EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 11.7.2023

SWD(2023) 443 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

on the use of railway infrastructure capacity in the single European railway area, amending Directive 2012/34/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) No 913/2010

{COM(2023) 443 final} - {SEC(2023) 443 final} - {SWD(2023) 444 final}

1.Introduction: Political and legal context

1.1.Political context

1.2.Interaction with other EU policy instruments

1.3.Legal context

1.4.Economic context

1.5.Ex-post evaluation

2.Problem definition

2.1.What are the problems?

2.2.What are the problem drivers?

2.3.How likely is the problem to persist?

3.Why should the EU act?

3.1.Legal basis

3.2.Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action

3.3.Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action

4.Objectives: What is to be achieved?

4.1.General objective

4.2.Specific objectives

5.What are the available policy options?

5.1.What is the baseline from which options are assessed?

5.2.Policy measures and policy options

5.3.Overview of policy options

5.4.Description of policy options

6.What are the impacts of the policy options?

6.1.Economic impacts

6.2.Social impacts

6.3.Environmental impacts

7.How do the options compare?

7.1.Effectiveness

7.2.Efficiency

7.3.Coherence

7.4.Subsidiarity and proportionality

8.Preferred option

8.1.Identification of the preferred policy option

8.2.REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)

8.3.Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach

8.4.Sensitivity analysis of the policy options

9.How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?

Annex 1: Procedural information

1.Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references

2.Organisation and timing

3.Consultation of the RSB

4.Evidence, sources and quality

Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report)

1.Consultation strategy and overview of Consultation activities

2.Feedback on the Call for Evidence

3.Results of the open public consultation

3.1.Questions on challenges and problems

3.2.Questions on measures and solutions

4.Targeted stakeholder consultation

4.1.Organisation and participants

4.2.Outcome of the targeted stakeholder consultation

5.Workshops on the initiative organised via PRIME and RU-Dialogue

Annex 3: Who is affected and how?

5.Practical implications of the initiative

6.Summary of costs and benefits

7.Relevant sustainable development goals

Annex 4: Analytical methods

1.Description of the analytical methods used

2.Baseline scenario

2.1.Main assumptions of the Baseline scenario

2.2.Baseline scenario results

3.Impacts of policy measure in terms of costs and cost savings

4.Direct transport impacts per policy option

4.1.Impacts on infrastructure capacity

4.2.Impacts on train punctuality

4.3.Impacts on temporary capacity restrictions

4.4.Impacts on the reliability of rail transport services

4.5.Impacts on rail transport activity per policy option

4.6.Sensitivity analysis

Annex 5: Data and information about the rail sector

1.Uncoordinated temporary capacity restrictions (TCRs)

2.Reliability of rail services

3.Punctuality of rail services

4.Punctuality of international trains at selected border crossing points

5.Speed of international rail freight services

6.Congested sections and overall length of rail networks

7.Evidence of rail infrastructure capacity requested, allocated and used

8.Changes / modifications of timetable requests

9.Information supporting the ‘SME test’ for railway undertakings

10.Regional differences of the rail network and rail markets in EU

Annex 6: Retained policy measures

Annex 7: Description of the TTR project

1.Genesis

2.Objectives

3.Key elements

4.Ownership and support

Annex 8: Effectiveness of the different policy options

Annex 9: Discarded policy options

Glossary

1.Introduction: Political and legal context

This impact assessment accompanies a legislative proposal amending the rules for rail infrastructure capacity allocation and rail traffic management 1  for domestic and cross-border passenger and freight trains with the purpose of improving the performance of railway transport, particularly of cross-border trains.

1.1.Political context

Transport by railway is an environmentally friendly mode of transport. In 2020, it performed 5.1% of intra-EU passenger transport and 11.5% of intra-EU freight transport while being responsible for only 0.4% of transport greenhouse gas emissions in the EU 2 . This can be explained by the energy efficiency of rail transport – which accounts for only 1.5% of transport energy consumption – and by the fact that most train kilometres are performed on electrified lines 3 . In view of these and other favourable characteristics, such as its high level of safety, EU policy consistently promotes railway transport.

Several Commission strategic policy documents refer to the general objective of boosting freight and passenger railway transport, as well as to the need to address specific aspects that are relevant to railway performance. One of these aspects is the management of capacity of and traffic on the rail network, which is the topic of this initiative.

The European Green Deal Communication 4 confirmed the EU’s goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and the need to reduce transport emissions by 90% by 2050. It called for a strong boost to multimodal transport and for a substantial part of the 75% of inland freight carried today by road to shift onto rail and inland waterways, recognising that this ‘…will require measures to manage better, and to increase the capacity of railways…’. The sustainable and smart mobility strategy 5 referred to the need to strengthen cross-border coordination and cooperation between rail infrastructure managers, to have a better overall management of the rail network and to deploy new technologies to boost rail freight. In the strategy, the Commission announced that it would propose improved rules on rail capacity allocation in line with the ongoing rail sector initiatives. In the action plan to boost long distance and cross-border passenger rail 6 , the Commission further detailed its intentions by announcing that it would work on an initiative to improve capacity allocation and traffic management processes, aiming at better coordination of the capacity allocation within the overall rail system, covering passenger and freight services.

The initiative contributes towards Sustainable Development Goal 13 (‘Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’) by contributing to the increased availability of rail – an environmentally friendly mode of transport.

1.2.Interaction with other EU policy instruments

This initiative complements other measures that aim to reduce emissions from transport and promote the use of more sustainable modes including railways, like the introduction of carbon pricing on road transport and the facilitation of multimodal travel via better ticketing. Together with measures that improve the performance and attractiveness of railway transport – such as the implementation and enforcement of the Single European Railway Area and the ongoing work on technical specifications for the interoperability of the railway system – all these initiatives contribute to boosting demand for railway transport, which, however, the railway network must be capable of accommodating.

The present proposal will help to ease congestion and generate additional capacity on the existing network. In parallel, the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation 7 creates the conditions for expanding and improving transport infrastructure, building an effective EU-wide and multimodal transport network.

1.3.Legal context

Directive 2012/34/EU 8 establishing a single European railway area (hereafter ‘the Recast Directive’) sets up the Union’s legal framework for the Single European railway area. In particular, it lays down the rules on: i) the management of railway infrastructure and the activities of the railway undertakings; ii) the licencing of railway undertakings; and iii) the principles and procedures applicable to railway infrastructure charges and to the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity. The latter part, which provides the general framework for allocation of network capacity, is directly relevant to the present initiative.

Regulation (EU) 913/2010 9 concerning a European rail network for competitive freight (hereafter ‘the Rail Freight Corridors Regulation’ or ‘the RFC Regulation’) intends to address the specific needs of rail freight and constitutes a lex specialis for freight. Based on it, Member States established 11 rail freight corridors including lines crossing the territory of at least two Member States and linking two or more terminals (see Figure 23  in Annex 5). The RFC Regulation provides for a dedicated governance structure of these corridors and for special rules on capacity management and allocation, including the use of a one-stop shop for capacity requests. Corridor one-stop shops are another key feature of the RFC Regulation whose objective is to provide railway undertakings and other applicants with a single point of contact for the submission of requests for capacity on corridors spanning more than one network.

1.4.Economic context

The technical characteristics of rail imply that the capacity of and the traffic on the rail infrastructure must be managed at network level by a single actor to ensure the high level of coordination needed for safe operations and efficient use of the network 10 . The management and operation of rail infrastructure thus constitutes a natural monopoly that requires detailed regulation and oversight, as provided in EU legislation. These tasks are assigned to rail infrastructure managers (IMs), who supply rail infrastructure services to railway transport operators.

The provision of rail transport services, on the contrary, has been liberalised in a gradual manner since 2007 11 . The operators of railway transport services, referred to as ‘railway undertakings’ (RUs), benefit from open and non-discriminatory access to the railway infrastructure and compete not only in the market for transport of passengers and freight, but also with respect to access to the network. Availability of train paths is indispensable for the provision of RUs’ services, but network capacity is a scarce resource, since not all train paths are of equal quality and certain lines are congested.

The quality of infrastructure services provided by IMs has direct and significant impacts on the performance and quality of rail transport services. Poor management of capacity does not fully exploit the network and limits the volume of transport services that RUs can offer. Poor management of traffic implies longer times to return to normal operations after any deviation from the plan and results in unnecessary delays to transport services.

Rail infrastructure capacity availability, quality and issues differ between EU regions and Member States. These differences reflect geographical, topographical and historical circumstances and transport policy decisions about developing and using rail. To begin with, the density of the rail network differs considerably between Member States and a clear difference is noticeable between the central and peripheral regions of the EU, with the former having a denser network (see Annex 5, Figure 21 ). Traffic density also differs considerably, as does the predominant use (domestic vs cross-border and passenger vs freight) as shown by the data in Annex 5,section 10. Whereas passenger traffic is dominated by domestic services, freight is split almost in equal parts between domestic and cross-border.

The rail freight market can be better analysed by dividing it into three broad segments: block trains, intermodal trains, and single wagon business. The market share of these different market segments depends on economic structure of a Member State or a region and in particular on the presence of heavy industry, which is a traditional user of rail freight.

A block train transports many wagons carrying a single, generally bulky, commodity between two sidings. These are the trains that typically carry metal ores, coke, coal and lignite, basic metals, chemicals, agriculture products, and wood. To a large extent this is a captive and profitable market since road transport does not represent a viable alternative. It is, however, a slowly declining market considering the progressive dematerialisation of the economy.

Intermodal trains carry intermodal loading units, such as containers or semi-trailers, between transhipment terminals. There is no available data on what is being transported in the units, but this is the segment that competes more directly with road transport. It is also a segment that is growing strongly. Data indicates that intermodal rail freight has grown by over 50% in tonne kilometres in the period 2011-2021 12 and its share expressed in rail freight tonne kilometres in the EU is growing steadily. The greater the distance that goods must travel, the greater the advantage of rail with respect to road-only transport. The break-even point is generally considered to be at 300-400 km.

Single wagon load trains are long distance trains that are assembled from various locations and then distributed to various destinations. The need to accompany these trains with feeder and distribution traffic, and the time and complexity of the shunting operations, makes them particularly costly and generally unprofitable. This segment is declining sharply, although there are technologies that could greatly reduce the cost of shunting operations (digital automatic coupling) and could revive this market sector.

The main types of goods transported by rail in 2021, based on tonne-kilometers, were ‘metal ores and other mining and quarrying products; peat; uranium and thorium’ (12.6%), ‘coke and refined petroleum products’ (9.5%), ‘basic metals; fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment’ (8.9 %), and ‘chemicals, chemical products, and man-made fibers; rubber and plastic products; nuclear fuel’ (8.2%). In terms of weight (in tonnes), the main type of goods transported were ‘metal ores and other mining and quarrying products; peat; uranium and thorium’ (15.3%), followed by ‘coal and lignite; crude petroleum and natural gas‘ (11.9%), ‘basic metals; fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment’ (9.4%), ‘coke and refined petroleum products’ (9.2%), and ‘chemicals, chemical products, and man-made fibers; rubber and plastic products; nuclear fuel’ (7.6%). Unidentifiable goods, which can be assumed to be indicative of the volume of traffic for intermodal trains, represented the highest share of 27.5% of the total measured in tonne-kilometres and 22.1% of the total measured in tonnes, as shown in Figure 1 13 .

Figure 1: Rail freight transport by type of goods

There are strong differences in the Member States in the relative size of these segments, which largely reflect the structure of the economy.

Rail transports some 1.6 billion tonnes of freight and 7.1 billion passengers every year in the EU 14 . National transport represents more than 90% of the total rail passenger transport traffic for all EU Member States, with a few exceptions (e.g. Luxembourg and Lithuania close to 70%, Austria with 77% and Slovenia with 80%) (see Annex 5, section 10,  Table 80 ). For freight, at EU level the share of national transport is more or less half of the total freight (2018 figures indicating domestic traffic at 48% of total rail freight, see Annex 5, section 10, Table 81 ). At Member State level, countries that registered the highest shares of cross-border rail freight are located on key corridors within the European market and have a relatively small territory (Slovenia, the Baltic Member States, Denmark, Slovakia, etc.). The Netherlands, strategically situated in the heart of the European market, has a share of over 80% of cross-border freight measured as share of the total tonne-kilometres. The key port of Rotterdam, with large sea/rail transfers of goods dispatched within the EU, is one of the main driver for this large share. The Baltic States, and in particularly Latvia and Estonia, also have a very high share of cross-border rail freight above 90% (Annex 5, section 10, Table 81 ). The network in the Baltic States has the Russian track gauge and not the European standard gauge, which means that until now the vast majority of the rail transit freight traffic flows in the Baltic States originated in Russia and Belarus 15 .

The EU rail network consists largely in mixed-use lines that serve different passenger and freight transport markets on the same infrastructure. The key exception are high-speed lines which are used exclusively for long-distance in some Member States and some freight-only lines in industrial regions and logistics hubs. The construction of new rail infrastructure has differed significantly between Member States as do the resources dedicated to maintenance and renewal of the network.

In terms of differences between different EU regions, it should be noted that the regional distribution of railway infrastructure is shaped by specific historical developments, economic developments and the geographical characteristics of regions. For example, some large EU Member States that have considerable distances between major cities have developed high-speed rail infrastructure (e.g., Germany, Spain, France and Italy). Some of the Member States that are more densely populated, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, have a higher frequency of (generally less rapid) trains. Several eastern European Member States have relatively extensive rail networks, reflecting a legacy from the communist or Soviet era when there was often a greater reliance on rail (compared with road) for transporting passengers and goods. Figure 22 in Annex 5 presents rail freight transport by NUTS2-level region in 2020 – as measured by the quantity of goods loaded. In general, the lowest levels of rail freight transport were recorded in rural and peripheral regions of the EU (where rail infrastructure was often less extensive). The highest levels of rail freight transport were in a cluster of regions centred on Germany and its neighbours. Many of these regions are characterised as manufacturing centres, where goods are loaded onto railways to be transported within the EU and also to the EU’s main ports. Others, such as Hamburg and Zuid-Holland, are regions with major maritime ports, whereby goods arriving by sea are loaded onto railways to be transported to distribution and/or manufacturing centres. Based on available information, the highest levels of rail freight transport in 2020 were recorded in the German regions of Düsseldorf, Sachsen-Anhalt, Hamburg and Braunschweig (each had 26.9–29.9 million tonnes of goods loaded), as well as the Dutch region of Zuid-Holland (which includes the EU’s largest port of Rotterdam; 18.9 million tonnes) 16 .

As a result of demand and supply-side developments, the challenges with respect to rail infrastructure capacity differ significantly between Member States. As a general tendency, Member States in the centre and north-west of the EU have well-developed and maintained rail infrastructure but face congestion issues due to high levels of demand and limited infrastructure expansion in the last decades. By contrast, in Member States at the periphery of the EU, capacity is often abundant but the quality of the infrastructure and its management is often poor, due to deferred maintenance/renewal and a general under-financing of the rail sector. In addition, expenditure on maintenance and renewals increased in the past decade across the EU. While improving the situation in the medium to long-term, the surge in infrastructure works poses important challenges for the provision of sufficient capacity in the short term.

The total length of railway tracks that was declared congested in the EU has more than tripled between 2015 and 2020. Germany, Romania and Lithuania in particular were the Member States reporting the highest number of kilometres of freight corridors congested (620, 320 and 309 km respectively). These figures on congestion, although indicative of the different situation in terms of available capacity in different Member States, may underrepresent the scale of the problem as some infrastructure managers appear to refrain from declaring lines as congested.

This initiative consists mainly in reviewing the legal rules applicable to IMs and to the services they provide. However, since the performance of rail transport services is the combined result of the activities of all the operators involved, it will also consider providing adequate incentives to other stakeholders, in particular the RUs, to make best use of the network’s capacity.

1.5.Ex-post evaluation

In 2018, the Commission produced a report on the application of the RFC Regulation 17 , followed, in 2021, by an evaluation 18 . The conclusions of the evaluation are that there had been limited use of the corridors’ structures and a general failure to attain the goals of the Regulation. Meanwhile, the developments during the COVID-19 pandemic – when more capacity became available to freight following the collapse of passenger transport – confirmed that there is much unexploited potential for cross-border rail freight and therefore measures to improve rail freight’s access to infrastructure capacity remain relevant.

On the positive side, the evaluation found that the RFC Regulation contributed to the objective of improved cooperation, and also – but to a lesser extent – to the objective of increasing the competitiveness of rail freight in the multimodal transport system. Rail freight corridors also provided fertile ground for initiatives aiming to remove technical and operational bottlenecks, modernise timetabling, and predict train arrival times.

The evaluation identified the following weaknesses:

-The use of one-stop shops and pre-arranged train paths was lower than expected and therefore the Regulation failed to provide better quality and more infrastructure capacity for cross-border rail freight.

-The Regulation did not harmonise tools and procedures, which were in use at national level, thus failing to facilitate cross-border rail freight.

-The contribution of the Regulation to coordinating cross-border investments was limited at best.

-The main stakeholders failed to monitor thoroughly the performance of rail freight services with a view to developing and implementing effective plans to improve performance.

-There was limited progress at best on improving traffic management and coordination with terminals.

Table 1  summarises the weaknesses identified by the evaluation and the way in which this impact assessment addresses them, together with more general improvements to the current provisions on capacity allocation.

Table 1: Summary of the conclusions of the evaluation of the RFC Regulation and links to the IA

2.Problem definition

2.1.What are the problems?

The problems, underlying problem drivers and consequences that are relevant for this initiative are presented in Figure 2. The public consultation and the targeted stakeholder consultation carried out as part of the impact assessment support study (‘the support study’) 19 indicated overall agreement with this analysis.

Figure 2: Overview of drivers, problems and their consequences

Problem 1: Poor performance of cross-border rail services, in particular freight

At present, cross-border rail services (in particular freight) suffer from poor reliability, punctuality, and predictability; slow speed; and long transit times 20 . The information available from the evaluation of the RFC Regulation suggests that freight trains’ punctuality at departure is relatively poor and cannot be rectified during the train run, with punctuality at destination being even worse 21 . The evaluation concluded that: ‘Data shows that a considerable number of trains running on the rail freight corridors start with a delay of over 30 minutes’ 22 . This makes rail services less attractive than other modes of freight transport 23 . The demand for rail transport services depends on the available alternatives and is driven by various factors whose relative importance differs between market segments. The cost of the transport service is an obvious determinant, but in freight transport – particularly in the context of complex supply chains (e.g. just-in-time production) – reliability and predictability play a major role in the choice of mode.

65% of the respondents (80 out of 97) who expressed opinions during the open public consultation appeared supportive of this problem, mirrored by similar views collected during the targeted survey (60 out of 88 respondents).

Problem 2: Insufficient infrastructure capacity to absorb growth in transport/traffic

Railway transport not only struggles to attract additional customers, particularly for freight, but also faces difficulties in accommodating existing (and prospective) demand owing to the limits of rail infrastructure capacity, especially on certain parts of the network. Indeed, the total length of railway tracks that was declared congested 24 in the EU has more than tripled between 2015 and 2020 25 . In total, in 2020, congestion affected 2 934 km of tracks 26 , more than half of which affected rail freight corridors (cross-border traffic), namely 1 816 km 27 . It is worth noting that the available figures may understate the scale of the problem, as IMs may be inclined to underreport congestion 28 , which would automatically trigger the need for corrective action on their part 29 . 

The effects of congestion extend beyond the congested section: the entire train path (from origin to destination) suffers from the bottleneck effect created by the congestion, which severely limits the number of available train paths 30 . Congestion implies that certain trains are either denied a train path or redirected to less favourable routes/times that do not correspond to the needs of demand. Accordingly, growth of rail transport is not only hindered by shortfalls in service quality that thwart potential demand (Problem 1), but also by lack of available capacity on the network (Problem 2) that act as physical limit to supply.

