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Document 52010IE0644
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European shipbuilding industry dealing with the current crisis’
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European shipbuilding industry dealing with the current crisis’
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European shipbuilding industry dealing with the current crisis’
SL C 18, 19.1.2011, p. 35–43
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
19.1.2011 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 18/35 |
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European shipbuilding industry dealing with the current crisis’
2011/C 18/07
Rapporteur: Marian KRZAKLEWSKI
Co-rapporteur: Enrique CALVET CHAMBON
On 16 July 2009, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Article 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on
The European shipbuilding industry dealing with the current crisis.
The Consultative Commission on Industrial Change, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 9 April 2010.
At its 462nd plenary session, held on 28 and 29 April 2010 (meeting of 29 April), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 168 votes to 14 with 12 abstentions.
1. Conclusions and recommendations
1.1 The European Economic and Social Committee is very concerned at the profound crisis affecting the EU shipbuilding industry, characterised by a complete lack of new orders, major problems in financing existing orders, overcapacity for construction of commercial vessels, irreversible jobs losses with further lay-offs forecast, and an ever growing number of bankruptcies and closures of shipyards and ancillary businesses.
1.2 The Committee is convinced that, as a result of the crisis, there is a need for a joint European strategy for the future of the EU shipbuilding industry and coordinated action by Member States in this regard. The first elements of this strategy should be defined and implemented no later than mid-2010 and should address the following urgent needs:
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stimulating demand (see 4.1 and 4.1.1), |
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financing (including a prolongation beyond 2011 of measures under the Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding), |
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ensuring employment measures (including support at the time of shipyard closures), |
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countering the absence of a level playing field. |
These measures should help counteract the tendency to adopt measures which might hamper competitiveness.
1.3 Given the lack of trade regulations for the shipbuilding sector that are legally binding throughout the world, the Committee believes that the Commission should be urged to invest greater energy and to take more direct action to protect this strategic sector. In the absence of an international agreement at the OECD, however, the EU must take direct and decisive action to protect the European shipbuilding sector from unfair competition.
1.4 European and national decision-makers, businesses in the sector and the social partners must take urgent steps to implement this joint project (1). The political aims of the project are to:
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maintain a strong and competitive industrial base for this high-tech sector in Europe capable of delivering high-levels of sustainable employment in the future; |
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avoid short-sighted redundancies during the downturn, maintain jobs and, equally important, to retain a highly-skilled workforce in this strategic sector; |
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give special consideration to the environmental and energy-saving arguments in favour of maritime transport – the European shipbuilding industry, and especially the marine equipment sub-sector, has significant potential to improve the situation in these two areas; |
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ensure cohesion in endangered coastal regions, including shipbuilding regions; |
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prevent the manufacturing capacity of shipyards from falling below the critical mass, otherwise the EU will be unable to produce vessels in future; |
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safeguard European know-how in the area of shipbuilding finance (2); |
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maintain European maritime skills (in research and higher education, among other areas); |
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ensure that the sector has significant potential for growth, innovation and expansion in the area of R&D; |
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make it clear that the costs of inaction are far greater than those of taking concrete measures to support the sector now (see example from the USA) (3). |
1.5 The Committee calls on the Council, the Commission and the Parliament to ensure that, as a matter of strategic priority, Europe seeks to maintain the critical mass that is required for shipbuilding and repair in Europe. This is essential in order:
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To monitor progress on environmental and energy matters in the area of transport and to monitor growth of energy efficiency in this area. |
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Not to lose the sector's major technological contribution to European industry, with its impact on other sectors (external economies). Once a shipyard closes, it does not open again. |
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To take advantage of future growth potential (e.g. making use of wind energy), which Europe may only do by using its capabilities in the field of shipbuilding. |
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To retain a sufficient capacity to respond to unprecedented conditions (in crisis situations, every vessel becomes a strategic element of the struggle, including commercial vessels). |
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To maintain a skilled workforce and sufficient high-level research in the shipbuilding industry, which otherwise would pass entirely into non-European hands in areas such as transport, sustainable growth, environmental conservation, and technological excellence in innovation. |
1.6 The Committee warns that the loss of vital critical mass in the shipbuilding sector will lead to the closure of institutions for training engineers and specialist technical staff and vocational schools for specialist workers. This means that the European Union risks losing critical intellectual mass to the benefit of its commercial and political rivals.
