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Document 52024IR1799

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind

COR 2024/01799

OJ C, C/2025/285, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/285/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/285/oj

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Official Journal
of the European Union

EN

C series


C/2025/285

24.1.2025

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind

(C/2025/285)

Rapporteurs

:

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO (PT/PES), Member of the Parliament of the Autonomous Region of the Azores

and

Emil BOC (RO/EPP), Mayor of Cluj-Napoca

Reference documents

:

Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 9th Cohesion Report

(COM(2024) 149)

Forging a sustainable future together: Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe – Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

1.

welcomes the publication of the 9th Cohesion Report which demonstrates the indisputable added value of cohesion policy as a policy which has successfully delivered over the years, by supporting territories to respond to the important internal and external EU challenges; recognises, nevertheless, that it sheds light on the arising, persistence and in many instances increase of regional inequalities both at European and national levels;

2.

recalls that at its core cohesion policy is about economic convergence and equality of opportunities for all EU citizens, post-2027 cohesion policy should enhance the development of all EU territories, including those that are currently lagging behind, by leveraging local strengths and assets to foster growth, reduce imbalances and invest in mobilising untapped economic potential particularly in less developed regions, as highlighted by the report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy (HLG report);

3.

notes that in several countries, a non-negligible number of middle-income regions, as well as some more developed ones, have experienced sluggish or negative growth, falling into ‘development traps’; Calls on the European Commission to provide a clear definition of ‘development traps’ to avoid the risk of political exploitation and controversy around the concept and to carefully assess its implications on the current system of classification of regions; further notes that the lack of a clear definition can lead to an overgeneralisation of the concept, applying it inappropriately to diverse and varied situations; also notes that the rapid changes brought about by globalisation and technological advancements can alter the dynamics of development. The concept of development traps may not fully capture the opportunities and challenges posed by these global trends, such as digital inclusion, global supply chains and innovation diffusion;

4.

highlights that the growing concentration of economic activities in metropolitan regions and large cities has often come at the expense of other territories (rural areas, mid-sized cities, etc.) while fuelling problems that result in more economic and social disparities (e.g., lack of housing). Notes that this might be an even bigger challenge especially for countries where a large part of the population still lives outside metropolitan areas, in rural areas or small towns;

5.

welcomes the message conveyed by the HLG report according to which Europe’s future competitiveness is also dependent upon tapping into the unleashed potential of all its territories, including less developed and peripheral ones;

6.

notes that, as highlighted in the 9th Cohesion Report, alongside longstanding structural challenges (e.g. labour market inefficiencies, low human capital, weak innovation capacity, etc.), European regions are also confronted with climate change, energy dependency, demographic change and geopolitical tensions as well as the accelerated pace and intensity of shocks;

7.

is of the view that the aforementioned territorial trends and the urgency to address them in order to preserve Europe’s economic, social and even democratic stability are testament to the critical role of cohesion policy in the years to come;

8.

recognises that a new combination of challenges facing Europe and its territories necessitates a reform of the policy, whose success in tackling regional disparities will be contingent upon reinforcing its objectives and principles rather than diluting or altering them;

Narrative and objectives

9.

welcomes the fact that a reinforced and improved cohesion policy is being recognised in the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 of the European Council, the political guidelines of the European Commission President for 2024-2029 and several other high-level documents such as the Letta report on the future of the single market (1), the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness (2), the joint declaration adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Visegrad Group on Cohesion Policy in May 2024 and the recent demands of a number of political groups in the European Parliament and letters confirming a broad political consensus on the need for a strong and decentralised cohesion policy;

10.

considers that Europe’s political agenda is rapidly changing in response to new circumstances and cohesion policy cannot be disconnected from this process. Post-2027 cohesion policy has a role to play in the delivery of the policies linked to emerging priorities as they often require a place-sensitive approach and touch upon sub-national authorities’ competences (e.g. climate policies). This gives even more importance to having a cohesion policy available for all European regions, targeting their specific situation according to a differentiated approach;

11.

highlights that the goal of territorial cohesion goes hand in hand with the broader objective of promoting a competitive, resilient and climate neutral Europe 2050; stresses that investments in infrastructure, innovation, human capital and sustainable practices through territorial cohesion policies support the broader objective of making the EU a more competitive and dynamic global player. The HLG report offers strong evidence that improving Europe’s overall competitiveness is not only about the potential of developed regions but is also dependent upon unleashing the potential of its less developed areas;

12.

stresses that territorial cohesion policies often emphasise sustainable development, which is increasingly important for long-term competitiveness. By promoting environmentally sustainable practices, regions can develop green technologies and industries, positioning themselves as leaders in the emerging green economy. This aligns with global trends and enhances the competitiveness of the EU in sustainable markets;