The vast majority of respondents who expressed opinions during the open public consultation (77 out of 93) agreed with this problem, supported by similar views collected during the targeted survey (83 out of 88 respondents).

2.2.What are the problem drivers?

Trains can run on the rail network only after requesting and receiving a ‘train path’, that is availability of infrastructure along a specific route over a given period. IMs are responsible for allocating train paths following requests from train operators, RUs, and other applicants. It is important to note that the allocation of train paths does not consist of a simple attribution of slots based on clearly defined priority criteria. It is a complex process of optimising the use of a network where freight and passenger trains use the same lines but have different destinations and different driving characteristics (speed, acceleration and deceleration profiles, weights and lengths). In addition, IMs are responsible for maintaining and renewing the infrastructure and, for this purpose, must schedule time windows to carry out the necessary works 31 .

The quality of allocated capacity is not uniform. Capacity is considered of good quality when is in line with the applicants’ needs in terms of train characteristics (e.g. speed and weight), routings, timings, and stability vis-à-vis external disturbances such as accidents (e.g. availability of buffer times and alternative routes). Typical indicators of quality include the commercial speed that is guaranteed to an applicant 32   33 . The quality of capacity also depends on when it is assigned: rail passenger operators need advanced availability to enable early-on tickets sales; freight transport operators need capacity available on short notice in line with the volatile customer demand imposed by today’s fast-paced supply chains.

Therefore, effective capacity management pursues three objectives: (i) maximisation of rail traffic and network use; (ii) provision of train paths of high quality; and (iii) balanced allocation of capacity to different services (passengers and freight, domestic and cross-border) matching society’s needs to the best extent possible. In the planning phase, a compromise between these three goals must be found. Currently, several factors (described in the following sections as problem drivers) prevent effective capacity management and result in sub-optimal utilisation of infrastructure capacity. Freight transport and cross-border traffic are the market segments that suffer the most from these shortcomings.

2.2.1.Problem driver 1: Legal and procedural obstacles for capacity management

Problem driver 1 is linked to problem 1 and problem 2. The capacity management procedure imposed by the Recast Directive is centred around an annual exercise – the definition of the annual working timetable – that allocates most capacity based on simultaneous requests from all applicants. Requests for capacity under the annual timetable need to be made 8 months before the start of the annual timetable (second Saturday of December at midnight). The IM is obliged to meet, as far as possible, all requests and must adhere to the schedule for capacity allocation set out in the Directive 34 . This procedure does not enable a more strategic approach to maximise capacity utilisation through upfront planning, nor does it respond to the different time horizons of demand for rail transport services, as services might start after the annual timetable has been adopted and run into the next timetabling period.

IMs have the possibility to allocate capacity on a multi-annual basis, via so-called ‘framework agreements’, as well as to reserve capacity for ‘ad hoc’ requests for individual train runs 35 . However, the design of these instruments does not promote more efficient capacity management. Framework agreements must be concluded long before the operation of trains and are subject to a complex set of criteria. Ad hoc requests are only possible for individual train runs, which even in the case of freight traffic remain a niche segment (e.g. agricultural goods during the harvest period) 36 : most of capacity needs materialising after the deadline for application are for more than one train run.

A different approach, whereby the IM would withhold a bigger part of the capacity for later allocation to meet the needs of different rail market segments including cross-border freight, is not compatible with the current regulatory framework.

The RFC Regulation derogates from the rules of the Recast Directive by providing a special regime covering the allocation of capacity for cross-border freight traffic. In particular, the RFC Regulation allows concerned IMs to jointly define and organise international pre-arranged train paths (PaPs) and establishes one-stop shops for applying for cross-border capacity. While this approach addresses the issue of cross-border coordination on an individual corridor, it does not consider the need for coordination between the corridor and the rest of the network. However, cross-border freight transport requires train paths that include stretches going beyond the lines designated to corridors. As a result, the one-stop shops did not do away with the need for freight service operators to interact with national IMs. Instead of facilitating operations, one-stop shops ended up as an additional administrative layer, further complicating the process. Moreover, the framework established by the RFC Regulation attributes capacity in a similar fashion to the Recast Directive: as part of the annual timetabling process (in the form of PaPs) and for ad hoc requests (in the form of reserve capacity). It therefore suffered from similar shortcomings as the capacity provided by the Recast Directive 37 . Since much of the capacity is allocated at the planning stage in the annual timetable, this approach favours rail market segments (such as intermodal trains), which run predictable, regular services and can bid early for precisely the capacity that they need. However, it leaves other segments that can only plan a train run on relatively short notice (block trains, single wagonload, etc.), struggling to obtain the remaining rail infrastructure capacity.

In the stakeholder consultation, on the one hand, the majority of the representatives of the railway undertakings indicated the ineffective rail capacity management as one of the most important problem drivers, while on the other hand the majority of the representatives of the infrastructure managers did not identify this as the most important problem driver. The explanations for these results are two-fold. The consultation used a different definition of the problem driver (PD1: ineffective rail capacity management and PD2: ineffective rail traffic management), so it did not identify the legal framework as the problem driver, but rather its implementation. Therefore, the question was perceived as an assessment and self-assessment of the performance of IMs.

In terms of the detailed issues that contribute to problem driver 1, which was presented in the consultation process more as a performance issue, rather than a legal issue, stakeholders highlighted the lack of complete overview on the cross-border lines and the traffic situation, which considered to contribute to problem driver 1 to a large extent by 31% and to a moderate extent by 40% of respondents. For 20% of the stakeholders this factor contributes to a small extent (15%) or not at all (5%) to the driver. Differences in priority rules in operations adopted on the two sides of a border are considered contributing from a large to a moderate extent to ineffective rail traffic management by 67% of respondents and to a small extent by an additional 17% of them. Inadequate response to major traffic disruptions is considered as contributing to ineffective rail traffic management, with 61% of respondents believing its contribution is either large or moderate and 22% believing that it results in a small contribution. Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution brought by the low priority given to cross-border freight traffic (vis-à-vis national traffic) is more varied, with 51% of respondents believing that it contributes from a large to a moderate extent, 18% to a small extent, 19% attributing no contribution at all, while 13% does not know.

The representatives of railway undertakings have largely identified the factors suggested in the questionnaire as contributing to a large or moderate extent to the ineffective rail traffic management. The representatives of the infrastructure managers are more sceptical and their opinions vary. With regard to the specific factors, a large majority of the representatives of the railway undertakings deem that all factors influence problem driver 2. In particular, the inadequate response to major traffic disruptions and the differences in priority rules in operation adopted on the two sides of a border are the two more recurring responses. On the other hand, the infrastructure managers believe that the poor sharing of information among all the concerned stakeholders and the lack of complete overview on the cross-border network and traffic situation contribute to the problem driver of ineffective rail traffic management. Finally, one can note that the responses of the representatives of the regulatory bodies follow the same patterns as those of infrastructure managers.

2.2.2.Problem driver 2: Insufficient performance and respect of capacity-related commitments by IMs and RUs

Problem driver 2 is linked to problem 1 and problem 2.

Priority criteria in the allocation of capacity and performance targets

Passenger services constituted 80% of the traffic expressed in train-km on average in the EU in 2019 38 . Freight operators complain that IMs give priority to passenger services and that this is a major contributor to disadvantaging freight in capacity planning and allocation. This is confirmed by experts’ findings 39 .

Priority rules differ considerably between Member States, but mostly define passenger traffic operated under public service obligations as the highest priority (Figure 3). Cross-border freight traffic, which makes up half of all freight traffic and requires coordination between IMs, is typically lower in the priority ranking. In addition, different criteria applied by IMs in different Member States multiply the risks that cross-border trains do not fulfil the conditions to be allocated capacity as a priority in at least one of the segments of a cross-border train path. Moreover, a survey conducted by regulatory bodies indicates that only a very few IMs allocate scarce capacity based on socio-economic criteria and on the assessment of the specific situation of competing requests 40 . This can result in situations where certain rail segments are systematically (de)prioritised regardless of the merits of individual services and cross-border trains face significant difficulties to get high quality capacity for the whole train run. For example, a rule that always gives priority to passengers over freight, might imply that a passenger train off-peak with very low occupancy rate, crowds out a fully loaded freight train. Better results could be achieved if infrastructure managers were instructed or given incentives to base their decisions on socio-economic criteria and on the assessment of the specific situation of competing requests. Public Service Obligations (or ‘PSO’) are State-supported public passenger transport services that transport companies would not provide on their own initiative for lack of economic viability. They are often given the highest priority because of the State’s decision to fund them as services of general economic interest, which does not mean that profitable services operated on market terms are less valuable to the society.

Neither the legal framework nor other mechanisms provide sufficient incentives for IMs to base their prioritisation decisions on criteria that better account for societal needs and the merits of all rail segments. Part of the problem may be that the financing and performance agreements 41 concluded between Member State authorities and IMs are limited to the question of financing infrastructure managers and lack effective incentives to reduce the cost of infrastructure provision, user-oriented performance targets and a strategic vision for the development of the rail infrastructure 42 . This means that Member States may not fully exploit the potential of economic incentives to orientate IMs’ efforts to reduce the cost of infrastructure provision while improving the quality of infrastructure services.

The RFC Regulation introduced performance monitoring as an explicit task of the management boards of the freight corridors. However, the evaluation of the Regulation 43 showed that performance monitoring focuses on the volume of capacity offered, without taking into account adequately other aspects relevant to rail freight customers (e.g. door-to-door punctuality) or to policy makers (e.g. modal share of rail along the corridors). For this reason, performance monitoring failed to induce significant performance improvements.

Figure 3: Principal types of services prioritised by infrastructure managers (number of MSs assigning each priority, 2020)

Source: Data from the draft 8th Rail Market Monitoring report (RMMS)

Respect of commitments in the allocation process

Apart from shortcomings in the allocation of capacity, capacity management suffers also from failure of both RUs and IMs to respect the commitments taken during the definition of the annual working timetable.

For RUs, requesting and not using the capacity does not result in costly penalties. As a result, many freight RUs request capacity months before they know the details of the train services that they intend to run 44 and end up modifying or cancelling the request later in the process. This generates administrative efforts and costs for both applicants and IMs 45 . In some cases, capacity reserved but not in line with actual needs cannot be utilised for other purposes and is wasted. Information from stakeholders indicates that only 20-25% of all capacity requests remain stable until the actual train run, while 75-80% are modified at one or more points in the process. The number of modifications of annual timetable requests by freight applicants is more than twice the number of similar requests by passenger applicants owing to the volatility of demand for freight transport. A stakeholder study indicates that any change requires an additional administrative effort of at least 25% of the request’s cost 46 .This practice, combined with the legal obligations for IMs to meet capacity requests within strict deadlines, results in situations where there is little capacity left for ad hoc trains on heavily utilised lines, which, in turn, puts pressure on applicants to request capacity during the annual timetable planning.

The Recast Directive provides an option (but not an obligation) for IMs to levy appropriate charges for capacity that is allocated but not used. According to an analysis carried out by regulatory bodies 47 , the reservation charge schemes put in place by IMs vary widely. However, the RUs’ persistent overbooking of train paths to safeguard capacity (see Annex 5) suggests that reservation charges have not provided effective disincentives against this behaviour. The Recast Directive does not envisage penalties for IMs in case of cancellations or modifications of already allocated train paths 48 , but requires IMs to set up performance schemes to encourage RUs and IMs to improve the performance of the railway network. The schemes may include penalties for actions which disrupt the operation of the network, compensation for undertakings which suffer from disruption, and bonuses that reward better-than-planned performance. Performance schemes have been established by most EU IMs, but an overview of performance schemes prepared by regulatory bodies in 2017 concluded that they improved performance only in a few countries 49 . A specific challenge is that performance schemes established by individual IMs often lack incentives for traffic running on more than one network 50 .

Altogether, reservation charges and performance schemes have not been sufficient to solve on their own the problems of overbooking capacity and late modifications of train paths.

The stakeholder consultation used different definitions for the problem drivers, which resulted in respondents addressing different issues, which were nevertheless relevant for the analysis of the problem drivers. However, both organisations representing RUs and some IMs expressed views in position papers and in meetings with the Commission indicating that performance incentives are necessary for both stakeholder groups, confirming the relevance of the problem driver.

In regard to the specific issues contributing to the lack of incentives for improving capacity and traffic management, stakeholders indicated issues that prevent proper performance monitoring, which in turn makes it difficult to identify the need for incentives for improving performance for capacity and traffic management. In particular, limited data sharing and the lack of commonly agreed concepts, definitions and indicators for performance monitoring (e.g., as regards punctuality) are considered to contribute from a large extent a moderate extent to problem driver 2 respectively by 65% and 55% of respondents. Moreover, 17% of respondents consider limited data sharing to contribute to a small extent, but the figure rises to 25% when considering lack of commonly agreed concepts, definitions and indicators for performance monitoring. Limited data availability for performance monitoring and measurement is considered contributing to the driver from a large to a moderate extent by 56% of respondents, while 19% are of the opinion that it contributes to a small extent. The lack of a neutral performance monitoring platform involving all stakeholders is believed to contribute to the lack of proper analysis of performance from a large to a moderate extent by 51% of respondents, while 19% considers its contribution to be small. Finally, the limited scope of performance measurement, either in geographical terms or due to aspects not monitored is believed to have a large to moderate effect on the ability to address performance issues by 53% of respondents and a small effect by 20% of them.

When it comes to the patterns across different stakeholder groups, the responses were rather comparable after disaggregating them by the two main stakeholder groups (i.e., infrastructure managers and railway undertakings). The only pronounced difference was about the limited scope of performance measurement, either in geographical terms or due to aspects that are not monitored. In this case, it is more widely identified as factor influencing poor performance monitoring by the representatives of the railway undertakings (i.e., 82%, of which 68% choosing to a moderate or large extent), rather than the representatives of the infrastructure managers (i.e., 65%, of which 43% choosing to a moderate or large extent). Finally, it is interesting to note that for both factors all representatives of the regulatory bodies agree that they contribute to the problem drivers of ineffective train performance monitoring and lack of effective tools to incentivise performance improvement. For the respondents of this stakeholder group, these problem drivers can be linked to limited data sharing and the limited data availability for performance monitoring and measurement.

2.2.3.Problem driver 3: Inconsistent planning and provision of rail services across borders and modes

Problem driver 3 is linked to problem 1 and problem 2. Planning use of capacity and subsequent management of traffic on the network involves matching the requirements of several categories of operators. A positive outcome is best achieved by effective coordination of the involved parties at all stages of the process. The evaluation, the responses to the public consultation and the targeted stakeholder consultation emphasised weaknesses in coordinating three aspects of the process: i) infrastructure maintenance works; ii) train and terminals activity; iii) cross-border traffic management.

Planning of infrastructure works

The management of rail infrastructure involves maintenance, renewal and upgrade of the existing infrastructure. This means that a trade-off must be found between allocating capacity to passenger and freight transport, and scheduling time windows, the so-called temporary planned capacity restrictions (TCRs), for the execution of infrastructure works. TCRs are especially disruptive in cases where there are few or no alternative routes or when the works are poorly coordinated and result in successive closures along important routes. Directive 2012/34/EU requires IMs to consult applicants and to publish information on capacity restrictions 24 and 12 months before the publication of the annual timetable. Nevertheless, stakeholders 51 continue to identify poorly managed and coordinated TCRs as a major reason for reduced capacity of the rail network and indicate that such restrictions result in considerable costs and, in extreme cases, rule out rail transport as a viable transport option 52 , 53 .

The impact of works on traffic can be mitigated by effective planning – e.g. by carrying out simultaneously as many maintenance and renewal activities as possible on a given part of the network – and by ensuring that adequate re-routing options remain available during capacity restrictions 54 . A particular challenge is effective coordination between networks.

Information from RUs suggests that the level of international coordination of TCRs – despite the existence of dedicated EU rules 55 – is often insufficient and does not always take place. In some cases, coordination of TCRs involves only a publication and provision of information to the concerned neighbouring IMs and no attempt to synchronise works to minimise the impact of TCRs. Bilateral international coordination has no institutionalised procedures and is sometimes based on good relationships and individual contacts between employees of IMs 56 . The RFC Regulation did not have any major effect on the planning of TCRs either; its evaluation concluded that ‘the users (in particular the RUs and the terminal managers and owners) still criticise that infrastructure works are announced too late and ‘that works are not really coordinated’ 57 . On some networks, TCRs are in the hundreds on a weekly basis and in the tens of thousands for an entire year. In some cases, more than 50% of the issues concern changes or cancellation of previously announced TCRs, indicating a severe lack of stability in planning and execution. Further evidence of the number and effects of TCRs is presented in Annex 5.

Coordination of train and terminal activity

For loading/unloading and for technical/operational purposes, trains need capacity at designated facilities (passenger stations, terminals, shunting yards, etc.). The train paths for accessing these facilities are not always aligned with the capacity schedule of the facility. This is particularly problematic for freight trains and terminals since the latter often have limited capacity for parking trains when they cannot process them upon arrival. Freight is particularly dependent on other operators at the departure and destination, as the cargo needs to be loaded and unloaded onto the train by a third party. The coordination for freight trains involves RUs, the IM, the facility operator, operators of relevant services at the facility, the client providing the cargo and the one taking over the cargo at arrival 58 .

For the planning phase, the Recast Directive and Regulation (EU) 2017/2177 59 lay down rules to ensure access to rail facilities, but do not address coordination mechanisms. Solutions to the coordination challenge are provided in the RFC Regulation, which introduces an advisory group of terminal operators to the management boards and requires procedures for optimal coordination of the allocation of capacity between IMs that takes account of access to terminals. However, some participants in the advisory groups consulted within the evaluation of the RFC Regulation pointed out that there was one-way communication and terminal operators have limited influence on decisions already taken by IMs in the management boards. The sub-optimal coordination at terminals results in reduced punctuality and poor reliability of freight trains.

Coordination of cross-border traffic

Traffic management is about coordinating train movements on the network between start and end of the journey 60 . This activity is under the control of IMs which must coordinate among themselves in case of cross-border trains.

Many cross-border trains (especially freight) do not stick to the timing provided with the train path. Evidence shows that on average in the EU, more than half of the cross-border freight trains are never on time (not within 30 minutes of their allocated train path) 61 . As a result, IMs need to manage actively the traffic to ensure safe and efficient travel on the network. Delays in one Member State can have a knock-on effect along the route of a cross-border train and different approaches of different IMs to managing delayed trains can affect negatively the punctuality of cross-border trains 62 .

At present, traffic management involves the sharing of limited information, but it lacks further direct data exchange and dynamic interaction (including automatised decision support/decision making) between the involved systems (i.e., national traffic management systems, terminal/yard management systems, other resource management systems). Therefore, IMs are not fully aware of the effects that their dispatching decisions will have on the train run itself or on the networks in the subsequent neighbouring countries. This results in accumulating delays for cross-border trains. Moreover, there are no uniform priority rules in traffic management, which means that a cross-border train could be considered a priority in one Member State, but not after crossing the border in the other Member State.

Coordination of traffic management becomes critical in cases of disturbance such as incidents, where alternative routes must be provided. The evaluation of the RFC Regulation showed that despite legal provisions obliging IMs to put coordination procedures in place 63 , major incidents often resulted in high numbers of cancelled trains. IMs and RFCs’ management boards made efforts to implement harmonised rules (the International Contingency Management Handbook) for rail freight, but the evaluation of the RFC Regulation concluded that these efforts did not result in immediate major improvements 64 . The coordination mechanisms are mostly generic and the more specific ones on contingency management are not implemented systematically. They result in performance deficiencies for cross-border rail that are manifested mostly as lack of reliability (cancelled or late trains, increased costs due to longer routes) and poor punctuality.

The definition of the problem driver in the stakeholder consultation differed from the definition used in the impact assessment (lack of coordination on planning and operations between stakeholders involved in multimodal transport chains), but it still touched upon the main issue of coordination. 62% (51 out of 83 respondents) indicated the problem driver being relevant for problem 1 to a large or to a moderate extent and 22% (18 respondents) – to a small extent.

