19.2.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 47/1

1.1.

The ECB has previously stated that the concept of leverage, as referred to in Directive 2011/61/EU (1), is fundamental to the business model implemented by many alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) (2). In general, the ECB agrees with the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) that information on the level of leverage calculated on the basis of gross exposure is key for the monitoring of systemic risk and that this information should also be provided to investors. While excessive leverage can create significant risks for financial stability, leverage risk is not the only risk for alternative investment funds (AIFs). Therefore, any information about leverage should be supplemented by relevant information about other risk sources. In this context, it is important that requirements aimed at addressing the various sources of risk are kept separate. Such sources of risk include the position risk, i.e. the market and credit risk relating to particular investments, and the leverage of AIFs.

1.2.

In order to be consistent and to prevent any regulatory arbitrage, the ECB finds it appropriate that the methods for calculation of leverage to be adopted should, to the extent possible, be consistent with the Basel III framework (3) and the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (4) and the proposed regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (5) (hereinafter together the ‘proposed CRD IV’) (6). For example, this consistency should be ensured by reference to the recognition of hedging transactions and the treatment of cash borrowings. Moreover, cross-reference to the concepts laid down in the proposed CRD IV could also be considered (7).

1.3.

As stated in paragraph 1.1 above, the ECB is of the view that, when calculating exposures, one should distinguish between: (a) the inherent risks of the assets (portfolios) being purchased by AIFs, i.e. ‘position risk’; and (b) the actual leverage involved. Hence the two risk sources should be kept separate when determining the leverage of AIFs. For example, while cash borrowings from external sources that are not invested are indeed neither exposed to market risk nor credit risk, they increase the actual leverage of the AIF. By contrast, the proposed CRD IV does not seem to differentiate between different types of cash borrowings (8).

1.4.

The draft delegated regulation refers to the application of the gross method and the commitment method (9). It does not include the advanced method (10) as this method would not ensure comparability of results. The ECB understands that the advanced method, which relaxes the rules of the commitment method, was designed for AIFMs managing AIFs, for which the commitment method may not be appropriate or may not provide meaningful results. The ECB supports the Commission’s Decision not to include the advanced method since the application of the gross method and of the commitment method are sufficient and will provide useful information to both investors and competent supervisory authorities about the leverage of AIFs.

3.1.

The draft delegated regulation (13) provides that AIFMs may invest in securitisation positions provided that they conduct a thorough due diligence of the sponsor and originator. More specifically, the draft delegated regulation provides that, before investing in securitised instruments, the AIFM should: (a) satisfy certain qualitative requirements, e.g. a comprehensive understanding of the risk profile of the investments and appropriate formal policies and procedures (14); and (b) ensure that sponsors, as well as originators, satisfy a number of qualitative requirements including effective risk management requirements, adequate diversification strategies, etc. (15).

3.2.

The ECB supports the qualitative criteria that foster the AIFMs’ awareness of the risks taken prior to investing in securitised products. As regards the provisions under 3.1(b) above, the obligations on AIFMs to ensure that originators and sponsors have proper risk management procedures may be difficult to apply as AIFMs may not be able to directly check criteria pertaining to the internal procedures of the sponsor or originator.

3.3.

In order to ensure that such requirements do not restrict AIFMs from investing in securitised products, thereby hindering the broader goal of reviving the securitisation market, the draft delegated regulation may provide that ESMA shall give general guidance on the precise documentation to be provided by sponsors or originators to AIFMs regarding the above qualitative requirements.

4.1.

The ECB welcomes the comprehensive duties that depositaries will fulfil (16) pursuant to the draft delegated regulation. In particular, the ECB believes that the detailed requirements (17) will, to a large extent, limit the custody risk for investors in AIFs.

4.2.

The ECB supports the stringent liability regime introduced by Directive 2011/61/EU and further specified in the draft delegated regulation (18). It notes, however, that this liability regime, together with future amendments (UCITS V) (19) to Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (20), could subject depositaries to very substantial liability claims. In the case of some depositaries, such claims could amount to losses sometimes in excess of multiples of their entire capital. The ECB therefore considers it imperative that depositaries manage these risks appropriately, whether they are credit institutions or investment firms or other supervised institutions (21), and that the risks are accounted for under the respective capital requirements rules. The forthcoming UCITS V regulatory process provides a good opportunity to address this subject with respect to UCITS as well as to AIF depositaries.

5.1.

The ECB welcomes the reporting requirements set out in Article 112 of the draft delegated regulation. Under Article 112(7), AIFMs must provide the information in accordance with a pro-forma reporting template set out in the Annex to the draft delegated regulation. In this respect, the ECB supports the data reporting requirements suggested by ESMA in its advice (22), which provides that some information is collected on a monthly basis and suggests the provision of additional information about the historical risk profiles of AIFs. This more granular information is important for the establishment of a comprehensive systemic risk monitoring framework.

5.2.

Notwithstanding the above, these reporting requirements to competent authorities, in particular those set out in paragraph 1 of Article 112 of the draft delegated regulation, overlap to a large extent with the statistical reporting requirements set out in Regulation ECB/2007/8 of 27 July 2007 concerning statistics on the assets and liabilities of investment funds (23). Therefore, the ECB considers that there is potential to limit the reporting burden of AIFMs by aligning certain reporting obligations of competent authorities with the ECB’s statistical requirements (24). In this respect, the ECB is ready and willing to discuss with the Commission and ESMA how the reporting requirements shall best be aligned.

5.3.

Lastly, as regard the exchange of information, the draft delegated regulation (25) leaves national authorities with significant discretion regarding the conditions under which information relevant for the monitoring of systemic risk (26) should be shared with ESMA and the ESRB. The ECB suggests that the above provisions should be clarified in order to avoid uncertainties.