1.7 The Committee believes that, as in other sectors (e.g. automotive), Member States should pool their efforts to take joint action at European level with a view to enabling the sector to survive the crisis, with temporary short-term measures that take account of the sector's characteristics.
1.7.1 These measures should ensure that:
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new orders are secured as quickly as possible; |
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the link between shipyards, cooperating businesses and workers with vital know-how is maintained when the industry is going through a bad patch so that knowledge is not lost irretrievably as a result of a temporary crisis. |
1.8 As regards employment policy in the sector, the Committee believes that all means should be employed to prevent lay-offs. Qualified and skilled workers, of which there has been a lack in recent years, must be kept on. For the duration of the crisis in the sector, the public authorities must put in place common European frameworks for short-time working arrangements with a view to ensuring a level-playing field in Europe and protecting workers. This protection must be available to any worker who is at risk.
1.8.1 These frameworks must guarantee that jobs and purchasing power are maintained wherever possible, and ensure the right of all workers to access training and retraining. Programmes are needed to train and retrain shipyard workers in order to improve their individual skills and the general level of qualifications in shipyards.
Specific recommendations and proposals of the Committee
1.9 Action should be stepped up at European level in order to facilitate the urgent renewal of the fleet to take account of environmental issues. To this end, it is important to make use of the possibilities arising from the 2008 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection. The International Maritime Organisation should solve environmental issues on an international level as a matter of priority. This process is already under way.
1.10 Member States and the EU must address the problem of the long-term financing of the shipbuilding sector. A European financing instrument for shipbuilding should therefore be set up with the EIB. Industry, policy-makers and the EIB must explore how to make EIB funds for the promotion of ‘green technologies’ and clean transport available to the shipbuilding sector.
1.11 There needs to be stricter control of ship owners’ business practices so that they do not use European and national aid to purchase ships from shipyards outside the EU.
1.12 Help and support should be provided for the environmentally-friendly and economically responsible dismantling and modernisation (retrofitting) of old vessels, with European quality requirements for the shipyards that carry this out.
1.13 The Committee supports the LeaderSHIP 2015 initiative as a good framework for all stakeholders to jointly develop policies for the sector. Such a framework should also be extended to other industry sectors.
1.13.1 LS 2015 must develop a dynamic and bold action plan that focuses on strengthening the European shipbuilding industry, maintaining high-skill employment and addressing the environmental challenges linked to the shipbuilding industry. It is vital that the proposals developed in the context of LS 2015 are implemented by all stakeholders, in particular the EU institutions and Member States.
1.14 The Committee recommends that during the crisis the social partners make special use of the opportunities for social dialogue with a view to drawing up joint strategies for the future. Social dialogue is a platform for joint ideas and solutions to tackle current and future challenges for the shipbuilding sector. In this connection, social standards for workers in the European shipbuilding industry must also be agreed and implemented.
1.14.1 The Committee believes that the application in the sector of the principle of corporate social responsibility (CSR) should contribute to its sustainable development.
1.14.2 The Committee urges that specific measures be put in place in order to maintain the worker-business link during long periods of weak demand (labour pools, subsidised training, etc.).
1.14.3 The possibility of earmarking some ‘social’ support (ESF (4), ERDF, globalisation adjustment fund) temporarily for the shipbuilding sector should be reviewed.
1.15 The Committee supports the prompt establishment of a sectoral employment and skills council for the shipbuilding sector, in accordance with the new Commission strategy providing for the creation of such bodies.
1.16 Given the major importance of ‘green’ production and energy-saving vessels for the survival of the industry, it is vital to ensure that shipbuilding companies, colleges and the public authorities provide training and retraining programmes to promote and develop a relevant set of skills and competences enabling an effective transition to low emissions and energy-saving vessels. The Committee supports the idea of ‘green qualifications’ for all workers in the sector.
1.16.1 Use should be made in the shipbuilding sector of the ECVET, EQARF and EQF instruments to facilitate mobility and boost competitiveness and productivity.
1.17 The shipbuilding industry should be urged to broaden its objectives and activities (maritime world, aquaculture, off-shore energies, arctic dimension, etc.).
1.18 Technological measures should be directed towards new fields as well (including research) and the role of technological platforms (for example Waterborne) and collaboration between them strengthened.
1.19 The Commission should be urged to provide more support and to take more urgent action to introduce short sea-shipping, motorways of the sea and suitable vessels to use them which meet European environmental and energy requirements.
