—

having regard to its resolutions of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (1), and of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘A new EU Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development’ (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the situation in Chad (3),

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having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2021 on the human rights violations by private military and security companies, particularly the Wagner Group (4),

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having regard to its resolutions of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021’ (5) and ‘Implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021’ (6),

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having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (7),

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having regard to the 41st Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) between the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the EU held in Strasbourg, France, from 1 to 3 April 2022,

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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

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having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

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having regard to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on democracy and good governance,

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having regard to the Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU),

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having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

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having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

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having regard to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force on 14 December 2005,

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having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (8) (the Cotonou Agreement), as amended in 2005 and 2010 (9),

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having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16 on the promotion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) — Global Europe (10),

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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004),

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having regard to the Strategy for Security and Development of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) countries of September 2016, the Integrated Priority Actions Framework of February 2020, the Sahel Alliance and the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel,

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having regard to the joint declaration of the members of the European Council with the member states of the G5 Sahel of 28 April 2020,

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having regard to the joint communiqué of the second African Union (AU)-EU Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting of 25 to 26 October 2021,

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having regard to the Sahel Conference held in Paris on 17 February 2022,

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having regard to the joint declaration of the Sixth AU-EU Summit of 17-18 February 2022,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea,

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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/253 of 25 February 2020, amending decision (CFSP) 2018/906 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel (11),

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having regard to UN Security Council resolution 2590 (2021) of 30 August 2021 on the renewal of sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) and the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts concerning Mali until 30 September 2022,

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having regard to the UN Security Council report of the Secretary-General of 11 November 2021 on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel,

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having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution A/ES-11/1 of 1 March 2022 on the aggression against Ukraine,

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having regard to the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda,

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having regard to the communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council held on 31 January 2022 on the situation in Burkina Faso,

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having regard to the communication of the chairperson of the AU Commission of 6 August 2021 in the wake of the terrorist attacks against Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Chad,

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having regard to the communication of the chairperson of the AU Commission of 24 January 2022 on the situation in Burkina Faso,

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having regard to the Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government of 3 February 2022 on the political situation in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali,

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having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell of 26 January 2022 on Burkina Faso,

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having regard to the ACP-EU JPA resolution adopted on 21 June 2017 on the security situation in the Sahelo-Saharan region,

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having regard to the ACP-EU JPA resolutions of 11 March 2021 on democracy and the respect for constitutions in EU and ACP countries, of 28 September 2021 on the role parliaments can play in strengthening international security, and of 21 November 2019 on the impact of social media on governance, development, democracy and stability,

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas in the regions concerned, the compounding threats of poverty, lack of access to basic social services, climate change, terrorist armed groups, rising inter-community violence over land and resources, food insecurity, displacement of people, and gender-based violence have resulted in a complex context of instability and insecurity;

B.

whereas the Sahel and West Africa play a crucial role for the security and stability of the entire African continent; whereas the security situation in those regions has deteriorated sharply in recent years, presenting a threat to regional and international stability; whereas violence in the Sahel has been increasing ever since the downfall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, and as a result, is one of the regions most affected by the proliferation of illicit small arms; whereas the Sahel is one of the poorest regions in the world;

C.

whereas in 2013, after a request by the Malian Government, the French army launched Operation Serval to oust jihadist and other military rebel groups from the north of Mali, who had begun a push into the centre of Mali; whereas the French army successfully fulfilled the objective of this mission;

D.

whereas numerous international missions and initiatives have been launched over the past years, including the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013, the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger in 2012, the European Union Training Mission in Mali in 2013, the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali in 2014, Operation Barkhane in 2014, the G5 Sahel in 2014, the G5 Sahel Joint Force in 2017, the Sahel Alliance in 2017, the Coalition for the Sahel in 2020 and the Takuba Task Force in 2020; whereas over the past decade, African security institutions have deployed thousands of personnel in peace operations on the continent; whereas these interventions have still lacked the capacity to solve the security challenges in the region;

E.

