This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52013SC0132
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment - Part 1 Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment - Part 1 Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment - Part 1 Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
/* SWD/2013/0132 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment - Part 1 Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change /* SWD/2013/0132 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment - Part 1 Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
An EU Strategy on adaptation to
climate change This report commits only the Commission's
services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of
any decision to be taken by the Commission. 1........... Procedural issues and results from
consultation of interested parties. 4 1.1........ Organisation and timing. 4 1.2........ Consultation and expertise. 4 1.3........ Addressing the Impact
Assessment Board's comments. 5 2........... Problem definition,
policy context, and subsidiarity. 5 2.1........ Climate change and the
need for adaptation. 5 2.2........ Who is affected, in what
ways, and to what extent?. 7 2.2.1..... Environmental challenges. 7 2.2.2..... Sectoral challenges. 7 2.2.3..... Social challenges. 8 2.2.4..... Territorial challenges. 9 2.2.5..... Potential vulnerability to
climate change in Europe. 10 2.3........ Policy context 11 2.3.1..... EU initiatives. 11 2.3.2..... Adaptation policies at
Member State level 11 2.3.3..... Transnational, regional and
local adaptation efforts. 12 2.4........ What are the specific
problems that require additional action?. 13 2.4.1..... Knowledge and access to
information gaps. 13 2.4.2..... Gaps in adaptation action at
sub-EU level 15 2.4.3..... Gaps in adaptation uptake in
key sectors. 16 2.5........ How would the problems
evolve by 2020 without further EU action?. 19 2.5.1..... Knowledge and access to
information gaps. 19 2.5.2..... Gaps in adaptation action at
sub-EU level 20 2.5.3..... Gaps in adaptation uptake in
key sectors. 22 2.6........ Does the EU have the
right to act and is EU added-value evident for enhancing climate resilience? 23 3........... Objectives. 24 3.1........ What are the general and
more specific/operational objectives?. 24 3.1.1..... General objective. 24 3.1.2..... Specific and operational
objectives. 24 3.2........ Consistency with EU
policies and horizontal objectives of the European Union. 25 4........... Policy options. 25 4.1........ What are the policy
options?. 25 4.2........ Description of each
option. 26 4.2.1..... Options aiming at better
informed decision making. 26 4.2.2..... Options aiming at increasing
the resilience of the EU territory. 27 4.2.3..... Options aiming at increasing
the resilience of most vulnerable sectors. 27 4.3........ Which options have been
discarded at an early stage and why?. 28 5........... Analysis of impacts. 28 5.1........ Expected impacts of
options aiming at better informed decision making. 29 5.1.1..... No policy change. 29 5.1.2..... Options aiming at increasing
knowledge generation. 30 5.1.3..... Options aiming at better
knowledge dissemination. 31 5.2........ Expected impacts of
options aiming at increasing the resilience of the EU territory. 32 5.2.1..... No policy change. 32 5.2.2..... Options aiming at promoting
and facilitating adaptation policies at Member State and regional level 33 5.2.3..... Options aiming at promoting
and facilitating adaptation action for cities. 35 5.3........ Expected impacts of
options aiming at increasing resilience in key sectors. 37 5.3.1..... No policy change. 37 5.3.2..... Options aiming at a more
consistent and comprehensive mainstreaming of adaptation. 38 5.3.3..... Options aiming at increasing
the resilience of major infrastructure investments. 41 6........... Comparing the policy
options. 44 6.1........ Comparing options on
promoting better-informed decision making. 44 6.1.1..... Effectiveness, efficiency
and coherence. 44 6.1.2..... Summary table. 44 6.2........ Comparing options on
promoting adaptation at sub-EU level 45 6.2.1..... Effectiveness, efficiency
and coherence. 45 6.2.2..... Summary table. 47 6.3........ Comparing options on
promoting adaptation in key sectors. 48 6.3.1..... Effectiveness, efficiency
and coherence. 48 6.3.2..... Summary table. 49 7........... Identification of the
preferred policy package. 50 8........... Monitoring and
evaluation. 52 1. Procedural
issues and results from consultation of interested parties This Impact Assessment (IA) report forms
part of the Commission's proposal for an EU Strategy on Adaptation to climate
change[1]. This initiative builds upon the White Paper "Adapting to
climate change: Towards a European framework for action"[2]. 1.1. Organisation and timing An Impact Assessment steering group (IASG)
met 3 times between May 2012 and October 2012. This group was chaired by DG
CLIMA and the following services participated: AGRI, BUDG, ECFIN, ECHO, EEA,
EMPL, ENTR, ENV, JRC, MARE, MARKT, MOVE, REGIO, R&I, SANCO and SG. 1.2. Consultation and expertise This
IA report has been preceded by wide-ranging consultation and benefits from a
broad spectrum of scientific and policy expertise. Both inputs from stakeholder
and research results are included in this report.[3] Its
preparation included the following steps: Consultation with the Adaptation
Steering Group: This group was created in September 2010 to support the
Commission in developing its approach to adaptation. The ASG consists of
representatives from EU Member States and a wide range of stakeholders,
including business organisations and NGOs. The Group met 7 times between
September 2010 and January 2013. Ad hoc online public
consultation: It was launched on 21 May 2012[4] and ran
for 13 weeks until 20 August 2012. The Commission received a total of 175
replies from a broad range of stakeholders, including Member States, business organisations, environmental NGOs and citizens. Thematic seminars: Various events to consult Member States and key stakeholder groups
on specific dimensions of the Adaptation Strategy (e.g. standards, forestry)
were held in 2012. Overall, stakeholders were supportive of additional EU-promoted
action on adaptation, while acknowledging that many of the climate change impacts
are to be addressed at local level. They highlighted that the Strategy will be
especially useful for actors that are less advanced on the issue of climate
change adaptation. Mainstreaming adaptation into key EU initiatives is seen by
all as a priority, as well as providing the right framework, information tools,
and EU funds that allow for the effective integration of adaptation issues at
all levels of government. Some Member States would oppose an EU legislative
instrument for promoting the adoption of national adaptation strategies.
Environmental NGOs put a stronger emphasis on environmental issues than
government and private organisations. Respondents to the public consultation
also felt that the EU should be more involved in funding adaptation projects.
Furthermore, stakeholders at all meetings raised the issue of uncertainty and
reported that the lack of dedicated research hinders the adaptation process. In
addition, communicating relevant information to decision makers was named as a
challenging task. The preparation of this IA report was accompanied by a pool of
external experts[5] and additionally used scientific/research results from the EU´s
Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7). 1.3. Addressing
the Impact Assessment Board's comments The IA was
discussed at a meeting of the IA Board (IAB) on the 7th of November 2012. The
IAB in its first opinion, asked for a revision of the document. Based on this,
the report was modified as follows: i/ the intervention logic was
clarified, by better linking the identified problems to newly-defined policy
objectives. In addition, the policy options were amended so as to focus on
problems that need to be addressed in priority at EU level. The specific and
operational objectives were also linked to progress indicators, so as to
provide a sound base for future assessments of the policy achievements; ii/ the
baseline scenario was reinforced, so as to provide as much quantitative
evidence as possible on the expected consequences of no additional EU action;
iii/ the policy options have been more clearly defined, providing
additional detail on the necessary implementation stages. The discussion around
the need for a legislative proposal, its potential content and nature has also
been reinforced so as to facilitate decision-making; v/ the analysis of the
social, environmental and economic impacts is more transparent, clearly
presenting the available evidence as well as the areas still subject to
uncertainty. In terms of procedure and presentation, additional efforts
have been put to clarify the achievements of the 2009 White Paper on adaptation
as well as the remaining gaps. The results of the stakeholders' dialogue are
now better scattered across the report, which facilitates the understanding of
stakeholders' opinion on the identified problems and on the assessed options. In its second opinion, issued on
December 20, the IAB asked first for further strengthening the case for EU
action concerning adaptation at sub-EU level and by the private sector. This
comment has been addressed by reinforcing the positive impacts to be expected
by EU-promoted action in most vulnerable sectors and regions. Second, the IAB
asked for further clarifications regarding operational objectives and progress
indicators, which have been modified so as to facilitate the assessment of the
actions foreseen in the EU Adaptation Strategy during the reviewing phase.
Thirdly, as requested by the IAB, the description of options has been separated
from its assessment, via the use of a dedicated section. Finally, in line with
the IAB's comments, in view of the evidence provided, the revised IA report is
more balanced regarding the conclusions on the respective impacts of a
legislative proposal requiring adaptation strategies now versus later. 2. Problem
definition, policy context, and subsidiarity 2.1. Climate change and the need for adaptation The increase in global
surface temperature is the most obvious aspect of anthropogenic climate change.
The average temperature for the European land area for the last decade
(2002-2011) is 1.3°C above the preindustrial average, which makes the
increase over Europe faster than the global average. Moreover, significant
economic losses[6] and human fatalities associated with extreme weather events, such
as heat waves, droughts and heavy precipitation, have been registered. Climate change will continue
for decades to come because of the delayed effect of past emissions. Even if
all greenhouse-gas emissions were to stop today, we would still see major
changes in the climate. Achieving the EU goal of limiting the rise of global
mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, which was agreed by
Parties to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2010
as part of the Cancun Agreements, would reduce the most serious risks of
climate change. Yet, although international pledges help in reducing emissions
to below a business-as-usual level in 2020, they are insufficient to ensure a
“likely” chance of limiting global warming to 2°C[7]. Global
mean temperature increases may therefore go beyond 2°C by the end of this
century. We therefore have no choice but to deal with the unavoidable
climate impacts and their economic, environmental and social costs. Figure 1:
Likely (>66%) temperature increase (T) during 21st century associated with
emission pathways. Source (UNEP, 2011) Managing the risks of climate change implies coupling mitigation efforts with
adaptation to climate change, since the success of each is linked to the
other. The results of today's mitigation efforts will determine the degree of
adaptation required in the future. At the same time, reaching levels of adverse
impacts that will be impossible to address through adaptation must be prevented
through mitigation. Early action will save on damage costs later. Examples of
actions include using scarce water and energy more efficiently, adapting
existing building codes to stand future climate conditions and extreme weather
events[8] or promoting green infrastructure, for instance in cities. The recent EEA report on climate change
impacts and vulnerability in Europe notably highlights that some studies
estimate large economic costs for Europe. The minimum cost of not adapting to
climate change is estimated to range from € 100 billion a year in 2020 to
€ 250 billion in 2050 for the EU as a whole[9]. Moreover,
the PAGE09 Integrated Assessment Model[10]
reports total damage costs equivalent to almost 4 % of GDP for Europe by 2100
under a 3 to 4°C scenario, with a risk of extremely large costs at the tails of
the distribution (in excess of 10 % of GDP equivalent). Under a scenario equivalent
to the 2°C target, these fall to under 1 % of GDP equivalent and, more
importantly, remove the tail of extreme values. Some other modelling approaches
report lower values.[11] A recent study estimated the annual cost of
adapting to global warming of modest level (+2°C compared to pre-industrial
times) to between $70 and 100 billion (approximately €55-75 billion) worldwide
between 2010 and 2050[12]. 2.2. Who
is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? The need for climate change adaptation is a
horizontal issue, affecting all economic sectors, environmental systems and
citizens, to varying degrees[13]. 2.2.1. Environmental challenges Adaptation is particularly required to
address climate impacts on water, soil, biodiversity and ecosystems. Challenges
refer both to physical climate impacts and mutual dependencies across
environmental systems, and to policy failures and knowledge gaps. On soil,
climate change may aggravate erosion, decline in organic matter, salinization,
soil biodiversity loss, landslides, and flooding. There is clear evidence to
show that biodiversity is already responding to climate change and will
continue to do so, though it it is unclear how and whether biological systems
will be able to adapt to an unprecedented combination of fast climate change,
its associated disturbances and other human-induced negative drivers.
Assessments show vulnerability primarily arises where species are constrained
in colonising new areas with suitable climate. In the future, climate change is
likely to affect water availability and quality and global warming will
probably increase both the number and magnitude of hydrological extremes. In
river basins under severe water stress, there will be strong competition for
scarce water resources between households, industry, agriculture, and nature. 2.2.2. Sectoral
challenges Investments in infrastructure
or buildings are increasingly put at risk by changing climatic conditions
and extreme weather events. Buildings and infrastructure can be vulnerable to
climate change because of their design (low resistance to storms) or location
(e.g. in flood-prone areas, landslides, avalanches). Flooding is one of the
most costly kinds of disasters and this is mainly due to floods in built-up
areas. There is also a growing problem with overheating of the built
environment being exposed to rising temperatures and extreme heat, which is not
only an issue for the construction material but also affects the occupant's
comfort and health. Experiences of past catastrophes and
research results show clearly that extreme weather events today are not
sufficiently addressed by transport systems and in particular by risk or
emergency management procedures within the transport sector[14]. More intense and frequent heat waves will shift energy
supply and demand patterns, often in opposite direction. For instance, in the
cas of heat waves, supply will be lower due to decreased efficiency (for
thermal plants), and decreased cooling water supply, while demand for air
conditioning will increase. Higher magnitude and frequency of extreme weather
events will cause threats for physical energy infrastructure (explicitly
overhead transmission/distribution, but also other infrastructure – e.g.
substations, transformers or fragile supply infrastructure). Climatic conditions affect agriculture
and the water resources needed to maintain stable production levels in many
areas of Europe and food security. Impacts of climate change and variability
largely depend on farm characteristics (e.g. intensity, size, land use), as
they influence management types and adaptation. Effects of climate change
include increased risk of biotic (pests and diseases) and abiotic (droughts,
storms and fires) disturbances to forest health. However, the exact
effects of climate change on forests are complex and not yet well understood. The
frequencey and intensity of most types of extreme event is expected to
change significantly as a result of climate change (IPCC, 2012). In the short term, as long as due allowance is
made for the underlying trend, premiums would rise gradually and the insurance
market would absorb such changes without disruption. However, risk knowledge
often advances in ‘steps’, which can lead to jumps in the price over a short
period. In the longer term, particularly in sectors or areas where insurance
has not been customary, climate change could create or exacerbate issues with
correct pricing and availability. 2.2.3. Social challenges Climate change is a significant threat to health.
While the short- to medium-term impacts of climate change on health are mainly
exacerbations of existing effects, projections for future impacts include an
increase of heat-related mortality and illness as well as a higher burden from
vector-, water- or food-borne diseases. Changes in weather/precipitation
pattern and increases in extreme events are projected; therefore, more intense
and frequent events are expected. Already in the past 20 years, 953 disasters
killed nearly 88,671 people in Europe, affected more than 29 million others and
caused approximately 250 billion Euros in economic losses[15]. Floods alone resulted in more than 2500 fatalities and affected
more than 5.5. million people. Europe's ageing
population, disproportionately affected by reduced mobility or health
impediments, will result in a higher share of the population being vulnerable
to climate change impacts. Displacement of people due to climate change
impacts presents a set of challenges including avoiding trapped populations,
urbanisation, and managing free movement. Generally
speaking, population groups with lower incomes and assets are more exposed to climate impacts but have less capacity
to face them. For instance, women may be placed in a disadvantaged position
when expensive adaptation measures are required. Climate change will affect labour
markets through the increase in adverse natural phenomena such as floods,
heat waves, and variations in precipitation levels. On the labour market supply
side, climate change may affect workforce availability due to a decrease in the
health conditions of the population and additional occupational health
constraints (higher temperature at work, more frequent and intense natural
hazards keeping people from reaching their work place). On the demand side,
several economic sectors are highly vulnerable because of their dependence on
regular climate conditions. Sectoral production shifts – in agriculture and
tourism for instance – are expected as a consequence of climate change[16]. Major investments in adaptation could offer employment and income
opportunities in activities such as reinforcing coastal defences, buildings and
(green) infrastructure, water management and relocation of exposed settlements[17]. Yet, great uncertainty remains regarding the possible net job
creation effects of such investments. Skills upgrading will be necessary to
grasp these opportunities. 2.2.4. Territorial challenges Because of Europe's territorial diversity, climate
impacts vary from region to region and are also very specific to the local
situations. Some changes could provide time- and territorial-specific benefits
(through better crop yields or increased tourism) while others will be
detrimental to economic activities and the social fabric. This imbalance also
holds on a broader level (see Figure 2). Moreover, continuous changes in climatic
conditions lead to widespread climate impacts, e.g. changes in species
composition, damage to ecosystems and their services as well as to
infrastructure associated with socio-economic consequences for European society
and an increased need for disaster operations in many parts of Europe. Figure
2: Impacts of climate change across Europe. Source: EEA 2012 Home to more than 70% of our population, cities[18] play a crucial role for Europe's economy. Cities are exposed to a
range of social and economic pressures which have the potential to worsen the
impacts of climate change and increase the vulnerability of particular groups.
For instance, soil sealing affects the vulnerability and resilience of cities and
areas to climate change, as it is an important factor in the urban heat island
effect. Similarly, climate change can magnify the pre-existing socio-economic
challenges that cities face such as social exclusion or demographic change[19]. Climate risks in coastal zones
include sea-level rise, changes in sea surface temperature leading to adverse
weather anomalies, increased erosion or ocean acidification. In drier areas,
drought and desertification are expected to increase. In the mountainous
regions, temperatures are increasing at a faster rate than in other
bio-geographical regions. Additionally, threats to local communities are
expected to increase when avalanches, flash floods, landslides and rock falls
become more common. Climatic risks are also likely to exacerbate the
socio-economic challenges that rural areas face. Rural areas – which
still make most of the EU's land area and represent an important share of
employment – are exposed to a wide range of impacts such as those affecting
agriculture, forestry, tourism, and infrastructure. The EU's outermost
regions are particularly vulnerable to different types of extreme weather
events (e.g. floods, drought and cyclones) and to sea-level rise. 2.2.5. Potential vulnerability to climate change in Europe Exposure[20] to climate change and sensitivity to this exposure jointly
determine climate change impacts, and impacts together with the adaptive
capacity of a system determine climate change vulnerability. Exposure
refers to the nature and degree to which a system is exposed to significant
climatic variations, for example, the extent of warming observed. Sensitivity
captures the degree to which the system is affected by changes in climate
parameters, for example, the share of GDP of climate-sensitive sectors such as
agriculture. Adaptive capacity refers to the ability of a system to deal with
the potential impacts, for example, the quality of emergency services in a
country. Various methodologies are used to assess
climate change vulnerability across the EU. Due to the uncertainty of climate
projections and all subsequent analyses one may only speak of ‘potential
vulnerability’. As an illustration, the potential vulnerability of Europe’s regions to climate change is depicted in Figure 3. It shows potential negative impacts
on the territorial cohesion objectives of the EU. Climate change will
trigger a deepening of the existing socio-economic imbalances. Figure 3:
Potential aggregate impact, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate change.
Source: ESPON Climate (2011), in EEA: climate change impacts and
vulnerability in Europe (2012) 2.3. Policy context 2.3.1. EU
initiatives The 2009 White Paper on adaptation to climate change called for a comprehensive EU
Adaptation Strategy to be adopted by 2013. The 2009 White Paper included 33
actions to be implemented by end of 2012. Most actions announced in the 2009
White Paper have now been implemented or are in the process of being so. Yet,
further action is needed along the main objectives identified in the White
Paper. More specifically, on knowledge gaps, further EU-funded and
national research is needed to fill gaps on methods, models, data sets and
forecasting tools, in order to improve the understanding of current and
expected climate impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation options. On assessing
the cost and benefit of adaptation options, some progress has been made
at microeconomic level, but important gaps remain on the macroeconomic approach
to model adaptation and assess their implications. No detailed assessment is
available yet on the impacts of climate change and adaptation policies on employment
and on the well-being of vulnerable social groups, though some progress
has been made in the context of the recently adopted Employment package,
especially through work on green jobs.[21] Mainstreaming
adaptation needs to be reinforced into some of the areas already highlighted as
of key importance in the 2009 White Paper. This applies to the EU energy policy,
for climate-proofing EU-funded infrastructure projects, and on the potential
for insurance and other financial products to complement adaptation measures. The 2011 Commission proposal for the next Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 recognises mainstreaming as the
MFF’s favoured approach to facilitate the necessary contribution to a
low-carbon economy and building resilience of sectors and policy domains[22]. It also includes a minimum contribution of 20% for climate related
expenditure and that all EU funds will need to take climate change into account
in their funding allocation decisions. Contrary to the White Paper, the EU
Adaptation Strategy will not consider international issues, that is,
climate change adaptation in the rest of the world, as this is covered under the development and cooperation policy and through
the UNFCCC negotiations. 2.3.2. Adaptation
policies at Member State level By January 2013, 15 EU Member States
have adopted an adaptation policy (strategy and/or plan)[23]: Figure 4:
Member States with (in green) and without (in orange) an adapted adaptation
strategy in March 2013. Source: climate-adapt Some of the adaptation strategies in place
have action plans of varying levels of detail. Most adaptation
strategies are being implemented (or will be implemented) by government /
inter-ministerial committees or working groups. This approach confirms an
acceptance of adaptation as something that must be implemented by stakeholders
at all levels and in all areas of society, and not something to be pursued in
isolation of other policy objectives, programmes and services. Each of the adaptation strategies has been
developed with sectoral focus. Integration and mainstreaming adaptation
with existing national programmes and policies is central to all of them. Communication
and awareness raising is another key principle of each of the adaptation
strategy. Member States acknowledge that without effective communication and
awareness raising, the adaptation strategy will not be successful. Only one of the adaptation strategies in
place considers transboundary issues, i.e. those issues affecting
neighbouring countries: Belgium. In contrast, nine adaptation strategies
consider international issues, that is the need to adapt to changes
taking place in other parts of the world. 2.3.3. Transnational, regional and
local adaptation efforts No complete picture of adaptation efforts
at regional or local level in the EU exists, though it is known that some
regions have adopted regional climate change strategies in some cases dealing
both with mitigation and adaptation, in others with adaptation only[24]. There are some examples of joint adaptation projects between
several European countries or cities in different countries. These are often partially
financed by EU-funds such as the Life+ and programmes co-financed under the
'European Territorial Cooperation 2007-2013' objective. In addition, both
transnational cooperation programmes 2007-2013 and macro-regional strategies
have started working on transboundary adaptation challenges (e.g. Danube and Baltic Sea strategies[25], transnational cooperation programme 'Alpine Space'[26]). Cities are important drivers of adaptation
activities at local and regional levels. Some cities in Europe have already
adopted adaptation strategies or action plans or are in the process of
developing them. In several Member States, cities are cooperating with other
cities on mitigation and adaptation issues, including sector-specific
adaptation strategies and plans.[27] 2.4. What are the specific problems that require additional
action? 2.4.1. Knowledge and access to
information gaps What is the problem? Adaptation to climate change is a
relatively new policy area and the level of information is irregular. The uncertainty
regarding the future impacts of climate change and related adaptation needs
remains one of the most important cross-cutting challenges for policy making in
this area. Global, EU and national research projects have improved our understanding
of climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation over the past few
years. However, data and knowledge gaps are still a major issue. The following
topics represent relevant information barriers and knowledge gaps to
adaptation activities: -
Information on projected damage and adaptation
costs and benefits; -
Regional and local-level analyses and risk
assessments; -
Frameworks, models and tools to support decision
making within uncertainty and to assess the effectiveness of adaptation
measures; -
Monitoring and evaluation of past adaptation
efforts; -
Socio-economic trends that are interrelatedt
with climatic changes; As an example, Table 1 summarises the
current knowledge on adaptation costs and benefits across sectors. Obvious gaps
have been identified, for instance for business and industry. Table 1:
Coverage of adaptation studies in Europe (Selection). Source: ClimateCost
project (www.climatecost.cc/). Sector || Coverage || Cost estimates || Benefit estimates Coastal zones || Very high coverage (infrastructure/erosion) for Europe, regions, several Member States as cities/local examples || +++ || +++ Agriculture || High coverage of farm level adaptation benefits, as well as on costs of climate change, but less on adaptation || ++ || ++ Health || Low – medium. Adaptation costs for heat alert and food-borne disease, but less coverage of other health risks || + || Water || Low-medium. Limited number of national, river basin, or subnational studies on water supply || + || Tourism || Low-medium. Studies on winter tourism (Alps) and some studies of autonomous adaptation from changing summer tourism flows. || ++ || + Biodiversity / eco-system services || Low- limited number of quantitative studies || + || Business and industry || Very low – no quantitative studies found || || Generating knowledge is only a first step.
Once the information is available, it needs to be properly disseminated.
Access to detailed data and reliable information is essential for a correct
risk assessment. Knowledge of environmental issues improved over time, but
according to a recent Eurobarometer survey, still around 40% of European
citizens consider themselves badly-informed on environmental issues, indicating
that considerable work is still needed to raise awareness and spread knowledge.
To take a concrete sectoral example, a key challenge is to integrate findings
from the physical and agronomic sciences with local knowledge from farmers, so
as to develop robust and practical adaptation strategies, which, over a range
of climate and socio-economic scenarios, can minimize the negative impacts of
climate change.[28] The main tool for dissemination of
knowledge on adaptation in the EU, the web portal Climate-ADAPT, already
provides information from various sources, including observed and expected
climate change in Europe, vulnerability of regions and sectors at present and
in the future, disaster risk management, information on national and
transnational adaptation strategies, case examples of adaptation and potential
future adaptation options, tools that support adaptation planning, an overview
of relevant EU policy processes. Further work is however needed, for
instance for engaging platform users to upload relevant information. In
particular, there is a lack of organised collection of data and information from
the local and regional level, as well as of private sectors' initiatives. At
national level, comprehensive adaptation portals exist in 6 Member States (AT,
DE, DK, FI, SE, UK), while more limited adaptation portals are available in 8
more Member States. Enabling societies to adapt to climate change will require establishing
systems that transfer relevant information both from the national to the local
level and vice versa[29]. Science-policy interfaces (SPIs) aim to bridge relations
between scientists and other actors in the policy process, which allow for
exchanges, co-evolution, and joint construction of knowledge with the aim of
enriching decision-making. Experience (e.g. in the Forestry sector) has shown
that increased networking between scientists and policy-makers are important
for improving communication in the science/policy interface. Given the
relatively new nature of adaptation policies and the important knowledge gaps
currently faced, the development of science-policy interfaces can contribute to
better information dissemination and to increase capacity-building. At
the EU level, a number of SPI research projects have been set up, in particular
on agriculture, biodiversity, marine and water issues. In addition to the EU
funded projects, there are some regional and national level initiatives taking
place[30]. However, most SPIs have not yet taken up the issues of climate change
adaptation into their work. What are the drivers? In order to use synergies and decrease
costs, comprehensive and most recent information on climate change impacts and
adaptation with relevance for many European countries (e.g. EU-wide
vulnerability assessment, compilation of adaptation options) needs to be
generated, provided and disseminated centrally. However, an insufficient
level of cooperation at EU level as well as with Member States and stakeholders does not allow identifying most pressing issues and avoiding overlaps and
inefficiencies in defining and funding research projects. In addition,
knowledge on adaptation remains an evolving problem which requires regular
interactions to identify new priorities. Climate-ADAPT, as well as other national portals, are still at an early stage
of development. It initially focused on coverage of adaptation at EU
level, as well as on relevant policies and good practice examples. Yet, time
and political attention will be needed to improve the existing tool. Moreover, national adaptation platforms are costly to develop and financial
and administrative barriers may hamper their effective development. One of the
reasons for developing Climate-ADAPT was the lack of financial resources in
Member States[31]. A lack of institutions and working groups
on adaptation also hampers the necessary science policy interfaces to maximise
experience transfer. Stakeholders' views: Lack of knowledge,
especially on the benefits of specific adaptation measures, has been identified
as a major barrier by many stakeholders, both via meetings and via the online
public consultation. In particular, research was considered as needing to be
better integrated into EU policy making, making better use of EU funded
research results. Although no formal assessment exists yet of the respective
merits of Climate-ADAPT, stakeholders mentioned that the Adaptation Strategy
should enhance the sharing of experiences and good practice on climate change
adaptation, which can be provided by strengthening the European platform on
climate change adaptation, Climate-ADAPT. It experienced a very high web
use/traffic during and immediately after the launch, ranking high compared to
launches of other EEA products 2.4.2. Gaps in adaptation action at
sub-EU level What is the problem? Article 4.1 (b) and (e) of the UNFCCC
recommend in a broad and non-prescriptive manner the formulation and
implementation of programmes containing measures to facilitate adaptation to
climate change, a recommendation not even followed by all Member States. Still,
the UNFCCC "affirms that enhanced action on adaptation should … follow
a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent
approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and
ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science, …,
with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant social, economic and
environmental policies and actions"[32]. National governments have an important
stake in adaptation because climate change directly affects a wide range of
services, operations, programmes, or assets (e.g., infrastructure, land).
Moreover, climate change impacts will affect different regions differently and
it is the role of the national authorities to provide a national response to
these questions. Adaptation strategies are the most
effective instrument in preparing Member States to assess impacts,
vulnerability and adaptation options and thus to
face the projected impacts of climate change across sectors. Unlike mitigation,
there is not a one size-fits-all solution for adaptation. Each Member State will experience different effects and impacts of climate change (e.g.
precipitation could increase or decrease, depending on locations),
vulnerability is also country-specific, derived from particular physical
(environmental), social and economic features. And the way of planning and
implementing adaptation is also specific to the particular governance system of
each Member State. Effective adaptation to climate change requires
mainstreaming it along a large number of policies. This needs to be coordinated
or allowed by the executive or legislative powers. Some Member States are active in the
adaptation policy field but the following gaps have been identified: i/ almost
half of Member States have not yet adopted an adaptation strategy; ii/ the
level of efforts and the level of detail provided differs widely among Member
States; iii/ almost none of the adaptation strategies in place deal with
transboundary issues, or employment or social issues; iv/ the funding of
adaptation options remains vague in many cases; v/ only a third of Member
States have implemented an impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation assessment
to support policy; and vi/ only two Member States have
made substantial progress in developing indicators and monitoring methodologies.
The fact that a Member State has developed a strategy or an action plan does
not necessarily imply that it is based on solid science and research, nor that
the plan contains precise implementation measures or sufficient funding has
been planned. In some Member States, regions have wide
management and planning powers. Yet, regional adaptation strategies are not
widespread and not very well communicated. The same is true for adaptation across Europe’s cities. Preliminary findings from the Adaptation
Strategies for European Cities[33] show that around a quarter (24%) of the 100 cities or so surveyed
so far report that an adaptation strategy has been adopted in their city. While a few cities believe they are well prepared (e.g. Rotterdam,
Aalborg and Copenhagen), acting above and beyond their respective national
governments, there are also cities that clearly need more support and guidance
in order to adapt effectively (just under half the cities surveyed believe they
are still in the very early stages of work on adaptation). Adaptation remains a
new policy area for many city administrations. What are the drivers? Understanding of the concept of climate change adaptation by policy-makers still
remains a barrier. Guidelines for developing regional climate change adaptation
strategies are available[34], but a special focus on adaptation strategies at Member State level is still lacking. Insufficient human and financial resources
at all levels are a major barrier, more so under the current economic climate.
Financing is a particular issue for adaptation as specific studies need to be
commissioned and budgets do not always allow for this. Even when research
results exist, some Member States find it difficult to compile, collect and
organize existing information with relevance for adaptation to climate change,
notably in the absence of a national climate change adaptation portal. Additional instruments are required to internalise
the cross-border externalities of climate change adaptation. Some adaptation responses provide benefits or costs to other Member
States. For example, activities such as defences against sea-level rise,
building harbours, beach nourishment, dredging etc. do change coastal dynamics
and can have an impact on neighbouring states. Coordinating instruments are
therefore needed for a better integration of transboundary issues in national
policy-making. One key barrier for cities and governments
trying to address adaptation is a lack of cross-sectoral collaboration
within authorities and a prevailing “silo mentality”. Whilst adaptation plans
are developed by climate change departments, they do not filter into e.g. land
use planning, and are not always mainstreamed in other sectoral policies, which
may not see the links between adaptation and their own policy objectives. Stakeholders' views: A large majority of stakeholders see the
need to enhance awareness of the actual and potential consequences of climate
change and the need and possibilities for adaptation to climate change at
regional/ local level. There is expectation from
some Member States that the European Commission will deliver an external ‘push’
for action. 2.4.3. Gaps in adaptation uptake in
key sectors What is the problem? To favour synergies and decrease the costs
of adaptation, the EU has recognised the need to foster mainstreaming
into all EU sectoral policies: Adaptation has already been mainstreamed in
legislation in such sectors as marine waters[35],
forestry[36], and transport[37]; and in important policy instruments such as inland water[38], biodiversity[39] and migration and mobility[40]. In addition, the Commission has tabled legal
proposals on integrating adaptation in agriculture and forestry[41], maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal management[42], energy[43], disaster risk prevention and management[44],
transport[45], research, health[46], and the environment[47]. Forthcoming policy initiatives, in areas
such as invasive alien species (2013), green infrastructure (2013), land as a
resource (2014-15), and a new Forest Strategy (2013) are also expected to
consider adaptation. Guidelines on adaptation and coastal zone management are
being formulated (2014), and guidelines on adaptation and the Natura 2000
network are shortly to be issued (2013). So far, European policies help address some
of the transboundary issues associated with climate change. For instance, the
Floods Directive and the Water Framework Directive promote transboundary
cooperation in the water sector. Also, European and pan-European early warning
and detection systems for weather-driven natural disasters exist such as the European
Flood Awareness System, the European Forest Fire Information System and the European
Drought Observatory. Despite significant achievements, mainstreaming
of climate adaptation is not yet recognised in policies dealing with social and
education policies, tourism, fisheries, insurance and trade. In the case of
energy, transport, disaster risk reduction or health additional efforts are
needed. The 2009 White Paper proposed guidelines on adaptation and coastal zone
management, which have not yet been developed. Due to the long life spans of much of our energy,
transport and buildings infrastructure and their great economic value,
their preparedness for current and increasing future impacts of climate change
is critical. For some EU policy areas, climate resilience has already been
taken up as a parameter in cost-benefit analyses during the project development
phase[48]. However, there is no general requirement to do so, neither in
terms of assessing the costs and benefits of a project, nor when defining the
technical characteristics of a project. In 2010, more than 1.5 million housing
permits were issued in the EU, and construction started on close to 1 million
homes. While some adaptive measures can be retrofitted cost-effectively (e.g.
to save water), others are best incorporated into the design of the building. The
IPCC identifies the enforcement of building codes as a low-regret measure that
can reduce exposure and vulnerability to hazards and change. For municipal
governments, adoption of building codes in disaster-prone areas reduces damages
by US$ 108 (84€) per square meter for homes built from 1996 to 2004 in Florida[49]. In addition, green infrastructure, or ecosystem based
approaches, can often be cost-effective options to increase resilience of a
specific area, for instance green roofs in cities. Strengthening the
implementation of green infrastructure has just been taken up by the
Communication on a Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water. In addition to the physical risks it
brings, climate change will affect areas such as supply chains, logistics and
raw materials costs, in turn impacting on companies' profits. The
impacts from these risks are systemic (at the whole economy level), sector /
industry-wide or company-specific. Climate-resilience of business operations
and supply chains is therefore essential. Although there is evidence of
on-the-ground adaptation[50] this is mainly from multinational corporations and there is little
evidence of adaptation in SMEs outside those sectors most exposed to climate
and current weather variability and extremes, e.g. the water sector or
agriculture. Companies (and particularly SMEs) are discouraged by the often
high initial costs of infrastructure changes as they focus on short-term
returns, and ignore environmental risks. At the same time, SMEs are also
discouraged to adopt a pro-active stance as autonomous providers of services
and products for adaptation because of limited knowledge, information and
technical support, expertise, time and resources[51]. A
coherent framework of policies and regulations is necessary for effective
decisions on adaptation, providing the right incentives and helping address
potential barriers. Climate adaptation is not
only an instrument contributing to maintain the EU's macro-economic stability
and growth, but it is also a growing market, with expected business
opportunities for European firms on the EU and global markets. Thus, adaptation
will create new demand and market opportunities and increase need for
innovation. For instance, with increased water scarcity envisaged, the need
for irrigation will continue. While innovations in irrigation appear to reduce
downstream employment opportunities due to more efficient techniques, the
European companies can grasp opportunities from selling water-efficient
agricultural irrigation technologies worldwide. Approximately 28% of cropland
is now under irrigation, with half of this located in Asia[52]. But European companies will need to improve their products and
invest in R&D to compete to existing and forthcoming competitors from Asia. What are the drivers? First, some of the actions undertaken in
the context of the implementation phase of the 2009 White Paper have not yet
achieved their initial objectives, because the initial knowledge gaps were
too significant. For instance, additional EU-funded projects have allowed a
better understanding of adaptation costs and benefits for coastal zones and
river floods, but not yet for forestry issues. Second, only a limited number of
EU legislative acts are considering climate change, and always following the
normal revision cycle of EU legislation. For instance, the EIA Directive is
under revision and clearer provisions relevant for climate change have been
proposed, but the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (which arguably
also needs to include climate change adaptation considerations) has not been
revised yet. Third, there are sometimes inconsistencies between adaptation
and some other EU policy objectives, for instance when EU policies provide
incentives for additional use of water resources in areas prone to an increase
in the frequency of droughts. There is no common methodology or
guidance in place to systematically assess the climate resilience of
infrastructure projects and improve their sustainability and liability in
changing climate conditions. The work on design standards has remained
uneven, in particular due to the coordination resources required to address the
issue of climate change adaptation considerations in the thousands of
design-standards potentially affected. A number of barriers prevent the private
sector from taking appropriate adaptation actions and future-proofing their
business, among which the current economic conditions which are particularly unfavourable
to long-term investments, especially for SMEs. The lack of accurate, reliable
information, networking and exchange of experience also hinders the uptake of
adaptation investment because of a lack of awareness of climate-change related
risks. Moreover, almost none of the adaptation strategies currently in place at
Member State level consider the explicit role and constraints faced by the
private sector. Yet, as reiterated in the concluding remarks of the Informal
Environment Council of 7-8 July in Cyprus,[53] Member
States stressed the need for a balanced approach, so that adaptation is
undertaken by a variety of actors, including individuals, communities,
businesses and the private sector, civil society and governments. They also
emphasised that reliable funding, both public and private, is a key for implementing
any policies, plans or measures, and that the private sector had a key role to
play in this context, both through private equity funds and the provision of
technical expertise. Stakeholders' views: A consistent and comprehensive
mainstreaming of adaptation is seen by all stakeholders as a priority. According to respondents, the sector with the highest relevance
for improving Europe's resilience to the adverse impacts of climate change is
water, followed by agriculture and rural development, nature conservation,
energy and transport. Respondents identified the ‘contradictory requirements
from different EU policies’ as a barrier. They also ranked improving the
climate resilience of infrastructure investments as being very relevant.
Financial constraints have been mentioned as barriers to the uptake of
adaptation action. The business sectors' respondents to the online consultation
rank the "short-term vs. long-term horizon" issue as the most
important barrier to the uptake of adaptation action. In that respect,
financial institutions and insurance companies are considered to have a key
role to play in providing adequate incentives to companies. 2.5. How would the problems evolve by 2020 without further EU
action? 2.5.1. Knowledge and access to
information gaps The EEA has just adopted a report on
climate change impacts and vulnerability in Europe[54]. At
international level, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) 5th
assessment report will be adopted in 2014 and will provide the state of the art
on expected impacts, adaptation and vulnerability at global level. In addition,
the Commission proposal for Horizon 2020 includes ambitious research
objectives on climate change in general, and climate change adaptation in
particular. Moreover, the Commission's proposals for the next MFF allow for
Member States to draw on the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy and CAP to address the
knowledge gap and invest in the needed analyses, risk assessment, tools and
build up capacities for adaptation. Yet, without additional efforts to identify
knowledge gaps and coordinate research efforts among European and national
institutions, some overlaps in research projects are expected, and
knowledge gaps would not be addressed in the most effective way. To take one
example, between 2009 and 2012, various projects have looked at the costs and
benefits of adaptation at EU level, but limited progress has been made, as this
information remains still mainly available for river floods and coastal areas.
Even if funding is available, a lack of coordination in research activities would
have indirect economic social and environmental implications, as not enough
information would be made available for decision-making on resilience to
climate change in the EU. The Climate-ADAPT platform makes available
information on adaptation to climate change in Europe. Climate-ADAPT
already experienced a very high web use/traffic during and immediately after
the launch, ranking high compared to launches of other EEA products. Yet, no
longer-term programme for the platform has been approved. Without
additional action, it is not expected that the coverage of Climate-ADAPT would
change fundamentally, which would lead to significant gaps, in particular on local
or regional issues. This is particularly problematic for stakeholders, in
particular the private sector, in those Member States who have not developed
yet a climate adaptation web-portal. Science-policy interfaces will continue
addressing climate change adaptation on ad hoc basis and the mainstreaming
of adaptation in sectoral SPIs will remain limited. Therefore, any progress
on research in adaptation faces the risk of remaining unacessible to decision
makers, in particular in those sectors where no science policy interface could
be detected, such as energy or transport. It will also be extremely difficult
for practitioners to report to researchers on their adaptation expertise on the
ground. 2.5.2. Gaps in adaptation action at
sub-EU level Some new developments at national, regional
and local level are expected in the years to come. However, without additional
action, the barriers currently preventing national, regional or local
authorities from developing ambitious adaptation strategies are likely to
remain. When there is no adaptation strategy, a lack of resources will
prevent the necessary groundwork from being undertaken, potentially delaying
the adoption of a strategy. This is in particular the case in Southern and
Central European Countries in economic crisis. In most cases, precisely these
counties are likely to face significant impacts of climate change earlier than
elsewhere in Europe. From among these countries, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania appear to not have started yet the development of a
comprehensive adaptation strategy, whereas Italy, Slovakia and Czech Republic are expected to finalise planning processes in 2013 or later in the next
year(s). An unprepared Member State faces higher risks of significant economic, social and environmental losses. To illustrate the above assertion, one can compare France’s response to the 2003 heat wave compared with Greece’s response to the 2007 wildfires. France subsequently set out to improve its ability to respond by developing an early
warning system. Greece was much slower in addressing institutional
shortcomings, and as a result found itself once again vulnerable when the
problem reappeared in 2009.[55] For those Member States having already
adopted an adaptation strategy, the lack of funding would mean that the
strategies would not be translated into the necessary action plans. That is,
even if an adaptation strategy is in place, the absence of concrete action,
inadequate incentives or previous infrastructure investment decisions may leave
some regions or Member States in vulnerable situations. For instance, in
February 2010, the storm Xynthia hit the French Atlantic coast. In combination
with the high tide and large waves, it caused the failure of flood defences,
which led to the flooding of more than 50 000 ha. 53 people died because of the
storm itself or the flooding and the cost of the damages is estimated around
2.5 billion €, a human and economic cost much higher than the impacts of
Xynthia in Spain or Portugal. Moreover, climate change in one region
can have repercussions elsewhere. For instance, the summer 2010 heat-wave
in Russia was one of the drivers leading[56] to an
increase in the price of staple goods like pasta and bread all over Europe because
Russia’s wheat crops failed. It also contributed to inflation differentials
across the Euro area, as Member States were diversely affected by an increase
in import prices for agricultural products from Russia, the Baltic States being
particularly sensitive to this increase. Although the
quantification of loss from a lack of strategy in each Member State is not possible, the risk is that effective adaptation actions would not take place
across all Member States at similar pace, or that the approach followed and
recommendations given would be inconsistent. An issue explored in the JRC
PESETA II project is the extent to which climate impacts affecting part of
Europe (because adaptation measures are not taken) could affect the rest of Europe due to trade effects. Two counterfactual situations were simulated, where it
was assumed that only one EU region would face the impacts of climate change[57] . In both cases, there appears to be additional welfare loss in
the rest of the EU, equivalent to 20-30% of the welfare loss experienced in
the region directly affected. Transboundary issues have a broader scope
and create interdependencies between countries (e.g. hydrological,
social and economic ones in the case of water). For
instance, ecological corridors and ‘stepping stones’ have to be planned and
managed across national boundaries. Moreover, food security or global supply
chain issues can require cross-border cooperation to diversify import sources. Yet, under no policy change, transboundary
issues will remain a gap in most of the strategies, which can lead to
conflicting adaptation responses and would not provide for an effective approach
to tackle common risks. Cross-border and transnational coordination will
continue under the European Territorial Co-operation, but will remain mostly
not linked with national and sub-national adaptation policy developments as
having their focus on joint management of programmes and projects. In addition, an inadequate level of
preparedness at national, regional or local level would have implications on
the effectiveness and sustainability of EU Funding. Investments made
(e.g. in agriculture, infrastructure, biodiversity) in unprepared countries
could lead to inefficient expenditure. Cohesion Policy contributed over the
period 2007-2013 to more than 10% of public investments in Europe. Yet, out of
the ten Member States having the higher share of EU funds to their public
investments, only two have adopted an adaptation strategy (Portugal and Malta).[58] The risk is therefore that the EU would fund investments that are
vulnerable to climate change. In addition,
national support and funding is necessary to finance adaptation action at local
level. The absence of such support will increase existing disparities with
respect to the potential vulnerabilities to climate change at regional and
local level. Moreover, the impacts of climate change on cities are
characterised by their interlinked, and often transboundary nature. Thus even
those better prepared cities could be affected by other locations which suffer
as a result of being poorly adapted. 2.5.3. Gaps in adaptation uptake in key sectors Without additional
mainstreaming, some of the EU and Member States' policy objectives will
become more difficult / costlier to achieve. To take two examples, in
addition to the discussion on infrastructure that follows, most of the existing
social policies do not explicitly address the climatic change impacts on the
social domain, which can be expected in the future, and which could hamper the
achievements of the social pillar of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Moreover, recent
analytical research shows that there is currently an overall low market penetration
rate of disaster insurance in Member States,[59] which
can have a negative impact on the sector itself, but also on the economic value
of the insured and non-insured assets, and therefore on the competitiveness of
European firms. By combining penetration rates with damages associated with
extreme weather events, potential vulnerable Member States have been
identified, such as BG, AT and SI in terms of flood risks or BG, GR, IT and RO
in terms of storm risks. In addition, in order to meet the objective
of a minimum contribution of 20% for climate related expenditure in EU Funds,
additional attention must be given to the implementing measures
accompanying broad policy objectives, for instance, on how to use the proposed
Common Strategic Framework (now referred to as the European Structural and
Investment) funds. Whereas some minimum guaranteed share of funding is proposed
for cohesion policy to support mitigation measures such as energy efficiency
and renewable energy, in particular in more developed and transitional regions,
there is no similar earmarking of funds for adaptation, except for the overall
objective of having at least 20% climate-related expenditure overall for the future
EU budget. Where possible, priority should be given to options that realise
important synergies with climate change mitigation or bring about co-benefits
for other sectors such as industry, transport, water management and social
inclusion. This would help to promote climate adaptation under different
thematic objectives. Without further EU action, considerations
about current and future impacts of climate change for new infrastructure
investments will remain vague. This is problematic as already now, climate
hazards have an impact on buildings and infrastructure. For instance, the
ClimateCost project estimates the expected annual
damage of river floods at €20 billion annually by 2020. Analysis at the country
level shows high climate-related costs in the UK, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The study also assessed the costs and benefits of adaptation.
The benefits of these minimum protection levels are estimated at €9.2
billion/year by the 2020s. Moreover, the construction of new developments in
flood-prone areas is likely to continue as room for settlements is limited in
many European countries. The non-inclusion of climate change adaptation
considerations could imply lower investment costs in the short term, but higher
increasing maintenance/reconstruction costs in the medium to long term. To take
one example, the FP7 WEATHER project provides estimates of costs associated
with extreme weather events on transport (~2.2 billion €/yr.) largely explained
by damages to road infrastructure (80%). Such costs are expected to increase by
24 to 47%, depending on the climate scenario, by 2040-2100. Moreover, negative
interactions with 2020 climate change mitigation objectives would occur: the
absence of retrofitting could mean that old buildings will need to be cooled
with some use of fossil fuel, leading to additional emissions, thus further
accelerating climate change and enhancing the need for adaptation. Limited efforts
have been made at national level to further climate-proof design standards,
as reported in the context of a consultation of national standardisation bodies.[60] Climate change impacts are often local by nature, but the lack of
harmonised approach on standards at EU level will create potential technical
barriers to trade. Moreover, the IPCC (2012) recalls examples of highly
variable enforcement of building codes by municipalities, becoming a limiting
factor in disaster risk management and adaptation. Some of the largest transnational
corporations, and those in certain sectors, have begun to appreciate the
potential threat and opportunity presented by climate change. However by 2020,
in particular many SMEs will be unable to make the necessary adaptation
measures making them increasingly vulnerable to the effects of unavoidable
climate change. In the absence of measures from the EU to increase adaptive
capacity, the gap between large corporations and SMEs will widen – possibly
creating market obstacles for those left behind[61]. Without
adequate public policy on adaptation, such changes would lead to unnecessary
additional frictions on the labour market. 2.6. Does the EU have the right to act and is EU added-value
evident for enhancing climate resilience? The legal basis for adaptation action is
Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Combating
climate change is now explicitly referred to in the Lisbon Treaty. EU intervention in the field of climate
change adaptation must respect the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. While a “one-size-fits-all” approach to adaptation is clearly
not appropriate, there is a key role for – and significant benefits to be
gained from – integrated, coordinated EU adaptation action to complement
national, regional and local efforts. The EU can
coordinate efforts to identify knowledge gaps and support specific research
programmes on adaptation through focused project calls. EU-wide programmes
promote economies of scale in research, data gathering, knowledge transfer and
capacity-building. The EU can also facilitate further science-policy
interaction to facilitate the adoption of effective measures at national or
subnational levels. The EU can promote
adaptation action covering the whole EU territory, since lack of preparedness or inaction in one Member State may have negative consequences for neighbouring countries. It is clear that climate
change will impact everywhere, irrespective of administrative boundaries. Many
of the adaptation measures required have cross-border dimensions (e.g. for
river basins and bio-geographic regions). There is a role for the EU in
promoting and coordinating such cross-border adaptation action. At the same time,
the EU has a responsibility to integrate adaptation into its own policies
and financial programmes, given its competence in areas such as water,
agriculture, biodiversity, health etc. and the implications this has for Member
States policies. This includes ensuring that adaptation action is consistent
with mitigation and vice versa. Fundamental rights will also be affected by
climate change and climate change adaptation policies. Climate change impacts
such as sea-level rise, flooding or storm surges, threaten individuals' safety
and security on a large scale and have effects on the right to life and the
right to the integrity of the person (Title I, art. 2 and 3 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights), as well as on the right to property (Title II, art. 17). In
particular, women are likely to be disproportionately affected by climate
change as social exclusion has a strong gender bias that increases their vulnerability
to climate change, as they have fewer means on average (Title III, art. 23). Elderly
people and children are disadvantaged also in terms of health (greater exposition
to injury, death and destitution as a result of extreme weather events) or
ability to migrate (restrictions on mobility). In a global perspective, climate
change will also jeopardise the fundamental right to an environment capable of
supporting human society and the full enjoyment of human rights (Title IV, art.
37 of the Charter). 3. Objectives 3.1. What are the general and more
specific/operational objectives? 3.1.1. General objective The
general aim of the EU Adaptation Strategy is to contribute effectively to a
more climate resilient Europe. This means enhancing the
preparedness and capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change of the EU
and its Member States, down to the local level. Particular attention is given
to transboundary issues and sectors that are closely integrated at EU level
through common policies. 3.1.2. Specific and operational objectives To meet this general objective, and to
address the problems listed above, three specific objectives have been
identified, each one broken down into two operational objectives. Better informed decision making: the EU
Adaptation Strategy should further the understanding of adaptation, improve and
widen the knowledge base where knowledge gaps have been identified and enhance
dissemination of adaptation-related information. Operational objective 1a: by 2020, priority knowledge
gaps identified in 2013 have been closed Operational objective 1b: by 2020,
communication tools allow for available information on climate change
adaptation to be more easily accessible for decision-makers, including Member States, local authorities and firms. Increasing the resilience of the EU territory: the EU Adaptation Strategy should promote adaptation action at
sub-EU level, and support and facilitate exchange and
coordination. In doing so, the Strategy should address cross-border climate
impacts and adaptation measures. Operational objective 2a: by 2017, all
Member States have adopted (an) Adaptation Strateg(y)ies, complemented by
regional or local adaptation strategies when appropriate. Operational objective 2b: by 2020, cities of
more than 150,000 inhabitants have adopted an adaptation strategy Increasing the resilience of key vulnerable sectors: The EU Adaptation Strategy should develop initiatives for a consistent
and comprehensive integration of climate change adaptation considerations into
sectors that are closely integrated at EU level through common policies. Operational objective 3a: by 2020,
adaptation considerations have been mainstreamed in a consistent and
comprehensive way in key EU policies. Operational objective 3b: by 2020, new major
infrastructure investments are climate-proofed. 3.2. Consistency
with EU policies and horizontal objectives of the European Union The EU Adaptation
Strategy supports the overarching EU objectives of a smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth as stated in the Europe 2020 – Europe’s growth strategy. The strategy falls under the Resource-Efficient Europe flagship
initiative. The EU Adaptation Strategy is part of a broader
climate change response strategy, which includes mitigation efforts and
adaptation actions. Mitigation aims at reducing GHG emissions, the ultimate
cause of climatic change. Mitigation then implies interventions in order to
avoid the most serious impacts associated with continuing, longer-term changes
in the climate system as well as limiting the risks of large-scale
discontinuities in that system. Adaptation aims particularly at reducing
unavoidable negative impacts already in the shorter term, reducing vulnerability
to present, near and far future climate variability, and exploiting
opportunities provided by climate change. Moreover, in several cases,
adaptation activities can simultaneously produce mitigation benefits, while
sustaining production and growth. This is the case of a number of sustainable
agricultural practices or of energy efficiency measures for instance. Adaptation to climate change is a crosscutting
issue and will affect key EU policies such as Cohesion policy, Common
agricultural policy, policies related to disaster risk management, or
environmental policies. For instance, ecosystem-based approaches both
contribute to biodiversity protection and climate change adaptation. Better
managing water shortages or biodiversity loss would also contribute to the main
objectives of EU Agricultural policy. Synergies exist between energy efficiency
and adaptation objectives. Furthermore, adaptation is building on the existing
EU risk management approach, including the EU's disaster risk prevention objectives
and actions[62] which is also a cross-cutting issue. This requires close
coordination and cooperation to maximise synergies and strenghten the links
between the two policies and communities. 4. Policy
options 4.1. What are the policy options? Adaptation is such a cross-cutting issue
that a wide range of policy initiatives are conceivable to meet the objectives
identified above. This IA report assesses the impacts of alternative new policy
options per problem identified. The following table summarises the individual
policy options considered. Options should be compared horizontally,
to the no policy change scenario. They cover a wide array of potential
intervention tools, from soft measures to legislation, and including direct
intervention. The description of the options will
specify whether they should be combined or considered mutually exclusive. Table 2:
List of options considered for this IA report Problem || Drivers || Specific objective || Operational objective || Options No policy change || Providing information and guidelines || Direct intervention || Regulatory approach Knowledge and access to information gaps || Uncoordinated research activities || Better INFORMED decision-making || By 2020, priority KNOWLEDGE GAPS identified in 2013 have been closed || Horizon 2020 developed with no specific approach on adaptation || 1A: Developing a common climate vulnerability assessment in the EU || 1B: Developing a knowledge gap strategy || Incomplete instruments for knowledge dissemination || By 2020, COMMUNICATION TOOLS allow for available information on climate change adaptation to be accessible for decision-makers, including Member States, local authorities and firms || Climate-ADAPT follows a business-as-usual development || 1C: Promoting interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other services; || 1D: Supporting exchange between science and policy in the field of adaptation || 1E: Proposing the mandatory setup of national information platforms on adaptation Gaps in adaptation action at sub-EU level || Knowledge, financial, and political reluctance barriers Absence of internalisation of cross-border considerations || Increasing the resilience of THE EU TERRITORY || By 2017, all MEMBER STATES have adopted (an) Adaptation Strateg(y)ies, complemented by regional or local adaptation strategies when appropriate. || National, regional and local adaptation strategies are developed following a similar trend than in the past || 2A: EU guidelines for adaptation strategies || 2B: Using Life+ funding for supporting the preparation of adaptation strategies and for lighthouse projects on adaptation || 2C: Commission's proposal on the adoption of national adaptation strategies. Three sub-options: i/ non-legal; ii/ legislation later; iii/ legislation now By 2020, CITIES of more than 150,000 inhabitants have adopted an adaptation strategy || 2D: Supporting UNISDR “Making Cities Resilient” campaign among EU cities || 2E: Inclusion of adaptation into the Covenant of Mayors Framework || Gaps in adaptation uptake in key sectors || Incomplete and Inconsistent mainstreaming Financial and information barriers to resilient investment and business decisions || Increasing the resilience of key VULNERABLE SECTORS || By 2020, a comprehensive and consistent MAINSTREAMING of adaptation in EU policies is achieved || Commission's proposals on MFF; Piece-meal approach to mainstreaming || 3A: Guidance on how to mainstream adaptation into Cohesion Policy and the CAP || 3B: Listing mainstreaming priorities in EU policies and engaging with key stakeholders || 3C: Setting new calendar for revision of key EU legislation as part of the mainstreaming exercise; By 2020, major INFRASTRUCTURE investments are climate-proofed || Revision of EIA and guidelines under TEN-E and TEN-T || 3D: Guidelines for project developers for climate proofing vulnerable investments || 3E: Promote inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in relevant infrastructure standards || 3F: Proposal on mandatory requirements for climate resilience of infrastructure projects 4.2. Description of each option 4.2.1. Options aiming at better informed decision making Option || Description Option 1A: Developing a common climate vulnerability assessment || This option envisages the adoption of a common European-wide approach for climate vulnerability assessments, to be agreed by Member States and the Commission. This approach would be used to assess vulnerabilities across Europe and would serve as a basis for the identification of most vulnerable areas and sectors. Option 1B: Adopting a knowledge gap strategy || This initiative envisages the creation of a working group, composed of representatives of Member States and key stakeholders, aiming at a systematic collection of knowledge and data gaps. In 2013, the Commission will make a proposal on some preliminary identified knowledge gaps, with in view of achieving a common agreement on a list of priority knowledge gaps with the members of the working group. The knowledge gaps could be clustered into thematic areas and prioritized. The findings will be integrated into Horizon 2020 and other research schemes. This exercise is to be regularly repeated, for instance every three years. Option 1C: Promoting interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other services || Option 1C envisages that the Commission, in collaboration with the EEA, will boost interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other relevant databases. First it identifies key databases on adaptation to develop a guidance document to explain how to link in practice these databases to Climate-ADAPT. Second, particular efforts would be made by the Commission and the EEA to link and provide additional interfaces with the currently existing platform on adaptation for European cities. Third, additional guidance would be developed by the Commission and the EEA to clarify how the future Copernicus Climate services should be integrated to climate-ADAPT and its results better disseminated. Option 1D: Supporting exchange between science and policy in the field of adaptation. || under this option, the Commission promotes further interactions between researchers and policy makers about adaptation. The aim is to ensure that the most recent scientific knowledge is brought to policy makers and that the policy needs are expressed to the research community. Option 1E: Proposal for mandatory set-up of national adaptation platforms || under this option, the Commission proposes to Member States the mandatory set up of national information platforms on climate change adaptation including specifications on minimum requirements (similar to Climate-ADAPT) and how to link these national platforms to Climate-ADAPT. 4.2.2. Options aiming at increasing the resilience of the EU
territory Option || Description Option 2A: EU Guidelines for adaptation strategies || The guidelines aim to support EU countries in preparing their adaptation strategies. It intends to provide a framework for generating the information needed to prepare, implement and evaluate a national adaptation strategy. Option 2B: Using Life+ funding for supporting the preparation of adaptation strategies and for lighthouse projects on adaptation || The newly proposed LIFE programme has a budgetary allocation dedicated specifically to climate change adaptation (€363 million). This option is composed of two complementary sub-options: 2Bi/ fostering the development of national and regional adaptation strategies via financial support to experience transfer; 2Bii/ promoting lighthouse projects set to develop, testing and demonstrate policy or management approaches, best practices, and solutions, for climate change adaptation. Option 2C: Commission's proposal on the adoption of adaptation strategies for all Member States by 2017 || The aim of this option is to provide additional steer towards some minimum requirements across the EU in terms of adaptation policy processes. It focuses on the following elements: - Each Member State should adopt adaptation strategies covering its entire territory. - Such adaptation strategies should include a climate change vulnerability assessment, considerations for transboundary issues, and propose indicators to monitor and evaluate progress. - For those Member States who already have an adaptation strategy, they would need to adapt them in accordance with the requirements mentioned above once those strategies would be up for revision and no later than in 2020. Regarding the nature of the Commission's initiative, three alternative sub-options are considered: - non-legal request: Along the same line as the 2009 White Paper, the Commission would recommend Member States to establish an adaptation strategy by 2017 (time foreseen for the revision of the European Adaptation Strategy); - legislative proposal later: the Strategy would call all Member States to establish an adaptation strategy by a certain date, e.g. 2017, after which, if sufficient progress is not achieved, the Commission would adopt a legislative proposal; - legislative proposal now in the form of a Directive. Option 2D: promoting the UNISDR cities campaign || This option aims to promote bottom-up action by cities on adaptation. The “Making Cities Resilient” campaign is an initiative of the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR ) to raise awareness of the need for cities, towns and their local governments to become resilient to natural hazards, which include those arising from the changing climate, that result in disasters. Under this policy option, the Commission would increase its efforts to promote engagement by EU cities with the UNISDR campaign. This would initially focus on communication about the campaign both via Member States and existing urban networks and events, and could step up to include hosting campaign events and fora in collaboration with UNISDR. Option 2E: Inclusion of adaptation into the framework of the Covenant of Mayors || This option aims to incentivise local government commitment to tackle climate change adaptation. This option aims at an extension of the framework of the Covenant of Mayors to include adaptation and a voluntary commitment of the signatories (cities) to adopt local adaptation strategies as well as to inform about their implementation.[63] 4.2.3. Options aiming at increasing the resilience of most
vulnerable sectors Option || Description Option 3A: Guidance on how to mainstream adaptation into Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy || It provides additional guidance to facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation considerations into operational and rural development programmes and projects, in line with the Commission's proposals for the next MFF. Option 3B: Listing mainstreaming priorities in EU policies and engaging with key stakeholders || Under this option, the Commission provides a list of priority initiatives for mainstreaming adaptation into EU legislation by 2020. In addition to the above, the Commission seeks to engage with key stakeholders to anticipate and prepare the need for potential revision of legislation. Option 3C: Setting new calendar for revision of key EU legislation as part of the mainstreaming exercise || This option considers a Commission's proposal to amend the calendar of revision of key EU legislations which would need to integrate climate change adaptation. Option 3D: Guidelines for project developers for climate proofing vulnerable investments || This option considers guidelines developed by the Commission for project promoters of physical assets and infrastructure on how to incorporate resilience to current climate variability and future climate change within their projects. An alternative would be for the guidelines to be made mandatory for all EU-funded infrastructure projects receiving EU funding of €5 million or more and having an operational period of at least 20 years. Both voluntary and mandatory guidelines are discussed below. Option 3E: Promote inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in relevant infrastructure standards || Under this option, the Commission formally asks European standardisation organisations to map and prioritise relevant design standards that would need to be modified so as to take account of current and future impacts of climate change. Concretely, this option is two-fold: first, the Commission would issue an official request (Mandate) to map and prioritise relevant standards for transport infrastructure, energy infrastructure and buildings. Second, the Commission would support standardisation organisations in their efforts to update their environmental guide to include climate change adaptation considerations. Option 3F: Proposal on mandatory requirements for climate resilience of infrastructure projects || Under this option, the Commission proposes the elaboration of legally binding requirements on the resilience to climate change of existing and future infrastructure. That is, Member States would have to set up minimum climate resilience requirements for new infrastructure investments and for large existing ones that undergo major renovation. 4.3. Which options have been discarded at an early stage and
why? Options that would
legally require the development of adaptation strategies at regional and local
level have been discarded at an early stage for subsidiarity reasons. In fact,
the legal basis for imposing at EU level specific adaptation policies at local
level would not have allowed discussing prescriptive measures. Regarding the mainstreaming
of adaptation in specific EU legislations, the level of details needed to
asssess the expected impacts of a change in each EU legislation can only be
provided by a dedicated impact assessment. This was for instance necessary when
revising the EIA Directive. The current report does not go into such detail and
stays at the level of identifying key priority areas and comparing various
approaches for further mainstreaming. Options that require
additional EU financial instruments have also been discarded. In fact, the
Commission's proposal for the next MFF already makes available a range of policies
and instruments for promoting adaptation actions in various sectors, and this
report focuses on a discussion of potential measures aiming at achieving an
optimal use of existing instruments. Finally, prescriptive approaches for
European companies, such as the obligation to undertake climate risk assessment
along their supply chains, have also been ruled out. 5. Analysis of impacts The impacts of no further EU action have
been presented in section 2.5. The expected impacts of each considered option
are presented below, in comparison to the baseline scenario. Note that the
impacts being assessed are those of EU-promoted actions, which
represents only the 'tip of the iceberg' when it comes to adaptation action.
