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Document 51997AC0776
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) establishing a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme'
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) establishing a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme'
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) establishing a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme'
OJ C 296, 29.9.1997, p. 77–84
(ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) establishing a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme'
Official Journal C 296 , 29/09/1997 P. 0077
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) establishing a revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme` () (97/C 296/12) On 8 April 1997 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 130 S of the Treaty establishing the European Union, on the above-mentioned proposal. The Section for Protection of the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Affairs, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 3 June 1997. The rapporteur was Mr Koopman. At its 347th plenary session (meeting of 10 July 1997) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 66 votes in favour, with nine abstentions. 1. Introduction 1.1. In December 1996 the Commission published its long awaited Proposal for a revision of Council Regulation 880/92 which established the Community eco-label award scheme. The explanatory memorandum refers to certain difficulties which have been encountered in its implementation. In order to increase its effectiveness, efficiency and transparency, amendments are proposed aimed at improving and streamlining the approach, methodologies and working procedures of the scheme in accordance with Article 18 of the Regulation. 1.2. In its analysis the Commission mentions the difficulties which, in its view, have contributed to the slow progress of the scheme. These are: i. the reluctance of producer organizations to accept competition between their members on the basis of better environmental performance; ii. differences in market conditions within the Community; iii. the low visibility for consumers; iv. the existence of national schemes; v. the cumbersome procedures for criteria setting; vi. possible trade distortions and, vii. the subsequent costs of the awards. The Committee will give its views on these impediments when it discusses the measures proposed by the Commission to improve the scheme. 1.3. This is not a new subject for the ESC. The Committee expressed its views on the original proposal in a unanimously adopted opinion () and has also made numerous suggestions on the future course of the scheme as part of other recent opinions. These suggestions are contained in: point 2.7 ('sustainable consumption`) of the Opinion on the Priorities for consumer policy (1996-1998) () and point 4.4.3 ('new instruments of environmental policy, including eco-labelling schemes`) of the Opinion on International trade and the environment (). The present opinion will make use of these recommendations. 1.4. Furthermore, in providing the secretariat for the Eco-label Consultation Forum, the ESC has developed a good insight into the functioning of the scheme and the contribution of all the players involved. The drafting of this opinion has also benefited from the various inputs provided by the competent bodies, the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European interest groups. 2. General remarks 2.1. The Committee is of the opinion that the development of the number of criteria for product groups adopted and the number of eco-labels awarded, should not be judged negatively, given the short period the regulation has been in force. The German 'Blue Angel` (1977) and the 'Nordic Swan` (1989), which now have recognized positions in their home markets and to some extent also abroad, initially faced similar disappointments and set-backs. They too were 'slow starters`. 2.2. The ESC also believes that the coming into existence of a number of eco-labelling schemes in Member States at about the same time as the EU-scheme was launched, was an element that contributed to its modest start. In addition, its necessarily more complicated organizational structure, which was designed in order to accommodate the desire of Member States to actively participate in its operation, also played a part in this. Recent information provided by the Commission, however, shows that by the end of March 1997, the Scheme awarded 27 licenses to 14 producers for a total of 108 products. These facts, taken together with the statistics published by the Commission in its Proposal, may be an indication that the Scheme is now gaining momentum. 2.3. The Committee is convinced that, also given the trade barrier implications of the national schemes, the future of environmental labelling lies with strengthening the EU-scheme. To achieve this, an effort should be made to harmonize as much as possible the criteria of these national eco-label schemes. () 2.4. The successful implementation of the EU eco-label scheme is also of great importance since it is the only product-related and demand driven voluntary policy instrument to pursue the cause of sustainable consumption. 3. Specific comments 3.1. The introduction of a graded label 3.1.1. The Commission argues that industrial organizations are generally reluctant to endorse the eco-labelling scheme since it invites competition (on the basis of the environmental impact of the product only). Individual companies, however, seeking competitive advantage, may well be interested in the eco-label. The Commission also points to the different market structures for many product groups in the Member States and notes that for non-EU producers there exist significantly different conditions from those prevailing within the EU. These considerations have led the Commission to conclude that it will often not be possible to establish uniform criteria. 