1.20 The Committee believes that in looking for solutions for European shipyards we cannot overlook an assessment of the marine equipment manufacturers, which are directly associated with them. The situation of this sector is significantly better than that of the shipyards (not least because businesses can relocate more easily). It is therefore worth examining the reasons why these situations are different and to draw conclusions which could be taken into account when we look for effective solutions for European shipyards.
The Committee intends to prepare a report on this sector and its impact on the shipbuilding sector.
2. Introduction – background to opinion and its objectives
2.1 The European shipbuilding industry (5) has been hit particularly hard by the current crisis, due to:
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its specific financial requirements, which are greater than in other sectors; |
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its enormous sensitivity to changes in world trade, which is now in free fall as far as demand for shipbuilding is concerned, largely as a result of the record growth in the number of commercial vessels in the world, whose surplus clearly outstrips the growth in the need for sea transport; |
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its competition, which comes primarily from States that adopt an interventionist approach towards the shipbuilding industry and view this sector as strategically important; |
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the fact that this crisis has arisen at a time when there is clear overcapacity of physical capital throughout the world, significantly exceeding requirements; |
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the fact that this crisis has occurred just as many European shipyards are emerging from an advanced and often painful process of restructuring, modernisation and enhanced technical development. An example of this is the situation of Polish shipyards; |
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the specific features of this sector (huge investments, long production cycles, prototypes and goods that are never mass-produced, etc.), which in a number of ways make shipbuilding inevitably and inherently rigid. In times of deep crisis this leads to drastic measures such as shipyard closures. |
2.2 There is a real danger of losing the critical mass (6) needed to sustain production of European shipyards and this factor should be considered in order to assess the damage that such an event would cause, from economic, social, technological and strategic points of view, for the future of the Europe we wish to build.
2.3 The abovementioned factors have led the Committee to draw up this opinion, which focuses on the specific consequences of the crisis for the shipbuilding industry. The opinion examines the issue from economic and social perspectives (concerning employment, high-quality jobs, and the regional impact) and from technological and strategic angles.
2.4 In this opinion, the Committee also carries out a mid-term review and evaluation of the implementation of the LeaderSHIP 2015 initiative and seeks to answer the following questions: what can be done to ensure success and avoid failure, and how can this initiative be updated in response to new factors emerging from the economic crisis?
3. The specific consequences of the crisis for the shipbuilding industry
3.1 Given the unique nature of the shipbuilding sector, it is important to stress that the accumulation of financial problems in this sector, which is the result of both the ongoing financing problems (7), and an unfavourable stage in the economic cycle, as well as the withdrawal by investors of funding of previously placed orders (and the ever increasing number of cases of trade in second-hand ships (8)) poses a serious risk, especially as this branch of industry has always had more financing problems than other sectors.
3.1.1 The EU shipbuilding sector, and in particular the sub-sector of shipyards building large and medium-sized ships, is also suffering from the absence of a level playing field and from unfair competition from other parts of the world, something which has been happening for decades. The sector still lacks a system of trade regulations that are legally binding throughout the world. Furthermore, we cannot overlook the fact that the crisis has highlighted overcapacity in countries that are ruthlessly striving after permanent public funding of national production.
3.1.2 Given the unprecedented overlapping of many of the abovementioned adverse circumstances, the problem with which the sector is currently confronted cannot be treated simply as ‘history repeating itself’, but rather as a new and dramatic challenge. It is important to point out that the nature of these difficulties is more financial than industrial/structural.
3.1.3 However, the crisis presents an opportunity to take steps to maintain and safeguard the critical mass necessary to retain advanced technologies in this sector which, although at risk of collapse, is key to maritime transport. Unfortunately, European shipyards are at risk of losing this critical mass.
3.2 The shipbuilding industry demonstrates a characteristic tendency to lag behind any economic recovery. Given this unfavourable tendency, unless the sector is supported it may be fatally damaged which might also happen should the temporary support measures already under way be discontinued too early.
3.2.1 In the shipbuilding industry a period of growth has given way to a period of decline. This has been a familiar trend in the shipbuilding industry for decades and the EU should anticipate the effects of the economic cycle in its sectoral policies.
3.3 In discussing the causes and consequences of the difficult situation in the sector, it is important to mention the specific circumstances of countries such as Poland or Romania.