The costs of implementing such measures as well as their benefits are
necessarily of a different magnitude than the overall costs and benefits of
adaptation action across the EU. 5.1. Expected impacts of options aiming at better informed decision
making 5.1.1. No policy change 5.1.1.1. No policy change Major research efforts
on climate change have been promoted and financed at the European level within
the 7th Framework Programme and its predecessors. Such activities would
continue and further expand, in line with the Commission's proposals on
research under Horizon 2020. Although all the details have not been clarified
yet, Horizon 2020 is expected to improve the coordination of research
activities. However as no systematic mechanism of mapping knowledge gaps,
screening of on-going research and support activities and prioritising along
policy needs is proposed, some limitations in coordination and targeted close
of knowledge gaps can be expected. The Commission
developed in the context of the PESETA and the JRC PESETA II projects[64] a multi-sectoral assessment of the impacts of climate change in Europe for the 2011-2040 and 2071-2100 time horizons. However, to get to a harmonized and
agreed approach across the EU in modelling climate impacts would require
further efforts. An important recent global
initiative is ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project[65]. This is the first global activity aimed at
providing cross-sectoral global impact assessments, based on the newly developed
climate Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and socio-economic Shared
Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs). It is considered that Climate-ADAPT will be
further financed and that the EEA (supported by the European Topic Centre on
Climate Change adaptation[66]) will ensure regular maintenance and updating of Climate-ADAPT.
This includes ensuring inclusion of this work within the EEA annual management
plans and in the annual ETC CCA implementation plans. EEA (with ETC CCA) will
organise regular training sessions and meetings but also develop information
and publicity material such as a newsletter and a tutorial video. Beyond 2014
it remains unclear how Climate-ADAPT will further develop and which
dissemination activities will be carried out. An important additional element which is
now being implemented is the obligation for EU-funded projects under the last
FP7 Call to report to Climate-ADAPT on any climate change adaptation related
findings from the research project. Under the no-policy change scenario, it is
expected that these requirements will be included to EU-funded projects under
Horizon 2020. This could entail some costs, both on the project side – to
prepare reporting – and on the Climate-ADAPT management side – to ensure
quality assurance and quality control. In relation to data sets some progress has
been made,[67] which is concurring in creating a wider and more reliable data and
information base. Their linkage and an integrated use of the data stored
however remains an unsolved issue. While there are some science-policy
interface (SPI) research projects and expert groups that include climate change
adaptation as one of the main fields to focus on, many SPIs have not yet taken
up the issues of climate change adaptation into their work. It is not expected
that the situation would change dramatically without further EU intervention. Annex 9.3.1. also
provides a first assessment of identified knowledge gaps, in particular
compared to a previous exercise ran just before the adoption of the 2009 White
Paper on adaptation to climate change. 5.1.2. Options aiming at increasing knowledge generation Options 1A and option
1B, discussed below, could potentially be combined. 5.1.2.1. Option 1A: Developing a
common climate vulnerability assessment Implementing this
approach means developing in a centralised manner a climate risk assessment
sufficiently robust to provide relevant information at local and sectoral
level. At EU level, some projects look at vulnerability assessments in specific
sectors (e.g. SCENES, on water, or MOTIVE on forests) or in specific areas
(e.g. CECILIA for Central and Eastern Europe). At national level, in particular
the UK and Germany have undertaken comprehensive national climate vulnerability
assessments. The costs of similar exercises at national level have been
estimated by national authorities themselves to be between €40-45 million each.[68] It can be expected that a similar exercise at
EU level would cost at least as much. Such an exercise,
which could build on the approach of the JRC PESETA II project, described in
Annex 9.6., would close some knowledge gaps on the impacts of climate change
and the potential benefits of adaptation at sectoral and local level, for
instance in line with those mentioned in Table 1. It could
allow identifying, quantifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities across the EU
in a consistent way. However, imposing
the use of one common climate vulnerability assessment in the EU has
some limitations: i/ current activities, such as the recent global initiative
ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project can already help
achieve a better understanding of differences between impact model results relevant
globally and for Europe; ii/ Both scenarios and models are continuously
improved by a dedicated science community. Proposing one standard would lock
the state-of-the-art, and might hinder improvements and unconventional
solutions. Moreover, different models can be better suited to answer different
sets of questions. Accordingly, it would be important to exploit rather than
limit this richness. 5.1.2.2. Option 1B: Adopting a
knowledge gap strategy Administrative costs, to be split between the members of the Working Group, would result
from the organisation of the Working Group meetings, in 2013, as well as every
three years, when the knowledge gaps strategy needs to be updated. This initiative
also implies some administrative costs for Member States and stakeholders for
collecting the information, as they would need to prepare a questionnaire or
dedicated meetings, analysing and assessing the results, so as to complement
the initial proposal from the Commission. The administrative costs for Member States and stakeholders would differ depending on the format the information is
collected and the fragmentation of information available at Member States level
but no detailed estimate could be provided. There is no need for additional EU funding
per se, as this initiative only recommends a method for a better
streamlining in EU-funded research projects, under Horizon 2020 and other
research schemes, managed by EU institutions, such as the EEA's, the JRC's and
service contracts by Commission services. A better coordination of research
activities, at EU and Member States level, will result in a more efficient and
transparent allocation of resources. It also provides additional political commitment
at EU and Member States level, which notably facilitates transnationally
coordinated research. Economic, social and environmental benefits
are expected in so far as the identification of priority research areas
translates into the closing of knowledge gaps more quickly, among the
ones identified in Annex 9.3.1. Priorities could be given in addressing the
knowledge gaps identified in the more vulnerable regions or sectors within the
EU so as to benefit in particular the private actors facing knowledge when
implementing adaptation activities. 5.1.3. Options aiming at better
knowledge dissemination Option 1C and option 1E are seen as
alternative options, while option 1D could be combined to one or the other. 5.1.3.1. Option 1C: Promoting
interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other services Identifying relevant databases and developing
some guidance on how to link climate-ADAPT to such databases lead to
some direct costs for the Commission and the EEA estimated at 50.000 to 100.000
Euros. The wider economic benefits of this initiative is clearly depending on
the extent to which the guidance will be applied and therefore a quantification
in monetary terms is currently not possible. Still, it will result in avoided
costs for the EEA and other database managers for data integration into
Climate-ADAPT, reduced costs for end users in compiling and processing data due
to increased data availability (“one-stop-shop” principle). Using this
guidance would reduce barriers and enhance cooperation between institutions
(e.g. EEA and others). As the section on urban adaptation in
Climate-Adapt is currently rather limited, this option considers making
additional interlinkages with the cities platform created under the
Adaptation Strategies for European Cities project[69]. The
cost implications are therefore minimal (linking the two platforms) and the
main benefit – although impossible to quantify – relates to additional coverage
of adaptation actions at local level within Climate-ADAPT. This would address
one of the key issues currently faced by information dissemination at EU level,
namely the need to provide downscaled information on climate change and
climate change adaptation. Additional efforts, for the moment
impossible to quantify, will also be required to link the results of the Copernicus
(formally known as the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) Climate
Service to Climate-ADAPT. The Climate Service will be based on satellite and
in-situ monitoring data, modelling of the entire Earth system, including model
reanalysis and data assimilation. It will allow a better assessment of local
and sectoral vulnerabilities, and therefore providing additional data for
proper climate risk assessments. Making available this set of information to
decision-makers via Climate-ADAPT would have positive economic, social and
environmental impacts. Such impacts remain however impossible to quantify
without knowing the detailed structure of the Copernicus Climate Service,
currently under discussion. 5.1.3.2. Option 1D: Supporting
exchange between science and policy in the field of adaptation. Climate change adaptation topics can be
included in upcoming science-policy interface (SPI) research projects
under Horizon 2020. Two approaches could be considered: including specific work
packages dedicated to climate change adaptation “climate checking” the results
and recommendations ex-ante to identify where climate change adaptation would
be needed. An alternative approach is to set up
an expert group with the sole objective of addressing specific climate change
adaptation questions. Under this option, climate adaptation experts at national
and sub-national level would meet via a conference (e.g. every 18 months)
to continue to exchange ideas and experiences on climate change adaptation
measures and/or programmes to ensure that across Europe stakeholders are
working with the highest level and most up-to-date information. Organising such
a conference on climate change adaptation in Europe would be between 50,000
Euro and 200,000 Euro based on past experiences. This exercise can also be the opportunity
to increase awareness raising and business engagement in adaptation
policy making and planning. To date, business engagement has been focused on
issues related to mitigation rather than on adaptation. A specific strategy
for mobilising private sector strengths and assets is needed. There is some
untapped data and knowledge potential in the private sector which should be
maximised, and which an adequate science policy interface will help unfold. The benefits this option would bring relate
to further stimulating research and development, as well as innovation,
in the field of climate change adaptation in a broad spectrum of sectors, thus
placing the EU well on the international market. The bringing together of
research and translating it in a way that policy makers can understand is
essential for them to make the right choices in drawing up policies on adaptation;
furthermore, it will make the public better informed on climate change
adaptation issues as well, which fosters individual, collective and
organisational learning, leading to changes in organisational practices and
culture. 5.1.3.3. Option 1E: Proposal for
mandatory set-up of national adaptation platforms Developing national adaptation platforms is
costly, in particular if it has to be preceded by research on climate change
impacts. In Germany, the research costs were estimated at about €40 million. Another
crucial issue is the agreement on common quality standards across Member States and ensuring that the national and EU level information is following them.
The request from the EU to develop such platforms may therefore not be
sufficient to ensure their effective implementation. National adaptation platforms have a clear
benefit in bringing together national information and providing it
together with guidance for national, regional and local planners. Such
platforms on the national level can also avoid competition and duplication of
efforts and enhance complementarities between the various systems, strengthening
national cooperation. Finally the information can be made available in the
national language and therefore reach a broader range of stakeholders. 5.2. Expected impacts of options aiming
at increasing the resilience of the EU territory 5.2.1. No policy change Although most Member States are to some
extent active in terms of adaptation, as of January 2013, almost half of Member
States have not yet adopted an adaptation strategy. Without additional action,
the barriers currently preventing national, regional or local authorities from
developing their own adaptation strategies are likely to remain in place, be it
in terms of human or financial resources. Moreover, adaptation strategies will
likely vary in terms of scope, level of ambition and agreed financing of
adaptation measures. Also the timeframe for adaptation will differ. Some
countries might develop sectoral approaches only, covering a limited number of
sectors. The persistent financial and economic
crisis makes it difficult to provide the necessary financial resources to
develop adaptation strategies. A decentralised approach would increase already
existing disparities within the EU with respect to the potential
vulnerabilities to climate change. Communities, regions will develop their own
approaches, leading to a heterogeneous pattern of adaptation efforts. This
might lead to greater economic, social and territorial disparities counteracting
with the Union objectives on cohesion. Trans-boundary issues will remain a gap in
most of the strategies. Trans-boundary issues are more complex than issues
mainly affecting national and sub-national issues because procedures, laws,
etc. might vary from country to country. A lack of coordination on
trans-boundary issues could potentially lead to conflicting adaptation
responses and would not provide for an effective approach to tackle common
risks. 5.2.2. Options aiming at promoting and facilitating adaptation
policies at Member State and regional level Options 2A, 2B and 2C, discussed below, can
be combined. 5.2.2.1. Option 2A: EU Guidelines for adaptation strategies The development of the guidelines for
adaptation strategies takes stock of on-going adaptation activities in EU
Member States and beyond, draws on lessons learnt and experiences and specific
exchange with stakeholders on certain issues of common interest. Recommendations
are relevant for all EU Member States, independent from their state of
adaptation efforts. Yet, they could benefit in priority those Member States
less advanced in adaptation action, which, as shown in section 2.5.2., are
often also the most vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change. Cost savings for each Member State are mainly to be expected by providing in the guidelines a comprehensive compilation of
all issues needed to be addressed to prepare adaptation strategies complemented
with various tools and information sources. Furthermore, if recommendations
from the guidelines are taken up by Member States, cost-efficiency can also
be expected by preparing for a range of risks that are to be anticipated with
climatic changes. As such, the guidelines would not provide for recommendations
at sectoral level, but the recommended climate change risk assessment, when
implemented, would identify for each Member States most vulnerable sectors.
Developing preventive response actions will increase coping capacity and reduce
potential damage costs. Furthermore, more efforts invested in a comprehensive
adaptation policy will ease the implementation thereof and prepare all
necessary mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation in advance, thus reducing
costs at a later stage of the policy process. The above highlighted savings for
Member States and potentially further stakeholders that make use of the
guidelines clearly outweighs the investment to develop these guidelines, which
is estimated to be between 50.000 and 90.000 Euros[70] from
the side of the Commission. In terms of social implications, the
guidelines can assist in enhancing the preparedness of Member States and the
adaptive capacity of society, especially of those population groups that are
most affected. Taking into account recommendations from the guidelines for
stakeholder involvement can ensure that no potential risks will be overlooked
and social implications of climate change are dealt with in a preventive
manner. Environmental impacts are to be expected merely positive. Climate change as a
cross-cutting issue unfolds various effects on a number of environmental
systems (such as water, soil, biodiversity). Dealing with all those issues in
an integrated manner would ensure that cross-cutting issues and
interdependencies are thoroughly assessed and that appropriate adaptation
responses are developed. 5.2.2.2. Option 2B: Using Life+
funding for supporting the preparation of adaptation strategies and for
lighthouse projects on adaptation Building upon experience and knowledge from other countries where comprehensive adaptation strategies have
already been adopted and are being implemented can reduce the time and
resources needed and contribute to capacity building. Staff exchange schemes
are beneficial both for outgoing- and incoming partner institutions. Projects
under this scheme can be financed via Life+ and contribute to building new or
strengthen existing networks and collaborations between Member States and
associated countries and other third countries. The eligibility of the LIFE funding for the
development of adaptation strategies and action plans can include obligation
to apply good practices and guidance. It can also cover important sectors
and ensure compatibility with the EU environmental policies; and foster
transnational collaboration and cooperative problem solving. Moreover, the LIFE proposal encourages lighthouse
projects set to develop, test and demonstrate policy or management
approaches, best practices, and solutions, for climate change adaptation in,
but not limited to, transboundary areas. The development of such
lighthouse cross-sectoral and cross-border projects can also make use of an innovation
in the proposed Regulation, namely integrated projects (IP). A typical IP would
receive funding from several sources – European, public and private – not only
the LIFE programme. Among the topics that are suitable for lighthouse projects,
the following ones have been identified as particularly relevant to address
climate change adaptation issues. These suggestions are notably based on the
identification of knowledge gaps discussed above and on issues that could help
address vulnerabilities in sectors and regions most at risk: Cross-border
management of floods; Transboundary coastal management; Key
infrastructure protection; Adaptation to climate change in urban areas;
or Forest management. 5.2.2.3. Option 2C: Commission's
proposal on the adoption of adaptation strategies for all Member States by 2017 Developing a comprehensive Adaptation
Strategy needs commitment. Its drafting alone entails efforts estimated as
follows: some three full-time employees on average over the course of two years
or more, supported by consultants, depending on the level of ambition of the
vulnerability and risk assessments conducted. Total costs depend on how
detailed the adaptation strategy/action plan is, how many sectors are
addressed, whether concrete actions are specified or not and the number of
conducted stakeholder consultations. Experience in the EU Member States and
regions puts the cost of developing an adaptation strategy between 1 million
euro and 48 million euro, depending on the number of studies commissioned,
modelling done, etc. Based on the scope of existing strategies
and their estimated cost by Member States, rough cost estimates suggest that
around €3 million would be needed for the development of an adaptation
strategy in line with the considered EU guidelines (option 2A, assessed
above), not counting the elaboration of implementation action plans where these
are not included already in the adaptation strategies. The cost implications
for those Member States who need to revise their adaptation strategies will not
be higher than €3 million, as they can still build on their existing framework
and mechanisms. Although not easily quantifiable, there are
benefits to be expected from the adoption of an adaptation strategy, whose type
relates to the ones described in detail in the assessment of policy option
2A – guidelines on preparing adaptation strategies. The extent of the
benefits would however vary. The main advantage in an additional stimulus is in
the use of the suggestions made in the guidelines, which would translate in a
consistent and comprehensive treatment of climate change adaptation
considerations by 2020 in all Member States, taking account of local and
sectoral differences. It would also ensure an adequate coverage of
transboundary issues, currently overlooked. Cost-efficiency will be
increased by sharing financial burdens of implementing adaptation measures as
joint activities in a cross-border context. Furthermore, large-scale impacts
causes e.g. through extreme events that would highly affect low-income groups
can be reduced or even avoided. Further, potential un-coordinated responses
could be avoided. Exchange of good practices in dealing with climate change
impacts will be fostered. An inclusion of transboundary considerations in all
adaptation strategies would enhance in the long-term the adaptive capacity of
environmental systems, in particular with regard to water, biodiversity and
soil. Without a systematic overview of climate
risks – which needs to be regularly adapted as more knowledge is obtained –the
impacts of climate change will likely be addressed mostly reactively and
randomly, which would be significantly more costly than considering, in an
orderly way, whether and how public authorities, the private sector and
citizens should adapt. Moreover, this would prevent some of the negative
impacts identified under the baseline scenario from unfolding and avoid the
greater costs of inaction. The main differences between the three
options occur when discussing the effectiveness of each option and their
political acceptance, presented in the following section of the report. 5.2.3. Options aiming
at promoting and facilitating adaptation action for cities Options 2D and 2E, discussed below, are
seen as alternative options. 5.2.3.1. Option 2D: promoting the
UNISDR cities campaign Currently, 1067 cities worldwide are signed
up and involved, including around 330 from the EU27, though most of these are
from Austria (280) and Italy (34). All participants to the
“Making Cities Resilient” campaign are expected to be self-supporting as
they organize awareness-raising events, convene meetings and engage in planning
on campaign objectives. It is not possible to put exact figures on this since
the cost will be determined by the actions that each individual city chooses to
take. The Commission is already advertising the existence of this campaign. The
hosting campaign events, such as EU-based conferences, mentioned in the
description of the option would result in additional costs of about 50,000 –
200,000 Euros, based on experience for similar types of events. The wider
economic benefits of this initiative are in terms of stimulating adaptation
and disaster risk reduction planning at city level. While it may require
some investment in the short term, it should result in the avoidance of much
larger damage costs in the future, when extreme weather events are experienced.
In addition, sharing of good practice and engagement in the international
network could drive innovation in urban adaptation measures across a broad
spectrum of sectors, potentially supporting creation of jobs and increasing EU
market share in adaptation technologies. The opportunity to exchange learning experiences between cities might
result in more efficient adaptation decision-making at city level. 5.2.3.2. Option 2E: Inclusion of
adaptation into the framework of the Covenant of Mayors The Covenant of Mayors was officially
launched in January 2008. Since then, this initiative has met large
international success: 2,108 European cities had signed political commitments
by November 2012. The initiative addresses local and regional authorities,
voluntarily committing to increasing energy efficiency and use of renewable
energy sources on their territories. By their commitment, Covenant signatories
aim to meet and exceed the European Union's 20% CO2 reduction objective by
2020. The approach of ensuring voluntary, local
political commitment for EU policy objectives was replicated in two other
cases: i/ enlargement of the approach to cities in the Eastern Partnership and
Central Asia; ii/ the Green Digital Charter commits cities to work together to
deliver on the EU climate objectives using digital technologies. Hence both
projects are linked within the Covenant of Mayors framework, and in addition
some of the same partners are in charge of the operative support. However,
these initiatives are run through separate service contracts. Implementing
climate change adaptation related actions alongside existing initiatives can
help meet the objectives and reach cost-effectiveness. For example, in the UK, the Nottingham Declaration[71] was successfully extended from covering only climate mitigation to
include adaptation, and then further developed to provide action packs and
supporting guidance. Synergies
with the Covenant of Mayors and related initiatives within its framework, via a
common interface and common activities, can help increasing the effectiveness. Establishing
a supporting structure to deal with adaptation actions, like the Covenant of
Mayors Office for climate mitigation, would require EU funding to
administrate and steer the initiative. This has been estimated at around 500.000
Euro a year, with a one-off additional investment required to launch the
new area of action. The monitoring and evaluation of the municipalities'
activities on adaptation can be supported by elaborating a methodology and
related guidelines and through enhanced cooperation with the EEA. . In
addition, an estimated budget of around 200.000 Euro should be foreseen to
design and promote such an initiative, based on a bottom-up approach and
involving existing city networks and cities directly. The pledge for climate
adaptation actions, similarly to the Covenant of Mayors, will be a voluntary
commitment. Hence the adhesion is fully free of charge for the cities. However there
are costs to cities to follow up on pledges they sign up for. Using evidence
from the study on Adaptation Strategies for European Cities, the cost for
each city can be estimated at about €50,000[72], to be considered as the higher range of potential costs since above
described supporting structure will have some resources to provide support to
cities engaging in such activities. Such estimated costs do not include the
costs of implementing actions following the adoption of the adaptation
strategies. Given
the role cities have to play in increasing Europe’s resilience to climate
change, positive economic, social and environmental impacts would stem from
ensuring cities are still good places to live. This could be reinfored by
prioritising adaptation action in cities located in vulnerable areas, such as,
flood- or drought-prone areas, coastal zones, mountain areas and outermost
regions. Establishing strong spatial planning which stops placing homes,
businesses and infrastructure into current but also future risk-prone areas or
providing more room for rivers can be an effective and sustainable way to deal
with risks complementary to building higher dikes. For instance, the potential
for promoting green infrastructures within cities would be enhanced, which
creates multiple benefits. Green roofs and walls, for example, facilitate
shading and evaporation and help to cope with hot weather. Increasing tree
cover by 25% was estimated to reduce afternoon air temperatures by 5 to 10°C.[73] Adaptation to climate change at local level also offers the
opportunity for developing new jobs and promoting innovation. 5.3. Expected impacts of options aiming
at increasing resilience in key sectors 5.3.1. No policy change The
implementation phase of the 2009 White Paper can be considered as successful.
Most actions have been implemented and in some cases, EU initiatives went
beyond the White Paper's recommendations (see Annex 9.4.1 for details). Yet,
among the number of EU policies that are or will gradually be affected by the
adverse effects of climate change, some still do not sufficiently take into
consideration the need to adapt to those negative effects. Moreover, in some cases (e.g. energy policy), a lot of attention
has been paid to the greenhouse gas mitigation objectives while not necessarily
integrating in the EU policy discussions vulnerability to climate change or
adaptation options to reduce vulnerability. In addition, in many sectors,
adaptation considerations have been addressed on ad hoc basis, and insufficient
attention has been given to the implementing measures accompanying broad policy
objectives. In particular, clear requirements in the Commission's proposals
allow for serious consideration of climate change impacts in Cohesion Policy
and Common Agricultural Policy for 2014-2020. At the same time, these
requirements are flexible in nature, and allow for a great deal of
interpretation by both the Member States and the Commission in their practical
implementation. The EU is a major investor in
public infrastructure projects. European, investment-based development policies
such as EU cohesion policy, TEN-T and TEN-E, help overcoming gaps in
infrastructure needs, especially in Convergence regions. Due to the long life
spans of infrastructure and their great economic value, their preparedness for
current and future impacts of climate change is critical. Hence, an assessment
of a project's risk-exposure and vulnerability to climate change impacts is
vital to guarantee its long-term sustainability. Accordingly, for some EU
policy areas, climate resilience has already been taken up as a parameter in
obligatory cost-benefit analyses during the project development phase.[74] However, there is no common
requirement to do so. There is also no common methodology or guidelines in
place which could help project promoters to systematically assess the climate
resilience of infrastructure projects and improve their sustainability and
liability in changing climate conditions. Evidence[75] also
suggests that there is a certain lack of awareness of project promoters for
climate issues and insufficient knowlegde on how to conduct the climate
resilience checks for projects, especially private sector-driven projects. At EU level, the
inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in the design of
buildings has just started. As already announced in the 2009 White Paper, a
mandate has been adopted which would require standardisation organisations to
consider, in the context of their work to update Eurocodes, developing a
technical report analysing and providing guidance for potential amendments for
Eurocodes with regard relevant impacts of future climate change. Eurocodes are
a set of harmonized technical rules developed by the European Committee for
Standardisation for the structural design of construction works in the European
Union. The Eurocodes therefore replace the existing national technical
standards, published by national standard bodies, although many countries had a
period of co-existence. They provide a common approach for the design of
buildings and other civil engineering works. They cover earthquake resistance,
but not yet climate proofing. Since March 2010 the Eurocodes have to be
accepted in all public tenders as means of calculating structural design and
are de-facto standard for the private sector. A consultation
among national standardisation bodies showed that only limited efforts have
been undertaken at national level to further climate-proof design standards.
Denmark seems to have done some pioneer work on this issue. Road regulations
and railway standards are being/will be reviewed and revised with consideration
of expected climate changes. The standardisation body in the UK is also active,
with specific emphasis on climate change adaptation
measures in their standardization work with the construction sector (i.e.
standards on water supply, flooding and the like); risk/resilience
standardization (project underway to explore the role of risk/resilience
standardization in the context of climate change adaptation), and more
recently, their biodiversity work (where climate change adaptation is currently
considered within the context of the UK planning regime). Other national standardisation bodies active include the ones in BE,
DE and NL. 5.3.2. Options aiming at a more consistent and comprehensive
mainstreaming of adaptation Options 3B and 3C are alternatives. Option
3A could be combined to either or. 5.3.2.1. Option 3A: Guidance on how
to mainstream adaptation into Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural
Policy The guidance document will provide advice,
methods, and examples aiming at ensuring that climate adaptation objectives are
understood, fully addressed, and integrated into Member States’ Rural
Development Programmes (RDP) and Operational Programmes for the next
programming period (2014-2020). The guidance is intended to be used by Managing
Authorities as well as other actors participating in programme development,
consultation, and evaluation including climate experts and external
stakeholders involved in the process. The costs of developing the guidance are
estimated at €200,000, to be supported by the Commission[76]. A mix of “grey” (as related to
infrastructure), “green” (as related to the environment/ecosystems/green
infrastructure), and “soft” (as related to human capital and adaptive
capacities) adaptation options need to be promoted in future Cohesion
Policy and the CAP. The set of implemented options will yet vary throughout the
EU. These will depend on the nature and severity of the climate change threats
as well as on regional circumstances, including adaptive capacity. Adaptation options can have high
benefit-cost ratios, although the cost- benefit largely depend on the national
and regional context and the assumed climate scenarios. Preliminary work has
identified the following adaptation actions as potentially worth for funding by
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD): buffer strips for
agricultural land, storm retention reservoirs, on-farm water storage, measures
to adapt to river and coastal flooding. Other cost-effective options include:
floodplain management, the planting of winter cover to prevent soil erosion,
improvement of animal rearing conditions and high-efficiency ventilation. As
regards Cohesion Policy, cost-effective actions are: early warning systems,
adapting rail tracks to higher temperatures and adapting electricity grids. Of particular importance is the possibility
to make use of EU funds, in the context of the “Enhancing the competitiveness
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)” objective of the Cohesion Policy
proposal. An awareness raising campaign for SMEs could for instance help
disseminate the relevant information and facilitate the uptake of autonomous
adaptation by the private sector. Increasing awareness in the private sector
contributes to reducing the burden of climate change and climate change
adaptation for public finances, both because the private sector will also
invest in adaptation measures (direct effect) and also because the non-insured
losses following natural disasters will be reduced[77]. It
also benefits the workers' right to information and consultation within the
undertaking[78] as additional information would be provided on the climatic risks
faced by their company and its location. Existing instruments such as the
Enterprise Europe Network, which is articulated across Europe on the basis of
territorial entities, can be used to modulate the message according to local
and regional specificities. EU Funds can also be used to promote training and
skill upgrade for smaller companies. For instance, this could help undertake retro-fitting
and maintenance of buildings to increase energy efficiency and resilience to
climate change by promoting the use of adequate skills and "best available
technology". 5.3.2.2. Option 3B: Listing
mainstreaming priorities in EU policies and engaging with key stakeholders This option proposes a strategic approach
for mainstreaming climate change adaptation into EU legislation. So far, only a
limited number of legislative acts are considering climate change. Based on the
assessment described in the problem description the priority initiatives for
mainstreaming adaptation in the following years should focus on the following
areas and actions. Climate resilience of the transport,
energy and construction sectors: some specific options are discussed below
(section 5.3.2). In the case of mainstreaming in the health sector,
integration of future climate change risks is expected to result in fewer heat
related deaths through improved surveillance mechanisms and contingency
planning taking due account of potentially more frequent and extreme weather
events due to climate change. Fostering preventive actions would reduce the risk
of spreading of pests and diseases considering changes in certain disease
carriers (e.g. by the Asian tiger mosquito). The mainstreaming of adaptation to
climate change in social policies might not always involve direct
additions or edits of the texts of current legislation and other policy
documents, however, it certainly does provide additional reasoning and
importance for the development of EU social policies due to the fact that
successful achievement of social policy aims is inseparably linked to successful
strengthening of the adaptive capacity of societies. Coastal zones are
one of the high risk – but at the same time one of the most dynamic and
developing areas – in the EU territory. Increased mainstreaming into this
policy area could reduce this risk but could also contribute to a sustainable
development in the future. Additional mainstreaming would also improve
environmental protection, by integrating adaptation considerations in environmental
policies, such as strategic environmental assessments. Regarding
disaster risk reduction, the Commission would prepare guidelines of a
voluntary nature on disaster prevention, for a greater knowledge of good
practices of disaster prevention by Member States. The provision of disaster
prevention guidelines would have a limited cost on the EU budget (less than
400,000 Euro[79]). Such guidelines are expected to promote the sharing of valuable
experiences and the take up of good practices by Member States in areas such as
governance, planning, disaster data, research etc. As supported by Member
States in several Council conclusions, sharing experiences and good practices
is an essential component of prevention policy, as well as developing a
prevention culture that is shared by all actors. Besides the direct benefits that further
integration of climate change adaptation will create when EU legislations are
being revised, listing priority initiatives for further mainstreaming would raise
awareness of the need to integrate climate change considerations in key EU
policy areas. It fosters a dialogue with respective Commission services, but
also with Member States and other stakeholders and allows for greater
transparency. Benefits relate to a clear commitment to act at EU level
to integrate climate change considerations in all relevant EU policies in a
coordinated and well-planned manner. Similarly, anticipatory policy making on
Member States level can save costs, while avoiding potential overlaps in
mainstreaming efforts at national level. In fact, Member States would ensure
that the calendar of revisions of their national legislations to take account
of adaptation is in line with what the EU has planned in the same policy
fields. In addition to mainstreaming activities,
the Commission would engage with dedicated stakeholders all through the
implementation phase of the Strategy. The main objective would to be to prepare
the ground for potential legislative revisions and to identify relevant actions
to be implemented under the current legal context. First, it seems essential to
start engaging with insurance companies. The Commission is preparing a
paper on the prevention and insurance of disasters, foreseen for adoption in
2013. A stakeholders' involvement process would then follow, with the objective
of identifying good practice in the EU and detailing the need for additional
information at EU level. The objective is to ensure that insurance, both as a
sector and as an instrument for adaptation, provides the adequate incentives
for investments and business decisions so as to secure the long-term resilience
and competitiveness of the EU's economy. Efficient market functioning would
ensure that the potential costs associated with increased insurance premiums in
vulnerable areas would be outweighed by the avoided losses in case of natural
disasters. Second, while there is evidence of the
contribution of public investment banks (e.g. European Investment Bank) on
adaptation to climate change, less is known about the role of commercial
banks. Engaging with commercial banks would close knowledge gaps on the
approach undertaken by the financial sector. The impacts of the option are
impossible to quantify at this stage but it is not about imposing additional
constraints on the sector[80]. If effective, the policy would improve access to finance through a
more adequate offer of financial instruments on the EU market, in relation to
climate adaptation. Small businesses face the biggest constraints limiting the
type and scale of adaptation actions they can take[81].
Engaging with financial institutions and the banking sector to promote climate
resilient investments is likely to help SMEs to overcome financial barriers by
allowing them to adapt their operations and/or respond to new market demands by
investing in product / service development. Third, engaging with stakeholders dealing
with social issues would also be a priority of the Commission, in order
to better identify how Member States currently protect their vulnerable groups
and how existing EU instruments can be used to increase resilience. The first
step is to engage with representatives from Member States and relevant
stakeholders through, for instance, the existing Adaptation Steering Group, on
how they approach the social issues associated with climate change adaptation.
It will help identify good practice and potential gaps that could be filled by
EU intervention as regards health or employment issues. On employment, a
dedicated work programme would identify, based on on-the-ground experience,
requested skills and potential shortages for adaptation activities. It could
also help identify most vulnerable activities and good practice could be shared
on how to address such vulnerabilities. On health issues, the first step would
be to clarify the current achievements and the potential benefits of some of
the initiatives now under discussion, such as the new plant and animal health
Laws. 5.3.2.3. Option 3C: Setting new
calendar for revision of key EU legislation as part of the mainstreaming
exercise The main advantage would be that climate
change adaptation issues would be brought to the forefront sooner. It
may be advantageous to do so in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy, where
ambitious objectives have also been agreed regarding the current and future of
the EU to climate change. This initiative may be difficult to carry
out given its political nature. Certain revision dates have been subject to
long political negotiations between the EU, the Council and the Commission with
input from the Member States. Changing this timing could cause political
conflicts. Furthermore, there is a possibility that moving the legislative
revision forward might result in the introduction of other (hidden) political
agendas. Moreover, as highlighted by the
developments in water policy in the EU, voluntary action can pre-empt the
need for causing legislation to be revised at an earlier stage. Climate
change action is not required under the Water Framework Directive, but in 2009
the Water Directors agreed to follow a common implementation strategy guidance
on how to climate check river basin management plans. 5.3.3. Options aiming at increasing the resilience of major
infrastructure investments Options 3D, 3E and 3F, discussed below,
could potentially be combined. 5.3.3.1. Option 3D: Guidelines for
project developers for climate proofing vulnerable investments This option would help
developers of physical assets and infrastructure to incorporate resilience to
current climate variability and future climate change within their projects.
The estimated cost of developping these guidelines is slightly
above €100.000[82], to be supported by the Commission. The Climate-ADAPT platform as
well as additional publicity measures can be used to increase the up-take. The Guidelines may be
usefully applied to any investment project with a lifetime of more than 15 to
20 years, depending on the sector, because it is on these timescales that
climate change impacts will increasingly be felt. As such, they are not sector
specific but do identify a range of practices that could be considered for each
type of project. Specifically, the guidelines would help for the following: i/
‘Climate-influenced projects’ – assets and infrastructure projects whose
success may be affected if climate change is ignored; and ii/ ‘Climate adaptation
projects’ – whose main aim is to reduce vulnerability to climate hazards, such
as a flood management scheme. Climate proofing can be expected to slightly increase costs for
infrastructure projects. A
World Bank study[83] found that the net cost of adapting infrastructure
to climate change is no more than 1-2% of the total cost of providing that
infrastructure, as additional preparatory work may be needed, and some
technical choices would need to be amended. However, at the same time, climate
resilience may decrease costs over a longer period as it helps preventing
damages to and interruptions of infrastructure. The economic costs and benefits of certain adaptation options in the
energy and transport sector have been assessed.[84] Net
benefits are identified for adaptation measures due to electricity demand triggered
by supplemental cooling or for better drainage systems. Conversely, the investment
costs for better heat-resistant asphalt seem to outweigh the expected benefits.
The high level of uncertainty suggests however that such assessment would have
to be repeated on a case-by-case basis. Major effects on employment would
not be expected from the measure, if it is assumed that the upgrading of
infrastructures (e.g. improved drainage capacity) is integrated into the
regular reinvestment cycle. This would be different if existing infrastructure
was retrofitted before the end of its economic life span; but this would also
incur significantly higher cost than anticipated in this estimation. The EU industry is a main producer of
technologies for energy infrastructure. Many countries
outside the EU are also facing the challenge of installing electricity networks
that are better-adapted to climate change and that meet the needs of changing
generation patterns, which potentially increases the demand for European
technologies and expertise in the world market. The investment need in this
sector would have also a positive impact on small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
in the fields of construction, mechanical engineering and business services. Environmental benefits relate to reduced CO2 emissions, notably where mitigation measures
directly and indirectly target adaptation (e.g. improved energy performance of
buildings[85] helping to avoid energy demand peaks during heating/cooling
periods) and avoiding contamination of land and natural resources, especially
where infrastructure is resilient in case of extreme weather events (e.g.
flooding of power generators or waste water treatment facilities). To ensure a minimum up-take and application
by project promoters, the European level could encourage Member States and
regions to use it by including a reference into EU documents on
cost-benefit-analysis and ex-ante project assessments for various policy areas,
notably for projects under EU structural funds, TEN-T and TEN-E. However, the
decision whether to apply the guidelines or not would remain with the project
promoters or involved financial partners. The non-binding character of the
guidelines means lower impact on project promoters, thus on infrastructure
projects. However, it avoids an 'over-regulation' of projects as well as
a reduced administrative burden. In any case, access to finance for the
private sector can be achieved through the direct provision of grants by the EU
and other private funding mechanisms including traditional loan finance and
equity finance. The existing suite of grant schemes are set out within the
proposed 2014-2020 Multi-annual Financial Framework and future MFFs to 2050 are
seen as an opportunity to embed finance for adaptation measures. 5.3.3.2. Option 3E: Promoting
inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in relevant
infrastructure standards Mapping relevant
standards and identifying the ones to be revised is
a work of 1-2 years for standardisation organisations, with direct cost
implications to organise the coordination of this exercise. For instance,
according to CEN/CENELEC, some 500-1000 relevant transport standards need to be
mapped. A detailed cost estimate at EU and Member State level to carry out this
work could not be undertaken but main costs would relate to working time for
dozens of national experts from EU 27 to be involved over several years.
Including adaptation considerations in the environmental guide would have
limited costs as this can be prepared centrally. The Environmental guide
supports the assessment of sustainability during the development and amendment
of standards. It assesses the impact from a product/process on its environment
following a life cycle approach. For adaptation/climate proofing to be covered
by the guide, it should also assess the impact of the environment on a
product/process. Life-cycle thinking currently applied would also be relevant
for adaptation, as that would prescribe consideration of climate change risks
in all product development cycles from initial product development to raw
material sources, to production processes to use and disposal options. Due to
the voluntary nature of the guidance, the application cannot be guaranteed,
even if the current version of the guidance document is highly accepted by the
sector. This option is a first and important
step in a longer process to engage with stakeholders and to make European
infrastructure and buildings more climateresilient. It certainly contributes to
closing some knowledge gaps on the potential impacts of climate change on
infrastructure and on identifying technical solutions. On the other hand,
standards factoring in climate change risks lead in some cases to increased
resource consumption (e.g. thicker steel) for construction products. Research
on change in construction and on new materials would reduce these negative
environmental impacts[86]. Uncertainty in climate modelling and
potential lack of data/information in climate impacts for specific regions will
make the amendment of any standard a difficult exercise. There is a risk that
certain amendments will lead to overshooting the target and therewith
unnecessary costs. 5.3.3.3. Option 3F: Proposal on
mandatory requirements for climate resilience of infrastructure projects Given the important
role of the EU in Europe's infrastructure investment, a mandatory consideration
of climate resilience will not only help in ensuring greater sustainability of
action but also in promoting climate change adaptation as a EU policy priority.
The
implementation of this option may however be difficult. First, this may induce
increased project costs (short-term) due to additional investment for
adaptation solutions, which could have negative impacts on the short-term
competitiveness of European firms. Second, the uncertainty in climate
modelling and potential lack of data/information in climate impacts for
specific project sites may make the guidelines difficult to apply in practice.
Third, the climate proofing of projects would create additional administrative
burden for project promoters and for financing institutions to include it in
cost-benefit analysis, in particular when such institutions have already their
own approaches for climate proofing vulnerable investments, as currently the
case for the EIB. 6. Comparing
the policy options 6.1. Comparing options on promoting better-informed decision making 6.1.1. Effectiveness, efficiency and coherence Option 1A –
developing a common climate vulnerability assessment in the EU may not be as effective as other options to close
knowledge gaps, as a single climate vulnerability assessment would not allow
from benefitting of the interactions between approaches and varying
circumstances they can cover. The impacts would also be more limited on the
other two objectives. In comparison to the
baseline, option 1B – adopting a knowledge gap strategy will strengthen
knowledge generation, in particular in relation to existing policy needs
expressed at national and sectoral level, which indirectly contributes to the
other two objectives of the Strategy. However, the effectiveness of the impacts
on adaptation action will depend on other factors, as for example the political
willingness or financial capacity. In terms of efficiency,
option 1B may seem much less costly than option 1A, but it is
also due to the fact that it focuses mainly on a better streamlining of
existing funds. In that respect, this will have positive implications on the
use of EU funds as the identified and prioritised knowledge gaps will be
mainstreamed into Horizon 2020, as well as in other research pathways (e.g.
JRC, EEA, service contracts, Life+). Option 1C – Promoting
interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other services contributes to better decision-making by ensuring the dissemination
of information, specifically targeting improved data management, data access,
sharing, harmonization, interoperability as well as the integration of data and
services. Efficiency gains are mainly expected for final users, who can benefit
from a "one-stop-shop" principle when Climate-ADAPT becomes the focal
point on adaptation information in Europe. Option 1D –
supporting exchange between science and policy makers is effective in contributing to better-informed decision-making by
adding additional paths to knowledge dissemination. In particular, it allows a
very direct exchange between Member States, the Commission and stakeholders,
which can increase capacity-building and contribute to a better understanding
of adaptation. The assessment of past trends, as reported
by the EEA, on the development of adaptation portals at national level, led us
to conclude that there is no need for additional EU-promoted action in this
area, Option 1E – mandatory adaptation portals, would only have limited
impacts compared to business as usual. All options discussed here are coherent
with other EU policy objectives such as the ones set out in the Horizon 2020. The
results of the public consultation of the EU Adaptation Strategy confirm enhanced
support for research initiatives. When asked which actions could improve the
use of EU funding for projects, respondents rated ‘coordination among research
projects’ (option 1B) and ‘strengthening the science-policy interface’ (option
1D) as having medium to high potential (55% and 81% of respondents,
respectively). Conversely, Member States may oppose, on subsidiarity grounds, a
proposal for mandatory national adaptation platforms (option 1E). 6.1.2. Summary table[87] || Economic, social, and environmental impacts || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence /acceptability Better informed decision-making || Increasing the resilience of the EU territory || Increasing the resilience of key sectors BAU || || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Option 1A: developing a common climate vulnerability assessment || At least 40 million Euros at EU level for a comprehensive vulnerability assessment; close knowledge gaps and increase resilience || + closes knowledge gaps, but risks locking vulnerability assessment in an inadequate approach || + / ≈ Closing knowledge gaps helps in facilitating adaptation action at sub-EU level but top-down approach can limit effectiveness || + Would contribute to closing knowledge gaps per sector, provided sectoral assessments are conducted || Low cost-efficieincy as does not allow benefitting from other methods or local assessments || Could be in contradiction with approach followed by MS who have already conducted national vulnerability assessment Option 1B: adopting a knowledge gap strategy || Limited administrative costs will arise for collecting information; indirect positive eco, soc. and env benefits via more effective efforts to close knowledge gaps || ++ Common understanding of most pressing knowledge gaps and coordinated efforts to close them || + Triggers interactions with Member States' needs for adaptation action || + Triggers interactions with stakeholders' needs for adaptation action || + Better value for money for EU funded research, but additional administrative burden for MS and stakeholders || + in line with Horizon 2020 objectives Option 1C: Promoting interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other services || - costs of guidance documents and efforts to link platforms (≈ 100,000 for EC and EEA) + 'one-stop shop' for end users, which faciliates decision-making; soc. benefits via enhanced cooperation among data holders || + / ++ "One-stop-shop" concept || + Additional information on adaptation at local level || ≈ || + Limited cost but large benefits to be expected from interoperability || + Promotes more efficient use of Climate-ADAPT Option 1D: Supporting exchange between science and policy makers || - costs of conferences (between 50,000 and 200,000 annually for the EC); + integration of adaptation in research and innovation agenda at sectoral level || + Feedback from experience on the ground; increase adaptive capacity || ≈ || + Promotes cooperation in sectoroal and/or adaptation specific fora || + / ? Relative efficiency of integrating adaptation in existing SPIs vs. dedicated forum is uncertain || + Stakeholders in favour of additional interactions between researchers and decision-makers Option 1E: proposal for mandatory set-up of national climate adaptation platforms || - costs of setting up a platform for MS (can be as high as €40 million) + info disseminated in national languages; favours cooperation between regions within a MS || + Provides additional information at national level || + Improves EU coverage on information on adaptation actions || ≈ || ≈ / - Costly to implement; no clear additional benefit compared to BAU || ? Subsidiarity issues Magnitude of impact
as compared with the baseline scenario (the baseline is indicated as 0): ++
strongly positive; + positive; – – strongly negative; – negative; ≈
marginal/neutral; ? Uncertain 6.2. Comparing options on promoting
adaptation at sub-EU level 6.2.1. Effectiveness, efficiency and coherence The problem description identified three
main barriers to the development of adaptation strategies at sub-EU level: lack
of knowledge, be it in terms of the impacts of climate change or in terms of
how to define adaptation policy processes, lack of financial resources, and
political reluctance. Option 2A – EU guidelines for national
adaptation policies would not address by itself all
the barriers to effective adaptation. For instance, they would not help
overcome any financial constraints faced by Member States or regional
authorities in developing adaptation strategies. Therefore, if adopted in
isolation, the effectiveness of the measure would remain limited. This option
would be coherent with the better regulation objectives of the EU, which aims
at working more closely with Member States and reinforcing the constructive
dialogue between stakeholders and all regulators at the EU and national levels.
Representatives from Member States widely agreed that the development of guidelines
for national adaptation policy making would be of added value. Option 2B – Using Life+ will directly contribute to additional adaptation action in some EU
Member States or at subnational level. Moreover, this option also ensures a
better informed decision-making via the identification and implementation of
relevant cross-sectoral and cross-border lighthouse projects, as long as the
experience gained is appropriately disseminated, a precondition for increased
capacity-building. It also contributes to increasing the resilience of key
vulnerable sectors by promoting the uptake of cross-sectoral lighthouse
projects. The net benefits of the current programming period LIFE+ (2007-2013)
are estimated to be 600 million Euros/year. The transaction costs of LIFE+
(2007-2012) projects are typically low and did not exceed 2%. Both elements
contribute to considering this option as efficient, which confirms the expected
cost-effectiveness of this option. Option 2C – Commission's proposal on the
adoption of national adaptation strategies is composed
of three alternative approaches. The effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence
of the three approaches – no legal requirement, legislation later, and
legislation now – must be considered in conjunction with the implementation of
option 2A – guidelines and option 2B – presented above. In that respect, the
positive impacts to be expected from option 2C mainly relate to the stimulus
that the Commission would give for actions at national level. The non-legal approach is a
continuation of the approach presented in the 2009 White Paper. The additional
effectiveness of this approach, compared to implementing options 2A and 2B
alone, is expected to be small. Therefore, if the guidelines plus the
availability of Life+ funding opportunities are not enough to provide the
necessary political visibility to climate change adaptation, there is no
guarantee that the second objective of the Strategy will be met. However, it
would be uncontroversial, from a Member State's perspective. Legislation later will give Member States the chance to make use of the guidelines
and of LIFE+ funding in designing their adaptation strategy would be more
acceptable than a 'legislation now' scenario by Member States reluctant to EU
legislation on this issue. It would also provide additional political
incentives for adaptation action, in particular to speed up the process in
those Member States that are currently undertaking climate change adaptation
action. The risk is that for those Member States who have not started any
action on adaptation, the political incentive would be insufficient to
undertake adaptation action now, de facto delaying the necessary action to meet
the objectives of the Strategy to beyond 2017. Combining a legislative proposal now
with the adoption of the guidelines and the availability of Life+ funding
opportunities could increase the likelihood that all Member States have
developed an adaptation strategy by 2017, thus raising coherence of EU action
and bringing Member States to a similar pace. The Commission could help deal
with some of the compliance costs for Member States by providing funding
opportunities and the necessary framework for experience transfer and capacity
building. However, some of the Member States which have already an Adaptation Strategy have expressed their opposition
to the use of a legal instrument, arguing that legislative approaches would be
premature, given that Member States are already in the process of developing
programmes of work, and putting in place domestic programmes of action. This is
also true for a minority of Member States which have not adopted an adaptation
strategy and for a large part of the stakeholders that have answered the public
consultation. Conversely, a large majority of environmental NGOs who
answered the public consultation support a legislative proposal. Option 2D – promoting the UNISDR cities
resilience campaign, will only have limited
effectiveness. First, the Commission has no control over the level
of up-take by EU cities unwilling to commit budget to additional activities. In
addition, a signature of commitment to the campaign is not a guarantee that
cities will be actively involved or that their activities will result in
enhanced climate resilience. From an EU perspective, there is also a potential
lack of control by being involved in an independent UN campaign rather than supporting
EU policy priorities directly. Finally, the campaign is only scheduled to last
until 2015, although UNISDR expects to go beyond that date. It will not be
sufficient to steadily contribute to the objective of increasing the resilience
of the EU territory by 2020. Option 2E – inclusion of adaptation into
the Covenant of Mayors framework would contribute
to increasing the resilience at local level, while mainstreaming adaptation in
a context where both mitigation and adaptation objectives can be achieved. A risk is on the delivery side, as the signature to the pledge is
voluntary and does not guarantee that cities will actually invest and implement
in additional activities and that urban adaptation will be enhanced. However,
the effectiveness of the Covenant of Mayors' initiative has already been
assessed when it comes to the greenhouse gas mitigation objectives. From the
analysis of a sample of commitments, it is expected that the Covenant
Signatories will reduce their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 28% by 2020,
well in line with the initial objective of reducing emissions by more than 20%
by 2020. This confirms the potential effectiveness of the instrument. 6.2.2. Summary table[88] || Economic, social, and environmental impacts || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence /acceptability Better informed decision-making || Increasing the resilience of the EU territory || Increasing the resilience of key sectors BAU || || 0 || 0 || 0 || || 0 Option 2A ALONE: EU Guidelines for national adaption policiees || - cost of €100,000 for developing the guidelines + favours cooperation and identifies good practices; helps address transboundary issues || + Promoting climate risk assessment will increase knowledge and adaptive capacity at national level || + Highlights main steps for developing adaptation strategies: addresses knowledge barriers || ≈ || ≈ / + Limited impacts if option implemented on its own, as does not address all barriers to adaptation || + Supported by MS Option 2A + Option 2B: Using Life+ funding for supporting the preparation of adaptation strategies and for lighthouse projects on adaptation || - administrative cost of running the Life projects + eco. Soc and env. benefits from lighthouse projects; financial support to experience transfer and development adaptation strategies will increase uptake || + Eases cooperation; facilitates the uptake of demonstration projects and dissemination of results || + Addresses financial and knowledge barriers || + lighthouse projects can unlock adaptation options at sectoral level || + Draws on the benefits of an existing instrument || + Makes use of existing instruments Combining Option 2A, Option 2B, and 2C: Commission's proposal on the adoption of adaptation strategies for all Member States by 2017 || Non-legal request || Very limited additional benefits compared to the options above alone || ≈ / + would be supported by Member States but simply follows on the 2009 recommendations Legislation later || 80 million € for 27 MS adopting adaptation strategies or updating existing ones Provides for a coverage of the EU territory and ensures consideration of transboundary issues || + can speed up adoption processes for MS already preparing adaptation strategies and therefore increase the chances of benefitting from more adaptation strategies in Europe; unlikely to be effective when Member States have not started adaptation action || no compliance costs now, but may be less effective in the uptake of adaptation action || + Draws on conclusions from 2009 White Paper's implementation phase; avoids opposition by MS but may postpone achievements of adaptation strategy objectives Legislation now || ++ Addresses most barriers to the uptake of adaptation action at MS level; Helps achieve the mainstreaming objectives at national level || Additional transposition and compliance costs; ensure effective uptake of adaptation action || - Acceptability by Member States would most likely be an issue Option 2D – promoting the UNISDR cities campaign || Cost for cities participating to the programme; can increase resilience for participating cities || ≈ || + / ≈ no committed budget || ≈ || || - / ≈ Potential lack of coherence between EU and UN initiatives. Different timeframe Option 2E: Inclusion of adaptation into the framework of the Covenant of Mayors || - costs: ~ 500,000 Euro/year for the EC; may cost overall, 100 million euros for participating cities, but on a voluntary basies + high benefits for adaptation at cities level; links mitigation and adaptation || ≈ || + / ++ Experience exchange Builds on success of the Covenant of Mayors || + Links mitigation and adaptation efforts across sectors at local levels || + / ++ Uses an existing network whose efficiency has been proven. || + / ++ Links mitigation and adaptation; promotes action at the spatial level that is most relevant for climate change adaptation / builds on Covenant of Mayors' success Magnitude of impact
as compared with the baseline scenario (the baseline is indicated as 0): ++
strongly positive; + positive; – – strongly negative; – negative; ≈
marginal/neutral; ? Uncertain 6.3. Comparing options on promoting
adaptation in key sectors 6.3.1. Effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence Option 3A – guidance on how to mainstream
adaptation into CAP and Cohesion Policy, will help
improving the contribution of these policies to promote the resilience of key
vulnerable sectors, in particular agriculture and forestry as well as energy,
transport and construction. This usefully complements policy objectives and
instruments made available under the proposals for the next MFF and can
increase cost-efficiency with respect to the use of EU funds. The risk is that
the information that can be made available in guidance prepared at EU level is
not specific enough for the needs of local actors. To be effective, this
approach must be complemented by additional efforts both by managing
authorities at regional or local level, and by the Commission, to increase
capacity building, through, for instance, training events, at EU but also
national and regional level, targeting the main actors involved in the rural
development and operational programmes. Option 3B – listing mainstreaming
priorities and engaging with stakeholders, will
have an impact on the resilience of key vulnerable sectors when concrete
actions are proposed/taken. It can, for instance, prevent maladaptation. Increased
engagement with the financial and insurance sectors will raise awareness of
adaptation and there is likely to be a cascade effect with banks and insurance
companies communicating adaptation-related information with their customers and
supply chain partners. This will contribute to improved decision-making.
Additional mainstreaming at EU level can also facilitate mainstreaming of
national adaptation strategies in sectoral policies at Member State level,
therefore contributing to the second objective of the Strategy. It may be advantageous to propose a new
calendar for revision of some key EU legislation, option 3C, in the
context of the Europe 2020 Strategy, where ambitious objectives have also been
agreed regarding the current and future of the EU's climate change policies and
objectives. A risk is that the adaptation agenda would come in conflict with
the agenda of the sectoral issues that would need to be addressed. For
instance, Member States and stakeholders are only now starting to get familiar
with the requirements under the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive.
Amending it now would mean also anticipating a new period of adjustments for
Member States and stakeholders. Option 3D – guidelines for project
developers, and 3E – including adaptation
considerations in design standards, are a first important step for
increasing the resilience of key infrastructure investments. By doing so, they
will ensure that the resilience of those infrastructure sectors is increased.