3.1.2. In order to meet these problems, the Commission proposes the introduction of a graded label based on different (flexible) criteria for each of the environmental aspects of the product group concerned. Sufficiently strict benchmarks for these separate aspects are to be established in order to guard the integrity of the label so that it satisfies the basic requirements. 3.1.3. First of all it should be stressed that the rationale for establishing EU-wide ecological criteria for product groups is the desire to reduce their environmental impact within the European Union. This implies that the selection of the environmental aspects for which criteria have to be established and the strictness of these criteria should reflect environmental conditions within the EU. It may therefore not always be possible to accommodate non-EU-producers, who may be operating under significantly different environmental and legislative conditions (). 3.1.4. Secondly, one may cast some doubt as to whether the national conditions (including consumer expectations of high environmental standards) within the EU are so different that they necessitate national approaches with respect to the setting of criteria (establishment of different standards), especially as the single market will increase harmonization of economic conditions and environmental policies in the EU. 3.1.5. Thirdly, one may question the Commission's optimism that the reluctance of manufacturers to compete on the basis of environmental performance will be lessened by the introduction of a graded label. Admittedly, a graded label provides more flexibility for manufacturers to comply with the criteria, but its effects on competition are not at all clear, in particular because of the inherent lack of transparency of such a label. 3.1.6. It is highly questionable whether the introduction of a graded label will provide an answer to any of the concerns manufacturers have with respect to the EU eco-label scheme. So far, there is no evidence of a positive attitude of manufacturers or their organizations for a graded label. 3.1.7. It is true that such a system would provide the standard setting authority with more flexibility, in the sense that it allows for more nuances than the 'pass-fail` system. But it is unlikely that such freedom will bring much satisfaction to such an authority as it will lead to disputes regarding the choice of subsequent hurdles, due to the different (national) interests of producers. Furthermore, one has to be aware of the built-in pressure towards a lower base-line in a graded system. 3.1.8. Lastly, it is doubtful whether consumers appreciate being offered more choice through different 'bouquets` of flowers. It will be very difficult to explain the relevance and importance of the different labels to them. Consequently, it will be problematic for the consumer to choose between labels which show different scores for the various environmental aspects. Moreover, in general, the consumer does not like to spend much time on assessing information for the purchase of goods (), notwithstanding his interest in information on specific impacts on the environment and the state of the environment at large. 3.1.9. It is true that the consumer takes more time to choose 'the best buy` when it concerns durables. But usually she will at least have a notion of the properties (fitness for use) of the products that are relevant for her. And even then, as all consumer organizations know, it requires great skill and effort to provide the consumer with understandable and relevant information on comparative tests of such products - a system which is analogous to the format of a graded eco-label. 3.1.10. In the latter case, the problem of the consumer is aggravated because he will usually be far less familiar with the environmental qualities of the product and even less in a position to express preferences for them. Consequently, the consumer will not take time to digest the information on the label which he may neither comprehend well nor even need in order to make a purchase decision. It is therefore understandable that consumer organizations have expressed their opposition towards the introduction of a graded label. 3.1.11. For the same reasons industrial companies have doubts about a graded label, as it has disadvantages as a communication tool in the market place. 3.1.12. And consequently, it is understandable that nowhere in the world a graded eco-labelling scheme has become operational. 3.1.13. For all these reasons the ESC does not believe that the introduction of a graded label will be an adequate tool to overcome the hesitations of industrial and trading companies for participating in the scheme. The Committee rather believes that sufficient adaptations can be made within the present 'pass-fail` system to drastically increase its attractiveness towards these companies. 3.1.14. Because of all the risks involved, the Committee urges the Commission, if it would not be inclined to heed its advice to abandon this new approach, to at least firstly enquire whether producers and retailers (who may feel a responsibility to help interpret the information to the consumer) would really prefer a (kind of) graded scheme to the present 'pass-fail` system and as a result would be much more inclined to participate in such a scheme. 3.1.15. And if that were to be the case, the Committee further suggests that the Commission pre-tests such a system, before it presents definitive proposals. The outcome of such a test may well show certain variations within Member States, although the label that ultimately will be chosen should have the same design throughout the EU. The Committee would also like to suggest that the consumer committee be involved in this pre-testing exercise (see also the reference in Article 7). 