—

having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2011 on ‘The EU protein deficit: what solution for a long-standing problem?’ (1),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2016 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (‘Omnibus regulation’) (COM(2016)0605) and the amendment thereto seeking to include a request to the Commission to publish a ‘protein plan’by the end of 2018 (2),

—

having regard to the European Soya Declaration submitted to the Agriculture Council on 12 June 2017 by Germany and Hungary and subsequently signed by 14 Member States (3),

—

having regard to Council Decision 93/355/EEC of 8 June 1993 concerning the conclusion of a Memorandum of understanding on certain oil seeds between the European Economic Community and the United States of America within the framework of the GATT (4),

—

having regard to the document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, in particular Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2, 12 and 15 included therein,

—

having regard to the decision of the UN General Assembly at its 68th session to officially declare 2016 International Year of Pulses (IYP), under the auspices of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (5),

—

having regard to the study commissioned by Parliament’s Policy Department B at the request of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, entitled ‘The Environmental Role of Protein Crops in the new Common Agricultural Policy’ (6),

—

having regard to the hearing held at Parliament on improving European plant protein supplies,

—

taking into consideration the Danube Soya Declaration of 19 January 2013,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A8-0121/2018),

A.

whereas the European Union is suffering from a major deficit in vegetable proteins due to the needs of its livestock sector, which is dependent on feed imports from third countries, a situation which has regrettably seen little improvement despite the many announcements of intentions and initiatives on this topic over more than 15 years, and despite the use of co-products from biofuel production in animal feed; whereas the EU’s current situation, marked by the importation of vegetable proteins (mainly soya) from South America, is unsustainable and demonstrates that we should be taking more energetic action, notably to enhance the sustainability of these imports;

B.

whereas it is vital to reduce the Union’s massive dependency on imports of protein crops, which are mainly used for animal feed; whereas in addition to the environmental impact in soya producing regions, the current situation carries major risks especially for the EU livestock sector, as price volatility on international markets has substantially increased;

C.

whereas Parliament has on a number of occasions spoken about proteins and the need for a European protein plan, but whereas its initiatives have not led to real effects likely to change Europe’s dependence on others for its supply of vegetable proteins;

D.

whereas because of the outbreak of the BSE crisis a European ban was rightly imposed on the use of animal meal in feed (7), but this has had the effect of sharply increasing imports of soya from Latin America;

E.

whereas, consequently, the Union devotes only 3 % of its arable land to protein crops and imports more than 75 % of its vegetable protein supply, mainly from Brazil, Argentina and the United States;

F.

whereas livestock sectors in the Union are extremely sensitive to price volatility and distortion of competition and are dependent on imports of affordable and high quality vegetable protein, which poses a real challenge for European farms;

G.

whereas European protein crops generate oleaginous by-products which can contribute to the circular economy and be valuable for human consumption, renewable energy or the production of green chemicals; whereas the co-production of proteins and by-products in Europe makes it possible to reduce imports of both GMO proteins and biofuels which contribute to deforestation;

H.

whereas the issue of vegetable protein used in animal feed has too often been analysed with a focus on protein-rich matter, linked to our deficit in vegetable proteins and to the search for raw materials to supplement farm animals’ diets;

I.

whereas it is necessary to adopt a more comprehensive analysis of the vegetable protein issue in Europe so as to equip ourselves with a long-term strategy and maximise the number of instruments at our disposal for boosting the effectiveness of action to reduce our dependence on imported vegetable proteins; whereas this strategy is a tool in the transition towards more sustainable agri-food and farming systems;

J.

whereas proteins, like energy, are an essential component of our food and can be provided in plant or animal form;

K.

whereas vegetable proteins are at the core of the challenges of food security and sovereignty (for food and feed), environmental protection, global warming and renewable energy; whereas they are essential to life and are present in all foods consumed by both humans and animals;

L.

whereas the total European production of protein-rich matter rose from 24,2 to 36,3 million tonnes (+50 %) between 1994 and 2014, but at the same time consumption increased from 39,7 million tonnes to 57,1 million tonnes (+44 %); whereas the Union’s overall protein deficit (20,8 tonnes in 2014) is therefore increasing; whereas the world market in vegetable proteins, connected with the market in soya and soya meal, has grown considerably over the past 50 years, and whereas consumption of these raw materials has surged in all Member States, with soya consumption rising from 2,42 million tonnes in 1960 to almost 36 million tonnes today; whereas the EU livestock sector is heavily dependent on imports of soya beans and meal from third countries, especially from South America; whereas demand for soya within the EU uses an area of almost 15 million ha, 13 million ha of which are in South America;

M.

whereas the cultivation of protein crops generates a significant added value for the environment, which is not endangered by the related use of plant protection products;

N.

whereas in recent years China has become the world’s largest importer of soya and has launched its own genuine and non-transparent security of supply strategy, located outside traditional market mechanisms and based on production contracts with the world’s largest soya supplier, Brazil, and massive investment there, at the expense of the environment, in production, processing (crushing) and port transport infrastructure; whereas this internationalisation strategy on the part of the Chinese agri-food industry could impact the current soya and oilseed market supplies of the EU, which is also a major customer of Brazil, and endanger the stability of the markets of the Union;

O.

whereas the majority of soya imported, in particular from the Americas, is from genetically modified crops, and whereas European consumers distrust this technology; whereas there is growing interest in local non-GMO products and increasing concern about the carbon footprint of imports; whereas within the EU many soya bean producers and processors, animal feed producers, and representatives of the food industry (meat producers, milk and egg producers and other users of soybeans), trade chains and other relevant institutions support sustainable, certified GMO-free systems of soya bean production;

P.

whereas to meet the EU’s food needs, European agriculture has undergone a transformation, under the common agricultural policy (CAP); whereas it has intensified and agricultural produce and raw material markets have opened up, which has increased the EU’s dependence on imports of vegetable proteins from the Americas; whereas globalisation has brought a convergence of dietary habits and farm specialisation, giving rise to large-scale movements of inputs over long distances for the production of proteins, whether synthetic nitrogen fertilisers or protein-rich raw materials for livestock feed, with an impact on the environment and the climate;

