EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 8.7.2025

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

2025 Rule of Law Report

















Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Italy

Accompanying the document

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

2025 Rule of Law Report


















The rule of law situation in the European Union

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I.Justice System 1

Independence

The level of perceived judicial independence in Italy is average among the general public and continues to be average among companies. Overall, 46% of the general population and 48% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ in 2025 2 . Among the general public, this figure has significantly increased in comparison with 2024 (36%) as well as in comparison with 2021 (34%). The perceived judicial independence among companies has increased in comparison with 2024 (42%) and has significantly increased in comparison with 2021 (29%).

With a comprehensive reform of the justice system now in place, and the adoption of the implementing legislation necessary for it to take full effect, the High Council for the Judiciary took forward the tasks entrusted to it under the implementing legislation on this reform. The legislative decrees implementing the reform of the justice system adopted by the Government in March 2024 entrusted the High Council for the Judiciary with a number of follow-up activities, which have been carried out in recent months 3 . On 25 September 2024, the High Council approved a directive concerning out-of-tenure appointments for magistrates, setting stricter limitations on the possibility for magistrates to hold positions in government or other public administrations 4 . On 13 November 2024, it approved a directive regarding the appraisal of magistrates’ performance, which, inter alia, establishes the magistrate’s professional file 5 . This was followed on 3 December 2024 with a Code of Judicial Management, aimed at enhancing transparency in the assignment of managerial and semi-managerial functions of judicial offices 6 . The High Council is also working on the implementation of the psychological test for access to the judiciary 7 . Under the implementing legislation of March 2024, the High School of the Judiciary was given an enhanced role in the phase of access to the judiciary, however it noted that its new tasks needed to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in financial and human resources 8 .

The draft constitutional reform separating careers of judges and prosecutors is currently subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, while reservations expressed by the judiciary remain. On 16 January 2025, the Chamber of Deputies approved the draft constitutional reform aimed at separating careers of judges and prosecutors, establishing two separate High Councils, one for judges and one for prosecutors, and creating a High Disciplinary Court to which the disciplinary powers over ordinary magistrates would be transferred from the High Council for the Judiciary 9 . The reform is now subject to the approval of the Senate, and after that it will require a further passage through the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 10 . On 8 January 2025, the High Council for the Judiciary issued a critical opinion of the reform, highlighting challenges with the two separate High Councils considering that this would weaken their authority as self-governing bodies of the judiciary and that the new nomination procedure (appointment by lot) would undermine the representation of magistrates in the High Councils, putting at risk the overall organisation of the justice system and the autonomy of prosecutors 11 . Similar concerns were also expressed by the First President of the High Court of Cassation and the Prosecutor General at the High Court of Cassation in respect to the High Disciplinary Court. The National Association of Magistrates organised a strike against the reform 12 and on 5 March 2025, it presented a document with eight proposals on administration of justice 13 . On their part, the National Bar Association and the Union of Italian Criminal Chambers confirmed their support to the draft constitutional reform, deemed essential to guarantee the impartiality of judges and effective disciplinary proceedings against magistrates 14 . Based on other European legal systems, the Minister of Justice considers that the separation of careers will strengthen the role of magistrates and will implement the general principle that jurisdiction is exercised through a fair trial, where the parties are on equal footing before an impartial judge 15 , The Government notes that the separation between the careers of judges and prosecutors exists in many European legal systems. 16

The Constitutional Court considered that the comprehensive reform of tax courts represents adequate progress towards a fairer system that complies with constitutional principles. The establishment of the Department of Tax Justice was part of a comprehensive reform of tax courts to improve the quality of tax jurisdiction. To address concerns about the independence of newly established tax courts from the Ministry of Economy and Finance 17 , it was set up as an autonomous body within the Ministry of Economy and Finance, distinct from the Finance Department of the Ministry. However, the Presidential Council of Tax Justice considers that the level of independence of the tax courts has not improved since the Department is de facto a branch of the Ministry, the tax courts are still functionally dependent on the Ministry, the role of the Presidential Council as self-governing body would be still limited and most tax judges continue to be honorary, with an insufficient financial package 18 . The Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the questions raised by some tax courts regarding the independence and impartiality of tax judges, considering that the reforms introduced by Law No 130 of 2022 represented adequate progress towards a fairer system that complies with constitutional principles 19 .

Some stakeholders reported on public statements by politicians being critical of the judiciary. These statements were reportedly made by Government officials and members of Parliament, and they related to ongoing inquiries and judicial decisions mostly regarding migration, also targeting individual judges and prosecutors. Some of the judges concerned were put under institutional protection by the High Council for the Judiciary 20 , or placed under police protection 21 , also in view of the risks linked to the proceedings they handle. The judiciary has expressed concerns about the loss of mutual respect between institutions and the effects that these incidents have on citizens’ trust in the judiciary 22 . According to European standards, while criticising judicial decisions is a normal aspect of democratic discourse, the executive and legislative powers should avoid criticism that undermines the independence of or public confidence in the judiciary 23 .

Quality

The recruitment of magistrates and administrative court staff continues at a good pace although persistent shortages remain. 578 new ordinary (criminal and civil) magistrates took office between July 2024 and April 2025 24 . Competitions for the recruitment of an additional 1 050 ordinary magistrates are expected to be completed between the end of 2025 and 2026 25 . This extensive recruitment plan will make it possible to cope with the significant shortages of ordinary magistrates, allowing to close the overall shortage which is now at 17% 26 . From July 2024 to April 2025, 849 members of the administrative staff of the ordinary courts took office, but a shortage rate of around 37% remains; four competitions were launched in 2024 and should be completed by the end of 2025 27 . The vacancies at the High Court of Cassation are at around 20% of the judicial posts (although in recent year competitions have been launched more regularly than in the past) and 33% of the administrative staff 28 . As concerns administrative justice, early 2025, there was an overall shortage of 13% of judges (but competitions for 53 posts are to be launched by the end of 2025) and of around 23% of administrative staff  29 . As concerns tax justice, a competition for 146 judges launched in 2024 is expected to be completed by the end of 2025 and further competitions will be launched in the next years, with a view to implement the planned replacement of honorary judges with professional judges; a shortage of around 26% affects the administrative staff, but 41 additional clerks should be recruited by the end of 2025 30 . As concerns the Court of Auditors, the overall estimated personnel shortage is around 23% 31 : 30 new magistrates were recruited in the last year, leading to a vacancy rate of around 15%, and competitions for the appointment of new magistrates are regularly held 32 ; 29 administrative staff units were hired. Finally, the Constitutional Court returned to full strength in February 2025, with the appointment of four judges by Parliament (after a deadlock since December 2023); in the last year, 36 members of the administrative staff were recruited 33 . While acknowledging the progress made in recent years, it is a well-established view among stakeholders that the filling of judicial and administrative vacancies in the courts is a prerequisite to make the Italian justice system more efficient 34 .

Stakeholders reiterated the positive impact of the Clerks for the Office of the Trial on the management of court proceedings, although the number of those in office continued to decrease. As part of the Recovery and Resilience Plan, Italy introduced Clerks for the Office of the Trial (Addetti all’Ufficio del Processo), tailor-made to the size and the needs of each court and aimed to increase their productivity. In particular, the Clerks help magistrates manage cases, prepare hearings and draft judgements. 35 . Stakeholders reiterated that the Clerks helped increase efficiency and quality of the justice system, effectively contributing to the reduction of the length of proceedings 36 . Despite the efforts of the authorities (including various competitions held in 2024), a high resignation rate of Clerks persisted in the last year, leading to a decrease of Clerks in office (from July 2024 to January 2025, 186 fewer Clerks in ordinary courts and 26 in administrative courts) 37 .

There has been some further progress on the recommendation to improve digitalisation of criminal courts and prosecutors’ offices 38 . With the other branches of justice already fully digitalised 39 , Italy still has only limited digital solutions in place to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases 40 . The use of a case management system – the APP – has been made mandatory in all criminal courts and prosecutors’ offices as of 1 January 2025, with an additional set of acts to be carried out exclusively in digital form as of 31 March and the goal to transition to fully digitalised case-management by the end of 2025 41 . However, owing to system-related shortcomings, 87 criminal courts and prosecutors’ offices have opted to derogate from the obligation and postponed the effective launch of the APP 42 . In the second half of 2024, the High Council for the Judiciary set up a special taskforce and the Ministry of Justice conducted several visits to the courts to collect users’ views and feedback, with a view to identify the solutions to have the entire first instance trial digitalised by the end of 2025 43 . Despite some setbacks, some further progress has been made on the recommendation in the 2024 Rule of Law Report.

Efficiency

Despite some improvement to the disposition time, the length of judicial proceedings remains a serious issue. In 2023, the disposition time of civil and commercial cases decreased in all three instances (by 29 days in first, by 50 days in second and by 60 days in third instance, compared to 2022), but remained the lengthiest in the EU, as it still took around 6 years to resolve such cases 44 . In 2023, the disposition time for first instance criminal cases significantly decreased to 281 days (355 in 2022) 45 . Italy remains under enhanced supervision of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers as regards the length of civil and criminal proceedings 46 . Also, administrative and tax justice recorded slight improvements: in 2023, the time needed to resolve administrative cases in all instances fell by 13 days (976 against 989 in 2022) 47 and for tax justice by 96 days (1 071 against 1 167 in 2022) 48 . In 2023, Italy was ordered to pay a total of EUR 88 376 682.61 in compensation, following claims brought by private individuals, for the excessive duration of judicial proceedings 49 .