The problem driver was more widely identified as a driver for problem 2 by the infrastructure managers.

A fair share of 59 respondents to the survey-questionnaire (71%) in the stakeholder consultation believe that the lack of capacity products (for both railways and terminals) fitting customers’ needs contributes from a large to a moderate extent to the lack of coordination on planning and operations between stakeholders involved in multimodal transport chains; 19% attribute a small impact to this factor, while the remaining 10% either assess it does not contribute at all (3%), or do not know (7%).

The second-ranked factor contributing to the problem driver is the different planning timeframes of actors to which 63% of stakeholders attribute either a large or moderate contribution, while an additional 12% believes the effect to be small. 25% consider the contribution to be null or do not know.

More than half of respondents (57%) attributes to the lack of digitalisation of the processes a large (25%) or moderate (32%) contribution to the poor coordination between different actors; 25% assesses the contribution to be small, while the remaining 17% either considers the factor not contributing at all, or do not know.

The lack of coordination between customers, railways undertakings and terminal operators in the planning phase (rail and terminal capacity) is considered contributing to a large extent by 24% of respondents, to a moderate extent by 29%, and to a small extent by 22%. 10% of stakeholders assesses the contribution to be null, while an additional 15% do not know.

The lack of coordination between customers, railways undertakings and terminal operators in the operational phase (yard and terminal operations and railway traffic management) is also seen as contributing to a large extent by 17% of responding stakeholders, to a moderate extent by 37% and to a small extent by 12% of respondents.

Other factors identified in the stakeholder consultation as contributing to problem driver 3 are: (i) the lack of common understanding of operational processes and of the respective roles of all stakeholders involved, which is considered contributing from a large to a moderate extent to the driver by 38% of respondents and to a small extent by another equal share (38%) of them; and (ii) the lack of use of digital tools due to their poor performance and user-friendliness assessed to contribute from a large to a moderate extent to the driver by 48% and to a small extent by 20% of respondents. Finally, 30% of respondents state that the lack of a common terminology used by different stakeholders contributes the problem driver from a large to a moderate extent and an additional 34% is of the opinion it contributes to a small extent.

In terms of patterns across stakeholder groups, it is particularly interesting to note how the lack of capacity products (for both railway infrastructure and terminals) fitting customers’ needs is believed to be a factor influencing to some extent the lack of coordination on planning and operations between stakeholders involved in multimodal transport chains. This holds for almost all the representatives of the railway undertakings (i.e., 95%), of which 52% believe that it has a large influence and 38% that has a moderate influence, respectively. Although they agree considering this factor as an important aspect, the view of the representatives of the infrastructure managers is generally more moderate.

2.2.4.Problem driver 4: Insufficient digital tools supporting capacity and traffic management processes

Problem driver 4 is linked to problem 1 and problem 2. The RFC Regulation introduced one-stop shops in the rail freight corridors for the request of international train paths along those corridors. Although it did not mandate use of any specific digital tool, the Path Coordination System (PCS) 65 had been developed for use by the one-stop shops and the applicants. However, given the inherent complexity of timetable planning and the numerous national specificities and processes to be respected, a deep integration between the IMs’ planning systems and the PCS has not been achieved. Accordingly, there is limited benefit from the use of PCS as central request tool and RUs often prefer to submit requests through the national systems, as confirmed by stakeholders consulted for the evaluation of the RFC Regulation 66 .

Digital tools are important not only for managing rail infrastructure capacity at the planning stage, but also in the operational phase i.e. in traffic management. When looking at operational tools for the dispatching and management/optimisation of the traffic, which are normally deeply integrated within the national command and control systems, it was established that international train-paths are still managed at national level as separate segments. There is no detection and consideration of effects/conflicts in neighbouring countries and no use of real-time information for integrated service optimisation.

Also, the required technology enhancements of the national/regional traffic management systems are included in the Multi-Annual Workplan of Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and are planned to be developed in the first project phase until 2025. Their effective implementation will however require the necessary set up of joint rules and respective legislation to allow and govern the cross-border management and optimisation activities.

A variety of digital tools are already in use at national level, but they are often neither integrated nor interoperable, nor common to the majority of IMs. Stakeholders consulted in the context of the support study pointed out that the development of digital tools without harmonised processes and authority able to enforce harmonisation and cooperation might lead to stranded investments.

The stakeholder consultation showed that the problem driver was particularly relevant for problem 1 with 63% of respondents suggesting that PD4 was relevant from a large to a moderate extent and 25% indicating only to a small extent. In regard to problem 2, 53% (42 out of 80 respondents) recognised the problem driver as contributing to a large or to a moderate extent to the problem and by 29% (23 respondents) – to a small extent;

RUs assigned stronger importance to the problem drivers, compared to IMs. As indicated above, the questions on the problem drivers could also be interpreted as an assessment of the performance of IMs, which would explain, at least partially, the more reserved attitude in recognising the problem driver.

In terms of detailed information about the type of digital systems that are part of the problem driver, for 63% of the respondents the missing integration between RNE’s Path Coordination System and the national planning systems for path request contributes from a large extent to a moderate extent to the ineffectiveness of digital tools for planning and operation of rail services and an additional 18% is of the opining that it contributes to a small extent. The lack of connection of yard and terminal planning systems with railway planning systems has been indicated as a large contributing factor by 39% of respondents, while 15% attributes a moderate contribution and 20% a small contribution to such factor. Overall, 52% of respondents considers inadequate methods and rules for cross-border traffic management to contribute largely or moderately to the problem driver under analysis and an additional 15% of them believes it contributes to a small extent.

Other impacting factors considered as contributing from a large to a small extent to problem driver 3 by responding stakeholders are as follows: lack of connection of national/regional traffic management tools to enable cross-network management (61% of respondents); poor information quality and availability of RNE’s Train Information System (65%) and lack of connection of yard and terminal operational management systems with railway traffic management systems (58%).

In this case the responses provided by the two main stakeholder groups are more comparable, with the representatives of the railway undertakings being only slightly less diverging and positive compared to the opinions provided by the representatives of the infrastructure managers. Also, the responses of the representatives of the regulatory bodies show similar patterns, despite having rather different distributions due to the lower number of respondents. The results are thus comparable to the aggregated figures across all stakeholder groups.

2.2.5.Contextual problem drivers not addressed by this initiative

The four problem drivers described above refer to existing obstacles to effective management of rail network capacity. There are however other factors that contribute to the main problems identified in section 2.1, most notably, the limitations of the physical rail infrastructure in terms of bottlenecks and parameters 67 of the infrastructure (contextual problem driver 1), and the lack of interoperability 68 , 69 (contextual problem driver 2). Other policy initiatives address the aspects related to physical infrastructure 70 and interoperability 71 and are therefore not further analysed in this context.

The views of all stakeholder groups converged on the relevance of these contextual problem drivers for both problems. The respondents to the survey-questionnaire indicated that the limitations related to the physical infrastructure significantly influence the poor performance of rail freight services. Out of 81 respondents, 76% of them considers this contextual problem driver as contributing to the problem 1 from a large to a moderate extent, 20% to a small extent and the remaining 4% not contributing at all to the problem or they do not have an opinion. The stakeholders also believe that the second relevant driver is the lack of interoperability in terms of operational, technical and safety-related aspects (i.e., contextual problem driver 2), indicated by 72% of respondents as contributing from a large to a moderate extent to the problem; by 14% to a small extent; by 9% not contributing at all to the problem. The remaining 6% do not have an opinion.

The respondents to the survey-questionnaire indicated that the limitations related to physical infrastructure also result in limited capacity of the rail network to absorb additional traffic (problem 2). Out of 78 respondents, 78% of them considers the driver contributing to problem 2 from a large to a moderate extent; 13% to a small extent; 5% not at all and 4% do not have an opinion.

Lack of interoperability in terms of operational, technical and safety-related aspects is considered by 58% of respondents to contribute to a large or to a moderate extent and by 25% to a small extent to problem 2.

2.3.How likely is the problem to persist?

Problem 1: Poor performance of cross-border rail services (in particular freight). Without EU level action the poor performance of cross-border rail services is likely to persist over time. The rail sector launched several initiatives aimed at improving rail freight’s performance 72 and, in particular, the Timetable Redesign Project (TTR) 73 which is specifically addressed at improving the management of network capacity. However, for these initiatives to become something more than pilot projects or recommended best practices, rules need to be put in place with clearly defined obligations. In the case of TTR, some of the measures cannot be implemented without a change to the EU legal framework, as they are not in line with the current rules.

A specific threat to the performance of rail (freight) transport for the next few years are the temporary capacity restrictions, which were identified as a major problem by stakeholders 74 . While further efforts in implementing the existing rules on the planning and implementation of works (in particular Annex VII of Directive 2012/34/EU) could reduce the negative effect of temporary planned capacity restrictions (TCRs), it is also clear that without the possibility for long-term strategic planning, IMs will struggle to accommodate the needs of the sector.

Problem 2: Insufficient rail infrastructure capacity to absorb growth in transport/traffic. As explained in section 2.1, congestion is a growing problem for the EU’s rail network 75 . In the future, infrastructure capacity will need to accommodate an increasing amount of demand: current trends and projections that take into account the EU climate change goals, suggest a considerable growth in the demand for transport services (see section 5.1) with freight and passenger rail volumes expected to grow consistently until 2050.

Although significant capacity improvement is expected in the next decades due to improved infrastructure envisaged by the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation, the achievement of such improvements until 2050 (with intermediate deadlines of 2030 and 2040) is also expected to further increase the occurrence of TCRs on the network and to put additional pressure on the system. With the increase in transport demand and with upcoming works, the problem of the lack of infrastructure capacity to absorb the growth of transport traffic will deteriorate, especially in the short and medium term.

Stakeholders who provided opinions during the targeted consultation, consider that both problems and the underlying drivers will continue to hamper the growth of cross-border rail freight in the period until 2050.

3.Why should the EU act?

3.1.Legal basis

Title VI (Articles 90-100) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) establishes the EU’s right to act in the area of transport. Article 91(1)(a) of the TFEU provides that the Union has competence in the field of transport to lay down measures to adopt common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member States.

3.2.Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action

The Union has already adopted legislation on rail infrastructure capacity management and rail traffic management – the Recast Directive (in particular Chapter IV thereof) and the RFC Regulation (in particular Chapter IV thereof). This reflects the policy goal of achieving a Single European Rail Area, in which RUs are able to provide transport services on an increasingly integrated and interoperable network.

Action at EU level is necessary to address the problems and their underlying drivers identified in section 2. This is obviously the case in order to remove obstacles in current EU legislation (problem driver 1), which prevent implementation of sector initiatives such as the TTR project. Poor incentives and performance schemes (problem driver 2) could, in principle, be re-designed at national level but would lack the scope necessary to tackle cross-border issues. Possible sector initiatives risk to make little progress in view of conflicting interests among stakeholders. In the case of lack of coordination (problem driver 3), the problem would be how to achieve an effective coordination at international level without clear legal rights and obligations, which need to be harmonised, at least to a certain extent, across the territory of the EU. Finally, the lack of harmonisation/interoperability of digital tools (problem driver 4), is unlikely to be solved by sectoral or national initiatives, in view of insufficient enforcement possibilities.

3.3.Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action

The adoption of a legal framework at EU level will eliminate the differences in national rules and practices that stand in the way of maximising capacity use of the rail network, reduce the effectiveness of rail traffic management, and ultimately result in the poor performance of cross border rail. Action at EU level would also make it possible to put in place effective and efficient instruments for coordination of strategic infrastructure capacity planning, address potential gaps in the mandate of regulatory bodies with regard to cross-border rail traffic, and introduce harmonised rules incentivising the reduction of cancellations of and amendments to capacity requests.

4.Objectives: What is to be achieved?

4.1.General objective

Railway transport has an important role to play in the transition to a climate neutral economy. This initiative contributes towards Sustainable Development Goal 13 (‘Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’). It also contributes to reducing other negative externalities like road congestion, road accidents and local air pollution. For this to happen, it is important to improve railway transport performance as well as to enable it to cater for growing levels of demand.

The performance of railway transport and the increase of rail traffic depends on multiple factors, many of which are outside the scope of this initiative, such as investments in physical rail infrastructure, technical barriers and competition with other transport modes (which are addressed in other legislative proposals). Consequently, defining the absolute growth of rail traffic (passenger and freight) as the objective of this initiative would risk distorting the analysis, as much of the growth would depend on such external factors. Considering the above, the focus and general objective of this initiative is to allow rail infrastructure capacity and rail traffic to be managed in a way that optimises the utilisation of the network, thus improving the quality of services and accommodating larger amounts of traffic.

This means that the initiative contributes directly to the objectives for the development of rail transport defined in the sustainable and smart mobility strategy (SSMS) 76 , including a 50% increase in rail freight traffic by 2030 and a 100% increase by 2050 as well as doubling high-speed passenger traffic by 2030 and tripling it by 2050. Sound management of infrastructure capacity can increase the usable capacity for any given level of physical infrastructure and is therefore a key enabler to achieving these objectives. Improvements in infrastructure management can be implemented faster than investments and should deliver significant impacts by 2030 already. However, better management alone will not be sufficient in each and every case. Investments to expand the physical capacity of rail infrastructure are a key element of TEN-T policy. The revision of the TEN-T Regulation on the basis of the Commission’s 2021 proposal 77 will provide further impetus in this regard.

4.2.Specific objectives

To address the identified problem drivers, four specific objectives have been set. The specific objectives (SOs) and their correspondence with the problem drivers are presented in Figure 4  and discussed below.

Specific Objective 1 (SO1) – Enable alternative capacity management procedures. The current rules on capacity management, while intended to provide RUs equal and non-discriminatory access to the rail network, are not adapted to the different needs of the various rail market segments and result in systematic disadvantages for freight and cross-border railway transport, including both freight and rail passenger services. The first specific objective of this initiative is to enable a more collaborative approach to the management of network capacity and a more effective planning cycle, providing greater flexibility to IMs and corresponding safeguards for RUs. By amending the rules on capacity allocation in both the Recast Directive and the RFC Regulation, the initiative will address the limitations of the existing rules on capacity management for the whole single European railway area.

SO1 also ensures that the capacity management procedures will make it easier for both IMs and RUs to stick to their commitments both by improving capacity planning and by providing better access to capacity via more flexible procedures for requesting capacity. The introduction of strategic planning in the capacity management process will allow policy makers and RUs to develop cross-border rail services by ensuring that sufficient capacity is available for such services.

The new capacity management procedures should also provide a faster and more flexible construction and allocation of train paths, which can only be achieve through increased use of interoperable digital tools both by IMs and RUs.

Figure 4: Relation between the specific objectives and the problem drivers

Specific Objective 2 – Strengthen incentives to improve performance of rail infrastructure and rail transport services. The second specific objective is to provide clear incentives and/or requirements for all key stakeholders to improve rail performance. For IMs, this means allocating scarce infrastructure capacity according to social, environmental and economic criteria. It also means keeping allocated capacity stable until the day of the train run and implementing maintenance works in accordance with the agreed plan. For transport operators, it means requesting capacity in line with their actual needs, avoiding capacity hoarding behaviour that goes to the detriment of overall system performance.

The introduction of harmonised rules on incentivising the performance of both IMs and RUs, in particular in the process of planning and allocating capacity, will address the problem of frequent amendments of capacity requests and ensure a more reliable access to capacity, which will allow to develop rail services. Introducing further coherence in the planning and allocation of capacity will facilitate cross-border rail.

Incentives for improved performance would help increase punctuality and facilitate traffic management, ultimately increasing the reliability of rail services (especially freight).

Specific Objective 3 – Introduce more effective mechanisms for stakeholder coordination. The establishment of a true single European rail area requires close cross-border coordination and cooperation on the side of IMs but also between public authorities, rail transport operators and regulators. While the responsibility for the management of capacity and traffic on the network must remain at national level, it is important to significantly improve coordination on all aspects that have a cross-border impact. Accordingly, the third specific objective is to strengthen the relevant governance structures of the single European rail area to support better coordination at all stages of planning and operations, including strategic capacity management, the planning of TCRs, capacity allocation, rescheduling as well as traffic and contingency management.

Both cross-border freight and passenger rail would be able to benefit from clearer rules on capacity and traffic management, from increased convergence of IMs’ procedures and practices and from more consistent rules across the internal EU borders. This should help those rail market segments, which include more cross-border traffic, such as freight, but also allow other market segments to grow by providing more cross-border services.

Coordination of train and terminal activities would cover planning and operational aspects and should improve rail freight’s overall performance and when it is part of multimodal transport.

Specific Objective 4 – Support the deployment of digital tools for capacity and traffic management. Digitalisation is a key enabler of better capacity utilisation, more flexible responses to customer needs, increased reliability and resilience vis-à-vis disruptions. The current fragmentation and (partial) duplication of tools, systems and standards should be corrected. Existing legally mandated standards should be further developed with a clear focus on user and business needs. The integration of rail with customers and partners in passenger transport and freight logistics should be intensified based on open standards and clearly defined interfaces, supporting the development and deployment of solutions that increase the performance and cybersecurity of IT systems and applications for capacity management and traffic management. The fourth specific objective of this initiative is to clarify and strengthen the legal requirements regarding digitalisation of planning and operations of rail capacity and traffic.

In the targeted stakeholder survey, all four specific objectives received clear support from the 62 participants, with the strongest related to digitalisation (90%) and the lowest related to conditions for access to rail infrastructure (64%).

5.What are the available policy options?

5.1.What is the baseline from which options are assessed?

The EU Reference scenario 2020 (REF2020) is the starting point for the impact assessment of this initiative 78 . The REF2020 takes into account the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that had a significant impact on the transport sector. More detailed information about the preparation process, assumptions and results are included in the Reference scenario publication 79 . Building on REF2020, the baseline has been designed to include the initiatives of the ‘Fit for 55’ package proposed by the Commission on 14 July 2021 80 and the initiatives of the RePowerEU package proposed by the Commission on 18 May 2022 81 . The baseline scenario assumes no further EU level intervention beyond the current Rail Freight Corridors Regulation and the Recast Directive that sets up the Union’s legal framework for the Single European railway area 82 . A common baseline was developed for this impact assessment, as well as for other initiatives related to freight transport 83 . More details on the baseline are provided in Annex 4.

In terms of transport network, the baseline scenario accounts for the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation 84 . It assumes that the high-quality TEN-T rail network would be gradually completed in three steps: 2030 for the core network, 2040 for the extended core network and 2050 for the comprehensive network. It also assumes full electrification of the core TEN-T rail network by 2030 and of the comprehensive TEN-T network by 2050 85 .

In the Baseline scenario, EU transport activity is projected to grow post-2020, following the recovery from the COVID pandemic. Road transport would maintain its dominant role within the EU by 2050. Rail transport activity is projected to grow significantly faster than for road, driven in particular by the completion of the TEN-T core network by 2030 and of the comprehensive network by 2050, supported by the CEF, Cohesion Fund and ERDF funding, but also by measures of the ‘Fit for 55’ package that increase to some extent the competitiveness of rail relative to road and air transport. Passenger rail activity is projected to go up by 24% by 2030 relative to 2015 (69% for 2015-2050). High speed rail activity, in particular, would grow by 68% by 2030 relative to 2015 (169% by 2050), missing however to deliver on the milestone of the SSMS of doubling its traffic by 2030 and tripling it by 2050. Freight rail traffic would increase by 42% by 2030 relative to 2015 (96% for 2015-2050) 89 hence falling short of the milestone of the SSMS of increasing the traffic by 50% by 2030 and doubling it by 2050.