whereas more than 200 members of UN peacekeeping forces and more than 50 French soldiers of the Serval and Barkhane missions, as well as numerous African soldiers, have been killed while fighting for the security of the Sahel region; whereas numerous European and UN soldiers have been wounded during their deployment to the region;

F.

whereas despite the numerous peacekeeping efforts by the Sahel countries and the international community, the situation in the region remains very volatile; whereas terrorist groups, including Islamist terrorists affiliated with ISIS such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have increased their presence in the Sahel and West Africa region and are responsible for mass killings, torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, looting and forced displacement; whereas the year 2020 saw a sharp increase in killings attributed to, among others, Islamist violence, with a total number of 4 250 deaths being reported according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies; whereas more than 7,7 million people have been forcibly displaced across seven countries in the Sahel; whereas there are currently around 3 million internally displaced people in the region;

G.

whereas humanitarian needs have increased as a result of the various intertwined crises; whereas 20 million people are currently in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in the central Sahel; whereas women and children are particularly vulnerable to and affected by the crisis;

H.

whereas security, development and the protection of fundamental human rights are mutually reinforcing, and necessary for the creation of lasting peace; whereas such sustainable peace will only be achieved by addressing the root causes of insecurity, including poverty, corruption, hunger and scarcity of resources;

I.

whereas the security challenges across West Africa and the Sahel differ in nature between countries; whereas these challenges include the activities of terrorist organisations with links to international jihadist networks, ethnic and tribal conflicts, clashes over access to natural resources, extrajudicial activities of militias and security services, armed rebellions, separatist conflicts, and political and electoral violence;

J.

whereas the security of Europe and Africa are closely interlinked; whereas terrorists, armed groups, militias and traffickers are exploiting a series of complex overlapping challenges in the region, including poverty, lack of access to basic social services, food insecurity, deforestation, environmental degradation, weak institutions, corruption and a lack of confidence in the state;

K.

whereas climate change is having a severe impact in the region; whereas this can lead to further destabilisation; whereas there is a grave risk of radicalisation due to economic, social and environmental marginalisation in West Africa and the Sahel;

L.

whereas the burden of debt contributes to the threat to the overall stability of countries in the Sahel and West African regions;

M.

whereas the capacity to address these security challenges has been further weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic;

N.

whereas the democratic consolidation in West and Sahelian Africa is being further undermined by military coups, undemocratic constitutional changes, crackdowns on popular protests, restrictions in relation to the freedom of assembly, expression and the press and restrictions placed on opposition parties and politicians;

O.

whereas, in addition to security threats, democratic consolidation in West and Sahelian Africa is being further undermined by corruption, crackdowns on popular protest and assembly, restrictions on freedom of expression and of the press, restrictions placed on opposition parties and politicians, a lack of respect for presidential term limits and other constitutional provisions, and capacity challenges in providing inclusive and transparent elections for displaced populations;

P.

whereas the EU, the AU, ECOWAS and other international organisations have deployed election observation missions across West African and Sahelian countries over the past 20 years; whereas comprehensive reports have been published which include substantial recommendations for reform, only some of which have been taken forward;

Q.

whereas according to the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, levels of corruption are uneven across West Africa, with Cabo Verde and Senegal among the best performers in anti-corruption reforms, and Liberia, Mali and Nigeria among the worst;

R.

whereas increased security challenges and public discontent with governments and the international community has led to a number of public demonstrations calling for further government reforms and improvements to the security situation; whereas accusations of corruption and nepotism against regional government authorities have persisted for a considerable time and have led to a steady decline in trust and satisfaction with governments and their institutions;

S.

whereas the overall state of democracy and security cooperation in the Sahel suffered enormous setbacks when the militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso toppled their governments, namely in Mali in August 2020, and again in May 2021 when the military toppled the very same government that they had previously installed, and then in January 2022 when a coup d’état took place in Burkina Faso; whereas this reflects a deep-rooted crisis in the region;

T.

whereas ECOWAS and the AU on numerous occasions organised exchanges and visits to Mali and Burkina Faso in order to mediate and reach compromises between the various actors; whereas on numerous occasions, ECOWAS has underlined the importance of setting a clear timetable for a return to democratic processes, including an imminent date for democratic elections;