The positive trend of reducing the case backlog continues. In 2023, the rate of resolving judicial cases improved for all jurisdictions, confirming the positive trend of previous years. In particular, as concerns civil and commercial cases, the clearance rate was equal to 110% and the number of pending cases decreased by 69 849 cases (from 2 027 478 cases in 2022 to 1 957 629 in 2023) in first instance 50 . For criminal cases, the clearance rate was equal to 111% and the number of pending cases decreased by 174 078 cases (from 1 118 090 cases in 2022 to 944 012 in 2023) 51 . For administrative cases (all instances), the clearance rate was equal to 123% and the number of pending cases decreased by approx. 10% 52 . For tax cases, at last instance the clearance rate was 113% and the number of pending cases decreased by 4 012 cases (45 919 in 2022, 41 907 in 2023) 53 . As regards audit justice, the cases clearance rate in 2024 was 98% 54 .

The reform of the mediation system is intended to improve the efficiency of the justice system and its impact will need to be assessed over time. On 25 January 2025, a revision of the rules on mediation and assisted negotiation came into force, having the objective of further encouraging the use of these tools and reducing the number of legal proceedings 55 . This revision intervenes in a context of already extended use of mediation, as reformed in last years, with an increase of 11% in mediated cases in 2023 compared to 2022, even though the overall rate of success of mediation in 2023 was equal to 15 % 56 .

II.Anti-Corruption Framework 

The perception among experts, citizens and business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains relatively high. In the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Italy scores 54/100 57 and ranks 19th in the EU and 52th globally. This perception has been relatively stable over the past five years 58 . The 2025 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 82% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 69%) and 41% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 30%). As regards businesses, 81% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 44% consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 35%). 43% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 36%), while 38% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 33%) 59 .

The National Anti-Corruption Plan was updated, and the newly adopted action plan for open Government includes integrity actions. In January 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) approved the update to the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NAP) 60 , with new guidelines on simplified procedures to prevent corruption-risks in small municipalities 61 . The 6th National Action Plan for Open Government (adopted by the Ministry of Public Administration in July 2024) includes a commitment to improve integrity in the public administration, and a guide on the use of indicators and open data for preventing corruption in public procurement 62 .

The law abrogating the offence of abuse of public office was declared to be in compliance with the Constitution. In August 2024, the law abrogating the offence of abuse of public office, and which limits the scope of the offence of trading in influence, which had been tabled at the request of a majority of local authorities, entered into force. This law had raised some concerns, including from ANAC 63 . The UN Convention against Corruption encourages Member States to consider the criminalisation of abuse of office and trading in influence which can be important tools for law enforcement and prosecution to fight corruption 64 . The Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the Law of 2024 abrogating the abuse of office based on several requests for review, and in May 2025 it declared that the law does not breach the Constitution and is compliant with the UN Convention against Corruption 65 . A draft law to further limit the duration of wiretapping, to address its frequent use beyond the needs of an investigation, is currently pending at the Parliament 66 . Another draft law to reduce the time available to conduct proceedings for criminal offences, including on corruption cases, remains before the Senate 67 .   

The number of convictions against individuals and legal persons for corruption offences decreased. From 1 668 convictions for individuals and 30 for legal persons in 2023 to 969 and 18 respectively in 2024 68 , but this might partly be explained by a backlog in the collection of data 69 . The high rate of convictions suspended (67% in 2024) remained similar to previous years 70 . The Guardia di Finanza carried out investigations for corruption used by a criminal organisation based in several jurisdictions, and operating in the education sector 71 , and law enforcement authorities performed searches against six public officers suspect of corruption in a public contract. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) investigated 51 corruption cases in 2024 72 . The Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Register was suspended 73 , and the measures countering foreign bribery raised a few concerns 74 . The National Anti-mafia and Anti-terrorism Directorate recruited three additional deputy prosecutors (previously there was one), to facilitate coordinating the fight to organised crime, including corruption 75 .

ANAC strengthened its human resources, and it issued guidelines on revolving doors, with those on whistleblowing under preparation. Last year, ANAC increased its staff 76 and, together with the National School of Administration, continued to deliver corruption prevention training to public officers 77 . In 2024, ANAC saw a 40% increase in its monitoring activities compared to 2023, but a similar decrease (about -43%) in the sanctioning activity, while it examined 200 files concerning conflicts of interests 78 . In 2024, ANAC issued a decision with guidelines on ‘revolving doors’, with clarifications on its monitoring and sanctioning powers, and to support public administrations redress these cases; ANAC also plans to deliver specific training to integrity officers of public institutions 79 . Annual plans for anti-corruption by different institutions are collected digitally and verified by ANAC (which issued 36 sanctions in 2024 against public institutions failing to adopt their annual anti-corruption strategy) 80 . In 2024, ANAC received an increased number of whistleblowers’ reports for retaliation measures (+33% compared to 2023) 81 , and it plans to issue guidelines on the establishment of internal reporting channels by 2025 82 . In 2024, 271 indictment requests for financial crimes against the public administration (for a value of around EUR 277 million) where filed in front of the Court of Auditors, which issued 177 convictions (worth around EUR 41 million) 83 . The draft law to reform the Court of Auditors was presented at the initiative of the Parliament and is currently being discussed in the Senate and is receiving a broad support among central and local authorities. Its aim is to strengthen the system of preventive control by the Court of Auditors over acts of the administration so that they are safeguarded from subsequent investigations. Nevertheless, the Court of Auditors raised some concerns linked to effectively combating corruption due, amongst others, to what it considers to be a broader list of exemptions in relation to which it could not intervene 84 .

Actions to improve the integrity of police forces and training for judges were launched. Concerns were raised regarding the completeness of the integrity measures for high-level officials. Suggestions to improve the integrity measures applicable to police forces 85 , were taken forward by them 86 . The High School of the Judiciary delivered training (both on the integrity for members of the judiciary, and on methodologies to prosecute corruption cases) 87 .

There has been some progress on the recommendation to adopt comprehensive rules on conflict of interest 88 . Italy is still lacking comprehensive rules on conflicts of interest for political office holders, including members of Parliament 89 . In October 2024, ANAC issued an analytical report on conflicts of interests, which expressed concerns on the consistency of the measures for asset declarations applied to top ministerial officials, their staff members and advisers, and on the usability of the published declarations filed by members of Parliament 90 . A draft law on conflicts of interest 91 and to improve integrity measures for members of Parliament 92 remains pending. The budget law for 2025 includes some conditional restrictions for Members of Parliament and the Government, as well as presidents of regions, to hold paid positions in companies based outside the EU 93 . Therefore, there has been some progress on the implementation of the recommendation made in previous years.

There has been limited progress on the recommendation on adopting comprehensive lobbying rules 94 . The lack of a comprehensive regulation of lobbying activities continues to be perceived as one of the main shortcomings of the national integrity system 95 . The president of ANAC indicated before Parliament the importance of envisaging a national regulation on lobbying, including a publicly accessible register of lobbyists 96 . In 2024, hearings of experts took place on the draft laws on lobbying tabled at the two chambers 97 , but the legislative process has not advanced, including the issue of a ‘legislative footprint’ 98 . The Senate 99 has not adopted a register of lobbyists and concerns were raised on the lobbying measures applicable to high-level officials 100 . At the same time, three Ministries have voluntarily introduced registers of lobbyists and codes of conduct that lobbyists must sign. Therefore, limited progress has been made to implement the recommendation made in previous years. 

There has been no progress yet in relation to the financing of political parties and campaigns by donations through political foundations and associations since draft laws are still under parliamentary scrutiny 101 . The persistent practice of private party donations could impede public accountability and may even result in private donors exerting disproportionate influence on the political agenda depending on the size of their contributions 102 . The draft laws tabled in both Chambers of Parliament to address this long-standing issue have not been discussed yet 103 , neither has the draft law to increase the autonomy of the Committee for Transparency and Control of Political Parties and Political Movements 104 . For 2024, the Committee assessed 76 budgets from political parties (52 were considered compliant, and 24 remained to review), and received 10 budgets from political associations and foundations (which remain under review) 105 . The human and financial resources of the Committee have recently been increased, responding to a request from the Committee 106 . Since the draft laws are still pending in both Chambers, there has been no progress yet regarding the implementation of the recommendations made in previous years.