As rail infrastructure capacity will need to accommodate an increasing amount of demand, by 2030 nearly 9 000 kilometres of rail (about 6.5% of the network) are projected to be affected by capacity restrictions in the baseline, of which 6 500 kilometres would be congested (4.7% of the network) and 2 500 kilometres highly utilised (1.8% of the network). By 2050, the rail network affected by capacity restrictions is projected to further increase to 20 200 kilometres (about 14.6% of the network), of which 11 500 kilometres would be congested (8.3% of the network) and 8 700 kilometres highly utilised (6.3% of the network). Congestion on the network (expressed in train-kilometres) is projected to go up from 94.3 million train-kilometres in 2020 to 159.3 million train-kilometres in 2030 and 231.2 million train kilometres by 2050 90 . This is despite the significant capacity improvement expected in the next decades due to improved infrastructure envisaged by the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation.

Passenger and freight train punctuality is projected to deteriorate by 2030 and to only somewhat improve post-2030, driven by the improved infrastructure envisaged by the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation. The share of passenger trains that are punctual is projected to go down from 88.3% in 2020 to 87.8% in 2030 and to increase to 90.3% by 2050. Freight rail is expected to face more challenges in terms of punctuality relative to passenger rail. The share of freight trains that are punctual is projected to reduce from 58.4% in 2020 to 57.4% in 2030, increasing to 68.4% by 2050.

Congestion costs 91 would increase by about 14% by 2030 and 32% by 2050, relative to 2015. Congestion on the inter-urban network would be the result of growing freight transport activity along specific corridors, in particular where these corridors cross urban areas with heavy local traffic.

CO2 emissions from transport 92 are projected to be 24% lower by 2030 compared to 2015, and 87% lower by 2050. The baseline scenario shows that the emission reductions from the transport sector would contribute towards the ambition of at least 55% emission reductions by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, while relying to a significant extent on technological solutions (i.e. the uptake of low- and zero-emission vehicles and of renewable and low carbon fuels) and carbon pricing. This would depart from the balanced approach underpinning the impact assessments accompanying the ‘Fit for 55’ package and the staff working document accompanying the REPowerEU initiatives 93 , showing a combined approach of carbon pricing instruments and regulatory-based measures to deliver on the increased climate ambition 94 .

NOx emissions are projected to go down by 56% between 2015 and 2030 (85% by 2050), mainly driven by the electrification of the road transport and in particular of the light duty vehicles segment. The decline in particulate matter (PM2.5) would be slightly lower by 2030 at 52% relative to 2015 (90% by 2050).

The baseline scenario reflects the projected higher energy prices driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine 95 . Beyond this aspect, it was however not possible to quantify the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the context of the baseline scenario, as there is large uncertainty with respect to its impacts, in particular for the medium to long term. While its impact is felt in terms of trade (e.g. grain, bulk fertilisers and hydrocarbons) and in certain geographical areas, the impact on the baseline of this initiative is expected to be relatively limited, although the problem of the lack of infrastructure capacity to absorb the growth of transport traffic may further deteriorate due to the changes in transport routes.

5.2.Policy measures and policy options

As a first step, a comprehensive list of possible policy measures was established after extensive consultations with stakeholders, expert meetings, independent research, and the Commission’s own analysis. This list was subsequently screened based on the likely effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality of the proposed measures in relation to the given objectives, as well as their legal and technical feasibility, following input from the stakeholders.

5.2.1.Retained policy measures

Table 2 provides an overview of the retained policy measures and their links with problem drivers, specific objectives and policy options. A more detailed description of the individual policy measures included in the policy options is presented in Annex 6.

Table 2:    Overview of the policy measures and their link with problem drivers, specific objectives and policy options (an X indicates that a measures is included in the respective policy option)

5.2.2.Discarded policy measures

Some policy measures considered in the preparatory phase of the impact assessment were discarded based on a pre-screening, providing a first assessment of potential impacts in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, proportionality and subsidiarity and based on stakeholder feedback. These measures include (i) an involvement of customers in the governance of rail freight corridors; (ii) the mandatory establishment of a legal entity for each rail freight corridor; (iii) EU rules for rail-related activities in terminals; (iv) the introduction of an entity in charge of monitoring and supervising rail traffic at EU level in real time and (v) a stronger centralisation of IT tools for capacity and traffic management. More detailed explanations on reasons for discarding them are provided in Annex9.

5.3.Overview of policy options

The retained policy measures have been grouped in 4 policy options: policy option 1 (PO1), policy option 2 (PO2), policy option 3 (PO3) and policy option 4 (PO4). Figure 5 provides a high-level overview of how the four policy options were built. PO1 is an evolutionary development of the current legal framework, which maintains the corridor approach to the cross-border coordination of capacity and traffic management as set out in the RFC Regulation. By contrast, PO2, PO3 and PO4 imply a switch from a corridor-based to a network-based approach to the coordination of rail capacity and traffic management, covering all types of rail transport (passenger/freight, domestic/cross-border), that enable a more seamless approach on the entire rail network, not just on lines designated to corridors 96 .

Figure 5: Overview of the four policy options - shared elements and differences

PO2, PO3 and PO4 introduce a comprehensive harmonisation and modernisation of the rules and procedures for capacity and traffic management. They therefore involve a more comprehensive review of the legal framework.

The main difference between PO2, PO3 and PO4 lies in the stringency and ambition of requirements and in the extent of centralisation of the decision-making process. PO2 relies on voluntary cooperation between the stakeholders concerned, in particular rail IMs, with no or very limited centralised coordination structures at EU level. PO3 extends PO2, from which it takes over most of the measures, and entrusts additional responsibilities for harmonisation to coordinating bodies at EU level, making use, to the largest extent possible, of existing entities. The mission of one of the coordinating entities in PO3 is to (i) develop common rules and procedures for capacity and traffic management and (ii) to monitor the implementation of these rules by individual IMs. As a counterbalance to this entity, PO3 introduces a ‘network of regulatory bodies’ in charge of supervising the activities of the IMs’ coordinating entity.

Finally, PO4 extends the remit of the coordinating entity introduced in PO3 by adding operational and decision-making tasks, such as the competence to take final decisions in case of disagreement/non-alignment between IMs and the setup of a European traffic management function supporting the management of major incidents (‘crisis cell’).

5.4.Description of policy options

5.4.1.Policy option 1 – Strengthening the corridor approach

In continuing the corridor approach, PO1 maintains key elements and tools introduced by the RFC Regulation and addresses their shortcomings by means of targeted interventions.

PO1 addresses SO1 (Enable more effective capacity management procedures through changes to legislation) by making use of the corridor one-stop shops mandatory for the allocation of cross-border infrastructure capacity (train paths), both for passenger and freight services (PM1). This is intended to make the use of the one-stop shops in capacity management and allocation obligatory for all cross-border traffic on RFC lines, compared to the current situation where less than 20% of cross-border freight traffic is allocated via them. PO1 also extends the scope of the functions of the one-stop shops beyond the capacity allocation phase by requiring the involvement of one-stop shops at earlier and later stages, such as the strategic planning phase (e.g. scheduling of capacity restrictions due to infrastructure works) and following capacity allocation (e.g. rescheduling in response to unforeseen changes on the side of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings), in order to eliminate the existing need for railway undertakings to revert to individual infrastructure managers for all activities other than capacity requests/allocation. In addition, as regards the coordination with terminals, PO1 will require corridor management boards to develop procedures on coordinating rail infrastructure and terminal capacity allocation together with the terminal advisory groups. With respect to SO2 (Strengthen incentive to improve performance), PO1 strengthens the monitoring of the quality of rail transport services along the corridors (PM7). This involves the adoption of a mandatory and harmonised set of performance indicators covering all aspects of rail infrastructure and transport services relevant for cross-border rail transport. The definition of indicators will be based on a consultation via the corridors’ advisory groups of RUs, terminals and customers of rail freight services. Publishing the results of performance monitoring can be considered as a ‘reputational’ incentive to improve performance.

With respect to SO3 (Introduce more effective mechanisms for stakeholder coordination), PO1 strengthens the corridor governance structure by extending and/or clarifying its competences and by complementing it with a formal cross-corridor governance layer to coordinate across corridors (PM14). In addition, PO1 introduces more specific requirements as regards the coordination of traffic management between IMs, on the one hand, and between IMs and terminals, on the other (PM15). As regards the latter measure, whereas Regulation 913/2010 merely requires infrastructure managers to ‘put in place procedures for coordinating traffic management along the freight corridor’, which produced only limited results, PO1 introduces binding rules and procedures for coordination along corridors.

In relation to SO4 (Support the deployment of digital tools enabling better capacity and traffic management), PO1 introduces requirements for digital exchange of information (PM24) – a measure included in all options.

5.4.2.Policy option 2 – Network approach based on common European rules and procedures implemented via cooperation between infrastructure managers

This policy option abandons the rail freight corridors in favour of a network approach. With respect to SO1, it introduces a common European legal framework for rail capacity management and allocation that applies to the entire network (PM2-1). It also adds transparent and harmonised methodologies for the partitioning of capacity to different rail infrastructure users (PM5) based on socio-economic criteria and taking into account the need for infrastructure works. These procedures and methods involve a broad range of stakeholders – including public authorities, infrastructure users (RUs and other applicants) as well as representatives of rail transport services users (passenger and freight). The outcome of this phase are binding planning documents that safeguard capacity for defined rail transport market segments over a horizon of 5 to 10 years.

These plans provide the basis for a strategic capacity management process (PM3) which (i) establishes a multi-annual planning procedure to optimise the quantity and quality of the capacity offer and (ii) provides a reserve of capacity for flexible allocation to individual applicants in the capacity allocation phase. In this policy option, the detailed rules and procedures for the strategic management process are elaborated based on cooperation between IMs, following consultation of all relevant stakeholders. The actual implementation of the strategic capacity management process remains in the competence of individual IMs and is under the scrutiny of regulatory bodies. Cross-border coordination is ensured by bilateral or multilateral cooperation between IMs. The results of the process are documented via a sequence of planning documents of increasing level of detail about the utilisation of capacity as the planning cycle progresses. The measure is closely related to the ‘advanced planning phase’ provided for under the already mentioned TTR project and the output related to capacity (capacity model/partitioning/supply).

Following the outcomes of the strategic capacity management process, PO2 introduces market-oriented procedures for allocating capacity to individual RUs and other applicants (PM4). The procedures and mechanisms are closely related to the allocation concepts proposed under the TTR project, such as capacity allocation on the basis of a rolling planning process or more market-oriented ways to allocate capacity rights covering several timetable periods. A more detailed description of the TTR project, and how it is reflected in the policy measures, is provided below:

In this policy option, capacity allocation remains in the competence of individual IMs. However, for cross-border rail services, IMs must provide seamless capacity via IT applications covering cross-border capacity in a single place and operation (PM17).

This option also strengthens existing and introduces new procedures and mechanisms to ensure traffic continuity in the event of emergency or crises situations (PM6). This includes mandatory measures to prepare for major network disruptions or sanitary or security crises and, potentially, rules for the re-allocation of capacity in such cases, subject to pre-defined criteria and safeguards with respect to the fair and non-discriminatory treatment of applicants.

As regards SO2, PO2 clarifies the legal requirements for effective and reciprocal economic incentives to strengthen respect by all stakeholders of commitments related to capacity (PM8). This comprises obligatory cancellation charges for RUs, i.e. require payment for capacity allocated but not used. It also introduces charges for IMs for unilaterally cancelling allocated capacity, or for making substantial changes to allocated train paths. The charges will take into account situations of force majeure. In addition, the policy option strengthens the legally defined rights of applicants related to capacity vis-à-vis IMs (PM9), notably in relation to cross-border services and in the event of changes to allocated capacity. In particular, IMs must ensure the consistency of train paths along the entire cross-border route 97 .

In relation to SO3, PO2 introduces a requirement for IMs to conduct continuous transport market monitoring and analysis at European level (PM18-1) to support the strategic capacity planning process outlined above. Market monitoring has to be carried out by IMs in cooperation with and must involve a consultation of all relevant stakeholders. PO2 also introduces a European framework for the coordination of rail traffic management across borders and between different stakeholder groups (PM17). These stakeholders will be required to establish the actual rules and procedures, on the basis of collaborative decision-making and in close cooperation with the European Agency for Railways and the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking. Finally, PO2 requires the presence of a forum for high-level exchange and coordination at European level involving all stakeholders involved in rail transport (PM16). This platform will involve further stakeholders from public authorities, partners and customers of rail transport services and possibly other groups (supplier industry, civil society, and academia), and will be chaired by the Commission. The platform can set up working groups operating based on the mandate from the plenary to address specific issues such as performance review and digital tools. It will replace the advisory groups of the rail freight corridors and ensure systematic involvement of the operators of freight terminals and intermodal transport services in all individual policy measures.

With respect to SO4 (digitalisation), PO2 requires IMs to provide single IT interfaces at EU level providing seamless end-to-end services for capacity management (PM25). This measure complements the requirement for digital data exchange common to all policy options (PM24); it requires IMs to provide IT services and interfaces covering the entire capacity management process in a single place and operation, going beyond the peer-to-peer approach underlying PM24 98 .

5.4.3.Policy option 3 – Network approach supported by a central entity in charge of defining common rules and monitoring their implementation

This policy option also abolishes the rail freight corridors and adopts a network approach. It comprises the same measures as in PO2 in regard to capacity management. However, entities at EU level are introduced to ensure that uniform rules are implemented by all IMs, to strengthen coordination and monitoring for cross-border capacity and traffic management.

With respect to SO1, PO3 introduces an ‘EU network statement’ to accompany the network statements of individual IMs 99 . The EU network statement sets out the concrete common rules and procedures for capacity and traffic management at EU level (PM2-2). Its purpose is to support harmonisation of rules and procedures, by providing a common, mandatory framework for the network statements of individual IMs thereby ensuring consistency and complementing the harmonised legal framework (PM2-1). Preparation of the network statement is assigned to the EU network coordination entity (PM20-1).

In relation to SO2, PO3 introduces an independent expert body responsible for reviewing the performance of rail infrastructure and cross-border rail transport services (PM10). The body is comprised of senior experts or managers bringing together technical, market and managerial experience in railways, acting in a personal capacity as independent experts not affiliated with any particular stakeholder (group). Its primary purpose is to provide advice to the network of regulatory bodies and to the rail sector on all matters related to the performance of cross-border rail services. It also introduces EU-level support and monitoring that addresses (i) compliance with agreed rules and procedures and (ii) the performance of infrastructure and transport services (PM11).

With respect to SO3, PO3 empowers the European Network of Infrastructure Managers to carry out the key tasks (PM20-1) of (i) developing common rules and procedures for capacity and traffic management, (ii) supporting and monitoring the implementation of these rules by IMs and (iii) resolving inconsistencies between IMs in relation to capacity planning and allocation. The network will be supported by an operational entity (hereafter the “rail network coordinator”), to be designated by the Commission. The scope of such common rules and procedure includes in particular measures PM3, PM4, PM5 and PM6 100 . The governance of the entity assembles all main European IMs and the European Commission. The central coordination entity centralises European-level transport market monitoring and analysis (PM18-2) 101 .

As regulatory counterpart to ENIM, policy option 3 strengthens the competences of the European network of regulatory bodies (PM19) set up by the Recast Directive. The network complements national regulatory bodies on matters involving a European or cross-border dimension; it acts as appeal body in the event of complaints or can launch own-initiative investigations. Its tasks include in particular the regulatory supervision of the activities of the EU network coordination entity and of the European network statement. The option assigns ENIM (supported by an operational entity) with the task to carry out continuous transport market monitoring and analysis at European level (PM18-2).

In addition, PO3 provides for an escalation mechanism to resolve disputes at European level or relating to cross-border traffic (PM21). In the first instance, ENIM and the Network Coordinator are given the task of identifying and finding solutions for cases of non-alignment or disagreement between IMs. If this does not result in a satisfactory solution, the matter is forwarded to the network of regulatory bodies (PM19) for a binding decision.

With respect to digital support tools (SO4), policy option 3 includes the same measures as PO2.

5.4.4.Policy option 4 – Network approach, assigning competences in operational decision-making to the EU network of infrastructure managers, supported by an operational entity

This policy option builds on PO2 and PO3; it also abolishes the rail freight corridors. The key feature of PO4 is that it entrusts the EU network of infrastructure managers with several operational and decision-making competences relating to capacity and traffic management for cross-border rail traffic (PM20-2).

In relation to SO1, PO4 includes the same policy measures as PO3. With respect to SO2, PO4 includes the measures of the PO3 and additionally assigns the network of regulatory bodies with the task to identify best practises with respect to the contractual agreements to be concluded between Member State authorities and IMs in accordance with Article 30 of Directive 2012/34/EU and, in the light of these results, gives national regulatory bodies the responsibility to review the effectiveness of the multi-annual agreements concluded at national level (PM12). In addition, it introduces an EU performance scheme to strengthen the incentives for IMs and RUs to improve the performance of rail infrastructure and transport services (PM13), which will be developed with support from the independent performance review body (PM10).

In relation to SO3, PO4 entrusts an entity at European level (PM20-2) with the competence to take final decisions as regards the strategic capacity management phase and the allocation of capacity for cross-border services (PM22). This implies that the planning documents of the capacity planning phase (network utilisation concepts etc.) for lines part of the TEN-T network, in particular lines making up the European Transport Corridors, are approved by ENIM; the latter also has the competence to approve the outcomes of the allocation of capacity (train paths) as far as cross-border traffic is concerned. As regards coordination of traffic management, PO4 introduces an EU ‘crisis management cell’ providing operational support for the coordination of traffic management during major network disruptions and emergency / exceptional situations (PM23). The crisis cell is established as a part of the EU network coordination entity. Its key function is to coordinate between operational stakeholders in the event of major incidents and crises on the network which have an impact on cross-border rail traffic, as current operational (‘real-time’) traffic management by infrastructure managers is typically done only at local and national levels with no dedicated entities to support the coordination of cross-border incidents and crises. Other measures addressing SO3 like PM16 (Introduce a high-level advisory/ coordination platform at European level) and PM17 (Introduce a European framework for the cross-border coordination of rail traffic management) are common to PO2, PO3 and PO4, and PM18-2 (Conducting continuous transport market monitoring and analysis at European level) and PM19 (Strengthening the competences of the European network of regulatory bodies) are common to PO3 and PO4.

With respect to SO4, PO4 includes the same measures as PO2 and PO3.

5.4.5.Measure common to all four policy options

With respect to SO4, all four policy options introduce mandatory requirements and deadlines for the implementation of the technical specifications for interoperability on telematics applications for freight 102 and for providing the technical description of the rail network via the register of infrastructure 103 (PM24). This measure complements ongoing Commission initiatives to revise the relevant technical railway legislation 104 .

6.What are the impacts of the policy options?

This section summarises the main expected economic, social and environmental impacts of each policy option 105 . The proposed measures are assumed to be implemented from 2025 onwards, so the assessment has been undertaken for the 2025-2050 period and refers to EU27 106 . Costs and benefits are expressed as present value over the 2025-2050 period, using a 3% discount rate. Further details on the methodological approach and a description of the estimation of impacts in terms of costs and the direct transport and wider economic impacts are provided in Annex 4 107 .

It should be emphasised that while some impacts were estimated with advanced methods, such as timetable modelling, others had to be based mainly on plausible assumptions or could not be monetised at all, including some of the presumably most significant impacts 108 . Extensive efforts have been made to compile information and input data from stakeholders, as a basis for the estimation of impacts, in the context of the impact assessment support study. The feedback was mainly limited to anecdotal evidence. Therefore, a conservative approach was taken in which costs estimates are relatively high, while the estimates of benefits are at the low end of the spectrum.

6.1.Economic impacts

This section provides the economic impacts of the policy options on RUs and other applicants for capacity, IMs, public authorities (Member States’ public administrations, regulatory bodies responsible for the railway sector and the European Commission), and other stakeholders (terminal operators and customers of rail transport services). It also provides an assessment of impacts on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), on the functioning of the internal market and competition, the competitiveness of the rail sector, congestion costs of the road transport sector and on digital by default. The results show a considerable difference in the magnitude of impacts – both on the cost and the benefit side – between the policy option adopting the corridor approach (PO1) and those adopting the network approach (PO2, PO3 and PO4).