However, mainstreaming climate change into CEN-CENELEC standards will only
bring effective impacts if finally standards are amended to reflect the
potential impacts from climate change. This will require time and further interactions
with stakeholders in the impacted sectors. This will clearly contribute to
increasing knowledge and will allow for a better-informed decision making by
2020. Standardisation is seen as a significant contributor to the completion of
the Internal Market in the context of 'New Approach' legislation[89], which refers to European standards developed by the European
standards organisations. There is support from Member States and stakeholders
in promoting more climate resilient infrastructure investments, the business
sector putting the emphasis on traditional infrastructures while environmental
NGOs highlighting the role of green infrastructures. The time dimension and the uncertainties
surrounding the impacts of climate change and the necessary technical options
to address them are also an issue if option 3F – mandatory approach is
followed and requirements are imposed for current and future infrastructure
investments. 6.3.2. Summary table[90] || Economic, social, and environmental impacts || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence /acceptability Better informed decision-making || Increasing the resilience of the EU territory || Increasing the resilience of key sectors BAU || || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Option 3A: Guidance on how to mainstream adaptation into Cohesion Policy and the CAP || Cost of developing the guidance Capacity building and increase resilience of key investments and sectors (SMEs in particular) || + Contributes to increasing understanding and capacity of MA and related actors involved in all the stages of programming || + Capacity building strategy calls for interactions with and between MS || + Contributes to increasing resilience of agriculture, energy transport and water sectors + Triggers pro-active involvement of EU-funded project managers || + Contributes to more cost-effective implementation of EU budget || + / ++ In line with MFF objectives; Member States and regional authorities have expressed a need for this intiative Option 3B: Listing mainstreaming priorities in EU policies and engaging with key stakeholders || + fosters dialogue, allows for greater transparency; Detailed econ. social and envrtal impacts in line with mainstreamed areas || ≈ || + eases decision-making at MS level for EU-related policies || ≈ / + Allows for better understanding of the role for insurance and banking sectors || ≈ || + / ++ Provides visibility for MS on Commission's activities; Mainstreaming seen by all stakholders as a key componenet of the Strategy Option 3C: Setting new calendar for revision of key EU legislation as part of the mainstreaming exercise || mainstreaming is achieved earlier, but risk of additional adjustment costs || ≈ || ≈ / - Negatively influences existing priority setting || + Ensures swift mainstreaming in key EU initiatives ≈ || ? Potentially problematic in terms of allocation of resources || + / ≈ In line with past and current objectives on mainstreaming; Negatively influences exsiting priority setting Option 3D: guidelines for project developers || Cost of 100,000 Euros for EC for developing the guidelines; initial costs but indirect eco.soc. and environmental benefits via more resilient infrastructure || + Triggers additional research on climate proofing vulnerable investments || ≈ || +/ ++ in line with Commission's proposals for TEN-E and TEN-T; Triggers pro-active involvement of EU-funded project manager || + Voluntary nature would allow providing adequate methodology without additional administrative burden || + / ++ In line with Commission's proposals for TEN-E and TEN-T Option 3E: Promote inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in relevant infrastructure standards || - administrative cost of around 200,000 € a year for standardisation organisations; + first necessary step to provide for indirect benefits for more resilient infrastructure || + Triggers research activities on standards || + Triggers interactions among standardisation organisations at EU and MS level || + Indirect impacts expected to be significant in energy / transport/construction || ? Difficult to conclude at this stage || + / ≈ Initiative well received by stakeholders Option 3F: proposal for mandatory requirements for climate resilience of infrastructure projects || - additional costs, potentially high when adaptation technologies are not available yet || + Triggers research needs || ≈ || - Difficult to implement in practice || - Long term technological lock-in may prove inefficient given uncertainties. || - Resistance from stakeholders to be expected because of increased administrative and financial burden. Magnitude of impact
as compared with the baseline scenario (the baseline is indicated as 0): ++
strongly positive; + positive; – – strongly negative; – negative; ≈
marginal/neutral; ? Uncertain 7. Identification
of the preferred policy package On the basis
of the above comparison of the different options, the preferred policy package
would be summarised as follows: Specific objective || Operational objective || Preferred Option Information and guidelines || Direct intervention || Regulatory approach Better INFORMED decision-making || By 2020, priority KNOWLEDGE GAPS identified in 2013 have been closed || || 1B: Developing a knowledge gap strategy || By 2020, COMMUNICATION TOOLS allow for available information on climate change adaptation to be accessible for decision-makers, including Member States, local authorities and firms || 1C: Promoting interactions between Climate-ADAPT and other services || 1D: Supporting exchange between science and policy in the field of adaptation || Increasing the resilience of THE EU TERRITORY || By 2017, all MEMBER STATES have adopted (an) Adaptation Strateg(y)ies, complemented by regional or local adaptation strategies when appropriate. || 2A: EU Guidelines for developing adaptation strategies || 2B: Using Life+ funding for supporting the preparation of adaptation strategies and lighthouse projects || 2Cii: Legislative proposal later By 2020, CITIES of more than 150,000 inhabitants have adopted an adaptation strategy || || 2E: Inclusion of adaptation into the Covenant of Mayors Framework || Increasing the resilience of key VULNERABLE SECTORS || By 2020, a comprehensive and consistent MAINSTREAMING of adaptation in EU policies is achieved || 3A: Guidance on how to climate proof Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy; || 3B: Listing mainstreaming priorities in EU legislation and policy initiatives by 2020, and engaging with key stakeholders in areas of particular importance || By 2020, major INFRASTRUCTURE investments are climate-proofed || 3D: Guidelines for project developers for climate proofing vulnerable investments; || 3E: Promote inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in relevant infrastructure standards || Implementing the preferred policy
options identified in the above-table will ensure that by 2020, all decision
makers in the field of adaptation will benefit from more accurate and more
easily accessible information. Adaptation needs massive input from R&D
programmes and it needs it already now, to face the current impacts of climate
change, but also to plan and make decisions for the short and medium term.
Additional efforts to promote coordination for knowledge generation and
dissemination will greatly increase the efficiency in the use of EU funds
made available for research on climate change adaptation. It will close
knowledge gaps faster and facilitate decision making. Climate-ADAPT will become
the main source of information on adaptation in Europe. Information transfers
between researchers and decision makers will be reinforced, increasing the
adaptive capacity of decision-makers. In that respect, adaptation decisions
will be more robust, with a positive impact on the resilience of economic,
social and environmental systems. Implementing the measures to meet the first
specific objective of the Startegy would cost the European Commission
approximately 350,000 Euros (for all the guidelines and conference events),
mostly one-off costs. In addition, additional coordination costs are expected
for Member States and stakeholders to collect relevant information. Implementing the preferred policy
options identified in the above-table will ensure that by 2020, adaptation
strategies will be in place across the EU territory, providing an effective
policy framework for adaptation action. Giving a clear timeline by which adaptation
strategies will be completed in all Member States means that the most basic
tools needed to enhance Europe's resilience will be available, that a minimum
assessment of risks and vulnerabilities will be undertaken and adaptation
actions planned for the whole EU territory. In fact, national adaptation
strategies are the recommended instrument at global level in the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change context. These strategies are key analytical
pieces of work to inform and prioritise actions and investments. Acceptability issues may hamper the
selection of a legislative proposal now. The combination of guidelines and
Life+ funding opportunities can provide the necessary support to Member States
willing to act on climate change adaptation, in particular those who already
started to develop an adaptation framework. The reviewing phase of the
Adaptation Strategy will help decide whether a legislative instrument should be
used to facilitate compliance with overall Union objectives on climate policy,
in case some Member States remain inactive and create the risk of spillovers
and additional vulnerabilities within the EU. Most vulnerable population groups will be
identified and can therefore be better protected. Efficient stakeholder
involvement can ensure that no potential risks will be overlooked and social
implications of climate change are dealt with in a preventive manner. This will
also provide better information for decision-making, therefore also
contributing to the first objective of the Strategy. It will also reduce the likelihood and
frequency of maladaptation actions if all major adaptation decisions are
screened for their potential adverse effects. Adaptation strategies at will help
Member States to identify and justify the needs for adaptation financed under
the EU budget, in particular on regional/cohesion policy and Common Agriculture
Policy. This option will reduce the negative economic, social and environmental
implications identified under the no policy change scenario in case of
inadequate adaptation in some parts of Europe. Spillovers will also be
minimised as Member States will address transboundary issues. In
addition, building on the existing EU disaster management approach, better
prevention and preparedness across the whole EU territory also helps to reduce
the impact of extreme weather events and climate-related disasters (e.g.
flooding in coastal areas, landslides in mountainous areas, heat waves). A
strong signal will be sent to our international partners that adaptation to
climate change is seriously addressed within the EU. The EU will also support local and regional
action and will facilitate experience transfer and the uptake of innovative
solutions via cross-border and cross sectoral demonstration projects, in
particular in the most vulnerable areas and sectors. The key roles that cities
must play in adaptation to climate change is also acknowledged and the EU will
contribute to promote and facilitate adaptation at local level. The adoption or reviewing of adaptation
strategies would cost for the EU 27 Member States around 80 million Euros. In
addition, the Commission would prepare guidelines (100,000 Euros) and would
make available some of the funds available under the proposed LIFE instrument
for experience transfer or local lighthouse projects. Voluntarily complying
with future pledges on adaptation via the Covenant of Mayors Framework has been
estimated at a maximum of €50,000 per city. Implementing the preferred policy
options identified in the above-table will ensure that by 2020, most EU-led vulnerable
sectors will integrate climate change adaptation considerations in their
investment and business decisions. By 2020, all relevant EU policies that will
have been revised will include climate change adaptation considerations, and
the Commission will engage with key stakeholders to ensure that even without
revision, considerations on adaptation will be mainstreamed. Moreover,
the use of EU funds will promote climate resilient investments, in particular
in the area of energy, transport, and buildings infrastructure and will enhance
the competitiveness of EU firms by reducing losses associated with
climate-related disasters and by seizing business opportunities that adaptation
represents. The Strategy also contributes to a sustainable and resilient
agriculture in Europe. Benefits are also expected from further interactions
with actors in the insurance and financial sectors. This leads to more
efficient market functioning, increasing the adaptive capacity and facilitating
European firms' decision makings. The direct cost of additional mainstreaming
activities at EU level are uncertain but expected to be limited (the cost of
adapting legislation when revised). The indirect impacts would be more
significant but this will be the object of dedicated impact assessments.
Mainstreaming would also be about making efficient use of the ambitious
objectives under the next Multi-annual Financial Framework, funds already
allocated in the MFF proposals to climate action. The direct costs of promoting more
resilient infrastructure investments are also limited, and would consist in
preparing guidelines (€100,000) and engaging with standardisation organisations
for reviewing current standards (€200,000). Even if uncertainty is high on the
potential costs of actually making infrastructure investments more climate
resilient, esimates from the World Bank mention that it could cost 1 to 2% of
infrastructure investments. In addition, the potential benefits of concrete
adaptation action have been estimated in the energy and transport sectors,
showing that some options do provide net benefits with high confidence. Broader
benefits from more resilient infrastructures are expected, such as
additional employment in the construction sector when new projects are
considered, and fewer disruptions to economic activities due to infrastructure
failures following extreme weather events. Although many of the measures discussed in
this report have consequences for more than one objective of the Strategy, the
identified problems are sufficiently independent from each other that no other
combination of individual initiatives is expected to bring additional benefits
at lower costs. 8. Monitoring
and evaluation In the course of this impact assessment a
series of actions have been evaluated which should improve the resilience of
the EU to the impacts of climate change. Many of the actions are preparatory in
nature and will only unfold their full effects in years to come. Monitoring
will be required not only to assess whether the actions defined in the Strategy
are on track but also to review the evolution of the global context and to
determine whether additional measures will be required. The EU Adaptation Strategy will run until
2020. A review is scheduled by 2017/2018, which will provide an
assessment of what is achieved at EU and sub-EU level and whether additional
actions would be needed to meet the objectives of the Strategy. The
Commission will present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council
on the state of implementation of the Strategy. This report will build on
the reporting of adaptation activities provided by Member States following the
proposed Monitoring Mechanism Regulation. This report will also build on
information provided by the Member States in the annual implementation reports
to be submitted in 2017 for programmes funded by the ESI funds in the period
2014-2020. The report will also make use of the indicators presented below to
assess whether the Strategy is on track for achieving its objectives. An important issue to consider is the
relatively limited number of indicators currently available to allow an
assessment of adaptation efforts and vulnerabilities across the EU. The
Commission will use available reports, from the EEA on impacts, vulnerability
and adaptation, or from the 5th IPCC Report to be adopted
in 2014 and new research and knowledge gathered in the meantime on future
impacts. These will be complemented by more specific indicators and
assessments to follow the implementation of the measures adopted with the
Strategy. It will in particular use the following indicators specified in the
Table[91] below. Specific objective || Operational objective || Core indicators || Score || Comment Better INFORMED decision-making || By 2020, priority KNOWLEDGE GAPS identified in 2013 have been closed || List of knowledge gaps (initiated) now, in 2017 and in 2020. || 2 || New FP7 calls on adaptation now specify that information collected should be reported to Climate-ADAPT, which will ease information collection for the last indicator. The forthcoming IPCC's 5th assessment report will also be used as a source of information. Horizon 2020 projects, JRC research (on-going): number of projects dealing with adaptation and budget allocated || 1 By 2020, COMMUNICATION TOOLS allow for available information on climate change adaptation to be more easily accessible for decision-makers || Use of Climate-ADAPT (on-going): number of visitors, pages most visited, number of registered users, assessment of the content, databases and metadata || 2 || This information can easily be collected by slightly amending existing practices Number of conferences, workshops, adaptation events (registered in Climate-ADAPT) || 2 Increasing the resilience of THE EU TERRITORY || By 2017, all MEMBER STATES have adopted (an) Adaptation Strateg(y)ies, complemented by regional or local adaptation strategies when appropriate || Number of National Adaptation Strategies and Action Plans and national climate change risk assessments, as reported in Climate-ADAPT || 3 || Number and amount of Life+ grants used for experience transfer || 3 By 2020, cities of more than 150,000 inhabitants have adopted an adaptation strategy || Number and amount of Life+ grants used for lighthouse projects on adaptation || 1 || Additional efforts will be required to monitor and assess adaptation at local level, which can be implemented by the Commission with the help of the EEA. Covenant of Mayors (on-going): number of cities pledging to develop an adaptation strategy || 1 Number of cities of more than 150000 euros in vulnerable areas with an adaptation strategy (a follow-up in Climate-ADAPT could be organised) || 2 Increasing the resilience of key VULNERABLE SECTORS || By 2020, a comprehensive and consistent MAINSTREAMING of adaptation in EU policies is achieved || List of policies and legal acts where adaptation has been mainstreamed (available) || 3 || This will also make use of the reports by Member States on the implementation of programmes funded by the ESI funds about climate change action(2017) Adaptation activities by private organisations as reported in the Carbon Disclosure Project surveys || 3 By 2020, major INFRASTRUCTURE investments are climate-proofed || Amount of adaptation infrastructure investments (co-)financed by EU funds and/or public financial institutions. || * || Tracking of adaptation in EU Funds is part of the Commission's proposal for the next MFF. Progress on the mapping of relevant standards in which to integrate adaptation considerations will be part of the normal cycle of interactions with standardisation organisations Progress on the mapping exercise by CEN/CENELEC || 2 [1] COM(2011) 777 final VOL. 2/2 [2] COM(2009) 147 final [3] In addition, annex 9.7 presents an overview of topics
which arose in the dialogue with stakeholders and how they are addressed in
this report. [4] http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/consultations/index_fr.htm [5] Contract CLIMA.C.3/SER/2011/0026: 'Support to the
development of the EU strategy for adaptation to climate change' [6] Between 1980 and 2011, direct economic losses in the
EU due to flooding alone amounted to more than €90 billion. (EEA, 2012b). [7] UNEP (2011) The Emissions Gap Report: Are the
Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2° C or 1.5°
C? A preliminary assessment. [8] This includes requirements under the Energy
Performance of Buildings Directive (Directive 2010/31/) but not only. [9] EEA report No 12/2012 ‘Climate change, impacts and
vulnerability in Europe’. Medium to high greenhouse gas emissions scenario,
leading to temperature increases above the 2°C objective. [10] Watkiss, P.
(ed.) (2011) The ClimateCost Project. Final Report, Vol. 1: Europe.
Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm. http://www.climatecost.cc/
reportsandpublications.html. [11] In particular the JRC PESETA II project, presented in
Annex 9.6. [12] The World Bank 2010. The Economics of Adaptation to
Climate Change: Synthesis Report. Washington DC, The World Bank [13] Details on the expected impacts of climate change and
adaptation needs in Europe are provided in Annex 9.2. It shows that climate
change poses important environmental, economic and social challenges for
adaptation, now and in the future. [14] Papanikolaou, A.; Mitsakis, V.; Chrysostomou, K.;
Trinks, C.; Partzsch, I. (2011): Innovative emergency management strategies.
Deliverable 3 of the research project WEATHER. [15] UNISDR (2009): Disaster statistics in Europe: available
at http://www.unisdr.org/files/8867_pr200903DisasterStatisticsEurope.pdf
[16] See for instance the discussion in Annex 9.2.3 [17] ILO (2008). Global Challenges for Sustainable
Development: Strategies for Green Jobs. ILO Background Note for G8 Labour and
Employment Ministers Conference Niigata, Japan. Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/speeches/somavia/2008/g8paper.pdf
[18] "Cities" here broadly
stands for "cities and towns" including urban areas of less than
50.000 inhabitants, see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/conferences/citiesoftomorrow/index_en.cfm [19] EEA (2012a): Urban adaptation to climate change in Europe.
Challenges and opportunities for cities together with supportive national and
European policies. EEA Report No 2/2012. Available at:
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-adaptation-to-climate-change [20] See glossary for definitions [21] SWD(2012) 92 final, Exploiting the employment potential
of green growth [22] http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/commission-proposals-for-the-multiannual-financial-framework-2014-2020/index_en.htm [23] The map considers all EEA Member States. This IA report
concentrates on EU Member States. Note that Austria adopted its strategy in
October 2012, which is not reflected on this map [24] E.g. in Germany, 10 out of 16 regions have a regional
adaptation strategy, while in Spain, 6 out of 17 [25] http://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climate-adaptation http://www.baltadapt.eu/ [26] http://www.alpine-space.eu [27] The 2012 EEA report on ‘Urban adaptation to climate
change in Europe’ (EEA 2012c) provides examples from across the EU. [28] See section 9.2.1. on agriculture for more details [29] http://www.worldresourcesreport.org/expert-perspectives/question-five [30] BaltCICA
(ed.) (2012): Climate Change Impacts, Costs and Adaptation in the Baltic Sea
Region, Final Report, Version 1.0, May 2012. Available at:
http://www.baltcica.org/documents/BaltCICA_Final_Report_Version_1_080512.pdf [31] See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/tenders/2011/208209/clearinghouse_concept_note_en.pdf [32] See http://unfccc.int/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/items/5852.php
[33] http://eucities-adapt.eu/cms/
[34] http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/docs/ras_final_report_en.pdf
[35] Council Directive 2008/56/EC and EU Regulation No
1255/2011 [36] Regulation (EC) 2152/2003 [37] Decision 661/2010/EC [38] COM(2012)673 final [39] COM(2011)244 final [40] COM(2011) 743 final [41] http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/legal-proposals/index_en.htm [42] COM(2013) 133 final [43] COM(2011) 665/3 [44] COM(2011)934 final [45] COM(2011) 650/2 final [46] http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2013_sanco_002_eu_plant_health_law_en.pdf [47] COM(2012) 628 final [48] For example, the proposal for 'guidelines for
trans-European energy infrastructure' COM(2011)658 includes, in annex V, the
'system resilience, including disaster and climate resilience, and system
security, notably for European critical infrastructure as defined in Directive
2008/114/EC' as an aspect to be considered for cost-benefit analyses for
electricity transmission and storage. The majority of the Global 500 companies
(81%) report physical risks from climate change and the percentage of companies
that view these risks as current has nearly quadrupled from 10% in 2010 to 37%
in 2012. In the UK the Carbon disclosure project surveyed members of the FTSE
100 group of companies finding more than 80% identify substantive risks to
their business from climate change. [49] Kunreuther, H.C., E.O Michel-Kerjan, with N.A. Doherty,
M.F. Grace, R.W. Klein, and M.V. Pauly, 2009: At War With the Weather: Managing
Large-Scale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. [50] PWC (2010) Business leadership on climate change
adaptation: Encouraging engagement and action; . OECD (2011) Private Sector
Engagement in Adaptation to Climate Change: Approaches to Managing Climate
Risks; UK Trade & Investment (2011) Adapting to an uncertain climate: A
world of commercial opportunities [51] Flash Eurobarometer 342, SMEs, Resource efficiency and
Green Markets [52] See Commission study The number of jobs dependent on
environmental and resource efficiency improvements, 2012. [53] http://www.cy2012.eu/index.php/en/file/Y5RGhpLt8X_2nxXo9+AUZw==
[54] EEA (2012b): Climate change, impacts and vulnerability
in Europe – An indicator-based report. EEA Report No 12/2012. [55] Fankhauser, S. and Soare, R. (2012): Strategic Adaptation
to Climate Change in Europe, Report prepared for the European Investment Bank,
March 2012 [56] Other drivers notably include the Russian export ban,
which increased the vulnerability of some EU Member States. [57] The two cases are explained in detail in Annex 9.6 [58] The ten Member States where Cohesion Policy represents
the highest proportion of public investment are: HU, LT, SK, EE, MT, BG, LV,
PL, PT, and RO. [59] Joint Research Centre, European Commission (2012), Natural
Catastrophes: Risk relevance and Insurance Coverage in the EU; OECD (2011),
Future Global Shocks, Improving risk governance. [60] DK seems to have done some pioneer work on this issue.
Road regulations and railway standards are being/will be reviewed and revised
with consideration of expected climate changes. Moreover, the UK's
standardisation body has given a specific emphasis on climate change adaptation
measures in standardization work with the construction sector and more
recently, its biodiversity work. Other Member States active at national level
include BE, DE and NL. [61] Lack of action can have negative implications on the
right to fair and just working conditions (Title IV, art. 31 of the Charter of
Fundamental rights) for employees due to additional occupational health
constraints (higher temperature at work, more frequent and intense natural
hazards keeping people from reaching their work place) not adequately
addressed. [62] COM(2009) 82 Commission's Communication on 'A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made
disasters ' [63] Two administratively different processes could be
considered: i/ fully integrating adaptation tasks into the contract services
for the Covenant of Mayors Office: ii/ Replicating the approach, but under a
separate structure, could also be considered. Both administrative arrangements
have similar impacts [64] Projection of Economic impacts of climate change in
Sectors of the European Union based on boTtom-up Analysis: http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ [65] http://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/climate-impacts-and-vulnerabilities/projects/Externally_RD2/isi-mip [66] http://cca.eionet.europa.eu/ [67] Data bases such as Climate-ADAPT, INSPIRE, WISE,
CORDIS, OURCOAST Copernicus services, WSDiS, EEA WQ Waterbase, JRC EDO, Water
Accounts, Research and Regional programmes have been further developed or new
ones have been set up. [68] National authorities were informally consulted in the
context of the preparation of this report. [69] The completion of the project is scheduled for
mid-2013. See http://eucities-adapt.eu/cms/
[70] Figures are based
on the contracts No ENV.G.1/ETU/2008/0093R and CLIMA.C.3/SER/2011/0026 [71] The
Nottingham Declaration has been succeeded in 2012 by the Climate Local
initiative which supports carbon reduction and climate resilience. See http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/the-lga-and-climate-change/-/journal_content/56/10171/3574359/ARTICLE-TEMPLATE
[72] Based on a daily average cost of €500 for 40 days for the cities time plus potential consultancy cost of
€27.000 (the figure would be reduced if the city
administration were able to do the work in-house). [73] Zipperer et al. (1997): Urban tree cover: an ecological
perspective, Urban Ecosystems, Vol 1, 4°, pp 229-246. [74] For example, the proposal for 'guidelines for trans-European
energy infrastructure' COM(2011)658 includes, in annex V, the 'system
resilience, including disaster and climate resilience, and system security,
notably for European critical infrastructure as defined in Directive
2008/114/EC' as an aspect to be considered for cost-benefit analyses for
electricity transmission and storage. [75] Agrawala, S.; Matus Kramer, A.; Prudent-Richard, G.;
Sainsbury, M. (2010a): Incorporating climate change impacts and adaptation in
Environmental Impact Assessments: Opportunities and Challenges. OECD
Environmental Working Paper No. 24.
Available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/incorporating-climate-change-impacts-and-adaptation-in-environmental-impact-assessments_5km959r3jcmw-en
[76] Figures are based on the contract
CLIMA/C3/SER/2011/0011 [77] The fiscal implications of climate change adaptation: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/external_studies/pdf/fiscal_implications_1.pdf [78] Title IV, art. 27 of the Charter of Fundamental rights [79] Figures are based on the contract
070401/2010/581708/SER/C4 Strengthening the EU Disaster Management Capacity -
Good Practices on Disaster Prevention [80] Title II, art. 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [81] PWC (2010) Business leadership on climate change
adaptation: Encouraging engagement and action [82] Figures based on on-going consultancy contract for developing
"Climate resilience guidelines for project managers' (DG CLIMA, 2011-2012) [83] World Bank (2010a): The Costs of Adapting to Climate Change for
Infrastructure, Discussion Paper nr.2, August. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/407863-1229101582229/DCCDP_2Infrastructure.pdf [84] Altawater et al. (2011a-c) [85] This would draw on the current requirements under the
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), which already allows for a
regional diversification of energy performance on top of the minimum
requirements of the Directive. [86] Title IV, art. 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [87] The preferred options are highlighted in bold [88] The preferred options are highlighted in bold [89] See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/regulatory-policies-common-rules-for-products/new-legislative-framework/index_en.htm [90] The preferred policy options are highlighted in bold [91] Indicators are scored according to the progress already made for
each of them: Not yet started = 0; Underway (limited progress) = 1; Underway
(substantial progress) = 2; Complete (under review) = 3; Future report (after
implementation) = *. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment - Part 2 Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
An EU Strategy on adaptation to
climate change This report commits only the Commission's
services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of
any decision to be taken by the Commission. 1........... Annexes. 3 1.1........ Evidence of climate
change and benefits of adaptation action. 3 1.1.1..... Climate scenarios. 4 1.1.2..... Uncertainties. 8 1.1.3..... Climate impacts. 8 1.1.4..... The benefits of adaptation. 10 1.2........ Climate change impacts
and adaptation needs across the EU.. 12 1.2.1..... Economic sectors and systems. 12 1.2.2..... Environmental systems. 28 1.2.3..... Social issues. 35 1.2.4..... Territorial challenges. 42 1.2.5..... Cross-sectoral challenges. 48 1.3........ Likely impacts of policy
initiatives. 55 1.3.1..... Likely impacts of policy
initiatives on knowledge generation. 55 1.3.2..... Likely impacts of policy
initiatives aiming at increasing the resilience of the EU territory. 67 1.3.3..... Likely impacts of policy
initiatives aiming at increasing the resilience in key vulnerable sectors 77 1.4........ EU initiatives on
adaptation: 95 1.4.1..... State of play implementation
of the 2009 White Paper 95 1.4.2..... Additional initiatives. 106 1.5........ An overview and review of
adaptation strategies. 107 1.5.1..... Perspective on Member
States' actions. 107 1.5.2..... Transnational, regional and
local adaptation efforts. 111 1.6........ JRC PESETA II:
methodology and preliminary results. 112 1.7........ Summary of results of
public consultation. 121 1.8........ Glossary. 129 2........... Bibliography. 133 1. Annexes 1.1. Evidence of climate change and
benefits of adaptation action Global
warming: current evidence The main climatic drivers are temperature
rise, changes in precipitation patterns, changes in intensity and frequency of
extreme weather events (extreme precipitation, heat waves, cold spells,
storms), sea level rise and changing wind patterns (Altvater et al., 2011a). The average temperature in Europe has continued to increase. Temperature over the land areas in the last decade
(2001-2010) was 1.2°C above the 1850-1899 average (1.0°C for the combined land
and ocean area). Considering the land area, 8 out of the last 13 years of the
period 1850-2010 were the warmest years since 1850 (EEA, 2011). Consistent with
previous trends, the rate of warming has been greatest in high latitudes in Northern Europe. Annual precipitation trends in the 20th
century showed an increase in Northern Europe (10–40%) and a decrease in some
parts of Southern Europe (up to 20 %) (EEA, 2008; Del Rio et al. 2011). At the
continental scale, winter snow cover extent has a high variability and a
non-significant negative trend over the period 1967-2007 (Henderson and
Leathers, 2010). High-temperature extremes (hot days,
tropical nights, and heat waves) have become more frequent, while low
temperature extremes (cold spells, frost days) have become less frequent in
Europe (EEA, 2011) based on Climate Research Unit (CRU) gridded datasets
HadCrut3 (land and ocean) and CruTemp3 (land only). In Eastern Europe the summer
of 2010 was exceptionally hot, with an amplitude and spatial extent that
exceeded the previous 2003 heat wave (Barriopedro et al., 2011). These two heat
waves broke the seasonal temperature records over approximately half of Europe. The recently published special report by
IPCC on 'Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate
change adaptation' (IPCC, 2012) examines the interaction of climatic,
environmental, and human factors that can lead to negative impacts and
disasters, options for managing the risks posed by impacts and disasters, and
the important role that non-climatic factors play in determining impacts. The
SREX (IPCC, 2012) states evidence from observations gathered since 1950 of
changes in some extremes. Confidence in observed changes in extremes depends on
the quality and quantity of data and the availability of studies analysing
these data. It consequently varies across regions and for different extreme
events. The Special Report identifies a likely increase in the frequency of
heavy precipitation events or proportion of total rainfall. SREX also
identifies, with medium confidence, an increase in the length or number of warm
spells or heat waves. With regard to human fatalities, the most
prominent natural hazard so far is heat waves. The 2003 heat wave killed over
70 000 people in 12 western and central European countries (EEA-JRC-WHO, 2008).
Heat waves were also responsible for numerous fatalities in the summers of 2006
in Western Europe and the summer of 2007 in Eastern Europe. Of all types of natural disasters, flooding
and storm events result in the greatest economic losses compared with other
types of disasters in the EU (25% by flooding and 32% by storms). The most
significant flooding events in terms of economic losses were in the UK in the summer of 2007 (4 billion), in Switzerland, Austria and Germany in 2005 (2.8 billion) and
in France in December 2003 (1.6 billion). It is important to note that the existing
estimates of loss linked to natural hazards are to be considered low estimates
(IPCC 2012) because many impacts, such as loss of human lives, cultural
heritage, and ecosystem services, are difficult to value and monetize, and thus
are either omitted or only poorly reflected in loss estimates. Current pledges
and projections Achieving the EU goal of limiting the rise
of global mean temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, as agreed
by Parties to the UNFCCC in Cancun in 2010, may limit the most serious risks of
climate change. The European Council reconfirmed in February 2011 the EU
objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to
1990, in the context of necessary reductions by developed countries as a group[1], in order to keep climate change below 2ºC. In December, 2009, countries were
encouraged to submit pledges for reducing greenhouse gas emissions for the year
2020 as part of the Copenhagen Accord. Subsequently, 42 industrialized
countries and 44 developing countries submitted pledges. At the climate
conference in Cancun one year later, parties formally recognised country
pledges and decided “to hold the increase in global average temperature below
2°C above pre-industrial levels”. Although the country pledges help in reducing
emissions to below a business-as-usual level in 2020, they are not adequate to
reduce emissions to a level consistent with the 2°C target, and therefore lead
to a gap. Therefore, Europe must prepare to face more
significant consequences of climate change. Mitigation on its own will not be
enough to address the climate problem. Two important clarifications must be
added: i/ even if greenhouse gas emissions were to stop now, the earth's
climate will continue to change for decades. Adaptation is therefore inevitable;
ii/ the climate scenarios only start to show diverging trends in terms of
temperature increase or precipitation levels after 2050. This is to say that
for any policy or action with a medium-term horizon (around 20-30 years), the
emission path is not key. However, for any policy aiming at affecting
investments with a longer-term horizon now, the emission pathways must be
factored in. 1.1.1. Climate scenarios 1.1.1.1. Description
of current scenarios A range of different climate scenarios are
used in the studies analysed for this report. This section aims to provide an
overview of these different climate models. Figure 1 shows a schematic illustration of
Special Report Emission Scenarios (SRES) scenarios produced by the IPCC. Four
qualitative storylines yield four sets of scenarios called “families”: A1, A2,
B1, and B2. Altogether 40 SRES scenarios have been developed by six modelling
teams. All are equally valid with no assigned probabilities of occurrence. The
set of scenarios consists of six scenario groups drawn from the four families:
one group each in A2, B1, B2, and three groups within the A1 family,
characterizing alternative developments of energy technologies: A1FI (fossil
fuel intensive), A1B (balanced), and A1T (predominantly non-fossil fuel).
Within each family and group of scenarios, some share “harmonized” assumptions
on global population, gross world product, and final energy. These are marked as “HS” for harmonized
scenarios. “OS” denotes scenarios that explore uncertainties in driving forces
beyond those of the harmonized scenarios. The number of scenarios developed
within each category is shown. For each of the six scenario groups an
illustrative scenario (which is always harmonized) is provided. Four
illustrative marker scenarios, one for each scenario family, were used in draft
form in the 1998 SRES open process and are included in studies summarised in
this Report. Two additional illustrative scenarios for the groups A1FI and A1T
are also provided and complete a set of six that illustrates all scenario
groups. All are considered to equally sound. Figure 1:
The main characteristics of the four SRES storylines and scenario families
Source: IPCC, 2000 The IPCC related work has considered how,
by 2100, the world will have changed. Each storyline assumes a distinctly
different direction for future developments. Together they describe divergent
futures that encompass a significant portion of the underlying uncertainties in
the main driving forces. They cover a wide range of key “future”
characteristics such as demographic change, economic development, and
technological change. For this reason, their plausibility or feasibility should
not be considered solely on the basis of an extrapolation of current economic,
technological, and social trends. The A1 storyline and scenario family
describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that
peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new
and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are convergence among
regions, capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions,
with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. The
A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative
directions of technological change in the energy system. The three A1 groups
are distinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (A1FI),
non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all sources (A1B). The A2 storyline and scenario family
describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and
preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge
very slowly, which results in continuously increasing global population.
Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic
growth and technological changes are more fragmented and slower than in other
storylines. The B1 storyline and scenario family
describes a convergent world with the same global population that peaks in
mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid
changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with
reductions in material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient
technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social, and
environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional
climate initiatives. The B2 storyline and scenario family
describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic,
social, and environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously
increasing global population at a rate lower than A2, intermediate levels of
economic development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than
in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the scenario is also oriented toward
environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and regional
levels. 1.1.1.2. Bias
correction method The JRC PESETA II project used high
resolution climate simulations developed in the framework of the FP6 project
ENSEMBLES (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009) under three emission scenarios,
namely the A1B, E1 and RCP8.5. The E1 scenario was developed within the
ENSEMBLES project as an attempt to match the European Union target of keeping
global anthropogenic warming below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The E1
scenario was derived by using an "Integrated Assessment Model" which
includes the energy system, land use, carbon cycle and also a simple climate
model, following a methodology used earlier to develop low stabilization
scenarios from B2 baseline (Van Vuuren et al, 2007). The Representative Concentration Pathways
(RCP's) are new set of scenarios developed for the upcoming IPCC 5th assessment
report. The RCP8.5 scenario combines assumptions about high population and
relatively slow income growth with modest rates of technological change and
energy intensity improvements, leading in the long term to high energy demand
and GHG emissions in absence of climate change policies. RCP8.5 thus
corresponds to the pathway with the highest greenhouse gas emissions, without
any specific climate mitigation target. Figure 2 depicts
the projected emissions for each scenario. Figure 2:
Total CO2 emission per year as projected by different scenarios (Source: JRC
PESETA II project, based on IPCC SRES (A1B), ENSEMBLES project (E1) and IIASA
(RCP8.5).). As climate model
outputs may present significant errors (biases) when compared to observations,
the climate runs originally obtained from the ENSEMBLES project were
statistically corrected for biases (Dosio and Paruolo, 2011; Dosio et al.
2012) thus reducing the overestimations and underestimations of temperature and
precipitation. Due to differences in
the models’ formulation and physical parameterization, the climate change
signal projected by different climate models may present significant
differences. However, all the model's runs driven by the same A1B emission
scenario represent an equally probable projection of the future evolution of
the climate. To better represent the climate variability related to the model
choice, in PESETA II a combination of different climate models were used. Figure 3 shows the geographical
distribution of the (multi-model) mean summer and winter temperature and
precipitation climate change signal (i.e. the difference between the period
2071-2100 and the reference period 1961-1990) undere the A1B scenario. These
results are in accordance with those shown for instance in the ENSEMBLES final
report (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009) and show a general warming up by
more than 4°C in Northern Europe in winter and in Southern Europe in summer. Daily precipitation change at the end of
the century shows a general positive trend in winter (with the exception of the
Iberian Peninsula), where the increase over Northern Europe and Scandinavia ranges between 20 % and 45 %. However, over Middle, Southern, and Eastern Europe, the value (and in some cases also the sign) of the change depends strongly
on the model. In summer, Southern Europe will face a
reduction in precipitation up to more than 40%. Over great part of Central and Eastern Europe, however, the value of the change is very small (less than 15%) and comparable
to the value of the inter model variability (Dosio et al, 2012). Figure 3:
Mean seasonal climate change signal for bias corrected temperature (upper row)
and precipitation (lower row) in winter (left column) and summer (right column)
under A1B scenario (source JRC PESETA II) 1.1.2. Uncertainties As pointed out above when summarising the
various IPCC scenarios, there is great uncertainty about the trajectory of
greenhouse-gas emissions, which is dependent on future socioeconomic
development and policy decisions. Future warming of the earth will affect
many aspects of the climate system, for instance leading to increasing sea
levels, and changes in weather extremes. Observations show increases in ocean
temperature, in atmospheric water content, and in sea level, whereas the ice
sheets snow cover in both hemispheres are declining rapidly. Significant
changes have also been observed in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, and
wind patterns, whereby the direction and magnitude of change differs across
regions (Solomon et al., 2007). Extreme weather events have also changed,
including increases in heat waves, droughts, heavy precipitation, and the
intensity of tropical cyclones. Economic losses from weather- and climate-related
disasters have increased, but with large spatial and interannual variability
(SREX, 2012). Scientific research in the
next decades will resolve some of the present uncertainties, as our
understanding of complex climate processes and the adaptive capacity of
ecosystems improves. However, a significant amount of uncertainty will remain, as
embracing more complex processes means adding in ‘known unknowns’, such as the
rate at which ice falls through clouds, or the rate at which different types of
land cover and the oceans absorb carbon dioxide. Several international reviews
and initiatives on the issue of uncertainty assessment and communication have
been carried out over recent years, including by the IPCC. As regards marine
observations and monitoring of the sea, the impact assessment for Marine
Knowledge[2] already highlighted that reducing uncertainty in sea-level rise by
25% would deliver savings of about €100 million a year in terms of coastal
defence work. Figure 4:
Cascade of uncertainties: Range of major uncertainties typical in impact
assessments showing the “uncertainty explosion” as these ranges is multiplied
to encompass a comprehensive range of future consequences, including physical,
economic so 1.1.3. Climate impacts Figure 5 below
summarises some of the impacts to be associated with climate change. Figure 5
Projected impacts of climate change and associated threats. Based on EEA report
Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability in Europe (2012). The top left part of
the figure refers to the number of days that combine a hot summer day (defined
as having a temperature exceeding 35 °C) and a tropical night (defined as
having a minimum temperature higher than 20 °C). It is a basic indicator of
human comfort due to heat stress. Model projections presented here are the
average of six regional climate model (RCM) simulations of the EU ENSEMBLES
project using the IPCC SRES A1B emission scenario for the periods 1961–1990,
2021–2050 and 2071–2100. The number of such combined heat stress days is
projected to double across most parts of southern Europe by 2071 to 2100
(Source: Fischer and Schär, 2010). The top right part of
the figure refers to projected changes in annual (left) and summer (right)
precipitation (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009). Seasonal mean precipitation
values and inter-annual variability is better reproduced by an ensemble of RCMs
than by any single RCM (Beniston et al., 2007; Tapiador, 2010). These
projections indicate a general increase in annual precipitation in northern
Europe and a decrease in southern Europe. Projections for summer precipitation
show a decrease over southern, central and northwest Europe, which can reach of
up to 60 % in parts of southern Europe. Precipitation is projected to remain constant
or to increase slightly in northeast Europe (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009;
Tapiador, 2010). The bottom right figure
refers to projected changes in fire danger. Daily severity values can be
averaged over the fire season obtaining a Seasonal Severity Rating (SSR) index,
which allows objective comparison of fire danger from year to year and from
region to region. Although the index is dimensionless and mainly used for
comparison purposes, SSR values above 6 may be considered in the extreme range.
Projected climate changes would increase the length and severity of the fire
season, the area at risk and the probability of large fires, possibly enhancing
desertification. The figures presented here compare modelled fire danger
projections for baseline (1961–1990) and projected (2071–2100) climate
conditions. The results suggest that climate change would lead to a marked
increase of fire potential in south-eastern and south-western Europe; in
relative terms the increase in SSR would be particularly strong in
western-central Europe (Source based on Camia et al., 2008 as referred in the
EEA report N°12/2012.) The bottom right figure
refers to the affected population and gross value added (GVA) affected by
floods for the 2050s for the 'Economy First' scenario, taking into account both
climate change and socio‑economic changes. Specifically, it looks at the number of people
(left) and amount of manufacturing gross value added (GVA), (right), affected
by 100-year flood events in the 'Economy First' scenario for the 2050s.
Calculations are based on median ensemble results from LISFLOOD linked to
population projections from SCENES scenarios (Source: Flörke, Wimmer,
Cornelius, et al., 2011). It is based on underlying work of the JRC[3]. The figures on population and Gross Value Added affected present
only the future (2050) situation. Note that the maps show the absolute number
of affected people or GVA in a region rather than the percentage of population or
GVA. It should also be noted that there are large differences in changes in
projected flood frequency 1.1.4. The
benefits of adaptation The minimum cost of not
adapting to climate change is estimated to range from € 100 billion a year
in 2020 to € 250 billion in 2050 for the EU as a whole[4]. Between 1980 and 2011, direct economic losses in the EU due to
flooding alone amounted to more than € 90 billion. This amount is expected
to increase, as the annual cost of damage from river floods is estimated at € 20
billion by the 2020s and € 46 billion by the 2050s. Floods resulted in
more than 2500 fatalities and affected more than 5.5 million people over the period
1980-2011. Taking no further mitigation or adaptation measures could mean an
additional 26 000 deaths/year from heat by the 2020s, rising to 89 000
deaths/year by the 2050s[5] Figure
6: Projections of economic costs from
climate change and socio‑economic developments for four major categories (source:
Watkiss (2011) as reported in EEA (2012) "climate change impacts and
vulnerability in Europe" When faced with the potential
impacts of climate change, three options are possible: self-protect – that is,
adapt – purchase insurance against climate change damage, or do nothing.
Uncertainties on climate hazards and damage costs notwithstanding, there is
evidence of benefits for adaptation in terms of risk reduction and sharing. First, there is ample evidence of the benefits of effective adaptation
action at local level. Case studies of adaptation measures have been made
available on Climate-ADAPT[6]. Methodologies have been derived to help assess the costs and
benefits of adaptation action, taking account of the uncertainty surrounding
some of the costs of climate change as well as of the co-benefits to be
expected from adaptation measures for other objectives. Such studies show that
investing in adaptation can reduce the overall damage costs with climate change.
Second, the sectoral coverage
of the adaptation cost estimates is limited, though the evidence base is now
growing. To take an example, the ClimateCost study shows that the avoided costs
due to adaptation action from the impacts of sea level rise in the EU are
estimated, depending on the climate scenario, around EUR 3,5bn (A1B) and 4bn
(E1) per year in the 2020s, around EUR 8,6bn (A1B) and 9,9bn (E1) per year in
the 2050s, and around EUR 22,7bn (A1B) and 15,4bn (E1) per year in the 2080s[7] ClimateCost results[8] || Economic impacts || Adaptation costs || Reduction in damage costs || 2020s || 2050s || 2080s || 2020s || 2050s || 2080s || 2020s || 2050s || 2080s Sea-level rise || 5bn || 11bn || 25bn || 1bn || 1.5bn || 1.6bn || 3bn || 9bn || 23bn Floods || 20bn || 46bn || 98bn || 1.7bn || 3.4bn || 7.9bn || 8bn || 19bn || 50bn Energy || || 30bn || 109bn || || || || || || Third, macroeconomic evidence
exists of the potential benefits of adaptation (Bosello,
2010, Bosello et al., 2010). Modelling results show that adaptation measures can effectively complement mitigation efforts and
reduce overall damage costs due to climate change. Moreover, in several cases,
adaptation activities can simultaneously produce mitigation benefits, while
sustaining production and growth. This is the case of a number of sustainable
agricultural practices or of energy efficiency measures for instance. 1.2. Climate
change impacts and adaptation needs across the EU 1.2.1. Economic
sectors and systems 1.2.1.1. Agriculture[9] Expected impacts of climate change Over the coming decades agriculture will be
influenced by climate change both globally and within the EU. Even though EU
agriculture is technologically developed, its capacity to deliver food and to
contribute to ecosystem services for the European society is directly dependent
on climatic conditions. Socio-economic factors, international competition,
technological development, as well as policy choices will eventually determine
the impact that climatic changes will have on the EU agricultural sector in the
future. Agriculture is highly sensitive to
climate, both in terms of longer-term trends in the average conditions of
rainfall and temperature, which determine the productivity and spatial
distribution of crops, but also in terms of year-to-year variability and the
occurrence of droughts, floods, heat waves, frosts and other extreme events. Direct
effects are primarily expected from higher CO2 levels resulting in
increased biomass production and water use efficiency. Indirect effects come through
changes in climatic variables, such as temperature, precipitation, radiation,
humidity and extreme weather events, which affect plant water uptake,
occurrence of weeds, pests and diseases, soil moisture, and ultimately
influence crop growth. Climate change is already having an impact
on agriculture. It has been recognized as one of the factors contributing to
recent stagnation in wheat yields in parts of Europe despite continued progress
in crop breeding (Brisson et al., 2010). The variability of crop yields has also
greatly increased over the last decades mainly as a consequence of extreme
climatic events, such as recent heat waves and drought. Year-to year variability of crop
productivity is generally expected to increase trhoughout the EU due to the
projected rise in the frequence and severity of extreme climate events and
other facrors suh as pests and diseases (EEA, 2012a). The projected increase in
the occurrence of such events would be particularly detrimental for crop
production in central and southern Europe, where such events will occur more
frequently and add to current stresses The latter may exacerbate the trend
towards rising price volatility over the last years. Studies indicate a strong regional
divergence in climate change effects in the EU. In northern areas
climate change may produce positive effects on agriculture through the introduction
of new crop varieties, higher yields and expansion of suitable areas for crop
cultivation. Increased crop productivity, especially for cereals, is due to the
expected increase in the duration of the thermal growing season, decreasing
cold spells and extended periods without frost. Negative impacts are also
projected in northern areas such as increased pests and diseases, nutrient
leaching, and reduced soil organic matter. In southern areas the disadvantages
are likely to be predominant, although the picture is very different depending
on the models used, the time horizon and the crops considered. The overall expected
reduction in precipitation and water avalability, and extreme heat events may negatively
affect crop productivity,lead to higher yield variability and, in the long
term, drive a change in the range of current cropping possibilities. Effects are expected to be increasingly
visible towards 2050, when climatic changes intensify. In extreme cases, a reduction
in suitable areas for cultivation in certan European regions can be expected (Olesen
and Bindi 2004; Olesen et al. 2011; Iglesias et al. 2009). For instance,
farmland in coastal areas may decrease considerably in the future, due to the
potential increase of flooding and inundation of fields. In addition, saltwater
intrusion of groundwater aquifers could negatively impact water for irrigation
affecting crop yield if suitable source alternatives are not available. Impacts on crop production – findings from AVEMAC[10] This project, carried out by the JRC, assesses the potential impacts of changing climatic conditions on main arable crops in the coming decades (2020 and 2030) by using two realisations of one emission scenario (A1B)[11]. These scenarios do not differ remarkably on projections for air temperature, but they show contrasting results in precipitation patterns (in terms of magnitude but also direction of the change). Rainfall trends are particularly critical for rainfed crops in Southern Europe, and they can lead either to an improvement or to a deterioration of crop productivity. The main simulation results by 2020 without explicitly considering farm-level technical adaptation are as follows: § the simulations for wheat show a negative response at northern latitudes, and a rather unchanged yield level at southern laitudes. § For rapeseed a negative potential impact was simulated at southern latitudes. Sunflower yield was simulated to potentially improve at northern latitudes, but with negative effects on yield at southern latitudes. § For maize, a potential rise in yields is expected at northern latitudes, while lower yields are simulated at southern latitudes. § Under waterlimited production the different precipitation patterns estimated by the two models led to a different response of rain-fed crops (wheat, rapeseed, sunflower). Under the “warm” scenario, potential yields were simulated to improve in Southern Europe. The simulation including technical adaptation in the form of autonomus adjustement of technical management by farmer (e.g., different varieties, changing sowing time, increased/reduced irrigation) has shown in many cases an alleviation of the most negative impacts. Improvement of results are especially perceiced under the “cold” scenario in Southern Europe in general, and with a more modest effectiveness in Southern Spain. Also, yield estimates in many areas show improvements under the “warm” scenario in Southern Europe. One of the expected impacts is the
increasing year-to year weather variability, which may exacerbate the trend
towards rising price volatility over the last years.. The variability of
crop yields has indeed greatly increased over the last decades mainly as a
consequence of extreme climatic events, such as recent heat waves and drought. The
projected increase in the occurrence of such events would be particularly
detrimental for crop production in central and southern Europe, where such
events will occur more frequently and add to current stresses (EEA, 2012a). The relevance of pests and plant diseases
to agricultural losses should not be underestimated. A changing climate is
associated with increased a incidence and geographical spread of pests and
diseases. It is estimated that 30% of losses caused by harmful organisms can be
attributed to new pests and diseases (Pimentel, 2005), although poor
agricultural practices may be responsible to a larger extent in less developed
countries. Kenis & Branco (2010; as quoted by Pimentel, 2011) estimate
annual economic losses for the EU of approximately €10 billion caused by
already introduced alien insects, not including control, eradication, or
quarantine costs, nor costs linked to foreign trade or market aspects. This
does not yet consider similar costs due to introduced non-European viruses,
bacteria, fungi and nematodes, which add up to a multiple of that figure. Dryer conditions and rising temperatures will
affect livestock activities in different ways, including implications
for animal health and welfare. Climate change has a complex influence on the
livestock sector due to the great diversity of production systems in the EU.
Warming and extreme events, such as heat spells, will also have direct impacts
on animal health, growth and output, as well as on reproduction.
There will also be indirect effects through changes in the productivity of
pastures and forage crops, and in the distribution of animal diseases. Highly adverse impacts are likely to be
felt in extensive grazing systems which are directly dependent on climate
conditions for the provision of feed and shelter. Changes in transhumance and
grazing patterns may also facilitate the spread of diseases by increased
congregation of animals for feeding or watering at smaller surfaces.In
Mediterranean areas warmer temperatures and summer precipitation deficits will
shorten the grazing period and decrease forage production and its quality. In
the North-Western humid areas a moderate warming can, however, be beneficial to
livestock activities in the short to medium term because of the productivity
increase of pastures. At global level, there is rising
concern that climate change could also contribute to exacerbate the food
security problems. Global food production will still be possible at levels
similar to or above current production levels, but new farming practices to
adapt to climate change will be needed, and these may increase production
costs. Food supply chains could also be affected
and have an impact on retailers. Additional work is needed to investigate the
possible implications on food supply chains. Economic effects of climate-related risks – results from JRC PESETA II project A quantitative modelling framework has been developed by the JRC analysing the impacts of climate change and examining the adaptation measures in Europe in the horizon 2020, compared to the reference situation of no climate change. CAPRI, an agricultural partial equilibrium model, was used for this purpose, using biophysical impact estimates from the JRC BioMA modelling framework (as assessed by AVEMAC). Nine scenarios were assessed. Two adaptation scenarios – "no-adaptation" and "best-adaptation" – were included. For each adaptation scenario two climate scenarios with fixed prices (warm and mild[12]) and two climate scenarios with price effects (warm-global and mild-global) were run. Additionally, a baseline scenario defines the reference situation and thus serves as a comparison point for the 8 counterfactual scenarios. The simulation results indicate that by 2020 climate change effects will reduce the prices of agricultural commodities in the EU. The price decrease under the "no-adaptation" scenario is lower than in the "best-adaptation" scenario. This is because for the overall EU,, climate change tends to have a positive impact on agricultural production due to higher yields although there are strong differences in the adjustment pattern between sectors. Adjustment of animal production to climatic changes is relatively lower but positive in all four scenarios. The overall increase in animal production is induced by lower crop prices which reduce animal feed costs (in the global scenarios) and higher yield level of feed crops in all scenarios (e.g. grassland). The impact of climate change on EU land use is relatively small. Climate change will lead to a small positive impact on total welfare. Total welfare could improve due to consumer gain from lower food prices but the change is very small (close to zero). The agricultural income reacts stronger but the effect is still relatively low: between -0.1 and 8% change compared to baseline. Policy context and current adaptation
activities Since its creation, the European Common
Agriculture Policy (CAP) influenced the development of the EU agriculture but
also adapted with times. In this context, the European Commission tabled in
2011 proposals for a reform of the CAP after 2013 with the aim to strengthen
the competitiveness and the sustainability of agriculture and maintain its
presence in all regions, in order to guarantee European citizens healthy and
quality food production, to preserve the environment and to help develop rural
areas. The Commission included in its legal
proposal for the reform of the CAP various elements that will contribute in a
complementary and coherent way to the objective of a more sustainable use of
natural resources, mitigating climate change and enhance farmer’s resilience to
the threats posed by climate change and its variability often referred to as
the "greening of the CAP". The "greening" comprises
enhanced cross-compliance, the further greening of the first pillar through the
granting of a "green" specific decoupled direct payment, the
reinforcement of an improved agri-environmental policy under the second pillar
encouraging the introduction and/ or maintenance of extensive, environmentally
friendly farming systems as well as broad support from the Farm Advisory System
and applied research. The new CAP will provide an enhanced framework for
sustainable management of the natural environment in which agricultural
activity takes place, which will contribute to adaptation to climatic changes. The EU intends to further pursue and
support adaptation in the agricultural sector with four broad types of
instruments within the CAP and the EU research and innovation policy: -
improved framework to sustainable management
of natural resources, such as a new “green” payment as part of the income
support, strenghtened cross-compliance for climate change and enhanced
environmental and climatic support within the rural sector. One of the key
changes proposed for the rural development policy is to structure forthcoming
rural development programmes (RDP) around "priorities". Six
priorities have been set, two of which relate to the environment and to climate
adaptation, such as promoting resource efficiency, and focus on increasing
efficiency in water usage by agriculture, and on a low carbon and climate
resilient agriculture. Within the current Commission proposal, Member States
are encouraged to implement actions related to the six priorities although they
may put more emphasis on certain ones according to their situation and
priorities. Adaptation is also an aspect to be taken into account when
assessing the specific needs of the other five priorities, since climate change
is considered a cross-cutting issue. For instance, funding of an upgrade
irrigation equipement will be conditioned to the achievements of a certain
level of water saving and efficiency requirements. -
Financial support.
Rural development policy will continue providing a
targeted support to a large array of adaptation measures involving building an
adaptive capacity of farmers (e.g. information actions, training) and
implementing actions (e.g., agri-environment-climate measures, enhanced support
for risk management instruments, such as insurances). Building resilience
encompasses a broad range of socio-economic-ecological actions, not necessarily
climate-specific but which can help coping with climate variability and change. -
Enhanced research and innovation, and a new European Innovation Partnership on "Agricultural
productivity and sustainability". The EIP aims at building bridges between
research, innovation, advisors and farmers, bringing scientific results to the
“field”, and having research working on issues needing solutions in
co-operation with local knowledge. Adaptation of agricultural systems is a key
area for research and innovation. On the other hand, agricultural research in the
forthcoming Horizon 2020 framework for EU research and innovation will support
transition pathways towards resilient farming systems combining the goals of
ensuring productivity while considering all dimensions of sustainability.
Achieving a climate-smart agriculture including adaptation of agricultural
systems is a key component of the second Societal Challenge of the Horizon 2020
relating to "Food security, sustainable agriculture, marine and maritime
research and the bio-economy". -
Knowledge transfer and information actions. Enhancing the adaptive capacity of farmers
is a necessary condition for sustaining adaptation in agriculture.
Strengthening information and advisory support on climate-related matters to
farmers and agricultural workers is key for motivation and preparedness to
adapt. (improved Farm Advisory instrument covering climate-related issues,
actions to enhance knowledge transfer to the farm community). With regard to plant health, the role of
the EU and related legislation concerns measures to prevent the entry,
establishment and spread of pests of plants that are not native to the EU. The
Commission Work Programme foresees also the adoption of a proposal for a new
plant health law by 2012, which will reinforce mitigation of risks from climate
change and trade globalisation to plant health. Main barriers to action Some barriers have been identified that
prevent a higher uptake of adaptation action in the sector. An important one is
the uncertainty of the effects of climate change and adaptation
solutions that may hamper the planning of specific adaptation actions,
particularly if these are costly. There is often a chain of uncertainty
involved in the projections going from emission scenario, through climate
modelling, downscaling and to assessments of impacts using an impact model
(Olesen et al., 2007). The extent of all these uncertainties is rarely
quantified, even though some studies have assessed uncertainties related to
individual components. The crop modelling community has only recently started
addressing uncertainties related to modelling impacts of climate change on crop
yield and effect of possible adaptation options, and so far only few studies
have involved livestock systems (EEA, 2012a). However, adaptation planning can also bring
opportunities to build agricultural systems with greater resilience to
environmental, climatic and economic risks. The preparation of national and
regional adaptation strategies and plans covering agriculture as well as
additional guidance and information sharing could better guide Member States
and regions on how adaptation action can be best pursued. In this process, it
is important to further engage the farming community in the discussion on
adaptation needs and in sharing good practices. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU action? The vulnerability of farming varies across
the EU depending on the exposure to adverse climate impacts, the socio-economic
context and the specific farm characteristics (e.g., size, level of
diversification). Existing agro-ecological conditions and the experience in
dealing with changing conditions greatly influence farmers' adaptive capacity. Independently to the contribution of the
CAP, autonomous adaptation to climate change occurs at farm level. Adaptation
to weather conditions is inherent to farm management. Constant evolution of
crop patterns, farm management practices and land use are observed across the
EU, partly in response to the perceived climatic variations. Such farm-level
adaptations aim at increasing productivity and dealing with existing climatic
conditions, and mainly draw on farmers' current knowledge and experience, but
these largely depend on farmers' current knowledge, experience and financial
possibilities for change. Therefore not all farmers have the same opportunity
for developing spontaneous adaptation strategies. Coping with the increasing short term
climatic variability could be more difficult than adjusting to gradual long-term
changes in mean climatic variables. This may require greater attention to
ensuring stability and resilience of agricultural production and farm
incomes in vulnerable regions. Diversifying farm activities and income sources,
with fundamental changes in farm structures and in some cases, additional
investments, may become necessary. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience To effectively complement what has been
proposed for the revision of the CAP, identifying adaptation options at farm and
landscape level would help Member States and regions in developing their rural
development programmes. A balanced mix of preventive and coping actions
should be promoted. Insurance schemes/mechanisms that compensate for crop
losses due to disaster events should ensure that they do not hinder investment
in adaptation. The climate challenge puts a renewed
emphasis on the need for enhancing agricultural research, at EU
and national levels, to assess the impacts of climate change on agricultural
production as well as costs and benefits of adaptation, covering arable and
permanent crops as well as livestock systems. Forthcoming research should better
integrate the potential effects of extreme climate events and biotic hazards,
as well as the increased competition for scarce resources, such as water. A key challenge is to integrate findings
from the physical and agronomic sciences with local knowledge from farmers, so
as to develop robust adaptation strategies, which, over a range of climate and
socio-economic scenarios, can minimize the negative impacts of climate change.
The Farm Advisory System can be an important tool also in this regard. Equally important is to strengthen the
capacity of regional institutions to use appropriate tools to address climatic
changes. Partnerships between national and regional research institutions,
advisory services and social partners in agriculture as well as setting up of
regional networks providing information to farm communities will help to design
adequate site-specific strategies. 1.2.1.2. Forests and the forestry sector Expected impacts of climate change Forests and the way they are managed are
particularly sensitive to climate change because the long lifespan of trees
does not allow for a rapid adaptation to environmental changes. Effects of
climate change include increased risk of biotic (pests and diseases) and
abiotic (droughts, storms and fires) disturbances to forest health. During the
stakeholder meeting convened with forest experts in June 2012 it came clear
that, over the last ten years, natural catastrophes have led to a massive
increase of damages in several regions . However, the exact effects of climate
change on forests are complex and not yet well understood. Potential
environmental impacts include: changing tree species distributions in Europe; northwards
and upwards (mountains) expansion of broadleaved deciduous species; increasing
threats for specialized plant communities; thermophilic plant species become
more common, while cold-tolerant species decline; in large areas of western and
central Europe, indigenous conifers may be replaced by deciduous trees chance
of tree species influences the quality of water. In southern Europe, slow growth and high
forest fire risk might require landowners to carry out more intense thinning
strategies and change the species composition towards less productive species.
Shortening rotation periods have also been mentioned in the study referred
below as a way to reduce the risk from storm or fire damage. Such actions would
likely reduce the level of growth per hectare, affecting income and the
provision of forest functions (EUSTAFOR, 2011). In Europe no overall assessment
has yet been made of the economic implications of climate change, nor of the
potential costs of the various adaptation measures needed. The PESETA II
project has estimated the cost to the EU economy of forest fires in the
Mediterranean region (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Mediterranean France).
The study finds that increased forest fires would reduce economic welfare (mainly
due to restoration costs) in the EU as a whole by between 0.01% and 0.04%. The
loss would be greatest in Portugal (around 0.8%) and Greece (around 0.2%) since
the cost of increased fire instance in these countries is particularly large
relative to the size of their economies. These results should be considered a
preliminary minimum estimate of the cost of climate-induced forest fires since
many important damages have not yet been considered (such as costs of fire
fighting and destruction of capital other than in the forest sector). The impacts of climate change will vary
throughout the different geographic European regions, with forest fires likely
to dominate in southern Europe and the limited diversity of tree species in
boreal forests enhancing the risk of significant pest and disease impacts.