Q.

whereas the production of protein crops, particularly soya, imported for the production of animal feed is one of the key drivers of land use change and is a major driver of global deforestation in many regions outside Europe; whereas increased cultivation of European protein crops could provide an important complement to measures to promote agricultural commodity supply chains without deforestation; whereas addressing the global challenge of deforestation and forest degradation has become even more important in the light of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change;

R.

whereas the nitrogen needed to feed plants and manufacture vegetable proteins, with the exception of leguminous crops, is today mainly provided by synthetic nitrogenous fertilisers, which are costly and energy-intensive to produce, generate pollution of both water and air resources and have a high ecological footprint due to the large amounts of fossil fuels consumed during the production process; whereas this does not contribute to the goal of the circular economy and making more efficient use of our resources and waste streams; whereas in these circumstances, the question of proteins needs to be rethought, from production right through to consumption, in terms of productive and environmental performance, based on more satisfactory management of the nitrogen cycle, including the use and development of organic nitrogen fertilisers such as recycled nutrients from organic waste streams like animal manure;

S.

whereas in order to reduce the EU’s dependency on imports of vegetable proteins, it is necessary to focus not only on protein-rich crops which address the needs of ruminants and non-ruminants, but also on all other crops (including in forage and grassland areas) which, while they have a lesser protein content, are extensively cultivated throughout the Union; whereas there are many benefits to pasture-based grazing for ruminants, including reduced farm input costs;

T.

whereas there will not be any increase in vegetable protein production without improvement of the profitability of such plants and there is a need today for the implementation of a strategic, effective and ambitious vegetable protein supply plan to support the sustainable development of European agriculture; whereas such a plan requires the mobilisation of several EU policies, first and foremost the CAP;

U.

whereas in recent decades the Union has used three main levers to support the objective of European protein independence, namely voluntary coupled aid for protein and oilseed crops, EU biofuels policy and the conditionality of 30 % of direct support introduced by the last reform of the CAP in relation to the implementation of greening measures, including the obligation to devote 5 % of arable land to ecological focus areas (EFAs) and the decision to allow nitrogen-fixing crops and catch crops;

V.

whereas the interest of farmers in nitrogen-fixing and protein-rich crops has increased significantly because they help farmers to meet requirements under the greening policy, and whereas this interest will encourage plant breeders to resume or increase their activities related to these crops;

W.

whereas over the period 2000-2013 the measures introduced by the CAP did not by themselves succeed in reversing the declining trend or stagnation of protein production in Europe, but whereas since 2013 the combination of such support together with the greening measure authorising the cultivation of protein crops in EFAs has led to a sharp increase in the production of protein crops in the EU;

X.

whereas the political agreement on the CAP reached by Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 2013 envisages the possibility of growing nitrogen-fixing crops on EFAs;

Y.

whereas research has shown that feed manufacturers often add more protein to food than is considered necessary and whereas efficiency gains can be made by means of more precise determination of the protein content required by the target species;

Z.

whereas owing to the small share of protein crop cultivation in the EU, the number of vegetable protein research programmes is falling, matched by a decline in training, innovation and the acquisition of practical experience in the EU; whereas the effectiveness of innovation should be enhanced and protein research policy stepped up, but whereas this would only succeed if backed by medium- to long-term political commitments; whereas protein research policy should also include locally adapted home grown leguminous crops;

AA.

whereas supporting plant breeding activities will be important for the development of new varieties of protein crops that can contribute to higher EU protein production; whereas effective plant breeding activities require a sufficiently funded long-term research policy and a suitable regulatory environment that encourages innovation;

AB.

whereas the Commission has already funded, and is in the process of funding, a number of relevant projects, including those under the heading ‘SFS-44-2016 – A joint plant breeding programme to decrease the EU’s and China’s dependency on protein imports’; whereas appropriate communication, dissemination and exploitation of the results of such projects should be ensured so that future policy decisions in this field are based on evidence;

AC.

whereas the cost of soya has roughly doubled in real-terms since 2007;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

—

having regard to Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’ (1) (the ‘7th EAP’),

—

having regard to Articles 191 and 192 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, relating to preserving, protecting and improving the quality of human health and the environment,

—

having regard to the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21 and the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the UNFCCC, held in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015,

—

having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their interconnected and integrated nature,

—

having regard to the European Environment Agency’s report of December 2016 entitled ‘Environmental indicator report 2016 – In support to the monitoring of the 7th Environment Action Programme’,

—

having regard to the European Environment Agency’s report of November 2017 entitled ‘Environmental Indicator Report 2017 – In support to the monitoring of the 7th Environment Action Programme’,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 February 2017 entitled ‘The EU Environmental Implementation Review: Common challenges and how to combine efforts to deliver better results’(COM(2017)0063), and the 28 accompanying country reports,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2016 entitled ‘Delivering the benefits of EU environmental policies through a regular Environmental Implementation Review’(COM(2016)0316),

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 November 2017 on the EU Environmental Implementation Review (EIR) (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2015 on resource efficiency: moving towards a circular economy (3),

—

having regard to its resolution of 2 February 2016 on the mid-term review of the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy (4),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 November 2017 on an Action Plan for nature, people and the economy (5),

—

having regard to its recommendation of 4 April 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into emission measurements in the automotive sector (6),

—

having regard to the European Environment Agency’s report entitled ‘SOER 2015 – The European environment – state and outlook 2015’,

—

having regard to the European Environment Agency’s report of 19 May 2015 entitled ‘State of Nature in the EU’,

—

having regard to the European Implementation Assessment study of November 2017 on the ‘Mid-term review of the implementation of the 7th Environment Action Programme (2014-2020)’carried out by the European Parliamentary Research Service, including its annexed study,

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 April 2012 on the review of the 6th Environment Action Programme and the setting of priorities for the 7th Environment Action Programme – A better environment for a better life (7),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 22 November 2016 entitled ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future’(COM(2016)0739),

—

having regard to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 September 2011 entitled ‘Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe’(COM(2011)0571),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 29 November 2017 entitled ‘The Future of Food and Farming’(COM(2017)0713),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A8-0059/2018),