Measures were taken to mitigate corruption in public procurement, which remains a high risk area. The Flash Eurobarometer on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU shows that 33% of companies in Italy (EU average 25%) think that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice in the last three years 107 . 81% of companies perceive the level of independence of the public procurement review body (Regional Administrative Tribunals and the Council of State) as very or fairly good 108 . The Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard on access to public procurement in Italy reports 37% of single bids for 2023 (EU average 29%). The public procurement sector continues to be exposed to attempts of infiltration by organised crime, including through corruption 109 . In 2024, 98% of public contracts were allocated through direct allocation 110 . Public procurement is digitalised through an interinstitutional platform, which helps counter attempts of infiltration and corruption, however the technical interoperability, and qualification of the staff, remain a challenge 111 . In 2024, the code of public procurement was updated by the Government 112 . ANAC issued guidelines and reports on risk of corruption in public procurement, including those used by local medical entities 113 , and it extended the use of its platform for public contracts 114 , among some concerns on transparency 115 . In 2025, ANAC, the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri renewed collaboration to prevent corruption in public contracts 116 .

III.Media Pluralism and Media Freedom

The media regulator is well resourced and exercises its functions independently. A well established and functional framework ensures that the Communication Regulatory Authority (AGCOM) carries out its functions independently 117 . Its budgetary independence is guaranteed through a self-financing system based on contributions that AGCOM directly and autonomously collects from the entities falling under its regulatory remit. This self-financing system provides for a level of resources that AGCOM considers adequate to effectively carry out its extensive, and growing, regulatory competences, ranging from telecommunication and postal services to audiovisual media services and online platforms 118 . In this respect, AGCOM is a proactive regulator and plays a crucial role in the Italian media regulatory environment 119 .

There has been some progress on the recommendation related to the funding of public service media 120 . RAI - Radiotelevisione Italiana is the media service broadcaster currently entrusted with the public service mission in Italy. RAI is required to provide an independent, impartial and pluralistic offering, in line with the service contract concluded between the broadcaster and the Government, and regulating the modalities for the fulfilment of RAI’s public service mission. RAI’s commitment towards the provision of accurate and pluralistic information is reflected in internal policies which are aimed at guaranteeing editorial independence and integrity and include legal assistance for RAI’s journalists and staff targeted by lawsuits related to their reporting activities 121 . According to the Government, the pluralism of the public service media system is reflected by RAI’s programmes also featuring numerous journalistic investigations on members of the Government and its parliamentary majority  122 . At the same time, there are concerns among some stakeholders related to RAI’s vulnerability to risks of undue interference 123 under the current governance and funding frameworks, and the lack of legislative progress to address these issues 124 . Six different legislative proposals to reform RAI were presented in the Senate in October 2024. Their aim is to reform the current governance system, to foster RAI’s independence and reduce the involvement of the Government in the appointment procedures. The competent Senate committee is currently working on a draft proposal consolidating these proposals and parliamentary discussions in this respect started in May 2025 125 . Some stakeholders indicated that the stalemate 126 in the Parliamentary Committee relates to the appointment procedure 127 of the new RAI president 128 . In addition, the decision of the CEO of RAI to introduce ‘editorial managers’ for all the broadcaster’s programmes was criticised by certain stakeholders, since in their view it could increase the risks of undue interference by the management vis-à-vis RAI’s journalists and newsrooms 129 . On the other hand, RAI indicated that this decision was part of its internal re-organisation efforts and was meant to ensure a better separation of the administrative and editorial roles within the outlet, leaving editors-in-chief with fewer administrative duties on top of their editorial responsibilities 130 . The decision to reduce RAI’s licence fee to EUR 70 adopted in 2024, which entailed a 22% cut of RAI’s independent revenues, was not confirmed by the Budget Law for 2025, leaving the licence fee at EUR 90, the same level as in 2023 131 . Although stakeholders welcomed this development as it would increase RAI’s resources, they also stressed the need for a comprehensive and structural reform of the funding system that should equip RAI with stable and predictable financial resources on a multi-annual basis 132 . Against this background, there has been some progress on the recommendation made in the 2024 Rule of Law Report.

The general legal framework for media is considered to be effective, although there is room for simplification in certain sectors and to improve public support. In 2024, the rules on media market concentrations were upgraded to cover players like video-sharing platforms as well as elements such as online advertising revenues. These adjustments were further complemented by a set of guidelines adopted by AGCOM on the criteria to be followed for the assessment of positions of significant market power detrimental to media pluralism 133 . Stakeholders considered these updates to be a positive development contributing to aligning the concentrations regime more with the new market dynamics. In this respect, stakeholders stressed that the rules for assessing concentrations in the press sector – which currently do not take account of the impact of digitalisation as they still rely solely on the level of print circulation – would also need to be changed. Media businesses can rely on a robust and effective regulatory framework, but some stakeholders consider that the TV and radio sectors are subject to overregulation that would require better streamlining and simplification of the existing rules 134 . Stakeholders also indicated that the overall system of public funding for the media sector could be improved, in particular by ensuring that initiatives are more focused on providing high-quality public interest journalism and are developed in a more stable and structured manner, on a multi-year basis 135 .

The rules on access to judicial information remain a source of concern for journalists. Following the adoption of the Legislative Decree 188/2021 136 (the “Cartabia reform”), – which identified the Prosecutors’ offices as the sole authorities allowed to disclose information on criminal proceedings to the press, new rules known as the “Nordio reform” 137 and the “Costa amendment” 138 , regulating access to and publication of certain judicial information, have been introduced 139 . The Government considers that these measures ensure a fair balance between protecting the presumption of innocence and the freedom of the press and of information, as especially with respect to the Costa amendment, journalists would still be able to inform about a pre-trial custody order by summarising or paraphrasing its content 140 . Several stakeholders, on the other hand, argued that the Costa amendment could have a chilling effect on journalists, who might be more exposed to defamation accusations in case of incorrect summaries or reformulations 141 . Stakeholders also indicated that after the introduction of the Cartabia reform, there have been instances where Prosecutors’ offices did not inform the press about facts of potential public interest. The Milan Court, the Milan Prosecutor’s Office and journalists’ associations signed a memorandum of understanding calling to better regulate the flow of information on criminal proceedings. While welcoming the memorandum as good practice, stakeholders underlined that only a reform of the relevant rules could address their concerns about what they consider to be unwarranted restrictions on journalists' access to judicial information 142 .

Although relevant rules and initiatives for their protection are in place, journalists continue to face challenges in the exercise of their profession. The Italian legal framework foresees specific protection protocols for journalists under threats 143 . The Specialised Coordination Centre, established within the Ministry of the Interior is considered by stakeholders as an important initiative for the monitoring of cases of attacks and threats against journalists 144 and it ensures the implementation of the relevant legal framework. In the context of the Specialised Coordination Centre, the Ministry of Interior has established a technical panel gathering representatives of the institutions and relevant media stakeholders. The purpose of the technical panel is to work on new initiatives to improve the safety of journalists  145 . However, cases of threats and intimidations remain a source of concern for journalists 146 . Since the 2024 Rule of Law Report, 11 alerts concerning Italy were registered by the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists relating to, respectively, three cases where journalists were physically attacked while on assignment, two cases of threats for reporting; two cases of targeting with spyware, a case of detention by police; a case of police search and seizure of a newspaper’s newsroom and a journalist’s house; and a case about the below mentioned reform of the defamation regime 147 . The Mapping Media Freedom platform reported 87 incidents, 57 of which related to different forms of attacks on journalists and 17 related to cases of legal incidents involving journalists 148 . The latest available data of the Coordination Centre also shows a 16% increase in cases of intimidations against journalists in 2024 compared to 2023 149 . The recourse to legal actions against journalists including defamation lawsuits and other legal actions from politicians and members of the Government identified as SLAPPs is reported by some stakeholders to be increasingly worrying 150 . In 2025, reports alleged that Paragon spyware had been deployed in several countries across Europe, including Italy 151 . The allegations raised concerns among stakeholders who stressed that the use of spyware against a journalist was unprecedented in Italy and in violation of professional secrecy and relevant national laws 152 . The Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR), entrusted with oversight over the Italian intelligence services’ activities, conducted an enquiry into the matter. In its report, approved unanimously and published in June 2025 153 , the Committee stated that it had not identified any use of the spyware by Italian intelligence services to target Italian journalists. Nevertheless, it reserved the right to carry out further investigations as appropriate. In parallel, the Government instructed the National Cybersecurity Agency to investigate the case while underlining that it had no knowledge of the matter 154 .

There has been no further progress on the recommendation to reform the defamation regime 155 . A legislative proposal 156 to reform the defamation legislation 157 is still under examination by the Senate. The aim is to address the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, and to strike a balance between the freedom of information and the protection of reputation 158 . Stakeholders stressed that the proposal is a positive step forward since it foresees to formally abolish the penalty of imprisonment for press defamation and it provides for financial penalties for anyone who files a vexatious lawsuit against a journalist. However, concerns remain over certain elements which are seen as putting press freedom at risk, such as the increase of criminal pecuniary penalties 159 , the possibility of suspension from performing journalistic activities 160 , and the introduction of an obligation of automatic rectification 161 . Against this background, there has been no further progress on the recommendation made in the 2024 Rule of Law Report.