The dramatic situation in Poland, reflected in the current collapse of production at two major shipyards in Gdynia and Szczecin, is the result of a combination of several disastrous circumstances which were not anticipated several years in advance. These were as follows: the abandonment of efforts to reform and restructure the sector primarily as a result of the political decision between 2002 and 2003 and the failure to take advantage of the benign economic climate in the European and international market between 2003 and 2008.
3.4 This is an industry of strategic importance in itself, and also in relation to other sectors and employment. This is particularly noteworthy and evident in these times of crisis. The Commission and hopefully the current EU presidency have also recognised this fact. Political action should therefore be expected and required of them. Unfortunately to date there has been a lack of clear support on the part of the majority of those Member States which have a shipbuilding sector.
3.5 The social impact of the crisis in the shipbuilding industry is very significant at regional level. Rising unemployment in shipbuilding regions and the loss of a significant proportion of regional GDP may be more drastic than in national industries, in which support measures are being carried out nationwide.
3.6 When a shipyard is closed down, it is usually for good. At this point, know-how or advanced technologies will be lost irretrievably. In practice, all shipbuilding products are pilot or prototype products, with each of them containing a different R&D component. If Europe loses them, then the future of environmentally-friendly and low-carbon transport guaranteed by ‘clean ships’ will lie in other, uncertain hands. In addition, the loss of critical mass poses the risk of limiting access to energy and raw materials from the oceans and to minerals extracted off-shore.
3.7 The repair sub-sector is not in crisis, but may be beginning to feel the competition from construction shipyards which are shifting their profile towards repair. Recently, however, there have been cases where repair shipyards have purchased (or leased) elements of manufacturing infrastructure from construction shipyards and employed groups of skilled workers from shipyards that have been shut down.
3.8 Shipbuilding and repair and the high-tech equipment and materials used for this purpose play a key role not least in defending Europe, improving protection and security and the environment and in transferring technologies to other areas of industry, which represents an important argument in the search for a way out of the current crisis in the sector.
3.9 In describing the situation of the shipbuilding sector, and especially that of shipyards, we cannot overlook an assessment of the marine equipment manufacturing sector, which is directly linked to it. In Europe, this sector employs almost twice as many workers as the shipbuilding sector (excluding employment in the yacht and recreational boat-building sector, which is one and a half times greater than in the traditional shipbuilding sector). The EU marine equipment manufacturing sector's share of global production of hi-tech equipment is considerably higher than that of shipyards, amounting to 36 % (compared with Asia's 50 % share, which concerns products of a lower class). The situation of marine equipment suppliers is therefore incomparably better than that of shipyards.
3.10 It is therefore worth examining the reasons why these situations are different and drawing conclusions which could be taken into account when we look for effective solutions for European shipyards. Solutions applied in this sector and its natural ties to shipyards may create valuable synergy worthy of implementation throughout the shipbuilding sector. At the same time, we should not overlook the prognosis of a considerable deterioration in the situation of the European equipment sector in the event of a loss of critical mass by European shipyards.
4. Proposed action and solutions for dealing with the current crisis in the sector
4.1 There is an urgent need to increase demand for the products and services offered by the entire sector (including repair). The Committee believes that, to this end, it is important to encourage the environmentally-friendly modernisation (retrofitting) of old or unsafe as well as ‘polluting’ ships through legislative measures and economic incentives.
4.1.1 To bridge over the problem of the poor market situation in this sector, the EU and Member States could, among other things, support/finance environmental improvements and energy savings in the EU commercial fleet, together with the subcontracting industry/marine equipment.
4.1.2 European yards should concentrate in building ships which have a comparative advantage i.e.: specialised high quality & high tech ships (9).
4.2 Consideration should be given to specific measures within the framework of ‘internal’ flexicurity, protecting the link between workers in the sector and their know-how in the dumping phase of the cycle (10). These should be supported through negotiations within the framework of social dialogue and the organisation of state aid measures for this purpose.
4.2.1 Certain regional structural support measures could be reviewed once again and focused on the sector. The ERDF (11) could be a source of funding for some instruments of this type.
4.3 To date, the struggle for a level playing field on the competitive market for shipbuilding and ship repair has been neither serious nor fair. Free competition must be ensured in Europe, but this sector, which has to square up to the rest of the world, must be offered the same level of protection as its competitors outside the EU.