A.

whereas the 7th EAP sets legally binding objectives in the fields of environment and climate change to be achieved by 2020; whereas it also sets out a long-term vision for 2050;

B.

whereas the 7th EAP does not contain a mid-term review clause; whereas the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety on the implementation of the 7th EAP is an opportunity to assess this EAP’s progress and to make evidence-based recommendations for the further implementation of the current EAP and any future EAPs; whereas this report should go beyond restating well-known problems, and should focus on proposing solutions for achieving the goals laid down in the 7th EAP;

C.

whereas the Commission is working on an evaluation report, the focus of which will be on the structure and strategic role played by the 7th EAP; whereas that report is intended, in particular, to check whether the agreed framework is helping to deliver the nine priority objectives in a smart manner;

D.

whereas the EU has strong environmental legislation, the weak and ineffective implementation thereof is a long-standing problem; whereas these implementation gaps threaten sustainable development, have adverse trans-boundary impacts on the environment and human health and entail important socio-economic costs; whereas, moreover, the implementation gaps undermine the EU’s credibility;

E.

whereas progress towards the 2020 objectives has so far been mixed: it is unlikely that objective 1 (protecting natural capital) will be met, but likely that some of the sub-objectives under objective 2 (low carbon economy and resource efficiency) will be met; it is uncertain whether objective 3 (reducing environmental pressures and risks to human health) will be met;

F.

whereas the continuing failure to implement legislation and integrate specialised knowledge into policy-making in areas such as air quality, environmental noise and exposure to chemicals poses severe health threats and reduces quality and length of life for EU citizens;

G.

whereas the most recent data published by the European Environment Agency confirms the general trends described above for each thematic objective but also reports a slowing of progress in some areas; whereas, in some cases, such as greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficiency, the outlook for achieving the sub-objectives remains unchanged by these new trends;

H.

whereas it is now uncertain whether the target for ammonia emissions will be met and unlikely that the land take target will be met;

I.

whereas much uncertainty exists with regard to implementation owing to a lack of indicators and the limitations of existing indicators; whereas knowledge gaps continue to hinder progress on three levels: understanding of risk; formation of appropriate policy to manage and reduce risk; and monitoring of the effectiveness of policies;

J.

whereas knowledge often exists but is not used in policy-making or transferred to the parties responsible for implementation; whereas this is often due to a lack of political will and competing interests which are not perceived to be consistent with the EAP or environmental policy goals in general; whereas continued economic growth is also dependent on a clean environment;

K.

whereas synergy between the high-level instruments of Union policy and the EAP needs to be improved in order to achieve the objectives of the programme;

L.

whereas there is inadequate funding at some levels for the proper implementation of the 7th EAP; whereas funding at EU level has sometimes failed to deliver the expected results and this has, in multiple cases, been the result of poorly administered financing rather than a lack of money;

M.

whereas the scope of the 7th EAP is relevant to current needs in the field of environmental policy, although many stakeholders recommend the addition of new sub-objectives to increase the programme’s relevance in the future;

N.

whereas stakeholders also express a preference for a less complex, more focused EAP;

O.

whereas there is general support for an 8th EAP;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

—

having regard to Articles 11 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

—

having regard to Articles 2 and 3(3), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (1),

—

having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (2),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 26 April 2017 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (COM(2017)0253),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal on the third medium-term Community action programme on equal opportunities for women and men 1991-1995 (COM(90)0449),

—

having regard to the resolution of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 5 October 1995 on the image of women and men portrayed in advertising and the media (3),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 7 June 2000 entitled ‘Towards a Community framework strategy on gender equality (2001-2005)’ (COM(2000)0335),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 June 2008 on eliminating gender stereotypes in society,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 June 2013 on advancing women’s roles as decision-makers in the media,

—

having regard to the European Pact for Gender Equality (2011-2020), adopted by the Council in March 2011,

—

having regard to the Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010 of 1 March 2006 (COM(2006)0092),

—

having regard to the Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015 of 21 September 2010 (COM(2010)0491),

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 3 December 2015 on Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019 (SWD(2015)0278),

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 July 1997 on discrimination against women in advertising (4),

—

having regard to its resolution of 3 September 2008 on how marketing and advertising affect equality between women and men (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2013 on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2016 on gender equality and empowering women in the digital age (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2016 on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance (8),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2016 on application of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (‘Employment Equality Directive’) (9),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2017 on the need for an EU strategy to end and prevent the gender pension gap (10),

—

having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2017 on working conditions and precarious employment (11),

—

having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on women’s economic empowerment in the private and public sectors in the EU (12),

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU (13),

—

having regard to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 10 July 2013 on gender equality and media,

—

having regard to Recommendation 1555 of 24 April 2002 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Image of women in the media,

—

having regard to Recommendation 1799 of 26 June 2007 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on The image of women in advertising,

—

having regard to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 27 September 2017 to member States on gender equality in the audiovisual sector,

—

having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) study of 2013 entitled ‘Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States: Women and the Media – Advancing gender equality in decision-making in media organisations’,

—

having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and its annexes thereto, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995,

—

having regard to the Council of Europe report of 2013 entitled ‘Media and the image of women’,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality and the opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A8-0031/2018),

A.

whereas equality between women and men is a core principle of the European Union, as enshrined in the Treaties in Article 8 of TFEU stating that, in all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between women and men; whereas EU policies to promote gender equality have helped to make life better for many European citizens;

B.

whereas the media act as a fourth power, have the capacity to influence and, ultimately, shape public opinion; whereas the media are one of the cornerstones of democratic societies and, as such, have a duty to ensure freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism, to promote respect for human dignity and to combat all forms of discrimination and inequality by, among other things, portraying diversified social role models; whereas, therefore, media organisations have to be sensitised;

C.

whereas the fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, recognised the importance of the relationship between women and the media in achieving equality between women and men, and incorporated two strategic aims into the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA):

D.

