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Document 62022CN0211
Case C-211/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (Portugal) lodged on 17 March 2022 — Super Bock Bebidas, S.A., AN, BQ v Autoridade da Concorrência
Case C-211/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (Portugal) lodged on 17 March 2022 — Super Bock Bebidas, S.A., AN, BQ v Autoridade da Concorrência
Case C-211/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (Portugal) lodged on 17 March 2022 — Super Bock Bebidas, S.A., AN, BQ v Autoridade da Concorrência
OJ C 266, 11.7.2022, p. 8–10
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
11.7.2022 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 266/8 |
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (Portugal) lodged on 17 March 2022 — Super Bock Bebidas, S.A., AN, BQ v Autoridade da Concorrência
(Case C-211/22)
(2022/C 266/11)
Language of the case: Portuguese
Referring court
Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa
Parties to the main proceedings
Appellants: Super Bock Bebidas, S.A., AN, BQ
Respondent: Autoridade da Concorrência
Questions referred
1. |
Does the vertical fixing of minimum prices constitute in and of itself an infringement by object which does not require a prior analysis of whether that agreement is sufficiently harmful? |
2. |
In order to demonstrate that the ‘agreement’ element of the infringement consisting in the (tacit) fixing of the minimum prices to be charged by distributors is present, is it necessary to show that the distributors actually charged the fixed prices in the case in question, in particular by direct evidence? |
3. |
Do the following factors constitute sufficient evidence of the commission of an infringement consisting in the (tacit) fixing of the minimum prices to be charged by distributors: i) the sending of lists containing minimum prices and margins for distribution; ii) asking distributors for information on the selling prices they charge; iii) complaints from distributors (where they consider the resale prices imposed on them to be uncompetitive or find that competing distributors do not adhere to them); iv) the existence of price-tracking mechanisms (as a minimum); and v) the existence of retaliatory measures (even though it has not been demonstrated that these have actually been applied)? |
4. |
In the light of Article 101(1)(a) TFEU, Article 4(a) of Regulation No 330/2010, (1) the European Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints and the case-law of the European Union, can an agreement between a supplier and its distributors which (vertically) fixes minimum prices and other terms of business applicable to resale be presumed to be sufficiently harmful to competition, without prejudice to an analysis of any positive economic effects arising from such a practice, within the meaning of Article 101(3) TFEU? |
5. |
Is it compatible with Article 101(1)(a) TFEU and the case-law of the European Union for a judicial decision to find that the presence of the objective defining element of an ‘agreement’ between a supplier and its distributors is proved on the basis of:
|
6. |
Is an agreement on the fixing of minimum resale prices which exhibits the characteristics described above and covers almost the entire national territory capable of affecting trade between Member States? |
(1) Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ 2010 L 102, p. 1).