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Document 62016CN0372

Case C-372/16: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht München (Germany) lodged on 6 July 2016 — Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch

OJ C 343, 19.9.2016, p. 33–34 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

19.9.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 343/33

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht München (Germany) lodged on 6 July 2016 — Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch

(Case C-372/16)

(2016/C 343/45)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht München

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Soha Sahyouni

Defendant: Raja Mamisch

Questions referred

1.

Does the scope of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 (1) of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (OJ 2010 L 343, p. 10), as defined in Article 1 of that regulation, also include cases of private divorce, in this instance one pronounced by unilateral declaration of a spouse before a religious court in Syria on the basis of sharia?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

In applying Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 [when examining] Article 10 thereof in cases of private divorce,

(1)

is account to be taken in the abstract of a comparison showing that, while the applicable law pursuant to Article 8 grants access to divorce to the other spouse too, that divorce is, on account of the other spouse’s sex, subject to procedural and substantive conditions different from those applicable to access for the first spouse,

or

(2)

does the applicability of that rule depend on whether the application of the foreign law, which is discriminatory in the abstract, also discriminates in the particular case in question?

3.

If the answer to Question 2(2) is in the affirmative:

Does the fact that the spouse discriminated against consents to the divorce — including by duly accepting compensation — itself constitute a ground for not applying that rule?

(1)  OJ 2010 L 343, p. 10.

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