4.3.1 If the shipbuilding sector is to be regarded as strategically important, then, as far as competition from outside the EU is concerned, we should take action similar to that which is being taken for example in connection with the motor vehicle sector. At the same time, however, the latest agreement with Korea does not even require fulfilment of its most recent and previous obligations; this is not a serious approach.
4.3.2 Korea must respect its commitment to ‘normal value prices’ and refrain from bailing out shipyards. The Commission should recommend this at the OECD meeting concerning the negotiations on the new shipbuilding agreement.
4.4 Shipbuilding linked to defence also has an important role to play in the sector's future. Consideration should be given here to action undertaken by the European Defence Agency which should be regarded as forward-looking. It would be worth mentioning at this point the opportunities that dual-use technologies will create for this sub-sector.
4.5 It is important to develop the capacity and potential of the WATERBORNE technological platform in connection with the shipbuilding sector as part of the 7th R&D framework programme and its collaboration with other technological platforms, and in so doing maintain the development of one of shipyards’ most important weapons, namely R&D&I measures.
4.6 Maintaining a critical mass of industry at European level is essential if we wish to have safe, ‘green’ and energy-saving ships, which will have a key influence on the future of environmental protection at sea, the costs of all transport and the protection and maintenance of European transport in terms of energy supply (coastal ships, platforms, worker accommodation on drilling platforms, offshore wind farms, etc.) This is also linked to the idea of organising green transport (short sea shipping, motorways of the sea, etc.)
4.6.1 Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection [2008/C82/01] explicitly mention the acquisition of environmentally-friendly vessels. These guidelines need to be implemented swiftly and without red tape.
4.7 In light of current challenges, the general system of support for mass production sectors provided by the framework programmes should be adapted to the needs of the sector, ensuring that they are applied in high-tech shipbuilding, which usually produces prototypes or short production runs.
4.8 The 2003 European financial framework on state aid to shipbuilding (12), which was drawn up by the European Commission, is useful and should be prolonged beyond 2011 in order to ensure reliable innovation conditions. The renewed principles should correspond more effectively to the specific and most recent needs of the sector and ensure greater stability within it.
5. The LeaderSHIP 2015 initiative – what can we do to ensure it helps the sector in the current crisis and to avoid failure?
5.1 When the LeaderSHIP 2015 (LS) initiative was drawn up by the sector and supported by EU decision-makers in the 2002-2003 period, the prospects for the European shipbuilding industry appeared to be rather poor. New orders had dried up, and the costs of building new ships were low and falling due to major growth in Asian production capacity.
5.1.1 The LS 2015 strategy is currently at its halfway point but the sector is in a similar or – given the global crisis – possibly even worse situation than at the time the initiative was launched.
5.1.2 Six years ago, the LS 2015 initiative was understood as a vision based on faith in the production capacities and innovative potential of the European maritime sectors and on a determination to fight for the future. It would appear that this approach still applies but the initiative itself must be adjusted and adapted to the here and now in particular by drawing conclusions from the period of its establishment and implementation.
5.2 The assessment of the LS2015 by the social partners from the shipbuilding sector is as follows:
a. |
The key achievements are:
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b. |
The key shortcomings are:
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5.2.1 In short, the social partners believe that the long-term approach must be adjusted using measures that respond to the crisis.
5.3 In a document giving its view on the progress of the LS 2015 programme's implementation two years ago, the Commission gave the following final opinion: ‘LeaderSHIP 2015 continues to provide an appropriate framework for its policies towards the shipbuilding sector. It should continue and be accelerated where possible, particularly with regard to the issue of ship financing. But it should also be noted that in many areas the ball is largely in the field of industry (e.g. industry structure) or of Member States.’ The Commission declares that it remains committed to LeaderSHIP 2015 and will continue to strive to ensure that the best policy mix is being crafted and applied at EU level.
5.4 Notwithstanding the content or intentions of the above assessment, we need to make it quite clear that, over two years since this document was drawn up, there is an urgent need (largely due to the changes in the sector caused by the crisis) for it to be updated and included in the programme of renewed instruments, although the general outlines of the most important measures relating to the sector do not seem to have lost any of their relevance.
5.4.1 It appears that the main problem in making a success of the LS 2015 initiative is that planned activities are not being implemented effectively and that it is finding limited expression in some Member States, especially those which have not been members for long.