6.1.1.Impacts on railway undertakings and other applicants in general

All policy options are expected to lead to adjustment costs for RUs, while PO1 would also result in administrative costs, and PO2, PO3 and PO4 in adjustment costs savings relative to the baseline. Each category of costs/costs savings is briefly discussed below, while a detailed analysis including the estimates and the assumptions used for deriving the costs and costs savings for each policy measure, by Member State where relevant, is provided in Annex 4 (section 3).

Adjustment costs for RUs. In terms of recurrent adjustment costs for 2030 and 2050, PO1 shows no significant costs relative to the baseline (see Table 3 ). PO1 is however expected to result in one-off adjustment costs of EUR 282.8 million due to investments in digital tools to ensure RUs compliance with the IM systems providing capacity-related services (PM24) - a measure included in all options.

PO2, PO3 and PO4 result in higher recurrent adjustment costs for RUs in 2030 and 2050 compared to PO1 (see Table 3 ) mostly due to the strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures (PM3, PM4 and PM5) 109 , the EU framework for the coordination of traffic management and terminal operations (PM17) and the procedures for tackling disruptions (PM6), that are included in all three options. These measures introduce important elements of the new approach to capacity and traffic management. They require additional efforts from RUs to provide input for long-term planning of capacity needs for different rail segments and for preparing contingency plans. This input is voluntary, but RUs have a vested interest to participate in the process. PO3 and PO4 show somewhat higher annual adjustment costs relative to PO2 (EUR 7.1 million for PO3 and PO4 in 2030 and 2050, compared to EUR 6.7 million in PO2) due to the monitoring function at EU level introduced by PM11. All three options are expected to lead to one-off adjustment costs of EUR 305.2 million, of which EUR 282.8 million linked to investments in digital tools (PM24), EUR 16.9 million to the strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures (PM3, PM4 and PM5), EUR 4.2 million to the procedures for disruption/non-availability (PM6) and EUR 1.3 million to the EU framework for the coordination of traffic management and terminal operations (PM17).

Total adjustments costs expressed as present value over 2025-2050, relative to the baseline, are estimated to be the highest in PO3 and PO4 (EUR 435.1 million), followed by PO2 (EUR 429 million) and PO1 (EUR 282.8 million). The investments in digital tools to ensure RUs compliance with the IM systems (PM24) represent around 65% of the total adjustment costs in PO3 and PO4, 66% in PO2 and 100% in PO1. Other measures with significant contribution to adjustment costs are the strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures (around 17% of the total adjustment costs in PO3 and PO4 and 18% in PO2) and the EU framework for the coordination of traffic management (around 10% of the costs in PO2, PO3 and PO4).

Administrative costs for RUs. PO1 is estimated to result in limited administrative costs for RUs, estimated at EUR 0.1 million in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 3 ), driven by the strengthened monitoring of service quality and customer satisfaction on the freight corridors (PM7). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the administrative costs for PO1 are estimated at EUR 2.4 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Adjustment costs savings for RUs. PO2, PO3 and PO4 would also result in adjustment cost savings for RUs due to the improved capacity management and allocation process, notably from greater stability of allocated paths (PM4). This measure is estimated to reduce costs in PO2 by EUR 20.2 million in 2030 and EUR 27.8 million in 2050 relative to the baseline, in PO3 by EUR 20.3 million in 2030 and EUR 28.1 million in 2050 and in PO4 by EUR 20.4 million in 2030 and EUR 28.9 million in 2050 110 . PO3 and PO4 lead to additional cost savings for RUs (see Table 3 ) due to the support function for cross-border coordination of capacity management at EU level (PM21) and the strategic capacity management for TEN-T at EU level (PM22), respectively. These measures organise the coordination of capacity planning between IMs or central capacity planning and ensure access to higher quality of capacity for cross-border trains.

Total adjustment cost savings, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline, are estimated to be the highest in PO4 (EUR 540.6 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 482.8 million) and PO2 (EUR 415.3 million). The reduction in the train path requests (PM4), in conjunction with the improved capacity management and allocation process introduced, represents around 78% of the cost savings in PO4, 87% in PO3 and 100% in PO2.

Table 3: Recurrent costs and costs savings for RUs in the POs relative to the baseline scenario (EU27), in million EUR (2021 prices) in 2030 and 2050

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study. Note: excluding one-off adjustment costs.

Other direct benefits for RUs. All policy options are expected to result in an increase of available capacity compared to the baseline. The additional capacity was calculated in several steps (see Annex 4, section 4.1.1) and it took into account the different effect the policy measures would have on single, double and cross-border lines. The modelling focused on the ability of IMs to offer additional train paths by implementing the PMs included in the different POs, in particular on congested lines. The focus was on incorporating a maximum number of train paths. This also resulted in a reduction of the transport time due to more coordinated and informed path planning.

The modelling of the impacts of the policy measures on rail infrastructure capacity for the policy options required the development of different model variants of a timetable. Three factors, explained in Annex 4 (section 4.1.1) were used for deriving the results:

•    The time frame, which is split into three time horizons (2030, 2040, 2050).

•    The track type – more specifically the distinction between national single track, national double track and international/cross-border sections.

•    The congestion status of the lines.

This additional capacity translates into an increase in traffic (expressed in train-km) estimated at 0.2% in PO1, 2.2% in PO2, 4% in PO3 and 7% in PO4 relative to the baseline in 2050 111 , 112 . This means an increase in traffic in 2050 relative to the baseline of 13.9 million train-km in PO1, 139.6 million train-km in PO2, 249.1 million train-km in PO3 and 432.8 million train-km in PO4 113 . These estimates are based on an IT tool for timetable design, which was used to simulate an actual timetable optimisation using a limited number of representative, real-world case studies; the estimation is explained in more detail in Annex 4 (section 4).

The benefits for RUs from the additional traffic are monetised accordingly 114 . These results provide a very conservative estimate of the benefits. PO4 results in the highest benefits due to the increase of available capacity, estimated in monetary terms (see Table 4 ) at EUR 2 759.1million (expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline), followed by PO3 (EUR 2 575.7 million), PO2 (EUR 1 981 million) and PO1 (EUR 242.1 million).

To provide another perspective on the impact of the policy measures on available capacity, it is also possible to provide a rough estimate of the additional infrastructure that would be required to accommodate a growth in traffic equivalent to the estimations for the policy options in 2050. On the basis of some stylised assumptions about the use of new infrastructure, this would require the construction of 43 km of new lines in PO1, 431 km in PO2, 769 km in PO3 and 1 336 km in PO4. The cost for the construction and maintenance of the additional infrastructure in the period from 2025 to 2050 (expressed as present value) would amount to approximately EUR 0.5 billion in PO1, 4.7 billion in PO2, 8.4 billion in PO3 and 14.6 billion in PO4. The purpose of the estimates is mainly to put into relation the additional rail traffic enabled by the capacity increase estimated for the four policy options. Given the reliance on a number of assumptions, these figures were intentionally not used in the assessment of the policy options with respect to the efficiency criterion, i.e. the estimation of net benefits and benefit/cost ratio.

All policy options are expected to result in improvements in punctuality compared to the baseline. These improvements are expected to be higher for freight than for passenger rail. PO4 is estimated to result in the highest benefits (EUR 664.9 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 658 million), PO2 (EUR 501.3 million) and PO1 (EUR 72.7 million). These improvements are monetised, using assumptions on the different value of delays for different EU regions, based on the ASTRA model.

Table 4: Monetised benefits due to increase in capacity and in punctuality in the POs, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline (EU27), in million EUR (2021 prices)

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study

All policy options reduce the negative effects of TCRs by improving the planning, implementation and cross-border coordination of infrastructure works. They also increase rail’s reliability. RUs will benefit directly from these improvements. It is expected that the effects will be passed on to their customers (logistics operators, travel agencies, etc.), to consumers and businesses using rail transport. It was however not possible to quantify these effects 115 .

Net costs/benefits for RUs. Overall, considering the costs, costs savings and other direct benefits for the RUs, all policy options are estimated to result in net benefits for RUs, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 (relative to the baseline). PO4 would lead to the highest net benefits (EUR 3 529.5 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 3 281.4 million), PO2 (EUR 2 468.4 million) and PO1 (EUR 29.6 million).

6.1.2.Impacts on infrastructure managers

All policy options are expected to lead to adjustment costs for infrastructure managers, while PO1 would also result in administrative costs, and PO3 and PO4 in additional enforcement costs relative to the baseline. At the same time, PO2, PO3 and PO4 would also result in adjustment and administrative costs savings for infrastructure managers 116 .

Administrative costs for infrastructure managers. PO1 is expected to result in recurrent administrative costs of EUR 1.3 million relative to the baseline in 2030 and 2050 due to the introduction of a mandatory and harmonised set of performance indicators for rail freight corridors (PM7), which would go beyond the current performance monitoring carried out by the management boards (see Table 5 and Table 6 ). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the administrative costs for PO1 are estimated at EUR 23.9 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Adjustment costs for infrastructure managers. Infrastructure managers are the stakeholder group which is estimated to bear the highest share of total adjustment costs in PO2, PO3 and PO4, while in PO1 RUs would bear the highest share of adjustment costs. PO1 would result in EUR 59.1 million one-off costs, and recurrent costs of EUR 2.3 million in 2030 and EUR 0.2 million in 2050 relative to the baseline. Of these, the highest one-off and recurrent adjustment costs (EUR 58.8 million one-off costs and recurrent costs of EUR 2.2 million in 2030 and EUR 0.1 million in 2050 relative to the baseline) are associated to digital tools to ensure RUs compliance with the IM systems providing capacity-related services (PM24), while the introduction of binding rules and procedures for coordination of traffic management (PM17) would lead to EUR 0.3 million one-off costs and EUR 0.1 million recurrent costs in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 5 and Table 6 ).

PO2, PO3 and PO4 are estimated to lead to significantly higher adjustment costs than PO1 due to the change to the network-based approach to the coordination of rail capacity and traffic management. These three policy options include few common measures that lead to adjustment costs for IMs and are related to the introduction of: (i) strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures (PM3, PM4 and PM5), (ii) procedures in case of disruption/non-availability (PM6), (iii) a high-level advisory/coordination platform at European level (PM16), (iv) an EU framework for the coordination of traffic management and terminal operations (PM17), (v) digital tools to ensure RUs compliance with the IM systems (PM24), and (vi) digitalisation and automation of capacity management (PM25). The common measures are estimated to lead to one-off adjustment costs of EUR 677.4 million, and recurrent costs of EUR 48.5 million in 2030 and EUR 27.2 million in 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 5 and Table 6 ). Of these common measures, the highest share of costs relates to the measure on the digitalisation and automation of capacity management (PM25). In addition, in PO2 the introduction of transport market monitoring by IMs (PM18-1) would add one-off adjustment costs of EUR 4.2 million and recurrent costs of EUR 1.8 million in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline. Thus, PO2 is estimated to result in total one-off adjustment costs of EUR 681.6 million and recurrent costs of EUR 50.2 million in 2030 and EUR 29.2 million in 2050 relative to the baseline.

PO3 and PO4 also include costs related to the ENIM plus the Network Coordinator, which will assist IMs at EU level in the planning and management of capacity. Some of these costs differ between PO3 and PO4, as the Network Coordinator performs different tasks in each option. More specifically, in addition to the common measures included in PO2, PO3 and PO4, both PO3 and PO4 include adjustment costs for the introduction of a performance review body (PM10), for the monitoring function at EU level (PM11) and the transport market monitoring by ENIM (PM18-2). These three measures are estimated to lead together to one-off adjustment costs of EUR 4 million and recurrent costs of EUR 4.1 million in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline, of which the highest share of the costs is attributed to the transport market monitoring by ENIM (PM18-2). In addition, PO3 accounts for the preparation of the network statement by the EU Network Coordinator (PM20-1) and the support function for cross-border coordination of capacity management at EU level (PM21), that are estimated to add recurrent costs of EUR 5 million in 2030 and EUR 6.5 million in 2050 relative to the baseline. In total, PO3 is estimated to result in one-off adjustment costs of EUR 681.4 million and recurrent costs of EUR 57.5 million in 2030 and EUR 38.1 million in 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 5 and Table 6 ).

PO4 additionally accounts for the introduction of the EU performance scheme (PM13), it entrusts an entity at European level (PM20-2) with the competence to take final decisions as regards the strategic capacity management phase and the allocation of capacity for cross-border services (PM22) and introduces an EU ‘crisis management cell’ (PM23). These measures together are estimated to result in one-off adjustment costs of EUR 2.5 million and recurrent costs of EUR 15.7 million in 2030 and EUR 20.3 million in 2050 relative to the baseline, of which the highest share of the costs is attributed to the strategic capacity management phase and the allocation of capacity for cross-border services (PM22). They add to those of the common measures included in PO3 and PO4. Overall, PO4 is estimated to lead to total one-off adjustment costs of EUR 683.9 million and recurrent costs of EUR 68.2 million in 2030 and EUR 51.8 million in 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 5 and Table 6 ).

Expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline, PO4 is expected to result in the highest total adjustment costs among the policy options (EUR 1 812.8 million, of which EUR 683.9 million one-off costs), followed by PO3 (EUR 1 596.5 million, of which EUR 681.4 million one-off costs), PO2 (EUR 1 452.8 million, of which EUR 681.6 million one-off costs) and PO1 (EUR 81.6 million, of which EUR 59.1 million one-off costs). The largest share of the costs in PO1 (97% of the total adjustment costs) is associated to digital tools to ensure RUs compliance with the IM systems (PM24). In PO2, PO3 and PO4 the largest share of the costs can be attributed to the digitalisation and automation of capacity management (49% of the total adjustment costs in PO2, 45% in PO3 and 39% in PO4), followed by the strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures which involve considerable organisational changes (21% of the total adjustment costs in PO2, 19% in PO3 and 17% in PO4), the introduction of an EU framework for coordination of traffic management and terminal operations (16% of the total adjustment costs in PO2, 15% in PO3 and 13% in PO4), and the strategic capacity management phase and the allocation of capacity for cross-border services (14% of the total adjustment costs in PO4).

Table 5: Recurrent costs and costs savings for IMs in the POs relative to the baseline scenario (EU27), in million EUR (2021 prices) in 2030 and 2050

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study. Note: excluding one-off adjustment costs; for the category ‘total net costs/costs savings’ a positive value stands for net costs and a negative value for net benefits.

Table 6: One-off adjustment costs for IMs in the POs relative to the baseline scenario (EU27), in million EUR (2021 prices) in 2030 and 2050

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study

Enforcement costs for infrastructure managers. In PO3 and PO4, the introduction of the monitoring function at EU level (PM11) is estimated to lead to recurrent enforcement costs for infrastructure managers, estimated at EUR 0.7 million in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the enforcement costs for PO3 and PO4 are estimated at EUR 12.5 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Administrative costs savings for infrastructure managers. The introduction of a harmonised legal framework for railway capacity and traffic management and the abolition of the rail freight corridors (PM2-1) in PO2, PO3 and PO4 is expected to lead to administrative costs savings of EUR 0.4 million from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline (i.e. EUR 17 836 per year on average per infrastructure manager 117 ). These savings come from removing the obligations to collect and publish the information contained in the network statement for national networks regarding the freight corridor, to produce customer satisfaction surveys and to monitor the performance of rail freight services on the freight corridors and publish the survey and monitoring results. The policy measure will also remove the need for management boards to publish annual reports, important and informative documents, which was undertaken on the boards’ own initiative. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the total administrative costs savings for infrastructure managers are estimated at EUR 8.2 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Adjustment costs savings for infrastructure managers. PO2, PO3 and PO4 are also expected to result in adjustment cost savings from the harmonised legal framework for railway capacity and traffic management and the abolition of the rail freight corridors (PM2-1) and from the reduction in the train path requests resulting from the new approach for capacity and traffic management (PM4). The transition from corridor-based to a network-based approach and the abolition of the rail freight corridors results in cost savings related to the governance and operation of the rail freight corridors (including the one-stop shops) and all the activities carried out by the management boards related to capacity and traffic management. Thus, PM2-1 would lead to adjustment costs savings for infrastructure managers of EUR 3.6 million per year relative to the baseline from 2025 onwards. In addition, PM4 is estimated to reduce costs in PO2 by EUR 20.2 million in 2030 and EUR 27.8 million in 2050 relative to the baseline, in PO3 by EUR 20.3 million in 2030 and EUR 28.1 million in 2050 and in PO4 by EUR 20.4 million in 2030 and EUR 28.9 million in 2050 118 . By making the capacity management process more stable, both IMs and RUs (as explained in section 6.1.1) would reduce wasted efforts for repeated changes to the timetable, as RUs would be able to request and get high quality capacity closer to the time of the train run and IMs would be incentivised to limit changes to allocated train paths. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs savings for infrastructure managers are estimated to be the highest in PO4 (EUR 490.5 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 485.3 million) and PO2 (EUR 481.9 million). Around 86% of the total adjustment costs savings are associated to the reduction in the train path requests.

Net costs for infrastructure managers. Overall, net recurrent costs for infrastructure managers are estimated to be the highest in PO4 (EUR 44.5 million in 2030 and EUR 19.6 million in 2050 relative to the baseline), followed by PO3 (EUR 33.9 million in 2030 and EUR 6.6 million in 2050). PO2 would result in net recurrent costs of EUR 25.9 in 2030 and net recurrent costs savings of EUR 2.6 in 2050 relative to the baseline, and PO1 in net recurrent costs of EUR 3.6 million in 2030 and EUR 1.5 million in 2050. These come in addition to the one-off costs estimated at EUR 683.9 million in PO4, EUR 681.4 million in PO3, EUR 681.6 million in PO2 and EUR 59.1 million for PO1. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050 (relative to the baseline) all policy options are estimated to lead to net costs for infrastructure managers. The highest net costs are estimated for PO4 (EUR 1 326.5 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 1 115.5 million), PO2 (EUR 962.6 million) and PO1 (EUR 105.5 million).

Other direct benefits for infrastructure managers. The additional traffic is expected to benefit mostly RUs. Other direct benefits for IMs were not possible to estimate for two reasons. Firstly, the principles laid down in the Recast Directive 119 envisage that charges for the use of rail infrastructure should cover the cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating a train service. Additional traffic will therefore result in increase in revenue, but they may cover only the marginal costs and would not change considerably the financial situation of IMs. Secondly, as an exception and under certain conditions, mark-ups can be charged to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred by the IMs, but it is difficult to assume how IMs will structure the charges in the future. Hence, assessing the contribution of additional traffic to improving the financial situation of IMs would be speculative 120 . Improvements in punctuality from the policy measures were also estimated only as benefits for RUs, even though they could have limited benefits for IMs through additional traffic and optimised use of resources. As IMs are expected to contribute to the increase of rail traffic and to decarbonisation of transport, the direct benefits are de facto implementation of their legal obligation to ‘ensure optimal and efficient use’ of rail infrastructure 121 .

6.1.3.Impacts on public authorities, including regulatory bodies

This section discusses the impacts of the policy options on the national public authorities, the European Commission and EU funding. National public authorities include both Member States’ bodies responsible for rail policy and its implementation and regulatory bodies for the railway sector.

Impacts on national public authorities

PO3 and PO4 are expected to lead to adjustment costs for national public authorities, while PO2, PO3 and PO4 would result in enforcement costs. At the same time, PO2, PO3 and PO4 would also result in adjustment and administrative costs savings for national public authorities 122 .

Adjustment costs for national public authorities. In PO3 and PO4, the costs related to the secretariat of the EU Board of Regulators (PM19) 123 , which will prepare the opinions, guidelines, reports, recommendations, common positions and identify the best practices and organise the work of national regulatory bodies in working groups, is estimated at EUR 0.3 million per year from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline. In addition, in PO4 the introduction of the EU performance scheme (PM13) would require an assessment of the compliance of national performance schemes with the European one leading to recurrent costs estimated at EUR 0.1 million from 2025 onwards (see Table 7 ). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, PO3 is estimated to result in adjustment costs of EUR 5.9 million and PO4 to costs of EUR 8.2 million, relative to the baseline.