IV.Other Institutional Issues related to Checks and Balances

Parliamentary scrutiny of the draft constitutional reform, aimed at enhancing governmental stability and introducing the direct election of the Prime Minister, is advancing. After its approval in the Senate in June 2024, the draft constitutional reform is now before the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber, which is conducting a series of hearings with constitutionalists and experts 162 . In December 2024, the Minister for Institutional Reforms reiterated that the reform was a priority for the Government and for the country, in order to ensure greater stability for governments 163 . Some stakeholders are concerned that by altering the dynamics between the President and the Prime Minister, the proposed constitutional reform may impact checks and balances 164 .

Stakeholders reiterated concerns about the frequent use of urgency decrees by the Government. According to official data 165 , in the current legislature (October 2022 to February 2025), the Government adopted 87 law decrees, 72 of which have been converted into ordinary laws. 48 out of 179 total laws approved by Parliament made use of a motion of confidence in at least one of the branches of Parliament 166 . Stakeholders consider that the combined use of law decrees and the confidence motion might affect the separation of powers between the government and Parliament 167 . In August 2024, the President of the Chamber of Deputies highlighted the excessive use of law decrees and called on the Government to use the instrument more rarely, considering that it could jeopardise the legislative function of Parliament. According to the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber, although law decrees have been one of the main legislative instruments for years now, the prerogatives of Parliament would not be affected because in many cases Parliament amended the law decrees when converting them into law 168 .

The Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Senate is discussing a draft law to amend the accounting justice code, and reform the Court of Auditors 169 . The objective of the draft law is to find a new balance in the system of fiscal responsibility, which combines deterrence with respect to fiscal offences with avoiding that an excessive level of risk borne by the public official would translate into a disincentive to take action. The Court of Auditors expressed concerns about certain provisions in the draft law, warning that they could lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of administrative responsibilities; in its view this could undermine legality, transparency and efficiency in the actions of public authorities and reduce accountability 170 . The Court of Auditors also explained that the reform falls within a context where the accounting judiciary is still experiencing the effects of the reform of 2020 (the ‘public liability shield’), which limits the public financial liability of public officials to acts committed with intention on gross negligence. While the reform aims to boost the effectiveness of administrative action by mitigating the chilling effect associated with the risk of liability, the Court contends that it hinders the capacity of accounting magistrates to address maladministration, irregularities, and misuse of public (both national and European) funds 171 . In the parliamentary discussion, central and local authorities expressed the need for a clear distinction between the Court’s audit and judicial competences, calling for the former to prevail. 172

On 1 January 2025, Italy had 74 leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights pending implementation, an increase of 8 compared to the previous year 173 . At that time, Italy’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had been implemented was at 27% (compared to 35% in 2024; 73% remained pending), and the average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 6 years and 4 months (compared to 6 years and 7 months in 2024) 174 . The oldest leading judgment, pending implementation for 24 years, concerns excessive length of criminal proceedings 175 . As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December 2024 there were 122 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 136 in 2023) 176 . On 16June 2025, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had remained 74 177 .

Over half of the companies surveyed in Italy express confidence in the effectiveness of investment protection. 58% of companies are very or fairly confident that investments are protected by law and courts 178 . As regards authorities relevant for economic operators, 70% perceive the level of independence of the national competition authority (the Competition and Market Authority) as very or fairly good 179 . A number of judicial mechanisms are in place at the level of the Council of State to ensure the implementation of administrative court judgments, including fines for responsible officials for non-compliance, the possibility to substitute the annulled administrative act, to order compensation and award direct and consequential damages 180 .

There has been no further progress on the recommendation to establish a National Human Rights Institution 181 . While five draft laws are still pending in Parliament, no concrete actions have been taken to establish a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) 182 . One of the draft laws pending in Parliament (AS 505) envisages the assignment of NHRI tasks to the Data Protection Authority. While the Authority was not involved in the relevant parliamentary debate, it declared to have the competence to fulfil this role 183 . In this regard, some stakeholders raised doubts as to the capacity of the Authority to take on the role of NHRI 184 . Overall, no further progress has been made to implement the recommendation to establish a NHRI.

A new Security Law seeking to combat terrorism and organised crime and improve internal security raised stakeholder concerns over a possible impact on civic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms. Civic space in Italy is rated as ‘narrowed’ 185 . On 4 June 2025, Parliament adopted the Security Law by converting the Government Decree that had entered into force in April 2025 186 . The objective of the Law is to combat terrorism and organised crime, managing seized assets, urban security, protecting security personnel, and handling prisoners and related work activities 187 . It includes a number of criminal offences, inter alia increasing the penalties for destruction or damage of property caused by violence at public demonstrations and for blocking roads or railways, and prohibiting access to certain areas and means of transportation by persons reported or convicted of crimes against the person or property committed in the same area and transforming certain administrative offences into a criminal offence 188 . In a letter to the President of the Senate, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe had expressed concerns that a lack of precision in the draft law could allow for arbitrary and disproportionate application which could potentially conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights 189 . Six United Nations Special Rapporteurs had also expressed concerns that the draft law risked violating a number of rights, notably the right to freedom of expression and opinion, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of association 190 . Similar concerns have also been expressed by civil society organisations 191 . The Government considers instead that the new provisions achieve a balance between the right to peaceful assembly and the right to free movement and personal freedom, all of which are protected by the Constitution  192 . On 23 June 2025, the High Court of Cassation issued its periodic report on the latest legislative measures, which also included an opinion on the Security Law, providing observations on both substance and procedure 193 .

Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*

The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2025 Rule of Law report can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-consultation_en .

AC 2084 (2024), Parlamento Italiano - Disegno di legge C. 2084 - 19ª Legislatura | Senato della Repubblica

ANAC (2024a), Decision No. 493, on the prohibition of pantouflage, https://www.anticorruzione.it/-/news.13.11.24.linee.guida.pantouflage

ANAC (2024b) Resolution No. 495, https://www.anticorruzione.it/-/delibera-n.-495-del-25-settembre-2024

ANAC (2024c), Decision No. 497, Indications to contracting authorities regarding the methods of carrying out checks and verifications during the executive phase of service and supply contracts, https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/190202672/Delibera+n.+497+del+29+ottobre+2024.pdf/15e8098a-0a8a-2599-00f8-f8afdf4cc3f5?t=1732029463913

ANAC (2024d), Annual Activity Report, https://www.anticorruzione.it/-/relazione.annuale.2024 .

ANAC (2024e), Giuseppe Busia "La riforma Nordio farà male al Pil. Senza abuso d'ufficio cittadini più sfiduciati", https://www.anticorruzione.it/-/rs.lastampa.12.07.2024.

ANAC (2025a), Update to the National Anticorruption Plan, https://www.anticorruzione.it/en/-/del.31-30.01.2025.pna

ANAC (2025b), ANAC annual activity report for 2024, https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/307867242/Anac+-+Presentazione+della+Relazione+annuale+2025+su+attivit%C3%A0+2024.pdf/76ef621e-7ee4-8865-2904-a8f2e912c7b6?t=1747761198450 .

ANSA, Casellati, la riforma del premierato è una scelta obbligata, 12 december 2024, Casellati, la riforma del premierato è una scelta obbligata - Ultima ora - Ansa.it

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2025), Media pluralism monitor 2025 – country report on Italy,  https://cmpf.eui.eu/projects/media-pluralism-monitor/  

Chamber of Deputies (2025a), Draft Law A.C. 2336, Regulation of the activity of institutional relations for the representation of interests (Disciplina dell’attività di relazioni istituzionali per la rappresentanza di interessi).

Chamber of Deputies (2025b), Committee for Constitutional Affairs, Council Presidency and Home Affairs , https://www.camera.it/leg19/1101?idLegislatura=19&idCommissione=&tipoElenco=indaginiConoscitiveCronologico&annoMese=&breve=c01_rappresentanza_interessi&calendario=false&soloSten=false&foglia=true&shadow_organo_parlamentare=3501&id_tipografico=01 .  

Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), The Liberties Rule of Law Report, https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/rolreport2025-main/45330 .  

Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, https://search.coe.int/cm#{%22CoEIdentifier%22:[%2209000016805afb78%22],%22sort%22:[%22CoEValidationDate%20Descending%22]} .

Committee for Transparency and Control of Political Parties and Political Movements (2024), Annual activity report, ( https://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg19/attachments/uploadfile_commissione_trasparenza/pdfs/000/000/020/CRP_Relazione_29042024.pdf ).  

Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Testo Unico sulla dirigenza giudiziaria, https://www.csm.it/web/csm-internet/attualita/news/-/asset_publisher/9tbuc9iuwq32/content/testo-unico-sulla-dirigenza-giudiziaria/maximized?inheritRedirect=falseCorte Constituzionale, Judgment No. 204 of 17 December 2024.

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2025), Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 18th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, https://rm.coe.int/gbr-2001-18e-rapport-annuel-2024/1680b4d77d .

Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists – Italy, https://fom.coe.int/en/pays/detail/11709530  

Council of Europe, Table of cases under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers, https://rm.coe.int/table-of-cases-enha-eng-not-for-lawyers-/1680b303bb .