whereas the portrayal of women and men in the media may convey unequal representation in various contexts, including political, economic, social, academic, religious, cultural, and sports contexts – with men appearing mainly in active social roles and women being confined to more passive roles; whereas of all the stereotypes affecting the image of women and men, the prime example is the sexualisation of the female body, which can be seen most clearly in the tabloid press and in advertising; whereas the eroticisation of violence and objectification of women in the media have a negative effect on the fight for the eradication of violence against women; whereas gender stereotypes are often combined with other stereotypes involving discrimination on any grounds;

E.

whereas the media have a significant impact on cultural gender norms and on how social representations associated with both women and men are formed and evolve, and influence the audience with stereotyped body images and ideas of masculinity and femininity, for example, the representation of women in advertising and the way products target potential consumers tend to perpetuate traditional gender norms; whereas in cases where the media continue to present stereotyped representations of women and men, including those of LGBTI individuals, people very often view these depictions as legitimate, thus making it difficult or impossible to call them into question;

F.

whereas in modern-day societies the advertising industry plays a major role within the media landscape, as it communicates by using images and ideas that appeal to our emotions and can hence shape our values, attitudes, and perceptions of the world; whereas, by conveying a distorted gender image, advertising may resort to sexism and replicate discriminatory practices; whereas an advertisement may be considered discriminatory or sexist if a gender is portrayed in a degrading and insulting way or as less capable, intelligent or as inferior;

G.

whereas new technologies are transforming traditional media business models; whereas the audiovisual sector is a highly important industry of economic value which alone directly employs over one million people in the EU; whereas, in order to cope with the new online communication and multimedia systems, the necessary adjustments have to be made to the oversight of the arrangements at national level, as well as to self-regulation schemes without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations on the Audiovisual Media Services Directive;

H.

whereas the perspective of both women and men should be taken into account equally in order to achieve a complete and diversified picture of every facet of social reality; whereas it is important not to lose out on women’s potential and skills in communicating information, facts and opinions about the challenges faced by women in the media, while acknowledging that women cannot be treated as a homogenous group;

I.

whereas the continued projection of negative and degrading images of women in media communications – electronic, print, visual and audio – must be changed; whereas gender inequalities are also created and replicated through the language and images disseminated by the media; whereas children are confronted with gender inequalities at a very young age through role models promoted by television series and programmes, discussions, games, video games and advertisements; whereas gender roles are shaped mostly during childhood and adolescence with an impact throughout life; whereas the education and training of media professionals are powerful tools for combating and eradicating stereotypes, raising awareness and promoting equality;

J.

whereas women constituted 68 % of journalism and information graduates in the EU-28 in 2015 (14), while employment data for the EU-28 over 2008-2015 show that the percentage of women employed in the media sector on average is continuously languishing at around 40 %;

K.

whereas, moreover, the share of women in decision-making in media in the EU-28 in 2015 was still below the gender balance zone (40-60 %) at just 32 %, while the share of women as board presidents was a mere 22 % (15);

L.

whereas gender pay and pension gaps are a persistent problem in the EU, and are evident in different economic sectors, including in the media, where the gender pay gap is 17 %;

M.

whereas women continue to face a glass ceiling in the media and might not have equal opportunities for promotion or career advancement owing to a variety of factors, including the procedures of an organisational culture which is often unfavourable to a work-life balance with a competitive environment characterised by stress, inflexible deadlines and long working hours; whereas women have less decision-making power in setting the news agenda due to their underrepresentation in senior management positions;

N.

whereas media organisations in the Member States can establish their own equality policies, which leads to a wide spectrum of practices in the EU: from very comprehensive policy frameworks covering media content and providing for a balanced representation of men and women in decision-making bodies, to there being no such policy in place;

O.

whereas research has shown that only 4 % of news coverage is against stereotypical portrayal; whereas women account for just 24 % of the people we hear or read about in the news (16); whereas around 37 % of stories from both online and offline news sources are reported by women, a situation which has demonstrated no prospect of improvement in the past 10 years (17); whereas women are mostly asked to provide a popular opinion (41 %) or personal experience (38 %) and are seldom quoted as experts (just 17 % of stories); whereas research has also shown that less than one in five experts or commentators are women (18 %) (18);

P.

whereas women are disproportionately under-represented in the news and information media and are even less visible in the domains of sport, politics, the economy and finances, notwithstanding the variety of media outlets across the Member States; whereas the women of history are almost entirely absent from related media content, such as biographical documentaries;

Q.

whereas female participation on an equal level with men in reporting content and serving as information sources is crucial not only for reasons of representation, but also for reasons of equal opportunities and the full recognition of their expertise and knowledge; whereas, within the European media landscape, there are obstacles to engaging in a responsible approach to gender equality given the financial constraints and working conditions, including job insecurity and the levels of professional experience, combined with the growing speed of information and commercial considerations;

R.

whereas there are women in the media working at a top professional level, including renowned film makers, journalists and reporters, who, although performing equally well as men, are more exposed to gender-based violence and workplace discrimination and may not be given the same level of appreciation as their male counterparts;

S.

whereas women engaging in social media are encountering increasing levels of harassment; whereas this harassment has the potential to silence women’s voice and weakens their participation in society; whereas data collected globally shows that half of the women employed in the media have experienced sexual abuse, one quarter of them have experienced acts of physical violence and three quarters have experienced intimidation, threats or abuse (19); whereas there is increasing concern about cyber violence against women and girls and it is estimated that one in ten women in the EU have experienced some form of cyber violence since reaching the age of 15; whereas there is a lack of data and research on cyber violence against women and girls at EU level; whereas psychological and sexual harassment are human rights violations; whereas the media and national and international regulators should lay down rules, including sanctions to be applied by media organisations, to deal with these matters;

T.

whereas female investigative journalists in particular are often subjected to violence and the target of deadly attacks, as evidenced by the cases of Veronica Guerin or Daphne Caruana Galizia;

U.

whereas according to a study by the European Women’s Audiovisual Network (EWA) (20), only one in five films in the seven European countries examined is directed by a woman, and the vast majority of funding resources go into films that are not directed by women, even though approximately half of all film school graduates are women;

V.