U.

whereas after the coup d’état in Guinea in September 2021 and the arrest of President Alpha Condé, who was recently released, the country will remain excluded from ECOWAS until constitutional order is restored; whereas the military authorities were given a deadline of 25 April 2022 to provide details on their transition plan; whereas on that date, they requested a new deadline for the presentation of a timetable for the transition;

V.

whereas respect for the national constitutional order and rule of law is as vital for ensuring peace and stability as it is for combating terrorism and ensuring military security; whereas upholding democratic principles, including the organisation of transparent and inclusive elections, is of fundamental importance in order to ensure governments have broad public mandates; whereas citizens are supportive of genuine democratic processes and seek fair participation therein;

W.

whereas the involvement of national parliaments in decision-making on security issues is essential for developing long-lasting security and societal stability;

X.

whereas security, development and the protection of fundamental human rights are mutually reinforcing and necessary for the creation of lasting peace;

Y.

whereas the shrinking space for civil society organisations and press freedom in some countries of West and Sahelian Africa poses serious challenges to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights;

Z.

whereas the European Union is committed to supporting the security and development of West Africa and the Sahel region through political, diplomatic and humanitarian partnerships, including, inter alia, technical support for security sector reform, military and police training, electoral processes and accountability, and the strengthening of civil society;

AA.

whereas the AU is a close partner of the EU in peace and stability efforts; whereas the aims of regional security actors, including ECOWAS and the AU’s African Standby Force, overlap with the EU’s interest in assisting struggling countries to ensure peace and prosperity; whereas EU and AU leaders have agreed to boost peace and security cooperation on the African continent; whereas the AU-EU memorandum of understanding on peace, security and governance and the European Peace Facility are designed to fight instability, radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism, and to address the entire conflict cycle through an integrated approach;

AB.

whereas the G5 Sahel, which is supported by the EU and the AU, provides security and regional development in an effort to combat terrorism and bring stability to the Sahel region; whereas the G5 Sahel is facing challenges in demonstrating progress and maintaining public support; whereas EU-financed activities for conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation are still limited;

AC.

whereas all efforts by the international community have contained very strong components of democratic and security sector reforms; whereas most countries in the region suffer from a lack of state capacity to effectively implement much-needed reforms;

AD.

whereas the presence of foreign private military and security companies in West Africa continues to destabilise the security and political environment of the region; whereas the so-called Wagner Group, a proxy group of mercenaries for the Russian Government, has been present in Mali since it was invited by the military junta in late 2021; whereas the Wagner Group allegedly relies on Russian military infrastructure, and the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in the funding, recruitment, training and protection of Wagner operatives; whereas the Wagner Group stands accused of committing grave violations of human rights;

AE.

whereas UN experts have jointly concluded that the Wagner Group has conducted gross and systematic human rights violations in the Central African Republic, including mass summary executions, arbitrary detentions, sexual violence, looting, enforced disappearances and torture during interrogations;

AF.

whereas Russia has been spreading and continues to actively spread disinformation throughout the Sahel in order to delegitimise European initiatives aimed at bringing stability and security to help the region;

AG.

whereas the EU and its common security and defence policy missions have been subject to disinformation campaigns and urgently need to be given the means for effective strategic communication; whereas disinformation has gone as far as falsely accusing the French military of mass murder in the Gossi area of Mali, although evidence shows that Malians and foreigners suspected of belonging to the Wagner Group are responsible for a gruesomely concocted and misleading fabrication;

AH.

whereas as a result of the multiple obstructions by the Malian transitional authorities, international actors have concluded that the conditions to continue their military engagement in Mali are no longer met;

AI.

whereas at the request of their African partners, European and international actors have agreed to continue their joint action against terrorism in the Sahel region, including in Niger and in the Gulf of Guinea, and have begun political and military consultations with them with the aim of setting out the terms for this shared action by June 2022;

AJ.

whereas the situation in the Sahel is closely interlinked with the situation in the Gulf of Guinea; whereas piracy remains a security threat in the Gulf of Guinea; whereas the Council has extended the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf of Guinea by two years;

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