Decree-Law No. 25 of 14 March 2025, coordinated with the law of conversion no. 69 of 9 May 2025, containing: 'Urgent provisions on recruitment and functionality of public administrations’. https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2025-05-13&atto.codiceRedazionale=25A02898&elenco30giorni=true  

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Mapping Media Freedom, Italy country profile, https://www.mappingmediafreedom.org/category/italy/  

European Commission (2023), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption (COM/2023/234 final), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A234%3AFIN .

European Commission (2024), 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Italy.

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 12 August 1999, Ledonne v. Italy (no. 1), case 35742/97, https://www.google.com/search?q=Judgment+of+the+ECtHR%2C+35742%2F97%2C+Ledonne+v.+Italy+(no.+1)%2C&oq=Judgment+of+the+ECtHR%2C+35742%2F97%2C+Ledonne+v.+Italy+(no.+1)%2C&gs_lcrp=EgRlZGdlKgYIABBFGDkyBggAEEUYOTIICAEQ6QcY_FXSAQcyODBqMGo5qAIAsAIB&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

European Implementation Network (EIN) (2025), Written input for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Federazione Nazionale Stampa Italiana (2025), Contribution from Federazione Nazionale Stampa Italiana for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

GRECO (2024a), Fifth Evaluation Round, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680b16315

GRECO (2024b), Fourth Evaluation Round, Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report, https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a8018a

High Council for the Judiciary (2025), Contribution from the High Council for the Judiciary for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

High Court of Cassation (2025), Report n. 33/2025, https://www.cortedicassazione.it/resources/cms/documents/Rel.332025.pdf  

High School of the Judiciary (2025), Contribution from the High School of the Judiciary for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Il Fatto Quotidiano (2024a), L’imprenditore Stefano Ricucci condannato a 6 anni di carcere per corruzione in atti giudiziari, https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/12/09/limprenditore-stefano-ricucci-condannato-a-6-anni-di-carcere-per-corruzione-in-atti-giudiziari/7798241/ .  

Il Fatto Quotidiano (2024b), Corruzione negli appalti per il Giubileo, perquisizioni al Comune di Roma, https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/11/13/corruzione-appalti-giubileo-comune-roma-campidoglio/7765367/ .

International Federation of Journalists (2025), Italy: IFJ and EFJ support journalists’ union legal action over Paragon case, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/italy-journalists-union-takes-legal-action-over-paragon-case

Italian Government (2025a), Contribution from the Italian Government for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Italian Government (2025b), Additional written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Italian Government (2025c), Press Release of 4 April 2025: Press conference following Council of Ministers meeting no. 122,  https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/press-conference-following-council-ministers-meeting-no-122/28148 .

Law (draft) A.C. No. 1621, Amendments to Law No. 20 of 14 January 1994, to the Accounting Justice Code, as per Annex 1 to Legislative Decree No. 174 of 26 August 2016, and other provisions on the control and advisory functions of the Court of Auditors and liability for damage to the Treasury, https://www.camera.it/leg19/126?leg=19&idDocumento=1621 .

Law (draft) A.S. 552, Amendment to Law No. 96 of 6 July 2012 on the regulation of the Commission for the verification of statutes and the control of the accounts of political parties. Information received in the context of the country visit to Italy from Parliamentary Committees,   https://www.senato.it/leg/19/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/56635.htm .  

Law (draft) AS 1353.Law (draft) A.C. No. 1921.

Ministry of Interior (2025a), Contribution from the Italian Ministry of Interior for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Ministry of Interior (2025b), Atti intimidatori nei confronti dei giornalisti – 2024, https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2025-04/report_atti_intimidatori_giornalisti_2024.pdf

National Action Plan for Open Government (2024), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Italy_Action-Plan_2024-2026_June_EN.pdf .

National Bar Association (2025), interview to its President, https://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/documents/20182/3603938/INTERVENTO+Presidente+CNF+-+INAUGURAZIONE+A.+G.+CORTE+DEI+CONTI+2025.pdf/4b73d555-78b0-a6eb-ef61-eab08a488baa?t=1739542646916 .

OECD (2024), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Italy, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/implementing-the-oecd-anti-bribery-convention-phase-4-two-year-follow-up-report-italy_5841d4d2-en.html .

Open Polis (2024), Why are we forced to present yet another FOIA on the PNRR?, https://www.openpolis.it/perche-siamo-costretti-a-presentare-lennesimo-foia-sul-pnrr/ .

Ordine dei Giornalisti (2025), Contribution from Ordine dei Giornalisti for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (2025), Contribution from Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Ossigeno per l’informazione (2025), Contribution from Ossigeno per l’informazione for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

RAI (2025), Contribution from RAI for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

Reuters (2024), Two Italian prosecutors convicted for hiding documents in Eni-Shell Nigeria trial, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/two-italian-prosecutors-convicted-hiding-documents-eni-shell-nigeria-trial-2024-10-08/ .

Senate Act No. 466 (2024).

Sistema Penale (2023), Gli aspetti autoritari della mera cancellazione dell’abuso di ufficio, https://www.sistemapenale.it/it/opinioni/donini-gli-aspetti-autoritari-della-mera-cancellazione-dellabuso-di-ufficio . 

Speech by the First President of the High Court of Cassation at the opening ceremony of the judicial year 2025 (2025).

Speech by the Minister of Justice at the inauguration of the judicial year (2025), "Discorso del Primo Presidente della Corte di Cassazione alla cerimonia di apertura dell'anno giudiziario 2025."

Speech of the representative of the Bar at the opening ceremony of the judicial tax year 2025 on 12 March 2025, https://webtv.camera.it/evento/27602 .

Transparency International (2024), Il monitoraggio sull'integrità della politica in tutta Europa,  https://www.transparency.it/informati/news/integrity-watch-integrita-politica-europa .

United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf  

Venice Commission (2013), CDL-AD(2013)038, https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/CDL-AD(2013)038-e .

Annex II: Country visit to Italy

The Commission services held virtual meetings in February and March 2025 with:

·Communications Regulatory Authority (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni)

·Amnesty International Italy

·ARCI

·Articolo 21

·National Anti-Corruption Authority (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione)

·Anti-corruption Unit of the Financial Police

·Italian Association of Constitutionalists (Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti)

·Association Antigone

·Association of Journalists (Ordine dei Giornalisti)

·CILD

·Committee for EU Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies

·Committee for EU Affairs of the Senate of the Republic

·Committee for Justice Affairs of the Senate of the Republic

·Committee for Statutes, Transparency and Accountability of Political Parties (Commissione di garanzia degli statuti e per la trasparenza e il controllo dei rendiconti dei partiti politici)

·Confartigianato

·Confcommercio

·Confindustria

·Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale)

·COSPE

·Council for Tax Justice (Consiglio di Presidenza della Giustizia Tributaria)

·Council of Administrative Justice (Consiglio di Presidenza della Giustizia Amministrativa)

·Council of State (Consiglio di Stato)

·Council of the Court of Auditors (Consiglio di Presidenza della Corte dei Conti)

·Court of Auditors (Corte dei Conti)

·Data Protection Authority (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali)

·Democratic Area for Justice (Area Democratica per la Giustizia)

·Democratic Judiciary (Magistratura Democratica)

·Department for Institutional Reforms (Dipartimento per le Riforme istituzionali)

·Department for Tax Justice (Dipartimento di Giustizia Tributaria)

·Emergency

·FIEG

·Italian National Press Federation (Federazione Nazionale Stampa Italiana)

·High Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione)

·High Council for the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura)

·Independent Judiciary (Magistratura Indipendente)

·Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato)

·Libera

·Ministry for Enterprises and Made in Italy (Ministero delle Imprese e del Made in Italy)

·Ministry of Interior

·Ministry of Justice

·National Anti-mafia and Anti-terrorism Directorate (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo)

·National Association of Magistrates (Associazione Nazionale Magistrati)

·National Bar Association (Consiglio Nazionale Forense)

·National School of Administration (Scuola Nazionale dell’Amministrazione)

·Open Polis

·Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso

·Ossigeno per l’Informazione

·Presidency of the Council of Ministers

·Prosecution Service at the High Court of Cassation (Procura Generale presso la Corte Suprema di Cassazione)

·General Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Auditors (Ufficio del Procuratore Generale presso la Corte dei Conti)

·RAI – Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.A.

·High School of the Judiciary (Scuola Superiore della Magistratura)

·The Good Lobby

·Transparency International – Italy

·Union of Italian Criminal Chambers (Unione delle Camere Penali Italiane)

·Lawyers' Union for the Protection of Human Rights (Unione Forense per la Tutela dei Diritti Umani)

·Unity for the Constitution (Unità per la Costituzione)

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:

·Amnesty International 

·Araminta 

·Civil Liberties Union for Europe  

·Civil Society Europe  

·European Civic Forum  

·European Partnership for Democracy 

·European Youth Forum, 

·International Commission of Jurists  

·International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 

·JEF Europe 

·Philea – Philanthropy Europe Association. 

·Transparency International

(1)    An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found  here .

(2)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figures 50 and 52 and, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figures 49 and 51. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).

(3)      See Legislative Decree No. 44, Art. 8(1). On the reform of the judicial system, see 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, pp. 4-5.