whereas media companies should adopt self-regulation systems and codes of conduct setting out procedural rules and criteria on careers and media coverage to safeguard and promote gender equality; whereas self-regulation and conduct codes of this kind should be drawn up in collaboration with the industry’s trade unions, pursuing a clear policy on gender equality;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

—

having regard to Articles 2 and 3(3), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

—

having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the 4th World Conference on Women in 1995, and, in particular, the area of concern ‘Women and the Media’,

—

having regard to the outcome document of 16 December 2015 of the high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society,

—

having regard to the Commission’s Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 6 May 2015 entitled ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2015)0192), and the mid-term review on its implementation entitled ‘A Connected Digital Single Market for All’ (COM(2017)0228),

—

having regard to Pillar II of the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy, which is aimed at creating the right conditions and a level playing field and environment for digital networks and innovative services to flourish, and Pillar III, which supports an inclusive digital society, in which citizens have the right skills to seize the opportunities brought about by the internet and boost their chances of getting a job,

—

having regard to the Education and Training 2020 framework,

—

having regard to the Commission study ‘ICT for work: Digital skills in the workplace’ and the Commission communication of 10 June 2016 entitled ‘A New Skills Agenda for Europe: Working together to strengthen human capital, employability and competitiveness’ (COM(2016)0381),

—

having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘Empowering women on the Internet’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies in October 2015 (1),

—

having regard to the Commission report of 1 October 2013 entitled ‘Women active in the ICT sector’,

—

having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) study of 26 January 2017 entitled ‘Gender and Digital Agenda’,

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 May 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on application of the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2013 on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU (3),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on the Digital Agenda for Growth, Mobility and Employment: time to move up a gear (4), and, in particular, the Grand Coalition on Digital Skills and Jobs,

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2015 on the application of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2016 on gender equality and empowering women in the digital age (6),

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on empowering women and girls through the digital sector (O-000004/2018 – B8-0010/2018),

—

having regard to Rules 128(5) and 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas digitalisation has revolutionised and fundamentally changed the way people access and provide information, communicate, socialise, study and work, creating new opportunities to participate in public and political discussions, education and the labour market, opening up new prospects for a self-determined life, and having enormous economic potential for the European Union and beyond; whereas digitalisation not only has an impact on markets, but also on society as a whole;

B.

whereas the information society, driven by information and communication technologies (ICTs), brings with it huge opportunities for generating and distributing wealth and knowledge;

C.

whereas all around the globe, women as a demographic group are less likely to be online than men; whereas 68 % of men and 62 % of women use computers and the internet on a regular basis; whereas 54 % of men, compared to 48 % of women, use the internet on mobile devices; whereas 33 % of men install software onto the devices themselves, compared to only 18 % of women; whereas 41 % of men use online radio and television, compared to 35 % of women; whereas 47 % of men use online banking, compared to 35 % of women; whereas 22 % of men sell goods on the web, compared to only 17 % of women; whereas 20 % of men buy goods online, compared to 13 % of women;

D.

whereas digital models of communication have contributed to the creation of conditions conducive to the increased dissemination of hate speech and threats against women, with 18 % of women in Europe having suffered some form of cyber harassment since reaching adolescence; whereas the number of threats, including death threats, towards women has increased; whereas social awareness of digital forms of violence remains insufficient; whereas various forms of online violence have not yet been fully taken account of by the legal framework;

E.

whereas only 2 % of all women in the labour market are employed in technical, professional and scientific jobs, compared to 5 % of men; whereas only 9 % of developers in Europe are women, only 19 % of senior managers in the ICT and communications sectors are female (compared with 45 % in other service sectors) and women represent just 19 % of entrepreneurs in these sectors (compared with 54 % in other service sectors);

F.

whereas there is a significant gender gap in access to professional and educational opportunities in relation to information and communication technologies and to computer skills;

G.

whereas sexism and gender stereotypes constitute a serious obstacle to equality between women and men, and further widen the gender gap in the digital sector, making it difficult for women to develop fully their capacities as users, innovators and creators;

H.

whereas jobs, not only within the ICT sector, increasingly require some degree of e-skills and digital literacy, and this trend will likely be amplified in the future with a broader spectrum of digital skills needed for the majority of occupations and vacancies;

I.

whereas improving digital skills and IT literacy presents a unique opportunity to improve work-life balance by increasing access to education and training and facilitating the inclusion in the labour market not only of women and girls, but also of people with special needs, such as persons with disabilities, and of the inhabitants of rural and remote areas far from urban centres; whereas digitalisation of the workplace may bring some challenges which need to be addressed; whereas increasing the number of women in ICT, one of the highest paying sectors, could contribute to their financial empowerment and independence, resulting in the reduction of the total gender pay gap and the enhancement of women’s financial independence; whereas only around 16 % of the almost eight million people working in ICT in Europe are women;

J.

whereas digitalisation offers new opportunities for entrepreneurship for women, including small-scale digital entrepreneurship, which in many cases does not require significant initial capital, as well as enterprises pursued within the framework of the social economy, which enhance social inclusion; whereas there is a need to support female digital entrepreneurship as it is one of the fastest growing and prospering sectors in the economy, offering numerous opportunities for innovation and growth, and women constitute only 19 % of entrepreneurs in this field;

K.

whereas the entry of more women into the ICT sector would boost a market in which labour shortages are foreseen, and in which the equal participation of women would lead to a gain of around EUR 9 billion in EU GDP each year; whereas women remain heavily underrepresented in ICT degree programmes, where they constitute only around 20 % of graduates in the field, with only 3 % of all female graduates holding a degree in ICT; whereas women face numerous difficulties in integrating into and staying in the ICT sector; whereas the male-dominated working environment, with only 30 % of the workforce being female, contributes to the trend of many women leaving the ICT sector within a few years of completing their university degrees; whereas women’s participation in the digital labour market decreases with age; whereas women under 30 with a degree in ICT make up 20 % of the ICT sector, compared to 15,4 % of women aged between 31 and 45 and 9 % of women over 45;

L.

whereas the study entitled ‘Women active in the ICT sector’ estimates that there will be 900 000 unfilled positions in the ICT sector in Europe by 2020; whereas the ICT sector is growing rapidly, creating around 120 000 new jobs every year;