3.2. The relationship between the EU scheme and national schemes 3.2.1. The ESC can concur with the view of the Commission that in future national labels should only apply to product groups for which no specific Community eco-label criteria exist. It proposes however to change 'are established` into 'have been established` (Article 11.1) (). The determining factor for the Committee is that there will no longer be any products in the market place carrying a national eco-label for which EU-labels have been established after the new regulation has been in force for five years. This adaptation would allow the presence of national labels in the market in the (sometimes long) period which lies between the announcement of the mandate for the development of criteria for that particular product group and the publication of the criteria by the Commission (Article 5.3). Furthermore it has to be recognized that this provision is only applicable to the so-called co-ordinated schemes because the governments of the Member States are not accountable for other, existing unregulated labels. The ESC recommends that the Commission will clarify the precise meaning of this paragraph. An exception may, however, be made for the adoption of (stricter) national criteria in the co-ordinated schemes to combat environmental problems which are genuinely of national significance. Such an exception is deemed appropriate as the TBT and SPS Agreements (), under conditions, also allow for the establishment of national standards. The burden of proof for the establishment of such national labels should rest with the national authority for eco-labelling. It is not expected that much use will be made of such an exception clause. 3.2.2. The Commission proposes the establishment of criteria for only a very limited number of product groups, given the modest financial contribution it is prepared to make. () Hence, not only would the logo's visibility hardly improve, but even worse, its share in the coordinated system of eco-labelling would most certainly even decrease. One way of arresting this unfortunate trend would be to back the commendable initiative of several national schemes to harmonize their criteria for particular product groups and so create additional EU-criteria. The ESC would like to emphasise that harmonization of criteria is to be preferred to a system of mutual recognition (of non-harmonized) criteria. 3.2.3. A cause for concern is the existence of uncoordinated national (private) schemes, a problem which is also referred to by the Commission. The ESC therefore welcomes the Commission proposal to allow retailers to apply for the eco-label for products marketed under their own brand name (Article 6.1) as it may tempt them to give up their own logo and to participate in either the official national scheme or the EU scheme. It urges the Commission to affirm that wholesale brands are also permissible in the scheme. 3.2.4. The proliferation of private labels and other environmental claims should be strongly discouraged. These unregulated labels confuse the consumer and their claims are sometimes misleading. Consequently, they harm the development of the EU eco-label and the national labels issued under the aegis of the competent bodies. 3.2.5. In order to enable national authorities better to tackle misleading environmental claims, the ESC recommends that the Commission - in collaboration with the Committee as proposed in Article 13 - scrutinizes existing legislation and codes of practice on misleading advertising, with a view to the need for introducing amendments taking into account the different national legal and institutional structures. 3.3. The organizational set-up of the EU scheme 3.3.1. The relationship between the EEO () and the Commission 3.3.1.1. The Committee concurs with the Commission proposal to encourage the setting up of a private international association of the eco-label competent bodies () that will assume the responsibility for the establishment and updating of the criteria, the corresponding assessment and verification requirements and the coordination of the activities of the competent bodies. The Committee has adopted this view as it recognizes that there does not exist a viable alternative to this Commission proposal. 3.3.1.2. The Committee, in preparing this opinion, has investigated the possibility of entrusting the EEA with the final responsibility for the establishment of the criteria. It has invited the director of the EEA to give his views on this thought. The director strongly believes that this administrative task of establishing criteria would impede his core business of independent collection and dissemination of information on the environment. Consequently the Committee recognizes that the EEA can not function as a viable alternative to the EEO. 3.3.1.3. The Commission is to be applauded for its 'retreat` from the execution of the scheme, as past experience has shown that the scheme is (also) vulnerable because of the driver's seat position of the Commission. This shift of responsibilities to the EEO is all the more appropriate, given the increased sensitivity about trade distortions (). An additional advantage of the setting-up of the EEO, is that it may be conducive to the further harmonization of national schemes (see also point 3.2.2). 3.3.1.4. However, at an informal meeting of competent bodies and government officials discussing the proposal (29 till 30 May 1997), several delegations expressed a preference, at least at this juncture, for the Commission to retain ultimate responsibility for adopting the criteria. The following arguments were offered in support of this view: - the authority of the Commission, if needed, in defence of the adopted criteria; - the competence of the Commission to negotiate in a European and international context; - the sense of 'ownership` (feeling of responsibility for the body to be set up) and finally the financial consequences. The Committee is of the opinion that these concerns should not be taken lightly and urges the Commission to find adequate solutions for these problems. 