Enforcement costs for national public authorities. PO2, PO3 and PO4 are expected to result in enforcement costs for national public authorities relative to the baseline. The introduction of the strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures (PM3, PM4 and PM5), common to the three policy options, is expected to lead to costs for regulatory bodies for scrutinising the strategic planning (EUR 3.4 million one-off costs in 2025, followed by recurrent costs of EUR 0.7 million relative to the baseline from 2026 onwards). The introduction of procedures in case of disruption/non-availability (PM6), also common to the three options, is expected to add one-off costs of EUR 0.8 million in 2025 and recurrent costs estimated at EUR 0.2 million from 2026 onwards. Overall, PO2 would result in one-off costs of EUR 4.2 million in 2025 and recurrent costs estimated at EUR 0.8 million from 2026 onwards (see Table 7 ).

PO3 and PO4 result in additional enforcement costs for regulatory bodies relative to PO2, related to the additional functions allocated to European Network of Regulatory Bodies. These tasks are mainly related to the control and monitoring of the European Network of Infrastructure Managers. More specifically, relative to PO2, PO3 provides for an escalation mechanism to resolve disputes at EU level or relating to cross-border traffic (PM21), estimated to lead to recurrent costs of EUR 0.2 million in 2030 and EUR 0.3 million in 2050. Thus, PO3 would result in total one-off costs of EUR 4.2 million in 2025 and recurrent costs of EUR 1.1 million in 2030 and EUR 1.2 million in 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 7 ).

Costs between PO3 and PO4 differ due to the different approach to strategic capacity management. PO3 (in particular PM21) envisages a more decentralised approach for strategic capacity planning, which would allow some part of the oversight to be carried out by national bodies in cooperation with each other. PO4 requires more work to be done at EU level, with additional resources needed, and comes at higher cost estimated at one-off costs of EUR 4.2 million in 2025 and recurrent costs of EUR 1.7 million in 2030 and EUR 1.9 million in 2050 relative to the baseline (see Table 7 ). The two measures that bring additional costs in PO4 relate to the competence to take final decisions as regards the strategic capacity management phase and the allocation of capacity for cross-border services (PM22) and the responsibility to review the effectiveness of the multi-annual agreements concluded at national level (PM12).

Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the enforcement costs for national public authorities are estimated to be the highest in PO4 (EUR 37.6 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 25.1 million) and PO2 (EUR 20.2 million). Around 75% of the enforcement costs in PO2, 60% in PO3 and 40% in PO4 are associated to the introduction of strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures (PM3, PM4 and PM5). The introduction of procedures in case of disruption/non-availability (PM6) would represent around 25% of the enforcement costs in PO2, 20% in PO3 and 13% in PO4, while the competence to take final decisions as regards the strategic capacity management phase and the allocation of capacity for cross-border services (PM22) is estimated to provide around 34% of the enforcement costs in PO4.

Adjustment costs savings for national public authorities. In PO2, PO3 and PO4 the harmonised legal framework for railway capacity and traffic management and the abolition of the rail freight corridors (PM2-1) is expected to lead to adjustment costs savings estimated at EUR 0.4 million per year from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline (see Table 7 ). These cost savings would result mostly from terminating the participation in the executive boards, which includes direct labour costs but also overheads (i.e. travel costs for an average of 2 meetings per year per RFC) for the Member States participating in the corridors 124 . Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs savings for national public authorities are estimated at EUR 6.8 million in PO2, PO3 and PO4.

Administrative costs savings for national public authorities. The introduction of a harmonised legal framework for railway capacity and traffic management and the abolition of the rail freight corridors (PM2-1) in PO2, PO3 and PO4 is expected to lead to administrative costs savings of EUR 0.1 million from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline (see Table 7 ). These costs savings would result from the abolishment of the biennial reports of the executive boards of the RFCs 125 . Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the total administrative costs savings in PO2, PO3 and PO4 are estimated at EUR 2.6 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Table 7: Recurrent costs and costs savings for public authorities in the POs relative to the baseline scenario (EU27), in million EUR (2021 prices) in 2030 and 2050

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study. Note: excluding one-off adjustment costs.

Net costs for national public authorities. Overall, net recurrent costs for national public authorities (see Table 7 ) are estimated to be the highest in PO4 (EUR 1.7 million in 2030 and EUR 1.9 million in 2050 relative to the baseline), followed by PO3 (EUR 0.9 million in 2030 and EUR 1 million in 2050) and PO2 (EUR 0.3 million in 2030 and in 2050). These come in addition to the one-off costs of EUR 4.2 million in all three options. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050 (relative to the baseline) PO4 results in net costs for national public authorities of EUR 36.4 million, followed by PO3 (EUR 21.7 million) and PO2 (EUR 10.9 million).

Impacts on the European Commission and the use of EU funds

PO3 and PO4 are expected to lead to adjustment costs for the European Commission, while PO2, PO3 and PO4 would also result in adjustment costs savings due to a reduction in the use of EU funds 126 .

Adjustment costs for the European Commission. PO3 and PO4 result in adjustment costs for the Commission due to the setting up of a performance review body that will advise the Commission on improving performance monitoring and related methodological issues. The adjustment costs for the expert body are estimated on the basis of the existing Performance Review Body of the single European sky 127 . The Union budget provides for a special allowance of a maximum of EUR 600 in the form of a daily unit cost for each working day for the members of the Performance Review Body. The adjustment costs for the European Commission are estimated at EUR 0.1 million per year from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the total adjustment costs are estimated at EUR 1.8 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Adjustment cost savings due to a reduction in the use of EU funds. PO2, PO3 and PO4 are expected to result in adjustment costs savings due to the introduction of a harmonised legal framework for railway capacity and traffic management and the abolition of the RFCs (PM2-1). Part of the costs related to the governance and operation of the rail freight corridors, overheads (including for IT) and cost of external services (transport market studies, some external services provided by RNE, etc.) are eligible for EU funding. According to the evaluation of the RFC Regulation, the EU funding is estimated at EUR 6.3 million per year (in 2021 prices) and it is assumed to remain constant over time in real prices in the baseline. PM2-1 would thus result in adjustment costs savings for the EU estimated at EUR 6.3 million per year. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the adjustment costs savings are estimated at EUR 116.7 million (in 2021 prices). However, it can be expected that the EU will continue to provide some form of support for implementing the policy measures resulting from this initiative and the costs savings could be cancelled by future funding. At this stage it is not possible to estimate the amount of a possible future EU budget contribution.

6.1.4.Impacts on other stakeholders

Terminal operators

Estimating the costs/cost savings and other benefits for terminal operators is complicated due to the large divergence in their size, the transport markets served, the organisation of operations and their business models. Therefore, due to these caveats, the estimated costs for terminal operators should be regarded as order of magnitude. PO1 is expected to lead to administrative costs for terminal operators, while PO2, PO3 and PO4 to adjustment costs 128 .

Administrative costs for terminal operators. PO1 is estimated to result in limited administrative costs for terminal operators, estimated at EUR 0.1 million in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline, driven by the strengthened monitoring of service quality and customer satisfaction on the freight corridors (PM7). Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, the administrative costs for PO1 are estimated at EUR 2.4 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Adjustment costs for terminal operators. In PO2, PO3 and PO4 the EU framework for coordination of traffic management and terminal operations (PM17), which involves rules, procedures and tools for coordination of train and terminal operations, is estimated to lead to one-off costs of EUR 0.5 million in 2025, followed by recurrent adjustment costs estimated at EUR 0.9 million from 2026 onwards. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, total adjustment costs for terminal operators are estimated at EUR 17 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices).

Other direct benefits. All policy options are expected to result in an increase of available capacity compared to the baseline. This additional capacity translates into an increase in traffic (expressed in train-km) estimated at 0.2% in PO1, 2.2% in PO2, 4% in PO3 and 7% in PO4 relative to the baseline in 2050 129 . In addition, improvements in punctuality are expected mostly for freight trains. Terminal operators should benefit from the additional traffic and improved punctuality. This should result in additional revenues and operational cost savings. However, as explained above, the complicated structure of the sector and the data gaps do not allow for a sound estimate of these benefits.

Rail customers

Similar to terminal operators, rail customers are expected to benefit from the additional capacity in all policy options. Rail customers vary from citizens and various businesses using passenger rail to specialised transport companies (multimodal operators, logistics services providers, freight forwarders, transport organisers, etc.) and numerous businesses using or planning to use freight transport in general. All of them are expected to benefit from the additional rail capacity and operational improvements. Estimating and monetising such impacts is complicated by the large number of rail users, their very different profiles (including the value of rail services for them) and the lack of information on how costs savings could be passed on to rail customers. Therefore, these economic benefits are not estimated in this impact assessment and all the benefits from the increase in traffic and operational cost savings are assigned to RUs.

6.1.5.Impacts on SMEs

SMEs in the rail sector include some RUs, in particular new entrants, as well as terminal operators and customers of rail transport services 130 . Therefore, the initiative is considered relevant for the SMEs and the SME test has been performed.

Step (1) of SME test (identification of affected businesses). The exact number of SMEs among RUs, or their market share, could not be established as information on SMEs is not reported separately in rail market statistics by Eurostat, regulatory bodies or sector associations. Nevertheless, information available about the market share of new entrant RUs and about their number suggests that a significant number of the new entrants in rail freight transport classify as SMEs 131 . In the freight transport, the average annual turnover of non-incumbent RUs is far below the upper threshold for an SME (EUR 50 million turnover) in the majority of Member States. Similarly, in passenger transport, the average annual turnover of non-incumbent RUs is below the threshold of EUR 50 million, with only one exception in Poland. It is therefore safe to assume that a significant number of freight and passenger RUs are indeed SMEs. These aggregate statistical figures have been corroborated by a few samples of RUs, for which staff numbers and turnover could be found.

The market share of the SMEs among RUs is likely to remain low in the baseline but in the policy options (especially in PO2, PO3 and PO4) new entrants could provide a significant boost to competition in market segments where incumbents continue to dominate. SMEs could be successful in market niches such as seasonal touristic trains or in remote regions 132 .

Step (2) of SME test (consultation of SME stakeholders). SMEs constitute a significant share of the stakeholders involved in the consultation activities: 25 out of 75 respondents to the survey-questionnaire in the targeted stakeholder consultation were submitted by SMEs. In addition, approximately 15 133 of the 47 stakeholder interviews were conducted with representatives of SMEs. The specific needs and challenges for SMEs were duly taken into account throughout the impact assessment; key issues are mentioned below.

Step (3) of SME test (assessment of the impacts on SMEs). As shown in section 6.1.1, all policy options are estimated to result in net benefits for RUs. PO4 would lead to the highest net benefits (EUR 3,529.5 million), expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline, followed by PO3 (EUR 3,281.4 million), PO2 (EUR 2,468.4 million) and PO1 (EUR 29.6 million). It was not possible to separate in the analysis the net benefits for SMEs. It is however expected that a share of the net benefits will accrue to new entrants and SMEs. On the cost side, SMEs will have to make investments in IT interfaces, as other RUs. However, as the relevant measure includes IT interfaces standardized at European level (PM24) and the right to interact with all EU IMs via a single interface, this is expected to be particularly beneficial for SMEs, which in the current situation face significant disadvantages vis-à-vis larger RUs due to the need to deploy national or network-specific interfaces.

Step (4) of SME test (minimizing negative impacts on SMEs). It should be noted that a key issue highlighted by respondents in the stakeholder consultation is the difficulty for small RUs, given limited resources, to actively contribute to consultation processes concerning strategic matters, i.e. of non-operational nature. PO2, PO3 and PO4 include a number of such processes, notably in the context of strategic capacity management (PM3), transport market analysis (PM18-1, PM18-2) and the development of new rules and processes (PM2-1, PM2-2) or IT tools (PM24, PM25). PO2, PO3 and PO4 mitigate this challenge to a certain extent by replacing the corridor approach to cross-border coordination with a network approach, reducing the number of interfaces (groups and meetings) between RUs and IMs at EU level. Another important element is the cooperation between RUs, which can nominate representative bodies defending the common interests vis-à-vis infrastructure managers and/or other (groups) of RUs in capacity management. In PO1 there is no significant change in the consultation processes concerning strategic matters relative to the baseline, so no major impacts on SMEs are expected.

6.1.6.Impacts on the internal market, competition and the single European railway area

All policy options are expected to have a positive impact on the functioning of the internal market. Improving the planning and operations of rail infrastructure allows RUs to deliver better rail transport services for the benefit of freight customers and passengers throughout the Union. Better rail transport services are expected to have knock-on effects throughout the entire economy, leveraging the initial impact on the transport sector. This is also expected to lead to positive impacts on GDP, which is estimated to increase by around 0.1% in 2030 and 0.2% in 2050 in PO3 relative to the baseline (corresponding to EUR 7 billion increase in 2030 and EUR 30 billion increase in 2050) and by around 0.1% in 2030 and 0.3% in 2050 in PO4 (corresponding to EUR 8 billion increase in 2030 and EUR 47 billion increase in 2050). PO1 and PO2 would lead to more limited impacts on GDP 134 . PO2, PO3 and PO4 will result in a higher level of harmonisation and integration of rail infrastructure services, than PO1, which will benefit operators developing cross-border services, thus providing opportunities for more competition and contributing to a single European railway area. In addition, PO3 and PO4 strengthen the role of regulatory bodies at European level, which will enable them to address counter-competitive practices. This will help to create a single European market for rail transport services, in particular for cross-border traffic.

6.1.7.Impacts on the competitiveness of the rail sector

As explained in section 6.1.1, the biggest share of the additional adjustment costs for RUs compared to the baseline are related to digitalisation and the accelerated implementation of the mandatory requirements for the technical specifications for interoperability on telematics applications. On the other hand, all policy options and in particular PO2, PO3 and PO4 will result in benefits for RUs (especially freight) due to the improved quality of capacity, punctuality and reliability, which will allow better utilisation of RUs’ resources (see Table 4 , in section 6.1.1). Overall, all policy options are estimated to result in net benefits for RUs (EUR 3 529.5 million in PO4, EUR 3 281.4 million in PO3, EUR 2 468.4 million in PO2 and EUR 29.6 million in PO1, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline). Therefore, it can be concluded that all policy options are expected to improve the competitiveness of RUs, although the positive impact of PO2, PO3 and PO4 would be higher than that of PO1. As regards the price-competitiveness of rail, the potential for RUs to pass on the net cost savings generated by the measures of this initiative to their customers, in particular in the freight segment, may create positive knock-on effects in other, client industries such as the automotive sector or the chemical industry. Naturally, benefits to such other industries would also benefit the sectoral competitiveness of EU companies at international level.

IMs will bear the biggest share of the costs, but as they are natural monopolies, no competitiveness issues arise.

6.1.8.Impacts on congestion costs for road transport

The reduction in the road transport activity in PO2, PO3 and PO4, enabled by better rail transport services for the benefit of freight customers and passengers, leads to a decrease in the external costs of inter-urban road congestion for passenger cars and freight heavy goods vehicles. This reduction is estimated at around EUR 3 531 million in PO4, EUR 2 375 million in PO3 and EUR 1 370 million in PO2 relative to the baseline over the 2025-2050 period, expressed as present value. In PO1 the decrease in congestion costs is more limited (EUR 181 million) due to the lower reduction in road transport activity relative to the other three options 135 , 136 .

6.1.9.Digital by default 

All policy options will have a positive impact on the application of the ‘digital by default’ principle, introduced by the common measure on requirements for digital exchange of information (PM24), included in all options. The impact would be higher in PO2, PO3 and PO4 relative to PO1, as they all require IMs to provide single IT interfaces at EU level providing seamless end-to-end services for capacity management (PM25).

6.2.Social impacts

Social impacts are assessed in terms of impacts on employment, public health, road safety and impacts on the protection of fundamental rights.

6.2.1.Impacts on employment

All policy options are expected to have a positive impact on employment in the sector, although the impact of PO2, PO3 and PO4 is expected to be higher relative to PO1, driven by the switch from the corridor-based to the network-based approach to the coordination of rail capacity and traffic management. The increase in capacity and thus in the rail traffic would lead to higher gross value added for the sector, and thus to an increase in employment relative to the baseline. According to the ASTRA model, economy-wide (in net terms), the number of employed persons in PO4 is estimated to increase by 1.46 million cumulatively over the period 2025-2050 (58 520 additional employed persons per year on average), relative to the baseline. In PO3 the number of employed persons would increase by 1.06 million over 2025-2050 (42 320 additional employed persons per year on average) relative to the baseline, followed by PO2 (0.71 million additional employed persons over 2025-2050 or 28 560 per year on average) and PO1 (5 000 additional employed persons over 2025-2050 or 200 per year on average) 137 . The higher impacts in PO4 and PO3, relative to PO2 and PO1, are due to the higher impacts of the measures included in the options on capacity and additional traffic 138 .

6.2.2.Impacts on public health

PO2, PO3 and PO4 lead to an increase in rail traffic and a reduction in the road and air transport activity relative to the baseline 139 . Although PO1 results in similar type of impacts, their magnitude is much more limited than in the other three policy options. Enabling higher use of more sustainable transport modes would result in reduced air pollutant emissions and subsequent positive impacts on public health. Savings in external costs of air pollutants are estimated to be the highest in PO4 (EUR 1 026 million), followed by PO3 (EUR 681 million), PO2 (EUR 416 million) and PO1 (EUR 36 million), expressed as present value over 2025-2050 (relative to the baseline) 140 . The reason for higher savings in external costs of air pollutants in PO4 and PO3, relative to PO2 and PO1, is the higher increase of available rail capacity in these options that results in higher increase in rail traffic relative to the baseline. The reduction of air pollutant emissions would be particularly relevant in urban nodes.

6.2.3.Impacts on road safety

The reduction in the road transport activity in PO2, PO3 and PO4, enabled by better rail transport services for the benefit of freight customers and passengers, would lead to a decrease in the cumulative number of fatalities and injuries from road transport over 2025-2050 of 0.1% in PO2, 0.2% in PO3 and 0.3% in PO4 relative to the baseline. The effect is the highest in PO4 due to the higher reduction in the road transport activity in this policy option. PO1 results in very limited decrease in the number of fatalities and injuries, below 0.1% relative to the baseline. The reduction in the external costs of accidents is estimated at around EUR 4 194 million in PO4, EUR 2 802 million in PO3, EUR 1 608 in PO2 and only EUR 181 million in PO1 relative to the baseline over the 2025-2050 period, expressed as present value (in 2021 prices) 141 . The 2019 Handbook on the external costs of transport 142 has been used to monetise the costs. According to the Handbook, the external cost of a fatality in 2021 prices is estimated at around EUR 3.6 million and that of a serious injury at around EUR 0.5 million.

6.2.4.Impacts on fundamental rights 

The policy options were assessed to determine if they have an impact on the fundamental rights and/or equal treatment of EU citizens. The starting point of the assessment of the fundamental rights is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 143 . All options were assessed having regard to the relevant EU instrument and it was concluded that they maintain full respect for human and fundamental rights and none will have any negative impact thereon.

6.3.Environmental impacts

The analysis of environmental impacts covers CO2 emissions and air pollutant emissions. The environmental impacts were quantified with the ASTRA model.