Evidence to date suggests that biomass productivity in northern and central Europe has increased and is likely to continue to increase. Further, northward expansion of
potential distribution of some tree species is expected and potentially more
favourable conditions for summer recreation in mountainous regions will exist. With more drastic changes in climate
towards the end of the century, severe and wide ranging negative climate change
impacts have to be expected in most European regions, with the Mediterranean
region as the most vulnerable to climate change based on potential impact
assessment and adaptive capacity. Due to the long timespan of trees, adaptation
action would be required by 2020. Changes in the patterns of disturbance by
forest pests (insects, pathogens and other pests) are expected under a changing
climate as a result of warmer temperatures, changes in precipitation, increased
drought frequency and higher carbon dioxide concentrations. However there is
evidence from an FAO desk review that climate change is having considerable and
widespread impacts on forest health worldwide, and, as a result, on the forest
sector (FAO, 2008). Climate change can affect forest pests and the damage they
cause by: directly impacting their development, survival, reproduction,
distribution and spread; altering host physiology and defences; and indirectly
by impacting the relationships between pests, their environment and other
species such as natural enemies, competitors and mutualists (ibid). Gradual
shifts in climatic suitability in previously unsuitable regions of the world
provide new opportunities for forest pests to establish in new locations. Policy context and current adaptation
activities EC Regulation 2152/2003, repealed by
Regulation (EC) No 614/2007, established a Community scheme on monitoring of
forests and environmental interactions to protect the Community’s forests.
Monitoring activities also cover the issue of climate change. The new EU Forest
Strategy is scheduled for adoption for the first quarter of 2013 There are also other policies where forests
and forestry are a significant and essential element and, therefore, these
policies also impact forestry management. The proposed Rural Development policy
for the period 2014-20 will offer support for forestry measures that will also
help adaptation objectives. The Commission Work Programme foresees also the
adoption of a proposal for a new plant health law by 2013. The Commission is
currently working on a dedicated legislative instrument on Invasive Alien
Species. Main barriers to action The following barriers for action have been
identified: First of all there is an overflow of information at all levels,
with several policy areas – such as biodiversity, the CAP or nature conservation
– to be simultaneously considered by forest managers when making decisions. The
proposed EU Forest strategy will integrate these different policies into an
overall strategic framework. Adaptation possibilities are also often limited
due to legal requirements in other policy areas such as nature conservation
obligations (e.g. planting of new non-native species). The second large barrier lies within the
structure of the sector. The overall discussions on adaptation at EU level
hardly reach the ground (single forest owner) due to the diversity and
fragmentation of the sector (few large companies versus several small forest
owners). Forest management also has different objectives (e.g. economic, nature
conservation, protection of human activities), in which adaptation should be
integrated to be efficient. This should be considered when trying to convince
forest managers to take actions in the area of adaptation to climate change. Finally there is a lack of awareness. It is
important to increase the awareness on adaptation at the local level. This
could be done via the use of advisory services and the creation of local forest
organisations (co-operations). Such organisations are seen as a suitable entry
point for increasing awareness about EU policies in general but also for
adaptation in particular. For larger companies it is also important to create a
business case for adaptation. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU action? It is expected that extreme weather events
will continue to have an impact on the forestry sector. In addition, some
long-term investment decisions should already factor in the long-term impacts
of climate change. Out of the 12 Member States which have developed a an
adaptation strategy, 10 address the issue of forestry. Stakeholders' dialogues
with the actors of the sector have also indicated that at least those forestry
owners which have a business case in forest management will also take
adaptation measures in order to ensure the sustainability of the business. The
new EU Forest strategy should address climate change – mitigation and
adaptation – as a cross cutting objective. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience In 2008 a list of adaptation measures was
developed in a study for the Commission[13]. This
list was discussed and amended by the Working Group under the Standing Forestry
Committee contributing to the development of a new Forest Strategy. In
addition, stakeholders' dialogues with the actors of the sector have shown the
need to: i/ Build capacity through information exchange and awareness raising
between forest owners on climate change adaptation; ii/ Support research to
fill knowledge gaps on vulnerable areas, regional adaptive capacity, economic
implications of climate change, the socio-economic adaptation capacity of the
forestry sector and how to include regional climate change information into
smaller-scale environmental impact assessments. Additional specific topics
include: risk prevention measures, location based adaptation, how adaptation efforts
in the forestry sector will impact other sectors and vice versa, dealing with
uncertainties, etc. 1.2.1.3. Transport Expected impacts of climate change Consequences of climate change will both be
negative and positive for transportation infrastructure such as for rail, road,
shipping and aviation, but will differ from region to region. In particular,
the projected increase in frequency and intensity of extreme weather, such as
heavy rain (e.g. causing floods), heavy snowfall, extreme heat and cold, drought
and reduced visibility can enhance negative impacts on the transport
infrastructure, causing injuries and damages as well as economic losses. But
also some beneficial impacts on transport due to climate change can be
expected, such as reduced snow fall for most European regions improving traffic
conditions. Many impacts aggravated by climatic change,
such as flooding and erosion, will affect all transport modes, while some are
unique to each mode (e.g. scour on bridge supports, rail buckling). However,
the vulnerability of the transport sector is also influenced by human behaviour
and societal changes: as different transport modes are differently affected by
climate change, the kind of mobility chosen by individuals is influencing the
vulnerability of the whole sector. For example, a strong shift from individual
transport to public transport could decrease overall vulnerability of the
sector as public transport generally is better controllable and manageable. In terms of cost estimates for future climate
change impacts on the transport sector, the Weather project (Fraunhofer ISI, in
Trinks et al. 2012) concludes that from 2010 to 2050, due to weather extremes,
rail transport will experience the most substantial increase in all cost
categories (i.e. comprising direct costs to the transport sector and indirect
costs to its users and to other sectors). Most hit are rail services in France
and the UK, but also in central Europe and Scandinavia. Regarding road
transport the highest increase of costs of approximately 80 % is predicted in
the analysis for France. In contrast, a considerable decrease of more than 20 %
in infrastructure, service and user costs in road transport related to extreme
weather events is predicted for Germany, Spain and Italy. The aviation sector
is well adapted to handle weather extremes and the additional cost may in
principle be limited in Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe and with an
increasing tendency in the Mediterranean Area and France. However, the
inter-linkages between major airports across and outside the EU – through
connecting, returning and onward flights – imply that the closure of one or
several airports due to extreme weather conditions relatively fast can become
widespread causing further delays and cancellations. Policy context and current adaptation
activities Climate change impacts will enhance the
pressure on transport infrastructure in the future, also in economic terms.
This is of particular importance considering the long-term investments – with a
life-span-time up to 100 years (e.g. major transport routes, bridges, tunnels,
urban transport). The majority of existing EU transport policies does not
explicitly address the climatic pressures and impacts which can be expected in
the future as potentially harming transport infrastructure. However, a few
policy implementation reports (e.g. Fifth report on economic, social and
territorial cohesion ) are highlighting the need for climate change adaptation
of transport infrastructure. Other policies include mechanism or technical
standards which are of importance in terms of adaptation (e.g. Directive on
River Information Services requests for implementing information services and
providing information on navigation, water level etc.). In addition, adaptation
can be integrated in existing policies dealing with new infrastructure projects
to ensure climate resilience. In case of the TEN-T-Guidelines , adaptation to
climate change has been integrated in the proposal for revision. Besides
activities at the EU level, adaptation activities at Member States´ level are
also crucial due to the fact that the majority of adaptation actions need to be
taken at that or lower levels. Up to now, the first adaptation activities
can be observed in the different transport modes. For example, the rail sector
has started to deal with the issue of climate change impacts and some companies
(e.g. UK, France) have prepared strategies on how to cope with these impacts.
Related activities include research concerning the impact of climate change in
the next decades as well as the identification of challenges, constraints,
solutions and benefits of adaptation measures. In other transport modes such as
road, fewer activities can be observed (result from literature review and
stakeholder exchange). Main barriers to action To foster adaptation to climate change in
the transport sector, a common understanding of problems related to climate
change as well as information on possible impacts are required, but often
missing. As uncertainties exist in relation to future climate projections and
inherently in the occurrence of extreme weather events, planning for adaptation
is often postponed as well. Unclear responsibility for climate issues in the
transport sector might additionally hinder adaptation. The implementation of
adaptation options might face problems due to a lack of knowledge on damage
costs as well as costs of adaptation. In addition, funding of adaptation
options seems to be a bottleneck. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? Transport infrastructure investments boost
economic growth; create wealth; enhance trade, geographical accessibility and
the mobility of people (COM 2011 ). Experiences of past catastrophes and
research results show clearly that extreme weather events today are not
sufficiently addressed by transport systems and in particular by risk or
emergency management procedures within the transport sector (Papanikolaou et
al., 2011). Extreme weather events have economic impacts, which are closely
related to the frequencies of damage-, disruption- and transport restriction
events and the availability of transport alternatives. Climate change impacts
due to change in precipitation patterns (magnitude and frequency) and to
increase of temperature will enhance the pressure on transport infrastructure
in the future, also in economic terms. Furthermore, transport infrastructure
networks are often trans-boundary and coordination efforts for adaptation are
therefore required. Existing EU policies do not accommodate these changes
adequately and thus, in case of inaction, additional negative effects might be
expected by 2020. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience The general objective is to enhance the
resilience of transport infrastructure in regard to future climate change
impacts including extreme weather events. The aim is to decrease the
frequencies of damage, disruption and transport restrictions and to enhance the
availability of transport alternatives. Research funding should be available to
close knowledge gaps in the transport sector such as regional vulnerability hot
spot analyses by transport mode, aggregated costs to transport systems from
climate change, costing of adaptation options, research on technical issues to
be able to suggest specific amendments in standards and regulations, etc. A number of relevant existing policies
might provide entry points to integrate climate change adaptation. Such
relevant policies at EU level for all transport modes are the TEN-T Guidelines
(661/2010/EC); the link to adaptation has been included in the revised version
of the guideline. Regarding climate change adaptation in rail, policies
focusing on the safety of rail networks and on new development of
infrastructure are of specific interest (e.g. mainstreaming climate change
adaptation into the TSI-Directive 2008/57/EC on the interoperability of the
rail system within the Community). In case of roads, the Directive 2008/96/EC
on road infrastructure safety management requires the establishment and
implementation of procedures relating to road safety impact assessments, road
safety audits, the management of road network safety and safety inspections by
the Member States for the trans-European road network, whether they are at the
design stage, under construction or in operation. When carrying out these
assessments, not only the current climate conditions should be taken into
account, but also information on possible future climatic conditions should be
considered. The EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018 might provide further
entry points for mainstreaming of climate change adaptation. Technical adaptation options should focus
on the use of materials for transport infrastructure which better cope with
extreme heat events (e.g. to prevent track buckling or softening of pavement
materials). A higher dimension of drainage systems should be considered. Sea
level rise needs to be taken into account in navigation systems and
infrastructure as well as in the design of long-life structures (e.g. dock and
wharfs). In addition, early warning-systems (e.g. for forest fires, floods) and
monitoring (e.g. land slopes, wind speeds) should be enhanced and improved. 1.2.1.4. Construction and buildings Expected impacts of climate change The impact of climate change is
particularly pertinent to the construction industry given the life expectancy
of buildings and the fact that there is a need to adapt the existing built
environment, to deal with a climate that may be significantly different from
that in which it evolved. Major threats to construction and buildings requiring
short-term action can be aggregated to: i/ extreme precipitation, which can be
expected European wide, e.g. leading to water intrusion, damage to foundations
and basements, destruction of buildings and infrastructure, overflowing sewers,
land- and mud-slides, flooding, etc.; ii/ extreme summer heat events,
especially but not only in South Europe, e.g. leading to material fatigue,
decreased comfort and potentially severe health implications, high energy use
for cooling, etc. iii/ exposure of constructions to heavy snowfall, iv/ rising
sea levels that increase the risk of flooding. In the past, precipitation in its various
forms caused the most damage to buildings and infrastructure. This is true for
all parts of Europe and all forms of buildings and civil engineering works. For
example, heavy snowfall and storms have created serious damage to roofs and the
outer shell of buildings, heavy rain and storm waters causing flash flooding
lead to infiltration of water into buildings, damage or destruction. Salt water
intrusion can cause deterioration of facades, statues and monuments and
structural parts of buildings and civil engineering works. Especially urban
areas are affected by climate change due to higher sealing-rates related to
construction and buildings. European cities close to a river or to the coast
are most vulnerable to flooding. Due to a lack of space, flood plains are
more and more used for housing and industry. Short term social, commercial,
economic and political pressures may outweigh scientific caution and
environmental concerns. Research has shown that the increase in economic damage
of the past decade may be due to an increase of economic assets in vulnerable
places rather than an early consequence of climate change. Buildings and infrastructure can be
vulnerable to climate change because of their design (low resistance to storms)
or location (e.g. in flood-prone areas, landslides, avalanches). Flooding is
(after earthquakes) one of the most costly kinds of disasters and this is
mainly due to floods in built-up areas. Many European cities have been built
along a river; and these rivers will respond to extreme rainfall or snowmelt
events with extreme discharges, threatening the cities with floods. There is
also a growing problem with overheating of the built environment being exposed
to rising temperatures and extreme heat, which is not only an issue for the
construction material but also affects the occupant's comfort and health. In
coastal areas, coastal protection (e.g. sea walls, barriers) may require
increasing maintenance costs and higher frequency of readjustments. Cultural and nature-based heritage sites
are increasingly threatened by climate change. Some of these treasures are at
risk as a result of impacts like rising sea levels, flooding and storms, and
others are threatened by changes in historic and local climatic conditions.
These in turn may lead to subtle but damaging shifts in moisture levels
affecting structures directly, or the chemistry and stability of soils in which
they are found. During the past ten years, Europe has seen
a number of serious floods and heat waves due in particular to an increase in
valuable properties in areas with flood risk, which is expected to become more
vulnerable due to climate change. Policy context and current adaptation
activities Existing EU policies related to
construction and buildings do not explicitly address climatic pressures. Where
the climate is taken into account, it mainly refers to mitigation and the relation
to the fulfilment of the Kyoto 2°C target, but not yet to adaptation. EUROCODES, a set of unified international
codes of practice for designing buildings and civil engineering structures, so
far do not incorporate the aspects of future changes of climatic conditions and
in the extreme weather events. The EUROCODES aim at eliminating the disparities
that hinder free circulation of goods and services within the Community, are
meant to lead to more uniform levels of safety in construction in Europe, and
are designed to become the reference design codes replacing national codes. Main barriers to action Uncertainty in the projections of future
climate change and in particular the extreme weather events (temperature, wind,
precipitation) that may affect buildings/infrastructure depending on location
and design lifespan. Prevention of flooding is an expensive
adaptation option and countries may hesitate to free budget for an effort that
may require 20-30 years of investing before it is completed. Because of the long timescales involved and
the inherent uncertainties in the projections it is difficult for construction
companies to build competitive advantage based on adaptive innovations. A lack of information on future risks
prevents local governments and citizens to make different choices. Insurance
companies often look at history to define flood risks, and do not take climate
change into account. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? Buildings have a life-span up to 70 years
or longer. Without taking climate change into account in these long-term
investments, new buildings will be more vulnerable to the negative effects of
climate change and higher damages might occur. Old buildings will be cooled
with use of fossil fuel, leading to more CO2 emissions, thus further
accelerating climate change and enhancing the need for adaptation. Also, the
construction of new developments in flood-prone areas is likely to continue as
room for settlements is limited in many European countries. Potential actions by 2020 Additional research on possible impacts is
needed to be able to develop effective adaptation measures for construction and
buildings (including design, building type, green infrastructure, water storage
and communication infrastructure). More knowledge is also needed on the
aggregated cost to buildings from climate change covering all impacts and all
Europe. Further, adaptation benefits and cost of residual damage need to be
evaluated. Concrete formulation of adaptation needs of
buildings into the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive[14] might be an important factor to adapt successfully and create
synergies between adaptation and mitigation efforts. Methodologies and
guidelines for ensuring climate resilience of buildings could be incorporated
into the national plans for increasing the number of nearly zero-energy
buildings. A preliminary climate resilience proof check could be required in
order to get an approval of a building project. Further, the integration of
climate change considerations in technical standards (design, construction and
products) is needed. In addition, existing mechanisms such as Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) need to be
explored as appropriate instruments to mainstream adaptation[15]. Specific technical measures to prevent
flooding and overheating of buildings can be taken at two levels: the building
level and the project or spatial level. The project/spatial level has to be
taken into account in an early stage for new developments, while at the
building level adjustments to the existing construction might be necessary. For new building measures may include,
inter alia, to plan for a minimum elevation above street level so that the
streets will drain excessive water while buildings remain dry; building ground
floors of water resistant materials; putting electricity, communication
networks and other water-sensitive installations on the first floor, or, at the
least, not in a basement; enabling shutting off sensitive appliances in case of
flooding. In existing buildings, potential measures to be taken, comprise
refurnishing the ground floor in a more flood-proof way (e.g. with tiles
instead of wood); mobile shading structures, preferably on the outside of the
building; reducing heat producing equipment (LED lighting, passive lighting
such as skylights, energy saving equipment; installing green roof or facade,
which provides cooling through evaporation and limits uptake of solar
radiation. 1.2.1.5. Energy Expected impacts of climate change Climate threats for the European energy
system do already exist and are projected to increase. Explicitly affected by
climate change is and will be even more the security of electricity supply for: -
citizens and companies as energy consumers,
whose activity is threatened by weather-induced black outs (threatened security
in energy supply) in conjunction with -
TSOs and DSOs as the infrastructure (explicitly
for the usually less robust distribution grid) is threatened by extreme events
– sometimes in extremely critical conjunction with high demand (cf. black out
2003 in Italy and Switzerland as one example) -
Energy suppliers with a high share of vulnerable
supplies – i.e. water intensive energy supply (i.e. for cooling thermal plants
as well as for run-off plant-generated hydropower) More intense and frequent heat waves will
shift demand patterns to critical constellations in which supply is low due to
i) decreased CARNOT efficiency (for thermal plants), ii) decreased cooling
water supply, but demand is high due to i) increasing demand by air
conditioning (private, office and storage of for example food and
pharmaceutical products). Shifting patterns of precipitation will cause
problems for energy supply. Higher magnitude and frequency of extreme weather
events will cause threats for physical energy infrastructure (explicitly
overhead transmission/distribution, but also other infrastructure – e.g.
substations, transformers or fragile supply infrastructure). Threats to the energy system might increase
regional disparities with the EU with southern countries suffering from i) high
electricity import dependency and thus relying on yet non-resilient
transmission infrastructure and ii) projected impacts from gradual temperature
increase, heat wave and drought frequency further threats to domestic supply
aggravating import dependency.Meanwhile, northern countries show a more complex
and uncertain picture of potential gains and losses for energy supply and
security. Policy context and current adaptation
activities All policies related to energy transmission
could be potentially concerned. Fundamental are TEN-E Guidelines
(1364/2006/EC), Connecting Europe Facility COM(2011) 665, Guidelines for
trans-European energy infrastructure COM(2011) 658, Cohesion Fund COM(2011) 612
final, the smart grid technology platform, the European Electricity Grid
Initiative (EEGI) and its implementation plan and the Internal Energy Market.On
the supply part, important European policies are the Strategic Energy
Technology Plan (SET plan), the communications Energy Roadmap 2050 as well as
Energy 2020 – A strategy for a competitive, sustainable and secure energy. Furthermore, policies aiming at decreasing
demandalso have a potential to cut-off seasonal demand peaks, e.g. directive
2010/31 on the energy performance of buildings, directive 2006/32 on energy
end-use efficiency and energy services and repealing Council Directive
93/76/EEC ("The Energy Services Directive")[16] or
regulation (EC) No 106 on a Community energy-efficiency labeling programme
for office equipment (Energy Star). The EU's renewable energy policy is the
current main driver of change to Europe's energy mix. This is accelerating
Europe's adoption of low carbon energy, with the gradual introduction of
renewable energy heating, cooling and power sources geared to local
circumstances. Thus, emissions are being reduced (mitigation), and smaller
scale, often distributed power genration is geared to local climatic
circumstances (adaptation). Main barriers to action Current adaptation activities in the energy
sector are basically taken place at different national levels, namely in member
states with adaptation strategies already in place (e.g. Finland, Netherlands,
France and Germany). At European level, policies supporting to reach adaptation
targets (e.g. cutting down seasonal demand peaks, Connecting Europe Facility,
Smart Grids initiative, renewable energy development) are in place and
emerging, although not named as such – thus having high mainstreaming
potential. Adaptation to climate change is seen as additional burden to the
ongoing shifts of the energy system towards the 20-20-20 goals. Mitigation is
thus regarded as much greater challenge. However, adaptation requires sufficient
knowledge e.g. on: i) Vulnerable hot spots in the transmission and distribution
grid, ii) Vulnerability assessment of energy supplies including explicitly
nuclear, fossil fuel and renewable energy supplies and iii) Future
climate-induced demand patterns. While iii is well-covered in many studies,
projects and publications, i and ii still show significant knowledge gaps.
Limited data access to damages of energy infrastructure as well as a lack of
energy meteorological forecasts and data is an additional barrier to start
action on adaptation in the energy system. An ongoing challenge for TSOs and DSOs is
the connection with newly built, remote or isolated energy supply infrastructure
(e.g. mainly offshore wind parks or pumped storage power), which leaves less
budget for the investment in hardening and adapting existing grid infrastructure.
Increasing regional disparities in energy would become striking without further
action. These would have significant economic impacts due to i) Endangered
energy security explicitly in southern member states as well as ii) Price
signals to companies and citizens in those countries with a high import
dependency. Potential examples of adaptation actions
to increase resilience by 2020 Research policies should focus on detecting
vulnerable hot spots and potential technical measures to increase the physical
resilience as well as capacity at climatically triggered/demand-induced
bottlenecks in the trans-European grid. Furthermore research investments should
be further enlarged for alternative storage technologies. Research on the
vulnerability of all energy sources’ efficiency towards changing climate
parameters is necessary as well as intensified efforts to support energy
efficiency and sufficiency – along the preexisting policies described above. Further adaptation measures could focus on
installing underground cables to the degree possible, expand aisles in
storm-prone areas, putting slope stability measures in place, set up/expand
existing early warning systems among TSOs, relocate flood-prone transformers
and substations, support ‘isle solutions’ for critical production or explicitly
important facilities (thus enabling them to become independent from the grid). Adaptation measures in import dependent
countries should focus on extending the share of domestic supply or in the
diversification of energy sources. Measures to safeguard electricity supply can
be achieved by technical optimization of hydropower plants, enhance management
in hydropower catchments to better control erosion/sedimentation processes,
install capacities at suitable run-off regimes (e.g. glacial regimes for
small-scaled facilities as buffers). Improved assessment of changes to local
climatic conditions (in the context of infrastucture and power generation
planning) would increase the scope for local energy sources to be exploited in
accordance with local climatic conditions, minimising risks to energy supply
though avoiding disruptions from constraints on transmission infrastructure or
fuel supply. Measures to cut-off critical
seasonal/climate-induced demand peaks could focus on installing further solar
cooling (meant here: PV-powered), promote water-saving technologies to relief
cooling water demand, further measures to increase efficiency/sufficiency
focussing on ‘high demand periods’ and setting up regulations and contingency
plans for extreme meteorological periods. 1.2.1.6. Insurance Expected impacts of climate change The probability of most types of
extreme event is expected to change significantly, in many cases upwards, as a
result of climate change (IPCC, 2012). Several national studies have
interpreted the predictions for insurers; for example in the UK (ABI, 2005) and
in France (FFSA, 2009). In fact the ongoing rapid changes make it hard to
assess the future risk. The most dramatic and reliable changes are predicted
for temperature; the historical 500 year heat wave event might become a 2
–yearly (biennial) event by the 2040s (Stott, Stone and Allen, 2004). Current activities Insurance can be a valuable tool for
adaptation in three main ways: helping to manage climate change risks;
providing incentives for risk prevention; and providing information on risk
(Courbage and Stahel, 2012). Insurance should be seen as one of the possible
options and tools available to government and individuals to respond to climate
change risks and should be adopted in conjunction with other preventive and
response measures. The insurance sector is arguably the most
advanced in evaluating risks and opportunities. Major adaptation initiatives in
the insurance sector, to date, have focused around building institutional
networks that address the common risks to the industry through collaboration.
It is likely that the insurance sector leads in this area due to its
vulnerability, but also because of its historical experience in risk management
and climate-related risks. How would the probblem evolve without
further EU action? In the short term, the effect of climate
change on insurance might not be thought to be significant, as long as due
allowance is made for the underlying trend For example, prices would rise
gradually, and the market would absorb such changes without disruption.
However, risk knowledge often advances in ‘steps’, which can lead to jumps in
the price over a short period. In the longer term, particularly in sectors
or areas where insurance has not been customary, climate change could create or
exacerbate issues with correct pricing and availability. In particular, sea
level rise will become an issue for coastal and estuarine risks. The problem of
drought for agriculture and livestock may also become more serious.
Drought-related subsidence may also become a greater issue for the built
environment in some regions where clay soil is sensitive to the absence of
water (Swiss Re, 2011). Potential losses from storm and flood could also rise
significantly (ABI, 2005; GDV, 2011), but the actual increase would be highly
dependent on changes in exposure and vulnerability. Potential actions by
2020 to increase resilience As stated by
stakeholders in the sector, the insurance sector should no longer be regarded
solely as a provider of compensation for losses. The Insurance buffer function
is of great importance for the economy since it allows insured parties to plan
with more certainty by covering specific risks that could otherwise threaten
business continuity. Yet, in adaptation too, the role of insurance goes much
further. Insurance is an integral part of the whole risk-management cycle, from
risk identification to risk transfer and recovery. A Green Paper on the insurance and
prevention of disasters is under preparation. It will be a first step for a
better understanding of the role that insurance can play to promote adaptation.
1.2.1.7. Tourism Expected impacts of climate change Tourism is a major economic sector in
Europe, with the current annual flow of tourists from Northern to Southern
Europe accounting for one in every six tourist arrivals in the world. Climate
change has the potential to radically alter tourism patterns in Europe by
inducing changes in destinations and seasonal demand structure (Ciscar et al.
2009). There are a number of specific projected impacts on the tourism sector
as a result of climate change and from increased risks of water scarcity,
changes in winter/snowfall and temperature change. The biggest adverse impacts
would appear to be from changes in summer tourism flows (in the Mediterranean
region) and winter skiing (in the Central region). The likely effects of
climate change on the tourism sector vary widely, depending on the location and
the season (Altvater et al., 2011b). High levels of economic dependence on the
tourism industry in some southern countries will make these areas more
vulnerabl to the impacts of climate change. Negative climatic consequences will
have particularly serious effects if climate-sensitive tourism has major
economic importance. Conversely, some benefits are to be expected in other
areas, which may benefit from a shift in tourist flows. How would the problem evolve? The Tourism and Recreation sector appears
to have a general idea of the risks that it will face in light of climate
change. However, only firms in regions that are already affected (Northern
Mountains and Tropical Destinations) are adapting to climate change using
technical, managerial, financial, or behavioural adaptations. It is unclear how
tourism in other areas will be affected by climate change, it appears that
stable weather is an important determinant of destination attractiveness. 1.2.2. Environmental
systems 1.2.2.1. Soil Expected impacts of climate change Both the agricultural and forestry sector are
closely connected with soil and affected by soil degradation through soil
carbon loss, erosion and salinization[17]. Around
45% of soils in Europe have a low or very low organic matter content (meaning
0-2% organic carbon) and 45% have a medium content (meaning 2-6% organic
carbon). Soil organic matter plays a very important role not only for soil
fertility, for maintaining soil structure, for buffering and water retention
capacity and for soil biodiversity. It is also an important organic carbon
stock, estimated to between 73 and 79 billion tonnes in the EU (some 1,500
billion tonnes at the global level – that is around twice the amount of carbon
in the atmosphere and three times that to be found in vegetation). It is
important to underline that the soil organic matter cycle is based on
continually supplying carbon in the form of organic matter as a food source for
microorganisms, the loss of some carbon as carbon dioxide, and the build-up of
stable carbon in the soil. If the rate of assimilation is less than the rate of
decomposition, soil organic matter will decline and, conversely if the rate of
assimilation is greater than the rate of decomposition, soil organic matter
will increase. Both the assimilation and decomposition processes occur
concurrently, but are of a different order of magnitude – organic matter can be
lost instantaneously (e.g. by fire) or very quickly (e.g. in case of grassland
conversion to arable land), whereas its build-up is spread over several
decades. The northern latitudes are most affected by
increased CO2 and methane emissions from decomposition of organic
matter in soil. Currently decomposition processes are limited by low
temperatures and permafrost. Although the Mediterranean region is historically
most severely affected by erosion there is growing evidence of significant
erosion occurring in other parts of Europe as well (e.g. Austria, Czech
Republic and the loess belt of Northern France and Belgium). Artificial salinization
occurs in Portugal, Spain (Ebro valley), Italy (Sicily), France, Greece,
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. Coastal areas and irrigated agricultural land
are sensitive to salinization. In Europe, 13 of the 27 EU member states have
declared themselves affected under the UNCCD[18]. Climate change may aggravate erosion,
decline in organic matter, salinization, soil biodiversity loss, landslides,
and flooding. The effect of climate change on soil carbon storage can be
related to changing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, increased
temperatures and changing precipitation patterns. Extreme precipitation events,
fast melting of snow or ice, high river discharges and increased droughts are
all climate related events which influence soil degradation. Deforestation,
inappropriate agricultural practices, urbanization and other human activities (e.g.
skiing) also play a role. Saline soils are expected to increase in coastal
areas as a result of salt water intrusion from the seaside, because of rising
sea levels and (periodically) low river discharges. Soil biodiversity is
already under threat because of soil contamination, acidification, soil sealing
and other human-induced impacts[19]. There
is little information available on impacts of climate change on soil
biodiversity. Landslides in Europe are most often the result of soil saturation
with water from heavy rainfall events and snow melt in combination with
inappropriate land use and land use changes (e.g. deforestation and building
activities). Desertification often results from the overexploitation of
vegetation cover leading to topsoil erosion and hence reduced productivity, or
improper water use resulting in salinization. Desertification is aggravated by
prolonged droughts. The predicted increase in temperatures and
decreases in summer precipitations could lead to higher soil moisture deficits,
which area also likely happen earlier in spring affecting the growing season of
crops and their water needs. Some recent studies suggest that soil organic
carbon in European agricultural land is decreasing. The EEA expects an increase
in erosion risks of 80% in agricultural areas in Europe, especially in places
where erosion is already severe. The 2006 Soil Thematic Strategy indicates that
erosion is increasing in Europe; at that moment in time, 3.4% of the area (1.6
million hectares) of the 21 Member States covered in the assessment is at risk
from erosion of more than 10 tonnes per hectare per year, and 18% (54 million
ha) are at risk of losing soil above 1 tonne per hectare per year. As for soil
sealing, in the European Union (EU) at least about 1,000 km² - an area larger
than the city of Berlin - were subject to land take annually for new
infrastructure - housing, industry, roads or recreational purposes - between
1990 and 2006. Soil consumption due to land take (urbanization often
decoupled from population growth) will contribute to climate change. The loss
of water retention and evaporation potential is going to influence weather
patterns and local climate conditions, in urban areas often expressed in
overheating during summer periods. Due to sealing land is deprived of its
function to act as a sink for atmospheric carbon, to be fixed as carbon in soil
organic matter or vegetation. In order to maintain these ecosystem functions of
soil the 2011 Roadmap for a Resource efficient Europa is promoting a zero-net
land take rate in Europa by 2050. Sealing of soil caused by
built-up areas (not only but particularly on floodplains and water retention
areas) impacts on the storage capacity of the floodplain, increasing the risk
of flooding and flood damage. The increasing number of flooding events and
their seriousness in these areas can be partly attributed to the reduction of
open space (decreasing retention capacities of agricultural land, caused by
compaction and low levels of organic matter, can be concurrent factors). For
example, the costs of the summer floods in England in 2007, classified as a
national disaster, have been estimated to be more than £ 3.2 billion
(approximately €4.5 billion). The Commission's services have recently published a
working document containing Guidelines on Best Practice to Limit, Mitigate or
Compensate Soil Sealing[20] informing about magnitude of soil sealing in the European Union,
its impact on the environment – including the climatic aspects – and examples
of best practice. The 2012 implementation report on the Soil Thematic
Strategy (COM(2012) 46) confirmed on-going and increasing soil degradation,
highlighting the preservation of soil organic matter as one of the main
challenges. Keeping terrestrial carbon stock is not only essential for food
security but for the fulfilment of present and future emission reduction
commitments. There is a lack of data on the different
degradation processes that makes it difficult to assess its full impacts and the
development at European scale. Policy context and current adaptation
activities The European Commission adopted a Soil
Thematic Strategy (COM(2006) 231) and a proposal for a Soil Framework Directive
(COM(2006) 232) on 22 September 2006 with the objective to protect soils across
the EU. The strategy has four pillars, namely awareness raising, research,
integration, and legislation. The framework would consist of a risk analysis by
the Member States for erosion, organic matter, salinization, compaction and
landslides. Agriculture is a key sector for maintaining carbon
stocks and soil fertility and avoiding deterioration due to erosion,
salinization, compaction etc. The CAP has an important role in protecting soils,
avoiding depletion of organic matter - especially on carbon rich soils (peat
land, pastures) – and supporting agro-environmental measures aiming at carbon
sequestration, and a better care of soils which sustain agricultural activities.
Current soil related activities at EU level involve: -
Work on the Soil Thematic Strategy, aiming at
the implementation of an EU Soil Framework Directive; -
Activities of the JRC working group in the area
of climate change and soil biodiversity; -
The European Soil Data Center as one of the ten
environmental data centres in Europe and acting as the focal point for soil
data at European level; its Soil Portal, contains soil data and provide links
to national or global datasets. The website serves also as a vehicle to promote
the activities of the European Soil Bureau Network. Main barriers to action Despite on-going degradation of soil
resources in Europe and globally, as stated in the 2012 Commission report on
the implementation of the Soil Thematic Strategy (COM(2012) 46), no agreement
has been reached so far within the Council on the proposed Soil Framework
Directive, due to a blocking minority. Further barriers relate to a lack of coherent
and EU wide data on the different soil degradation processes as well as little
information available on impacts of climate change on soil biodiversity. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU action? Soil degradation in the European Union is accelerating due to
inappropriate farming practices (erosion, organic matter decline), salinization
(climate change impacts on water, irrigation), landslides (intensive land use),
contamination (industry and mining) and soil sealing (urbanization). As neither
most Member States nor the EU have an integrated soil protection policy in
place, the degradation is likely to proceed. For
example, in the eight years to the end of 2020 we can expect that an extra
8,000 km² of European fertile land will be lost to food production, around 4.5
billion tonnes of topsoil will have been washed away because of water erosion,
more than 700 million tonnes of CO2 will have entered the atmosphere as a result
of soil organic matter losses from cropland, and 62% of the habitats and 52% of
the species covered by the Habitats Directive would continue to be in an
unfavourable conservation status[21]. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience Knowledge (examples): Areas where the most
basic knowledge is lacking include: i) the costs of climate change related to
soils and land use; ii) soil biodiversity; iii) the social impacts related to
soils and land use. Areas where aggregation of knowledge to the EU level is
needed comprise: i) monitoring soil carbon storage; ii) soil erosion; iii) soil
salinization; iv) landslides. Technical options (examples): i/ Soil carbon
storage: appropriate water management to preserve peat soils; ii/ Erosion:
contour ploughing, terracing, improving vegetation cover, roughening of soil to
slow down water flows, wood fibre matting and adding mulch to enhance water
absorption by the soil; iii/ Prevent salinization with sustainable water
management; iv/ Landslides may be prevented with proper land management, by
taking care of the balance between soil and biotic structures; v/ Prevent soil
sealing, limit soil sealing with semi permeable bricks or asphalt; to
compensate for soil sealing in other areas. 1.2.2.2. Biodiversity Expected impacts of climate change There is clear evidence to show that
biodiversity is already responding to climate change and will continue to do
so. Species respond individualistically, with direct impacts including changes
in phenology, species abundance and distribution, community composition,
habitat structure and ecosystem processes. Climate change is also leading to
indirect impacts on biodiversity through changes in the use of land and other
resources. These may be more damaging than the direct impacts due to their
scale, scope and speed and include: habitat fragmentation and loss;
over-exploitation; pollution of air, water and soil; and spread of invasive
species. They will further reduce the resilience of ecosystems to climate
change and their capacity to deliver essential services, such as climate
regulation, food, clean air and water, and control of floods or erosion. Vulnerability assessments have been
undertaken in relation to potential impacts of climate change on some species,
habitats, ecosystems and ecosystem services and their adaptive capacity.
Assessments show vulnerability primarily arises where species are constrained
in colonising new areas with suitable climate. The vulnerability of habitats to
climate change is also likely to be a problem for species, particularly habitat
specialists already constrained by habitat availability and/or condition.
Climate change is likely to exacerbate such threats, rather than create new
opportunities. Vulnerability assessments suggest that the
majority of species studied are likely to be vulnerable. One study ranked the
vulnerability of 64% of 212 species assessed as high, very high, critical or
extremely critical under at least one future climate change scenario . Policy context and current adaptation
activities: The EC White Paper on adapting to climate
change has recognised the significance of climate change for biodiversity loss
and has highlighted that it is important for the EU and Member States “To
promote strategies which increase the resilience to climate change of health,
property and the productive functions of land, inter alia, by improving the
management of water resources and ecosystems”. The new EU biodiversity strategy
to 2020 goes on to state that “Ecosystem-based approaches to climate change
mitigation and adaptation can offer cost-effective alternatives to
technological solutions, while delivering multiple benefits beyond biodiversity
conservation”. It aims to restore degraded ecosystems and maintain and enhance
ecosystem services by incorporating green infrastructure into spatial planning. Other existing EU instruments (e.g. the
Birds and Habitats Directives) explicitly address the implications of climate
change for biodiversity. A set of seven overarching biodiversity adaptation
principles have been identified for the Bern Convention. Each principle gives
rise to a number of more detailed measures whose relative weight depends on each
sector’s: impacts and dependencies on biodiversity; threats and opportunities
that could be addressed by integrated action; synergies with other sectors; and
scale of activity (e.g. EU, Member State, local).explicitly address the
implications of climate change for biodiversity. A set of seven overarching
biodiversity adaptation principles have been identified for the Bern Convention
. Each principle gives rise to a number of more detailed measures whose
relative weight depends on each sector’s: impacts and dependencies on
biodiversity; threats and opportunities that could be addressed by integrated
action; synergies with other sectors; and scale of activity (e.g. EU, Member
State, local). Ecosystem-based adaptation activities are
currently mostly driven by the biodiversity sector. However, there is growing
recognition of the importance of ecosystem-based approaches by other sectors,
particularly in relation to coastal protection, urban planning and water
management. Main barriers to action Successful adaptation requires that the
conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services is fully integrated with
other land and water management and economic activities. Additionally, whilst
Member State policies to tackle climate change adaptation at a national level are
essential, the state of development of these across the EU is currently
variable. The EU 2020 biodiversity strategy
recognised that, in addition to its intrinsic value, biodiversity and the
services that ecosystems provide have significant economic value that is seldom
captured by markets. Biodiversity often falls victim to competing claims on its
use because it escapes pricing and is not reflected in society’s accounts. The
report on The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) recommends that
the economic value of biodiversity should be factored into decision-making and
reflected in accounting and reporting systems. Quantifying links between
biodiversity and ecosystem services and estimating their value is clearly an
urgent requirement that currently remains far from completion. However, there
is also a cultural barrier to broad uptake of ecosystem-based solutions, which
are ready to hand, as many people, including decision-makers, believe climate
change is a technological problem that needs to be addressed by technological
solutions. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? Delay in further EU action will result in
more severe impacts on biodiversity and the delivery of essential ecosystem
services, including climate regulation and adaptation, fewer available options
and increased costs of damage and intervention to maintain these essential
ecosystem services. This is mainly due to the length of time that it will take
to implement adaptation actions and for biodiversity to respond to them. Costs of inaction would be dwarfed by the
costs to society of biodiversity loss, as many economic actors in sectors
depend directly on ecosystem services. For example, insect pollination in the
EU has an estimated value of € 15 billion per year. The continued decline of
bees and other pollinators could have serious consequences for farmers. The
TEEB report estimated that if nothing is done, the loss of terrestrial
biodiversity alone could cost 7% of GDP by 2050, with loss of marine ecosystem
services adding substantially more. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience Evidence needs, which should be identified
and addressed with stakeholder participation across all sectors, include:
identification of the impacts and dependencies of all sectors on biodiversity
and ecosystem services, and estimates of their economic value; monitoring of
direct impacts of climate change and, where possible, indirect impacts (e.g.
associated with land-use change and underlying socio-economic drivers);
vulnerability assessments of EU species and habitats (notably within the Natura
2000 network); establishing possible impacts of invasive alien species;
scenario assessments and identification of ‘no regrets’ actions; piloting of
new approaches through demonstration projects; assessing the effectiveness of
adaptation actions and changes in management strategies. Appropriate development of biodiversity
adaptation indicators, involving stakeholders from across all policy areas,
might do much to catalyse development and integration of policy objectives that
promote ecosystem-based adaptation across sectors. Indicator development could
bring cross-sectoral attention to the need for a wide range of EU policies to
address sectoral impacts and dependencies on biodiversity, and the associated
threats and opportunities that could be addressed by integrated actions, which not
only support biodiversity but also achieve required sectoral outcomes. Climate change highlights the need to adopt
an increasingly dynamic approach to conserving biodiversity and ecosystem
services. The movement of species needs facilitating by: enhancing the
ecological quality of existing habitats, reducing external impacts (e.g. by
establishing buffer zones and controlling pollutant emissions) and managing
species populations (e.g. controlling exploitation and impacts of invasive
alien species); increasing the area of available habitat by restoring degraded
habitats and creating new habitat adjacent to existing sites;
increasing/restoring habitat connectivity through landscape-scale conservation
measures (e.g. restoring degraded habitats and creating new habitats as
‘stepping stones’ between existing habitat patches, enhancing the permeability
of the wider matrix between habitat patches, and creating habitat corridors to
physically link them). Furthermore, ecosystem services and their
valuation could be linked to a wide range of existing financial tools, such as
carbon markets and eco-tourism fees, which attract a wider range of funders,
including private finance. These payments, be they government or public,
voluntary private or regulation-driven private, could be used to maintain and
improve biodiversity and ecosystem services that support climate change
adaptation across all sectors that make use of land and natural resources. 1.2.2.3. Inland water Expected impacts of climate change Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience:Floods, Droughts and Water Scarcity have already affected large
parts of the European Union and have an important impact on socio-economic
developments. In the future, climate change is likely to change water
availability and global warming will probably increase both the number and
magnitude of hydrological extremes Scenarios developed under the SCENES
project estimated potential impacts of climate change. In western Europe, the
energy sector in particular is extremely vulnerable to water scarcity and
droughts under the EcF scenario conditions because of increased electricity
production. Extreme flood events are expected to increase in eastern Europe,
leading to loss of life and higher flood damages. For example, among the European
countries, Hungary is likely to suffer from the highest costs in percent of GDP
due to direct impacts of flooding. Flooding damages might decrease the
Hungarian GDP by 0.09% in 2050. In southern Europe, agriculture is the major
water use sector and could suffer significant economic losses if water scarcity
and drought events are more frequent and severe under climate change. In
northern Europe, water stress only occurs in a few places (e.g. BE) and only
(locally) the thermoelectric sector may be at risk during low flow periods. The recently completed ClimWatAdapt project
investigated the future water situation and developments in the water sector in
Europe until 2050 in terms of “vulnerability to water scarcity”, “vulnerability
to droughts”, and “vulnerability to floods”. The ClimWatAdapt project concludes
that changes in future water scarcity are mainly driven by changes in water
withdrawals. Under the EcF (Economy First) scenario, the percentage of area
under severe water stress is expected to increase in all regions until 2050,
with major changes in particular in eastern, western, and southern Europe.
Increasing water withdrawals are the main cause in eastern and western Europe.
In southern Europe a decrease in water availability due to climate change
exacerbate the situation. Mostly, water stress will not occur in northern
Europe, with some localized exceptions (e.g. the UK). In river basins under
severe water stress, there will be strong competition for scarce water
resources between households, industry, agriculture, and nature. Overall, this
situation is most severe during summer when river flows are low and are
becoming lower due to climate change. Additionally, the water demands are
highest during the summer due irrigation demands and tourism water use. Such stress on water resources would also
impact on the energy sector, given the cooling needs of thermal power stations
and the water flow needs of hydro-power stations. Climate change will also affect drinking
water supply from ground and surface water.[22] In
particular changes in groundwater recharge and low flow conditions are the main
issues. Most vulnerable areas include: i/ coastal aquifers, because of the
combined effects of increasing sea levels, reduced recharge and often high
abstraction pressures; ii/ Mountainous, permafrost and boreal areas, where
increasing temperatures lead to changes in snow accumulation and melting, with
resultant impacts on groundwater recharge and discharge; iii/ • Most
small islands are especially vulnerable to future changes and distribution of
rainfall because they have a limited water supply, and water resources; iv/ in
the case of increasing frequency of flood events, combined with associated
increased pollutant peaks (combined sewer overflows, pesticide runoff etc) all
drinking water resources along rivers could be impacted as well as systems that
use bank filtration. However it should be noted that additional pressure will
arise from socio-economic pressures due to increased urbanisation, growing
water demand in other sectors (in particular agriculture) and further loss of
ecosystems. Policy context and current adaptation
activities: The Water Framework Directive (WFD) commits
the EU Member States to achieve good ecological status of all surface waters,
including marine waters, and good chemical status of groundwater by 2015. The
WFD does not explicitly refer to adaptation to climate change. However when
drafting the guidance document No. 24 River Basin Management in a Changing
Climate (EC 2009) it was agreed that from the second planning cycle onwards
climate-related threats and adaptation planning should be incorporated in
RBMPs. In order to address the issue of water scarcity and droughts in the EU,
in 2007 the European Commission issued a Communication COM/2007/0414 final
‘Addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European
Union’. The communication lists a set of policy options that are implementable
as a concerted EU action to increase water efficiency and water savings, and to
improve drought preparedness and risk management. The Directive 2007/60/EC (Floods Directive)
sets to prevent and limit floods and their damages on human health, the
environment, infrastructure, cultural heritage and property. The Directive
obliges the Member States to assess risks posed by each Member State’s water
courses and coast lines, and to produce maps of area subjected to floods of
different intensity. Climate change should thereby considered. The Rural Developmentstrand of the Common
Agricultural Policy, also give support to climate adaptation measures in the
field of water management by agricultural sector. Main barriers to action: Governance issues may prevent the uptake of
innovative measures to achieve the WFD objectives, e.g. taking advantage of
natural retention over hard flood defenses. and to work with a more integrated
and comprehensive approach on sustainable land management and in this way
overcome the sectoral compartmentalisation As regard to adaptation measures there are
several barriers preventing implementation such as i) lack of concrete rules or
definitions for implementation of measures; ii) lack of coordination of
measures across river basins or administration units; iii) lack of concrete
financing sources in some cases; iv) measures are often voluntary;When the EU
water directors endorsed the guidance document on climate change, they also
agreed that climate change will be considered in the 2nd and 3rd implementation
cycle of the WFD. However the assessment of the first river basin management
plans showed that almost all Member States are working on the issue of climate
change to a different extent. It is expected that these efforts will be
strengthened with the adoption of the EU communication “Blueprint for
Safeguarding Europe's Water' .” and the commitment made by the water directors.
In order words it is expected that several more adaptation measures will be
taken in the future to mitigate the impacts of floods and droughts. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? Many actions promoted by the forthcoming
Blueprint will also be very relevant to tackle climate change adaptation
issues. 1.2.3. Social
issues The table below summarises the
socio-economic impacts of climate change. Table 1:
climate change challenges and their socio-economic impacts (Source: ILO, Skills for green jobs (2011)) Climate change major features || Major areas of impacts || Possible impacts on employment || Possible impacts on income Rising average temperature || Health, food security, water, resources || √ || √ Higher climate variability || Food security, water || √ || √ High incidence of droughts and floods || Food security, population displacement, resources || √ || √ Melting of glaciers || Food security, water || √ || √ Rising of sea levels || Coastal areas || √ || √ Loss of biodiversity || Food security, resources || √ || √ 1.2.3.1. Health Expected impacts of climate change Climate change will impact Europe citizen´s
health, animal (livestock) and plant (food security, environment, agriculture)
health as well as cause (damage) costs related to direct and indirect health
impacts. Increases in the annual mean temperature projected for all regions,
while stronger in the North, South Central and Mediterranean Europe. The
numbers of frost days are decreasing. The annual mean number of summer days
will be increasing in the Southern-central and Mediterranean Europe the
strongest. Annual mean precipitation in winter months will be mostly
increasing, especially in Northern Europe, but not in the Mediterranean. Annual
mean precipitation in summer months will be mostly decreasing especially in
Southern-central and Mediterranean Europe and heavy rainfall will be increasing
in Northern-western and Northern Europe and decrease in Mediterranean Europe. A
variety of impacts are projected for European countries. The most important
effects on human health from future climate change are projected to include
increases in summer heat related mortality (deaths) and morbidity (illness)
(Watkiss et al., 2009; D`Amato et al., 2007); decreases in winter cold related
mortality (deaths) and morbidity (illness); increases in the risk of accidents
and wider well-being from extreme weather events (floods, fires and storms);
changes in the disease burden e.g. from vector-, rodent-, water- or food-borne
disease; and changes in the seasonal distribution of some allergenic pollen
species, range of virus, pest and disease distribution. The expected increase in heat/thermal
stress is related to mortality from annual temperature increases and heat
extremes. Additional human diseases will increasingly challenge EU public
health. Allergen potency and atmospheric transport of pollen will become more
intense. More extreme events such as floods, storms, droughts & wild fires
are expected by recent climate projections. Also the increase of risks in
relation to change in air quality and ozone are likely. Climate change may impact
on animals' living conditions and bring forth pathologies such as parasitic
diseases, nutritional disorders, sunstroke or dehydration which can be very
important for the farmers' economic situation. The control of transmissible infectious
animal diseases at EU and international level includes diseases considered to
respond to climatic changes especially vector-borne diseases dependent on
specific weather conditions and those transmitted by wildlife. Climate change
is likely to have facilitated the expansion of Bluetongue in Europe (e.g.
Martinuzzi, A. 2008[23]) Climate change may impact on plant health
by allowing for the expansion of the range of pests that so far could not
establish in the Union thanks to increased temperatures allowing them to
survive wintertime and to have multiple generation cycles per year, and by
increasing the susceptibility of crops and trees to new dangerous pests of
plants from other continents. Climate change thus increases the vulnerability
of plants while at the same time the globalisation of trade allows new pests to
reach the Union. Large-scale outbreaks of new forest pests could change
European forests from a carbon sink into a carbon source, as has happened in
Canada (mountain pine beetle). The EU plant health regime is in place to
protect the Union against the entry of such dangerous pests that so far do not
occur in the Union. Policy context and current adaptation
activities: Existing policies related to human, animal
and plant health like the EU Health Programme 2007-2013, EU Ambient Air quality
and Cleaner Air Directive, EU Animal Health Strategy (2007-2013) including the
revision and consolidation of veterinary legislation by a New Animal Health
Law, the review of the EU plant health legislation are good starting points for
the inclusion of climate change adaptation aspects. Current activities are related to the i)
protection of people from health impacts (e.g. thermal stress, disasters) and
diseases, ii) protection of animal health related to healthy food production
and the well-being of European citizens, iii) protection of plant health for
ensuring sustainable and competitive agriculture and forestry and for
protecting the environment, public and private green; and iv) promotion of
healthy lifestyles, and helping national authorities in the EU cooperate on
health issues also related to climate change. Latest developments with regard
to early warning systems (e.g. heat, flood, drought, forest fire, storms),
European Centre for Disease prevention and control (ECDC) and Disease
information systems and surveillance and strenghtening of the emergency
response systems serve as proactive developments, support climate change
adaptation activities. Main barriers to action Climate change impacts are already being
taken into account by health authorities and relevant actors are aware of
future challenges related to climate change. Nevertheless, there is a need to
close existing knowledge gaps, which might be a barrier to action, like the
lack of consistent and comparable epidemiological studies and analysis
including urban effects of heat related impacts and additional impacts (heat
waves). Also the possible interactions between climate and air pollution on
ozone need to be analyzed in more detail. Also the analyses of food-borne
disease, besides salmonella are a challenge. The national and sub-national
(financial) capacities might not be sufficient to address health risks and
might need financial support, especially in European areas, where health care
services are not so well established. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? Temperature increase will, according to
climate projections increase the number of heat related deaths. More than
70.000 excess human deaths were reported from 12 European countries in the hot
summer of 2003. The mortality risk increases between 0.2 and 5.5 % for every
1°C increase above a location-specific threshold. Long heat waves (more than 5
days) have an impact 1.5 to 5 times greater than shorter events. The reduction
of ability to work, resulting in a lower productivity e.g. shortening/ delaying
delivery of products and services will impact European economy. 86.000 net
extra deaths per year are projected for EU Member States (high-emissions
scenario) with a global mean temperature increase of 3 °C in 2071–2100 relative
to 1961–1990. Although the timeframe is longer than 2020, heatwave plans like
the one for England can be prepared by all Member States with EU support, also
clearly clarifying the responsibilities for action. The climate is becoming more suitable for
certain disease carrier like e.g. the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus).
Europe will have to deal with certain human, animal and plant pests and
diseases which were in the past very rare and were mostly imported via
international trade or tourism. Climate change and globalisation are mutually
reinforcing human/, animal and plant health problems. Changes in weather/precipitation pattern
and increases in extreme events are projected; therefore, more intense and
frequent events are expected. Especially floods and storms are the most common
natural disasters causing loss of life and economic damage in Europe. Already
in the past 20 years, 953 disasters killed nearly 88,671 people in Europe,
affected more than 29 million others and caused a total of 250 EUR billion of economic
losses. Climate change related challenges might even increase these numbers in
the future. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience: It is of great importance to identify
research needs and gaps in order to develop a sound knowledge base. The project
“The Sustainability of DG SANCO policies – New Consumption and Production
Patterns” (DG SANCO, 2008) e.g. suggests developping “an adaptation tool box”
in order to cope with most climate change related health challenges. There is
potential in collecting more data on EU-level to achieve the best possible
disease surveillance for the EU, and also raise awareness. Especially the
communication of direct and indirect impacts of human, animal and plant health
in a changing climate and a context of increasing globalisation of human
movements and trade needs to be strengthened. Therefore a strong protective and
more pro-active approach in the health sector is of importance. There is a need for Member States and their
regions to allocate the adequate financial resources for health within their EU
Cohesion Policy programmes from 2014 onwards to deal with climate challenges
and link forecasting tools (e.g. heat, floods, wild fires, storms) with the
health sector on a cross-border scale.Early warning for air pollutants,
especially ozone shall be closer connected to health services in order to
effectively react & ensure in timely actions. The EU Animal Health Strategy (2007-2013)[24]and its Action Plan[25]focuses on preventing rather than reacting to animal diseases
including considering the influence of Climate Change on animal diseases. A new
Animal Disease Information System (ADIS) is being developed to improve the
gathering of epidemiological data. Stepping up animal disease surveillance and
the establishment of further vaccine banks for certain animal diseases will
enable risk managers to better respond to emerging disease situations. The
proposal by the Commission of a new Animal Health Law is foreseen during 2012.
It will consolidate the exhaustive existing animal health legislation and put
emphasis on preventive measures such as surveillance activities. The rules will
be flexible allowing quick adaptation of diseases control measures to changes
in disease patterns including those resulting from climate change. The EU Plant Health Regime is being
reviewed so as to reinforce the protection of the Union against new and dangerous
pests from outside Europe. Prevention will be strengthened by targeting
high-risk commodities imported into the Union, and surveillance for outbreaks
of new pests will be reinforced to ensure early detection and immediate
eradication of those outbreaks. More and better instruments for eradicating
pests are foreseen. Increased Union financial support for these measures is
considered. The proposal by the Commission of a new Plant Health Law is
foreseen during 2012. It will replace the current basic acts by a single,
transparent and flexible framework, suitable to address the increasing problems
experienced with plant health. Additionally, the upcoming EU Strategy on
Invasive Species can support the monitoring (e.g. detection via early warning
mechanisms and rapid eradication) and reporting procedure, monitor climate
related changes on invasive species distribution, survival and spread, and
foster the exchange of information on potential eradication strategies. 1.2.3.2. Employment The impact of
temperatures increase, changes in precipitation regimes and sea-level rise will
affect – directly or indirectly – productivity and viability of nearly all
economic sectors across all EU Member States. Rising temperatures and
erratic weather pattern will in many places reduce the land and natural capital
productivity. More frequent and intense heat waves, and altered transmission
seasons and geographic range of important vector-borne diseases will lower
labour productivity. As a result of sea level rise and increased intensity of
climate extremes, physical capital assets will be more frequently impaired and
important lifelines disrupted with wide reaching economic and social
consequences. There is mounting
evidence that climate policy driven transition towards low-carbon, resource
efficient and green economy may positively affect employment market, and create
opportunity for more environmentally-related and qualitatively better jobs.
Significant efforts have been done by the Commission to better understand
labour market challenges to developing a green economy, in terms of net job
creation as well as in terms on the impacts on skills.[26] Although there is no
clear quantitative evidence yet of jobs created in an "adaptation"
sector, it should also be underlined that it is sometimes difficult to make a
clear distinction between adaptation and mitigation and thereby related
employment. For instance, buildings' renovation supports both mitigation and
adaptation. In addition, activities related to water management, waste water management
and water supply are included in the Eurostat statistics on eco-industries,
which provide information on employment related to activities with
environmental purposes. The global market for eco-industries is estimated at
roughly EUR 1.15 trillion a year (2010 figures for turnover) and there is a
broad consensus that the global market could almost double, with the average
estimate for 2020 being around EUR 2 trillion a year.[27] The
average annual growth in employment in the eco-industries in 2000-2008 was
2.7%. Total numbers employed have grown from 2.4 million in 2000 and 3.0
million in 2008 and are forecast to reach 3.4 million in 2012. Climate change
adaptation contributes to preserving existing jobs through maintaining
viability and resilience of existing businesses. Many adaptation measures will
require substantial investments which can stimulate demand for labour. A recent
study estimated the annual cost of adapting to global warming of modest level
(+2°C compared to pre-industrial times) to between 70 and 100 billion worldwide
between 2010 and 2050[28]. Climate adaptation is not
only an instrument contributing to maintain the EU's macro-economic stability
and growth, but it is also a growing market, with expected business
opportunities for European firms on the EU and global markets. Thus, adaptation
will create new demand and market opportunities and increase need for
innovation. For instance, with increased water scarcity envisaged, the need
for irrigation will continue. While innovations in irrigation appear to reduce
downstream employment opportunities due to more efficient techniques, the
European companies can grasp opportunities from selling water-efficient
agricultural irrigation technologies worldwide. Approximately 28% of cropland
is now under irrigation, with half of this located in Asia[29]. But European companies will need to improve their products and
invest in R&D to compete to existing and forthcoming competitors from Asia. However, not only the
number of jobs generated matters. Attention will have to be paid to 'decent
work and quality jobs'. Labour market and climate change adaptation policies
must be approached hand in hand to make sure adaptation to climate change can
contribute to economic transformation. The results of the
online consultation show that even though many stakeholders identify potential
job creation in the medium term due to climate change adaptation action, only
environmental NGOs seem to anticipate short-term benefits.