(4)      Directive P.13778/2014, available here . The issue of out-of-tenure magistrates (magistrates who temporarily stop working in judicial offices to take up positions in government or other public administrations) has traditionally been debated in Italy, due to the possible impact on independence and separation of powers (in the event that magistrates hold positions in the executive power) and on the efficiency of the courts (by reducing the number of active magistrates). Magistratura Indipendente (2025), written input; Magistratura Democratica (2025), written input, p. 4. In the country visit, Unicost did not share these concerns.

(5)      Directive P.21578/2024, available here . The concerns on the magistrate’s professional file, already expressed by the High Council for the Judiciary in its opinion of 13 March 2024, have been reiterated during the country visit by the judiciary, especially by Magistratura Democratica and Unicost. The main concern expressed by the High Council is the introduction of the notion of ‘serious anomalies’ in the judicial activity of the magistrate, which is formulated in too generic terms, with the risk of inconsistent interpretations and of a negative appraisal of the magistrate also in case of one judgment overturned at subsequent instances.

(6)      Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (2025). Two drafts were brought to the plenary of the High Council, which mainly differed on the level of discretion left to the High Council. Country visit Italy, Area DG, Magistratura Democratica, Unicost, Magistratura Indipendente. In his non-binding opinion, the Minister of Justice did not endorse the approved Code (Country visit Italy, Ministry of Justice).

(7)      High Council for the Judiciary (2025), written input, pp. 3-6. Doubts on the appropriateness of the psycho-aptitude test have been reiterated by the judiciary (Country visit Italy, National Association of Magistrates, Magistratura Democratica, Magistratura Indipendente, Area DG, Unicost), and by National Association of Constitutionalists and the High School of the Judiciary (written inputs, p. 2 and pp. 8-9, respectively).

(8)      High School of the Judiciary (2025), written input, pp. 3-7. A further important part of the reform of the judicial system is the establishment of priority criteria for criminal prosecution by Parliament. This is still pending in the Senate (see 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 8).

(9)      See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, pp. 5-7, for a description of the draft reform. In the country visit, the Ministry of Justice clarified that the ordinary legislation implementing the reform (which is essential to assess the reform) will be drafted after parliamentary approval of the reform and that it will be possible to appeal to the High Court of Cassation against the decisions of the High Disciplinary Court.

(10)      Draft law AS 1353. Since it is a constitutional reform, after Senate’s approval, it must be approved by both houses of Parliament a second time without amendments, at least three months after the first approval.

(11)      The opinion of the High Council for the Judiciary (available here ). In the country visit, concerns regarding the reform were raised by the judiciary (National Association of Magistrates, Magistratura Democratica, Magistratura Indipendente, Area DG, Unicost), the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate. See also MEDEL (2025), written input, pp. 9-10.

(12)      The press release is available here .

(13)      A report of the meeting is available here .

(14)      Country visit Italy, National Bar Association, Union of Italian Criminal Chambers.

(15)      Speech by the Minister of Justice at the inauguration of the judicial year on 14 January 2025, available here .

(16)      Italian Government (2025b), additional written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

(17)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, pp. 7-8.

(18)      Country visit Italy, Presidential Council of Tax Justice. Similar concerns have been expressed by the National Bar Association (see speech of the representative of the Bar at the opening ceremony of the judicial tax year 2025 on 12 March 2025, available here ).

(19)      Judgment of the Constitutional Court, No. 204.. See also Department of Justice (written input, p. 2).

(20)      In the period July 2024-February 2025, the High Council for the Judiciary opened five proceedings to protect independence of judges (written input, p. 16).

(21)      As of February 2025, overall (not only in relation to issues set out in this paragraph), 273 magistrates were under police protection.

(22)      Country visit Italy, High Court of Cassation, Prosecution Service at the High Court of Cassation, National Association of Magistrates, Area DG, Magistratura Democratica, Unicost. See also MEDEL (2025), written input, p. 11. In her speech at the opening ceremony of the judicial year 2025, the First President of the High Court of Cassation recalled the need of “a climate of mutual respect between the institutions of the State… A true pact for the rule of law able to fuel the confidence of citizens towards all the institutions that have been given the role of exercising sovereign functions by the fundamental Charter”.

(23)      Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 18. See also Venice Commission (2013), paras. 21-22.

(24)      These magistrates are the winners of the competition launched in 2021 and 2022. They will become fully operational after a 12-month traineeship period. Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 14.

(25)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, pp. 14-15. The competitions were launched in 2023 and 2024.

(26)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input. In 14 districts (out of 29), the shortage rate exceeds 50%.

(27)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex 3; Italian Government (2025a), written input, pp. 15-20.

(28)      Country visit Italy, High Court of Cassation and Prosecution Service at the High Court of Cassation.

(29)      Council of State (2025), written input, pp. 11-17.

(30)      Department for Tax Justice (2025), written input, pp. 4, 9, 10.

(31)      Court of Auditors (2025), written input.

(32)      Court of Auditors and Prosecution Service at the Court of Auditors (2025), written input, p. 5.

(33)      Constitutional Court (2025), written input.

(34)      National Bar Association (2025), written input, p. 13. Country visit Italy, Area DG, Unicost, Magistratura Indipendente, Magistratura Democratica.

(35)      Investment 1.8 of the Italian Recovery and Resilience Facility. Clerks for the Office of the Trial have been hired by ordinary courts and administrative courts.

(36)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 26. Country visit Italy, Council of State, Magistratura Democratica, Magistratura Indipendente. Area DG pointed out that the Clerks for the Office of the Trial could also have been envisaged for prosecution offices (not only for judicial ones, as envisaged in the RRF).

(37)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 26.

(38)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Italy to ‘[c]ontinue efforts to further improve the level of digitalisation for criminal courts and prosecutors’ offices”.

(39)      Lastly, with the completion of the digitalisation process of tax justice, pursuant to the timeline established under Legislative Decree 30 December 2023, No. 220 and the launch of the platform Pro.Di.Gi.T.

(40)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 48.

(41)      Applicativo del Processo Penale, see Decree of the Ministry of Justice No. 206/2024.

(42)      Technical challenges were confirmed by the Italian government (2025, written input, p. 24). The main problems concern the speed of the platform, the high frequency of error messages, restricted access to judicial acts and lack of correspondence between the types of judicial acts provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure and those available on the platform. Further difficulties would stem from the fact that the equipment of the Courts is obsolete, the Internet connections available to the Courts is often insufficiently reliable as to allow for full digitisation and the administrative staff has received sufficient training for the use of the platform. Area DG, Magistratura Democratica, Magistratura indipendente, Unicost (2025), written input. Country visit Italy, Union of Italian Criminal Chambers.

(43)      Country visit Italy, Minister of Justice. High Council for the Judiciary (2025), written input, p. 15. However, the level of digitalisation of the other jurisdictions is very good: civil, tax, administrative and accounting justice systems are completely digitalised. Country visit Italy, Minister of Justice, Department of Tax Justice, Council of State, Court of Auditors, High Court of Cassation

(44)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figures 6-7. In 2023, the disposition time was 511 days in first instance (540 days in 2022), 703 days in second instance (753 days in 2022), 1 003 days in third instance (1 063 in days in 2022).

(45)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex I.

(46)      Council of Europe, Table of cases under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers.

(47)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 9. In 2023 there was a slight increase in the disposition time of first instance cases, which – as clarified in the country visit by the Council of State – was due to contingencies. This slight increase was more than offset by the reduction of the disposition time in second instance. In September 2024, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers ended its supervision on the excessive length of administrative proceedings see  link .

(48)      Department of Tax Justice (2025), written input, p. 8.

(49)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input.

(50)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex II.

(51)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex I.

(52)      Council of State (2025), written input, pp. 2-6. 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figures 8, 9, 12, 16.

(53)      Court of Cassation (2025), written input.

(54)      Court of Auditors (2025), written input.

(55)      Legislative Decree No. 216 of 27 December 2024, laying down supplementary and corrective rules to Legislative Decree No 149 of 10 October 2022 on civil and commercial mediation and assisted negotiation. It focuses inter alia on the regulation of electronic means of participation to mediation, on requirements of mediation bodies, on the length of the mediation procedure, etc.

(56)      Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex 4, p. 3.

(57)      The level of perceived corruption is categorized as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), relatively high (between 59- 50), high (below 50).

(58)      In 2020, the score was 53, while, in 2024, the score is 54. The score significantly increases/decreases when it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points); is relatively stable (changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.

(59)      Data from Special Eurobarometer [561] (2025) and Flash Eurobarometer [557] (2025).

(60)      The consultation closed in January 2025. 

(61)       Such as municipalities of less than 5 000 inhabitants or with less than 50 employees. ANAC (2025a). In September 2024, ANAC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of the Interior, the Minister for Public Administration and the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI), aimed at promoting anti-corruption measures in small public administrations. ANAC (2025), written input, p.1.

(62)      National Action Plan for Open Government (2024).

(63)      ANAC (2024e). Sistema Penale (2023).

(64)      See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 15. Abuse of public office and trading in influence are part of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and trading in influence is part of the Criminal law Convention against corruption of the Council of Europe. The respective Article 19 in the UN Convention against Corruption reads as follows: “Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity”. In its proposal for an Anti-Corruption Directive, the Commission proposed to criminalise these offences at Union level, COM(2023) 234 final, 3.5.2023. 