6.3.1.Impact on CO2 emissions

The reduction in the CO2 and air pollutant emissions is mainly driven by the higher use of more sustainable transport modes and the reduction in the road and air transport activity. The highest CO2 emissions reductions from the transport sector 144 relative to the baseline are projected for PO4 (0.2% decrease in 2030 and 0.9% in 2050 or 1 491 thousand tonnes of CO2 saved in 2030 and 902 thousand tonnes saved in 2050), followed by PO3 (0.2% decrease in 2030 and 0.4% in 2050 or 1 195 thousand tonnes of CO2 saved in 2030 and 450 thousand tonnes saved in 2050) and PO2 (0.1% decrease in 2030 and 0.2% in 2050 or 778 thousand tonnes of CO2 saved in 2030 and 244 thousand tonnes saved in 2050). PO1 shows very limited emissions reductions relative to the baseline (below 0.1% for 2030 and 2050 or 87 thousand tonnes of CO2 saved in 2030 and 27 thousand tonnes saved in 2050) due to the lower increase in the capacity of the rail network in this option. In cumulative terms, over 2025-2050, PO4 is estimated to result in 39 million tonnes of CO2 emissions saved, PO3 in 26 million tonnes of CO2 emissions saved, while PO2 and PO1 in 15 and 1 million tonnes of CO2 emissions saved, respectively. The reduction in the external costs related to CO2 emissions is estimated at EUR 4 979.1 million in PO4, followed by PO3 (EUR 3 309.3 million), PO2 (EUR 1 919.6 million) and PO1 (EUR 140.7 million) 145 .

It should be noted that the reason for the limited CO2 emissions reductions from transport is the fact that the baseline scenario already reflects the ‘Fit for 55’ initiatives and the REPowerEU initiatives, as well as the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation. On the other hand, as explained in section 5.1, the scenarios underpinning the impact assessments accompanying the ‘Fit for 55’ initiatives 146 and the staff working document accompanying the REPowerEU initiatives 147 took into account a broader range of policies (including this initiative) that were represented in a stylised way ahead of the actual proposals, to show the delivery of at least 55% emissions reduction target by 2030 and to account for the interaction with the other forthcoming initiatives. Therefore, this initiative contributes towards the at least 55% emissions reductions target by 2030 and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

6.3.2.Impact on air pollutant emissions

Similarly to CO2 emissions, the reduction in air pollution emissions is mainly driven by the higher use of more sustainable transport modes and the reduction in the road and air transport activity. CO emissions from the transport sector 148 are projected to reduce by 0.1% in PO2, PO3 and PO4 in 2030 relative to the baseline and only marginally (by less than 0.1%) in PO1. For 2050, CO emissions would reduce by 0.7% in PO4, 0.3% in PO3 and 0.1% in PO2, while the CO emissions reduction due to PO1 is expected to be marginal. In cumulative terms, over 2025-2050, PO4 is estimated to result in 65 thousand tonnes of CO emissions saved, PO3 in 34 thousand tonnes of CO saved, while PO2 and PO1 in 19 and 1 thousand tonnes of CO emissions saved, respectively. For NOx emissions, PO4 is projected to lead to reductions of 0.2% in 2030 (0.8% in 2050) in NOx emissions from the transport sector relative to the baseline, while PO3 would result in emissions reductions of 0.1% in 2030 (0.4% in 2050). PO2 and PO1 show a more limited effect on NOx emissions from the transport sector (less than 0.1% decrease in 2030 for both PO2 and PO1 and 0.2% decrease in 2050 for PO2, with PO1 showing only marginal decrease for 2050). In cumulative terms, over 2025-2050, PO4 is estimated to result in 129 thousand tonnes of NOx emissions saved, PO3 in 84 thousand tonnes of NOx saved, while PO2 and PO1 in 48 and 2 thousand tonnes of NOx emissions saved, respectively.

With regard to particulate matter (PM) emissions, all policy options would lead to a very marginal increase in emissions relative to the baseline. This however is not linked to the energy/fuel use but can be explained by increased PM emission from rail transport due to higher wear and tear 149 , as a consequence of increased rail activity. This increase in emissions slightly overcompensates the reduction in the PM emissions from road transport. In cumulative terms, over 2025-2050, PO4 is estimated to result in 239 additional tonnes of PM emissions relative to the baseline, PO3 in 199 additional tonnes of PM, while PO2 and PO1 in 36 and 18 additional tonnes of PM emissions, respectively. For VOC emissions, PO4 and PO3 are projected to lead to reductions of 0.1% in 2030 (0.5% decrease in PO4 and 0.2% in PO3 for 2050) in VOC emissions from the transport sector relative to the baseline, while PO2 and PO1 would result in emissions reductions of less than 0.1% in 2030 (0.1% decrease in PO2 and less than 0.1% decrease in PO1 in 2050). In cumulative terms, over 2025-2050, PO4 is estimated to result in 10 thousand tonnes of VOC emissions saved, PO3 in 6 thousand tonnes of VOC saved, while PO2 and PO1 in 3 and 0.1 thousand tonnes of VOC emissions saved, respectively. Overall, the reduction in the external costs related to air pollutant emissions is estimated at EUR 1 026.5 million in PO4, followed by PO3 (EUR 681 million), PO2 (EUR 415.5 million) and PO1 (EUR 36.2 million), expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline 150 .

All policy options are consistent with the environmental objectives of the European Green Deal and the European Climate Law 151 , although PO1 only marginally contributes to the CO2 emissions and air pollution emissions reductions. All policy options contribute towards Sustainable Development Goal 13 (‘Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’), although PO1 only marginally. No significant harm is expected on the environment in any of the policy options.

7.How do the options compare?

7.1.Effectiveness

The assessment of effectiveness looks at the extent to which the general and specific objectives (SO) of the intervention are met. Table 8 provides the link between policy objectives and assessment criteria.

Table 8: Link between objectives and assessment criteria

Concerning SO1, all options are expected to result in additional rail infrastructure capacity, although PO2, PO3 and PO4 clearly have a much bigger impact than PO1. The same applies to meeting the needs of all rail market segments in terms of access to capacity. PO1 relies on the existing tools to support cross-border traffic and its impacts are limited as it does not address the core capacity issue for rail freight – i.e. not fitting into the annual timetable process. PO2, PO3 and PO4 introduce a new approach to capacity management, which is expected to result in significant benefits. This is due mostly to a more strategic management of capacity, allowing to optimise the provision of capacity in line with market needs over a longer time horizon and safeguarding capacity to be allocated later in the calendar year. The options differ in terms of total impact and how much time is needed to realise their full potential. According to the quantitative analysis, PO4 and PO3 show the highest impact on capacity resulting in benefits for railways undertakings (estimated at EUR 2 759.1 million in PO4, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline, and EUR 2 575.7 million in PO3), followed by PO2 (EUR 1 981 million), while the benefits of PO1 are more limited (EUR 242.1 million). PO2, PO3 and PO4 also result in significantly higher improvements in the performance of rail transport services, notably punctuality, relative to PO1. The benefits for railways undertakings due to improved punctuality are estimated at EUR 664.9 million in PO4, EUR 658 million in PO3 and EUR 501.3 million in PO2, while the impacts of PO1 are more limited (EUR 72.7 million). Thus, PO4 and PO3 are equally effective in addressing SO1, followed by PO2. It should be noted that this result is highly dependent on the hypothesis that, in PO4, the Network Coordinator achieves full optimisation of capacity on the TEN-T network lines for which it assumes the responsibility of strategic capacity planning. However, this working hypothesis does not account for the possible inefficiencies that, in PO4, could derive from mismatches between the capacity planning for the TEN-T lines carried out by the future Network Coordinator and the lines managed by IMs on the national network. Indeed, the number of intersections between TEN-T and non-TEN-T lines is considerable and potential mismatches would need to be addressed in what could be a time-consuming coordination process. This potential source of inefficiency is hard to quantify, but it has been evoked also by stakeholders and appears to constitute a non-negligible risk. In view of these considerations, the effectiveness of PO4 is subject to much greater uncertainty than that of PO1, PO2 and PO3.

Concerning SO2, PO1 does not address the challenges in the baseline resulting from the instability in the capacity management process, which leads to a waste of efforts and, in the worst case, of usable network capacity. It relies on strengthening the existing corridor performance monitoring, while PO2, PO3 and PO4 introduce a harmonised incentive scheme that encourages a higher respect of commitments related to capacity, both on IM and RU side, improving the stability of capacity planning and significantly reducing in this way their workload related to capacity management. The costs savings for infrastructure managers from the greater stability of allocated paths are estimated to be similar in PO2, PO3 and PO4: EUR 415.3 million in PO2, expressed as present value over 2025-2050, EUR 418.6 million in PO3 and EUR 423.9 million in PO4. Each modification of a train path concerns both infrastructure managers and railway undertakings (i.e. irrespective which side requests a change initially, the other side will have to adjust its planning accordingly) and the costs savings for railways undertakings are thus assumed to be the same as those for infrastructure managers. PO2, PO3 and PO4 contain additional measures that ensure equal treatment of cross-border applicants with national traffic. Thus, PO2, PO3 and PO4 are assessed to be equally effective and much more effective than PO1.

Concerning SO3, PO1 is expected to have negligible impacts on coordination procedures between all stakeholders involved in train runs (including in other modes for freight traffic) due to its reliance on structures and tools pre-existing in the baseline and to the persistence of the fragmentation resulting from a corridor approach. PO2, PO3 and PO4 are expected to have a positive effect with respect to this criterion, as they harmonise the procedures for capacity and traffic management (i.e. planning and operations). This creates a more solid basis for effective coordination procedures. Important differences in the effectiveness for cross-border traffic between PO2, PO3 and PO4 come from the different mechanisms ensuring cross-border coordination. The reliance on voluntary cooperation between infrastructure managers in PO2 is expected to limit both the degree of harmonisation and the exploitation of its benefits compared to PO3 and PO4 where the ‘Network Coordinator’ provides operational support. In PO4, a single interlocutor (the Network Coordinator) responsible for the planning of capacity on the TEN-T lines would bring about two effects: simplify coordination along the TEN-T lines but require an additional coordination process for the part of the rail journeys taking place outside the TEN-T lines; it is difficult to anticipate which of the two effects will prevail in comparing with PO3.

As regards the increase in reliability of rail transport, PO1 is expected to deliver limited positive impacts, based on a set of procedures to coordinate traffic management between IMs in a harmonised manner. PO2 delivers more significant improvements resulting from strengthened requirements regarding contingency planning and a more comprehensive approach to coordinate operations based on collaborative decision-making. PO3 and PO4 have even stronger positive impacts resulting from dedicated support by the network coordinator in (i) contingency planning to prepare for disruptions (PO3 and PO4) and in (ii) operational traffic management during disruptions (PO4 only). Overall, PO4 is most effective in addressing SO3, followed by PO3 and PO2. PO1 is expected to result in a more limited impacts.

Concerning SO4, PO2, PO3 and PO4 include a comprehensive measure to digitalise and automate capacity management, providing a virtual ‘one-stop shop’ functionality for RUs in the form of a single digital interface at EU level for capacity management. PO1 does not provide such functionalities and can only make a limited contribution through requirements for digital exchange of information. Thus, PO2, PO3 and PO4 are equally effective in addressing SO4 and more effective than PO1. A more detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the policy options is provided in Annex 8.

As explained above, the effectiveness of the POs with respect to SO1 and SO2 in monetary terms can be compared on the basis of the most important direct effects for the main stakeholder groups (IMs and RUs). These include the impacts from increases in available capacity (and traffic) and in train punctuality for RUs (SO1) and the cost reductions from the reduced number of amendments and cancellations of capacity requests (SO2) for RUs and IMs. The results indicate that PO3 and PO4 have the strongest direct impact especially for RUs.

Table 9: Summary of the effectiveness of the policy options expressed as direct benefits for IMs and RUs – present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline (EUR million in 2021 prices)

Table 10 provides a summary of the comparison of the options against the baseline scenario in terms of effectiveness. The following ranking symbols have been used: from '+' (more effective than the baseline) to '++++' (much more effective than the baseline); 0 indicated no or negligible impacts.

Table 10: Summary of the effectiveness of the policy options – qualitative comparison

As indicated above the measures in PO1 are expected to have limited or no effect in most of the cases. This is mostly due to them relying on the instruments available at present to the rail freight corridors, which, even with improvements, are likely to face considerable limitations. PO2 is expected to be more effective, as it shares a number of policy measures with PO3 and PO4 (e.g. for SO2). However, the lack of a clear and established coordination mechanism between IMs for capacity management, raises uncertainty about the impact in regard to SO1 and SO3.

Finally, PO3 and PO4 contain policy measures that provide the necessary mechanisms to ensure that the new approach for capacity management is implemented and coordinated. PO4 has a relatively higher impact based on the assumption that more coordination at EU level will provide more improvements in capacity management and allocation. However, as outlined in section 8.4, a number of factors raise uncertainty about the effectiveness of PO4, whereas these risks are expected to be lower for PO3.

7.2.Efficiency

Efficiency concerns the ‘extent to which objectives can be achieved for a given cost (cost effectiveness)’. In all policy options, the benefits outweigh the increase in costs, relative to the baseline. The estimates of costs and benefits are summarised in Table 11 .

Table 11: Summary of costs and benefits of policy options – net present value for 2025-2050 compared to the baseline (in million EUR), in 2021 prices

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study

The major cost element of the policy options, except for PO1, consists of adjustment costs for the digitalisation and automation of capacity management. Other significant groups of costs, included in PO2, PO3 and PO4, are adjustment costs related to strategic capacity management and new allocation procedures, the introduction of an EU framework for coordination of traffic management and terminal operations, and the requirement for digital exchange of information that is included in all options. In terms of stakeholders’ groups, the highest share of the costs consists of adjustment costs for infrastructure managers and railways undertakings (i.e. the stakeholders involved in delivering rail infrastructure and transport services).

PO1, comprising a limited set of measures aiming to improve existing structures and mechanisms, shows the lowest total costs, estimated at EUR 393.1 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. PO2, PO3 and PO3 show significantly higher costs of EUR 1 919.1 million, EUR 2 094.0 million and EUR 2 324.9 million, respectively. The main difference in terms of costs between PO1, on the one hand, and PO2, PO3 and PO4, on the other, comes from the additional investments in the digitalisation and automation of capacity management, the introduction of a strategic capacity management phase, additional procedures to ensure traffic continuity in the event of infrastructure non-availability and of a framework to coordinate traffic management and terminal operations. The additional costs in PO3 compared to PO2 (EUR 174.9 million) result mainly from staffing ENIM (including the Network Coordinator), responsible for coordinating between IMs and monitoring performance of rail infrastructure and transport services at European level. PO4 shows the highest costs of all policy options as a result of the additional functions assigned to the IM coordination entity in this policy option: taking over strategic capacity management from IMs on the most strategically important lines of the TEN-T network and an operational support function in traffic management.

In terms of benefits, the policy options result in improvements in the capacity and punctuality for RUs and IMs, costs savings for the public authorities and IMs due to the abolition of the rail freight corridors (PO2, PO3 and PO4), costs savings due to the greater stability of allocated paths for RUs and IMs (PO2, PO3 and PO4), as well as in reductions in the external costs of transport. The benefits related to improvements in the performance of rail transport in terms of capacity and punctuality accrue to RUs in the first instance but might be passed on the customers of rail transport services.

As regards total benefits, PO1 stands out with a clearly lower level of total benefits estimated at EUR 832.5 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. PO4 shows the highest total benefits of EUR 18 319.5 million, while the total benefits of PO2 and PO3 amount to EUR 8 826.1 million and EUR 13 502.7 million, respectively. The difference between PO1, on the one hand, and PO2, PO3 and PO4, on the other, is mainly driven by benefits generated by the introduction of new procedures, rules, as well as IT tools and applications, where PO1 relies mainly on existing instruments of limited effectiveness. Compared to PO2, the total benefits increase in PO3 and PO4 with the introduction of additional support and management functions at EU level, resulting in a more effective and seamless implementation of the common European framework.

Overall, all policy options result in net benefits relative to the baseline. PO4 shows the highest net benefits, estimated at EUR 15 994.6 million expressed as present value over 2025-2050, followed by PO3 (EUR 11 408.8 million) and PO2 (EUR 6 907.0 million). PO1 results in significantly lower net benefits of EUR 439.3 million. PO4 also shows the highest benefit to cost ratio (7.9), followed by PO3 (6.4), PO2 (4.6) and PO1 (2.1).

However, the efficiency of PO4 is subject to considerable uncertainties. PO4 results in a new split of responsibilities: (i) a geographical split between lines where capacity is managed at EU level (TEN-T) and at national level (rest of the network); and (ii) a functional split between the management of capacity (ENIM) and the development, renewal and maintenance of infrastructure (individual IMs).

As regards the geographical split, PO4 gives better results on cross-border lines by employing a single entity in charge for capacity management on all TEN-T lines. However, PO4 requires additional coordination between the lines managed at EU and national level, particularly in urban and industrial nodes. The TEN-T network comprises around 80 border crossings but more than 400 urban nodes. It was considered proportionate to limit the modelling work described in section 4.1 of Annex 4 to simulating capacity increases at the level of single lines. This fully captures the benefits of better cross-border coordination in PO4 but it does not cover wider network-level effects in nodes. Modelling a timetable for the whole EU network would have required an amount of resources disproportionate to the purpose of the analysis. Overall, the limitations of the analysis mean that the benefits of PO4 cannot be assessed with the same degree of certainty as those of the other POs.

The functional split in competences for maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure (which would remain in the competence of individual IMs) and for capacity management (which would be transferred to the EU level – ENIM) may be problematic because it concerns one of the key challenges facing rail capacity today: the planning and execution of infrastructure works for maintenance and renewal. This adds to the uncertainties over the benefits of PO4.

On the costs side, the effort for coordinating the strategic planning between the Network Coordinator, which is in charge of strategic capacity management on the lines of the TEN-T network with the highest strategic importance, and national IMs who are responsible for the rest of the national network, could result in higher efforts and costs than expected. Separating the strategic capacity management (Network Coordinator) from the allocation phase, the planning and implementation of infrastructure works and network development (responsibility of the IMs) increases the uncertainty that the capacity benefits will be realised in full.

7.3.Coherence

Internal coherence assesses how various elements of the revised legislation or new legal act function together to achieve the objectives. This does not only concern the existing RFC Regulation or a possible new legal act itself, but also any accompanying secondary legislation (delegated and/or implementing acts). Although all four policy options address the identified problems, PO1 relies on a corridor-based approach, using the governance and the tools of the existing rail freight corridors (specified in the RFC Regulation), while PO2, PO3 and PO4 introduce a network-based approach with a different level of intervention. The new approach means that the two sets of legal rules on capacity allocation – one in the RFC Regulation and the other in Chapter IV, Section 3 of the Recast Directive – will be replaced with a new Regulation. PO1 shares only one single measure with the other three options. All options contain measures that are fully coherent, with measures for the IMs acting as natural monopolies being complemented with measures on regulatory supervision.

External coherence concentrates on the compliance of the initiative with national policies, other EU instruments and relevant EU policies, as well as international obligations. All identified policy options show strong links to several EU instruments. There is an obvious link with the Recast Directive, which contains a number of relevant legal definitions and provides the broad framework for the Union rail sector, as well as a number of detailed rules on the functioning of IMs, regulatory bodies, rights of applicants for capacity, licensing of RUs, charging for the use of rail infrastructure, etc. The initiative is linked to the EU policy on infrastructure development (TEN-T Regulation) and with the legislation on interoperability. Both issues are identified as important contextual drivers. All options are consistent with the existing legislation, including the legislative proposal for the amendment of the TEN-T Regulation adopted in 2021 and strengthen the link to interoperability legislation and in particular with the technical specification for interoperability relating to telematics applications for freight services.

7.4.Subsidiarity and proportionality

The intervention addresses the deficiencies in EU rules on capacity management, identified in the evaluation of the RFC Regulation. These can only be addressed at EU level. The policy options tackle issues of cross-border coordination for capacity and traffic management, infrastructure works, performance schemes that affect cross-border traffic and therefore cannot be addressed at national or bilateral level. This being said, PO4 introduces a significant element of centralisation in the capacity management process, with the Network Coordinator taking over the responsibility for the strategic capacity management phase. Stakeholders have raised concerns in this respect, in particular IMs and regulatory bodies.