M.

whereas the ICT sector is characterised by a particularly high degree of vertical and horizontal segregation, as well as a gap between women’s educational qualifications and their positions in the ICT sector; whereas less than 20 % of ICT entrepreneurs are women; whereas the majority (54 %) of women in ICT jobs occupy lower paid and lower skill-level positions, and only a small minority of them (8 %) occupy high-skill software engineering positions; whereas women are also underrepresented in decision-making within this sector, with only 19,2 % of employees in the ICT sector managed by women, compared with 45,2 % of employees elsewhere;

N.

whereas women aged 55 and over are at particular risk of unemployment and labour market inactivity, with the average EU employment rate for women aged between 55 and 64 being only 49 % in 2016, compared with 62 % for men; whereas a low level of IT literacy and e-skills further amplifies this risk; whereas improving and investing in the digital competences of women aged 55 and over would boost their employment opportunities and offer a degree of protection against exclusion from the labour market;

O.

whereas according to 2014 Eurostat data, more women (42,3 %) than men (33,6 %) go on to higher education, yet women are present in greater numbers in the humanities than in scientific fields; whereas only 9,6 % of women students in tertiary education study ICT-related degrees, compared to 30,6 % of men; whereas women remain largely underrepresented in initiatives such as the EU Code Week, ICT for Better Education, the Startup Europe Leaders Club and the Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs, which are aimed at further fostering e-education and e-skills;

P.

whereas low participation on the part of women and girls in ICT-related education, and later in employment, is the result of a complex interplay of gender stereotyping that starts at the early stages of life and education and continues into professional careers;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

—

having regard to Articles 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

—

having regard to Articles 208 to 211 and 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, adopted at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 and renewed at the High-Level Meeting in Nairobi in 2016,

—

having regard to the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Sendai (Japan) from 14 to 18 March 2015,

—

having regard to the UN resolution entitled ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York on 25 September 2015, and to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals included therein,

—

having regard to the World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul on 23 and 24 May 2016, and the ‘Grand Bargain’agreement reached by some of the biggest donors and aid providers,

—

having regard to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (1) signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as revised on 25 June 2005 and 22 June 2010,

—

having regard to Council Decision 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union (2),

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (3),

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020 (4),

—

having regard to the Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the overseas countries and territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies (‘the Internal Agreement’),

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund (5),

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund (6),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020 (7),

—

having regard to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid of 2007 (8),

—

having regard to the new European Consensus on Development of 7 June 2017 (9),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 June 2017 on EU engagement with civil society in external relations,

—

having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on increasing the effectiveness of development cooperation (10),

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2016 entitled ‘EU Trust Fund for Africa: the implications for development and humanitarian aid’ (11),

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (12),

—

having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2013 on local authorities and civil society: Europe’s engagement in support of sustainable development (13),

—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 18/2014 on EuropeAid’s evaluation and results-oriented monitoring systems,

—

having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2017 entitled ‘Mid-term Review Report of the External Financing Instruments’(COM(2017)0720), and the related staff working documents, ‘Evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument’(SWD(2017)0600) and ‘Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund’(SWD(2017)0601),

—

having regard to the External Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (final report of June 2017), commissioned by the Commission from a team of external contractors,

—

having regard to the External Evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument (final report of June 2017), commissioned by the Commission from a team of external contractors,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 February 2018 on a new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020 (COM(2018)0098),

—

having regard to the ‘Coherence report – Insights from the External Evaluation of the External Financing Instruments’(final report of July 2017), commissioned by the Commission from a team of external contractors,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of and Annex 3 to the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A8-0118/2018),

A.

whereas since the adoption of the External Financing Instruments (EFIs), the international and EU policy framework has changed significantly with the adoption of landmark instruments such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, and the Agenda for Humanity; whereas the EU played a leading role in the negotiations of these instruments;

B.

whereas the Treaty of Lisbon, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), together with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the new European Consensus on Development and the Busan effective development principles, determine the EU strategy on development cooperation and humanitarian aid; whereas, in addition, the Council has adopted a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, which deals inter alia with development cooperation;

C.

whereas according to Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, humanitarian assistance must be delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality and guided by a needs-based approach; whereas humanitarian aid must not be a crisis management tool;

D.

whereas development policy should complement EU foreign policy and migration management, while ensuring that development funding is used only for development-related objectives and purposes and not to cover expenses related to the achievement of different objectives, such as border control or anti-migration policies;

E.

whereas the main objective of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is to reduce and, in the long term, eradicate poverty in developing countries that do not benefit from funding under the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) or the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), to provide thematic support for civil society organisations and local authorities in partner countries in the area of development-related global public goods and challenges, and to support the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU; whereas the DCI is the main geographic instrument in the area of development cooperation in the EU budget, with EUR 19,6 billion in allocations for the period 2014-2020;

F.

whereas the main objective of the EDF is to reduce and, in the long term, eradicate poverty in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region and achieve the sustainable development of overseas countries and territories (OCTs); whereas the EDF is the main EU development cooperation instrument, with EUR 30,5 billion allocated to the 11th EDF for the period 2014-2020;

G.

whereas the main objective of the Humanitarian Aid Instrument (HAI) is to provide assistance, relief and protection to people affected by natural or manmade disasters and similar emergencies, placing the focus on the most vulnerable victims regardless of nationality, religion, gender, age, ethnic origin or political affiliation, and in accordance with real needs, international humanitarian principles and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid;

H.

whereas the HAI extends beyond the core task of lifesaving operations to include relief for those affected by longer-lasting crises, short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work, disaster preparedness and addressing the consequences of population movements;

I.

whereas effective development cooperation calls for innovative approaches, giving donors the ability to respond quickly to local situations, work with local organisations and support local businesses and entrepreneurs, especially in the poorest and most fragile countries; whereas the EU’s audit system must give donors the flexibility to take on a reasonable amount of risk in such projects, enhancing the EU’s ability to react quickly and deliver effective aid;

J.