3.3.1.5. The concrete delimitation of responsibilities still leaves much to be desired. The proposal does not, for example, pay any attention to the question of liability for damages which may be awarded by the courts that emanate from decisions of the EEO. The ESC is of the opinion that the EEO should be indemnified by the Commission against damages which may arise from merely but properly discharging its mandate from the Commission. 3.3.1.6. Unfortunately, neither does the proposal present an unequivocal attribution of responsibilities between the Commission and the EEO with respect to the introduction of new criteria. It is true that the eco-label criteria will be established by the EEO, but they do not enter into force before the Commission is satisfied that the EEO has complied with the terms of the mandate. The mandate will specify procedural requirements for establishing eco-label criteria in accordance with the principles of annex 4. According to the proposal, see Article 5, paragraph 2, the Commission's responsibility consists of the selection of a product group and the verification of compliance with the procedural principles listed in annex 4. 3.3.1.7. However, the proposal sets out in point 32 that the Commission also has to verify that the tasks of the EEO are executed in conformity with the regulation. Moreover it sees an analogy with the 'new approach` procedure (point 33). 3.3.1.8. The ESC is particularly unhappy with this reference to the 'new approach`. In the first place the 'new approach` favours by its very aims and ambitions a national approach. Moreover, standardization (CEN) and eco-labelling (EEO) are fundamentally different concepts. While the former is technical, the latter is selective and a tool of policy. Hence the CEN-model and procedures are not suited for the operation of the EEO. 3.3.1.9. The Committee strongly believes that the task of the Commission should be to provide and stipulate proper rules of the game and to assure a level playing field. No more and no less. It therefore believes that the Commission's interests are sufficiently guaranteed by its role in co-drafting a proper charter for the EEO and by verifying whether the EEO has complied with the requirements of annex 4. In order to ensure sufficient compatibility with other environmental policy objectives and concerns, the Commission may, however, refer to any relevant EU-policy document in its mandate to the EEO to establish criteria for a particular product group. It will, however, be the EEO's responsibility to decide on its possible consequences for the determination of the criteria. 3.3.1.10. Given the nature of its functions, as defined in Regulation 1210/90 and the competence it has developed, the EEA may play an active role in assembling information which will be necessary for the determination of the product group (phase 1 of the procedural guidelines) and the drawing-up of the environmental impact assessment (phase 3). The EEA expressed a willingness to be engaged in these tasks. The Committee therefore urges the Commission to further investigate the formal involvement of the EEA in the Scheme (). In such a relationship it will be necessary to establish direct lines of communication between the EEA and EEO. 3.3.2. The relationship between the EEO and the Competent Bodies 3.3.2.1. The proposal does not say much about this relationship. This is understandable, as it will be an organ of the competent bodies and negotiations between the Commission and the Competent Bodies have hardly begun. As the proposal correctly states that the regulation will only enter into force, 'when the Commission decides (emphasis added) that the EEO is in a position to perform its tasks`, it is a pity that the Commission has not yet presented any views on this relationship. Such guidance would accelerate the coming into existence of the EEO. 3.3.2.2. The ESC welcomes the opportunity to present some ideas on this relationship. It strongly believes that the EEO charter should clearly stipulate it is only answerable to the competent bodies, notwithstanding the Commission's responsibility for verification (see above). The competent bodies are to function as the EEO's supervisory board and would at the same time, to the extent possible, assume responsibility for the establishment of the draft criteria for the mandated product groups. In this manner, the staff of the EEO can be kept at a minimum. In order to guarantee its efficient functioning, routine decisions should be taken by simple majority voting, while for other decisions a system of qualified voting could be adopted. 3.3.2.3. The main functions of the EEO would be: i) to receive a mandate from the Commission to establish or revise criteria, ii) to give a corresponding mandate to one or more competent bodies to establish the draft criteria (the lead-country approach that functioned well in the early years of the present Regulation), iii) to approve the established (draft) criteria, iv) to seek the advice of the forum on the establishment of the draft criteria and on desired adaptations of its guidelines, procedures and working methods, v) to present the established criteria to the Commission, vi) to advise the Commission on measures it intends to take in connection with the regulation. The supervisory board of the EEO should also institute working groups composed of staff of the competent bodies to prepare for decision making as much as possible. The charters of the competent bodies may provide guidance for the drawing-up of the EEO charter. 3.3.2.4. The EEO will be free, after the regulation has entered into force, to adopt the necessary changes regarding its mode of operation, provided they do not conflict with the regulation. It should for instance be free to adjust its working methods if it deems that to be necessary. As far as the (initial) working methods of the EEO are concerned, it may be wise to stick as close as possible to the 'procedural guidelines` () agreed upon earlier. It may be worth investigating whether red tape and other provisions that impede a speedy procedure and add to the costs of its operation can be avoided without loss of the quality of the criteria (). A comparative analysis of the procedures applied by the (co-ordinated) national schemes may yield promising results. It is worth mentioning that such an examination has been performed by the Danish ministry for the environment. 