In terms of proportionality, PO1 largely retains the current balance for decision-making between IMs (national level) and corridors (EU level). It strengthens the cross-corridor cooperation. PO2 envisages a transition to a network approach based largely on voluntary cooperation between IMs which raises uncertainty about the effectiveness of coordination of capacity planning. Both PO1 and PO2 do not address the limitations of national regulatory bodies in relation to cross-border traffic. PO3 and PO4 envisage some of the decisions related to capacity planning to be taken at EU level.

PO3 is proportional to the goals of the initiative of introducing new rules for capacity management for the whole rail traffic, including cross-border trains. The latter requires a reinforced mechanism of coordination compared to the current rail freight corridors’ governance.

PO4 assigns the strategic capacity planning of rail infrastructure capacity for lines part of the TEN-T network to the Network Coordinator. This allows for better planning of cross-border train paths, but requires new coordination processes to address potential mismatches between the capacity planning for the TEN-T and the non-TEN-T lines. Depriving IMs of the responsibility for capacity planning on the TEN-T lines might be considered disproportionate at a stage in which passenger rail is still predominantly national 152 and represents roughly 80% of the rail traffic.

8.Preferred option

8.1.Identification of the preferred policy option

Even though all policy options are in line with the general objective and include measures that address all specific objectives and problem drivers, there is a clear difference in effectiveness between PO1 and the other three options. The former is far less effective, as it relies on policy instruments (like the rail freight corridors’ one-stop shops) that have not been able to make a significant impact on capacity management, traffic management or on the performance of rail freight services. The measures included will not address the issue that trains travelling on RFC and non-RFC lines follow two different sets of processes, rules and tools – the ones of the RFC Regulation and the Recast Directive, respectively. This also results in less efficient use of resources by RUs and IMs.

When addressing SO1 (Enable alternative capacity management procedures), all policy options are expected to result in additional rail infrastructure capacity on capacity-constrained lines and nodes, and positive impacts on punctuality. PO4 and PO3 are however expected to be equally effective and more effective than PO2 and PO1 in addressing SO1 due to the higher increase in capacity and improvements in punctuality mostly driven by better capacity planning of cross-border traffic (PM20-1 and PM20-2).

Concerning SO2 (Strengthen incentives to improve performance of rail infrastructure and rail transport services), PO2, PO3 and PO4 are expected to result in similar costs savings for IMs and RUs from the greater stability of allocated train paths. The slightly higher impact on costs savings in PO4 relative to PO3 can be explained by the fact that the higher rail traffic in PO4 is accompanied by a higher reduction in the modifications to the planned train paths. Even more importantly, PO2, 3 and 4 improve the quality of capacity by improving TCRs planning and implementation (PM8 and 9). The impacts of PO1 are negligible.

When addressing SO3 (Introduce more effective mechanisms for coordination between stakeholders, in particular across borders) PO1 delivers limited positive impacts while PO2, PO3 and PO4 result in significant benefits due to harmonisation of processes and rules (PO2, PO3, PO4) and due to the introduction of a network coordinator supporting IMs in the cross-border planning and operational tasks (PO3). PO4 goes further than PO3 in attributing responsibilities to the coordination entity (Network Coordinator), which makes this PO difficult to assess with certainty: improvements in the coordination process along the TEN-T lines could be accompanied by difficulties in coordination with the rest of the rail network (infrastructure managers).

Concerning SO4 (Support the deployment of digital tools to enable better capacity and traffic management), PO1 has limited effects by ensuring interoperability of the IT systems for capacity management. POs 2, 3 and 4 all envisage a comprehensive digitalisation of capacity management services, which will allow to make full use of the new rules on capacity and traffic management and thus have a profound effect on improving access to and quality of capacity.

Concerning the efficiency, PO2, PO3 and PO4 result in significant net benefits relative to the baseline, with the net benefits being the highest in PO4, followed by PO3 and PO2. The benefit to cost ratio is estimated at 7.9 for PO4, 6.4 for PO3, 4.6 for PO2 and 2.1 for PO1.

PO4 shows the highest benefit to cost ratio. It results in the highest costs, born mostly by IMs, but these costs are overcompensated by the significant benefits due to increased capacity and improved punctuality, which accrue mostly to RUs as direct beneficiaries. The highest costs come from investments for IT development and deployment, required for the implementation of the new allocation processes, but additional resources are also required for staffing ENIM (and the Network Coordinator), responsible for strategic capacity planning on the TEN-T network lines. In fact, whereas the higher costs of PO4 with respect to the other options can be projected with some confidence, the actual realisation of the higher benefits, especially with respect to PO3, is subject to considerable uncertainties as explained in section 7.2. It is difficult to quantify the impact of these uncertainties, but they are likely to significantly reduce, and possibly eliminate, PO4’s advantage in terms of benefit to cost ratio with respect to PO3.

PO3 ranks second in terms of benefit to cost ratio and PO2 ranks the third. The difference between the two are the higher costs for PO3 for the work of the two central entities 153 (ENIM and the ENRRB). They are overcompensated by the higher increase in available capacity and improvements in punctuality. IT-related investments are expected to be the same as in PO4 and are by far the biggest contributor to costs for both policy options.

PO1 shows the lowest benefit to cost ratio. Even though it results in the lowest costs, it increases slightly the administrative burden, does not produce significant cost savings and results in very limited benefits due to increase in capacity and punctuality compared to the baseline.

Concerning internal coherence and external coherence, all POs are coherent. Concerning external coherence, PO1 keeps the existing RFC governance, which is given the task to contribute to EU transport infrastructure policy by providing feedback to the European Coordinators 154  in the proposal for a regulation 155 replacing the TEN-T Regulation 156 . In PO2, PO3 and PO4, this feedback mechanism will be taken over by the Network Coordinator, which coordinates input by individual IMs from a cross-border perspective. PO2, PO3 and PO4 will replace the advisory groups in the RFC governance with a new platform for consulting rail stakeholders, which will be broader in terms of the stakeholder groups involved, in particular by adding customers of rail transport services, and more efficient as regards issues to be addressed at EU level, by avoiding multiplication of exchanges in 11 corridors, and more flexible with respect to issues that require more local approaches, allowing address issues at the most appropriate level possible. All policy options envisage supporting the implementation of standardised digital information exchange between operation stakeholders in line with the technical specification for interoperability relating to telematics applications for freight services by requiring compliance of IM and RU systems for specified implementation deadlines.

All policy options are in line with the principle of subsidiarity, addressing issues that cannot be solved by an intervention at national level. This being said, PO4 introduces a significant element of centralisation in the capacity management process, with the Network Coordinator taking over the responsibility for the strategic capacity management phase. Stakeholders have raised concerns in this respect, in particular IMs and regulatory bodies.

In addition, all policy options meet the requirements of the proportionality principle but, as in the case of subsidiarity, stakeholder feedback on PO4 has been mixed. PO4 assigns the strategic capacity management of lines that are part of the TEN-T network to the Network Coordinator, thus depriving IMs of an important function. This move is rather controversial and might be considered not entirely justified in view of the uncertainty of the additional benefits that it would generate with respect to the, less radical, PO3. It is important to highlight that the behavioural response of parties involved in the implementation of the measures will have an influence on the success of the initiative, and that evidence from the evaluation of the RFC Regulation has shown that the formalistic implementation of rules can undermine the effectiveness of measures. In this regard, PO3 has the advantage over PO4 of eliciting a more positive response of stakeholders.

Overall, considering the assessment of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, subsidiarity and proportionality of the four options, the analysis points at PO3 as the preferred policy option, since it brings the best balance between the objectives which must be achieved, the degree of proportionality of the intervention, the costs and benefits incurred and the confidence that can be placed on the assessment of impacts.

Stakeholders’ views in the stakeholder consultation were divergent and there was no clear-cut majority for one policy option, although support for a new approach to capacity management, inspired by TTR prevailed. A higher number of railway undertakings were supportive of PO3 and the option was supported by some IMs. The latter mostly expressed support for PO 2. Some RUs and IMs alluded to a combination of PO2 and PO3 or a step-wise implementation of PO3.

With regard to PO4, the most contentious issue is the introduction of tasks for entities at EU level. While the feedback from the public consultation on the policy options was positive overall, including on this particular element, the targeted stakeholder consultation showed that several stakeholder groups had doubts. IMs expressed strong opposition towards the introduction of a central entity , which would take over management competences from individual IMs under PO4, and voiced a preference for either PO2 or PO3. RUs, on the other hand, appeared more supportive of the centralised mechanisms of PO4. The members of the rail freight corridors governance (both IMs and public authorities responsible for rail policy) considered a mix of PO2 and PO3 as the best approach and considered PO4 to be unrealistic. RUs were more supportive of the concept of central entities. Regulators supported options PO2 and PO3 and considered PO4 as too costly and time consuming for implementation 157 .

On the basis of what precedes and the analysis above, PO3 is selected as the preferred policy option.

8.2.REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)

This initiative is a follow-up to the evaluation of the RFC Regulation 158 , completed in 2021 159 , and it is part of the Greening freight package, included in the Commission work programme 2023 160 . This initiative has an important REFIT dimension in terms of streamlining and updating the rules on rail infrastructure capacity to suit better the needs of different rail market segments, in particular cross-border freight. The initiative will repeal Regulation (EU) 913/2010, which lays down rules applicable only to the rail freight corridor lines, and thereby replace the current two sets of rules for capacity and traffic management 161 with a single one for the whole EU network.

The preferred policy option is expected to lead to administrative costs savings for national public authorities due to the implementation of a harmonised legal framework for railway capacity and traffic management and the abolition of the rail freight corridors, estimated at EUR 2.6 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. The initiative will result in simplifications for applicants for capacity involved in cross-border rail services by making the process of capacity allocation more efficient. It will also result in a reduction of administrative costs for IMs, estimated at EUR 8.2 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2025-2050.

8.3.Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

PO3 will result in limited administrative cost savings for IMs, of EUR 0.4 million from 2025 onwards relative to the baseline (i.e. EUR 17 836 per year on average per infrastructure manager 162 ), due to the envisaged abolition of the rail freight corridors. Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, they are estimated at EUR 8.2 million relative to the baseline (in 2021 prices). As explained in section 6.1.2, the savings come from removing the obligations for management boards to collect and publish information, in particular to produce customer satisfaction surveys and to monitor the performance of rail freight services. The policy measure will also remove the need for management boards to publish annual reports, which they do on their own initiative.

The preferred policy option is expected to result in adjustments costs estimated at EUR 435.1 million for RUs, EUR 1 596.5 million for IMs, and EUR 17 million for terminal operators, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline. At the same time, it would also result in adjustment costs savings of EUR 482.8 million for RUs and EUR 485.3 million for IMs over the same period.

8.4.Sensitivity analysis of the policy options

Policy options 2, 3 and 4 introduce a new approach to capacity management. This creates challenges for all involved stakeholders and in particular infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. Overall, the introduction of the new approach and the different policy measures in the POs increase to a different degree the level of uncertainty of the estimations of the impacts. This warrants performing sensitivity analysis on the modelling results of the additional capacity created in the different POs, to complement the cost-benefit analysis in identifying the preferred policy option. The differences in the results on available capacity have a knock-on effect on a number of outputs that were modelled for this impact assessment, such as the estimates of the monetary value of the direct benefits from the additional freight and passenger capacity.

Two main factors create uncertainty: the higher level of complexity and ambition of a policy option and the effectiveness of the coordination between infrastructure managers and ENIM regarding traffic that goes both on TEN-T lines and the rest of the network.

For the first factor, the key assumption is that a higher level of complexity and ambition of a policy option results in a higher level of uncertainty about its outcomes, as the necessary adjustments increase compared to the baseline. Therefore, increasing uncertainty factors were assigned to the POs (the lowest for PO1 and the highest for PO4). One adjustment was made for PO2, where the lack of a solid coordination mechanism for cross-border traffic was assessed to result in the same uncertainty factor as the more complex PO3. While PO2 contains no policy measure on coordination, PO3 has a relatively straightforward mechanism introduced by PM20-1. For PO4, the uncertainty is the highest in particular due to the complexity of PM20-2, PM22 and PM23. The simulation of the timetable process in TPS focuses on individual lines, including cross-border lines. Policy option 4 fares very well in this respect, because capacity on cross-border lines is managed by the central entity. Therefore, the analysis in PO4 produces results on the premise that there are no remaining inconsistencies in the planning of capacity for cross-border traffic. However, the modelled results of PO4 assume the smooth implementation of higher and more complex requirements and dependencies towards the coordination of traffic between the lines managed by the central entity (TEN-T lines) and those managed by individual infrastructure managers (the rest of the network) than for the other policy options. Therefore, there is more uncertainty regarding potential inconsistencies in the capacity planning and allocation.

This uncertainty factor is also applied to calculate upper bounds. The modelling of the train paths, includes a buffer zone. This buffer was part of the simulated scheduling process to consider short operational delays. For PO4, these buffers had the highest relative negative impact due to the proportionally high number of lines on the network. Therefore, the reversed uncertainty factors are the basis for the upper bounds of the sensitivity analysis on the results of the additional capacity.

The second factor driving the sensitivity analysis is the uncertainty about the effectiveness of the coordination between infrastructure managers and ENIM regarding traffic using both TEN-T lines (where ENIM is competent for planning) and the rest of the network (in competence of infrastructure managers). This is introduced by PM20-2. The TEN-T lines are still heavily used for domestic traffic, which often does not start on these lines and hence would need to be coordinated between infrastructure managers and ENIM. This coordination might not always be smooth. The central value (CV) used for the estimation of the impacts of the options in section 6 assumed a full continuation of the domestic services. Therefore, for a lower bound (LB) calculation, a 50% reduction of the modelled impact of additionally available train paths is assumed for PO4, while for the upper bound (UB) a doubling of the additionally available train paths has been assumed. For the other policy options this uncertainty is scaled down by halving the previous value (i.e., from policy option 4, to policy option 3, to policy option 2 and to policy option 1).

The results of the sensitivity analysis are provided in Table 12 .

Table 12: Results of the sensitivity analysis on the additional rail infrastructure capacity created in POs 1 to 4 (LB – lower bounds; CV – central value; UB – upper bounds) relative to the baseline

Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study

The results show that the preferred policy option, PO3 has relatively stable results with an increase in the available rail infrastructure capacity between 2.7 and 3.9% in 2050 relative to the baseline. Policy option 4, which had the best cost-benefit ratio in the modelled results, shows considerable uncertainty especially in regard to the lower bound.

The effect of available capacity has a stronger impact on direct benefits and external costs, as these are the categories that have the most direct link to rail traffic. The results of sensitivity analysis in terms of total costs, total benefits, net benefits and benefits to costs ratio for PO3 and PO4 are presented in Table 13 . As shown in section 7.2, these are the policy options with the highest benefits to costs ratio and therefore have been retained for further analysis.

Table 13: Summary of costs and benefits of policy options – net present value for 2025-2050 compared to the baseline (in million EUR), in 2021 prices for POs 3 and 4 (sensitivity analysis). LB – lower bounds, CV – central value and UB – upper bounds

Source: Ecorys et al. (2023), impact assessment support study

The results of the sensitivity analysis show that if risks are considered the estimates of the additional capacity and the total costs and benefits for POs 3 and 4 change considerably. In particular, the lower bound of PO4 in terms of benefits to costs ratio is below that of all the variants of PO3. The sensitivity analysis confirms the benefits of selecting PO3 as the preferred policy option, which shows lower uncertainty with respect to the benefits to costs ratio.

9.How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?

The initiative will be implemented in conjunction with other legislative initiatives put forward by the Commission, which address challenges related to rail infrastructure development, interoperability in rail and multimodal transport.

As regards rail infrastructure development, the baseline scenario includes the completion of the core TEN-T network by 2030 and of the comprehensive TEN-T by 2050. It also assumes the full electrification of the core TEN-T rail network by 2030 and of the comprehensive TEN-T rail network by 2050, which is in line with the existing TEN-T Regulation. In addition to these developments, the Commission proposal on the revision of the TEN-T Regulation is also included in the baseline. It envisages accelerated and better aligned TEN-T implementation (e.g. for ERTMS deployment), the addition of infrastructure requirements for rail relevant for intermodal transport (P400 loading gauge), extending the scope of rail freight infrastructure standards to the comprehensive network (22.5 t axle load, 100 km/h line speed for freight and the possibility of running trains with a length of 740 m), digitalisation of passenger and freight terminals and upgrading their infrastructure (740 m long tracks under the crane, electrification, etc.) and the introduction of a minimum passenger line speed of 160 km/h for the passenger core network.

The initiative will complement all these infrastructure-related measures by providing a legal framework that would allow IMs to maximise the use of the network and prioritise better rail traffic on congested or capacity constrained infrastructure, which in turn will maximise the value of infrastructure investments. Better rail infrastructure capacity planning and allocation will allow to make full use of improvements in possible speed, train length and in ERTMS deployment. The measures of the initiatives on coordination of rail and terminal operators and the digitalisation of rail-related services will allow to take full advantage of terminal infrastructure improvements and the digitalisation of terminals.

The measures in this initiative ensure synergies with other initiatives in the Fit for 55 package of initiatives 163 , such as the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive 164 , the RePowerEU plan and with future Commission proposals for revision of the Combined Transport Directive 165 and CountEmissions EU 166 . The initiative should help increase rail traffic, which should improve EU’s transport energy efficiency and reduce the dependence of EU transport on imported fossil fuels, which is in line with the measures put forward in the Energy Taxation Directive proposal and with the RePowerEU plan. The taxation proposal envisages linking energy taxation rates to the energy content of energy products and electricity, while RePowerEU advocates for increased electrification including in transport. The proposal for revision of the Combined Transport Directive will provide a boost for multimodal transport and the measures to improve the performance of rail terminals will further support an increased role for rail in the multimodal chain. The initiative should facilitate the development of rail transport services and thus provide more options for those who want to reduce their transport carbon footprint, information on which should become increasingly available, as it will be based on transparent harmonised rules on calculating and reporting transport-related greenhouse gas emissions.

The initiative will be successful if it will bring about an improvement in the management of capacity and traffic that results in visible progress of rail performance. This, in turn, will trigger greater demand for rail transport, which could be accommodated thanks to greater availability of capacity.

Ultimately, a successful scenario is one in which there is growing modal share of rail and an increasing number of cross-border rail services, which would translate into a better environmental performance of the EU transport system.

The Commission services will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of this initiative through a number of actions and a set of core indicators that will measure progress towards achieving the operational objectives. These indicators, as well as the operational objectives will be developed based on the advice of a performance review body, which will include independent experts with experience in rail, coming from different stakeholder groups. Data will be provided by ENIM and in particular by the supporting operational entity - the Network Coordinator, which also play an important role in defining the operational objectives. The quality of data is expected to increase following the application of uniform definitions and methods for collecting and presenting the data, which the rail network coordinator should develop in cooperation with the Commission. Data and analysis on competition developments and implementation is expected to be provided by the ENRRB. Improvements in quality of the information are expected due to the collaboration of regulatory bodies.

Taking into account the interaction with the initiatives outlined above, when developing the performance indicators, the following will be taken into consideration:

·Monitoring capacity use (traffic) with less trains, including optimising stopping patterns and runtimes, minimising block occupation time, profile of freight trains in particular 740 m trains, developments of containerised transport on rail, changes in planned and actual train speed.

·Monitoring energy efficiency of rail transport and of EU transport in general.

·Monitoring rail market developments, in particular the development of new cross-border and long-distance rail transport services.

The performance indicators will be linked to rail capacity and traffic management or to coordination of rail and rail-related services in rail facilities to ensure that they can identify the effect of the policy measures included in the proposal. Nevertheless, the synergies between the policy initiatives mentioned above will also result in measuring the combined effects of some measures (e.g. the increase in traffic of 740 m trains will depend both on the investments in and the development of rail infrastructure and infrastructure management to allow for the construction of train paths for such trains).The table below provides an overview of performance areas, corresponding operational objectives and possible indicators.

Table 14: Performance areas, corresponding operational objectives and possible indicators