This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 61975CC0060
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 9 December 1975. # Carmine Antonio Russo v Azienda di Stato per gli interventi sul mercato agricolo (AIMA). # Reference for a preliminary ruling: Pretura di Bovino - Italy. # Case 60-75.
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 9 December 1975.
Carmine Antonio Russo v Azienda di Stato per gli interventi sul mercato agricolo (AIMA).
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Pretura di Bovino - Italy.
Case 60-75.
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 9 December 1975.
Carmine Antonio Russo v Azienda di Stato per gli interventi sul mercato agricolo (AIMA).
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Pretura di Bovino - Italy.
Case 60-75.
European Court Reports 1976 -00045
ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1975:170
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL REISCHL
DELIVERED ON 9 DECEMBER 1975 ( 1 )
Mr President,
Members of the Court,
To counteract rising prices on the domestic market the Italian Government on 24 July 1973 issued Decree-law No 427 which on 4 August 1973 became Law No 496. As a result the prices of producers, wholesalers and retailers of certain important foods, including pasta products from durum wheat, were temporarily frozen at the level at which they were on 16 July 1973 and increases were allowed only in December 1973 and September 1974. On the other hand the said Law provided that the Italian State intervention agency for agricultural products, the AIMA, could with ministerial consent intervene to control the Italian cereal market by purchases, storing and sale, the conditions for the sale on the domestic market being determined by an interministerial committee.
In application of these provisions the AIMA purchases on the world market as from September 1973 considerable quantities of durum wheat at an average price of Lit. 18500 per 50 kg. The greater part of this durum wheat was sold with the consent of the Interministerial Committee in various stages between September 1973 and April 1975 to Italian manufacturers of semolina and pasta. The prices lay between Lit. 11000, 13000 and 13600 per 50 kg, whereas the price on the Italian market at the period in question lay between Lit. 11500, 18500 or even 20000 per 50 kg.
The sales by the AIMA brought about a sudden fall in the price of the remaining stocks of durum wheat held by operators on the Italian market during the period from January 1974 to January 1975, particularly in Foggia which is the most important market centre in Italy for the durum wheat trade; this fall was so sharp that at certain times durum wheat was not even quoted.
The plaintiff in the main action, Mr Carmine Russo, a durum wheat producer in the commune of Castelluccio dei Sauri submits that he could aim at obtaining a price of only Lit. 17000 per quintal in January 1975 for 50 quintals of durum wheat, although under the system of the common organization of the market he was entitled — and what is more had the right — to expect a price of about Lit. 18500 per quintal, which the combined effect of the market and Community mechanisms would have produced, if in the meantime the AIMA had not intervened. He therefore brought an action against the AIMA before the Pretore in Bovino under Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code for compensation for the damage which he had suffered and which he assessed at Lit. 75000.
By an order dated 2 May 1975 the Pretore stayed the proceedings and referred to the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty the following questions:
|
(1) |
Does the existence of a common organization of the market in cereals allow the Member States to adopt unilateral measures which, through commercial operations in fact carried out by the intervention agency established for the implementation of Regulation No 120/67, result in an alteration of the price-formation machinery laid down in Community provisions and in a distortion of intra-Community trade? |
|
(2) |
Do the purchase of a quantity of durum wheat by an intervention agency of a Member State on the world market at a given price level and its subsequent resale within a Member State at a lower price than the purchase price and substantially lower than the intervention price, have the effect of a subsidy on the importation of the product in question (in this case durum wheat)? |
|
(3) |
If the provisions of Regulation No 120/67 of the Council and the detailed rules for their application are directly applicable within the Italian system, do they create for traders in this sector a right that there shall be no disturbance of the normal operation of the machinery provided for by the common organization of the market with regard to the formation of prices — a right which the national courts must directly protect? |
|
(4) |
If affirmative replies are given to the foregoing questions the Court is asked to rule whether the abovementioned intervention by the Member State is to be considered as an illegal action and consequently constitutes an infringement of the legal position accorded by Community sales to private traders; |
|
(5) |
If an affirmative reply is given to the foregoing question, does there exist in Community law a principle allowing private persons occupying the legal position described in the provisions of Regulation No 120/67 to be completely and in every way exempt from the harmful pecuniary consequences resulting from the unlawful action of the Member State, in particular as regards the intervention agency? |
My opinion on these questions is as follows:
|
I — |
The first two questions by the court making the reference are concerned with the compatibility with Community rules of measures of the kind adopted by the Italian Government.
|
|
II — |
The last three questions of the Pretore in Bovino are whether there is a principle of Community law according to which individuals can rely on the direct effect of Community regulations so that, of a Member State infringes these regulations, they are ‘wholly exempt’ from any adverse pecuniary consequences arising out of the conduct of the Member State which is alleged to constitute a breach of duty on the part of that State. The Court has already had occasion to make certain observations on the conclusions which the national court and the individuals concerned must draw from such a situation. The Court held (Judgment of 4 April 1968, Case 34/67, Lück v Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau [1968] ECR 251) that Community law ‘does not restrict the powers of the competent national courts to apply from among the various procedures available under national law those which are appropriate for the purpose of protecting the individual rights conferred by Community law’. For this reason whenever national law is inconsistent with Community law, the national court must refrain from applying the provisions of national law. In contentious administrative proceedings the court must not apply conflicting national law: the Italian Consiglie dello Stato confirmed this principle in its Decision of 25 September 1974 relating to the milk sector and in doing so even anticipated the Galli (judgment. But what happens when liability has been alleged — either before the ordinary courts or the administrative courts — for damage arising out of the application of these provisions which are incompatible with Community law? I believe that — as a general rule — this issue is one for the national courts which must, on the basis of the general obligations imposed upon Member States in Article 5 of the Treaty as regards their national legal order, draw the consequences flowing from their State's membership of the Community. The Court has held in many cases that individual Member States must adopt the procedural provisions which are necessary for the simultaneous and uniform application of Community law in all Member States. It decided as a preliminary issue in its judgment of 7 February 1973 (Case 39/72, Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 112) that ‘in the face of both a delay in the performance of an obligation and a definite refusal, a judgment by the Court under Articles 169 and 171 of the Treaty may be of substantive interest as establishing the basis of a responsibility that a Member State can incur as a result of its default, as regards other Member States, the Community or private parties’. The idea expressed in this judgment stems logically from the principle that Community law is supreme and directly applicable. It is true that, except in those cases where a direct application is made to the Court to give a ruling on individual rights arising under Community law, it is for the national court in accordance With his national legal system, to assist in the enforcement of those rights. If, however, it is desired to avoid the risk of unequal treatment of individual persons under the national legal system which applies to them, it is necessary to work out principles, as the Court has already done on various occasions, upon which a uniform and as effective as possible a method of enforcing individual rights under Community law can be established. Therefore I think I can state that there is a principle of Community law according to which the authorities and in particular the courts of Member States are under a duty to safeguard the interests of individuals affected by any breach of provisions of Community law, which establish individual rights, by giving these persons direct and immediate protection (cf; Judgment of 19 December 1968 in Case 13/68, S.p.A. Salgoil v Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade ([1968] ECR 453). In such circumstances, when the other prerequisites under the particular national law are present, a claim for damages may lie against the Member State which has not fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty. |
|
III — |
To sum up I therefore submit that the questions referred by the Pretore in Bovino be answered as follows:
|
( 1 ) Translated from the German.