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having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia,

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having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (1), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016,

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having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, and the European Council’s consequent granting of candidate status on 23 June 2022 based on a positive assessment by the Commission and in line with the views expressed by Parliament,

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having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the Republic of Moldova’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406), the Council conclusions of 24 June 2022 on the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032), and the Commission Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova of 6 February 2023 (SWD(2023)0041),

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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 March 2023,

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having regard to the joint statement following the 7th EU-Moldova Association Council of 7 February 2023 and to the final statement of the 13th EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee of 23 March 2023,

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having regard to the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,

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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Republic of Moldova has condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine since the beginning and has supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine; whereas the Republic of Moldova has been disproportionally affected by the war, having had to cope with an influx of over 700 000 Ukrainian refugees — proportionately more than any other country — with over 100 000 of them still remaining in the country, while the Moldovan economy has been severely affected by lost trade, a decrease in foreign investment, and increased energy and transport prices; whereas the Russian Federation, in cooperation with domestic Russian-sponsored actors, has galvanised and utilised the resultant economic uncertainty to delegitimise and foster opposition to the Moldovan Government’s pro-European policies;

B.

whereas Russia has used its gas exports as a tool to pressure the Moldovan Government, including on its pro-European orientation, by artificially creating a gas supply crisis in 2021 and 2022; whereas Russia’s weaponisation of energy has further exposed the fragility of the Moldovan energy sector, while the country’s connections to the EU gas and electricity markets and mechanisms have helped it to overcome the crisis; whereas high energy prices led to inflation rising to 30 %, and Moldova’s economic output fell by 5,9 % year-on-year in real terms in 2022; whereas although the Republic of Moldova has diversified its natural gas supplies away from Russia, its electricity supply remains largely dependent on the Russian-owned Cuciurgan power station in the Transnistrian region;

C.

whereas in the early 1990s, Russia was a direct participant in the Transnistria War against the Moldovan state and since then has continued to sponsor the de facto occupied region of Transnistria, where to this day it illegally maintains an estimated 1 500 Russian troops; whereas on 22 June 2018, the UN General Assembly urged the Russian Federation to complete, unconditionally and without further delay, the orderly withdrawal of its forces and armaments from the territory of the Republic of Moldova; whereas the Cobasna depot, located within the Transnistrian region near the Ukraine-Moldova border, contains approximately 22 000 tonnes of Soviet-era ammunition and military equipment guarded by the Operational Group of Russian Forces; whereas, in spite of commitments made in 1999 and again in 2021, the Russian Federation has failed to ensure the full destruction of these weapons and the withdrawal of its illegally stationed troops;

D.

whereas on 21 February 2023, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, revoked his decree of 7 May 2012 on measures to implement the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, which, among other things, committed Russia to seeking ways to resolve the separatist issue ‘based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova in determining the special status of Transnistria’;

E.

whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova; whereas in recent years, the Republic of Moldova has been dealing with an increase in disinformation from Russian and pro-Russian sources and media outlets; whereas Russia’s subversive activities in the Moldovan information space also seek to undermine widespread popular support for temporarily displaced Ukrainians and for the European Union, tie down Ukrainian forces on the southern border, and foster destabilisation; whereas other active measures envisaged by Russia include establishing and promoting front organisations disguised as NGOs and ‘cultural centres’, establishing strong pro-Russian political and societal constituencies, returning the Republic of Moldova to a state of dependency on Russian hydrocarbons, and taking steps that could result in armed escalation in the occupied Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova; whereas Russian officials have repeatedly and falsely claimed that the Russian-speaking population in the Republic of Moldova is oppressed;

F.

whereas Russian missiles targeting Ukraine have flown over the Republic of Moldova’s territory on several occasions, in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty, and on several occasions Russian missile debris has fallen on Moldovan territory, causing damage and endangering the lives of civilians; whereas Moldova’s air surveillance and defence is in urgent need of investment and modernisation and the Moldovan Government has asked its Western partners for air-defence systems;

G.