5.5 As regards the impact of the LS 2015 initiative on employment in the shipbuilding industry, assessments in some circles have been quite sceptical (14). They find fault with the initiative for its lack of concrete implementation. They stress that the only changes achieved due to implementation of LS2015 were mainly of a qualitative nature and concerned new skills for workers.
Brussels, 29 April 2010.
The President of the European Economic and Social Committee
Mario SEPI
(1) The planned response to the crisis was presented in Bremerhaven at the meeting of high-level representatives within the framework of the LeaderSHIP initiative.
(2) Until now Europe has dominated the shipbuilding credit markets. In order to safeguard and build on this know-how, a European guarantee system must be established that allows the shipyards to secure the financing of existing and future orders. Europe must maintain and further develop its role as a centre for ship financing.
(3) The commercial impact of a loss of critical mass in the USA was a 300 % increase in the costs of building new vessels following the crisis in the sector.
(4) European Social Fund.
(5) A definition of this term can be found in the glossary at the end of the opinion.
(6) A minimum level of total production in the shipyards of EU Member States is essential in order to ensure that the shipbuilding sector continues to function in the EU.
(7) Ever increasing funding problems as a result of low profit margins (CESA).
(8) The surplus of ships significantly outstrips the growth in the need for sea transport; if all the new ships were placed end to end they would stretch out over an area of 60 nautical miles (according to Bloomberg and Clarkson Research Services).
(9) Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can quote passenger ships, cruise ships, yachts, pleasure crafts, service ships, cars and chemical carriers, LNG/LEG/LPG carriers, offshore ships, middle ice breakers, hotel ships, fishing protection vessels, towing supply vessels, drilling platforms, offshore wind farms, vessels intended for military purpose, ships equipped with dual use technology, modern multi-purpose cargo ships, tugboats and research vessels.
(10) The period in which the effects of the crisis and the downturn in the economic cycle appear (very limited number of orders).
(11) European Regional Development Fund.
(13) Leadership Platform Financing.
(14) Presentation: ‘Assessment of the impact of the LeaderSHIP 2015 programme on employment in the shipbuilding sector’, Jerzy Bieliński, Renata Płoska, University of Gdansk, Poland.
APPENDIX 1
Glossary of Terms:
— Shipbuilding (including ship repair and conversion): is directed at the larger (mainly sea-going) vessels, intended for merchant/commercial purposes, but also naval vessels. It also addresses the products and services supplied for the building, conversion, and maintenance of these ships (seagoing and inland) (1). Within the shipbuilding industry two sub-sectors can be distinguished (2):
Ship Construction
Marine Equipment
— Ship Construction: includes the building of ships, ship repair (and conversion) and is directed at larger commercial seagoing vessels. This also includes the mega-yacht sub-sector.
— Marine Equipment: comprises all products and services supplied for the building, conversion and maintenance of ships (seagoing and inland) and maritime structures. This includes technical services in the field of engineering, installation and commissioning, and ship maintenance (including repair) (3).
Facts and Figures:
Shipyards:
There are around 150 large shipyards in Europe, with around 40 of them active in the global market for large sea-going commercial vessels. Around 120 000 people are directly employed by shipyards (civilian and naval, new building and repair) in the European Union. With a market share of around 15 % in volume terms, Europe is still vying with the countries of East Asia for global leadership in terms of the value of civilian ships produced (EUR 15 billion in 2007) (4).
Marine Equipment:
Direct employment in the marine equipment sector is estimated at more than 287 000 whilst indirect employment amounts to about 436 000. The annual turnover of the sector in 2008 was estimated at around EUR 42 billion (5). Nearly 46 % of equipment produced is for export. The marine equipment sector is the third largest in the maritime cluster after shipping and fisheries (6).
(1) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/index_en.htm.
(2) ECORYS, Study on Competitiveness of the European shipbuilding Industry, Rotterdam, October 2009.
(3) http://www.emec.eu/marine_equipment/index.asp.
(4) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/index_en.htm.
(5) EMEC members: Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and United Kingdom.
(6) http://www.emec.eu/marine_equipment/index.asp.
APPENDIX 2
to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
The following amendment, which was supported by at least a quarter of the votes cast, was rejected in the debate:
Point 1.11
To be deleted:
‘ |
’ |
Result of the vote
Votes in favour |
: |
65 |
Votes against |
: |
108 |
Abstentions |
: |
18 |