This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 62015TN0576
Case T-576/15: Action brought on 1 October 2015 — VIK v Commission
Case T-576/15: Action brought on 1 October 2015 — VIK v Commission
Case T-576/15: Action brought on 1 October 2015 — VIK v Commission
OJ C 7, 11.1.2016, p. 29–30
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
11.1.2016 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 7/29 |
Action brought on 1 October 2015 — VIK v Commission
(Case T-576/15)
(2016/C 007/40)
Language of the case: German
Parties
Applicant: VIK Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e. V. (Essen, Germany) (represented by: C. Kahle, lawyer)
Defendant: European Commission
Form of order sought
The applicant claims that the Court should:
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annul, pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, the decision of the European Commission of 25 November 2014 in the proceedings ‘State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Germany — Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users’ C(2014)8786 final, published in the Official Journal (OJ 2015 L 250, p. 122), in so far as
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order the defendant to pay the costs. |
Pleas in law and main arguments
In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.
1. |
First plea in law: No advantage The applicant claims that the special compensation rule does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since no advantage is granted to energy-intensive users by the cap on the EEG-surcharge. |
2. |
Second plea in law: No selectivity The applicant also argues that the special compensation rule does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since the condition of selectivity is absent. Energy-intensive users were not favoured over other users who are in a comparable factual and legal situation. In addition, the cap on the EEG-surcharge is justified on the basis of the nature and general scheme of the rule. |
3. |
Third plea in law: No resources received from the State In that regard, it is claimed that neither the nationwide compensation scheme nor the special compensation rule of the EEG-Act 2012 contained aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since there is no burden on State resources. |
4. |
Fourth plea in law: No restriction on competition In this respect, the applicant states that the cap on the EEG-surcharge merely serves to compensate for a competitive disadvantage which electricity/energy-intensive users must bear in comparison with sectors of users in other countries owing to the payment of the EEG-surcharge. |
5. |
Fifth plea in law: Compatibility of the aid with the common market The applicant claims that, if the cap on the EEG-surcharge were to be classified as aid, it would be compatible with the common market. The cap does not distort competition; rather, a competitive disadvantage for the users concerned is compensated for by this means. |
6. |
Sixth plea in law: No new aid The applicant also claims that, if the Court classifies the special compensation rule as aid, it is existing aid, to which the procedure under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (1) is not applicable. |
7. |
Seventh plea in law: Infringement of the general legal principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty The applicant submits in that regard that, by approving the EEG-Act 2000, the defendant created a legitimate expectation, which is infringed by the final decision. |
(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).