Modelling GDP impacts and sectoral shifts in economic
activity due to climate change
In the context of the
support to this project, a computable general equilibrium modelling exercise
was undertaken on the potential economic implications of climate change. Impact
types considered are those originated by: sea-level rise, changes of energy
demand, of crops productivity, of fish stock productivity, of tourism flows,
ecosystem losses, flooding and health. Impacts are also
economically assessed for a 2 °C and 4 °C warming scenarios, both are assumed
to occur in 2050. The EU 27 as a whole experiences a GDP loss of the 0.16% and
the -0.74% in the 2°C and 4°C cases respectively. The apparent low
vulnerability of the EU hides important country specificities: the southern EU
region is more severely hit with Greece top-loser (-1.76% and 6.24% of GDP in
2050 in the 2°C and 4°C temperature increase scenarios respectively), the
Northern one gaining or remaining basically unaffected. Among impacts type, at
the country level, agriculture clearly dominates, followed by tourism and
ecosystem. These three impacts together build more than 70% of the final GDP
result in the majority of the EU countries. Interesting is also country
specific vulnerability. For instance, in Greece and Spain, agriculture and
tourism impacts are by large the more concerning; agriculture is less of an
issue in Italy, Belgium and Poland, where on the contrary tourism and ecosystem
losses there appear to be more important. The model used depicts
a Walrasian, perfectly clearing/full employment labour market therefore
unemployment is not modelled. Any shock on the labour market implies just a
re-distribution of the labour forces from those sectors whose production, and
factor prices, are declining in relative terms, toward those sectors where the
opposite happens. This said, the redistribution of the labour force could
indirectly provide some insights of possible tensions on the labour market that
climate change may originate. In 2050, when the temperature increases 2°C,
higher labour demand contractions are concentrated in the agricultural sector
especially in Greece (-5.7%), Spain (-5.9%) and Portugal (-2.7%); in the
fishing sector in Italy (-7.9%) and Spain (-4.5%); in the service sector in
Hungary (-1.3%), Italy (-0.7%) and Portugal (-0.5%). Industrial labour demand
declines particularly in Finland (-4%), Sweden (-1.6%) and Hungary (-1.4%);
energy sectors tend also to expel labour force. There has been some
progress in better understanding labour market challenges to developing a green
economy[30], yet there is still not enough quantitative evidence about how many
new jobs can be created and what skills will be required as the communities and
sectors turn better adapted and prepared to the likely impacts of climate
change. Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle climate adaptation
activities from development and economic transformation driven by other
factors. Hence, there is an urgent need for additional assessments on the
long-term, indirect and induced effects of climate adaptation policies on
labour patterns and markets
Literature review on employment implications of climate
change adaptation
Climate adaptation will
enable the economic sectors to better cope with the impacts of climate change
and avoid to some extent economic and social disruptions. On the face of it,
climate adaptation contributes to preserving existing jobs through maintaining
viability and resilience of existing businesses. Many climate adaptation
measures will require one-time investments which temporarily stimulate demand
for labour. Long-term indirect and induced effects on employment on labour
patterns and markets are difficult to demonstrate (Harsdorff et al. 2011). Up
to date, most studies have focussed on employment generated by climate
mitigation policies whereas the employment effects of climate adaptation are
examined qualitatively or within a larger context of policies stimulating
'green' growth. We have found no comprehensive, analytical study shedding light
on the employment aspects triggered by climate adaptation. The existing studies
provide qualitative insights or anecdotal evidence (Anonymous 2008; Agrawala et
al. 2011; Carraro et al. 2011; EEA 2011; EEA 2012d). The few studies that
address the relationships between climate change adaptation and jobs, proposes
three different perspectives of analysis. The first analyses the amount of jobs
exposed to climate change risk and then tries to assess the potential of
adaptation to prevent, smooth or eliminate that risk, with the associated job
saving potential. It either conducts an analysis at the sectoral level, or
tries to compare the expected negative GDP effect of climate change (e.g. from
the -4% to the -20% of world GDP as proposed by the 2006 Stern Review) with
that of other crisis (e.g. the last financial crisis) to then make a
parallelism between observed and expected job losses. The second thread of
studies analyses the skills (new and old) that are, and will be increasingly
required to develop appropriate climate change adaptation strategies. All
economic sectors are expected to undertake some adaptive adjustments to climate
change, but the most concerned appear to be agriculture, forestry, building and
infrastructure. Technologies and therefore skills to develop good adaptation
practices will be required (see e.g. Strietska-Ilina et al., 2011). Finally the
third thread, drawing almost entirely qualitative conclusions, recognises that
the development of adaptation technologies and the implementation of adaptation
measures, like large irrigation programs, building insulation, landscape
re-planning against hydro geological risk, land recovering after floods or
drought may create additional jobs (Harsdorff et al. 2011). In addition to the lack
of quantitative studies, it is important to consider that: (a) the studies by a
large address developing countries; (b) job creation potential of adaptation,
if one excludes the technology-induced one, is likely to be short to medium
term, that is it can be experienced mainly as long as the specific adaptation
measures are being implemented; and (c) the investment needed to implement
adaptation measures or to develop adaptation technologies could crowd out other
kind of investments, therefore draining resources from other economic sectors
or activities. Climate change impacts
and adaptation needs are rooted in site-specific patterns of resource
availability and use, sensibility to climate risk, and ability to resist to,
and cope with climate extremes. Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle
climate adaptation activities from development and economic transformation
driven by other factors. Climate adaptation is about preserving employment in
sectors struggling with the impacts of the climate change, as well as about
exploiting opportunities of shift in markets or new product markets (e.g.
climate proofing materials and building designs) (Sussman& Randall Freed
2008). 1.2.3.3. Other social issues Climate change impacts might affect
people’s daily lives in terms of employment, housing, health, water and energy
access as well as the implementation of gender equality and other human rights.
Thus, including the social dimension of climate change within future climate
change adaptation efforts is of central importance and reflects one of the key
challenges at EU and Member State level. While not all climate change impacts will
be negative, it is broadly accepted that the most vulnerable communities will
bear a disproportionate share of the hardships associated with climate change
(UNICEF, 2007; Adger et al., 2003; Mearns and Norton 2009; Verner, 2011,
Worldbank, 2012). Negative impacts of climate change will especially affect disadvantaged
population groups (especially those living in poverty) in least developed
countries, but also within the EU Member States. Often people living in poverty
depend highly on the very natural resources affected by climate change and have
less capacity to protect themselves, adapt or recuperate losses (United
Nations, 2011). On a more abstract level research leads to
the conclusion that the people most vulnerable to social impacts of climate
change will be those (CAG Consultants, 2009): living in places at risk; already
socially deprived (e.g. by poor health, low income, inadequate housing, lack of
mobility); disempowered (by lack of awareness, adaptive capacity, support
services and exclusion from decision-making). Population ageing in Europe is
significantly increasing a group of population especially vulnerable to climate
change impacts. Moreover, the issue of social vulnerability is a further
characteristic of many cities which must be considered in the context of
climate change. Cities are often home to those with higher vulnerability to
climate change hazards and limited adaptive capacity and assets to respond
effectively to adverse climate impacts. Regarding migration, migration decisions
are multi-causal, and climate change is projected to have influence on several
of the already existing causes of migration rather than being a driver in it.
Recent evidence suggests that no significant increases of external immigration
to Europe solely due to climate or other environmental changes can be expected.
Reduction of poverty increases people's
adaptive capacity and reduces their vulnerability to climate change (better
health, better housing, less homelessness etc.). Thus, the inclusion of fight
against poverty and social exclusion in Europe 2020 strategy supports climate
change adaptation efforts in the EU. 1.2.4. Territorial challenges 1.2.4.1. Coastal zones Expected impacts of climate change Climate models, confirmed by current
observations, suggest that climate change will have a profound effect on
coastal zones and marine areas through: -
Increases in sea level rise: In most Europea
seas, sea-level has been rising in the last century. Even if in some areas of
Europe, a fall of sea-level has been observed in the last centrury, IPCC
projection estimating global average sea-levels to rise between 0.18m and 0.58m
by the end of 21st century. -
Changes in ocean currents, specifically the
thermohaline circulation, could affect Europe's seasons. -
Coastal erosion is already a serious problem in
Europe with already 20,000km of coastline threatened in 2004. Coastal erosion
could increase due to climate change through the above mentioned sea-level rise
as well as increased frequency in storms. -
Sea Surface Temperatures (SST): In Europe,
increases in SST have been greatest in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, with
lower rates identified in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. In the North
Sea and the Baltic Sea values are over 0.06-0.07 °C/year. Over the past 60
years, the extent of the Arctic sea ice at the end of summer melt has declined
at a rate of -7.8%/decade; the last 20 years have seen a trend of -9.1%/decade. -
Enhanced eutrophication: climate change could
indirectly increase eutrophication problems in coastal waters through increased
rainfall and its associated flooding loading rivers that discharge into coastal
areas. Although in recent years nutrient concentrations have been decreasing in
some areas, EEA (2011a) indicates an increase in nutrients in transitional,
coastal and marine waters in parts of the Baltic (Denmark, Finland), the North
Eastern Atlantic (Ireland) and the Mediterranean (Croatia). -
Ocean acidification: CO2 absorption by seawater
decreases the pH of oceans, leading to acidification. The ocean’s acidity could
increase by 150% relative to the beginning of the industrial era under the IPCC
A2 scenario, affecting aquatic species and reducing the ocean’s ability to act
as a carbon sink. The potential changes to coastal zones and
marine areas will not only affect aquatic flora and fauna, it will also affect
coastal economic development and human well-being. Increases in sea-level have
the potential to negatively impact economic growth as well as destroy physical
infrastructure such as housing roads. Estimates of the economic costs of
climate change impacts in coastal zones are still in the early stages of
development. Some studies estimate millions of Euros in
losses by 2020 under both the A2 and B2 scenarios due to floods and saltwater
intrusion. The loss of land along the coast as well as salt water intrusion
could impact aquaculture production by eliminating farm locations. However, it
is likely that aquaculture (which is not exclusively concentrated in coastal areas),
in view of its resilience and adaptability and its cultivation of a wide array
of species/species groups will be able to respond positively to climate change
impacts. Fisheries could on one hand increase fish catches in some areas – for
example a 24-45% increase in Scandinavia by 2055, but increasing temperatures
could also destroy some fisheries and lead to serious decline in fish species
as well as economic losses. Tourism may also be affected both positively and
negatively: northern destinations may see a surge in visits, while in others
increased storms and beach erosion may reduce tourism numbers and therefore
money. Green Infrastructure, soft coastal
protection are often cost-efficient alternatives to traditionally engineered
protection structures. In addition green infrastructure appears more effective
when facing uncertainty and provides multiple benefits. Policy context and current adaptation
activities Efforts to enhance more sustainable coastal
development in Europe were promoted by the Recommendation on Integrated Coastal
Zone Management (ICZM) in 2002). Right now the EU is assessing different policy
options for future EU action to further develop ICZM. Complementary, the
European Commission launched the OURCOAST initiative, a web-platform that
gathers and disseminates case-studies and practical examples of coastal
management practice in Europe. In 2010, the EU strengthened the legal framework
for integrated coastal zone management in the Mediterranean by deciding to
ratify the ICZM Protocol to the Barcelona Convention, which entered into force
on 24th March 2011. Both the Recommendation as the Protocol recognise the the
threat to coastal zones posed by climate change, which should be considered by
implementing ICZM strategies or plans. The EU Integrated Maritime Policy seeks to
provide a more coherent approach to maritime issues, with increased
coordination between different policy areas. It focuses on issues that do not
fall under a single sector-based policy e.g. "blue growth" (economic
growth based on different maritime sectors) and issues that require the
coordination of different sectors and actors e.g. marine knowledge. One of the
objectives there is to create a strategy to alleviate the consequences of
climate change in coastal regions. Another important policy is the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) which (beside others) is laying down rules to ensure
Europe's fisheries are sustainable and do not damage the marine environment. In
order to do so potential impacts from climate change on the fish stocks have to
be considered. Main barriers to action Stakeholders indicate that: i/ ICZM is a
complex issue and including climate change makes it even more difficult; ii/
lack of awareness; and iii/ lack of funding for monitoring impacts and taking
measures. Expected developments It is expected that due to the existing
legal framework and increased awareness raising as well as further research
under Horizon2020 by the Commission and the EEA more adaptation measures will
be taken. The planned guidelines on ICZM and climate change adaptation will
help Member States in taking action. So it is expected that the vulnerabilities
will decrease over the next years. The current policy framework also triggers
transboundary co-operation, so it is expected that adaptation will also be
dealt in this manner. At the moment, the European Commission is
not considering to develop any actions to increase the resiliency of coastal
and marine areas. However, the Commission initiative on Maritime Spatial
Planning and Integrated Coastal Zone Management intends to identify climate
change adaptation as an important element to consider for sustainable coastal
management. Knowledge gaps in relation to climate
change adaptation for marine and costal issues are handled with in the context
of the EU Adaptation Strategy under the Commission’s Green Paper on Marine
Knowledge 2020. 1.2.4.2. Mountain regions The increase in temperature is particularly
high in mountain regions, where loss of glacier mass, reduced snow cover,
thawing of permafrost and changing precipitation patterns including less
precipitation falling as snow have been observed and are expected to increase
further. This could lead to an increase in the frequency and intensity of
natural hazards such as floods and rock falls that will impact people and the
built environment. Key vulnerabilities include reduced winter tourism, less
energy supply from hydropower, a shift in vegetation zones, invasive alien
species and extensive biodiversity loss. Plant and animal species face the risk
of becoming extinct due to natural and artificial barriers not allowing them to
move upwards or northwards to more suitable areas. The retreat of the vast
majority of glaciers also affects water availability in downstream areas. 1.2.4.3. Cities and urban areas Expected impacts of climate change Around 70 % of the EU population –
approximately 350 million people – currently lives in urban agglomerations of
more than 5,000 inhabitants. Climate impacts on cities will directly affect
those citizens that live in and visit urban areas, and indirectly affect those
citizens that rely upon the services provided by urban areas. The major threats to European cities are
the impacts resulting from flooding, heatwaves, and water scarcity (or
drought), coupled with coastal impacts for those cities in vulnerable
locations. In addition, climate can magnify the pre-existing socio-economic
challenges that cities face. While urban areas will generally experience
the same changes in climate as their surrounding region, the urban setting
(physical form and socio-economic activity) can affect both exposure and
sensitivity to weather events, and therefore the impacts felt at the local
scale. For example, urbanisation of land can limit the land available for
natural flood management and lead to higher peak run-off of rain and flood
water (EEA, 2012c) thus magnifying the impact of high intensity rainfall
projected to occur as a result of climate change. In addition, built-up areas
can create unique microclimates in terms of temperatures, wind and
precipitation. It is likely that the length, frequency
and/or intensity of warm spells, or heat waves, will increase. The impact of
heatwaves is particularly strong in cities and towns because of the Urban Heat
Island (UHI) effect. Impacts will also vary by region. Cities in northern
Europe are potentially as much exposed to the human health effects of heat
waves as are cities in southern Europe, given the different heat thresholds and
levels of acclimatisation of local populations. Flooding is a potential risk across all
European regions and the extent of its impacts in urban areas is shaped not
only by long term changes in climate but by topography, characteristics of the
built environment, weather variability and extreme event occurrences. The
nature of flood impacts is also the result of existing vulnerability within a
particular city and the type of flooding. Climate change may act to change the
both the frequency, type and severity of future flood events. For example, Some
scenarios indicate that between 250,000 and 400,000 additional people per year
in Europe by the 2080s will be affected by river flooding, most of them in
cities Water stress is already a serious issue for
certain areas of Europe in the summer months, especially in Southern and
Eastern Europe and projections suggest that the water stress will worsen,
increasingly affecting more northerly latitudes. This increase in water
scarcity, alongside a range of socio-economic drivers such as population
growth, is likely to worsen water stress in cities. Recent sea level rise projections taking
into account the impact of artic ice melt suggest that increases of between 0.9
to 1.6 metres above the 1990 level could be expected by 2100. These increased
sea levels have the potential to interact with storm surges to present a
serious flood threat to Europe’s coastal area, where large cities and urban
centres are located. Cities along the coast of the Netherlands, Germany,
Belgium and northern Italy are most likely to be affected. Policy context and current adaptation
activities The number of Europeans living in urban
areas is set to increase from the current figure of around 70% to around 80% in
2020. Therefore, even without climate change, it is increasingly important to
enhance urban resilience to extreme weather events, but with projections for
more frequent and more severe heatwaves, flash flooding and periods of water
scarcity, and rising sea levels, the risks are also increasing. Cities are affected by a large number of
regional and sectoral policies. This includes cohesion policy, environmental,
agriculture and rural development, transport and energy, industrial,
employment, education and health policies. Of particular relevance are urban
development activities funded under cohesion policy programmes, environmental
policies targeting specific impacts (e.g. Flood directive (EC, 2007c), and
certain sectoral policies (e.g. agricultural policies can provide upstream
flood prevention measures or water management in water scarce regions). These
policies will influence the vulnerability of urban regions, the resilience to
climate impacts and the adaptive capacity. Current adaptation activities are highly
site specific; not all Member States have national climate change adaptation
strategies which may hinder development of adaptation plans at lower spatial
levels. In other countries, while there may be regulations at the national
level for larger municipalities to develop adaptation plans, such regulations
may not be strongly enforced. Adaptation remains a new policy area for many
city administrations in Europe. Main barriers to action In terms of capacity for EU cities to
adapt, there are a range of barriers, which include lack of awareness, lack of
appropriate knowledge and data at city-level, lack of communication of good
practice, little opportunity for cities to exchange experiences. Availability
of resource within city administratations and in financial terms can be a
barrier. The overarching multi-level governance framework to support urban
adaptation is also lacking. The EEA identifies a number of barriers to
local, regional and Member State governance for adaptation in urban areas.
These include the complexities of jurisdictional and economic boundaries
compared to the scale and location at which effective interventions for
adaptation may need to be implemented for increasing urban resilience. Lack of
communication between planning and risk management departments may mean, for
example, that whilst adaptation plans are developed by the municipalities, they
do not filter into e.g. land use planning; thus adaptation may remain a
separate, or additional issue, rather than becoming mainstream consideration.
Another barrier is associated with the apparent gap between local adaptation
action and national level strategies, and the fact that competition for
resources between policy sectors at the national level can lead to the neglect
of funding for urban adaptation. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? According to the EEA, it is clear that
adaptation is progressing across Europe, but this is patchy, uncoordinated and
of varied quality. The same is true for adaptation across Europe’s cities (e.g.
EEA, 2009b; CoR, 2011). Only a quarter (24%) of cities report that an adaptation
strategy that has been adopted in their city, with only 8% stating that no work
is planned or has begun on climate adaptation. Without new EU action the gaps
in adaptive capacity and in the development of appropriate adaptation responses
across Member States will remain or widen; the problem described above will
remain. Potential examples of adaptation actions
by 2020 to increase resilience The unique contribution of the EU level is
an over-arching, framework-setting function is to enhance an integrated and
multi-level governance approach to building climate resilience. In terms of
concrete actions, this would play out as mainstreaming into EU policies and
budgets, facilitation of exchange of good practice, and coordinated development
of the knowledge base relevant to urban adaptation. An extended Adaptation
Steering Group involving a wider range of local/city-level representatives
could support the implementation phase of the EU Adaptation Strategy providing
links across the governance levels. Given the large number of sectors requiring
adaptation at city level, in different local contexts with differing
vulnerability, a very wide range of technical measures for urban adaptation is
available. The appropriate options are also dependent on the nature of local
governance and its role / remit across affected sectors. At European level, the
role is predominantly one of support, rather than implementation. Urban adaptation could be facilitated by
mainstreaming of adaptation into key EU policy areas, as well as the removal of
potential policy conflicts at national and European levels. Areas identified as
a high priority include: urban development policy, especially current Cohesion
policy proposals; climate proofing for the EU budget for 2014–2020; climate proofing
of Commission sectoral initiatives with urban dimension; procedural
integration. A number of specific opportunities include:
exploiting both the increased urban emphasis and the new adaptation theme under
Cohesion proposals to support urban adaptation, increasing the take up of urban
adaptation projects under future Life+ programme, extending the urban section
of Climate-Adapt and linking with other urban (sustainability) platforms. There is strong potential for European
action to provide resources and coordinated action for research to fill
existing knowledge gaps in urban impacts and adaptation, and making use of the
Climate-Adapt platform in dissemination, engagement and application of this
knowledge base. Knowledge exchange can play an important
role in raising awareness and building adaptive capacity among cities, and the
EU can facilitate such exchange, through support of networks and campaigns
(such as UNISDR, Making Cities Resilient“), and/or through provision of a
platform to promote exchange of experiences among cities. 1.2.4.4. Rural areas In rural areas,
which still make most of the EU's land area and represent an important share of
employment, climatic risks are also likely to exacerbate the socio-economic
challenges that these areas face (depopulation, economic viability, social
services). Rural areas are exposed to a wide range of impacts from climatic
variations, beyond those directly affecting agriculture and livestock. These
include increased risk of flooding, particularly in Central and Northern
regions, and risks for damage to infrastructure due to other extreme events.
Increasing competition for water between different uses will also concern rural
population and economies. Forest ecosystems and forestry are important in many
rural areas. Climatic changes will lead to increased risk of disturbances
through storms, fire, and outbreaks of pests and diseases with implications for
forest growth and production. The trend
towards reduction of snow cover in mountainous areas will have negative
consequences for winter tourism and on rural economies dependent on income from
tourism. This can also be the case for areas facing water shortages, while a
warmer climate can bring new tourism opportunities for rural areas in other
parts of the EU. The rural
development policy for the period 2014-2020 will continue sustaining economic
development in European rural areas. 1.2.4.5. Outermost regions The outermost regions (OR) are amongst the
regions of the EU most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, most
notably to: biodiversity loss, health impacts, negative impacts on agriculture,
tourism stagnation and water scarcity. Studies have foreseen that the Caribbean
islands and French Guiana will experience increased dryness, more intense
cyclones and sea level rise, which will lead to coral bleaching, shoreline
erosion and the degradation of tropical forests, mangroves, and freshwater
ecosystems. Coral bleaching is a great reason for great concern, as the coral
reefs provide essential protection against storm surges and waves. Loss of
coral reefs will mean loss of livelihoods for many inhabitants of islands and
coastal regions. Corals already weakened due to overexploitation and pollution
are threatened through increased water temperature and ocean acidification. The
current CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (393 ppm) is already above the
viable limit for coral reefs, which according to current state of the art
knowledge lies at 350 ppm. The Macaronesian islands will be particularly
threatened by changes in wind and precipitation patterns that increase the risk
of invasive species and the potential of desertification. In Reunion, rising
temperatures, together with human induced impacts, drive coral bleaching, water
scarcity problems, and the spread of invasive species and vector-borne
diseases. The geographic and economic differences
between the OR and the rest of the EU make them special cases for the EU
adaptation strategy in terms of the potential impacts and the adaptation
options available. The OR are characterised by their remoteness, insularity,
small size, difficult topography and climate, and economic dependence on a
narrow range of goods and services, especially tourism and agriculture. Also
they generally have poor economic growth and suffer from high unemployment. The
habitats and species found in these regions are distinct from the rest of the
EU and provide an important contribution to global biodiversity. These
ecosystems are particularly sensitive to changes in climate and their deterioration
poses significant health and socio-economic concerns. These characteristics make them not only
vulnerable to climate change but also likely to have limited capacity for
adaptation without support. For example, the economy of Guadeloupe is highly
dependent upon bananas and the economy of Réunion is dominated by sugarcane.
Both require freshwater but sea level rise and saltwater intrusion into
aquifers will put increased pressure on this limited resource, which is also
under demand from domestic consumption and the tourism sector. The potential
reduction in fisheries resources due to climate change also poses a significant
threat for islands like Martinique. The OR are isolated, either due to their
island nature or due to the characteristics of the territory (Amazon forest in
French Guiana), most OR are mountainous and, as a result, urban areas are
predominantly coastal making them potentially vulnerable to sea level rise and
storms. Therefore, adaptations measures to minimise the effects of the deterioration
of the shoreline - corals, mangroves, beaches- is paramount. As they are already experiencing the
impacts of climate change, activities to increase the knowledge of climate
change impacts as well as the definition and implementation of adaptation strategies
are key priorities in the OR. Moreover, these regions could serve as early
demonstrations for the development of policy initiatives and technologies
devoted to climate change adaptation. Activities under the BEST initiative
could become a valuable contribution to the adaptation effort in OR. Lessons
learnt can then be exported; tailored to neighbouring countries and adapted for
the rest of the EU. 1.2.5. Cross-sectoral challenges 1.2.5.1. Linking disaster risk management
and adaptation One of the most important consequences of
climate change will be the increase in the frequency and magnitude of extreme
events such as floods, droughts, windstorms and heat waves. Climate change may
also trigger other hazards in which climate or weather conditions play a
fundamental role, such as snow avalanches, landslides and forest fires. The
drivers and causes for disaster risk are: -
Population growth, leading to settlements in
areas with a higher risk potential; -
Economic growth: economic risk will equally
increase; -
Human technology and behaviour (nuclear plants,
chemical industry, clear-cutting of forests, spilling freshwater resources,
arson). Risk is determined not only by the severity
of the hazard but also by the concentration of people and assets in
hazard-prone areas and their vulnerability to the hazard. Human fatalities tend
to concentrate mostly in Eastern and Southern Europe. People who are generally
more vulnerable are also more at risk when a natural disaster occurs: low
income households, the elderly and infirmed. With regard to human fatalities the most
prominent natural hazard is heat waves. The summer 2003 claimed lives of a
tremendous number of people on the continent, with over 70.000 excess deaths
being reported in 12 Western and Central European countries. Flooding and storm
events result the most significant amounts of economic losses relative to other
types of disasters in the EU. Climate change will lead to new disaster
risk ‘landscapes’ and distribution of hot spots. In recent years, policies for
disaster risk reduction and management have shifted from defence against
hazards (mostly by structural measures) to a more comprehensive, integrated
risk management approach. Policy context and current adaptation
activities The European Union has already developed a
set of instruments to address various aspects of disaster prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery. These include, inter alia, the Community
mechanism for civil protection (EC, 2001,2007), the implement of disaster risk
management policy (COM(2009)82), the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF; EC,
2002) The EU is developing an "Overview of
the Major Risks the EU May Face in the Future", so as to potentially
inform policy decisions at EU and MS level. The overview will be primarily
based on national risk analyses drawn from the national risk assessments that
Member States are now developing based on the 2010 Guidelines on risk
assessment for disaster management. Other on-going activities at EU level
include: i/supporting Member States in developing national risk assessments
and risk management plans; ii/ overcoming the challenges of data sharing
iii)develop incentives for prevention and innovative financing instruments iv)
facilitate cooperation and exchange of good practices among Member States
though training, exchange of experts, peer reviews, development on guidelines
for good practices in disaster prevention etc, v) enhancing the level of
preparedness though actions such as training, exercises, development of Early
Warning Systems, scenario development and contingency planning. On 20 December 2011 the European Commission
adopted a proposal to revise the existing European Union's Civil Protection
legislation in order to ensure more effective, efficient and coherent disaster
management.. The prevention and disaster risk management activities are thus
incorporated into the legislative framework and form part of the integrated
disaster management cycle. The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)
was set up to respond to major natural disasters and express European
solidarity to disaster-stricken regions within Europe. The Fund was created as
a reaction to the severe floods in Central Europe in the summer of 2002. The Floods Directive (FD) (2007/60/EC) was
proposed by the European Commission in 2006, and was adopted by Council and
Parliament in 2007. Its aim is to reduce and manage the risks that floods pose
to human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity. The
FD requires Member States to first carry out a preliminary assessment by 2011
to identify the river basins and associated coastal areas at risk of flooding
and come up with comprehensive flood risk management plans by 2015. Disaster risk reduction is a
well-established field in policy and research, and many technical measures have
been developed. For example, the recently published Special Report of IPCC on
disaster risk reduction (IPCC, 2012b) contains 140 pages on managing the risks
at three levels (local, national and international), including technical
measures such as warning systems, better land use management (through e.g.
conservation zones, buffer zones, or land acquisition), ecosystem management
and restoration (e.g. watershed rehabilitation and forest landscape
restoration) and post-disaster recovery and reconstruction (preferably in ways
that reduce future risk). Such activities are coherent with
international developments, such as the Hyogo Framework for action or the Rio
+20 conference on sustainable development. Indeed, in the field of preparedness, early
warning systems have been recognised as an important element of disaster risk
reduction as a means to protect lives and reduce losses. Also Rio+20 recognises
the complementary added value of global and regional early warning systems for
natural disasters to national systems in particular for trans-national hazards
such as large riverine floods, droughts and storms. European and pan-European
early warning and detection systems for weather-driven natural disasters exist
such as the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS, COM(2002)-481), the European
Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) and the European Drought Observatory
(EDO). They have been developed in close collaboration with Member States in
view of an improved European crisis management for weather related natural
disasters and contributed to the development of state-of-the art scientific and
technical solutions that are shared with the Member States organization and
scientific community. Furthermore, these systems foster the establishment of comprehensive,
European data and information archives which are essential for planning and
decision making up to 2020 across different sectors of environment,
agriculture, transport, energy, water management and land-use planning. Similarly, global systems such as the
Global Flood Detection System (GFDS) and the Global Disaster Alert and
Coordination System (GDACS) are developed in cooperation with the
United Nations Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA) to enhance preparedness and response to major international
disasters requiring humanitarian assistance. These systems also can provide
useful complementary information to systems and approaches used by national and
regional authorities in Europe. Main barriers to action Need to strengthen the synergies to
maximise the links between disaster risk reduction and climate change
adaptation policies and communities Sharing of data, observations, projections
and good practices on climate change vulnerability methods and adaptation
actions is so far limited. Still an obstacle for successful
cooperation between the DRR and the climate change adaptation community is the
different terminology. How would the problem evolve by 2020
without further EU Action? Without new EU action the cross-cutting
areas between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction will not be
properly developed. Potential actions by 2020 to increase
resilience Examples of potential action include: -
The assessment of exposure, vulnerability and
adaptive capacity, taking current weather related disasters as a starting
point. -
More robust regional climate change scenarios
that better capture the occurrence of extreme events and improved assessments
of their societal impacts are needed. -
Socio-economic scenarios for exposure,
vulnerability and adaptive capacity to the more frequent and more intensive
future extreme weather events. Addressing current risk levels, through actions
such as retrofitting buildings, relocating human settlements and restoring
ecosystems is more expensive than avoiding these risks in the first place. -
Linking national, European and global Early
Warning Systems for a more effective management of trans-boundary disasters in
Europe. Coupled decadal climate predictions to
early warning systems for floods, droughts and forest fires would be needed.
Further, it is imperative to record local disaster data, particularly damage
and loss at the local level for developing appropriate responses. In addition,
it would be useful to explore case studies where adaptation and DRR have been
linked and draw on lessons learned. Further potential entry points for
adaptation with regard to DRR and early warning and monitoring could be the
Action Plan on GNSS Applications (COM(2010)308). In addition, Copernicus and the
application of EGNOS and GALILEO could be explored further for early warning,
monitoring wind speeds, spread of flooding etc. Example
1: 2003 Heat wave in France In 2003,
France suffered the hottest summer in 50 years. That year, an exceptionally
severe heat wave claimed more than 15,000 lives. After this tragedy, the public
authorities established the national heat emergency plan, which is activated
every year from 1 June to 31 August, in order to reduce the risk of deaths from
heat waves. The French Red Cross, in its role as auxiliary to the public
authorities and with its 45,000 volunteers and 556 health and social
facilities, was mobilized in a large-scale operation in the summer of 2003
(helping vulnerable people, distributing water, assisting health facilities and
emergency services). Since then, it has played an active part in implementing
the national plan. Based on its own heat emergency guide and plan, it prepares
and implements a series of actions in coordination with the public authorities
and in accordance with local resources and needs. The national
heat emergency plan established by the Ministry of Health provides for French
Red Cross intervention at various levels. It plays a vital role in
strengthening solidarity and dealing with the problem of isolated vulnerable
people, particularly those most at risk from the effects of a heat wave. It
also mobilizes its volunteers to carry out specific activities, targeting the
most vulnerable sectors of the population including elderly and disables
people. in 2006 the French Red Cross mobilized its network to deal with
the effects of extremely high temperatures (level 2 or 3), deploying over 3,500
volunteers. Efforts
focused primarily on assisting homeless people and isolated elderly people,
supporting establishments and services, such as homes for the elderly and
hospital emergency services, and providing first-aid teams. On 17 July 2006,
the public authorities in western France activated level 2 of the heat
emergency plan, where the local Red Cross branch started on its rounds of
elderly people living on their own. The most problematic cases were to be dealt
with on the first day, focusing on the most vulnerable sectors of the
population, including those who are completely on their own, those who are no
longer in full possession of their faculties and those who have serious medical
conditions. On recognizing the Red Cross uniform, an elderly lady opened her
door quickly. In the dim interior of her pleasant, impeccably kept apartment,
87-year-old Suzanne invited the volunteers to sit down for a moment in her
living room. “I’m so happy to know that someone is thinking of me. You can’t
imagine how hard it is and how much my heart is warmed by what you do,” she
said (Source Red Cross, 2009) Example
2: 2010 Central European Floods The 2010
Central European floods were a result of storms and unusually heavy
precipitation events embedded in widespread and longer lasting rainfalls in May
2010. The resulting floods affected several Central European countries during
May and June. In August another flood event hit the countries again. Poland was the worst affected but also Austria, Czech
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine were affected. At least
thirty-seven people died in the floods and approximately 23,000 people were
evacuated. The estimated economic cost was 2.5 billion euros. According to Poland's Prime Minister Donald
Tusk the 2010 flooding was
"the worst natural disaster in the nation's history ... without
precedent in the past 160 years". The situation became critical when the
Vistula River broke its banks and flooding the town of Sandomierz where residents were stranded in their
homes while power outages affected telecommunication. Not able to cope with the
disaster with national resources, Poland triggered the European Civil
Protection, the MIC, for aid. On 20 May, aid began arriving to Poland from
several European Union countries. Hungary
triggered the MIC on the 26th May for support to strengthen its flood
containment capacity and put in place additional temporary protection. A
request for up to 2 million sandbags to strengthen its flood containment
capacity was communicated to the European Civil Protection Network. In 2010, for
the first time, the MIC had received information on the possibility for
upcoming floods through the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) and
therefore was prepared for the incoming requests which resulted in faster
response to the requests. (Sources: Wikipedia and JRC internal information_ 1.2.5.2. Adaptation actions and needs
for the private sector Expected impacts of
climate change The private sector is
defined as privately owned or controlled companies, organisations and entities.
Climate change will have a range of impacts on businesses Impacts are expected
to fall disproportionately on SMEs including disrupting business operations,
property damage, disruption to supply chains and infrastructure leading to
increasing costs of maintenance and materials, and raising prices. The majority
of the Global 500 companies (81%) report physical risks from climate change and
the percentage of companies that view these risks as current has nearly
quadrupled from 10% in 2010 to 37% in 2012. In the UK the Carbon disclosure
project surveyed members of the FTSE 100 group of companies finding more than
80% identify substantive risks to their business from climate change. In other
cases, climate change may also offer new business opportunities for products
and services that would help people to adapt in the form of expanding market
share and creating wealth in communities (innovation and job creation) and
accessing new finance streams (increased public funding and financial products
and services). New business opportunities might be as simple as increased
demand for air conditioning or chilled drinks or as complex as new roofing
materials or draining equipment suitable for changing weather conditions. Climate change exposes
businesses to a range of operation, profit and growth-related risks (such as
flooding damage to production facilities or supply routes in and outside the
EU). The impacts from these risks may be systemic (at the whole economy level),
such as damage to major infrastructure, or they may be sector/industry-wide or
company-specific, such as unavailability of an important feedstock. The problem for the
private sector can be seen as evolving alongside the evolution of climate
scenarios. Increased precipitation in the north of Europe and increasing drought
conditions in the south will increasingly impact on the organisation of the
means of production. As weather patterns shift so too will patterns of demand
and labour mobility. At present problems associated with failure to adapt can
be illustrated by increasing incidence of insurance related weather events.
However current experiences are a pre taste of much more significant adaptation
challenges in the years ahead including more frequent weather related damage to
property, production facilities or logistical infrastructure. Policy context and current adaptation
activities The Cohesion and Regional Development Fund
both allow support for the development of strategies for adaptation to climate
investment aimed at increasing adaptation to climate change including avoiding
damage to the built environment and other infrastructure, investments and the
development of tools to facilitate disaster prevention for large infrastructure
projects, not businesses themselves. The European Social Fund (ESF) and Horizon
2020 both also include funds that can be used in support of adaptation action
for the private sector. The ESF aims to increase employment opportunities and
ensuring the right skills are available and enhancing the competitiveness of
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as the future funding
programme COSME[31]. Firms are investing more to protect
themselves. Much of this takes the form of updating business continuity plans,
or upgrading risk trackers. But around one in four firms is either upgrading
their existing physical assets, for example by weather-proofing buildings, or
taking out new insurance policies. Around one in five businesses plan to adapt
their operations better to deal with such changes, such as adopting new crop
varieties or more water-efficient facilities (UK Trade & Investment, 2011).Other
examples of action by private organisations include the following, which shows
in particular how European companies can take action in other parts of the
world (Source: PwC: Business leadership on climate change adaptation:
Encouraging engagement and action, 2010). Type of exposure || Type of response || Examples of companies who have taken action Direct exposure || Identification of risks || Anglo American (mining/ natural resources) has commenced regional climate modelling exercises with UK Met Office, Imperial College of London and consultants to assess the long-term adaptation measures for operations and projects in South Africa, Brazil and Peru. A study of Peru’s Tambo water basin will help enable the safeguarding of local assets, resources and communities. Change in operational strategy || ThamesWater (water utility) is embedding adaptation into its core operational strategy. The strategy is focused on water resources, sewer capacity and flood resilience. The company has also challenged their suppliers to consider its adaptation actions to ensure and maintain service levels in future. Indirect exposure || Identification of risks || HSBC (financial services) is developing a detailed understanding of the physical risks of climate change to help the bank maximise the opportunities that arise. For example, the HSBC Climate Vulnerability Assessment, which maps risks for the G20 in 2020, looks at the impact of climate change on food production, water availability and health. An understanding of the scale of the issues helps the bank – and its clients - to focus on how best to respond. Opportunity || New products and services || BASF (chemicals) has developed products that are helping coastal settlements protect local dikes by absorbing the force of breaking waves and slowing down water masses. BASF’s researchers are also developing stress-tolerant plants that are more resistant to extreme weather conditions such as drought and superabsorbers are being trialed for a reforestation project in Brazil to increase water storage capacity. Allianz (insurance) offers micro-insurance products in six countries. With a highly established market in India, Allianz has extended its reach to Indonesia, Egypt, Cameroon, Senegal, and Colombia. Its first flood catastrophe bond is part of a EUR 1 billion programme to mitigate the risk of severe, regional floods across a global fund. Allianz's schemes are typically managed in partnership with others. Disaster risk management || Disaster relief support || Deutsche Post (logistics) has identified Disaster Management as one area of their global CSR priorities, and has initiated a global humanitarian partnership with the United Nations and a global network of DHL Disaster Response Teams in three regions: Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa and Americas. Main barriers for action A number of barriers prevent the private
sector from taking appropriate adaptation actions and future-proofing their
business, among which the current economic conjuncture which is particularly
adverse for long-term investments especially for SMEs. The lack of accurate,
reliable information, networking and exchange of experience hinders the uptake
of adaptation investment because of a lack of awareness of climate-change
related risks e.g. there remains a large gap between businesses recognising
current and future risks that climate change may pose to their operations, and
engaging in activities to address these risks. Companies’ ability to finance adaptation
can significantly affect their engagement – companies often state that cost is
a reason for not implementing risk management e.g. with regard to the high
costs of undertaking a climate risk assessment and the high cost of the
adaptation options they have considered. Some adaptive responses not only provide
private benefits to those who have paid for them, they also provide benefits –
or positive spill overs - to the wider economy e.g. positive externalities from
the restoration of the environment, reduced water use are not fully captured by
the organisation which invests in actions. Insurance is currently not being used
effectively to manage climate risk. Three categories of barriers to the
widespread uptake of insurance for adaptation relate to: i/ Inadequate risk
transfer conditions to the underlying risk e.g. price or premium, deductibles,
exclusions and co-insurance; ii/ Insufficient insurance supply: The
availability of insurance related to climate change remains limited e.g. due to
‘covariate risk’, i.e. many claims can occur simultaneously; iii/ Lack of
demand: In general, insurance penetration is low in the EU e.g. lower income
segments do not purchase insurance, and the farming sector has limited cover. How would the problem evolve without
further EU action? In the absence of EU action there is an
expectation that the gap between those organisations able and willing to take
adaptation actions and those left behind will grow. Some of the largest
trans-national corporations, and those in certain sectors, have begun to appreciate
the potential threat and opportunity presented by climate change. However by
2020, in particular many small and medium sized enterprises will be unable to
make the necessary adaptation measures making them increasingly vulnerable to
the effects of unavoidable climate change. In the absence of measures from the
EU this gap will widen – creating market obstacles for those left behind. Examples of potential adaptation action
by 2020 to increase resilience A first element could be an increased
awareness raising and business engagement in adaptation policy making and
planning. To date, businesses engagement has been focused on issues related to
mitigation rather than on adaptation. A specific strategy for mobilising
private sector strengths and assets is needed. There is some untapped data and
knowledge potential in the private sector which should be maximised. Access to finance for the private sector
can be achieved through the direct provision of grants by the EU and other
private funding mechanisms including traditional loan finance and equity
finance. The existing suite of grant schemes are set out within the proposed
2014-2020 Multi-annual Financial Framework and future MFFs to 2050 are seen as
an opportunity to embed finance for adaptation measures. There are
opportunities to further embed adaptation actions within existing EU programmes
such as CAP, Cohesion funds, ERDF and ESF and Life. There appears to be an important role for
insurance to play in a cost effective balance of measures adopted within the
public and private sectors. Market based instruments have the potential to
drive behaviours and achieve outcomes with low cost e.g. unlike standards,
which are applied uniformly, MBIs enable firms to adopt a cost-effective
solution as they also encourage businesses to innovate and increase
productivity. 1.2.5.3. Threats and opportunities
for companies with respect to climate change Finally, adaptation
activities can offer profitable business opportunities across the economy,
including for instance in the following sectors: environmental consulting
services; agricultural technologies; ecosystem managemen, water management and
technologies; construction; insurance. Table 2:
Threats and opportunities that companies could face with respect to climate
change || Threats (potential damage costs) || Opportunities (potential benefits) Markets – changing demand for goods and services || Decreased or disappearing demand for present range of goods and services Access of customers to products and services could be undermined by extreme weather || Increasing demand for present range of goods and services but in a different market or demand for new products More extreme events create opportunities in sectors of maintenance, repair, localized operations (e.g. tourism, recreation) Finance—implications for availability of credit, insurance, stakeholder reputation || Failure to adapt creates difficulties in securing affordable rates of insurance and financing Potential liabilities stemming from climate change related events are not factored into long-term business decisions || Rewards for better risk management in the form of reduced premiums Customers attracted to businesses that have demonstrated resilience against climate change related events Logistics—vulnerability of the supply chain, utilities and transport arrangements) || Possible negative effects on the availability of some good and services (e.g. raw materials, components); upward pressures on commodity prices Disruption to supply of electricity, water, and sewerage and other utilities Disruption of transportation along the supply chain || Competitive advantage for businesses with flexible supply chains and delivery systems Competitive advantage for businesses with continuity planning and back-up utility facilities. Opportunities for businesses supplying local markets; marketing strategies based on regional differences and reduced product miles. Premises or Assets (Impacts on building design, construction, maintenance and facilities management) || Vulnerability due to proximity to premises likely affected by climate change related events (e.g. river banks, coastal zones) Challenges to cope with temperature extremes at premises (cooling in the summer and warming in the winter without adding to GHG emissions) || Opportunities for businesses specializing in built environment for developing climate-related products (more efficient air-conditioning installations etc.) Depending on the region, maintaining inside temperatures in winter might become less costly. People (implications for the workforce and customers; changing lifestyles) || Threats to the health and travel arrangements for staff and clients due to extreme weather events related to climate change. Deterioration in internal work environment because of increased summer temperatures || Opportunities for improving public image by offering flexible working hours/travel arrangements, early warning systems Opportunities for businesses in tourism and recreational sectors Process (impacts in production processes and service delivery) || Reduction in productivity or disruption to climate sensitive processes or activities, e.g. in the construction sector and agriculture || Opportunities for new products and innovations in the climate sensitive sectors 1.3. Likely
impacts of policy initiatives 1.3.1. Likely impacts of policy
initiatives on knowledge generation 1.3.1.1. No policy change Major research efforts
on climate change have been promoted and financed at the European level within
the 7th Framework Programme and its predecessors. Such activities would
continue and further expand, in line with the Commission's proposals on
research under Horizon 2020. EU research projects should strive to provide
coherent, integrated and exhaustive results. In many cases tailored linkages
among projects will be beneficial. Although all the details have not been
clarified yet, Horizon 2020 is expected to improve the coordination of research
activities. However as no systematic mechanism of mapping knowledge gaps,
screening of on-going research and support activities and prioritising along
policy needs is proposed, some limitations in coordination and targeted close
of knowledge gaps can be expected. The Commission
developed in the context of the PESETA and the JRC PESETA II projects[32] a multi-sectoral assessment of the impacts of climate change in
Europe for the 2011-2040 and 2071-2100 time horizons. However, to get to a
harmonized and agreed approach across the EU in modelling climate impacts would
require further efforts. There are various on-going
activities for model comparison and model combination. In the “impact and
adaptation” area probably the most important is the on-going and abovementioned
IPCC RCPs action. All of these show that comparability is indeed possible also
in a multi model approach once the assumptions and structure of the models are
transparently communicated. In addition an important recent global initiative
is ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project[33]. This is the first global activity aimed at
providing cross-sectoral global impact assessments, based on the newly
developed climate Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and
socio-economic Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs). Various ways can be used to disseminate
information. In particular, the use of web-platforms as well as of
science-policy interfaces can be efficient tools to disseminate information.
The paragraphs below describe the expected developments by 2020 without further
EU Action. Under the no policy change scenario it is
assumed that Climate-ADAPT will be further financed and that the EEA (supported
by European Topic Centre on Climate Change adaptation[34]) will
ensure regular maintenance and updating of Climate-ADAPT. This includes
ensuring inclusion of this work within the EEA annual management plans and in
the annual ETC CCA implementation plans. It also includes regular reporting on
progress, e.g. through the EEA (and ETC CCA) progress reporting. EEA (with ETC
CCA) will organise regular training sessions and meetings but also develop information
and publicity material such as a newsletter and a tutorial video. The inclusion
of the results from the Joint Programming Initiative "Connecting Climate
Knowledge for Europe’ (JPI Climate) is expected to take place from 2014
onwards. Beyond 2014 it remains unclear how Climate-ADAPT will further develop
and which dissemination activities will be carried out. An important additional element which is
now being implemented is the obligation for EU-funded projects under the last
FP7 Call to report to Climate-ADAPT on any climate change adaptation related
findings from the research project. Under the no-policy change scenario, it is
expected that these requirements will be included to EU-funded projects under
Horizon 2020. This could entail some costs, both on the project side and on the
Climate-ADAPT management side, to ensure quality assurance and quality control.
In relation to data sets some progress has
been made,[35] which is concurring in creating a wide and reliable data and
information base. Their linkage and an integrated use of the data stored
however remains an unsolved issue. While there are some science-policy
interface (SPI) research projects and expert groups that include climate change
adaptation as one of the main fields to focus on, many SPIs have not yet taken
up the issues of climate change adaptation into their work. It is not expected
that the situation would change dramatically without further EU intervention. Only six (AT, DE, DK, FI, SE, UK) Member States have until now developed broad national web-portals
on climate change adaptation. If other portals will be soon developed, it is
unlikely that without EU intervention, all Member States would have a national
web-portal by 2020. Knowledge Gaps: some indications on
recent progress In a 2008
commission staff working[36] document, the need to evaluate the impacts and costs and benefits
of adaptation measures and to encourage innovation. Some progress has been
made, but the evaluation of climate change and adaptation efforts remains a
challenge. The following sections structure the main knowledge gaps along
environmental, social and economic issues, comparing them to the status of
2008. Environmental issues Knowledge gaps highlighted in 2008 || Initiatives || Remaining gaps Need to integrate medium and long-term uncertainties in climate change projections || The CIRCLE-2 (FP7) project promotes a joint initiative on dealing with and communicating climate uncertainties[37] that will produce a special issue peer-review journal and a final publication for decision-makers during 2013. || Uncertainties related to climate developments, impacts of adaptation measures and socio-economic developments however remain a main issue - lack of regional climate change information - confidence in projections is not the same for all the variables, space-scale and periods - need of a better understanding of coupled system processes and their feedbacks - need to strengthen climate observations and maintain long term records in order to understand key processes and their feedbacks (also in mountain regions) - need for a dedicated computing infrastructure to meet current and emerging research needs - need of a better understanding of the carbon cycle - need to better understand the links between the Arctic Ocean and the climate system || The AQWA[38], CIRCLE-2[39] MOUNTain[40] and CIRCLE-2 MED[41] Impact2c[42] projects should help close some gaps in the field of lack of data and information in the water sector. The CARBO-EXTREME[43] project should improve knowledge about carbon-cycle. ECLISE[44] should help for the coastal areas. Further there are several sectoral ongoing projects || Climatic model limitations (e.g. huge variation in predictions between different climate models, lack of local data, lack of models for certain regions i.e. modeling sea level rise in the Black Sea) and a lack of understanding natural processes (e.g. anthropogenic forcing, the carbon cycle, lack of epidemiological studies) still exist. Need to better understand vulnerability in relation to land use || || This issue still remains and there is a need to identify more precisely the vulnerable areas and the vulnerability of the different sectors in relation to spatial planning (e.g. different transport modes, climate sensitivity of renewable energy supply). - need to better address the impacts of climate change on water quality - need of more efforts on the assessment of impacts in the area of health - need to have more information about floods and droughts impacts in the water sector and about the impacts of extreme events - need to better understand the impacts of ocean acidification. || Over the last years some progress has been made in particular in relation to floods and droughts (e.g. by PESETA[45], CLIMWATADAPT[46], LISFLOOD[47]) and health (results of the not yet published CEHAPIS[48] study (results are expected for autumn 2012) will partly close the knowledge gaps, but also identifies areas where more research and effort is needed) || Some knowledge gaps remain: especially the improvement of existing early warning systems for heat waves, floods, droughts and forest fires can be an added value and advantage in knowledge, reducing impacts from extreme events and weather pattern. In the field of climatic drivers, there is a need to better develop projections, especially in terms of sea level rise in the Black Sea. There are also quite some uncertainties about ice melting and related impacts to temperature and sea level rise Need of a better estimation of impacts at finer spatial scales and shorter timeframes for agriculture and forestry || || There is still a lack of broad scale knowledge in the forest sector in particular about the regional or local level Lack of information about impacts of climate change on most vulnerable ecosystems || The CLIMSAVE[49] project is trying to address the issue of the indirect impacts of the different sectors on Biodiversity || Climate change impacts on ecosystem services are still a gap. An integration and coupling of land-use and climate change scenarios would provide better insights into future vulnerable ecosystem hot spots. limited information about indirect impacts (e.g. biodiversity, health sector (traumata after flood events, reduced working ability, workdays and productivity as a result of more severe weather events) or secondary impacts (e.g. deterioration of ecosystem has secondary impacts on employments and labor demand) Social issues Knowledge gaps highlighted in 2008 || Initiatives || Remaining gaps Need to take account of the social scenarios in the assessment of climate change impacts for the sectors of agriculture and forestry, and health || || In general much more attention should be paid to socio-economic pathways and policies (with and without adaptation) that determine which kind of Europe (which exposures, which sensitivities and adaptive capacities) will be hit by climate change in the forthcoming decades. Presently some general gaps in this knowledge have been identified, namely: - Land use developments, - Changes in demographic development, - Migrations developments. Missing information about population and land cover in the sector of coastal zone. - need of research on social impacts - need to better quantify the impacts of climate change in vulnerable world regions - need of studies related to urban adaptation || Several studies dealing with adaptation in urban areas have been carried out. The RAMSES project deals with the analysis of climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in EU and international cities, as well as with the full economic costs of adaptation in the particular contexts. Progress has been made on global impacts, mainly under the work performed by the IPCC. || - lack of information on how EU can be affected by the rest of the world (e.g. impacts of climate change and increase of population on food security) - lack of information about impacts in the fields of soil, drinking water supply and land use change - need to identify vulnerable groups and sub-regions, evaluate the inequality in adaptive capacities and how vulnerable are the most vulnerable, assess the impacts on poverty rates - adaptation measures themselves have unequal costs and benefits, which might increase social or regional disparities and which need to be further addressed || - Work of CIRCLE-2 in the field of adaptation strategies[50] especially related to transnational knowledge sharing and collaboration - Work in the RESPONSES[51] and MEDIATION[52], CLIMSAVE projects on multilevel governance and mal-adaptation avoidance - Initiated work in the BASE project on assessing and combining bottom-up adaptation needs with top-down strategic assessments in 20 diverse Case Studies. - Initiated work in the ToPDad project on the development and application of state-of-the-art socio-economic methods and tools for integrated assessment of climate change impacts and regional adaptation decision-making, with particular emphasis on the Energy, Transport, Tourism sectors. || - lack of knowledge on long-term adaptation in some sectors and on how adaptation decision-making processes deal with climate change uncertainties - need of research on how adaptive management can be supported by the regulatory system and how the adaptation process can be monitored and evaluated Economic issues Our future world will be impacted by the
direct effects of climate change but also by the evolution of the economic
context. It is thus important to have a good knowledge of the economic
scenarios to evaluate their impacts on the different sectors. Knowledge gaps highlighted in 2008 || Initiatives || Remaining gaps need of development of high resolution climate change impacts studies and large scale quantitative modeling || || - agriculture: need to find methods to predict long term agricultural land-use - coastal zones: missing information about economy and land cover - transport: possible impacts from the competitive contracts for infrastructure maintenance that may lead to a delay in responses to extreme climate events (need to study the effects of performance type contracts) - energy: in the field of estimating energy demand (demand peaks during extreme periods and cooling demand for urban agglomerations) - job/employment: difficulty to have appropriate scenarios due to its governance by a multitude of elements (e.g. technology development, economic development, demographics) need of more information about costs of climate change and adaptation, and about inter-sector linkages (need of development of high resolution climate change impacts studies and large scale quantitative modeling to obtain this information) || - ClimateCost[53] works on costs of inaction and costs and benefits of adaptation - The costs of damages in the sector of water are currently studied by the ACQWA project (expected outcomes by mid-2013). In the sector of transport, they are studied by the project WEATHER[54] and EWENT[55], and in the sector of Health by the project PESETA (updated in 2012) and CEHAPIS (results are expected for autumn 2012) - Adaptation of ecosystems are currently studied by the EcoSpace[56] project, and coastal technology options via the THESEUS project || - missing information on disaggregated and sectoral costs of inaction (direct damage costs and indirect costs due to disturbed/interrupted economic activities of system failures) - need of an elaboration on cost-sensitive climate triggers in all relevant sectors, a better assessment on the exposure of assets and economic activities, their projection and impacts of extreme events - need to better estimate the economic value of interdependencies between the different sectors - need to have a better knowledge of the impacts of some measures and policies on different sectors - need to evaluate adaptation costs and benefits and the costs of residual damages, and to take into account the changes in practices (e.g. CAP reform for the farmers) lack of information about the role of the financial flows in the insurance sector, the distribution of damage and repair costs between the different parties affected (focused research on coastal protection and monitoring activities recommended) || This issue is currently studied by THESEUS[57] (final results for Nov 2013) || Crosscutting issues The Commission staff working document also
mentions the need to develop multi-sectorial analysis. Presently some general
knowledge gaps have been identified, namely: i) Land use developments, ii)
Changes in demographic development, iii) Changes in technology and
technological development, iv) Economic developments, v) Migration developments.
With ESPON-CLIMATE[58] and PESETA some progress has been made to develop such
multi-sectorial analysis. However, still only a few sectors can be covered at
the same time. A major issue in this context is a lack of data availability
(e.g. soil characteristics not available for all regions and ecosystems,
cross-sectoral data). The CLIMSAVE project could help closing some gaps as it
develops linkages between key sectors under different climate and
socio-economic scenarios. 1.3.1.2. Option 1A: Developing a
common climate vulnerability assessment Currently several
climate vulnerability assessments have been or are carried out on the European
level. Often they use different SRES scenarios (e.g. the initial PESETA project
used the A2 and B2 SRES scenarios as references; more recently the FP6 CIRCE[59] project and the FP7 CLIMATECOST[60]
project used the A1B SRES scenario as reference; the FP6 ENSEMBLES[61] project even focused on an ad hoc non SRES stabilization scenario:
E1). More importantly they apply different models or combination of models. Efforts have been
undertaken by the Commission to use a consistent approach, initially based on
the PESETA – and now JRC PESETA II – project as a basis for its vulnerability
assessment. This approach has the merit of being the first attempt to provide a
comprehensive (multisector and EU wide) and integrated (internally consistent
and comparable) impact assessment exercise. Improving the
coordination of research efforts, the comparability of research methodologies
and outputs, and the consistency of policy messages is of utmost importance.
However, these goals are not achievable imposing the use of one single climate
scenario, one single social economic scenario, not to mention a single
evaluation tool. This is so because of the following reasons: Current activities,
such as the recent global initiative ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model
Intercomparison Project can already help achieve a better understanding of
differences between impact model results relevant globally and for Europe. Both scenarios and
models are continuously improved by a dedicated science community.
Proposing one standard would lock the current state-of-the-art, and might
hinder improvements and unconventional solutions. Moreover, different models
can be better suited to answer different sets of questions. Accordingly, it
would be important to exploit rather than limit this richness. Using a broader set
of scenarios, models and data sets allow quantifying and better communicating
the uncertainty. For example so called multi-model ensemble is used to sample
uncertainties in model formulation. Initial condition ensemble runs can be used
to estimate the uncertainty in the projections of future climate change due to
the incomplete knowledge of the present state of the climate system[62]. The different spatial resolution of these
assessments allows serving different specific purposes. This is particularly
relevant when adaptation is addressed, as different measures are effective at
very different spatial scales. The IPCC is currently
developing new scenarios for a possible use in its AR5[63]. Europe should link its assessment to this global work,
for scientific, but also for cost saving reasons. The 2009 White Paper already
stated that vulnerability should be assessed against a wide range of climate
scenarios and on different geographical scales to facilitate the definition of
adaptation measures. To improve the
comparability of results, in particular out of the future Horizon2020 EC funded
projects, the Commission could still prescribe which emissions scenarios shall
be used (based on the EU mitigation goals), but then leave flexibility in the
choice of the environmental, social economic impact assessment tools to apply.
In addition the Commission could mention good practice examples of such
assessments in the context of Climate-ADAPT. Finally, this
initiative might lead to the fact that some of the research groups not
following such a European approach might suffer from lack of funding. This
might hamper the development of alternative approaches. 1.3.1.3. Option
1B: Adopting a knowledge gap strategy This option would result in administrative
costs for the Commission, but mainly for Member States for collecting the
information e.g. via a questionnaire or dedicated meetings, analysing and
assessing the results, organising and hosting a working group (for instance
similar to the Working Group on Knowledge base created to favour discussions
among stakeholders and Member States when Climate-ADAPT was being prepared) and
writing a list of priorities. The administrative costs for Member States and
stakeholders would differ depending on the format the information is collected
(e.g. filling in a questionnaire is more time consuming than just writing an
informal letter) and the fragmentation of information available at Member
States level. For example if structures that coordinate research activities are
already in place, fewer efforts are necessary than in cases where various
research institutions have their own independent agenda and no overall
coordination exists. Regarding potential benefits, indirect
economic, social and environmental impacts exist in as much as prioritising
research activities can allow for filling knowledge gaps more quickly. No
quantitative evidence exists of such impacts but a survey among researchers and
research institutes showed that there is a widespread support for a higher
participation of stakeholders in European Research Area processes (where
Horizon 2020 is a part), mainly through dedicated working groups[64]. Falconi (1999)[65] identified several positive social impacts if priority setting in
research is done in a participatory mode. They refer to: -
the more efficient resource allocations
(reducing the risk of potential double funding) and allocating them in a more
transparent and unambiguous way, -
better achievement of a consensus of the
research agenda due to allowing different staff levels to participate in the
process as well as discussing a broader set of alternatives in a transparent
way, -
Strengthened credibility of an institution or
program and helps it to take a proactive role in soliciting government and
donor support for crucial areas to research. In January 2012 the European Commission
published the summary and analysis of the response to the ERA Framework Public
Consultation[66]: -
Joint Programming Initiatives and Alliances
between research institutes are considered appropriate mechanisms for
cross-border research. As climate change has wide-spread effects and can
potentially cause interdependencies between countries, this initiative will
most likely strengthen cross-border cooperation for issues of common interest. -
Lack of political commitment is considered to be
the major difficulty for transnationally coordinated research. The agreement on
common priorities by the European Commission and Member States in the field of
research on climate change adaptation could be seen as a way of increasing the
political commitment. -
Ensuring a closer cooperation and coordination
in policy development and implementation is considered to contribute to
reducing the research and innovation deficit and inefficiency in the EU. A more tangible benefit relates to a better
use of EU funds. There are currently examples of research streams being
conducted in parallel. Would a better coordination of research activities, at
EU and Member States level, have been in place, EU-funding could be better
rationalised. The results of the public consultation of
the EU Adaptation Strategy confirm enhanced support for research initiatives. When
asked which actions could improve the use of EU funding for projects,
respondents rated ‘coordination among research projects’ and ‘strengthening the
science-policy interface’ as having medium to high potential (55% and 81% of
respondents, respectively). Moreover, 76.4% of respondents agreed that
‘supporting pan-European discussion fora on adaptation to share experiences and
good practices’ would help to facilitate dissemination. However there is also the risk, that with
such a priority setting process certain issues will be overlooked (e.g. risk
exists that the priorities may concentrate too much on diagnosis and improving
the understanding without arriving at testable solutions). This risk can be
reduced due to the development of a list of key questions against the
priorities assessed. Further, knowledge gaps are closely correlated with
decision-making needs and adaptation governance. While research for climate
change had a strong focus on assessing vulnerabilities, a shift towards more
research activities on adaptation actions is already noticeable. When listing
knowledge gaps, it needs to be acknowledged that the compilation will need to
be regularly checked and updated reflecting demands for adaptation policy
processes. 1.3.1.4. Option
1C: Promoting interactions between Climate-ADAPT
and other services This initiative has a three-fold objective:
producing guidance on better linking climate-ADAPT to other relevant databases,
promoting the inclusion, when available, of the Copernicus Climate services under
Climate-ADAPT and ensuring the provision of more detailed information on
climate change adaptation at local level. Climate-ADAPT already experienced a very
high web use/traffic during and immediately after the launch, ranking high
compared to launches of other EEA products (see Figure 7). Figure 7: Main statistics for Climate-ADAPT for the
period 23 March – 23 August 2012 The costs to develop this guidance are
estimated to range between 50.000 and 100.000 euros for writing the guidance
and about 20 man days for one to two expert meetings[67]. The
wider economic benefits of this initiative is clearly depending on the extent
to which the guidance will be applied and therefore a quantification in
monetary terms is currently not possible. At this stage only the types of
benefits can be listed, namely: §
Avoided costs for data integration into
Climate-ADAPT at a later stage on an individual database level. This covers the
development of an integration approach, but also all technical works to ensure
interoperability (e.g. manual transformation of dataset, or the programming of
automatic software that converts the data). These cost savings would occur on
both the EEA side but also on the side of those who want to link to
Climate-ADAPT. §
Reduced costs for the end users in compiling and
processing data due to increased data availability (“one-stop-shop” principle).
