This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 61999CJ0280
Summary of the Judgment
Summary of the Judgment
1. ECSC - Steel aid - Prohibition - Conditions - Interference with the conditions of competition - Excluded
(ECSC Treaty, Art. 4(c))
2. ECSC - Steel aid - Authorisation by the Commission - Closure aid - Conditions for granting - Strict interpretation - Regular production
(ECSC Treaty, Art. 4; General Decision No 3855/91, second indent of Art. 4(2))
3. Appeals - Pleas in law - Mistaken assessment of the facts - Inadmissibility - Whether the Court of Justice may review the appraisal of the evidence - Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted
(Art. 225 EC; EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51)
4. ECSC - Steel aid - Prohibition - Derogations - Approval by the Commission of proposed aid in the light of conditions laid down by the scheme
(ECSC Treaty, Art. 4(c); General Decision No 3855/91)
1. Unlike in the case of Article 92(1) of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 87(1) EC), for aid to be deemed incompatible with the common market under Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty, there is no requirement that it distorts or threatens to distort competition. Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty unrestrictedly prohibits all aid in order to ensure the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal competitive conditions, with the result that aid is deemed incompatible with the common market without the need to establish or even to consider whether, in actual fact, there is, or is likely to be, any interference with competitive conditions.
( see paras 32-33 )
2. Since the Fifth Steel Aids Code constitutes a derogation from Article 4 of the ECSC Treaty, it must be strictly interpreted. That need for a strict interpretation stems from the actual wording of the reasoning of the Fifth Code in which the Commission clearly manifested its intention that the Code should be interpreted strictly and solely by reference to its express wording. Thus, the Court of First Instance directed itself correctly in law when it formed the view that the objective pursued by the Fifth Code is to authorise the grant of aid only for undertakings with a significant market presence and whose closure will bring about a commensurate decrease in steel production. The assessment of the Court of First Instance, according to which the requirement of regular production laid down in the second indent of Article 4(2) of the Fifth Code was adopted in order to increase the effectiveness of closure aid by ensuring that it has sufficiently significant effects, not only in terms of the dismantling of plant and equipment but also in terms of a reduction in current production levels, must therefore be upheld.
( see paras 40-41, 45 )
3. Under Article 225 EC and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the facts, except in a case where the factual inaccuracy of its findings arises from evidence adduced before it. The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice.
( see para. 78 )
4. In the context of a scheme, such as the Fifth Steel Aids Code, which derogates from the strict prohibition of aid laid down in Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty, proposed aid can be approved only if it observes each of the conditions laid down in that scheme. During the course of the procedure for examination of the proposed aid, it is therefore for the Commission to investigate whether the grant of aid will comply with those conditions. Consequently, there is no need for a statement of reasons other than the Commission's finding that certain criteria applied under that scheme are not satisfied in the instant case.
( see para. 90 )