3.3.2.5. If deemed helpful, the Commission and the competent bodies may agree to mandate an independent body to develop a proposal for a charter of the EEO on the basis of the relevant conditions stipulated in the draft regulation and this opinion. Such a draft charter may facilitate the negotiations between Commission and competent bodies on the early setting up of the EEO, which at present, unfortunately, lack direction. Its establishment is, as has been observed in point 3.3.2.1, a necessary condition for the repeal of the present regulation and the coming into force of a much needed new arrangement. 3.4. The involvement of social and economic interest groups 3.4.1. The Committee very much regrets that the proposal hardly pays attention to the involvement and position of different interest groups in the process of criteria setting. These interest groups are, according to Article 6 of the present regulation: industry and commerce (including trade unions as appropriate), consumer organizations and environmental organizations. The Committee wishes to make clear already that the involvement of the trade unions, which represent unique practical experience in workplace matters, should take place on the same footing as the other mentioned interest groups. Furthermore, the Committee supports the Commission's reference to the involvement of skilled crafts and SMEs through their most representative organizations. 3.4.2. The ESC wishes to reiterate its determined conviction that these interest groups have to play a vital role in the eco-labelling process in order to create and maintain a viable award scheme. It is therefore adamant in insisting that Article 6 of the present Regulation remain in force (), with the notable exception that the Forum should now become answerable to the EEO and not to the Commission. 3.4.3. In order to further involve the ESC and to commit it to the successful implementation of the scheme, the regulation may entrust it with the task of formally appointing both the members of the Forum on the basis of nominations from the interest groups and the president of the Forum. () The fact that the Committee is bringing together the economic and social partners within the EU means that it is well placed to oversee the activities of the Forum and in doing so to ensure transparency, well-balanced representation and provision of information to both EU and non-EU interests alike. To date the ESC has housed and provided the secretariat for the forum on ad hoc basis. To ensure the continued efficiency of the forum's activities, the present arrangement for its secretariat should be formalized (). 3.4.4. As is the case at present, the EEO's working methods should stipulate the involvement of the social interest groups in the working groups that prepare the draft criteria for designated product groups (see also point 3.3.2.3). These interest groups should be involved at all stages of the eco-labelling process as they are most closely involved with retailers, producers and consumers. 3.5. Financial aspects 3.5.1. In its financial statement, the Commission notes that it will end its financial involvement four years after the new regulation has been in force. In the Commission's view the scheme should then be self-supporting. The ESC would point out that experience with national schemes has made it abundantly clear that this view is untenable. The involvement of the EEA in drawing up the costly environmental impact analyses may however reduce the total costs of the scheme. It would nonetheless recommend that a review should take place at the end of the third year in order to assess to what degree the scheme can be financially self-sufficient. 3.5.2. The Committee can nevertheless concur with the view that the Commission cease financial support to the scheme provided that the competent bodies are willing and able fully to support the operations of the EEO. Because the competent bodies only have limited funds at their disposal, national governments would have to supplement the necessary resources. The Committee is of the opinion that agreement of the Member States with the cessation of EU-funding and their acceptance of its implications is vital for the realisation of this intention of the Commission. This question must also be part of the negotiations referred to in point 3.3.2. It is however convinced the rates mentioned in Annex 5 should not be increased as that would deter industry from applying for a label. 3.5.3. Since the social benefits emanating from the establishment of the criteria and from labelled products (through a reduced environmental impact for which no payment is made) will surpass the amounts collected as fees, the ESC is of the opinion that contributions from national sources (governments) to the competent bodies are appropriate and called for if the financial involvement of the Commission is ended. 3.5.4. The ESC is not able to fully assess the financial proposals contained in Annex 5. Although it sympathizes with the idea of offering extra support to applicants from SMEs and (indigenous) suppliers from developing countries (see point 3.5), it is not sure whether this preferential treatment would be consistent with the notion of fair competition. The ESC would recommend that the contents of Annex 5 be subjected to the scrutiny and judgement of the competent bodies, because they are not only truly competent to pass judgement, but, in the long run, also fully financially responsible for the scheme. 