For certain needs/policy requirements data from different sources might need to
be compiled and processed by the end user. However these policy needs might
occur several times across Europe and without interoperability each end user
has to develop its own solution. Interoperability at the EU scale might reduce
the need for singe solutions and might allow the development of a single tool
that can be used by different end users. The main benefits from a “one stop
shop” approach are an improvement of communication within the authority and
with the developers and better working relationships between the different
agencies. For the end user, it is a gage of efficiency and quality as it
increases the speed of access to information from validated sources and reduces
the need for matching information. (Department for Communities and Local
Government (2008) §
Reduced costs might also
occur due to better quality control of data in-put, more coherence as regards
input of data categories and improved user-friendliness. §
Guidance for database interfaces
makes the application development faster and easier and therefor cheaper. In the case of public funded databases all mentioned above will
allow a more efficient use of tax payers money. Using this guidance, there would be reduced
barriers between institutions (e.g. EEA and others) cooperating and better
collaborating. This might improve the working relationship as well as lead to a
better structured and coordinated information infrastructure for climate change
adaptation in Europe. Efficient sharing of data and methods is
vital on the track towards more comprehensive and reliable assessments in
environmental decision problems (Kokkonen, et al 2003). In addition, a second strand
of work would focus on ensuring that the information provided by Copernicus
Climate services, when available, is properly disseminated, in a pedagogical
manner, to potential users. The Copernicus (Global Monitoring for Environment
and Security) Climate Service will be based on satellite and in-situ monitoring
data, modelling of the entire Earth system, including model reanalysis and data
assimilation. Although not an adaptation option per se, additional data
availability, if properly disseminated, will facilitate adaptation policy
making. It will allow a better assessment of local vulnerabilities, and
therefore providing additional data for proper climate risk assessments. This
would have economic, social and environmental positive impacts, however yet
impossible to quantify. A third strand of work would
be dedicated to promoting specific efforts to ensure a better linkage with
adaptation at local level. The urban section of Climate-Adapt is currently
rather limited, but a stronger presentation of city-relevant material will be
provided following the conclusion of the Adaptation Strategies for European
Cities' project. This could potentially include increased functionality to
support networking or even “adaptation twinning” may be appropriate. ERDF
proposals under plans for future Cohesion Policy identify the intention for an
“urban development platform” with a focus on networking and knowledge exchange
on urban policy related to sustainable urban development. There is good
potential for this to be able to support exchange of experience on adaptation. The additional costs for this
option would be rather limited compared to the no-policy change scenario, as
the currently funded adaptation strategies for European cities already includes
in its core tasks the development of a platform. The additional work for
linking the two platforms would have to be assessed towards the completion date
of the project (mid-2013).Engagement with the platform by city stakeholders
would be entirely voluntary and therefore no direct fee for involvement.
However, there would likely be indirect costs, for staff time and travel to
engage via the platform and potentially in exchange visits, etc. Ultimately,
the platform would hope to encourage investment by city stakeholders in
adaptation activities in their local areas, but it is not possible to estimate
the range or scale of those indirect costs. 1.3.1.5. Option 1D: Supporting
exchange between science and policy in the field of adaptation What are Science-Policy Interfaces? Science-policy interfaces (SPIs), which aim
to bridge between the two actors, can be defined as “social processes which
encompass relations between scientists and other actors in the policy process,
and which allow for exchanges, co-evolution, and joint construction of
knowledge with the aim of enriching decision-making” . To achieve their aim,
SPIs use a range of tools to facilitate exchange such as publications, working
group meetings, conferences and web-based platforms that centrally house
knowledge and research material. SPIs can be found at all levels of government,
including the EU level. They often are sector-specific. At the EU level, a number
of SPIs already exist for the following sectors. A non-exhaustive list includes -
Agriculture and rural development: SEAMLESS
“System for Environmental and Agricultural Modelling, Linking European Science
and Society (www.seamless-ip.org) -
Biodiversity: Alter-net “A long-term
Biodiversity, Ecosystem and Awareness Research Network (www.alter-net.eu);
SPIRAL “Interfacing biodiversity and Policy” (www.spiral-project.eu); BISE
“Biodiversity Information System for Europe”. -
Transport: EPTS “European Platform of Transport
Sciences”; EFP “European Foresight Platform supporting forward looking decision
making (www.foresight-platform.eu) -
Water: SPI-Water “Science-Policy interfacing in
Water Management” (www.spi-water.eu); STREAM “Water research meets policy and
industry”; Step-Wise “Science, Technology and Policy using WIDE-RTD;
WaterDiss2.0 “Dissemination and uptake of FP water research results”
(www.waterdiss.eu); WISE “Water Information System for Europe”; Common
Implementation Strategy under the WFD -
PSI-Connect “Connecting Policy and Science
through Innovative Knowledge Brokering in the field of Water Management and
Climate Change”, -
Circle-2 “Climate Impact Research and Response
Coordination for a Larger Europe, -
Mediation “Methodology for Effective
Decision-making on Impacts and Adaptation”. In addition to the EU funded projects,
there are a large number of regional and national level initiatives taking
place (e.g. BaltCICA “Climate Change Impacts Costs and Adaptation in the Baltic
Sea Region, Knowledge Transfer Network from England covering many topics
including Industry, Energy, Environmental Sustainability etc.). Increasing interaction between scientists
and end users (policy makers, representatives, consumers) has the potential to
improve the critical evaluation and the integration of research findings,
clarify expectations of different stakeholders and SPIs provide a platform
where questions can be raised and positions clarified. For instance, the SPI
group for the Water Framework Directive carried out a prioritisation exercise
regarding research needs between 2010 and 2012 to support the work of the other
working and expert groups, leading to the identification of 59 priority
research areas and 180 specific research issues[68].
Another important outcome of science-policy interfaces is that they promote the
dissemination of already available research outputs to avoid repeating research
that has already been done. While there are some science-policy
interface (SPI) research projects and expert groups that include climate change
adaptation as one of the main fields to focus on, many SPIs have not yet taken
up the issues of climate change adaptation into their work. To remedy this, SPI
research projects could take two approaches: 1) they could include specific
work packages dedicated to climate change adaptation and 2) research projects
could “climate check” their results and recommendations ex-ante to identify
where climate change adaptation would be needed. As the intention of this initiative is to
piggy back on existing SPIs, the individual economic impact of including
climate change considerations into SPIs would be rather low. Extending existing
meetings could result in some additional costs of renting meetings rooms for
another half day but the impact would be low. The administrative burden would
therefore be limited. Incorporating adaptation into research projects is a more
costly option, although this depends on how it is included. An additional work
package under a FP7 project, for example, could increase a project’s budget by
an additional 50-100,000€ depending on the size; the additional costs would be
justified as the research outputs would be tangible and beneficial to the
climate change adaptation community. Increasing interaction between scientists
and end users (policy makers, representatives, consumers) has the potential to
improve the critical evaluation and the integration of research findings,
clarify expectations of different stakeholders and SPIs provide a platform
where questions can be raised and positions clarified (Totlandsdal, A., et al,
2007). The benefits of SPIs rest on how often stakeholders meeting and the
proper dissemination of research materials. For example, the development of the
AIRNET Thematic Network (SPI on air pollution) was found to have facilitated
the development of new networks within and across the various scientific
disciplines and policy-makers by establishing sub working groups, publishing
papers including non-technical summaries and organising meetings (ibid). SPI working groups can also help to better
structure future research needs. The SPI group for the Water Framework
Directive carried out a prioritisation exercise regarding research needs
between 2010 and 2012 to support the work of the other working and expert
groups in the CIS process of the WFD. This exercise brought together 150
participants from 15 MS, of with 35% were from the scientific community and 65%
from the WFD “end-users”, leading to the identification of 59 priority research
areas and 180 specific research issues . Another important outcome of
science-policy interfaces is that they promote the dissemination of already
available research outputs to avoid repeating research that has already been
done. Under the mandate of the SPI for the implementation of the WFD, the group
carried out an inventory of knowledge related to the topics initially
prioritised. Scientific research projects can occur in isolation of other
projects, so SPIs can bring together the experiences and knowledge to other
researchers and policy-makers to ensure that research is better taken up and
not “forgotten”. 1.3.1.6. Option 1E: Proposal for
mandatory set up of national adaptation platforms In addition to the initiatives presented
above, this initiative also considers the request for Member States to develop
national adaptation platforms. Seven Member States (AT, DE, DK, FI, FR,
and NL, UK) have already developed national adaptation platforms. Existing
portals are already web-linked to Climate-ADAPT and it is expected that the new
ones would do the same. National adaptation platforms have a clear
benefit in bringing together national information and providing it together
with guidance for national, regional and local planners. In cases where
national platforms already provide IT-based analytical tools or databases for
impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessment, benefits could result from the
fact that climate change information is taken into account at an early stage of
the planning process. Such platforms on the national level can also avoid
competition and duplication of efforts and enhance complementarities between
the various systems. This is in particular an important issue in countries with
decentralised research activities or federal structures. In the Nordic
countries the development of national platforms was driven by the fact that
apart from projects and networks, very little cooperation has taken place
between national authorities due to the lack of an identified focal point for
climate change adaptation[69]..Such platforms could strengthen
national cooperation. Finally the information can be made available in the
national language and therefore reach a broader range of stakeholders. Such platforms are costly to develop and
financial and administrative barriers may hamper their effective development.
One of the reasons for developing Climate-ADAPT was the lack of financial
resources in Member States[70]. Another crucial issue is the agreement on common quality standards
across MS and ensuring that the national and EU level information is following
them. The request from the EU to develop such platforms may therefore not be
sufficient to ensure their effective implementation. 1.3.2. Likely impacts of policy initiatives aiming at increasing the resilience of the EU territory 1.3.2.1. No policy change Although most Member States are to some
extent active in terms of adaptation, as of January 2013, almost half of Member
States have not yet adopted an adaptation strategy. Without additional action,
the barriers currently preventing national, regional or local authorities from
developing their own adaptation strategies are likely to remain in place, be it
in terms of human or financial resources. Yet, such adaptation strategies will
likely vary in terms of scope, level of ambition and agreed financing of
adaptation measures. Also the timeframe for adaptation will differ. Some
countries might develop sectoral approaches only, covering only certain
sectors, others might include adaptation in existing management plans such as
biomass action plan, sustainable development plans, etc.) The persistent financial and economic
crisis makes it difficult to confer necessary financial resources to developing
adaptation strategies. This may be in particular the case in Southern and
Central European Countries with high sovereign debt. In most cases these
counties are very likely to face significant impacts of human induced climate
change earlier than elsewhere in Europe. From among these countries; Cyprus,
Greece, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania appear to not have started yet the
development of a comprehensive adaptation strategy; whereas Italy, Slovakia and
Czech Republic are expected to finalise planning processes in 2013 or later in
the next year (s) (Venturini et al, in press[71]).
Other countries may need to significantly revise their existing adaptation
strategies to account for the fast growing body of evidence about the likely
impacts of climate change. Such a decentralised approach would
increase already existing disparities within the EU with respect to the
potential vulnerabilities to climate change. Communities, regions will develop
their own approaches, leading to a heterogeneous pattern of adaptation efforts.
This might lead to greater economic, social and territorial disparities
counteracting with the community objectives on cohesion. Trans-boundary issues will remain a gap in
most of the strategies. Trans-boundary issues are more complex than issues
mainly affecting national and sub-national issues because procedures, laws,
etc. might vary from country to country. A lack of coordination on
trans-boundary issues could potentially lead to conflicting adaptation
responses and would not provide for an effective approach to tackle common
risks. Under the no policy change scenario, mainly the water sector would
develop transboundary cooperation further as the legal framework and the
existing efforts would further be strengthened. Adaptation therefore would be
further included in the river basin management plans. It is difficult to estimate what these
developments would mean in terms of social, environmental and economic impacts,
but the following examples illustrate that better preparedness can reduce
damage costs and that impacts are often cross-border. -
During the summer 2010, mean temperatures were
between 4 and 8°C above normal during July and the two first weeks of August in
Western Russia and Eastern Europe. It was the most extreme heat wave in the
instrumental record of 1880-present for that region. The extreme heat and the
absence of rain led to the worst drought conditions in more than 100 years and
also to the worst wildfires in decades. Munich Re estimated 56,000 people died
from the effects of this heat wave. This heat wave also led indirectly to an
increase in the price of staple goods like pasta and bread all over Europe
because Russia’s wheat crops failed . -
In November 2005, Western Europe was hit by an
ice storm which causes the death of 2 persons in Belgium, 800 km of traffic jam
in the Netherlands and a train derailment in Scotland. It also broke 70
transmission towers and prevented 200.000 people from electricity for four days
for some of them in Germany. In France, 20.000 people were out of electricity
and many roads were blocked (Broström and. Söder, 2007;
Météo World, 2005). -
In February 2010, the storm Xynthia hit the
French Atlantic coast. Its combination with the high tide and large waves
caused the fail of flood defenses, which led to the flooding of more than 50
000 ha. 53 people died because of the storm itself or the flooding and the cost
of the damages is estimated around 2.5 billion €. Infrastructures and tourism
also suffered from the storm but the cost is hard to estimate. Many flood
defenses that failed presented maintenance delay partly because maintenance
responsibility was not always clear. In term of management, population warning
should have been improved. People were aware about the risks of wind burst but
the information about flooding was not clear enough and thus people were not
prepared to it. (Slomp, et all, 2010). -
Major funding has also been put into increasing
the capacity to combat forest fires in Europe. For example, Italy has Europe’s
largest fleet of aircraft and helicopters, and has on several occasions loaned
out its planes to France and Spain. The high level of preparedness requires
significant resources, but has shown good results: the year 2000 saw 6,600
fires destroy 58,000 hectares of forest, while almost the same number of fires
in 2006 only destroyed 16,000 hectares (Swedish Commission on Climate and
Vulnerability, 2007). 1.3.2.2. Option 2A: EU guidelines for
adaptation policies Description of
the option The guidance aims to support EU countries
with national adaptation policy processes. It intends to provide a framework
for generating the information needed to prepare, implement and evaluate a
national adaptation policy. It shall foster a common understanding of key
aspects relevant to any adaptation process and provides clear terms of references. Thus, it aims to deliver a
common basis for cooperative adaptation activities between different actors/stakeholders
concerned with climate change which deems necessary to avoid conflicts and make
use of existing synergies. Although there is no “one-size-fits-all”
framework for adaptation in place, certain aspects of good adaptation are in
common. The guidance shall highlight these key issues to give direction on how successful
adaptation policy processes should be carried out. In addition, it will present
various adaptation approaches as good practice examples taken by European
countries in order to foster knowledge transfer and lessons learnt. To allow
wide uptake of the guidance among European policy and decision makers, a
pragmatic approach for adaptation will be presented. Taking into account that a number of
European countries have their national adaptation strategies and action plans
already in place, the guidance also puts emphasis on providing support for the
implementation and monitoring and evaluation stage as well as on showing how
the EU can support national adaptation processes. Further, it provides the link
to activities carried out in the area of disaster risk reduction (DRR). "real-world” policy making is not a
linear step-by-step process, but is rather characterized by process development
phases that are closely interlinked and influencing each other. This mirrors
the understanding that adaptation policy making at national level is to be seen
as a process that is not finalised with having a national adaptation strategy
and/or action plan in place. Moreover, adaptation decisions set out in an
adaptation strategy and/or action plan should be periodically re-considered
taking account of emerging knowledge, changing risks and new policies. This can
apply to issues of all phases that could need to be adjusted over time when
implementing an adaptation policy. Assessment of the option The development of the guidance for
national adaptation policies takes stock of on-going adaptation activities in
EU Member States and beyond, draws on lessons learnt and experiences and
specific exchange with stakeholders on certain issues of common interest. Linking to the above mentioned
understanding of adaptation policy making at national level as a process,
recommendations presented are relevant for all EU Member States, independent
from their state of adaptation efforts. Those countries, which already have a
National Adaptation Strategy in place, will be finding information on how to
tackle implementation challenges (e.g. such as financing, assigning clear
responsibilities) and setting up appropriate mechanisms for monitoring and
evaluation. Member States further advanced with adaptation might be already in
the stage to learn from the implementation (e.g. FI) and start revising their
adaptation strategy accordingly. This might be opening up key issues to
re-consider throughout all phases of the policy process where the guidance
provides recommendations (e.g. one conclusion could be that there is a need to
involve more stakeholders by setting up a broader stakeholder process; another
conclusion might be that with evolving adaptation knowledge more and/or
different adaptation responses might be needed). Other countries, which are
still in the course of developing a national adaptation policy, will get
support for current “state-of-the-art” key issues and the given examples to
consider when preparing the ground for adaptation and policy development. Thus, the guidance will allow all Member
States to prepare, implement and evaluate their adaptation policy in a
cost-effective way as they will find detailed information on the process of
adaptation as well as on methods and tools for reaching good adaptation.
Practical examples on adaptation across Europe included in the guidance for all
phases of the adaptation process strengthen the share of expertise and good
practice. Compiling a set of recommendations for all phases of an adaptation
process will also help to avoid “re-inventing the wheel”, learn from (good and
bad) practices, exchange on potential barriers and how to tackle them. Tacking
stock of “state-of-the-art” adaptation knowledge and giving comprehensive
recommendations for key issues to consider reduce time and resource intensive
efforts that each Member State would have to invest otherwise to gather all
relevant information. It became clear from the workshops organised with Member
States to exchange on national adaptation policy processes that all face
similar barriers and learning from each other can substantially reduce
individual efforts and thus costs. Even only getting to know about activities
and approaches addressing issues of common concern reduces time and financial
efforts needed for single Member States. However, highlighting key issues and
presenting various tools to approach them in the guidance cannot substitute personal
exchange of knowledge and experience. Nevertheless, making use of the guidance
will better inform policy makers about promising approaches throughout the
policy process, where to find useful information and whom to contact for
further details, based on the examples or references given. Cost savings for
each Member State are thus mainly to be expected by proving a comprehensive
compilation of all issues needed to be addressed for national adaptation policy
making complemented with various tools and information sources.. Furthermore, if recommendations from the
guidance are taken up by Member States to develop, implement and evaluate
national adaptation policies cost-efficiency can also be expected by addressing
negative impacts from climate change before they even occur (cf. examples under
the “no policy change” scenario). Preparing for a range of risks that are to be
anticipated with climatic changes and developing preventive response actions
will increase coping capacity and reduce potential damage costs. The more
detailed a national adaptation policy is being developed considering a broad
variety of key issues as highlighted in the guidance, the better a Member State
is prepared for future challenges due to climate change. Furthermore, more
efforts invested in a comprehensive adaptation policy will ease the
implementation thereof and prepare all necessary mechanisms for monitoring and
evaluation in advance, thus reducing costs at a later stage of the policy
process. Cost-efficiency can also be expected to be
increased by sharing financial burdens of implementing adaptation measures as
joint activities in a cross-border context. Giving advice on linking adaptation efforts
better to Disaster Risk Reduction will furthermore facilitate joint activities
with natural hazard management and thus share financial efforts for preventive
approaches to extreme events. The above highlighted cost savings for
Member States and potentially further stakeholders that make use of the
guidance clearly outweighs the investment to develop the guidance, which is
estimated to be between 50.000 and 90.000 Euros[72]: In terms of social implications, the guidance
can assist in enhancing the preparedness of Member States and the adaptive
capacity of society, especially of those population groups that are most
affected. Assuming that suggestions in the guidance would be followed by Member
States, large-scale impacts caused e.g. through extreme events such as heat
waves that would highly affect vulnerable groups (e.g. children, elderly) can
be reduced or even avoided. Social issues can be best tackled by involving
stakeholders from all potential affected population groups throughout the
adaptation policy development process. Taking into account recommendations from
the guidance for stakeholder involvement can thus ensure that no potential
risks will be overlooked and social implications of climate change are dealt
with in a preventive manner. Further, potential political conflicts over
un-coordinated responses could be prevented when mechanisms are established to
engage in cross-border cooperation. Exchange of good practices in dealing with
climate change impacts would be fostered and brought to attention to a larger
community. Emerging themes such as awareness raising and climate change adaptation
communication are important to all Member States when it comes to taking up the
national responsibility for enhancing adaptive capacity, especially for those
population groups that are socially deprived. Environmental impacts of providing guidance
for national adaptation policy processes and thus following common approaches
are to be expected merely positive. By introducing a comprehensive process when
setting up a national adaptation policy a variety of environmental issues need
to be assessed. Climate change as a cross-cutting issue unfolds various effects
on a number of environmental systems (such as water, soil, biodiversity).
Through dealing with all those issues an integrative manner, thus ensuring that
cross-cutting issues and interdependencies are thoroughly assessed and
developing appropriate adaptation responses it can be assumed that this would
long-term enhance the adaptive capacity of environmental systems. As an outcome of the public consultation
for the EU Adaptation Strategy respondents felt that ‘guidance on developing
national adaptation strategies’ would have the most value added (60.25%) when
asked to select which type of instruments would bring the most added-value in
national adaptation strategies. Further 63.35% of replies considered that ‘Enhance awareness and develop guidance on the transboundary adverse
effects of climate change’ was an action EU should consider. However, this
option was less often chosen compared to ‘Facilitating
cooperation among countries’ and ‘providing EU funding
to address transboundary adverse effects of climate change’ (respectively
82.61% and 76.4% of the answers). This underlines, inter alia, that guidance
can provide an important framework for national adaptation policy making but
does not substitute additional exchange of knowledge and experiences on a
personal basis. Representatives from Member States also
widely agreed that the development of guidance for national adaptation policy
making would be of added value. They suggested that the guidance should
be generic to cover differences among Member States (e.g. different governance
structures) but also specific in providing tools and recommendations. The
guidance document should also provide support to the process of setting up
national adaptation policies but also on key issues to be considered when
implementing and monitoring/evaluating. The proposed structure of the guidance
document (cf. explanations above) and the presentation of good practice
examples across Europe were broadly welcomed. 1.3.2.3. Option 2B: Using Life+
funding for supporting the preparation of adaptation strategies and for lighthouse
projects on adaptation Article 15(c) of the Commission's proposal
for a Regulation on the establishment of a Programme for the Environment and
Climate Action (LIFE) includes among objectives of the climate action
sub-programme the development of adaptation strategies and action plans at
local, regional or national level. It offers the possibility to develop a
proposal that involves knowledge transfer and capacity building across Member
States. Building upon experience and knowledge from other countries where comprehensive adaptation strategies have
already been adopted and are being implemented can reduce the time and
resources needed. Staff exchange schemes are beneficial both for outgoing- and
incoming partner institutions. Projects under this scheme can contribute to
building new or strengthen existing networks and collaborations between Member
States and associated countries and other third countries. This will be associated with some
administrative costs, which may be reduced by creating a roster of experts with
required competences. The development of such a roster is eligible under
activities listed under the Article 22 of the proposed LIFE 2014-2020
regulation. Past experiences from the staff exchange schemes in other fields
such as the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, the International
Research Staff Exchange Scheme, and Twinning projects show high added value in
terms of achieved outcomes, best practices sharing, and networking (EC 2011,
CEI 2011) . The eligibility of the LIFE funding for the
development of adaptation strategies and action plans can include obligation to
apply good practices and guidance; cover all important sectors and ensure
compatibility with the EU environmental policies; and foster transnational
collaboration and cooperative problem solving. The Commission proposal for a Regulation on
the establishment of a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE;
EC, 2011u) encourages projects sets to develop, testing and demonstrate policy
or management approaches, best practices, and solutions, for climate change
adaptation in, but not limited to, transboundary areas (Art. 15a).
Demonstration, pilot or lighthouse projects are a common form of best practice
development/sharing and exploration of innovative solutions to intricate
problems. The development of such lighthouse
cross-sectoral and cross-border projects can also make use of a new innovation
in the proposed Regulation, namely integrated projects (IP). A typical IP would
receive funding from several sources – Community, public and private – not only
the LIFE programme. The IP are best suited to serve as demonstration
(lighthouse) projects, even if major break-through may be sometimes achieved in
smaller projects. The IP will operate on a large regional or sub-regional scale
or cross-sector manner. These projects could be tackling pressing issues of
mutual concern in many EU countries and develop innovative solutions. Among the topics that are suitable for
lighthouse projects, the following ones have been identified as particularly
relevant to address climate change adaptation issues. These suggestions are
notably based on the identification of knowledge gaps discussed above. -
Cross-border management of floods: The funded project should foster collaborative agreements based on
the EU Floods Directive and the UNECE Model Provisions on Transboundary Flood
Management. The assessment results should provide input into the envisaged
European Flood Impact Database currently explored by the European Environmental
Agency. Best practice example from the deployment of market based instruments
to reduce or transfer risk could be developed. -
Trans-boundary coastal management: The funded projects should improve risk and vulnerability
assessment and projections of future coastal change due to climate and other
drivers, building upon the existing field observations, models and pilot
experiments. Interdisciplinary research is required to analyse complex
natural-human sub-system interactions. Emphasis should be given to vulnerable
and densely populated deltas and coastal cities. As several project for the
Baltic and North Sea region exist, the focus should be on other regions.
In-depth assessment of coastal adaptation options and knowledge/experience
sharing should be promoted across the coastal regions[73]. -
Key infrastructure protection: The funded projects should explore alternative diagnostic
stress-test approaches that identify conditions which may lead to a failure or
disruption of key infrastructure systems and explore a combination of hazards
that may produce such conditions. Innovative risk and vulnerability assessment
methods should draw on the recent advancement in disaster economics and take
into account the full social welfare impacts of critical infrastructure
failure. The projects should typically focus on a combination of critical
infrastructures, including transnational and Pan-European transportation
corridors, water and energy networks, information and communication systems,
government services, banking and finance, health structures, food supply, and
ecological and social networks whose disruption may lead to significant effects
on vital social function, health, safety, security, economic or social
well-being of people. The project could inform the European Programme for
Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), the Directive 2008/114/EC, and the
EU Strategy for Integrated European Infrastructures. -
Adaptation to climate change in urban areas: The transfer of experiences from “early adapters” to other cities
can be greatly facilitated by LIFE+ Lighthouse projects, the more so if
cross-border co-operations between urban authorities is encouraged and cities
are supported in their attempts to elaborate shared adaptation strategies that
should include ecosystem services of urban green and blue areas, exchange
experiences and build commitment for sustainable adaptation strategies. The
funded projects may encourage knowledge and experience sharing in the areas of
risk and vulnerability assessment and implementation of pilot adaptation
measures, mainstreaming of adaptation planning into urban land use planning,
building layouts, public procurement practices, natural resources management
(green areas, water and wastewater management, improvement of air quality), and
disaster risk reduction. Good practice examples should comprise both strategic
approaches to assessment and implementation, including innovative strategies
for conservation of green areas from urbanization and planning and
implementation of innovative solutions, including, inter alia, the maximization
of urban ecosystem services and the creation of win-win solutions with regards
to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. -
Forest management:
The funded projects should elaborate ways and approaches to mainstream
adaptation to climate change into forest management considering the aspects set
by the new forest strategy. The project should include different objectives of
forest management (e.g. timber production, protection, nature conservation) and
should bring together different types of forest owns (private and public). Furthermore,
the projects should overcome barriers in the integrated assessment research to
advance analysis on forest fires particularly in the Mediterranean. The economic costs and benefits of the lighthouse
projects depend on the size and number of the projects and whether a critical
mass for a significant change will be established. It has been proposed that
the IPs should be equipped with substantial contribution from the LIFE
programme. Medhurst et al. (2011) suggested that the average budged of the
projects should be around 13 million Euros and the IPs should account for at
least 50% of the expenditure. Thus one may deduce that around 5 IPs of the
above size may be funded annually in the Climate Action sub-programme alone. 1.3.2.4. Option 2C: Commission's
proposal on the adoption of adaptation strategies for all Member States by 2017 Developing a comprehensive Adaptation
Strategy needs commitment. Its drafting alone entails efforts estimated as
follows: some three full-time employees on average over the course of two years
or more, supported by consultants, depending on the level of ambition of the vulnerability
and risk assessments conducted. Total costs depend on how detailed the
adaptation strategy/action plan is, how many sectors are addressed, whether
concrete actions are specified or not and the number of conducted stakeholder
consultations. Experience in the EU Member States and regions puts the cost of
developing an adaptation strategy between 1 million euro and 48 million euro,
depending on the number of studies commissioned, modelling done, etc. Based on the scope of existing strategies
and their estimated cost by Member States, rough cost estimates suggest that
around €3 million would be needed for the development of an adaptation
strategy in line with the considered EU guidelines (option 2A, assessed
above), not counting the elaboration of implementation action plans where these
are not included already in the adaptation strategies. The cost implications
for those Member States who need to revise their adaptation strategies will not
be higher than €3 million. Although not easily quantifiable, there are
benefits to be expected from the adoption of an adaptation strategy, whose type
relates to the ones described in detail in the assessment of policy option
2A – guidelines on preparing adaptation strategies. The extent of the
benefits would however vary. The main advantage in an additional stimulus is in
the use of the suggestions made in the guidelines, which would translate in a
consistent and comprehensive treatment of climate change adaptation
considerations by 2020 in all Member States, taking account of local and
sectoral differences. It would also ensure an adequate coverage
of transboundary issues, currently overlooked. Cost-efficiency will be
increased by sharing financial burdens of implementing adaptation measures as
joint activities in a cross-border context. Furthermore, large-scale impacts
causes e.g. through extreme events that would highly affect low-income groups
can be reduced or even avoided. Further, potential un-coordinated responses
could be avoided. Exchange of good practices in dealing with climate change
impacts will be fostered. An inclusion of transboundary considerations in all
adaptation strategies would enhance in the long-term the adaptive capacity of
environmental systems, in particular with regard to water, biodiversity and
soil. Without a
systematic overview of climate risks – which needs to be regularly adapted as
more knowledge is obtained –the impacts of climate change will likely be
addressed mostly reactively and randomly, which would be significantly more costly
than considering, in an orderly way, whether and how public authorities, the
private sector and citizens should adapt. Moreover, this would prevent some of
the negative impacts identified under the baseline scenario from unfolding and
avoid the greater costs of inaction. Option 2C – Commission's proposal on the
adoption of national adaptation strategies is
composed of three alternative approaches. The effectiveness, efficiency, and
coherence of the three approaches – no legal requirement, legislation later,
and legislation now – must be considered in conjunction with the implementation
of option 2A – guidelines and option 2B – presented above. In that respect, the
positive impacts to be expected from option 2C mainly relate to the stimulus
that the Commission would give for actions at national level. The non-legal approach is a
continuation of the approach presented in the 2009 White Paper. The additional
effectiveness of this approach, compared to implementing options 2A and 2B
alone, is expected to be small. Therefore, if the guidelines plus the
availability of Life+ funding opportunities are not enough to provide the
necessary political visibility to climate change adaptation, there is no
guarantee that the second objective of the Strategy will be met. However, it
would be uncontroversial, from a Member State's perspective. Legislation later will give Member States the chance to make use of the guidelines
and of LIFE+ funding in designing their adaptation strategy would be more
acceptable than a 'legislation now' scenario by Member States reluctant to EU
legislation on this issue. It would also provide additional political
incentives for adaptation action, in particular to speed up the process in
those Member States that are currently undertaking climate change adaptation
action. The risk is that for those Member States who have not started any
action on adaptation, the political incentive would be insufficient to
undertake adaptation action now, de facto delaying the necessary action to meet
the objectives of the Strategy to beyond 2017. Combining a legislative proposal now
with the adoption of the guidelines and the availability of Life+ funding
opportunities could increase the likelihood that all Member States have
developed an adaptation strategy by 2017, thus raising coherence of EU action
and bringing Member States to a similar pace. The Commission could help deal
with some of the compliance costs for Member States by providing funding
opportunities and the necessary framework for experience transfer and capacity
building. However, some
of the Member States which have already an
Adaptation Strategy have expressed their opposition to the use of a
legal instrument, arguing that legislative approaches would be premature, given
that Member States are already in the process of developing programmes of work,
and putting in place domestic programmes of action. This is also true for a
minority of Member States which have not adopted an adaptation strategy and for
a large part of the stakeholders that have answered the public consultation.
Conversely, a large majority of environmental NGOs who answered the
public consultation support a legislative proposal. 1.3.2.5. Option 2D: Promoting the UNISDR
“Making Cities Resilient” cities campaign The “Making Cities Resilient” campaign is
one opportunity for cities to be encouraged to take their own actions in
adaptation and urban resilience, and to take advantage of networks and
partnerships which are appropriate to their political character and context.
This campaign’s focus on disaster risk reduction brings both advantages and
disadvantages in relation to building urban adaptation specifically. The
advantage is that adaptation is mainstreamed into the broader disaster risk
reduction field, and so disaster risk reduction policy, tools and networks can
potentially be adapted to address climate impacts. The disadvantage is that
some of the unique challenges and characteristics of climate change adaptation
may be diluted or overlooked within this broader context. For example, the need
to plan on longer timescales and for the potential of larger, more extreme
climate change events will likely be underplayed in a disaster risk reduction
context. Currently, 1067 cities worldwide are signed up and involved, including
around 330 from the EU27 (most of it from Austria). All
participants to the “Making Cities Resilient” campaign are expected to be self-supporting as they organize awareness-raising events,
convene meetings and engage in planning on campaign objectives. So there will
be a cost to city stakeholders who engage in the campaign. It is not possible
to put exact figures on this since the cost will be determined by the actions
that each individual city chooses to take. The wider
economic benefits of this initiative are in terms of stimulating adaptation and
disaster risk reduction planning at city level, which while it may require some
investment in the short term, should result in the avoidance of much larger
damage costs in the future, when extreme weather events are experienced. In
addition, sharing of good practice and engagement in the international network
could drive innovation in urban adaptation measures across a broad spectrum of
sectors, potentially supporting creation of jobs and increasing EU market share
in adaptation technologies. There will be opportunity costs as staff devoting
more time to campaign activities and other work is not undertaken. There are
multiple potential social benefits associated with participation in
international networks and campaigns. These include individual, collective and
organisational learning, leading to changes in organisational practices and
culture, improvements in managerial styles, better communication and
co-ordination. The opportunity to exchange learning experiences between cities
might result in more efficient adaptation decision-making at city level. The potential
risks relate to the absence of budget for this initiative. In that respect,
there could be a low level of up-take by EU cities unwilling to
commit budget to additional activities. In addition, a signature of commitment
to the campaign is not a guarantee that cities will be actively involved or
that their activities will result in enhanced climate resilience. From an EU
perspective, there is also a potential lack of control over direction of
independent UN campaigns to support EU policy priorities directly. Finally, the
campaign is only scheduled to last until 2015, although UNSIDR expects to go
beyond that date. It could thus create some uncertainties on the possibility to
use this campaign for the duration of the EU Adaptation Strategy. 1.3.2.6. Option 2E: Inclusion of
adaptation into the Covenant of Mayors Framework Background Following the Adoption of the EU Climate
and Energy package in 2008, the Covenant of Mayor was set up to support the
efforts of local authorities in the implementation of sustainable climate and
energy policies. Since
then, this initiative has met large international success: 2,108 cities from 41
countries had signed political commitments by November 2012. The database
"benchmarks of excellence" is a repository of solutions implemented
at local level available via the web. In many cases, mitigation goes hand in
hand with adaptation and needs to be coordinated at local levels. Including adaptation
to the Covenant framework underlines the interlinkage between the two lines of
actions and helps to increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of
integrated climate action. The approach of ensuring voluntary, local
political commitment for EU policy objectives was replicated in two other
cases: i/ enlargement of the approach to cities in the Eastern Partnership and
Central Asia; ii/ the Green Digital Charter commits cities to work together to
deliver on the EU climate objectives using digital technologies. Both projects
are linked to the Covenant of Mayors, as the same partners are in charge of
implementation. They are implemented through separate service contracts. Implementing
climate adaptation related actions alongside existing initiatives can help meet
the objectives and reach cost-effectiveness. For example, in the UK, the
Nottingham Declaration[74] was successfully extended from covering only climate mitigation to
include adaptation, and then further developed to provide action packs and
supporting guidance. Discussion This
initiative aims at launching a new voluntary commitment for cities to adopt
local adaptation strategies as well as to inform about their implementation. In
order to offer operational support to such a commitment funding from the
European Commission needs to be provided to an office to administrate and steer
the initiative. This has been estimated at around 500.000 Euro a year, plus
additional 200.000 Euro for the bottom-up design process of the initiative and
promotional activities. In addition, initial funds to design and set up
the support package including a monitoring and evaluation mechanism will be
needed. The new commitment will be purely
voluntary. Hence the adhesion is fully free of charge for the cities; however there are costs to cities to follow up on pledges they sign up for.
Using evidence from the DG CLIMA study on Adaptation Strategies for European
Cities[75], completing an initial pledge to move one step
further with adaptation in their city cost an average of €50,000, which was based on a daily average cost of €500 for 40 days for the cities time plus on potential consultancy
costs of €27.200. However, numerous studies have proven
the cost of inaction to exceed the cost of action. Furthermore, urban
adaptation - if done well – forms part of integrated urban development and
supports the upgrading of the urban fabrique. Given the important role
cities have to play in increasing Europe’s resilience to climate change, the
positive economic impacts would stem from ensuring cities are still a good
place to live if not a better place to live, like wise invest and ensure
economic growth. Stimulating adaptation planning at city level
requires some investment in the short term, but will result in the avoidance of
much larger damage costs in the future, when extreme weather events are
experienced. Cities that are signed up to the revised pledge should
ensure greater sustainability of action than those going alone, so longevity of
action should have increasing postive economic impacts. There are
multiple potential social benefits associated with participation in
international networks and campaigns. These include individual, collective and
organisational learning, leading to changes in organisational practices and
culture, improvements in managerial styles, better communication and
co-ordination. The opportunity to exchange learning experiences between cities
might result in more efficient adaptation decision-making at city level. The
facilitation of peer-to-peer learning will enhance the necessary skills for the
successful implementation of international frameworks in the local setting and
sharing of good practice can lead to improvements in the quality and
performance of decision-making. However, in practice, engagement in initiatives,
provision of tools and guidance, or city exchanges do not automatically lead to
their intended outcomes due to outside factors that cannot be controlled. The
potential impact of this initiative on adaptation being incorporated into urban
governance and decision-making is not guaranteed. The initiative would support
job creation to deliver the adaptation pledge by the cities as well as
additional jobs in the supporting office. In the longer term, the
initiative should have positive environmental benefits since training and
toolkit align with principles of sustainable urbanisation and the supports and links to mitigation action will help further reducing CO2
emissions. A risk is on
the delivery side, as the signature to the pledge is voluntary and does
guarantee that cities will actually invest and implement in additional
activities and that urban adaptation will be enhanced. However, the
effectiveness of the Covenant of Mayors' model has already been assessed when
it comes to the greenhouse gas mitigation objectives. From an analysis of a
sample of commitments, it is expected that the Covenant Signatories will reduce
their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 28% by 2020, well in line with the
objective of the Signatories which aim at reducing emissions by more than 20%
by 2020. This confirms the potential effectiveness of such an instrument. 1.3.3. Likely impacts of policy
initiatives aiming at increasing the resilience in
key vulnerable sectors 1.3.3.1. No policy change To allow synergies and
decrease the costs of adaptation, the EU has already recognized the need to
foster mainstreaming into all EU sectoral policies
Mainstreaming adaptation at EU level has so far benefitted from two strands of
initiatives: the initiatives dealing with the implementation phase of the 2009
White Paper, and the Commission's proposal for the next Multi-Annual Financial
Framework. Regarding
the former, the implementation phase of the White Paper can be considered as
successful. Most actions have been implemented and in some cases, EU
initiatives went beyond the White Paper's recommendations (see Annex 1.4.1 for
details). Yet, among the number of EU policies that are or will gradually be
affected by the adverse effects of climate change, some still do not
sufficiently take into consideration the need to adapt to those negative
effects. Moreover, in some cases (e.g. energy policy),
a lot of attention has been paid to the greenhouse gas mitigation objectives
while not necessarily integrating in the EU policy discussion on vulnerability
to climate change or adaptation options to reduce vulnerability.In addition, in
many sectors, adaptation considerations have been addressed on ad hoc basis,
and insufficient attention has been given to the implementing measures
accompanying broad policy objectives. In particular, clear
requirements in the CAP and Cohesion Policy proposals allow for serious
consideration of climate change impacts in Cohesion Policy and Common
Agricultural Policy for 2014-2020. At the same time, these requirements are
flexible in nature, and allow for a great deal of interpretation by both the
Member States and the Commission in their practical implementation. Without further EU
action, mainstreaming adaptation would simply mean for Commission initiatives
to address in their related Impact Assessment the potential impacts of climate
change on the effectiveness of the initiative. It would also mean that no steer
would be given on the priority initiatives that would require ambitious and/or
immedtiate mainstreaming. The mainstreaming of adaptation in national policies
would also be hampered for those policies directly affected by policy
intervention at EU level. The European Union is a major
investor in public infrastructure projects. European, investment-based development
policies such as EU cohesion policy, TEN-T and TEN-E, help overcoming gaps in
infrastructure needs, especially in Convergence regions. Combining several EU
sources, it is estimated that some EUR 400 billion have been invested in the
TEN-T network projects since 1986 – almost a third coming from EU sources, much
of it from the Cohesion Fund.[76] Due to the long life spans of
infrastructure and their great economic value, their preparedness for current
and future impacts of climate change is critical. Hence, an assessment of a
project's risk-exposure and vulnerability to climate change impacts is vital to
guarantee its long-term sustainability. Accordingly, for some EU policy areas,
climate resilience has already been taken up as a parameter in obligatory cost-benefit
analyses during the project development phase.[77] However, there is no common
requirement to do so. There is also no common methodology or guidelines in
place which could help project promoters to systematically assess the climate
resilience of infrastructure projects and improve their sustainability and
liability in changing climate conditions. Evidence[78] also
suggests that there is a certain lack of awareness of project promoters for
climate issues and insufficient knowlegde on how to conduct the climate
resilience checks for projects, especially private sector-driven projects. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Directive[79]requires that Member States ensure that, before development consent
is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by
virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject
to an assessment of the environmental effects. Climate change may affect all
major developments subject to EIA but the EIA Directive does not explicitly
address the future climatic pressures and impacts. Additional guidance is under
way, and the EIA Directive is under revision and clearer provisions relevant
for climate change are likely to be proposed. Similar issues apply in the
context of the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive[80]. It requires the environmental effects of a broad range of plans
and programmes to be assessed so they can be taken into account while plans are
actually being developed, and in due course adopted. Here again, guidance is being
prepared, but no revision is scheduled for the time being. Having the above in mind, the Commission
proposal for guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport and
trans-European energy infrastructure[81]
include general considerations on the need to climate-proof those investments. However, it remains unclear how this aim can be achieved in
technical means and there is a risk that definition of common approaches will
take quite some time. It should also be noted that the application for projects
is voluntary for Member States and it cannot be ensured that all relevant
infrastructure will be made climate resilient in the next decades. Green infrastructure to
address natural hazards is governed by various EU policies. The evolution of
how these policies address green infrastructure in the coming years will have a
significant impact regarding its growth or stagnation. For instance, the WFD
encourages Member States to implement measures targeting land use but on a
voluntary basis. Many Member States have decided to wait to implement
supplementary measures. The forthcoming adoption of the Green Paper on green infrastructure
should provide additional elements on the way ecosystem based approaches issues
could be addressed at EU level to better capture their potential for climate
change adaptation purposes. At EU level, the
inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in the design of
buildings has just started. As already announced in the 2009 White Paper, a
mandate has been adopted which would require standardisation organisations to
consider, in the context of their work to update Eurocodes, developing a
technical report analysing and providing guidance for potential amendments for
Eurocodes with regard relevant impacts of future climate change. Eurocodes are
a set of harmonized technical rules developed by the European Committee for
Standardisation for the structural design of construction works in the European
Union. The Eurocodes therefore replace the existing national technical standards,
published by national standard bodies, although many countries had a period of
co-existence. They provide a common approach for the design of buildings and
other civil engineering works. They cover earthquake resistance, but not yet
climate proofing. Since March 2010 the Eurocodes have to be accepted in all
public tenders as means of calculating structural design and are de-facto
standard for the private sector. A consultation
among national standardisation bodies led us to conclude that only limited efforts
have been undertaken at national level to further climate-proof design
standards. Denmark seems to have done some pioneer work on this issue. Road
regulations and railway standards are being/will be reviewed and revised with
consideration of expected climate changes. The standardisation body in the UK
is also active, with specific emphasis on climate
change adaptation measures in their standardization work with the construction
sector (i.e. standards on water supply, flooding and the like); risk/resilience
standardization (project underway to explore the role of risk/resilience
standardization in the context of climate change adaptation), and more
recently, their biodiversity work (where climate change adaptation is currently
considered within the context of the UK planning regime). Other national standardisation bodies active include the ones in BE,
DE and NL. In the absence of EU action there is an
expectation that the gap between those organisations able and willing to take
adaptation actions and those left behind will grow. Some of the largest
trans-national corporations, and those in certain sectors, have begun to
appreciate the potential threat and opportunity presented by climate change.
However by 2020 large sectors and a great many small and medium sized
enterprises will be unable to make the necessary adaptation measures making
them increasingly vulnerable to the effects of unavoidable climate change, and
therefore less competitive. In the absence of measures from the EU this gap
will widen – creating market obstacles for those left behind. There is evidence of on-the-ground
adaptation (e.g. PWC, 2010; UK Trade and Investment, 2011; OECD, 2011) but this
is mainly from multi-national corporations and there is little evidence of
adaptation in SMEs. Indeed only 24% of respondents to the consultation exercise
indicated that EU action within the industry and SME sector was relevant or
highly relevant to improve Europe's resilience to the adverse effects of
climate change. 29% of respondents were neutral, 13% of respondents did not
believe industry and SMEs were relevant and 10% had no opinion. This suggests
that with no further action, multi-national companies rather than SMEs would
continue to be the drivers of adaptation. Firms are investing more to protect
themselves. Much of this takes the form of updating business continuity plans,
or upgrading risk trackers. But around one in four firms is either upgrading
their existing physical assets, for example by weather-proofing buildings, or
taking out new insurance policies. Around one in five businesses plan to adapt
their operations better to deal with such changes, such as adopting new crop
varieties or more water-efficient facilities (UK Trade & Investment, 2011). In a review of existing European National
Adaptation Strategies, there was very little consideration of the role of the
private sector in adapting to climate change. Four of the nine adaptation
strategies reviewed included discussion on the role of insurance, but this was
limited. Only the adaptation strategy for Malta contained a concrete action
relating to the role of insurance: “the Malta Resources Authority will steward
discussion amongst stakeholders to identify suitable mechanisms and instruments
that will ensure that the insurance market remains sustainable in the event of
increasing unpredictability of climate change impacts on various sectors in
Malta.” In light of this, it is likely that Member
States require further guidance and assistance from the EU on how to stimulate
the private sector into action on adaptation; combined with help to engage the
finance and insurance sectors on adaptation. Without further action, progress
among Member States is likely to be slow and fragmented. With no (new) action,
large businesses are likely to continue with a piecemeal approach to adaptation
and SMEs are not likely to step up their adaptation action. The impact of
climate change on Europe and the rest of the world will accelerate and
businesses will not be ready and able to reduce their vulnerability and seize
the opportunities that adaptation presents. 1.3.3.2. Option 3A: Guidance on how
to climate proof Cohesion Policy and CAP Interactions with Member States and
stakeholders have confirmed that there is a great deal of uncertainty on how
the cross-cutting adaptation objectives can be implemented on the ground. The guidance document will provide advice,
methods, and examples aiming at ensuring that climate adaptation objectives are
understood, fully addressed, and integrated into Member States’ Rural
Development Programmes (RDP) and Operational Programmes for the next
programming period (2014-2020). The guidance is intended to be used by Managing
Authorities as well as other actors participating in programme development,
consultation, and evaluation including climate experts and external
stakeholders involved in the process. Providing further guidance would therefore
support the European Commission and Member States in their efforts to achieve
optimal integration of climate change adaptation into the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and into the Cohesion and regional policy. The costs of developing
the guidance are estimated at €200,000, to be supported by the Commission[82]. A mix of “grey” (as related to
infrastructure), “green” (as related to the environment/ecosystems/green
infrastructure), and “soft” (as related to human capital and adaptive
capacities) adaptation options need to be promoted in future Cohesion
Policy and the CAP. The set of implemented options will yet vary throughout the
EU. These will depend on the nature and severity of the climate change threats
as well as on regional circumstances, including adaptive capacity. Adaptation options can have high
benefit-cost ratios, although the cost- benefit largely depend on the national
and regional context and the assumed climate scenarios. Preliminary work has
identified the following adaptation actions as potentially worth for funding by
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD): buffer strips for
agricultural land, storm retention reservoirs, on-farm water storage, measures
to adapt to river and coastal flooding. Other cost-effective options include:
floodplain management, the planting of winter cover to prevent soil erosion,
improvement of animal rearing conditions and high-efficiency ventilation. As
regards Cohesion Policy, cost-effective actions are: early warning systems,
adapting rail tracks to higher temperatures and adapting electricity grids. There will be competition between different
thematic objectives in Cohesion Policy. It is, therefore, important to promote
climate change expenditure in a smart way. Where possible, priority should be
given to options that realise important synergies with climate change
mitigation or bring about co-benefits for other sectors such as industry,
transport, water management and social inclusion. This would help to promote
climate adaptation under different thematic objectives. In addition to producing the guidance,
additional costs may be expected if training events are organised, at EU but
also national and regional level, targeting the main actors of the sectors. It
is difficult to provide a good estimate of such a widespread training exercise,
but additional costs of hundreds of thousand euros can be expected. These costs
would be shared between the Commission, Member States, managing authorities and
relevant stakeholders. Under both Cohesion Policy and CAP, various areas of
expenditure are likely to be sensitive to climate change related impacts from
threats, such as flooding, storms, and extreme temperatures. Of course, the effectiveness and efficiency
of such guidelance depend on their uptake. In that context, the capacity
building strategy, although generating additional costs, could prove a key
determinant to ensure the effective dissemination of the information available
in the guidelines. A focus on SMEs There are two steps to the awareness
process that have to be taken to avoid potential losses to the industry from
climate change events. The first step is for private enterprises to be aware
that climate change will have certain impacts specific to their activities
beyond general impacts that are increasingly becoming common knowledge in the
public domain. The second step is to carry out an assessment and be aware of
what specific impacts are likely to occur to their enterprise. Business sector entities might not be aware
of climate change impacts particular to their activities and therefore choose
not to allocate resources to find out how climate change will affect their business.
An awareness-campaign could provide detailed enough information to private
stakeholders (beyond common knowledge of overall climate events) as part of the
first step to convince them that they need to take the second step (autonomous
analysis of climate change impacts specific to their business) to ensure that
their enterprise remains competitive and is not at risk from climate change
events. The need for public intervention and
awareness raising might differ significantly among industry sectors and Member
States, and might be most crucial in Member States where climate change effects
are not yet apparent but are likely to have a significant impact on the private
sector in the future. Presumably a private sector entity will be aware of
climate change impacts, and public sector-driven awareness raising campaign
will not be needed, if there are evident climate change effects already
affecting the business, or if there is relevant, easily accessible and
digestible information already available. This initiative might be particularly
relevant for SMEs and could be implemented in the context of the “Enhancing the
competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)” objective of the
Cohesion Policy Legislative Proposals for the 2014-2020 programming period. There are no quantified benefit data
available on awareness-raising benefits for companies that would consider the
whole range of possible climate related damage costs specific to the industry.
One indicative figure is the following—the damage costs reported for river
flooding indicate that the damage to industrial and commercial activities
accounts for around 12% of total damage costs, valued at some €2.5 billion per
year (2010 prices) by the 2020s, based on the A1B climate scenario (Feyen and
Watkiss, 2011). 1.3.3.3. Option 3B: Listing mainstreaming
priorities in EU policies and engaging with key stakeholders Description of the option The aim of this policy initiative is to
propose a strategic approach for mainstreaming climate change adaptation into
EU legislation. This initiative would provide a list of priority initiatives
until 2020 for mainstreaming and how to reduce vulnerabilities and thus enhance
climate resilience. This would set out a plan for the political and structural
change needed up to 2020. Areas where policy action can make a real difference
are of particular focus. Based on the assessment described in the problem
description the priority initiatives in mainstreaming should focus on the
following priority areas and actions: -
Transport: Ensuring that transport related
infrastructure is made more climate resilient -
Energy: Ensuring that energy related infrastructure
is made more climate resilient -
Construction of buildings: Ensuring that energy
related infrastructure is made more climate resilient -
Health: Early warning should be improved and an
EU wide integration should take place. Also surveillance mechanism and periodic
monitoring should be improved. This requires better cooperation among regions
and Member States. -
Social issues: Particular focus should be spent
on vulnerable groups (e.g. older people), but also on how to make use of gender
issues for strengthening adaptation efforts. -
Insurance: With the Lamfalussy process a system
has been set up that enables the Solvency II and IMD 2 regimes to keep
up-to-date with future market and technological developments. This can be used
as a starting point for mainstreaming. -
Coastal zone management and marine issues:
Climate change needs to be considered within planning activities. This also
requires increased awareness and better cooperation among the different
stakeholders involved. Mainstreaming should not only focus on
introducing adaptation to climate change into legal actions or developing
guidance. There is also the need to tackle specific bottlenecks like
inconsistencies in policy (e.g. renewable energy) and market. These priority
initiatives should prevent failures to ensure that policies are all going in
the same direction. Cross-cutting themes such as social policies are also
addressed. The roadmap provides a framework in which future actions can be
designed and implemented coherently. It sets out a vision for the political and
structural change needed up to 2020, with milestones to be reached by 2017.
These milestones illustrate what will be needed to put Europe on a path to
mainstream climate change adaptation into all EU policies. Assessment of the option The direct costs for listing mainstreaming
priorities are seen to be marginal. When amending or developing new EU
legislation, a dedicated impact assessment will have to consider the
implications from a climate change adaptation point of view. It requires
mapping the current status of adaptation efforts in EU legislation (Directives,
Regulations and Commission Decisions) and other policy documents. Listing priority initiatives for further
mainstreaming will further raise awareness of the need to integrate climate
change considerations in key EU policy areas beyond the recommendations of the
White Paper on adapting to climate change. It will foster a dialogue with
respective Commission services, but also with Member States and other
stakeholders. For this initiative as such, it can be
assumed that the overall benefits relate to a clear commitment to act at EU
level to integrate climate change considerations in all relevant EU policies in
a coordinated and well-planned manner. It will further increase awareness of
the necessity to address climate change adaptation in various policy areas
projected to be affected by climate change impacts. Furthermore it can be
expected that agreeing on these priorities would allow to anticipating and
allocating better European Commission resources. Further, listing mainstreaming priorities
in EU legislation and policies allows for greater transparency for Member
States. They would be able to prepare better for respective implementation in
various sectors. Anticipatory policy making on Member States level can save
costs, while avoiding potential overlaps in mainstreaming efforts at national
level. Furthermore, processes to develop national adaptation policies can be
better informed by a roadmap for upcoming EU level mainstreaming efforts. A roadmap will also clearly outline
potential conflicting policy objectives as well as highlight synergies that can
be achieved through aligning mainstreaming efforts in several EU policy areas. Assuming that the above mentioned priority
areas and actions will form the core of the option the following more detailed
impacts can be assumed: For the transport, energy and construction
sector climate resilience will be improved. There are several existing EU
policies that may serve as entry points to include climate change
considerations in particular with a view to taking into account future climatic
conditions. Most policies take due account of climate mitigation issues, but
not yet of assessing risks posed by future climate change and developing
appropriate adaptation responses. For the transport sector this applies to
all transport modes where climate change impacts are expected to pose increased
pressure on the infrastructure in the future, also in economic terms. This is
of particular importance considering the long-term investments (e.g. major
transport routes, bridges, tunnels, urban transport). Taking account of future
climatic conditions is thus of high importance to both prevent potential damage
costs and safeguard the functioning of European transport systems. Identifying
and listing related policies that serve as entry points for mainstreaming
adaptation are relevant for both existing infrastructure (such as e.g. safety
management for roads) and new infrastructure to ensure that any investment is
“climate-proofed”. For the energy sector EU policies helping
to reach adaptation targets (e.g. cutting down seasonal demand peaks,
Connecting Europe Facility, Smart Grids initiative) are in place and emerging,
although not named as such – thus having high mainstreaming potential.
Anticipated threats on the European energy system such as (i) aggravated
extreme events, ii) increasing interconnection of grid-dependent European
internal energy market and thus increasing amounts of transmitted energy/less
domestic supply in many regions, iii) projected further shift towards
increasing electricity demands and according shifts in primary energy
consumption and iv) increasing share of renewable energy generation that will
entail a more complex picture of climate threats (e.g. increasing dependency
from solar irradiation, wind velocities, river run-off regimes) will need to be
taken into consideration in various related policies. Listing those with high
mainstreaming potential and assuring a coherent approach will allow to take
preventive action to address the above highlighted threats. For the construction sector EUROCODES as a
set of unified international codes of practice for designing buildings and
civil engineering structures are regarded as having high mainstreaming
potential, however so far do not incorporate aspects of future changes of
climatic conditions (for more details cf. option under problem 5). . In the case of mainstreaming in the health
sector, integration of future climate change risks is expected to improve,
inter alia, the following: -
Less heat related deaths through improved
surveillance mechanisms and contingency planning taking due account of
potentially more frequent and extreme weather events due to climate change -
Foster preventive actions to reduce the risk of
spreading of pests and diseases considering changes in certain disease carriers
(e.g. by the Asian tiger mosquito) -
Safeguard adequate financial resources for
health in the EU Cohesion Policy from 2014 onwards to deal with climate
challenges and link forecasting tools (e.g. for heat, floods, wild fires,
storms) with the health sector on a cross-border scale -
Connect early warning for air pollutants,
especially ozone, closer to health services in order to effectively react and
ensure timely actions -
Support the monitoring (e.g. detection via early
warning mechanisms and rapid eradication) and reporting procedure, monitor
climate related changes on invasive species distribution, survival and spread,
and foster the exchange of information on potential eradication strategies. Even if there are quite some uncertainties
related to mainstreaming adaptation into the EU social policies, doing so could
mitigate growing disparities in society due to climate change. Social harmony
which is a cornerstone of the EU will also be secured. The mainstreaming of
adaptation to climate change in social policies might not always involve direct
additions or edits of the texts of current legislation and other policy
documents, however, it certainly does provide additional reasoning and
importance for the development of EU social policies due to the fact that
successful achievement of social policy aims is inseparably linked to
successful strengthening of the adaptive capacity of societies. For example: Reduction of forced climate migration
(internal and external) through the development of adaptation policies in
potential source countries and regions (including EU member states) could
reduce the need for people moving away from marginal areas and supporting livelihoods
that are more resilient. Economic disparities lead to differences in
adaptive capacity between man and women. Climate change should be used as a
further argument to reduce these disparities and to reduce vulnerabilities in
particular of women. The IPCC recognises the elderly as a group
of greater vulnerability, which is mainly due to people of older age being more
sensitive to health impacts (IPCC, 2007a), especially caused by heat, as well
as to stress associated with losses and physical damage during extreme weather
events (CAG Consultants, 2009). They are also more likely to have reduced
mobility and therefore reduced access to essential services. Additionally,
older people are less likely to be willing to relocate away from exposed areas
due to general reluctance to migrate, which rises sharply with age (Huber &
Nowotny, 2008). Considering these aspects in the context of planning for
adaptation could reduce the vulnerabilities of elder people. Coastal zones are one of the high risk –
but on the same side one of the most dynamic and developing areas – in the EU
territory. Increased mainstreaming into this policy area could reduce this risk
but could also contribute to a sustainable development in the future. Engaging with the insurance sector The probability of most types of extreme
event is expected to change significantly, in many cases upwards, as a result
of climate change. Several national studies have interpreted the predictions
for insurers; for example in the UK and in France. In fact the ongoing rapid
changes make it hard to assess the future risk. The most dramatic and reliable
changes are predicted for temperature; the historical 500 year heat wave event
might become a 2 – yearly (biennial) event by the 2040’s (Stott et al., 2004).