(65)      The decision was published in a communication from 8 May 2025 by the Constitutional Court.

(66)      The bill sets a stricter 45-days limit for wiretapping, unless other specific and concrete elements arise. (Senate, AC 2084).

(67)      Country visit Italy, Ministry of Justice.

(68)      In 2024, there were 969 convictions for individuals and 18 for legal persons, while in 2023 there were 1668 and 30 respectively. For individuals in 2024, 75 cases were sanctioned with financial penalties; 722 cases with custodial sentences; and 6 cases with both custodial and financial penalty (in 2023 the cases were 66, 1 295 and 79, respectively). Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex 2.

(69)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report indicated that there were 1361 convictions for individuals in 2023. The data provided by the Italian authorities for this year’s report indicated that there were 1668 convictions for individuals in 2023. These differences can be explained by a backlog in the supply of data. While this might also be the case for the data for 2024, it is unlikely that the final number of convictions in 2024 will be as high as the number reported in 2023.

(70)      In 2024, there were 654 convictions suspended, compared to 1 090 in 2023 and 1 069 in 2022 (i.e. respectively 65% and 70% of the total convictions). Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, Annex 2.

(71)      Guardia di Finanza (2025), written input, p. 9-10.

(72)      EPPO (2025), written input, pp. 30-32. This number accounts for almost 2% of the EPPO’s total number of cases in Italy.

(73)      The suspension was decided pending the decision from the Court of Justice of the EU to a question filed by the Council of State Country visit Italy, Ministry of Justice.

(74)      OECD indicated that 7 previous recommendations were only partially implemented and other 23 recommendations remained not implemented. OECD (2024).

(75)      In particular, one procuratore aggiunto and two sostituti procuratori. Country visit Italy, Anti-Mafia Investigative Directorate. Italy (2025), written input, p. 13.

(76)      ANAC hired 4 administrative assistants and launched a procedure to recruit 4 managers, with a target of 400 staff, from the current 378. ANAC (2024d), p. 347. ANAC (2025), written input, pp. 16-17.

(77)      Training on anti-corruption, transparency and ethics in public administration, with a specific degree in public procurement integrity. SNA (2025), written input, p. 3.

(78)      For 2024, the request for ANAC advice remained stable compared to the previous year (around 5 000 requests per year). ANAC opened of a total of 642 files, of which 450 were supervisory and 61 sanctioning, compared to 621 files opened in 2023. ANAC (2025), written input, p. 4-8. ANAC indicated the need to better regulate conflicts of interest. ANAC (2025b).

(79)      ANAC (2024a). Country visit Italy, ANAC.

(80)      ANAC (2025), written input, p. 14.

(81)      About 1 350 reports were filed in 2024; 387 reports were considered inadmissible, 102 were rejected, 81 remained under investigation, and 780 received a preliminary examination. Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 36.

(82)      Country visit Italy, ANAC.

(83)      Court of Auditors (2025), written input, p. 6.

(84)      Court of Auditors (2025), written input, pp. 1-2.

(85)      GRECO called for equal measures to prevent on conflicts of interest and financial disclosure, code of conduct awareness-raising, guidance on gifts, lobbying, and proper sanctions, for all persons with top executive functions. GRECO considers that the State Police, the Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza, could benefit from regular integrity checks and training on whistleblower protection. GRECO (2024a). 

(86)      The Guardia di Finanza plans to update its rules on conflicts of interest; the Ministry of Interior launched a procedure to update the code of conduct of its employees, including police officers, while the Ministry of Justice established a working group to discuss and respond to the concerns on integrity within the Carabinieri. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice (2025), written input, p. 9 and Annex I, respectively. Country visit Italy, Guardia di Finanza. 

(87)      Training included a specific focus on foreign bribery, and criminal liability of corporations. High School of the Judiciary (2025), written contribution. ANSA (2024) and Il Fatto Quotidiano (2024a) (2024b) Reuters (2024).

(88)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended Italy to ‘[…] adopt the pending legislative proposal on conflicts of interest’.

(89)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 18.

(90)      ANAC (2025), written input, Annex 6 and GRECO (2024a) p. 28. The asset declarations of MPs are publicly available on the individual pages of parliamentarians, but they are in pdf form and handwritten, which makes it difficult to read and compare. Transparency International (2024).

(91)      After approval by the Chamber of Deputies on 28 May 2024, the draft law on conflicts of interest remains pending at the Senate. The draft law includes measures for different office holders and prohibits the receipt of payments from foreign states. See also GRECO (2024b).

(92)      The draft law aims to amend and strengthen the Chamber of Deputies’ Rules of Procedure by codifying certain key transparency provisions of the 2016 Code of Conduct and increasing the sanctions for breaches.

(93)      As per Law 207/2024, the external assignment can be authorised for annual remuneration up-to EUR 100 000.

(94)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended Italy to ‘[…] adopt comprehensive rules on lobbying to establish an operational lobbying register, including a legislative footprint’.

(95)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 19. Country visit Italy, The Good Lobby.

(96)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 33.

(97)      Under the current legislature starting in October 2022, five draft laws have been presented to the Chamber of Deputies and five to the Senate, but the legislative debate has not yet started. So far, only expert hearings took place, one in August and a second one in September 2024. 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p.19-20. Chamber of Deputies (2025a). Chamber of Deputies (2025b). NGOs remain concerned about the lack of legislation on lobbying. Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025).

(98)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 19.

(99)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 19. 

(100)      GRECO called for equal measures lobbying, for all persons with top executive functions. GRECO (2024a) p. 20.

(101)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Italy to “Effectively and swiftly address the practice of channeling donations through political foundations and associations and introduce single electronic register for party and campaign finance information”. 

(102)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy. Italy prohibits direct public funding to political parties, including for political campaigns. Since 2014, political parties are required to finance themselves almost exclusively through private donations from individual donors or legal entities.

(103)      Country visit Italy, Ministry of Justice. 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy.

(104)      Draft law A.S. 552. 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 21.

(105)      Committee for Transparency and Control of Political Parties and Political Movements (2024).

(106)    Decree-Law No. 25 of 14 March 2025.

(107)      Flash Eurobarometer 557 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2025). This is 8 percentage points above the EU average.

(108)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 59.

(109)      Ministry of Interior (2025), written input, p. 10.

(110)      ANAC (2025b).

(111)      ANAC (2025), written input, p.14.

(112)      Legislative decree 209.

(113)      ANAC (2024c, 2024f and 2025), written input, Annexes 1-5.

(114)      ANAC (2024b). Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 34.

(115)      In September 2024, some NGOs (including the Osservatorio Civico PNRR, Open Polis and Dati bene commune, which includes around 300 civic associations) raised concerns on the alleged lack of transparency on the implementation of contracts, including those related to the Italian RRP.

(116)      Country visit Italy, ANAC and Guardia di Finanza. Guardia di Finanza delivered training on digital investigative tools to its officers. Guardia di Finanza (2025), written input, pp. 1-12. Ministry of Interior (2025), written input, Annex I.

(117)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 24; the MPM 2025 considers the independence and effectiveness of national regulatory authorities to be at low risk, in view of the fact that AGCOM operates in a substantial degree of autonomy and is functionally autonomous and independent in the exercise of its regulatory competences, 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 18-19.

(118)      Country visit Italy, AGCOM.

(119)      Country visit Italy, FIEG and Confindustria; Media Pluralism Monitor(2024), p. 17.

(120)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Italy to “Ensure that rules or mechanisms are in place to provide funding for public service media that is appropriate for the realisation of its public service remit and to guarantee its independence”.

(121)      RAI (2025), written input, pp. 4-7.

(122)    Italian Government (2025b), p.3.

(123)      The MPM 2025 considers the independence of public service media to be at high risk in view of the challenges posed by existing legal shortcomings and subsequent practices, 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p.5, p.11, p.29 and pp. 35-36.

(124)      FNSI, Ordine dei Giornalisti, OBCT, Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), written inputs p.12, p.13, pp.12-13, and pp. 32-34 respectively; Country visit Italy, FNSI, Ordine dei Giornalisti, Ossigeno per l’Informazione, and Articolo 21.

(125)      Country visit Italy, Commissione Vigilanza RAI.

(126)      Notwithstanding the new management board was established in October 2024, RAI still does not have a President due to the difficulties within the Parliamentary Committee to find consensus and reach the required majority to approve the proposed appointment, Country visit Italy, Ordine dei Giornalisti, FNSI, Ossigeno per l’informazione, Articolo 21; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 8-9.

(127)      According to the relevant rules, although it is the management board who appoints the President among its members, the appointment becomes effective only after the Parliamentary Committee entrusted with RAI oversight approves it by a qualified majority (two-thirds of members), 2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, p. 25.

(128)      In this respect, the President of the Parliamentary Committee entrusted with the RAI oversight indicated that this stalemate is also impacting the effective ordinary functioning of the Committee, Country visit Italy, Commissione Vigilanza RAI.

