluding that the main action is prima facie admissible.
(see para. 17)
See: 376/87 R Distrivet v Council [1988] ECR 209, para. 21; 160/88 R Fédération européennede la santé animale and Others v Council [1988] ECR 411, para. 22; T-13/99 R Pfizer Animal Health v Council [1999] ECR II-1961, para. 121, confirmed on appeal in C-329/99P(R) Pfizer Animal Health v Council [1999] ECR I-8343
An application for interim measures must state the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures applied for. Those conditions are cumulative, so that an application for suspension of the operation of a measure must be dismissed if any one of them is absent.
In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application has a wide discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of Community law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be analysed and assessed.
(see paras 24-25)
See: C-363/98 P(R) Emesa Sugar v Council [1998] ECR I-8787, para. 50: T-234/02 R Michael v Commission [2002] ECRSC I-A-321 and II-1543, para. 17
The urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the need for an interim order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party who requests the interim measure. It is for that party to adduce proof that it cannot await the outcome of the main action without suffering such damage.
Purely financial harm cannot as a matter of principle be regarded as irreparable, or even difficult to repair, because financial compensation can be made for it subsequently. However, it is for the judge hearing the application for interim relief to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether the immediate execution of the contested decision may cause the applicant serious and imminent harm that even the annulment of the decision at the close of the main proceedings would be unable to repair.
The fact that a member of the temporary staff whose contract is expiring is forced, by reason of his family circumstances, to find new employment at the place where he was formerly employed does not as such constitute serious and irreparable harm. It is merely a consequence of the fact that his contract is coming to an end.
(see paras 29-33)
See: C-213/91 R Abertal and Others v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, para. 24; T-203/98 R Tzikis v Commission [1999] ECRSC I-A-37 and II-167, para. 49; T-70/99 R Alpharma v Council [1999] ECR II-2027, para. 128; T-373/00 R Tralli v ECB [2001] ECRSC I-A-19 and II-83, paras 26 and 27; T-300/01 R De Nicola v EIB, not published in the ECR, paras 52 and 60, confirmed on appeal in C-198/02 P(R), not published in the ECR, paras 46 and 49