3.6. Some comments on the articles of the draft regulation 3.6.1. Article 4, Scope 3.6.1.1. The Commission is to be applauded for setting conditions for the choice of a product group as this guidance is lacking in the present regulation. The Committee agrees that the visibility of the product group in the market place is an important criterion. It would however be wise not to apply these criteria too rigidly and to grant sufficient room to the EEO for the precise definition of the product group concerned. Furthermore a clause should be added which stipulates that EU-produced products constitute a considerable share in the total sales in the EU. The reason for this criterion is that the eco-label is instituted to solve EU-environmental problems. It would thereby also avoid the introduction of undesirable trade distortions (). 3.6.2. Article 5, procedures for the establishment of eco-label criteria 3.6.2.1. In Article 5.2, first paragraph, the Commission stipulates that eco-label criteria are to be reviewed at intervals of no longer than 3 years. According to Article 3, paragraph 5, the period of validity of the criteria shall however be specified within each set of eco-label criteria. The latter specification should therefore be applicable for the determination of the interval of its review. 3.6.2.2. In Article 5.2, third paragraph, the Commission intends to proceed to open consultations of all the interested parties, before selecting a product group. It is the view of the Committee that it suffices if the Commission, before selecting a product group, merely asks the advice of the EEO. 3.6.2.3. Paragraph 3 states that publication in the Official Journal () will take place when the Commission is satisfied that the mandate has been complied with. In line with the view expressed in point 3.3.1.7, the Committee would like to suggest that the Commission seek that satisfaction on the basis of a report by the EEO, in which it shows that it has complied with the requirements of Annex 4. An additional provision should be added saying that publication in the Official Journal will take place not later than one month after receipt of the said report, unless the Commission notifies the EEO that it was not satisfied because it had not complied with specific provisions of Annex 4. 3.6.3. Article 6, paragraph 4, verification 3.6.3.1. The Committee agrees that bodies entitled to perform tests and verifications in order to assess whether the application for the award is in conformity with the requirements, should comply with the standards of the EN 45000 series, or equivalent international standards. Because of its voluntary nature, it would, however, be in violation of competition rules to demand accreditation. The manner in which these testing institutes may wish to prove their compliance with these standards to the Competent body should be left open (). The second last line of point 4 should therefore read as follows: 'which comply with the standards of EN 45000 ...`. 3.6.4. Article 13, Advisory Committee 3.6.4.1. The ESC is pleased with the creation of an advisory body composed of representatives of the Member States, also in relation to the provisions contained in Articles 5, 11 and 12. The setting up of this committee is to be welcomed, because it also commits the governments of the Member States to the successful implementation of the scheme. Brussels, 10 July 1997. The President of the Economic and Social Committee Tom JENKINS () OJ C 114, 12. 4. 1997, p. 9. () OJ C 339, 31. 12. 1991. () OJ C 295, 7. 10. 1996. () OJ C 56, 24. 2. 1997. () See footnotes 3 and 4 and points 2.7.5 and 4.4.3.4 respectively. () The ESC expressed this view already in OJ C 56, 24. 2. 1997, point 4.4.3.5. () A Dutch consumer research institute (SWOKA) found that for 45 % of a sample of consumers interested in information on genetically manufactured food products it sufficed to know that the product in question was 'approved` by an authoritative body. More information was not deemed necessary. () In some languages, such as the Dutch language, the translation uses already the 'perfect tense`. () Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures respectively. () See Financial Statement, paragraph 9.1. It envisages the creation of criteria for five new product groups per year, over a four-year period. () European Eco-label Organization. () The organization(s) in the Member States to which manufacturers or importers may apply for the eco-label and which are responsible for the implementation of the scheme in their home country. () These responsibilities weigh more heavily for governments than for non-government organizations (Article 4 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement). () In order to assess the impact of the scheme, the Commission may also ask the EEA to perform such evaluations at regular intervals. () See also Commission information on eco-labelling, issue no 6, June 1994. It is obvious that the procedures have to be 'screened` with respect to the (dominant) role of the Commission in most of the phases which have been distinguished, notably, phase 1, 2 and 6. () OJ C 295, 7. 10. 1996, paragraph 2.7.6. () Taking into account the view of the Committee on the equal position of the trade unions and the involvement of SMEs it expressed in paragraph 3.4.1. () Reference may be made to Commission Decision 97/150/EC of 24. 2. 1997, OJ L 58, on the setting-up of a European consultative forum on the environment and sustainable development, with the notable exception that the members of this forum are appointed by the Commission. () OJ C 295, 7. 10. 1996, paragraph 2.7.7. () OJ C 56, 24. 2. 1997, point 4.4.3.4, last nine lines. () More precisely it states that the Commission will publish: the references to those criteria and requirements and their updatings. The ESC understands that this formulation implies that all the relevant data will be published as is the case under the present regulation. () Notwithstanding the fact that most, if not all, laboratories etc. will use the opportunity to seek this accreditation.