whereas the EU is the world’s leading donor of development and humanitarian aid; whereas through this assistance the EU champions efforts to reduce poverty and to promote global and EU interests and fundamental values;

K.

whereas the African Union-EU Summit held in Abidjan on 29 and 30 November 2017 confirmed the will to establish a genuine, modernised, globalised and ambitious partnership, creating the political and economic conditions for real equality;

L.

whereas there has been an exponential increase in the number of development cooperation agreements concluded with third countries, including China, Russia, Turkey, Brazil and India;

M.

whereas reinstating and extending the so-called global gag rule and cutting funds to organisations that provide women and girls with family planning and sexual and reproductive health and rights services is of serious concern;

N.

whereas third-country governments have real expectations when it comes to swift action, effectiveness and addressing the urgent need to maintain sound development cooperation partnerships; whereas there is a need to develop open and productive economies in partner countries, while taking into account new circumstances and new economic stakeholders in the international arena;

O.

whereas given the lack of UK involvement beyond 2020, Brexit will entail a reduction in the EU budget of between 12 and 15 %;

P.

whereas the EDF and DCI evaluations confirm that using the different geographic and thematic instruments in a coherent manner is indeed possible;

Q.

whereas the evaluation of the 11th EDF states that ‘there is a real threat that EDF will be pushed into responding to agendas that distance it from its primary objective of poverty alleviation, which are difficult to reconcile with the EDF’s core values and compromise what it does well’, that ‘despite consultations, government and [civil society organisation] views (with some notable exceptions such as in the Pacific region), have rarely been taken account of in programming choices’and that ‘the EDF11 programming thus used a top-down approach to apply the concentration principle but at the cost of the Cotonou Agreement’s central principle of partnership’;

R.

whereas according to the 11th EDF evaluation, by April 2017, nearly EUR 500 million from the EDF reserve had been disbursed to support the Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) department, nearly EUR 500 million had been allocated in emergency support to individual countries and EUR 1,5 billion had been disbursed to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa; whereas the EDF also contributes to the new European Fund for Sustainable Development;

S.

whereas the DCI evaluation states that ‘the DCI remains overall relevant and fit for purpose, both when it was adopted and at the mid-point of its implementation. It is broadly in line with new policy documents (e.g. the new European Consensus on Development and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) although implementing certain priorities, could be difficult in its current format’;

T.

whereas at the time of the adoption of the EFIs 2014-2020 Parliament expressed a preference for a distinct EFI dedicated to development cooperation and called for the ring-fencing of development funds should the EDF be budgetised;

U.

whereas with reference to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the EDF evaluation states that ‘compared to standard EDF projects, the shortened preparation and approval time, the indirect involvement of the EU in project implementation and the fact that these projects originate from EU priority concerns rather than as a response to [partner countries’] long-term objectives, all raise concerns over the likely effectiveness and sustainability of EU [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa] projects and over the ability of the EU to closely monitor their implementation’;

V.

whereas the financial flow from the Union to countries benefiting from financial instruments for development is lower than the remittances made privately by the diaspora from those same countries living in Europe;

W.

whereas despite having received billions of euros from the EDF for years and despite the Commission’s serious concerns about its financial management, the African Peace Facility was not part of the EDF evaluation; whereas the African Peace Facility has not been evaluated since 2011;

X.

whereas according to their respective evaluations and the Commission mid-term review report on the EFIs, the overall effectiveness and long-term impact of the DCI and the EDF in meeting their objectives is difficult to measure owing to serious limitations in defining adequate evaluation and monitoring systems and in assessing the role played by external factors, and to the breadth of the countries and themes concerned; whereas according to the evaluators, blending only mobilises additional resources in 50 % of cases;

Y.

whereas Parliament has been faced with very short deadlines for the scrutiny of draft implementing measures; whereas these deadlines do not take proper account of the characteristics of parliamentary activities; whereas at times this has been compounded by the fact that Parliament was sent draft implementing measures after the deadline or before recess periods, which restricted even further its ability to adequately exercise its scrutiny powers;

Z.

whereas the EU has recognised the importance of partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs) in external relations; whereas this includes involvement of CSOs in programming and implementing EFIs;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

DCI

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

EDF

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

HAI

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

—

having regard to the section of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda concerning debt and debt sustainability (1),

—

having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s reports of 22 July 2014, 2 August 2016 and 31 July 2017 on external debt sustainability and development,

—

having regard to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) principles for responsible sovereign lending and borrowing,

—

having regard to the UNCTAD Roadmap towards Sustainable Sovereign Debt Workouts (April 2015),

—

having regard to the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing,

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 68/304 of 9 September 2014, entitled ‘Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes’,

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 of 10 September 2015 on basic principles on sovereign debt restructuring processes,

—

having regard to the Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights drawn up by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2015 on financing for development (2), in particular paragraphs 10, 26, 40, 46 and 47 thereof,

—

having regard to the studies released by the ‘Global Financial Integrity’research body on the estimated scale and composition of illicit financial flows,

—

having regard to the Belgian anti-vulture funds law of 12 July 2015 (‘Moniteur belge’of 11 September 2015),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A8-0129/2018),

A.

whereas addressing the sovereign debt problems of developing countries is an important element in international cooperation and can contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in developing countries;

B.

whereas achievement of the SDGs in developing countries requires massive investment, the annual funding gap being currently estimated at around USD 2,5 trillion (3);

C.

whereas loans are a possible source of development funding; whereas loans must be responsible and predictable; whereas their cost must be fully offset by returns on investment, and debt-related risks must be carefully evaluated and measures taken to deal with them;

D.

whereas the debt crisis affecting the developing countries in the 80s and 90s and a large-scale debt relief campaign prompted the launch by the IMF and the World Bank of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), helping them to move closer to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals;

E.

whereas the HIPC and MDRI initiatives are not sufficient to put an end to the debt crisis;

F.

whereas these initiatives, accompanied by the commodity price boom, have improved the financial situation of many developing countries, while exceptionally low interest rates since the 2008 financial crisis have also contributed to debt sustainability; whereas, however, commodity prices have fallen since 2008; whereas a new debt crisis has begun in impoverished countries, with Mozambique, Chad, Congo and The Gambia unable to pay;