(129)      In particular, they indicated that the decision introduced an unnecessary and additional filter – on top of the editors-in-chief – which was not foreseen by foreseen by the rules governing the journalistic profession nor by the trade union agreements. Country visit Italy, Ordine dei Giornalisti, FNSI, Ossigeno per l’informazione, Articolo 21.

(130)      Country visit Italy, RAI.

(131)      RAI (2025), written input, p. 3.

(132)      RAI, OBCT, Ordine dei Giornalisti, FNSI, Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), written inputs, pp. 3-4, p. 13, p. 13, p. 12, and p. 29, respectively. Country visit Italy, RAI, Ordine dei Giornalisti, FNSI, Ossigeno per l’informazione, Articolo 21.

(133)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, pp. 40-41; Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), written input, p.32; Country visit Italy, AGCOM; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p.7 and p.22.

(134)      Country visit Italy, FIEG and Confindustria.

(135)      Ordine dei Giornalisti (2025), written input, p. 12; Country visit Italy, FIEG and Confindustria; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 25 and 33-34.

(136)      Adopted to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, OJ L 65, 11.3.2016., p. 1.

(137)      Law No.114.

(138)      Legislative Decree No. 198.

(139)      While the Nordio reform prohibits the publication of wiretaps which have not been used in a trial, the Costa amendment prohibits the publication, before the end of the investigations, of direct textual quotations of pre-trial custody orders, 2024 Rule of Law Report, pp. 28-29.

(140)      Country visit Italy, Ministry of Justice.

(141)      2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp.15-16.

(142)      Country visit Italy, FNSI, Ordine dei Giornalisti, Ossigeno per l’informazione, Articolo 21.

(143)      These protocols involve police and judicial authorities and range from providing the concerned journalist with an armoured car up to a round-the-clock police escort, depending on the level of risks to the life of the journalist, Country visit Italy, Ministry of Interior.

(144)      Ordine dei Giornalisti (2025), written input, p. 14; Country visit Italy, FNSI and Ordine dei Giornalisti.

(145)    These initiatives include the introduction of a specific aggravating circumstance for crimes committed against information workers as well as facilitating the transposition of the Directive 2024/1069 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). In parallel, the Government also announced its willingness to study suitable mechanisms to ensure safety of journalists in areas of crisis as well as high-risk and war contexts, Italian Government (2025b), pp. 4-5. 

(146)      The MPM 2025 assesses the journalistic profession, standards and protection indicator to be at a medium-high risk level, in view of key concerns such as an increase in threats and intimidation targeting journalists and cases of surveillance targeting journalists and activists, 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 17.

(147)      Italy has responded to eight of the 11 alerts, Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, Italy.

(148)      In particular, out of 57 incidents related to different forms of attacks on journalists 11 incidents related to cases of physical attacks, 10 incidents related to cases of attacks to property, and 36 related to cases of verbal attacks. Concerning other types of incidents, 32 of them related to cases of censorship, Mapping Media Freedom, Italy country profile.

(149)      Ministry of Interior (2025), written input, p. 11. Out of the 114 cases registered, 12.1% concerned organised crime and 65.8% were of ‘political-social nature’, while 37 out of 114 cases (32.5%) occurred online, Ministry of Interior (2024), p. 5.

(150)      Ossigeno per l’Informazione, Civil Liberties Union for Europe, OBCT (2025), written inputs, p. 12, pp. 36-39 and p.16 respectively; Country visit Italy, Ossigeno per l’Informazione, FNSI, Ordine dei Giornalisti and Articolo 21; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 6 and 14.

(151)      International Federation of Journalists (2025). In February and May 2025, it was reported that two Italian journalists were targeted by spyware, FNSI (2025). Italy is the only Member State where some of the targeted individuals, in this case journalists, have come forward and made their case public. 

(152)      Country visit Italy, Ordine dei Giornalisti, FNSI, Ossigeno per l’Informazione, and Articolo 21; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 18.

(153)      Relazione sull’utilizzo dello spyware “Graphite” da parte dei servizi di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica, 4 June 2025. ‘Graphite’ is a type of spyware software produced by Paragon Solutions.

(154)      Country visit Italy, Presidency of the Council of Ministers; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 18.

(155)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Italy to “Continue the legislative process on the draft reform on defamation, the protection of professional secrecy and journalistic sources while avoiding any risk of negative impacts on press freedom and ensure it takes into account European standards on the protection of journalists”.

(156)      Senate Act No. 466. 

(157)      Commission Recommendation on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’).

(158)      2024 Rule of Law Report, Italy, pp. 30-31.

(159)      The pecuniary penalties could reach up to EUR 50 000.

(160)      A suspension could be from one to six months.

(161)      FNSI, Ordine dei Giornalisti, OBCT, Ossigeno per l’informazione, Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), written inputs, p. 11, p. 13, pp. 16-17 and p. 41 respectively; Country visit Italy, FNSI, Ordine dei Giornalisti, Ossigeno per l’informazione, Articolo 21 and FIEG; 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p.13.

(162)      Draft Law AC 1921.

(163)      ANSA (2024).

(164)      National Association of Constitutionalists and the High School of the Judiciary (written inputs, pp. 6-7).

(165)      Chamber of Deputies (205a).

(166)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, p. 2.

(167)      Country visit Italy, Emergency, ARCI, CILD, COSPE, Amnesty International, Antigone, Unione Forense per la Tutela dei Diritti Umani.

(168)      Country visit Italy, Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber.

(169)      Draft Law AC No. 1621.

(170)      The remarks of the Court of Auditors concerns, inter alia, the rules aimed at increasing extensively the area of exemption from liability in case of a favourable check given by the Court of Auditors in the context of the pre-emptive control; and the rules aimed at introducing a broad and not clearly defined area of exemption for acts and conducts related to issues that were the object of a request for an opinion of the Court of Auditors. Court of Auditors and Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Auditors (2025), written input, pp. 1-2. Court of Auditors and Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Auditors also expressed strong concern about the proposal to reduce the number of local courts over the Italian territory, de facto abolishing its regional chambers and prosecutor offices. As a result of this stance, this proposal was removed from the draft law. Country visit Italy, Justice Committee of the Chamber. Concerns on the reform were expressed also by the Association of Magistrates of the Court of Auditors and by the National Bar Association.

(171)      Court of Auditors (2025), written input, p. 2. Decree Law 16 July 2020, No. 76 introduced the ‘public liability shield’ for public officials as a temporary measure to facilitate the implementation of measures of simplification within the public administration. It was then subsequently extended and now covers all the acts committed until 31 December 2024.

(172)      Italian Government (2025b), p.8.

(173)      For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.  

(174)      All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2025. EIN (2025), written input, p. 5.

(175)      European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 12 August 1999, Ledonne v. Italy (no. 1), case 35742/97 pending implementation since 1999.

(176)      Council of Europe (2025), p. 157.

(177)      Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).

(178)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 54. 20% and 15% of the surveyed investors respectively perceive the frequent changes in legislation or concerns about the quality of the law-making process, and the quality, efficiency or independence of justice, respectively, as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.

(179)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 60.

(180)      2025 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figure 49. The data presented reflects exclusively the mechanisms in place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in place at lower instance administrative courts.

(181)      The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Italy to ‘[s]tep up efforts to establish a National Human Rights Institution taking into account the UN Paris Principles’.

(182)      Italian Government (2025a), written input, pp. 43-44.

(183)      Country visit Italy, Data Protection Authority.

(184)      Country visit Italy, COSPE. Civil Liberties (2025), written input, p. 43-44.

(185)      See https://monitor.civicus.org/country/italy/ . Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed.

(186)      Decree-Law No. 48.

(187)      Italian Government (2025c), Press Release of 4 April 2025: Press conference following Council of Ministers meeting no. 122. 

(188)      Inter alia, disrupting traffic with one’s own body would be punishable by 6 months to two years in prison if carried out by at least two people. Resistance, including passive resistance, in the context of protests in prisons would be punishable by one to five years (or two to eight years for those who promote, organize or lead the action). Similarly, resistance, including passive resistance, in the context of protests in immigration detention centers and reception centers would be punishable by one to four years (and by 18 months to five years for those who promote, organize, or lead the action). The law would also give police broader authority to ban individuals from accessing areas near roads, railways, airports and other infrastructure for up to one year.

(189)      The letter was published on 20 December 2024 on the website of the Council of Europe, available here . Concerns were already expressed by OSCE in May 2024 (the opinion is available here ).

(190)      The letter is available here .

(191)      Country visit Italy, Emergency, ARCI, COSPE, Amnesty International, Unione Forense per la Tutela dei Diritti Umani, Associazione Antigone, Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso. Letter of European Civic Forum to Director-General Ana Gallego of 16 April 2025.

(192)      The Italian authorities refer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Bodson and Others v. Belgium as concerns legitimate limitations to freedom of assembly related to (malicious) traffic obstructions, Italian Government (2025b), pp, 6-7.

(193)    High Court of Cassation (2025), Report n. 33/2025. The report in particular points at the use of the extraordinary urgency procedure as well as the proportionality of certain sanctions and includes reflections on the constitutional viability of the Law.