whereas on 9 February 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy informed the European Council that Ukraine had intercepted a Russian secret service plan to destroy the democratic system in the Republic of Moldova and establish control over the country; whereas this was later confirmed by the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, who declared that the country had received intelligence that suggested that Russia was plotting to violently overthrow the country’s pro-European leadership;

H.

whereas Russia is using internal, pro-Russian oligarchs and political forces, such as the Șor party, to destabilise the political situation in the country; whereas the Șor Party has reportedly actively recruited, arranged logistics for, and abused citizens’ vulnerable economic position by providing financial incentives to attend anti-government protests since August 2022; whereas the leader of the Șor party, Ilan Șor, fled the Republic of Moldova in 2019 after being convicted of money laundering and embezzlement in a bank fraud scandal that resulted in the equivalent of USD 1 billion being siphoned away from Moldova’s banking system; whereas on 13 April 2023 the Chisinau Court of Appeal sentenced Ilan Șor to 15 years in prison on corruption charges in the bank fraud case; whereas Moldovan prosecutors are seeking his extradition from Israel and have also prosecuted his party for receiving illegal financing;

I.

whereas the Moldovan Government has called on the EU to impose sanctions on fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor whom it accuses of helping Russia wage a hybrid war against the government in Chișinău by spreading social unrest; whereas oligarchs Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc have been sanctioned by the United States and the United Kingdom for their involvement in the USD 1 billion bank fraud and other illicit schemes;

J.

whereas the Republic of Moldova’s democracy has demonstrated its resilience in the face of Russian disinformation and propaganda during the recent government reshuffle despite increased Russian and Russian-sponsored subversive activity; whereas despite all these attempts at destabilisation, the Moldovan people and leadership remained determined to follow the pro-European path they have chosen;

K.

whereas the Republic of Moldova submitted its application to join the EU on 3 March 2022, attesting to the determination of the Moldovan authorities and its citizens to advance Moldova’s European integration; whereas the Republic of Moldova is now a candidate country for EU membership;

L.

whereas the Government of the Republic of Moldova has embarked on an ambitious political, judicial and institutional reform process and has demonstrated its determination to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission opinion to meet the conditions set for the opening of accession negotiations; whereas the Moldovan Government’s implementation of existing agreements demonstrates its commitment to closer cooperation with and integration into the Union; whereas EU accession remains a merit-based process conditional upon the fulfilment of established criteria and conditions;

M.

whereas the Republic of Moldova is a close and valued partner of the EU and EU-Moldova relations have intensified over the past year, based on a mutual commitment to strengthen their political association and deepen their economic integration; whereas the Council conclusions of 13 December 2022 on the enlargement and stabilisation and association process put the emphasis on further deepening the EU’s sectoral cooperation with Moldova and its integration into the EU single market; whereas the EU and its Member States have provided significant political, economic and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova, and have been actively engaged in promoting the rule of law, democracy and reforms in the country; whereas the European Council conclusions of 23 March 2023 reaffirmed the EU’s determination to continue providing all relevant support to the Republic of Moldova and tasked the Commission with presenting a support package ahead of its next meeting; whereas an ambitious and comprehensive support package is essential both for countering destabilising activities by external actors and for sustaining the country’s accession path;

N.

whereas the Union has provided the Republic of Moldova with EUR 1,09 billion in loans and grants since October 2021 to strengthen its resilience, including budget support, macro-financial assistance, humanitarian aid and assistance under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and the Moldova Support Platform; whereas the second instalment of the EUR 105 million in macro-financial assistance pledged in November 2022 has still not been disbursed; whereas the Council adopted assistance measures worth EUR 7 million in 2021 and EUR 40 million in 2022 in further non-lethal military assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) supports Moldova’s and Ukraine’s efforts to effectively manage their common border;

O.

whereas the Republic of Moldova will host the next European Political Community summit in Chișinău, demonstrating its ambitious and resolute pro-European stance;

P.

whereas the Republic of Moldova overcame the substantial logistical blockages at its border with Ukraine by deploying additional specialised border guard staff;