There is now strong evidence that extreme high temperature and precipitation
events are more common in many regions. Similar projections for other extremes are
less available. For several major European rivers, e.g. Odra, Elbe, Po, Loire,
Danube, what used to be a 100-year flood might by 2100 become a one in 50 year
or even one in 20 years event (Dankers and Feyen, 2008). The main underlying
cause is rainfall; the return period for an event of annual maximum 24-hour
precipitation with a 20-year return period in the late-20th-century is
projected to be about 5-15 years by the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2012).
A study of extreme rainfall in London found that daily rainfall with a 100-
year return period prior to 1960 has a 10-year return period now (Lloyd's,
2010). On the reverse side, there is a projected
increase of duration and intensity of drought in the Mediterranean region and
central Europe, but this is not well-quantified (IPCC, 2012). For storms, the
outlook is less clear still, but the consensus is a gradually increasing risk
for north-west Europe (IPCC, 2012). As a result climate change can affect the
functioning of insurance markets. The impacts are likely to be in the same
areas where the disaster insurance markets already experience difficulties.
These may intensify as a result of climate change. Three main areas are
identified that might be affected by potential impacts: -
Risk transfer conditions (price / coverage): An
increase in the event probability and severity would lead to price increases.
In the short term (under 5 years say), the effect of climate change on
insurance might not be thought to be significant, as long as due allowance is
made for the underlying trend[83]. In the longer term, particularly in sectors or areas where
insurance has not been customary, climate change could create or exacerbate
issues with correct pricing and availability. In particular, sea level rise
will become an issue for coastal and estuarine risks. The problem of drought
for agriculture and livestock may also become more serious. Potential losses
from storm and flood could also rise significantly (ABI, 2005; GDV, 2011), but
the actual increase would be highly dependent on changes in exposure and
vulnerability. At the same time, changes in the underlying pattern of extreme
events would increase the uncertainty of estimation, which would mean an
additional increase in price to provide a greater safety margin. -
Availability: As a result of increasing risks,
insurance might become unavailable in certain areas. It is widely accepted that
natural events that are less frequent than 1 in 75 years are readily insurable.
Swiss RE indicates that for risks with a 100 to 200 years return period (0.5%
to 1.0% probability), the risk premium is 3.5% of the value of the assets. For
more extreme risks, the premium therefore becomes too high as an annual charge.
Practice in the UK broadly confirms this – the limit for an insurable flood
risk when there is no adverse selection, and the risk is bundled with other
hazards is a 75 year frequency, i.e. 1.3% probability (ABI, 2005). -
Demand: It might be expected that climate change
will increase the demand for insurance, due to higher risk. However, the
increasing stresses may divert disposable income to other purposes, as well as
creating greater calls for public relief after disasters. Furthermore, if not
addressed, climate change could lead to insurance becoming less affordable or
unaffordable, particularly for lower income population. Insurance can be used as an instrument for
adaptation to climate change in at least three ways -
Managing climate change risks: Insurance should
be part of strategic risk management e.g. state policy for agriculture and
forestry, and for energy which is weather-dependent. It is important to
remember that climate risk management needs to be observed for existing assets
and activities, as well as new ones. It is also important that stakeholders are
aware of the available insurance products for their climate risk management
portfolio. -
Providing incentives for climate change risk
prevention: In order to give incentives for risk prevention, insurance prices
have to be risk based and adequately adjusted according to risk prevention
efforts taken by customers. In principle, if insurance prices and conditions were
related to the risk, that would send a clear signal to the purchaser, about the
economic implications of the present exposure and risk management. In practice
this often does not happen, because such measures are voluntary and not common.
'Regulatory framework mandating or codifying risk resilience would encourage
price differentiation. -
Disseminating information on climate change
risks and risk prevention measures: Insurance sector organisations are among
the entities which could provide climate change risk related information to
clients, since they are already involved in the business of risk management. It
could be argued that it is in insurers’ interest to divulge information on
risk, so that clients make appropriate preparations to deal with climate hazards,
and so reduce the scale of potential losses. It is premature at this stage to identify
the detailed policy options that could be implemented on insurance, both as a
sector and as an instrument for adaptation. However, it seems essential to
start a process of consultations with stakeholders on the prevention and
insurance of natural disasters. This process in itself will not provide
detailed implications but it will allow identifying good practice in the EU and
detailing the need for additional information at EU level. Engaging with commercial banks The Finance and Investment sectors’ broad
economic participation make them exceptionally vulnerable to climate change.
The sectors have investments, portfolios, assets, debtors, and collateral
across the world and across sectors, any of which may be adversely affected as
the climate changes. At the same time, the Finance and Investment sectors can
greatly influence adaptation measures by financing adaptation projects in all
other sectors, and providing risk assessment services to other sectors. Investors in
infrastructure include banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, sovereign
wealth funds, investment/development banks and public and private pension
funds. Time frames range from investors looking for a return within 5 to 10
years to those long-term investors looking for a continual rate of return on
their investment over 20 years or more. For long-term investors in
infrastructure in particular, climate change impacts present a risk, e.g. to
the continuity of rates of return. Therefore, some long-term investors can see
the potential benefits of incorporating climate risk into their decision making
and adapting their infrastructure assets as this will help to lower the risk to
their financial returns. Investors have an
important role in making investments more resilient by -
Demanding greater disclosure of climate risks
and adaptation actions by companies to increase awareness, understanding and
action. -
Incorporating within their own ‘due diligence’
processes an assessment of vulnerability to climate change and how this is
planned to be addressed over an asset’s proposed lifetime. -
Developing financial models to incentivise
infrastructure to be planned, designed, built and operated with both current
and future climate risks in mind. Addressing access to
finance issues was identified as a significant issue by 63% of respondents to
the consultation exercise. 62% of respondents also said that lack of available
funding for adaptation measures was a significant or very significant barrier
preventing the economy from becoming more climate resilient. While there is evidence on the role of public investment
banks (e.g. European Investment Bank) on adaptation to climate change, less is
known about the role of commercial banks. Therefore this
initiative seeks to engage directly with commercial banks to a) review
what adaptation-related actions are currently being taken, if any; b) review
existing structures for risk assessment, e.g. is climate change risk and
adaptation taken into account when applying for a loan; c) raise awareness of
adaptation and initiate dialogue with stakeholders and facilitate
cross-organisation working where possible; and d) motivate
commercial banks to consider mobilising funds and sharing best practice with
other commercial banks (where it does not compromise banks’ competitive edge). The
longer-term goal of engagement is to build relationships and facilitate
cross-organisation working. The impacts of the initiative are
impossible to quantify at this stage. They will also be difficult to establish
because they would mostly be indirect (i.e. they would result from the
investments enabled by the initiative). However, some qualitative analysis of
the main impacts is possible and presented next. If effective the policy would improve access to finance
through a more adequate offer of financial instruments on EU market, in
relation to climate adaptation. This in turn would improve the understanding of
the costs and benefits related to adaptation investments and ultimately enable
investments that increase climate resilience and innovation in EU businesses.
This initiative may also give EU financial institutions a leading edge in
climate-related investments and instruments. In addition, through engagement
with financial institutions the Commission will demonstrate a strong policy and
financial commitment to adaptation, thereby increasing the likelihood of
climate resilient investment Small businesses face the biggest
constraints limiting the type and scale of adaptation actions they can take (as
do many businesses in developing countries)[84].
Engaging with financial institutions and the banking sector to promote climate
resilient investments is likely to help SMEs to overcome financial barriers by
allowing SMEs to adapt their operations and/or respond to new market demands by
investing in product / service development. It is also important to bear in
mind that adaptation measures should not increase red tape for SMEs. Preparing
guidelines on disaster prevention Regarding
disaster risk reduction, the Commission would prepare guidelines on disaster
prevention. In order to achieve climate change adaptation and disaster
prevention objectives (see COM (2009)82), there should be a greater knowledge
of good practices of disaster prevention by Member States. This can then be
disseminated to other Member States policy makers, and relevant institutions to
promote sharing of experiences and mutual learning. The Council Conclusions from November 2009
on a Community Framework on disaster prevention within the Union asked the
Commission to prepare together with Member States Guidelines on minimum
standards for disaster prevention in particular for risks shared by several
Member States on the basis of good practices in disaster prevention. The preparatory work has included the
collection and analysis of more than 400 examples of good practice from over 35
countries including all countries participating in the Civil Protection
Mechanism plus Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, USA and Switzerland. A
non-exhaustive inventory was established covering practices across various
sectors, including horizontal measures, earthquakes and tsunami, flood and
storms, heat waves, drought and forest fires, industrial accidents. To shortlist good practices from the
broader inventories per theme, selection criteria were used based on the
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Transferability, Sustainability, and Coherence of
the practices. Dedicated interviews, stakeholder meetings (April-May 2012) and
follow up consultations with expert groups from the Member States helped verify
the inventory and shortlist the practices that could feed into the Guidelines
on good practice prevention standards. Throughout the consultation process, it was
generally agreed that the Guidance should be of a voluntary nature and centred
on multi-hazard or horizontal and cross cutting themes that could be in line
with the 4 prevention priorities under the "Hyogo Framework for
Action". Potential topics to be covered include: -
Governance –inter alia cooperation and
coordination at different levels of governance and across different authorities
and stakeholders, cross border cooperation, monitoring, evaluation and
implementation of existing legislation, cooperation with the business sector and
voluntary organisations, community resilience actions, coherence with other
policies including climate change adaptation; -
Planning – including development and promotion
of multi-hazard and cross sectoral risk assessments as well as specific risk
assessment and mapping at national, regional and local level which should be
further integrated into risk management plans, recovery, capability and
response planning as well as long-term sustainable development strategies and
policies (e.g. land-use planning, infrastructure) and financial mechanisms; -
Disaster data – including recommendations and
good practices on collection, analysis and sharing of data and its use for
policy-making; -
Risk communication, information-sharing and
awareness raising – including use of social media, mechanisms for effective
exchange of information before, during and after a disaster, creation of one
information portal on risks, vulnerabilities and preventive actions, tailored
risk communication to target local and vulnerable population, education and
awareness raising activities; -
Research and technology transfer – including use
of new technologies for prevention and risk management, development of
multi-hazard early warning systems, extract value out of research and implement
into practice and underpin scientifically based decision-making; The identified topics and practices will be
complemented with findings from parallel activities, in particular EU-US
workshops organised on disaster data (28 Sept 2012) and a 'Peer Review'
programme to help transfer good practice on prevention and preparedness on the
basis of the Hyogo Framework for Action Monitoring tool . On this basis by the end of 2012, the
Commission will prepare a discussion paper on the potential scope and content
of the Guidance for discussion in the risk assessment expert group before
discussion in the Civil Protection Committee in early 2013. Consideration on costs The provision of disaster prevention
guidelines would have a very limited cost on the EU budget (less than 400 000
euros). A study carried out by an external consultant to be finalised before
end of 2012 has already been conducted under the civil protection financial
instrument budget (cost € 359 900) and will provide the Commission with both an
inventory and assessment of good practices in disaster prevention and draft
guidelines for minimum standards The output of the study will also be made
available through Climate-ADAPT. Such guidelines, contributing to the
knowledge objective of the adaptation strategy are expected to promote the
sharing of valuable experiences and the take up of good practices by Member
States: as supported by Member States in several council conclusions, sharing
experiences and good practices is an essential component of prevention policy,
as well as developing a prevention culture that is shared by all actors. They
will also help inform policy decisions and actions at EU and Member State
level. In addition, if recommendations from the
guidelines document are taken up by Member States and implemented
cost-efficiency can be expected: the prevention level will increase (for
targeted areas) resulting in lower cost impact of disasters. Furthermore,
investing in prevention and disaster resilience makes strong economic sense the
rate of return on every Euro invested in prevention is between 4 and 7 times,
especially as demonstrated by the World Bank. Cost efficiency can also be
expected from the implementation of joint cross-border actions. 1.3.3.4. Option 3C: Setting new
calendar for revision of key EU legislation as part of the mainstreaming exercise This initiative would define priority
legislation whose timelines should be revised so that climate change adaptation
can be inserted into legislation. By prioritising legislation, the Commission
would carry out a process under which legislation would be screened for their
links to climate change adaptation. The main advantage would be that climate
change adaptation issues would be brought to the forefront sooner. It may be
advantageous to do so in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy, where ambitious
objectives have also been agreed regarding the current and future of the EU to
climate change. This initiative may be difficult to carry
out given its political nature. Certain revision dates have been subject to
long political negotiations between the EU, the Council and the Commission with
input from the Member States. Changing this timing could cause political
conflicts. Furthermore, there is a possibility that moving the legislative
revision forward might result in the introduction of other (hidden) political
agendas. Moreover, as highlighted by the
developments in water policy in the EU, voluntary action can pre-empt the need
for causing legislation to be revised at an earlier stage. Climate change
action is not required under the Water Framework Directive, but in 2009 the
Water Directors agreed to follow a common implementation strategy guidance on
how to climate check river basin management plans. Nonetheless, the added
value of moving up the review deadline for policies where it is possible is that
climate change adaptation issues will be brought to the forefront sooner. It
may be advantageous to do so in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy, where
ambitious objectives have also been agreed regarding the current and future of
the EU to climate change. On the other hand, there is no guarantee - given the
varied political interests across the EU - that moving up the review would
ensure that adaptation is included in articles. The impact of this initiative,
therefore, is not certain and could face a lot of resistance. 1.3.3.5. Option 3D: Guidelines for
project developers for climate proofing vulnerable investments This option would help
developers of physical assets and infrastructure to incorporate resilience to
current climate variability and future climate change within their projects.
The estimated cost of developping these guidelines is slightly above
€100.000[85], to be supported by the Commission. The Climate-ADAPT platform as
well as additional publicity measures can be used to increase the up-take. Climate proofing can be expected to slightly increase costs for
infrastructure projects. A World
Bank study[86] found that the net cost of adapting infrastructure
to climate change is no more than 1-2% of the total cost of providing that
infrastructure. However, at the same time, climate resilience may decrease
costs over a longer period as it helps preventing damages to and interruptions
of infrastructure. Altvater et al. (2011b) assessed the
economic costs and benefits of certain adaptation options in the energy and
transport sector. The study highlights various uncertainties in relation to the
assessments but concludes the following: Adaptation measures due to electricity
demand triggered by supplemental cooling to enhance the energy infrastructure in
the EU and make it more resilient towards storm damages and demand-induced
overloads in transmission lines are expected to be at some € 500 to 650 million
per year until 2020[87]. The benefits are estimated at € 130 million to € 6,5 billion per
year, with a best-guess estimate of € 870 million per year. The investment costs for better
heat-resistant asphalt have been estimated between 2.9 and 8.9 billion Euros
per year for public roads. The highest investment costs are assessed for
Germany, France, United Kingdom and Poland. The benefits are estimated between
1.8 and 2.5 billion Euros per year for passenger travel and approximately 183
million Euros per year for freight transport. In comparison to the benefits,
this implies that, if the costs are at the lower end of the estimated range,
benefits and costs would be almost equal. It is more likely though that the
costs of the measure would exceed the estimated benefits. It has to be kept in
mind that the estimated benefits only measure the benefits of avoided delays
and detours in terms of saved travel time. Thus, they only represent a share of
the overall benefits: for instance, the avoided costs of road accidents have
not been counted, and neither have the avoided maintenance and repair costs for
fixing heat-induced damages to the road surface. The investment costs of better drainage
systems with a higher capacity are between 50 and 240 million Euros per year
for public roads. The highest costs are assessed for France, Germany and United
Kingdom. The benefits of this measure are estimated between 19 and 57 million
Euros per year. Keeping in mind that the benefit estimate only captures part of
the overall benefits, there is no guarantee that the benefits of the measure
will exceed its costs. If the costs are at the lower end of the estimated
range, and the benefits at the upper end, there is a chance that the measure
will deliver a net benefit. If the costs are at the upper end of the estimated
range, they will exceed the benefits – at least that share of the benefits that
was quantified above. The estimated operating costs for rail
track buckling in the form of costs induced by speed restriction that could
prevent derailments. The operating costs for speed restrictions due to track
buckling are estimated to range from 59 million to 260 million Euros per year
for EU-27 according to different values for delay minutes. The benefits are
estimated to fall within a range of 90 million to 537 million Euros per year.
It is therefore likely, but not certain that the benefits of the measure would
exceed the costs. If the total costs are at the higher end of the projected
range, but the benefits at the lower end, it is also possible that benefits may
exceed the total cost. Major effects on employment would not be
expected from the measure, if it is assumed that the upgrading of
infrastructures (e.g. heat resistant asphalt or improved drainage capacity) is
integrated into the regular reinvestment cycle. In this case, there would be no
substantial effects, since the required labour input does not differ. This
would be different if existing infrastructure was retrofitted before the end of
its economic life span; but this would also incur significantly higher cost
than anticipated in this estimation. The development and construction of new,
more robust pylons and overhead lines, but also the development of more
resilient grid layouts can help to promote the diffusion of European
technologies. The EU industry is a main producer of technologies for energy
infrastructure (EC, 2010m). Many countries outside the
EU are also facing the challenge of installing electricity networks that are
better-adapted to climate change and that meet the needs of changing generation
patterns, which potentially increases the demand for European technologies and
expertise in the world market. The investment need in this sector would have
also a positive impact on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the fields of
construction, mechanical engineering and business services (EC, 2010n). Negative environmental impacts during the
construction phase are not anticipated: compared to normal renewing works, the
construction of heat-resistant road surfaces or increased drainage capacity
does not create significantly different environmental impacts. Retrofitting
transmission lines can affect agricultural activities including irrigation,
aerial spraying, wind breaks and future land development. The placement of
pylons on agricultural land can create problems for turning field machinery,
lead to the compaction of soils, damage drain tiles, obstruct moving irrigation
systems and interfere with a future consolidation of farm fields (PSCW, 2009;
BDEW, 2011; Vattenfall Europe, 2005). For underground cables, a corridor of at
least four metres width is required, with only low vegetation and without
trees. Extensive excavation work and soil movement occurs during the
construction of underground cables (BDEW, 2011; Schering, 2009). The excavation
work is followed by long-term impacts on soil. Since underground cables produce
heat, they may exacerbate droughts in drying out the soil, with adverse effects
on the vegetation and agriculture (Vattenfall Europe, 2005; Gouda, et al,
1997). The costs of underground cabling exceeds the costs of overhead lines by
a factor of 5 to 21 (highly dependent from local circumstances)[88] and it is thus not feasible to replace overhead lines in the high
voltage transmission grid to a large extend. However, the low and medium
voltage distribution grid in urban areas is already underground to a large
extend in most cities of western and central Europe, which has improved the
resilience of urban distribution grids. Alternatively, it could also be considered not to make mandatory these
guidelines. To ensure a minimum up-take and
application by project promoters, the European level could encourage Member
States and regions to use it by including a reference into EU documents on
cost-benefit-analysis and ex-ante project assessments for various policy areas,
notably for projects under EU structural funds, TEN-T and TEN-E. However, the
decision whether to apply the guidelines or not would remain with the project
promoters or involved financial partners. The non-binding character of the
guidelines means lower impact on project promoters, thus on infrastructure
projects. However, it avoids an 'over-regulation' of projects as well as a
reduced administrative burden. Public-private partnerships can be encouraged
with a view to the sharing of investment, risk, reward and responsibilities
between the public and private sectors in the delivery of adaptation action, in
particular for investments in infrastructure. 1.3.3.6. Option 3E: Promote
inclusion of climate change adaptation considerations in relevant
infrastructure standards Infrastructure is usually subject to strong
regulation, in particular for safety reasons, and standards may therefore
provide a particularly useful tool for the adaptation to climate change. The
built environment is characterized by long investment cycles and thus prone to
climate change. When revising existing or building new structures, standards
are used in every phase during the lifetime cycle. They can apply during the
planning phase, the construction phase and the maintenance phase. Thus
standards have the potential to significantly impact the resilience of
products, processes and constructions. The use of standards may be particularly
relevant for transport and energy infrastructure, and for buildings. Yet,
current design standards or standard development guides, across the whole scope
described above, are not yet climate-proofed. The Commission can use European
standardisation as a policy tool to support implementation of Union's
legislation and policies. European standardisation and use of European
standards as a policy tool are regulated by Regulation on European Standardisation,
Reg.(EU) No 1025/2012[89]. European standardisation may supports important Union policies
such as consumer welfare, energy efficiency environmental protection, trade and
the single market. The Commission has, since the mid-1980s, made an increasing
use of European standards in support of Union policies and legislation. A
standard is voluntary in application and established by all interested parties.
Standards are build bottom-up but the Commission can request the recognised
European standardisation organisation (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) via a mandate[90] to develop European standard(s) on a certain topic. CENELEC
operates on electrotechnical field, ETSI on telecommunications and CEN covers
all other domains For buildings, the Eurocodes[91] are a series of European Standards (EN), providing a common
approach for the design of buildings and other civil engineering works and
construction products. They are meant to lead to more uniform levels of safety
in construction in Europe, and to become the reference design codes replacing
national codes. They cover earthquake resistance, but not yet climate change
resistance. Concretely, three strands of initiatives can be considered to
include climate change adaptation considerations in standard-design. Amending the environmental guide of CEN Originally, an ISO Guide 64
‘Guide for addressing environmental issues in product standards’ was developed.
Following its publication, CEN decided to adopt it as a CEN Guide 4. This
initiative would consider issuing an official request to CEN to integrate
adaptation in the CEN guide 4 - Environmental Guide. The Environmental guide
supports to assess sustainability during the development and amendment of
standards. It assesses the impact from a product/process on its environment
following a life cycle approach. For adaptation/climate proofing to be covered
by the guide, it should also assess the impact of the environment on a
product/process. Life-cycle thinking currently applied would also be relevant
for adaptation, as that would prescribe consideration of climate change risks
in all product development cycles from initial product development to raw
material sources, to production processes to use and disposal options. The use of the CEN-CENELEC
guide 4 - Environmental Guide is voluntary. Due to the voluntary nature of the
guidance, the application cannot be guaranteed, even if the current version of
the guidance document is highly accepted by the sector. Mapping relevant CEN-CENELEC standards
in view of revising them to make them more climate resilient Second, this initiative considers the possibility of mapping
relevant standards and identifying the ones than would need to be revised to be
made more climate resilient. As already set out for the Eurocodes initiative,
the majority of the administrative burden for guidance falls at EU level and
involved Member States. Mapping and prioritising relevant standards for
transport infrastructure, energy infrastructure and buildings will require a
considerable effort. According to CEN/CENELEC, indicatively 500-1000 relevant
transport standards need to be mapped. The time for carrying out this mapping
exercise is assumed to take at least 1-2 years[92]. For
the energy sector, no figures of potential standards to be reviewed have been
found/given, but this initiative would have to take into considerations the
on-going work on standards for energy efficiency in the context of the Energy
Performance of Buildings Directive. While acceptance of Eurocodes is mandatory
in certain areas (public tendering), the use of European Standards is mostly
voluntary. This means that there is no automatic legal obligation to apply
them. However, laws and regulations may refer to standards and even make
compliance with them compulsory. For all three parts of the initiative the majority
of the work has to be shared between EU level and Member States. A detailed
cost estimate to carry out this work could not be undertaken but main costs
would relate to working time for dozens of national experts from EU 27 to be
involved over several years. Uncertainty in climate modelling and potential
lack of data/information on climate impacts for specific regions may complicate
the amendment of the concerned standards. Developing this guidance will likely
trigger the need for innovation and research, which in turn will stimulate the
creation or maintenance of jobs in the area of research. However, the number of
generated jobs cannot be estimated at this stage. Due to the processes required
for carrying out this initiative increased awareness of climate change within
the standardisation bodies could be expected. This might lead to a more
detailed discussion when reviewing standards or developing new ones. This might
also trigger mainstreaming climate change adaptation for standards which are at
the national level. Overall, climate proofing of design-standards will also be
a necessary step in the way of achieving the objectives set out in the proposed
TEN-E and TEN-T guidelines. Some respondents of the public consultation
stated that ‘Adaptation should be included in relevant national building codes
and Eurocodes to ensure that future constructions resist the consequences of
climate change. In addition, standards for assessment of sustainability of
buildings such as standards developed by the technical committee CEN/TC 350
"Sustainability of construction works" standards could take into
account adaptation to climate change as an aspect of sustainability’. Also from
the stakeholder workshops, the stakeholders involved supported an EU approach
on adaptation in order to integrate adaptation into existing key standards
concerning long life cycles. 1.3.3.7. Option 3F: Proposal on mandatory
requirements for climate resilience of infrastructure projects A legal proposal could
be launched which obliges infrastructure developers in Europe to take into
account certain climate scenarios when retrofitting or building new infrastructure.
This legal proposal could include mandatory requirements that have to be
adhered to when building roads and energy infrastructure. The legal proposal
would also force Member States to retrofit existing transport and energy
infrastructure until 2040. Given the important role of
the EU in Europe's infrastructure investment, a mandatory requirement will not
only help in ensuring greater sustainability of action but also in promoting
climate change adaptation as a EU policy priority. The
implementation of this option may however reveal difficult. First, this may
induce increased project costs (short-term) due to additional investment for
adaptation solutions, which could have negative impacts on the short-term
competitiveness of European firms. Second, the uncertainty in climate modelling
and potential lack of data/information in climate impacts for specific project
sites may make the guidelines difficult to apply in practice. Third, the
climate proofing of projects would create additional administrative burden for
project promoters and for financing institutions to include it in cost-benefit
analysis, in particular when such institutions have already their own
approaches for climate proofing vulnerable investments, as currently the case
for the EIB. The uncertainty in
climate projections and regional impacts are still quite high. Therefore, the
level of adaptation and in some cases also the direction of adaptation (more
floods, less floods) cannot be clearly estimated. Considering the low awareness
on climate change issues, the acceptance of this initiative is considered to be
relatively limited. 1.4. EU initiatives on adaptation: 1.4.1. State of play implementation
of the 2009 White Paper This Annex presents the
latest evidence regarding the implementation of the measures announced in the
2009 White Paper. Approximately half of them have been successfully
implemented. In other cases, much more remains to be achieved for the initial
objective of the White Paper to be successfully implemented. This is mainly due
to the factors: -
First, in some cases, although the EU has
contributed to the implementation of the White Paper by undertaking a dedicated
action (policy initiative, research funding, …), this has not yet been followed
up at Member State level. Hence, additional actions will be needed in those
areas. -
Second, it is also the case that the initial
issue could not be comprehensively addressed by the actions mentioned in the
White Paper. This refers to knowledge generation and dissemination, or to
mainstreaming for instance. In such cases, additional action will be needed at
EU level to increase the EU's resilience. In two cases, more efforts
are still needed before the White Paper's proposed actions can be considered as
implemented. On knowledge gaps. Further EU-funded and national research is needed to fill gaps on
methods, models, data sets and forecasting tools, in order to improve the
understanding of current and expected climate impacts, vulnerabilities and
adaptation options. For instance, there are significant data gaps on the
development of systems for measuring and monitoring the impacts of climate
change. When available, data are often non-standardised and non-comparable,
have limited accessibility (non-centralised) or present other problems that
make them difficult to use. This is particularly relevant when dealing with
data and impacts across boundaries. Developing indices for vulnerability,
exposure and adaptation practice and results is essential for monitoring
impacts. Progress in developing indicators systems that are policy relevant is
insufficient and slow. For many sectors, methodologies and tools for outlining
adaptation are not yet available, and there is a need for sector-specific data
and information for the assessment of vulnerability. On assessing the cost and benefit of
adaptation options, some progress has been made at microeconomic level, but
important gaps remain on the macroeconomic approach to model adaptation and
assess their implications. Further work could include a database on adaptation
measures, to be integrated into Climate-ADAPT, in order to gather information
available from existing FP7 projects and other relevant on-going projects. A
methodological study has been launched that will conduct an extensive review of
available information on costs of adaptation on adaptation measures within the
EU and a review of existing methodologies for identifying these costs. It will
also assess and compare such methodologies, identify the methodological and
data challenges associated with calculating the expenditure on adaptation. No detailed assessment is available yet on
the impacts of climate change and adaptation policies on employment and on
the well-being of vulnerable social groups, though some progress has been
made in the context of the recently adopted employment strategy, especially
through work on green jobs. On ensuring that adaptation in coastal and
marine areas is taken into account in the framework of the Integrated
Maritime Policy, in the implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework
Directive and in the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, some
progress has been made, but additional efforts are needed at Member State
level. European guidelines on adaptation in coastal and marine areas are still
to be developed. Knowledge gaps in relation to climate change adaptation for
marine and costal issues are handled with in the context of the EU Adaptation Strategy
under the Commission’s Green Paper on Marine Knowledge 2020. A similar
situation exists when it comes to ensuring that climate change is taken into
account in the implementation of the Floods Directive. Mainstreaming adaptation into the EU energy
policy needs to be further advanced and reconsidered in the context of the
Strategic Energy Review process and the Energy Roadmap towards 2050 adopted in
2011. Further work is needed on climate-proofing
infrastructure projects and on how to incorporate pragmatically and
usefully climate change adaptation considerations in the TEN-E and TEN-T
guidelines. The inclusion of climate proofing as a
horizontal condition for all investments is being considered in the discussions
on the future Cohesion Policy. Including climate proofing provisions in
EU co-financed programmes could be exemplary for national and local public
investments and for private sector take-up. On the potential for insurance and other
financial products to complement adaptation measures and to function as
risk sharing instruments , a study on applying economic instruments for
adaptation to climate change was finalised in 2011 which explored the
application of the following instruments: Risk Management Instruments, Market
Based Instruments, Public Private Partnerships. Further mainstreaming and
interaction is necessary, and we have identified engaging with targeted
stakeholders (insurance companies and commercial banks) as a first priority. An
important milestone will be the forthcoming Green Paper on the prevention and
insurance of disasters, planned for early 2013. Action (EU and Member States) || Status || Explanations Take the necessary steps to establish by 2011 a Clearing House Mechanism || J || Climate-ADAPT, a web-based tool which will help decision makers at national, regional and local level to establish adaptation strategies, has been launched on March 23rd 2012. Climate-ADAPT is presently hosted and managed by the EEA and is publicly accessible here: http://Climate-ADAPT.eea.europa.eu/ Develop methods, models, data sets and prediction tools by 2011 || K || Progress has been made but there are still some knowledge gaps Under the EU's 7th Framework Program for Research / FP7 (2007-2013) climate change remains a key priority including research on climate change adaptation. A number of projects funded under FP 7 have and will continue to contribute to the improvement of the assessment framework by improvement of the understanding of the climate system and its processes, the quantification of climate change impacts on human and natural systems (including extreme events), and to the identification and assessment of mitigation and adaptation options including their costs. These research projects also serve as a knowledge basis for the development and support of international climate policies as well as policies on e.g. disaster reduction (including hydrometeorological hazards). Most relevant FP7projects: ClimateCost: Full costs of inaction and adaptation of climate change; CLIMSAVE:Climate change integrated assessment methodology for cross-sectoral adaptation and vulnerability; RESPONSES:European responses to climate change: deep emission reductions and mainstreaming of mitigation and adaptation; MEDIATION: Methodology for effective decision-making on impacts and adaptation; CCTAME: Climate change, Terrestrial adaptation and mitigation; ClimateWater: Bridging the gap between adaptation strategies of climate change impacts and European water policies; ACQWA: Assessing climatic change and impacts on the quality and quantity of water; IMPRINTS: Improving preparedness and risk management for flash floods and debris flow events; CLIWASEC: Cluster - Climate-Water-Security; IMPACT2C: Quantifying projected impacts under 2°C warming; ArcRisk: Impacts on health in the Arctic and Europe owing to climate-induced changes in contaminant cycling; CLEAR: Climate change, environmental contaminants and reproductive health Viroclime: Impact of Climate Change on the Transport, Fate and Risk Management of Viral Pathogens in Water; EDENext: Biology and control of vector-borne diseases in Europe; DROUGHT-R&SPI: Fostering European Drought Research and Science-Policy Interfacing; KULTURISK: Knowledge-based approach to develop a culture of risk prevention; STEP: assessing potential effects of phonological changes and extreme weather events on honeybees and wild bees and bee-pollinated plants, SOILSERVICE: Assessing effects of extreme weather events and climate change on gas excahne (soil ecosystem service; BIOFRESH: examines how climate change and other stressors affect freshwater biodiversity; DG R&I has organised two workshops Adapting to Climate Change: A dialogue between research and policy in 2010 and 2011) involving FP7 research projects and policy DGs. The information on national expenditure related to climate change adaptation can be useful in evaluating the measures taken by Member States to address adaptation. Eurostat is investigating the feasibility of identifying such information on the basis of existing statistical classifications and administrative data in environmental protection expenditure accounts. The results of the study are to be used as a basis for further elaborating the precise statistical methodology for setting up an account on adaptation expenditure. Develop indicators to better monitor the impact of climate change, including vulnerability impacts, and progress on adaptation by 2011 || J || Actions will be completed when the two EEA reports are published but additional efforts will be needed to better assess the information provided by such indicators A set of studies and contributions from research projects will be used to convert the generic concept of vulnerability promoted by the Impact Assessment A (in the line of IPCC AR4) into an operational instrument to be used for raising awareness, guiding adaptation policy design (e.g. funding requirements), assessing the effectiveness of adaptation measures.EEA published a report on urban vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in May 2012 and is preparing 2 other reports: 1) 2012 indicator based report on climate change impacts and vulnerability in Europe (due in November 2012) 2) 2012 report on adaptation to climate change in Europe (due in early 2013) Assess the cost and benefit of adaptation options by 2011 || K || Even if actions have been undertaken to better assess the costs and benefits of adaptation options, in particular at a microeconomic level, some important gaps remain, in particular on the macroeconomic approach to model adaptation and assess their implications. A database on adaptation measures will be the backbone of this action. It will be integrated into Climate-ADAPT and will gather information available from existing FP7 projects and other on-going projects (see above). A methodological study has been launched that will conduct an extensive review of available information on costs of adaptation on adaptation measures within the EU and a review of existing methodologies for identifying these costs. It will also assess and compare such methodologies, identify the methodological and data challenges associated with calculating the expenditure on adaptation. It will propose a set of criteria for classifying different projects, programs or budget lines and calculating the expenditure on and propose a system to estimate the "adaptation share" for projects not exclusively intended for adaptation as well as producing a list of frequently occurring cases and borderline cases. The JRC PESETA II project, i.e. a multi-sectoral, bottom-up high-resolution impact and adaptation assessment using most recent high-resolution regional climate projections for Europe (IPCC/SRES in ENSEMBLES project) and operational physical impact models was initiated. . Results will be publicly available by the end of the year Develop guidelines and surveillance mechanisms on the health impacts of climate change by 2011. || J || The EU has explored with the WHO and EU agencies means of ensuring adequate surveillance and control of the impact of climate change on health, such as epidemiological surveillance, the control of communicable diseases and the effects of extreme events. The Parma Ministerial Declaration brings new priorities in the environment and health process with one pillar dedicated on protecting health and environment from climate change. The Health Programme of the EU has been the key financing mechanism for projects, setting up networks and initiatives to support the work of the Health Security Committee. Funding of projects to address adaptation to climate change has been foreseen under the work plans for 2009-2011, including: PHASE will provide the public health sector with prevention guidelines to promote resilience and reduce health risk associated to extreme weather events, their environmental consequences and development of tools to select vulnerable subgroups most at risk to specific extreme weather events; CLIMATE TRAP: Impact assessment, surveillance and preparedness guidelines, training, will play a pivotal role in assisting the process of strengthening the implementation of existing warning systems and plans and in strengthening the Health Sector in preparedness in facing the health impact of climate change; HIALINE aims at evaluating the effects of climate diversity and change on airborne allergen exposure, and to implement an outdoor allergen early warning network; EUROSUN aims at monitoring ultra violet exposure in the EU and its effects on incidence of skin cancers and cataracts; EUROMOMO aims at developing and operating a coordinated approach to real-time mortality monitoring across Europe such as pandemic influenza, emerging infections as well as environmental conditions with an impact on public health, i.e. heat waves and cold spells; CEHAPIS: Impact assessment, policy options and indicators on health and climate change aims at providing an evaluation of policy option impacts for successful health adaptation to climate change and monitor trends and policies over time; EDEN(Emerging diseases in a changing European environment) contributed to this effort. Atopica: Atopic diseases in changing climate, land use and air quality. ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) has completed an infectious disease threat assessment with international experts (Suk, 2011). In the threat assessment numerous key disease drivers were identified to explore how they might interact to create new risks or exacerbate current ones. EFSA is developing scientific reports on vector-borne diseases and has already issued a general overview of the geographical distribution of tick species and an update on the role of tick vectors in the epidemiology of African Swine Fever and Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever in Eurasia. Step up existing animal disease surveillance and control systems. || J || The development of a new Animal Disease Information System (ADIS), which will be operational in early 2013, will provide better and more comparable epidemiological data to risk managers, enabling them to better identify, evaluate and respond to changing or emerging disease situations. Assess the impacts of climate change and adaptation policies on employment and on the well-being of vulnerable social groups. || K || Although initiatives are addressing climate change and health issues, no detailed assessment is available yet on the employment and well-being implications of climate change. Some achievements have been met in the context of the recently adopted employment strategy, and in particular by the work on green jobs. The social dimension of adaptation policies needs to be pursued within existing EU processes in the social and employment fields, and all social partners need to be involved. ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) is mapping EU vulnerability on climate change and has developed a Handbook for National Vulnerability, Impact, and Adaptation Assessments. See also PHASE project. Ensure that measures for adaptation and water management are embedded in rural development national strategies and programmes for 2007-2013 || J || Completed, as far as the current rural development programmes will last until 2013. The EU regulation on rural development 2007-2013 contains explicit references to the need to anticipate the likely effects of climate change on agriculture. After the "Health check" of the CAP in 2008, additional funds to measures that target new challenges faced by agriculture, such as climate change and the need for better water management, were made available. The revised RD programmes have been approved by the Commission within 6 months and the additional resources used as from 2009. A share of 15% of the new funds made available has been allocated to mitigation and adaptation measures. In addition, some measures aiming at improving water management (22% of funds allocated) and biodiversity (34%) will have some positive impact on adaptation. Consider how adaptation can be integrated into the 3 strands of rural development and give adequate support for sustainable production including how the CAP contributes to the efficient use of water in agriculture || J || Completed, as far as the current rural development programmes will last until 2013. A number of actions with adaptation potential have been programmed by Member States and regions. Almost 70% of the RDP include actions to renovate irrigation equipment to improve the efficiency of water use. Half of the RDP supports waste water treatment installations on farms and water saving production techniques. Around 40% of the programmes also include the development/improvement of farm water storage capacity. After the 2008 "Health Check" reform better water management objectives have been included in the scope of cross compliance with a new "good agricultural and environmental condition" (GAEC) related to protection and management of water. Examine the capacity of the Farm advisory System to reinforce training, knowledge and adoption of new technologies that facilitate adaptation || J || The Farm Advisory System (FAS) is an important tool to improve farm management. It requires national authorities to offer advice to farmers, at least for the rules included into cross compliance. Member States may use the FAS for advising farmers on the respect of standards going beyond cross compliance, e.g., water commitments under agri-environmental measures. RDP provides the possibility to co-finance the setting-up of the FAS and its use by farmers. The Commission proposal for the CAP post-2013 foresees to extend its scope to climate-related aspects, such as information on prospective impacts of climate change in the relevant regions, impact on GHG emissions of the relevant farming practices and on the contribution of the agricultural sector to mitigation. Update forest strategy and launch debate on options for an EU approach on forest protection and forest information systems || J || Completed, with the expected adoption of the new EU Forest Strategy The 1998 EU Forestry Strategy established a framework for forest-related actions in support of sustainable forest management (SFM) which is currently being revised. A Green Paper on forest protection and forest information (preparing forests for climate change) was adopted in 2010 with a view to strengthening EU action on forest protection and forest information systems; currently a follow-up of the Green Paper on forest protection and information is ongoing. Two ongoing studies will have links to adaptation: "Disturbance of EU forests by biotic agents" and "Influences of EU forests on weather patterns". The EU’s rural development policy for the period 2007–2013 provides a basis for the full integration of forestry. In the context of the review of Rural Development Policy post 2013 the further development of the forestry measures will be examined. A new EU Forest Strategy is expected to be adopted in Spring 2013. Explore the possibilities to improve policies and develop measures which address biodiversity loss and climate change in an integrated manner to fully exploit co-benefits and avoid ecosystem feedbacks that accelerate global warming || J || Climate change was one of the four key policy areas identified in the Communication on "Halting the loss of Biodiversity by 2010 – and beyond" and the Biodiversity Action Plan includes the objective "to support biodiversity adaptation to climate change". The EU Biodiversity Strategy up to 2020 reiterates that biodiversity loss and climate change are intrinsically linked and states that "Ecosystem-based approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation can offer cost-effective alternatives to technological solutions, while delivering multiple benefits beyond biodiversity conservation". Green Infrastructure is seen as an essential means of integrating biodiversity and climate change adaptation, a Green Paper on Green Infrastructure shall be presented by the end of 2012. Develop guidelines and a set of tools (guidance and exchange of best practices) by the end of 2009 to ensure that the River Basin Management Plans (RBMP) are climate-proofed || J || The Water Framework Directive provides European countries with a common basis to address water challenges posed by climate change. In particular, the Directive’s river basin approach to water management – centred on the establishment and review of river basin management plans every six years, including a Programme of Measures to bring waters to good status, establishes a mechanism to prepare for and adapt to climate change. The first river basin management plans were required by 22 December 2009. The ClimWatAdapt study, completed in 2011, looked into how key sectors, i.e. agriculture, industry, tourism, can adapt in order to counterbalance the effects of floods, water scarcity, droughts and changes in water quantity and aims to provide a sound basis for the assessment of vulnerability and of adaptation measures in the context of water policy, but also other environmental and sectoral policies. Ensure that climate change is taken into account in the implementation of the Floods Directive. || K || Most Member States are doing so but the level of ambition may differ across Member States Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks requires Member States to assess if water courses and coast lines are at risk from flooding, then to map flood risks and to take adequate and coordinated measures to reduce the risk. Work is progressing on a catalogue of good adaptation measures and on the improvement of the information on past floods. Most Member States reported their preliminary flood risk assessments by March 2010. Member States must by 2013 develop flood hazard maps and flood risk maps for areas where potential significant flood risk exists. Assess the need for further measures to enhance water efficiency in agriculture, households and buildings || J || The 2007 Communication on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and drought in the EU set out a number of policy options for addressing water scarcity, including the important roles played by water pricing and land-use planning in incentivising efficient water use. The Policy Review for Water Scarcity and Droughts will be integrated into the "Blueprint to safeguard European waters" to be presented by the Commission by November 2012. A set of completed studies helped bridging important knowledge gaps as regards water scarcity & droughts in the EU and assessed what measures are needed to improve water efficiency in various sectors: agriculture, buildings, water distribution networks, product labelling. Explore the potential for policies and measures to boost ecosystem storage capacity for water in Europe || J || The Water Framework Directive (WFD) will contribute strongly to improving and maintaining ecosystems and works in order to deliver guidance on the relationship between inland river waterways and Natura 2000, selecting best-practice examples for integrated management, combining nature protection, climate change adaptation and transport navigation measures are ongoing. A service contract for the analysis of costs, benefits and climate proofing of natural water retention measures, as part of the "green infrastructure" approach for flood and water scarcity & droughts prevention was completed in April 2012. Modelling of the land-use, hydrological, and economic impacts of the natural water retention measures is undertaken by JRC in the context of the impact assessment of the Blueprint Communication, which will address the need and potential options for unlocking the potential of these measures. Draft guidelines by 2010 on dealing with the impact of climate change on the management of Natura 2000 sites. || J || Completed when the guidelines are published As the establishment phase is nearing completion the focus is increasingly on the management and restoration of sites in the network, and on its overall ecological coherence. A study on Biodiversity and Climate Change in relation to Natura 2000 was conducted. The guidelines on Natura 2000 and climate change will assess current knowledge of risk from climate change to species and habitats of EU conservation concern protected by the network, as well setting out on approaches to reduce, mitigate and adapt to such impacts, both within the sites and at broader network level. They will also look at the benefits arising from management and restoration of Natura 2000 sites to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Further assisting guidelines will help dealing with the impact of climate change on the management of Natura 2000. Scheduled issuing autumn 2012. Ensure that adaptation in coastal and marine areas is taken into account in the framework of the Integrated Maritime Policy, in the implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and in the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. || K || Additional efforts would be needed at Member State level to meet the objectives When addressing maritime activities from a cross-sectorial perspective, the EU Integrated Maritime Policy provides a comprehensive framework for better understanding the impacts of climate change with coastal and marine areas and to integrate measures on climate change adaptation at EU level. The EU Integrated Maritime Policy is implemented at the level of marine regions and specific Sea Basin strategies have already been developed for the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Sea Basin. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive will facilitate adaptation to climate change by ensuring that climate change considerations are incorporated into Member States’ marine strategies while providing a mechanism for regular updating of the marine strategies to take account of new information. Knowledge gaps in relation to climate change adaptation for marine and costal issues are handled with in the context of the EU Adaptation Strategy under the Commission’s Green Paper on Marine Knowledge 2020. The Common Fisheries Policy is currently subjected to a root-and-branch overhaul with a view, in particular, to rebuild stocks to levels capable to produce maximum sustainable yield. Increasing the size of fish stocks and their productivity will make them less vulnerable to external factors like climate change. A more coherent and integrated approach to coastal and maritime planning and management through integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and maritime spatial planning (MSP) will benefit adaptation in coastal and marine areas. The ICZM Recommendation (2002/413/EC) provides for Member States to take a strategic approach to the management of their coastal zones. The proposal for an EU framework on ICZM and MSP is expected towards the end of 2012. Develop European guidelines on adaptation in coastal and marine areas || L || The Commission is committed to developing guidelines on best practice in coastal and marine areas which will contribute to ensuring a coordinated and integrated approach to climate change adaptation in these areas. This could be addressed as part of the EU Communication on a strategy on adaptation to climate change to be adopted in 2013. The guidance will take account of and build on existing studies, research and relevant policy initiatives, in particular the Community strategy on disaster prevention, the Floods directive, the EUrosion study and the study on the Costs of coastal defence and adaptation. OURCOAST is an initiative to support and implement sustainable coastal planning and management. It includes a database of coastal planning and management practices, with a key focus on adaptation to risks and climate change. Take account of climate change impacts in the Strategic Energy Review process || K || Although clear synergies exist between energy efficiency and climate change adaptation objectives, further considerations is needed on adaptation for the long-term objectives of EU energy policy. The EU’s agenda for 2020 has set out the essential first steps in the transition to a high-efficiency, low-carbon energy system. The EU needs to develop a vision for 2050 and a policy agenda for 2030. The fundamental technological shifts involved in decarbonising the EU electricity supply, ending oil dependence in transport, low energy and positive power buildings, a smart interconnected electricity network will only happen with a coordinated agenda for research and technological development, regulation, investment and infrastructure development. In addition, the transition to a high efficiency, low-carbon energy system needs to be promoted not only in Europe but worldwide. The Energy Roadmap towards 2050 was adopted in December 2011. Develop methodologies for climate-proofing infrastructure projects and consider how these could be incorporated into the TEN-T and TEN-E guidelines and guidance on investments under Cohesion policy in the current period || K || References to climate change have been included in the proposals for TEN-E and TEN-T guidelines, although how to implement this in practice could be clarified to help transmission system operators meet their objectives of secure system operations. The 2008 Green Paper on infrastructure was designed to encourage a reflection on how energy networks should develop in the coming years, amongst others, to reflect the new climate change and energy policy. The Commission is currently working on a comprehensive energy infrastructure package. Elements such as increasing resilience of energy transmission infrastructure to cope with extreme weather condition, positioning of over-head power lines, impacts of climate change on LNG infrastructure will be examined in the TEN-E revision process. The TEN-T programme consists of hundreds of projects whose ultimate purpose is to ensure the cohesion, interconnection and interoperability of the trans-European transport network, as well as access to it. . Explore the possibility of making climate impact assessment a condition for public and private investment || L || In the discussions on the future Cohesion Policy the inclusion of climate proofing as a horizontal condition for all investments is ongoing. Including climate proofing provisions in EU co-financed programmes could be exemplary for national and local public investments and for private sector take-up. Assess the feasibility of incorporating climate impacts into construction design standards, such as Eurocodes || K || While design standards are covering conventional aspects of stability (including seismic activities) an evaluation of if and how climate change should be addressed in European design standards is still ongoing The Eurocodes are currently taken up by Member States and several have already fully replaced their previous national codes with the Eurocodes. In principle Member States are supposed to have the Eurocodes in place since the beginning of 2011. A new mandate to CEN is requiring an analysis of if and where climate change issues should be included in these design standards. The reply (work programme) is foreseen for early 2013. Develop guidelines by 2011 to ensure that climate impacts are taken into account in the EIA and SEA Directives || J || Completed when the guidelines become available. The Commission has decided to develop practical guidance and recommendations for integrating climate change and biodiversity into EIA/SEA procedures to assist EIA/SEA practitioners in taking full advantage of EIA and SEA in achieving EU climate change and biodiversity goals. The study contract for the development of the guidance was finalised in December 2011. It is expected that the Commission Guidance should be subject to inter-service consultations in Sep-Oct 2012 and made publicly available by the end of 2012. Estimate adaptation costs for relevant policy areas so that they can be taken into account in future financial decisions || K || Some actions have been undertaken but there are still important knowledge gaps CLIMATECOST developed estimates of adaptation costs and benefits for Europe in the following sectors: Coasts and tourism, Agriculture and water, Energy consumption and production, Infrastructure and extremes (floods & storms), Health, Ecosystems and forests. A methodological study finalised at the beginning of 2011 addresses the typology of adaptation actions, the methodology to project future adaptation costs and the methodology to estimate spending on adaptation. Further examine the potential use of innovative funding measures for adaptation || K || A study commissioned by DG CLIMA in 2010 has reviewed and assessed the potential use of economic instruments for climate change adaptation purposes. The Commission is exploring possibilities for the future Life+ instrument to address adaptation issues. The instrument would among other issues finance adaptation actions and would be managed in an innovative manner. Drafting needs to be improved Explore the potential for insurance and other financial products to complement adaptation measures and to function as risk sharing instruments || K || Completed but not yet mainstreamed in EU policies. A study on applying economic instruments for adaptation to climate change was finalised in 2011 which explored the application of the following instruments: Risk Management Instruments, Market Based Instruments, Public Private Partnerships. The application of the instruments is analysed from two perspectives: Promoting adaptation to climate change and sharing (transferring) the risks of climate change. Encourage Member States to utilise the EU’s ETS revenues for adaptation purposes || K || Some Member States are already considering the use of auctioning allowances for adaptation projects (AT, FR, etc.) The possibility of using revenue generated from auctioning allowances under the EU ETS for adaptation purposes should be utilised. The revised Directive governing the scheme from 2013 provides that at least 50% of the revenue generated from auctioning allowances should be used, inter alia for adaptation in Member States and developing countries. This additional revenue will be crucial for sharing adaptation costs between the public and private sector. Take a decision to establish by 1 September 2009 an Impact and Adaptation Steering Group (IASG) to step up cooperation on adaptation || J || In order to assist the Commission in developing its approach to dealing with adaptation, the Adaptation Steering Group was established in September 2010. This Group brings together Member States and a diverse range of stakeholders and is giving guidance about the work on mainstreaming of Adaptation into various EU policies and other issues. The Group is also supposed to assist the COM in the establishment of the 2013 Adaptation Strategy. Encourage the further development of National and Regional Adaptation Strategies with a view to considering mandatory adaptation strategies from 2012 || K || Not all Member States or regions have developed yet an adaptation strategy Guidelines for regional adaptation strategies were developed and made available on DG Clima's website. Currently 12 Member States have adopted an adaptation strategy; other Member States are in the process of doing so. . Step-up efforts to mainstream adaptation into all EU external policies || Not assessed in the context of this exercise || Bilateral and regional financial assistance programmes will aim to integrate adaptation considerations into all relevant sectors. The proposed review of the EU Environment Integration Strategy presents a good opportunity to emphasise the need for integrating adaptation needs, as will the Mid-Term Review of EC cooperation strategies. Strengthen dialogue with partner countries on adaptation issues || The EU is strengthening its analysis and early warning systems and integrating climate change into existing tools such as conflict prevention mechanisms and security sector reform. Adaptation is also being brought into the dialogue with European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partner countries and the regular "Energy, Transport, Environment" sub-committees offer a forum for structured dialogue. Take the Framework for Action on Adaptation forward in the UNFCCC || The EU is taking an active role in the negotiations to ensure adaptation issues are adequately dealt with in a post 2012 agreement. 1.4.2. Additional initiatives Table 3:
Policy actions beyond mainstreaming activities as mentioned in the White Paper
of Adaptation Policy option/Action || Timeline || Related Policy documents || Related adaptation measures Commission Recommendation on Research joint programming initiative ‘Connecting Climate Knowledge for Europe’ || tentative: Adoption end of Oct. 2011, targeted for Council meeting 5 Dec 2011 || Commission Recommendation and Staff Working Paper || 1) Improve climate predictability, 2) Developing climate services, 3) Understanding societal transformation and 4) Improving decision-making Set up of a Copernicus Climate Service. The service will be based on satellite and in-situ monitoring data, Modelling of the entire Earth system, including Model reanalysis and data assimilation. Specific services for Impact assessment (Indicators) and Attribution will be included || Definition of the service is still on going as part of the preparation of the Copernicus Operations from 2014 onwards. Developements activities are planned through the last call of the FP7 Space theme. || Documents related to Copernicus activities || No adaptation measures, but the Service will support Adaptation policy (i.e. the European Climate Adaptation Platform – CLIMATE ADAPT) Reform of the Common Agricultural policy for the period 2014-2020 (on-going) || 2012 || Commission Communication on the CAP towards 2020 (November 2010) and Legal proposals for the CAP after 2013 (October 2011), currently being discussed with the Member States and the European Parliament (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/legal-proposals/index_en.htm) || Enhancing farmers' resilience to the threats posed by climate change features among the three main objectives of the next CAP for the period 2014-2020. A climate resilient agriculture is one of the six key priorities for the future rural development policy and Member States will be requested to plan actions related to all priorities. Adaptation is also an aspect to be taken into account when assessing the specific needs of the other five priorities. The future RD will offer a wide range of possibilities to support actions that are targeted or relevant for preparing for climate change impacts, particularly for water management. Green Paper on Marine Knowledge || 2012 || 2013 EU Strategy on Climate Change Adaptation 2007 Blue Book on Integrated Maritime Policy 2010 Report from the EU Parliament on the EU Integrated Maritime Policy || No specific adaptation measures, but the Service is developing a study on Marine Knowledge that will explore the benefits, for both bussiness and public autorithies, of reducing the uncertainty in the behaviour of the sea. Improving marine knowledge will contribute to take better adaptation measures to Climate Change 1.5. An overview and review of
adaptation strategies 1.5.1. Perspective on Member States' actions As of January 2013, 15 EU Member States
have adopted an adaptation policy (strategy and / or plan) so far. Overall, the
Adaptation Strategies that currently exist for European Member States are
comprehensive and well-established. Some set out concrete action plans, namely
Finland, Germany, Denmark, France, Malta and Spain. The Belgian and Portuguese
adaptation strategies are comprehensive but do not include action plans. The
Netherlands adaptation strategy, while comprehensive, states that it is a
preliminary document setting out the first steps towards an agenda for a
climate-resilient Netherlands. All adaptation strategies appear to be intended
as evolving documents which will be reviewed and updated to take account of advancing
climate change science, research and technology. Austria adopted its adaptation
strategy in October this year. Slovenia has an adaptation strategy planned
for adoption in the near future. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic have announced their
willingness to develop an adaptation strategy or are in the process of
preparing one. Member States for which the adoption of an adaptation strategy
currently remains uncertain include Greece and Luxembourg. A brief analysis of the existing adaptation
strategies is given in the following 1.5.1.1. Brief analysis of existing
adaptation strategies[93] Legal framework; mandatory and voluntary
actions Each of the Adaptation Strategies has been
directed by government; therefore it is considered that the Member State is
committed to delivering all actions outlined in the adaptation strategy.
However to provide further detail on the types of actions, mandatory actions
are defined as those which have a specific legal requirement or policy
commitment (e.g. relating to the Water Framework Directive). Voluntary actions
are those without a specific policy commitment (e.g. general awareness raising
activities). However, this is not always made explicit. Action plans 6 of the adaptation strategies in place
have action plans of varying levels of detail. The Finnish adaptation strategy
assigns timeframes and owners to the adaptation actions, which are categorised
by sector. The German adaptation strategy is accompanied by an action plan
which commits to concrete steps in its further development and implementation.
It follows an integrated approach which takes account of the interactions
between sectoral and regional activities and strives to anchor consideration of
the possible impacts of climate change in all relevant policies. In some cases
the adaptation strategy provides a framework for developing an adaptation Plan,
e.g. Belgium and Portugal. The Dutch adaptation strategy recognises that a
framework for assessing adaptation actions is the ‘missing link’, but the Delta
Programme has been commissioned to fill this gap. Trans-boundary and international issues Only one of the adaptation strategies in
place considers trans-boundary issues, i.e. those issues affecting neighbouring
countries: Belgium. The Belgian adaptation strategy mentions the cross-border
SCALDWIN project (2009-2012) which aims to identify the best measures available
for an improvement of the ecological status of surface water and groundwater,
and a promotion of biodiversity in the Scheldt basin. The TIDE project
(2010-2013) focuses on a better knowledge of the ecosystem functioning and a
coherent management of the estuaries including the Scheldt (BE/NL). The AMICE
project (2009-2012) is a transnational project about the adaptation of the
Meuse and its catchments to the impact of flooding and low waters due to
climate change. The Future Cities - project (2009-2012) aims at making city
regions in Northwest Europe fit to cope with the predicted climate change impacts.
While the Maltese adaptation strategy does not make significant reference to
trans-boundary issues, it highlights that the Environmental Impact Assessment
regulations can address the trans-boundary effects of a development project and
sets out the procedures to be followed when a project is likely to have a
trans-boundary impact. In contrast eight of the adaptation
strategies consider international issues: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Malta, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. For example, the
international focus is very important for the ARK programme in the Netherlands,
both in terms of the development of knowledge and policy. Knowledge will be
developed in a manner consistent with international programmes and initiatives
such as Climate Impact Research Coordination for a Larger Europe (CIRCLE),
Biodiversity Requires Adaptation in Northwest Europe under a Changing Climate
(BRANCHE) and European Spatial Planning: Adaptation to Climate Events (ESPACE).
The projects of the EU's Sixth Framework Programme will also be involved. The
Finnish adaptation strategy contains a chapter on the need to adapt to changes
taking place in other parts of the world, including the adaptive capacity in
different countries; the interrelationship between the global impacts and
adaptation to climate change in Finland; financial measures and mechanisms and
connections between adaptation and reduction of emissions. The adaptation
strategy recognises that climate change will bring challenges in the planning
of Finland’s development cooperation. International supply issues, for example
concerning food and water, by contrast are only mentioned in two adaptation
strategy (Finland and Belgium). Governance structure for implementation Eight adaptation strategies have been
directed by government. This explains why they are being implemented (or will
be implemented) by government / inter-ministerial committees or working groups,
e.g. Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The objective of these
working groups is to create a forum for cross-department working, as well as to
reach out to businesses and citizens at the national, regional and local
levels. In the Netherlands, the State wishes for all parties, including
government bodies, the business community, scientists, and civil-society
organisations, to share in the responsibility for implementing the adaptation
strategy. In Belgium, it is foreseen that the future adaptation strategy will
be based on a bottom-up approach, building on the plans already developed by
the regions of Walloon, Flanders and Brussels. A number of regional committees
are already bringing together the sectors. This will result in the federal
government working closely with regional government to ensure effective
implementation and follow-up (monitoring and evaluation). This approach
confirms an acceptance of adaptation as something that must be implemented by
stakeholders at all levels and in all areas of society, and not something to be
pursued in isolation of other policy objectives, programmes and services.