G.

whereas debt crises triggered by falling commodity prices and volatile capital flows represent an ongoing threat to debt sustainability, especially in developing countries; which continue to be dependent on commodity exports;

H.

whereas there has been an increase in the number of developing countries classified by the IMF and the World Bank as burdened with unsustainable debt or presenting a high or medium risk, with most of the low-income countries now belonging to one or other of these categories;

I.

whereas, according to the IMF, the median level of debt in sub-Saharan Africa rose sharply, from 34 % of GDP in 2013 to 48 % in 2017;

J.

whereas several countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia, have debt levels at or above 50 % of GDP, and whereas this constitutes a significant debt burden, when one considers the low tax base in most African countries;

K.

whereas debt service as a percentage of government spending has considerably increased since 2013, and whereas this substantially reduces opportunities for public investment;

L.

whereas the global public debt landscape has undergone profound changes in recent decades, with the emergence of private investors, together with China, which are taking centre stage;

M.

whereas the composition of developing country debt has evolved in line with the growing importance of private creditors and trading conditions and increased exposure to financial market volatility, which has an impact on the sustainability of debt; whereas, while debt denominated in the national currency effectively eliminates exchange-rate risks, such an option may prove to be unfavourable or untenable where backed by insufficient domestic capital reserves;

N.

whereas threats to debt sustainability include not only deteriorating terms of trade, natural and man-made disasters, adverse trends and volatility on international financial markets, but also irresponsible lending and borrowing, the mismanagement of public finances, the misuse of funds, and corruption; whereas more effective mobilisation of domestic resources offers strong prospects of improved debt sustainability;

O.

whereas it is necessary to help boost the capacities of tax administrations and the transfer of knowledge in partner countries;

P.

whereas, while the UNCTAD principles for responsible sovereign lending and borrowing and the G20 operational guidelines for sustainable financing are undeniably useful for the formulation of regulatory framework provisions, priority must be given to ending irresponsible practices through the introduction of transparent principles, binding and enforceable deterrents and also, where justified, penalties;

Q.

whereas national debt sustainability depends not only on debt stock but also on other factors, such as explicit and implicit financial guarantees (contingent liabilities) issued by the countries concerned; whereas public-private partnerships often entail related guarantees, possibly accompanied by significant risks of future bank bailouts;

R.

whereas debt sustainability analysis should not focus solely on economic considerations, such as the prospects for future economic growth of the debtor State and its ability to service its debts, but must take into consideration the impact of the debt burden on the country’s capacity to respect all human rights;

S.

whereas the increasing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in developing countries under the EU External Investment Plan and the G20 Compact with Africa could add to state indebtedness; whereas PPP investors are protected by bilateral investment treaties, notably their investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms, that enable investors to litigate against the host states;

T.

whereas odious debts contracted by regimes parties to facilitate corrupt practices or transactions known by creditors to be illicit are resulting in a substantial burden for the people, particularly those who are most vulnerable;

U.

whereas the transparency of loans made to the governments of developing countries is essential for ensuring accountability of lending; whereas a lack of transparency was a key factor in aiding the irresponsible loans made to Mozambique, which were arranged without serious checks on the ability of the country to repay them and subsequently hidden from the financial markets and the people of Mozambique;

V.

whereas odious debt is defined as a debt incurred by a regime to finance actions that go against the interests of the citizens of the state, of which the creditors were aware, and whereas this is as such a personal debt of the regime which incurred it from creditors who were well aware of the borrower’s intentions; whereas, however, there is a lack of consensus with regard to the concept of odious debt, owing to strong opposition on the part of certain creditors;

W.

whereas the mobilisation of domestic resources is being hampered by tax evasion and harmful tax competition and by the transfer of transnational corporate profits in particular; whereas the OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative is a welcome but insufficient response to this situation; whereas there is a need to set-up an intergovernmental body for tax cooperation under the auspices of the UN to enable developing countries to participate equally in the global reform of existing international tax rules, as called for by Parliament in its resolution of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (4);

X.

whereas illicit financial flows from developing and emerging countries, estimated at USD 1 trillion annually, are a constant drain on their resources, in particular those necessary for the pursuit of the SDGs; whereas they lead to external borrowing and undermine debt repayment capacity;

Y.

whereas the fulfilment of Agenda 2030 and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda entails considering new SDG financing options, such as the setting-up of financial transaction taxes and a foreign currency transaction tax; whereas, according to the estimations of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), a foreign currency transaction tax of 0,1 % would easily finance the SDGs in all low-income countries (LICs) and lower middle-income countries (LMICs) (5);

Z.

whereas there is a need to tackle illicit financial flows in order to eliminate them definitively by 2030, inter alia by combating tax evasion and by stepping up international cooperation through measures to facilitate the disclosure of tax data to competent authorities and tax transparency in countries both of origin and of destination;

AA.

whereas existing debt service default proceedings for countries differ fundamentally from insolvency proceedings for businesses falling within national jurisdictions, since no provision is made for impartial arbitration before a court of law; whereas short-term loans, subject to terms and conditions and disbursed in tranches, are provided by the IMF, whose mission is to ensure the stability of the international financial system; whereas the Paris Club of creditor states only makes decisions on debt relief with regard to official bilateral lending by its members; whereas the London Club of private creditors only makes decisions on commercial bank loans by its members; whereas there is no permanent forum for coordinated decision making on debt restructuring by all creditors to a country in debt distress;

AB.

whereas the IMF remains the principal forum for discussing issues relating to the restructuring of sovereign debt, with significant influence over the EU and its Member States;

AC.

whereas vulture funds targeting distressed debtors and interfering with the debt restructuring process should not receive legal or judicial support for their pernicious activities, and whereas further action must be taken in this regard;

AD.

whereas, although debt relief has provided low-income countries with new opportunities, it must be noted that it is a one-off intervention to restore debt sustainability which does not address the root causes of unsustainable debt accumulation, and whereas challenges such as corruption, weak institutions and vulnerability to external shocks must be addressed as a priority;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.