Adaptation is an emerging policy area and it is important for government
(national or regional) to facilitate dialogue with the relevant stakeholders
and to be seen to be leading by example until adaptation becomes firmly
embedded. In Denmark, the central government plays less of a role and
adaptation strategy development and implementation is driven by the
municipalities. Integration and mainstreaming Each of the adaptation strategies has been
developed with sectoral focus, reflecting the need for Cross-Government
Adaptation Working Groups to drive implementation. Integration and
mainstreaming adaptation with existing national programmes and policies is
central to each of the adaptation strategies. For example, the objective of the
Spanish adaptation strategy is to mainstream adaptation to climate change in
the planning processes of all the relevant sectors or systems. To achieve this,
it is important that the development of the Plan becomes a major collective
project with the participation of all institutions and key players. In Finland,
some government departments have already developed adaptation plans of their
own, e.g. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to assist with integrating and
mainstreaming adaptation in other policy areas. The French adaptation strategy
outlines a number of cross-sectoral initiatives, e.g. Club ViTeCC connects
local policy makers with scientists involved in adaptation, thus addressing the
need for information on the local climate impacts and for funding innovative
projects; indeed ‘cross-cutting actions’ is one of the 20 thematic areas
outlined in the adaptation strategy. The German adaptation strategy follows an
integrated approach which takes account of the interactions between sectoral
and regional activities and strives to anchor consideration of the possible
impacts of climate change in all relevant policies. The German adaptation
strategy is intended to supplement and support other cross-sectoral strategies
such as the National Strategy for Biological Diversity. In other Member States,
integration and mainstreaming of adaptation is a key pillar of the adaptation
strategy, including in Denmark, and the Netherlands. Communication and awareness raising As with integrating and mainstreaming
adaptation, communication and awareness raising is another key principle of
each of the adaptation strategy. Member States acknowledge that without
effective communication and awareness raising, the adaptation strategy will not
be successful. For example, the Spanish adaptation strategy states “the
National Adaptation Plan will not be effective unless its existence, progress
and results are disseminated and communicated to stakeholders”. In
Portugal, awareness raising and knowledge dissemination are one of four
objectives. The Dutch adaptation strategy centres on three work packages, all
of which depend on awareness raising and communication. Communication is also inherent in many of
the actions outlined in the adaptation strategy. In France, four thematic
groups explicitly addressing communication have been created. These are:
information, education and training, research and governance. The success of
other actions depends on effective communication, e.g. the National Flash Flood
Plan. Finally the Cross-Government Working Groups which have been created will
also facilitate communication and awareness raising. 1.5.1.2. Barriers and challenges identified to the development of adaptation strategies Fundamental understanding of what
adaptation is Understanding of what adaptation is by
policy-makers still remains a barrier, there is often a mix up between what is
mitigation and what is adaptation. Also, society in general does not have
enough understanding of what adaptation is about. The Italian experience of
working with municipalities has shown that there is need to make them aware
they may already be working on adaptation, and that they are just not calling
it adaptation. It was reported that there is a lack of understanding of what
adaptation is by the scientific community in some countries and that it is not
only about action, but having a strong scientific knowledge base behind it to
inform planning. Insufficient human and financial
resources Some central governments have little
management or technical capacity so their adaptation role is about
mainstreaming, improving access to the knowledgebase, assisting organisation
with technical queries on adaptation, promoting the participatory process,
responsibility for international and EU commitments. Insufficient human resources and financial
resources at all levels is a major barrier, more so under the current economic
climate where results of the debates and agreed proposals are difficult to take
forward due to a lack of human resources both for research and the incentive to
move forward. Financing is an issue more widely for adaptation, specific
studies need to be commissioned and budgets do not always allow for this. If
national government budgets are cut so will the budget for climate change. To
try and overcome this, Malta suggested an independent authority that is
separate so decisions can be taken even during elections and changing
governments. In some Southern European Countries, the
restructuring of the public services has delayed action and reduced or changed
staff in sectors. This has delayed work in almost every sector and at
coordination level. However, in the case of Portugal, this has created the
opportunity to create an adaptation team in the Portuguese Environment Agency. Partial lack of dedicated research,
which is also hard to identify Southern European Countries want to
compile, collect and organize existing information with relevance for
adaptation to climate change first as they realise a lot of research exists
already, but is disperse and is not easily accessible. This takes time and
slows the production or move to developing the national strategy. Terminology used to interact with
stakeholders Terminology confusion and the mixing of
mitigation issues and other political issues with adaptation make communication
internally and with stakeholders difficult. The distinction between adaptation
strategy and adaptation plan and which is most appropriate in the country makes
it harder to inform the Commission or compare member states on the status of
national progress on adaptation. Mitigation is more straight-forward to
communicate Mitigation is much simpler to communicate
as the measures are easier to understand (e.g. through quantitative analysis,
progress towards targets). Mitigation is more quantitative so it is easier to
measure progress, adaptation is more difficult to measure and update year on
year. Countries are finding it difficult to addressing urgency of adaptation
planning when the focus is on mitigation; some countries suggested the focus
and strategies should be on both mitigation and adaptation together. How to mainstream adaptation Mainstreaming adaptation into existing EU
policies without creating extra administrative burden on Member States is a
major challenge which combined with the need to address more medium to long
term adaptation planning that is outside Member States elections results in a
major barrier to overcome to progress towards a national strategy for
adaptation. The uncertainty gap Bridging the uncertainty gap is also a
challenge, especially on communicating this well so that institutions and
stakeholders do not use uncertainty to do nothing and focus on short-term
planning and reacting. The Joint CIRCLE-2 and DG CLIMA project
“Support to the development of the EU strategy for adaptation to climate
change” SHARE Workshop Supporting the development of the EU strategy for
adaptation to climate change – Views and Challenges in Eastern Europe in Vienna
on 2 July 2012 found that many Eastern European countries are facing similar
barriers in terms of financial and practical constraints. Funding is seen as a
very important issue to get work on adaptation policies started. Countries
from Eastern Europe also highlighted the lack of knowledge base as a major
barrier to developing an adaptation strategy (i.e. collection of other projects
data with a new ‘label’ called adaptation). There is expectation from the EU
level that there will be an external ‘push’ for action (with the EU setting the
example for action). 1.5.2. Transnational, regional and
local adaptation efforts Many transnational cooperation projects on
adaptation have been initiated over the last years. They are typically
partially financed by EU-funds such as the Life+ and INTERREG programmes.
INTERREG activities have been initiated in all regions in Europe. However most
focus on North-West Europe and the Alps while less adaptation projects address
the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. An overview of on-going and finalized
projects can be found on Climate-ADAPT[94]. INTERREG projects differ in scope and
focus, nevertheless they share the advantage to deal with regional specifics
and develop appropriate adaptation responses. They all very much focus on
involving stakeholders on regional and local level aiming at gathering
knowledge and specific needs from the regional and local communities and
develop jointly feasible adaptation responses. Many of these transnational
projects are set up with case study regions within the greater transnational
cooperation area, where project results can be tested and discussed with
regional and local stakeholders towards their practical applicability. Results of INTERREG projects often also
inform sub-national and national strategic initiatives and programmes or are
even being integrated in legislation. UN Conventions as e.g. the Alpine and
Carpathian Conventions are highly engaged with INTERREG projects and make use
of their outcomes in a political context (e.g. Climate Action Plan under the
Alpine Convention). On local efforts, some information has been
provided by Member States towards the countries webpages on Climate-ADAPT[95] on a voluntarily base end of 2011. Most of the local actions
reported seem to be triggered by research programmes, either on national or EU
level. Many EU Member States also established databases on their national
climate change website that collect and present regional and local adaptation
good practices. On the policy level, Denmark is particularly focusing its
adaptation efforts on municipalities with all of them having to prepare climate
change adaptation plans within the next 2 years. City level adaptation has been addressed in
detail in the EEA 2012 report ‘Urban adaptation to climate change in Europe’
(EEA 2012)[96], which provides a wide range of examples of local adaptation action
in various European countries. 1.6. JRC PESETA II: methodology
and preliminary results[97] This annex presents the
methodology and preliminary results of the economic integration of the
biophysical impacts of the JRC PESETA II project, and other impact evidence
derived from the FP7 ClimateCost project (on coastal impacts and agriculture in
the 2080s), into the computable general equilibrium (CGE) GEM-E3 model[98]. The four main questions
to be addressed are the following. Firstly, how great are the impacts of climate
change under future climate scenarios, in particular, under a reference and a
2°C scenario? Secondly, what are the distributional implications of climate
impacts? Fairness and equity issues can be analysed assessing the dispersion of
economic impacts across EU regions. Thirdly, by how much can adaptation reduce
climate impacts? Fourthly, are spatial (cross-country) transboundary impacts
significant? With the proposed
methodology high time-space resolution climate data feed highly disaggregated
sector-specific impact models to estimate the biophysical impacts. Such
structural approach, as opposed to the reduced form formulation, aims indeed to
consistently integrate what is known on climate impacts in the various natural
sciences disciplines into the economic analysis. With this kind of methodology
it is possible to derive macroeconomic estimates of the economic effects. Methodology
and scope of assessment The methodology here
applied has three steps, following Ciscar et al. (2011). In the first stage the
climate runs used as input to all biophysical models are selected. In a second
stage, the biophysical impact models are run to compute the biophysical
impacts. In a third step, those impacts are valued in economic terms using a
computable general equilibrium model. The use of a multi-country
general equilibrium model implies that the economic impacts include both the
direct impact of climate change (e.g. the losses in the agriculture sector due
to lower yields) and the indirect consequences in the rest of the sectors (e.g.
in the agrofood industry) and the rest of the world (considered via trade
flows). The main economic output variables relate to household welfare, and
GDP. The study evaluates a
counterfactual situation: the impact of future climate on the economy of today.
This approach is known as comparative static. The advantage of this approach is
that the modelling effort can be focused on the impacts of climate change
rather than the wider question of how Europe's economy might develop to 2100.
The disadvantage is that by definition the interactions between climate change
and economic and population growth are not considered, since climate change is
the only shock imposed on the EU economy. From this perspective, impacts are
underestimated because economic growth would notably increase the assets
exposed to climate risk. The following climate
impact categories have been considered in the preliminary economic assessment:
agriculture, coastal areas, energy, river floods, forest fires, and transport
infrastructure[99]. The results are
presented dividing the EU into the following regions, according to their
latitude and the relative economic size, as it was made in PESETA: -
Northern Europe: Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Denmark. -
UK & Ireland: UK and Ireland. -
Central Europe north: Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Poland. -
Central Europe south: France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Romania. -
Southern Europe: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria. All reported impacts
assume that there is not public adaptation, unless otherwise stated. Therefore,
the methodology can be useful to understand where to prioritise adaptation
options. Economic impacts on
welfare are provided in monetary terms, and are presented undiscounted, in 2005
Euros. The welfare changes are also compared to GDP. Climate
scenarios and runs For the JRC PESETA II
study climate simulation runs were obtained from the FP6 ENSEMBLES project (van
der Linden and Mitchell, 2009). Runs were driven either by the SRES A1B
emission scenario (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), or the so called E1 emission
scenario (Tol, 2006). The E1 scenario was developed within ENSEMBLES as an
attempt to match the European Union target of keeping global anthropogenic
warming below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. It is important to note
that climate model outputs may present significant errors (biases) when
compared to observations: for instance, modelled summer temperatures in Southern Europe are usually overestimated, while large biases exist for precipitation. The
existence of such biases needs to be taken into account when using the outputs
of climate models for impact assessment. Consequently, the climate runs
originally obtained from the ENSEMBLES project (12 A1B and 3 E1) were corrected
for biases in temperature and precipitation by Dosio and Paruolo (2011), and
Dosio et al. (2012). Process-based
impact models are often too expensive to consider running every single climate run
through every physical impact model. Therefore, the JRC
PESETA II study considered four core climate runs: -
Reference Run. It
is interpreted as representing well the central or
average of the A1B runs. This run is called 'reference' in this project, being
interpreted as business as usual scenario. Two additional A1B runs show
significant deviations from the average climate change signal, being usually warmer and drier (Reference Variant 1) or colder and wetter
(Reference Variant 2) than the average; -
Reference Variant 1 is the climate run that is warmer and drier
than the average; -
Reference Variant
2 is the climate run that is colder and wetter than the average; -
The 2°C Scenario. This run is an example of the E1 scenario. This run is therefore
referred to as '2°C scenario' in the project. The combination of
climate models chosen for each core run is shown in Table 4[100]. All the models driven by the same A1B emission scenario represent
an equally probable projection of the future evolution of the climate. However,
the selected runs show a significant variety in climate change signal for both
temperature and precipitation. One can therefore expect that by using these
three simulations as an input for the study of impact assessment of climate
change, the main statistical characteristics of the A1B scenario as modelled by
the whole ensemble of RCMs are relatively well represented. Table 4:
Climate models chosen for PESETA II core runs || Climate Models Employed Core run || Agriculture || Sea-level rise || All other impacts Reference run || A1B ECHAM5 (UKMO) || 30 cm sea-level rise (median A1B projection) || A1B KNMI-RACMO2-ECHAM5 Reference Variant 1 || A1B ECHAM5 (DMI) || 30 cm sea-level rise (median A1B projection) || A1B METO-HC-HadRM3Q0-HadCM3Q0 Reference Variant 2 || A1B EGMAM2006 (FUB) || 30 cm sea-level rise (median A1B projection) || A1B DMI-HIRHAM5-ECHAM5 2°C run || E1 ECHAM5.4 (MPI) || 18 cm sea-level rise (median E1 projection) || MPI-REMO-E4 The sea level rise projections
come from the ClimateCost project (Brown et al. 2011). For the A1B scenario,
the medium projection for SLR in the 2080s is 30 cm, and 18 cm for the E1
medium projection. The respective values for SLR in 2100 are 37 cm and 26 cm.
The coastal impacts have been computed taking into account the projected
damages for the 2080s. CGE methodology GEM-E3 model[101] The GEM-E3 model is
used to compute the overall economic impacts of climate change. The model uses
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach that allows exploring the
indirect economic consequences of climate change due to the cross-sectoral
effects within the economy, on top of the direct economic impacts. The GEM-E3 CGE model
analyses the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the
environment. The current EU version is based on EUROSTAT data (base year 2005),
with most member states individually modelled. The countries are linked through
endogenous bilateral trade flows. The GEM-E3 model integrates micro-economic
behaviour into a macro-economic framework and allows the assessment of medium
to long-term implications for policies. Climate shocks to
GEM-E3 The various impact
categories are integrated by changing specific elements of the production
structure and supply-side (capital and labour) of the different sectors and of
the consumption structure of households. Table 5 summarizes the implementation of the
different impact categories[102] in GEM-E3. Table 5:
Implementation of sectoral climate impacts in GEM-E3 Impact || Biophysical model output || Model implementation Agriculture || Yield change || Productivity change for crops Coastal areas || Migration cost || Additional obliged consumption Sea floods cost || Capital loss River floods || Residential buildings damages || Additional obliged consumption Production activities losses || Capital loss Energy || Heating and cooling demand changes || Energy demand changes in residential and service sectors Transport infrastructure || Changes in cost of: - road asphalt binder application - bridge scouring || Additional obliged consumption Net change in costs related to: - extreme flooding - winter conditions || Capital loss[103] Forest Fires || Burned area damage || Capital loss Reconstruction costs || Obliged consumption Impacts on
GDP Figure 8 shows the
GDP effects for the EU, decomposed both by impact categories and EU regions.
Under the reference run, losses could reach 1% of EU GDP, mainly because of
impacts on coastal areas and agriculture. The overall GDP loss is reduced under
the 2°C scenario. Impacts of changes in energy demand (led by reduced need for
heating) are positive at EU level. Regarding the regional pattern of impacts,
Central Europe north is the area most affected by GDP losses (up to 1.7% of
GDP), as a consequence mainly of sea level rise. Southern Europe GDP losses are
also around 1% of GDP, led mainly by agriculture impacts. In all considered
regions, GDP losses become smaller when one moves from the reference run to the
2°C scenario. It is interesting to note that the two main
impact categories in terms of the effects on GDP are coastal areas and
agriculture. Figure
8. GDP impacts (% GDP) Source:
preliminary results of JRC PESETA II project Impacts on welfare The most appropriate way to interpret the
results of GEM-E3 is in terms of welfare changes, as the economic model is
rooted in neoclassical economics, where households pursue the maximisation of
their welfare levels. Figure 9
shows welfare changes for the core runs, expressed as a percentage of GDP. For
the EU as a whole (bars on the right-hand of the figure), the net welfare loss
of the reference runs is estimated to be around 0.7% of GDP[104]. The most significant negative impacts are
linked to coastal areas, agriculture and river floods. Damage from river floods
is more harmful to welfare than GDP because flood damage requires spending on
repairs by households. This is compulsory consumption that brings no welfare
benefit (but contributes to GDP). Moving to a 2°C scenario would reduce the
impact on agriculture and river floods for the EU as a whole and would reduce
coastal impacts to a lesser extent. Figure 9.
Welfare impacts (% GDP) Source:
preliminary results of JRC PESETA II project The overall EU climate impacts are
disaggregated by EU region in the rest of the figure. Energy impacts are
positive in most climate runs in all regions, expect Southern Europe. Starting
with the Northern Europe region (bars on the left-hand side), the region could
have welfare gains associated with lower energy expenditure and positive
agriculture yield changes. Impacts in coastal areas are the main negative
climate impact, and for Variant 1 river floods could lead to substantial
losses. The negative climate impacts in UK & Ireland are due to river
floods and sea level rise in coastal areas. The negative impacts in the Central
Europe north area are mainly provoked by sea level rise. The Central Europe
south region could register negative impacts due to sea level rise, agriculture
and river floods. The Southern Europe region impacts, all negative, appear to
be driven mainly by energy, as well as by agriculture and coastal damage. Adaptation
implications in coastal impacts The only model that is
able to explicitly analyse the effects of public adaptation measures is the
DIVA coastal impacts model. The adaptation measures considered in DIVA relate
to building dikes and beach nourishments. The GEM-E3 model has been run for the
Reference case with and without public adaptation to sea level rise. In that
case (Table 6) the overall welfare loss in the EU would be reduced from 42
billion Euros (under no adaptation) to 2 billion (with adaptation). Table 6.
Effects of adaptation in coastal impacts (reference run) Source:
preliminary results of JRC PESETA II project Possible transboundary effects of climate change, a preliminary
analysis An interesting issue to
analyse is to what extent climate impacts occurring in one EU region could
affect the rest of the EU, via trade effects. The intuition is the following.
If one region would not adapt to climate change, it would undergo welfare
losses, and they would affect the rest of the EU, via trade effects, given the
high degree of economic integration between the EU member states. Two
preliminary simulations with the reference run setting have been made to
explore these trade effects. In the first analysis
(first column of Table 7), one can imagine a counterfactual situation where
only Central Europe north is affected by sea level rise, while the rest of the
EU regions do not suffer any direct impact. Under such a case, the economic
modelling results suggest that Central Europe north would have a welfare loss
of 20.5 billion Euros. There would be an additional 30% welfare loss (5.6
billion Euros) felt in the rest of the EU due to the economic linkages between
EU regions. Table 7.
Transboundary effects (reference run) Source:
preliminary results of JRC PESETA II project A similar simulation
regarding agriculture impacts has been estimated. The hypothetical case would
be that only the Southern Europe region would be affected by agriculture
impacts. It is then assumed that the rest of the EU does not experience any
initial yield change. In that case the impact in Southern Europe could be 10
billion Euros. There would be an additional loss of 25% (2.5 billion Euros) in
the rest of the EU regions, leading to an overall welfare loss estimated at 13
billion Euros (second column of Table 7). Variability
in climate impact estimates There are many
uncertainties inherent to climate impact assessment since science has only a
limited ability to measure, estimate and quantify the true relationship between
changes in the climate, the physical environment and the economy. The four core
runs are able to cover some of this ‘uncertainty space’ by considering
different climate models (GCMs and RCMs) and emissions scenarios. The three A1B
runs show how results vary when different climate models are used, maintaining
the same physical and economic models and emissions scenario. Furthermore,
comparison between the Reference and 2°C scenarios provides insight into the
estimated impacts of climate change in a low emissions scenario compared to
business-as-usual (using the same physical and economic models in each case). The river flood
assessment provides additional insight by considering results from twelve
climate models, for the same emissions scenario (A1B) and economic model
(GEM-E3). The differences in the results are therefore uniquely attributable to
the use of different climate models. Table 8 shows the welfare impacts for the
reference run and the worst and best cases, out of these twelve runs. It is
interesting to note the wide variability of impacts. Impacts for the whole EU
could be around four times bigger or half the reference value. The range of variation
is larger for the EU regions. For instance, the Central Europe north region
would have a welfare loss more than eight times bigger in the worst case run,
compared to the reference, while Southern Europe suffers nearly two times more
in the best case (though this is the least damaging outcome for the EU as a
whole). Table 8.
Welfare impacts of river floods in worst, reference and best cases (million
Euro) Source:
preliminary results of JRC PESETA II project Table 9 presents the
related GDP changes. The EU GDP loss could be 0.1% in the worst case run, being
0.2% in some regions in UK & Ireland. Table 9.
GDP Impact of river floods in worst, reference and best cases (% GDP) Source:
preliminary results of JRC PESETA II project Scope of
the assessment and limitations The preliminary results
should be taken with care, due to the inherent uncertainties of the integrated
assessment. This preliminary analysis has provided an illustration of the
variability created by using different climate models and emissions scenarios.
However, the trajectory of GHG emissions and behaviour of the climate system
are only a subset of the factors that could influence the consequences of
climate change. Furthermore, while the Reference run uses temperature and
precipitation estimates that are close to the average of the twelve climate
models considered, one cannot say which of the climate outcomes is
fundamentally more likely to occur. Additional limitations
of the assessment are related to the fact that several large climate impact
categories have not been considered. That is notably the case of all the
impacts affecting ecosystems, biodiversity and human life, for which there are
not market prices. Abrupt climate change, including climate tipping points, has
also not been considered in the analysis. From this perspective, the assessment
of this study is expected to largely underestimate the potential consequences
of climate change. Moreover, the impacts
refer to a hypothetical, counterfactual situation where future climate of the
2080s occurs in today's economy. In this respect, the assessment is computing
one-off impacts, and not dynamic impacts such as changes in the rate of
economic growth. A methodological
difficulty relates to the proper modelling of adaptation and their economic
costs. The state-of-the-art in adaptation cost-benefit analysis is a developing
field and further research is required in this area to better understand how
and by how much adaptation options can reduce the climate vulnerabilities in
particular hot spots. Moreover, the proposed
bottom-up methodology has a series of limitations related to the integration of
the biophysical impacts into the CGE model that one should bear in mind. A
first issue relates to the characterisation of biophysical shocks as economic
impacts that can be computed in a CGE model. Each category of biophysical model
impacts has been implemented in a specific way which was considered appropriate
given the information and tools available. Finally, the analysis
has assumed that the rest of the world remains unchanged in spite of climate
change. This translates into changes in areas such as trade flows and prices
that will affect European impacts. For instance, the impacts of climate change
on agriculture production can be quite large in some world regions, with a
substantial influence on agriculture prices world-wide. In this respect, for
each of the sectoral studies it would be interesting to explore how impacts in
the EU differ depending on how climate change affects the rest of the world. 1.7. Summary of results of public
consultation For complex and socially relevant issues -
such as climate change and adaptation - a broad discourse with stakeholders is
seen as important for the policy-making process. This relates to enhancing the
quality of the content and the implementation success. Thus, stakeholder
involvement with the aim to raise awareness, provide relevant information and
gather expectations and needs are seen as important elements in the development
process of the EU Adaptation Strategy. From January 2012 to the end of August
2012, stakeholder involvement activities to support the development of the EU
Adaptation Strategy have been carried out on two levels: (i) stakeholder
involvement with line different Commission Services, Member States, private
sector and stakeholders for specific themes and (ii) public consultation via
the online consultation on ‘Your Voice in Europe’. For the first level, the identification of
relevant stakeholders was carried out in close agreement with the Commission.
Questions such as “Who will be affected by climate change”; “Who can
contribute to the quality of the EU strategy”; “Who will need to take
adaptation actions?” were used to guide the selection of
stakeholders. The stakeholder involvement events provided an arena for
exchanging knowledge on the issue of climate change adaptation and on practical
experiences. For involving the broad public, a public
consultation was carried out by DG CLIMA with the objective to collect opinions
from stakeholders and experts in the field of adaptation to climate change. The
“Consultation on the preparation of the EU Adaptation Strategy” was open from
21.05.2012 – 20.08.2012 on the website “Your Voice in Europe”. In order to secure the transparency of the
stakeholder involvement processes and enhance the usability of key results to
be included in the EU Adaptation Strategy (and accompanying documents), every
single activity was documented by using a common structure. Meetings and
formats used for stakeholder involvement as well as results gained from the
public consultation are described in detail in chapters 3 and 4. Stakeholder groups involved and methods used For stakeholder involvement within the Commission,
lunchtime seminars (1.5h workshops, lecture setting with 30-60 people) were
held with DG MARE, DG SANCO and DG MOVE. Two more seminars are to be held in
October 2012 (DG REGIO and DGs dealing with social issues). Furthermore, a
dedicated meeting has been organised with DG ENV. The specific aims of these
seminars were to increase the general awareness on climate change, to provide
information on the approach towards an EU Adaptation Strategy and to obtain
information on the issue and the current state of adaptation from the DGs. The stakeholder process with Member
State representatives identified the need and opportunity to engage with
different regions in Europe. In order to achieve this objective, two meetings were
carried out in specific regions – central/eastern Europe (with approx. 30
persons attending) and southern Europe (with approx. 20 persons attending).
Furthermore, a scheduled conference (Second Nordic International Conference on
Climate Change Adaptation in Helsinki) was used to gain input from the Nordic
countries. The meetings (1-2 days; interactive workshop setting; change between
plenary and working groups) were structured in a similar way to gain comparable
results and to provide good coverage for feedback on the needs and expectations
from central/eastern, southern and northern Europe. The focus was on the needs
and expectations of European guidance to support the elaboration of national
adaptation policies (i.e. strategies and action plans). In addition, other scheduled meetings
(EIONET, organised and hosted by EEA; 2 EPA Interest Group on Climate Change
Adaptation, meetings chaired by PBL Netherlands) were used to involve
stakeholders from the Member States in the development process of the EU Adaptation
Strategy. In general, these workshop sessions (2-3 hours; interactive workshops
setting; change between plenary and working groups) aimed to provide
information on the development of the EU Adaptation Strategy and offered an
arena for sharing knowledge and experience on adaptation policy and practice. Stakeholders from the private sector
were approached through two types of engagement: (i) a questionnaire and (ii)
dedicated meetings for specific issues. In addition, the private sector was
engaged by establishing a two-way dialogue and a productive working
relationship. Dialogues with the following stakeholders were carried out:
CEN/CENELEC (1.5h meeting); CEN/CENELEC together with
stakeholders from European transport sector (half
day-workshop); experts on climate scenarios and (the costs of) natural
disasters (1-day workshop); forest experts (1-day workshop) and insurance
experts (three 1-day workshops). All events aimed at collecting inputs from
practitioners and mobilising the experiences of the private sector about
climate change adaptation. Stakeholders dealing with marine spatial
planning and integrated coastal zone management have been involved having a
specific session in their first common meeting. For the broad involvement of the public,
the information on the public consultation for the strategy was circulated via
various networks such as the Adaptation Steering Group, CIRCLE-2-network, etc.
The public consultation received a total of 175 responses were received. Selected results from stakeholder involvement The stakeholder meetings with
representatives from Member States and the private sector were used to discuss
the various approaches taken towards adaptation, existing knowledge gaps (e.g.
in regional vulnerability assessments) and other barriers (e.g. insufficient
financial resources) that might hinder the process. While most stakeholders
contributed substantially to the discussions, others highlighted adaptation as
a new dimension and thus the events were also appreciated for both awareness
raising and capacity building (this applies in particular to feedback from
central/eastern European countries). In general, the stakeholders involved in
the development process of the strategy were supportive towards a European
approach on adaptation to climate change. The stakeholders highlighted that the
strategy will be especially useful for Member States and actors (e.g. from the
private sector) that are less advanced on the issue of climate change
adaptation. Within the public consultation the overall
focus was on the role of the EU in encouraging and supporting adaptation
efforts at more regional/local governmental level and within the private
sector. With respect to facilitating research, participants viewed a strong
involvement by national and regional governments as highly important, but that
the EU should be most involved in research focussing on improving monitoring
and evaluations systems. More specifically, representatives from
Member States made clear that a focus on mainstreaming of adaptation into
existing EU policies and on the specific challenge of trans-national
adaptation efforts would be an added value to the EU Adaptation Strategy. This
too was confirmed by the public consultation results: just under ½ of
participants selected reviewing EU legislation to facilitate mainstreaming as
having added value. In addition, stakeholders mentioned that the strategy
should enhance the sharing of experiences and good practice on climate change
adaptation, which can be provided by strengthening the European platform on
climate change adaptation, CLIMATE-ADAPT. Representatives from Member States also
widely agreed that the development of guidelines for national adaptation
policy making would be of added value. They suggested that the guidance should
be generic to cover differences among Member States (e.g. different governance
structures) but also specific in providing tools and recommendations. The
guidance document should also provide support to the process of setting up
national adaptation policies but also on key issues to be considered when
implementing and monitoring/evaluating. The proposed structure of the guidance
document and the presentation of good practice examples across Europe were
broadly welcomed. In the public consultation over half of participants
indicated that they welcome such guidance; the consultation also emphasized the
need to include in the guidance documents methods for risk assessment and how
to develop the strategies themselves. The EUROSAI WGEA – Cooperative audit, indicates,
among others, that "governments are not sufficiently prepared for the
expected impacts of climate change, and do not have adequate actions in place
to deal with these unavoidable negative effects" (EUROSAI WGEA, 2012, http://www.eurosaiwgea.org/Environmental%20audits/Air/Documents/Adapatation%20to%20climate%20change%20final%20version%2005112012%20web%20format.pdf
) Private sector involvement showed clearly that the issue of climate change
adaptation is a new topic on their agenda and the process is mainly in an
initial phase. Respondents to the public consultation highlighted the barrier
“short-term vs. long-term horizons” as most significant. “Policy and regulatory
weaknesses and change” was also often labelled as a very significant barrier
for the private sector in adaptation. When writing in their own barriers,
“Contradictory requirements from different EU policies” and their corresponding
“Harmful subsidies” came up a few times as well as an additional barrier. With
respect to the barrier “Uncertainty of the impacts and modelling tools”, only
1/5 of the respondents identified this barrier as highly significant. In
comparison, the respondents from the private sector to the questionnaire
carried out within the support project ranked the barrier “Lack of awareness”
as the top barrier, followed by “Lack of information”. Interestingly the cost
of adaptation was ranked as the joint lowest barrier. However, in the free form
section, a number of participants in the public consultation nevertheless
highlighted “budgetary constraints” and “cost sharing issues” as barriers to
making the economy more resilient. To overcome these barriers, the EU could
help the private sector strengthen its adaptive capacity through a number of
actions. “Improving the climate resilience of infrastructure investments”
including “Green infrastructure” were actions most considered relevant by
respondents of the public consultation, 35% and 47% respectively. “Addressing
financial issues” and “emphasizing market-based instruments” were also
considered medium to highly relevant by well over ½ the consultation
participants. When asked to personally name additional actions the EU should
take, respondents focussed on enhanced collaboration through networks and
guidance covering a range of topics such as economic valuation of environmental
goods, interdependencies between sectors and on the regulatory framework. On the issue of standards (with
focus on transport), the stakeholders involved supported an EU approach on
adaptation in order to integrate adaptation into existing key standards
concerning long life cycles. Stakeholders from the forestry sector
saw themselves in a unique situation as they play on the one hand an important
role in mitigating climate change, but on the other hand the sector also needs
to adapt to the impacts from climate change, and they build also the basis for
adaptation in other sectors (e.g. protection function of the forest sector
against increased avalanches and landslides). Stakeholders argued that the
overall discussions on adaptation at EU level hardly reach the ground (single
forest owner) due to the diversity and fragmentation of the sector (few large
companies versus several small forest owners). Thus, they considered awareness
raising/communication and the provision of tools/methods for assessing impacts
and supporting adaptation of crucial importance. Overall, barriers to adaptation
policy making was an issue for discussion at all stakeholder meetings and also
addressed by the public consultation´s results. Representatives from Member
States mentioned that the lack of human and financial resources as well as
political reluctance is key barriers for adaptation. Respondents to the public
consultation also felt that the EU should be more involved in funding adaptation
projects. Increasing direct funding for research was viewed as a highly
potential action by around ½ of the respondents. Furthermore, stakeholders at
all meetings raised the issue of uncertainty and reported that the lack of
dedicated research hinders the adaptation process. This is also supported by
the feedback to the public consultation, where training and awareness was well
received as well as strengthening policy-making overall and the science-policy
interface specifically. In addition, communicating relevant information to
decision makers was named as a challenging task. Participants to the public
consultation also viewed communication and awareness-raising as topics that
should especially be addressed by the EU. Decision-making under uncertainty,
however, should be addressed at all governmental levels. In terms of support
for trans-boundary issues, respondents felt the EU should focus on facilitating
cooperation among countries and providing funding for adverse effects of
climate change and for increasing resiliency and reducing vulnerability of
affected countries. Detailed
results online public consultation The pie chart presents the distribution
of responses by category of respondent. The greatest number of responses
came from companies and/or business associations, followed by an equal share of
environmental NGOs and national/regional governmental institutions; private
individuals were also well represented. Research facilities, universities and
think tanks were only marginally represented; the same for international
organisations and European institutions. Both business specific and nature
oriented associations were well represented; therefore, the responses to the
questions in the public consultation include a broad range of special interests.
Interestingly, out of the 25 respondents from environmental NGOs, almost ½ (11
out of 25) are bird specific interest groups, represented by, for example,
national Birdlife chapters and national ornithology groups. Figure 10
Distribution of responses per affiliation Part 1 of the public consultation asked questions relating to the current problems the environment
and society is facing in light of climate change as well as issues relating to
the potential for adaptation measures to increase the economy’s resilience. Respondents were asked to select a
maximum of three adverse effects of climate change that concern them the most. In total the different choices were selected a total of 454 times.
The greatest concern selected was biodiversity loss and degradation of
ecosystem services (chosen 85 times), followed by water availability/droughts
(79 times) and flooding of surface waters (66 times). Seen of lesser importance
were erosion (13 times), forest fires (13 times), storm surges (12 times) and
soil degradation (10). For this question it is important to
consider the influence the main stakeholders have on the popularity of the top
3 selected adverse effects. For example, environmental NGOs selected
“biodiversity loss and degradation of ecosystem services” 23 times compared to
only 14 times by national/regional governments and only 9 times by companies.
On the other hand, companies/business associations selected river flooding 39
times, compared to only 15 times by national/regional governments and only 5
times by environmental NGOs. Interestingly, private individuals chose
“biodiversity losses” much more often (17 times) than river flooding (only 4
times). For “water availability/droughts” – the second most often chosen effect
– companies/business associations, environmental NGOs and national/regional
governments selected the effect rather equally: 21, 15 and 12, respectively. Respondents were asked to select a maximum
of 2 populations/groups that in their opinion are the most vulnerable to the
adverse impacts of climate change. 259 entries were recorded, and by far the
elderly population (71 times) and low-income households (65 times) were chosen. In light of the most pressing climate
change impacts, the public consultation asked respondents to rank a set of
barriers regarding their significance in preventing the economy from becoming
more climate resilient. The graph below highlights the level of
significance given to each barrier. The barrier ‘short term vs. long-time
horizons’ received the highest ranking with an average 4.4, and the average
ranking for the barrier ‘Policy and regulatory weaknesses and change’ was 4.
‘Lack of awareness of climate-change related risks” average rank was a 3.8,
whereas ‘Cost and reversibility of adaptation actions’ received the lowest
average at 3.4. The remaining barriers – ‘Lack if available funding’, ‘Lack of
understanding of potential adaptation measures’ and ‘Uncertainty of the impacts
and modelling tools’ – equally received an average 3.7 ranking.. Figure 11
Significance of barriers in preventing the economy from achieving climate
resilience The public consultation asked
respondents to rank sectors regarding their relevance for improving Europe’s
resilience to climate change impacts. Respondents
could either indicate no opinion or rank the barriers from 1 to 5, with 5 being
very significant and 1 being not significant at all. According to the respondents, the sector
with the highest relevance for improving resiliency is water, receiving an
average 4.5 ranking. This is closely followed by agriculture and rural
development (4.4 average) and nature conservation (4.2). The energy sector also
received a high overall ranking with a 4.2 average. Forestry (3.9), maritime
(3.8), transport (3.8) and cities (3.8) received similar average rankings.
These sectors are followed by migration and construction/buildings, both with a
3.6 average rank. Industry/SMEs received a solid 3.5 average rank in terms of
its relevance in making the EU more resilient, while the health sector received
a 3.4 average rank. Civil protection received an overall average 3.2 score. The
employment sector received the lowest overall score of 2.8. As with the question on adverse effects of
climate change, the selection of sectors most relevant for improving Europe’s
resilience was largely split according to the type of stakeholder. For
companies/business associations, the top three sectors considered most relevant
(i.e. receiving a ‘5’) for action are energy (21 times or 51%), water (19 times
or 43%) and transport (13 times or 32%). For environmental NGOs, on the other
hand, the top three sectors considered most relevant for action are water (25
times or 100%), nature conservation (22 times or 88%) and forestry (20 times or
80%). National/regional governments selected as their top three sectors energy
(13 times or 52%), water (12 times or 48%) and nature conservation (10 times or
40%). Finally, private individuals selected water (16 times or 73%), energy (15
times or 68%), and forestry and nature conservation (13 times each or 51%).
These responses highlight that the most homogenous group in choosing sectors
were the environmental NGOs. The results of the public consultation have indicated that climate change is considered a pressing issue
and EU action is very important in a number of sectors in order to improve the
economy’s resilience to the identified climate change impacts. Respondents were
asked to consider in what timescale adaptation efforts will lead to certain
outcomes; multiple answers were possible. Whereas respondents think that job
creation and growth will largely happen in the short (32% of responses) and
medium term (36.5%), social objectives will more likely be achieved through
climate change adaptation in the medium (38%) and long term (31%). Similarly,
attaining a resilient economy and environment will more like happen in the
medium (40.6% and 36% respectively) and longer term (36.5% and 36.4%
respectively) due to climate change adaptation efforts. Important issues
regarding the effectiveness of adaptation policies and measures For the companies/business associations,
the main issues to be addressed are facilitating cooperation and raising
awareness at all level (local, regional, national and international), and
ensuring funding. For the environmental NGOs and the national or regional
government institutions, the priorities are the adaptation of the water sector
and the natural environment, the implementation of financial mechanisms and of
policy framework. International organisations, other NGOs and private
individuals mainly consider the need to facilitate cooperation and raising
awareness at all level. Other, NGOs, private individuals and research
institutes also consider water sector and natural environment as priority
issues. Part 2 of the consultation asked
participants to consider where gaps in research
remain and how best to develop funding mechanisms further. Respondents were
asked to point out which areas of climate (adaptation) research require
attention and/or resources at different levels of governance. In each research
area, participants could select between 1 and 5 levels of governance that
should get more involved in climate research. With respect to monitoring and
evaluation and communication and awareness-raising,
respondents favoured action at European level. For sensitivity and adaptation
options respondents most often felt that national and regional/local level
administrations should be involved. Respondents felt that research on adaptive
capacity, however, should rather receive attention and research at the
regional/local level. Decision-making under uncertainty and research on impacts
were evenly spread between EU, national and regional level, while interregional
level was not considered as relevant in this research domain (only 34%
supported work at this level). Sectoral level involvement only received more
than ½ of the responses for research relating to sensitivity (51.5%),
adaptation options (59%) and communication (57%). Respondents were asked to rank the
capability of actions to improve the use of EU funding for climate change
adaptation projects. Out of the 6 actions presented
in the questionnaire, the options to ‘increase direct funding for
adaptation-related research’ and ‘better involvement of the policy-making
community’ received the highest average ranking of 4.2. Respondents selected
the rank ‘5’ most often for direct funding. ‘Better dissemination of research
results’ and ‘training and awareness-raising’ both received an average rating
of 3.8. Respondents gave ‘more support of coordination between national and
international research programmes’ a 3.7 as average score. The least selected
action to improve the use of funding was ‘increased support for pan-European
Climate Services’, which received an average score of 3.6. Overall, the 6
actions were well-scored and none of them were particularly discarded by the
respondents. The final question in this section asked
respondents to judge additional actions that could be considered at EU level to
facilitate further knowledge and dissemination and sharing. Respondents could make multiple selections. Most of the options
were well regarded. ‘Activities to promote the use of the European Climate
Adaptation Platform’ was not as well received as the other options, although it
was nevertheless selected by over half (54.66%) of the respondents. ‘Support of
pan-European discussion forums to exchange best practice’ was most often
selected by respondents (76.4%). Part 3 of the consultation focussed on how respondents view the role of the EU in facilitating
working among the Member States, also in the context of transboundary issues. The consultation asked respondents how
the EU can facilitate the work of local authorities in adapting to climate
change. Respondents could select between 1 and 4
answers, of which only 13 (8%) felt that no direct EU intervention is needed.
All three options received high responses, but enhancing awareness and
providing guidance on adaptation at regional/local level were considered more
relevant than enhancing awareness at sectoral level. In the context of transboundary issues
relating to climate change, respondents were asked
to select between 1 and 4 options that the EU could take. Most of the options
were well regarded, but only 26% of respondents feel that the ‘creation of EU
agencies to address transboundary risks’ was an action the EU should consider.
‘Facilitating cooperation among countries’ received the greatest number of
responses (82.61%). ‘Awareness and guidance’ was selected by 63.35% of
respondents. Part 4 of the consultation focused on the link between EU policies and the private sector and
on what can be done at EU level to facilitate work on the national level. The consultation asked respondents to select
which type of instruments would bring the most added-value to further support
and incentivise Member States to develop national adaptation strategies (NAS). The option to have ‘Legislation in place that requires Member
States to develop NAS’ received the least number of responses (around 25%).
None of the business sector respondents selected the legislation option,
whereas 68% of environmental NGO respondents did; only 6% of national
institutions and 13.6% of private citizen respondents selected enacting
legislation. It is important to note that 35% of the respondents selected a
combination of these instruments; thus, the low percentage of respondents that
selected legislation as a potential instrument should be viewed with care. Respondents were asked to rate actions
at the EU level to strengthen the adaptive capacity of the private sector from a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being very relevant and 1 not relevant).
‘Promoting and developing green infrastructure’ received with a 4.2 the overall
highest average regarding actions to strengthen the adaptive capacity of the
private sector. ‘Improving the climate resilience of infrastructure
investments’ receive the next highest overall average with a rating of 3.9.
‘Public-private partnerships’ received an overall average score of 3.6, and
‘emphasising the role of market-based instruments’ received an overall average
score of 3.4. The action to ‘review the role and assess the needs for
insurance’ received the lowest overall average rating with a 3.1. 1.8. Glossary Adaptation:
Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including
anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation (IPCC, 2007): Anticipatory adaptation: Adaptation that takes place before impacts of climate change is
observed. Also referred to as proactive adaptation. Autonomous adaptation: Adaptation that does not constitute a conscious response to climatic
stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by market
or welfare changes in human systems. Also referred to as spontaneous
adaptation. Planned adaptation: Adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy decision,
based on an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and
that action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state. Adaptation benefits: The avoided damage costs or the accrued benefits following the
adoption and implementation of adaptation measures. Adaptation costs: Costs of planning, preparing for, facilitating, and implementing
adaptation measures, including transition costs. Adaptive capacity (in relation to climate change impacts): The ability of a system to
adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to
moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with
the consequences. Adaptation measures: Adaptation measures are technologies, processes, and activities
directed at enhancing our capacity to adapt (building adaptive capacity) and at
minimising, adjusting to and taking advantage of the consequences of climatic
change (delivering adaptation). Reactive adaptation is adaptation that takes place in response to the consequences of a
particular event Maladaptation: Action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate
change that impacts adversely on, or increases, the vulnerability of other
systems, sectors or social groups. Adaptation strategy – generally understood to be a broad policy document that outlines
the directions of actions intended to the capacity to adapt to climate change. Adaptation actions plan – more specific document guiding action. It can cover adaptation
actions generally or focus on some sector(s). Capacity building: In the context of climate change, capacity building is developing
the technical skills and institutional capabilities in developing countries and
economies in transition to enable their participation in all aspects of
adaptation to, mitigation of, and research on climate change, and in the
implementation of the Kyoto Mechanisms, etc. (IPCC, 2007). Capacity building
involves creating the information and conditions (regulatory, institutional,
and managerial) that are needed before adaptation actions can be undertaken[105] Climate change: Climate change refers to any change in climate over time, whether
due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs
from that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), which defines ‘climate change’ as: ‘a change of climate which is
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition
of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods’. See also climate
variability. (IPCC, 2007) Climate variability: Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and
other statistics (such as standard deviations, statistics of extremes, etc.) of
the climate on all temporal and spatial scales beyond that of individual
weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the
climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or
anthropogenic external forcing (external variability). See also climate change.
(IPCC, 2007) Climate system: The climate system is defined by the dynamics and interactions of
five major components: atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, land surface, and
biosphere. Climate system dynamics are driven by both internal and external
forcing, such as volcanic eruptions, solar variations, or human-induced
modifications to the planetary radiative balance, for instance via
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and/or land-use changes. Disaster: A
serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own
resources. Comment: Disasters are often described as a result of the
combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions of vulnerability that
are present; and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the
potential negative consequences. Disaster impacts may include loss of life,
injury, disease and other negative effects on human physical, mental and social
well-being, together with damage to property, destruction of assets, loss of
services, social and economic disruption and environmental degradation. There
are different ways in which disasters can be framed. See for example an
inventory made for the disaster reduction community. Disaster risk:
The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and
services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some
specified future time period. Comment: The definition of disaster risk reflects
the concept of disasters as the outcome of continuously present conditions of
risk. Disaster risk comprises different types of potential losses which are
often difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, with knowledge of the prevailing
hazards and the patterns of population and socio-economic development, disaster
risks can be assessed and mapped, in broad terms at least. Disaster risk management: Disaster risk management stands for a systematic process of using
administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities
to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to
lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster. Comment:
This term is an extension of the more general term "risk management"
to address the specific issue of disaster risks. Disaster risk management aims
to avoid, lessen or transfer the adverse effects of hazards through activities
and measures for prevention, mitigation and preparedness. There are different
ways in which risk management can be framed. See for example inventories made
for the disaster reduction community or for the Dutch Climate Changes Spatial
Planning Programme. Disaster risk reduction: The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through
systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters,
including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people
and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved
preparedness for adverse events. Ecosystem:
The interactive system formed from all living organisms and their abiotic
(physical and chemical) environment within a given area. Ecosystems cover a
hierarchy of spatial scales and can comprise the entire globe, biomes at the
continental scale or small, well-circumscribed systems such as a small pond.
(IPCC, 2007) Ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation (short ecosystem-based adaptation,
EbA: includes the sustainable management, conservation and restoration of
ecosystems to provide services that help people adapt to the adverse effects of
climate change. EbA often also contributes to climate change mitigation, by
conserving carbon stocks, reducing emissions caused by ecosystem degradation
and loss, or enhancing carbon stocks. EbA increases resilience and reduces
vulnerability. EbA can be a cost-effective adaptation strategy across the major
adaptation sectors. (Report CBD AHTEG, 2009 adapted) Extreme weather event: An event that is rare within its statistical reference distribution
at a particular place. Definitions of ‘rare’ vary, but an extreme weather event
would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile. By
definition, the characteristics of what is called ‘extreme weather’ may vary
from place to place. Extreme weather events may typically include floods and
droughts. (IPCC, 2007) Exposure: is
the nature and degree to which a system is exposed to significant climatic
variations (IPCC, 2007) Global warming: Global warming refers to the gradual increase, observed or
projected, in global surface temperature, as one of the consequences of
radiative forcing caused by anthropogenic emissions. Hazards: A
physically defined climate event with the potential to cause harm, such as
heavy rainfall, drought, flood, storm and long-term change in mean climatic
variables such as temperature (UNDP, 2004) Impacts
(climate change): the effects of climate change on natural and human systems.
Depending on the consideration of adaptation, one can distinguish between
potential impacts and residual impacts (IPCC, 2007): Potential impacts: all impacts that may occur given a projected change in climate,
without considering adaptation. This allows assessing all effects of climate
change if no adaptation occurs for a specific sector or area. Residual impacts: the impacts of climate change that would occur after anticipatory,
planned and autonomous adaptation. This would allow assessing the actual need
for intervention for a specific sector or area. Autonomous adaptation residual impacts: impacts that may occur given a projected change in climate,
considering only autonomous adaptation. This would allow assessing the actual
need for public intervention for a specific sector or area Likelihood –
See probability Mitigation:
An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the
climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and
emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks. (IPCC, 2007) Probability:
the likelihood or possibility of an event or outcome occurring. Probability can
range from being qualitative, using word descriptions such as likely or highly
confident, to quantified ranges and single estimates, depending on the level of
understanding of the causes of events, historical time series and future
conditions (UNDP, 2004). Projection:
The potential evolution of a quality or set of quantities, often computed with
the aid of a model. Projections are distinguished from predictions in order to
emphasise that projections involve assumptions — concerning, for example,
future socio-economic and technological developments, that may or may not be
realised — and are therefore subject to substantial uncertainty. Regional:
Area covered by an administrative geographic unit below national level that is
responsible for the development of the adaptation strategy (e.g. province,
Länder, large cities). (IPCC, 2007) Resilience:
The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while
retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for
self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change. (IPCC, 2007) Risk: The
combination of the probability of an event and its consequences[106]. Some climate change glossaries consider vulnerability a part of
risk, for example the UNDP guidance defines climate related risk as the result
of the interaction of physically defined hazards with the properties of the
exposed systems, i.e., their sensitivity or (social) vulnerability. Risk can
also be considered as the combination of an event, its likelihood, and its
consequences, i.e., risk equals the probability of climate hazard multiplied by
a given system’s vulnerability (UNDP, 2004). Scenario: A
plausible and often simplified description of how the future may develop, based
on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about driving forces
and key relationships. Scenarios may be derived from projections, but are often
based on additional information from other sources, sometimes combined with a
‘narrative storyline’. (IPCC, 2007) SRES: The
storylines and associated population, GDP and emissions scenarios associated
with the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakićenović et
al., 2000), and the resulting climate change and sea-level rise scenarios. Four
families of socio-economic scenario (A1, A2, B1 and B2) represent different
world futures in two distinct dimensions: a focus on economic versus environmental
concerns and global versus regional development patterns... (IPCC, 2007) Sensitivity:
the degree to which a system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, by
climate-related stimuli. The effect may be direct (e.g., a change in crop yield
in response to a change in the mean, range, or variability of temperature) or
indirect (e.g., damages caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal
flooding due to sea level rise (IPCC, 2001). Threshold:
The level of magnitude of a system process at which sudden or rapid change
occurs. A point or level at which new properties emerge in an ecological,
economic or other system, invalidating predictions based on mathematical
relationships that apply at lower levels (IPCC, 2007). Uncertainty:
An expression of the degree to which a value (e.g., the future state of the
climate system) is unknown. Uncertainty can result from lack of information or
from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types
of sources, from quantifiable errors in the data to ambiguously defined
concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of human behaviour.
Uncertainty can therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e.g., a
range of values calculated by various models) or by qualitative statements (e.g.,
reflecting the judgement of a team of experts). See also confidence and
likelihood (IPCC, 2007). Vulnerability: Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to,
and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate
variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character,
magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is
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Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, co-ordinated by EFI [14] Directive 2010/31/EU [15] As regards EIA, it is already being done as a part of
an ongoing review of the EIA Directive. [16] The energy efficiency Directive has not yet been
formally adopted at the time of completion of this IA report. [17] COM(2006) 231 and COM(2012) 46. [18] Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Italy,
Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain [19] See the European Atlas of Soil Biodiversity,
particularly pp. 62-63 (http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
library/maps/biodiversity_atlas/index.html). [20] European Commission [SWD(2012) 101] - Guidelines on best
practice to limit, mitigate or compensate soil sealing. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/sealing_guidelines.htm
[21] Annex 6 to the Impact Assessment on the proposal for a
general Union Environment Action Programme 'Living well, within the limits of
our planet', SWD(2012) 398, p. 30. [22] See second interim report to the study: “Literature
review on the potential climate change effects on drinking water resources
across the EU and the identification of priorities among different types of
drinking water supplies – ADWICE project” contract DG ENV
070326/SER/2011/610284/D1 [23] DG SANCO (2008): Sustainability
project, Synthesis Report; Takken W., Knols B.G.J. (2007): Emerging pests and
vector-borne diseases in Europe, Ecology and control of vector-borne diseases,
Volume 1, Wageningen Academic Publishers. [24] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:152:0001:0044:EN:PDF [25]http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/strategy/docs/COMM_PDF_COM_2008_0545_F_EN_AUTRE_PROC_LEG_NOUVELLE.pdf [26] See Exploiting the employment potential of green
growth, Commission Staff working document, SWD (2012) 92 final and source
quoted. [27] See Commission study The number of jobs dependent on
environmental and resource efficiency improvements, 2012. . [28] The World Bank 2010. The Economics of Adaptation to
Climate Change: Synthesis Report. Washington DC, The World Bank [29] See Commission study The number of jobs dependent on
environmental and resource efficiency improvements, 2012. [30] See Exploiting the employment potential of green
growth, Commission Staff working document, SWD (2012) 92 final. [31] The European Commission proposed a Programme for the
Competitiveness of enterprises and SMEs(COSME) that will run from 2014 to 2020.
http://ec.europa.eu/cip/cosme/index_en.htm [32] Projection of Economic impacts of climate change in Sectors
of the European Union based on boTtom-up Analysis: http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ [33] http://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/climate-impacts-and-vulnerabilities/projects/Externally_RD2/isi-mip [34] http://cca.eionet.europa.eu/ [35] Data bases such as Climate-ADAPT, INSPIRE, WISE,
CORDIS, OURCOAST Copernicus services, WSDiS, EEA WQ Waterbase, JRC EDO, Water
Accounts, Research and Regional programmes have been further developed or new
ones have been set up. [36] European Commission (2008): Commission
staff working document: Integrated climate change research following the
release of the 4th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and most recent research developments http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/pdf/commission_working_doc.pdf [37] http://www.circle-era.eu/np4/CARAUncertainties.html [38] http://www.acqwa.ch/ [39] http://www.circle-era.eu/np4/home.html [40] http://www.circle-era.eu/np4/CARAmountain1.html [41] http://www.circle-med.net/ [42] http://www.hzg.de/mw/impact2c/030467/index_0030467.html.en [43] http://www.carbo-extreme.eu/ [44] http://www.eclise-project.eu/ [45] http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ [46] http://www.climwatadapt.eu/ [47] http://floods.jrc.ec.europa.eu/lisflood-model [48] Climate, Environment and Health Action Plan Information System [49] http://www.climsave.eu/climsave/index.html [50] http://www.circle-era.eu/np4/CARAadaptationstrategies.html [51] http://www.responsesproject.eu/ [52] http://mediation-project.eu/ [53] http://www.climatecost.cc/ [54] http://www.weather-project.eu/weather/index.php
[55]
http://www.weather-project.eu/weather/inhalte/research-network/ewent.php [56] http://cordis.europa.eu/projects/rcn/96752_en.html [57] http://www.theseusproject.eu/ [58] http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_AppliedResearch/climate.html [59] http://www.circeproject.eu/ [60] http://www.climatecost.cc/ [61] http://www.ensembles-eu.org/ [62] http://ensembles-eu.metoffice.com/tech_reports/ETR_3_vn0.pdf [63] See http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ddc/ar5_scenario_process/index.html for further details [64] http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/era-summary-report-2012_en.pdf [65] Falconi, C.A (1999): 'Methods
for Priority Setting in Agricultural Biotechnology Research', Chapter 4 of Managing Agricultural
Biotechnology Addressing Research Program Needs and Policy Implications (ed. J.I. Cohen), CAB International. Available at ftp://192.156.137.116/isnar/IBS/II_04.pdf [66] Consultation on the ERA
Framework: Areas of untapped potential for the development of the European
Research Area (ERA) http://ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/era/consultation_en.htm [67] based on expert
judgment [68] Science-Policy Interface (SPI) activity on priorisation of research
needs, knowledge availability and dissemination for the Working Group E
(Chemical Aspects) 2010-2012. Available at: https://circabc.europa.eu/ [69]See http://www.nordregio.se/en/Metameny/About-Nordregio/Research--Development/Geographical-scope-we-cover/Norden/Addressing-climate-change-adaptation-at-the-Nordic-level/ [70]See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/tenders/2011/208209/clearinghouse_concept_note_en.pdf [71] Source to be added when available. , [72] Figures are based on the
contracts No ENV.G.1/ETU/2008/0093R and CLIMA.C.3/SER/2011/0026 [73] The research
priorities draw on the recommendations in the IPCC (2007a) 4AR – Parry et al. [74] The Nottingham Declaration has been succeeded in 2012 by the
Climate Local initiative which supports carbon reduction and climate
resilience. http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/the-lga-and-climate-change/-/journal_content/56/10171/3574359/ARTICLE-TEMPLATE
[75] http://eucities-adapt.eu/cms/ [76] 5the cohesion report [77] For example, the proposal for 'guidelines for trans-European
energy infrastructure' COM(2011)658 includes, in annex V, the 'system
resilience, including disaster and climate resilience, and system security,
notably for European critical infrastructure as defined in Directive
2008/114/EC' as an aspect to be considered for cost-benefit analyses for
electricity transmission and storage. [78] OECD 2011 (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5kg221jkf1g7.pdf?expires=1346855082&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=68799770483309BDDCBF3A8CF2E3C218) [79] Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain
public and private projects on the environment [codification] OJ L 26,
28.1.2012, p.1. [80]Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes
on the environment, OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p.30. [81] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0658:FIN:EN:PDF [82] Figures are based on the contract CLIMA/C3/SER/2011/0011 [83] The point is that regulators and insurers must allow for the
trend, not simply use the historical averages, which will be somewhat lagging
behind, and so will always produce an incorrect response [84] PWC (2010) Business leadership on climate change adaptation:
Encouraging engagement and action [85] Figures based on on-going consultancy contract for
developing "Climate resilience guidelines for project managers' (DG CLIMA,
2011-2012) [86] Worldbank (2009a): The Costs of Adapting
to Climate Change for Infrastructure – http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/407863-1229101582229/DCCDP_2Infrastructure.pdf [87] Cost estimations are based on
the IPCC emission scenarios A1FI and B1 [88] See https://online.tugraz.at/tug_online/voe_main2.getvolltext?pCurrPk=33553
[89] OJ L 316, 14.11.2012, p. 12. [90] Article 10 of Reg. (EU) No
1025/2012 [91] http://eurocodes.jrc.ec.europa.eu/showpage.php?id=1 [92] Based on discussions with actors of the sector [93] This assessment is based on information made available
by Member States as of November 2012. As such, it does not include the
developments associated with the adoption of the latest adaptation strategies
in Lithuania and Ireland. Ireland's National Climate Change Adaptation
Framework was published on 28th December 2012. The Framework provides the
policy context for a strategic national adaptation response to climate change
in Ireland. Our Framework, which is based on the EU approach, introduces an
integrated policy framework, involving all stakeholders on all institutional
levels to ensure adaptation measures are taken across different sectors and
levels of government to manage and reduce Ireland's vulnerability to the
negative impacts of climate change. The relevant Government Departments,
Agencies and local authorities have been asked to commence the preparation of
sectoral and local adaptation plans and to publish drafts of these plans by
mid-2014. [94] http://Climate-ADAPT.eea.europa.eu/web/guest/transnational-regions [95] http://Climate-ADAPT.eea.europa.eu/web/guest/countries [96] http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/urban-adaptation-to-climate-change [97] The JRC PESETA II project is
on-going. Final results are expected to be published during 2013 (project
information can be found at http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). [98] http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/activities/energy-and-transport/gem-e3/index.cfm
[99] Impacts related to tourism and
human health (labour productivity) are expected to be added in the next
analysis. [100] It is necessary to combine results from different climate models
since the climate models used for agriculture and sea-level rise follow a
different classification system from the other impacts. [101] http://www.gem-e3.net/ [102] A similar methodology was
followed in the PESETA project (see Ciscar et al., 2012). [103] Capital loss can be negative when combined changes in
winter conditions and extreme flooding create conditions that are more benign
than the baseline [104] That impact is lower than the impact of the previous
PESETA project, in particular because for the high emission scenario the sea
level rise considered is 30 cm in PESETA II, while it went to up 88 cm in
PESETA. [105] West, C.C. and Gawith, M.J. (Eds.) (2005) Measuring
progress: Preparing for climate change through the UK Climate Impacts
Programme. Available from www.ukcip.org.uk [106] United Nations, International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (UN/ISDR) Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009), available
from http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng.htm