13.

points out that the future cohesion policy should critically ensure that Europe’s quest for competitiveness on a global scale – which entails reversing its industrial decline, supporting SMEs and mid-caps, achieving leadership in emerging technologies, delivering the triple green, digital and demographic transitions and developing strategic autonomy – results in growth opportunities for all territories and does not exacerbate existing disparities;

14.

stresses that the transition in all its forms should be at the core of the next cohesion policy and defines the evolving identity of the policy to make it fit for the future;

15.

highlights the intertwined nature of resilience and competitiveness in regional development, recognising that robust resilience strategies are fundamental to sustained economic competitiveness; underlines the critical role of cohesion policy not least in addressing EU regions’ different vulnerabilities, for instance to climate change, geopolitical, demographic, economic and environmental challenges, by improving their resilience. As highlighted by the HLG report the policy should be a pre-emptive tool to ensure overall preparedness of the EU to face future challenges and to build resilience within the system with structural long-term investments; in this regard, the demographic transition should be among the priorities of the next cohesion policy framework, alongside the green and digital transitions;

16.

notes the particular challenges of digital transformation, which must feature digital inclusion and foster innovation diffusion across all regions. These aspects are essential for ensuring that all regions benefit from technological advancements and are able to participate in the global economy;

17.

insists on the importance for cohesion policy to strengthen implementation of the current and future European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) Action Plan and to enhance support to social innovation and better access to public services, in areas where the provisions of such services is facing increasing challenges, such as rural areas;

18.

warns, however, that the policy has come under pressure to address too many priorities under an increasingly sector-driven logic and calls for reaffirming in the future the primacy of its territorial approach. All investments under cohesion policy should serve its primary goal of redressing geographical disparities in accordance with Article 174 TFEU;

19.

also warns that a policy with too many priorities can lack clear direction and focus. Stakeholders, including policymakers, regional authorities and beneficiaries, may find it challenging to understand the main goals and objectives of the policy. This can lead to confusion and inefficient implementation of programmes and projects;

20.

stresses that such a drift towards a ‘congestion of priorities’, which dilutes the impact of the policy, should be equally re-balanced by incorporating a more explicit territorial approach to cohesion objectives into other thematic policies and instruments of the EU, in coordination with regions in order to create better synergies and bridges between instruments and policies, including national policies; welcomes, therefore, the 9th Cohesion Report message that cohesion cannot be pursued by cohesion policy alone but should be a shared objective of all EU and national investment policies in a coordinated manner;

21.

reiterates its calls to anchor the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle as a transversal tenet applying to EU policies. Ensuring the respect of this principle would require not just reinforcing the tool of territorial impact assessments but also creating a robust EU monitoring framework to assess the implementation of policies against the principle;

22.

recalls the critical, yet often neglected role of cohesion policy to promote the single market by cushioning its unintended effects in certain areas while helping many territories to develop the capacities to reap its benefits. As highlighted in the Letta report, without a sound cohesion policy the positive effects of the single market will be significantly hampered;

23.

points out that cohesion policy includes measures to strengthen the institutional capacity of regional and local governments. Improved governance and administrative capacity ensure that regions can effectively implement policies and projects that align with the objectives of the single market. Strong institutions are crucial for creating a favourable business environment and attracting investment. Furthermore, cohesion policy promotes cooperation between regions through various cross-border, transnational and interregional programmes. These initiatives foster collaboration and knowledge-sharing, helping regions to pool resources, share best practices and develop joint strategies for economic development. Such cooperation strengthens the single market by creating a more integrated and cohesive economic space;

Budgetary aspects

24.

recalls that the scale of territorial challenges outlined in the previous points demands equipping post-27 cohesion policy with a budget that is up to the task, at least equivalent to the 2021-2027 one (including the REACT-EU top-up) in real terms, while the European Territorial Cooperation component should be increased compared to the current programming period and represent no less than 8 % of the total amount, while the cross-border cooperation component should be at least doubled;

25.

stresses that all regions should continue to be eligible for funding and is of the view that calls for restricting the geographical scope of the policy rest upon a narrow and misleading understanding of its impact and benefits; emphasises that geographic restrictions can undermine the sense of unity and shared purpose that the policy is designed to promote. This could weaken the overall cohesion and solidarity within the EU, making it harder to achieve collective goals. Regions that feel neglected or unfairly treated might become disillusioned with the EU, leading to political instability and challenges to the integration process;

26.

recalls the long-standing request from the CoR to reform the revenue side of the MFF by establishing new own resources which would reduce the influence of the ‘juste retour’ logic on cohesion policy allocations to the benefit of criteria that best reflect the actual territorial needs;

27.

recognises the benefits of streamlining the architecture of the next MFF, including under the shared management family, but emphasises that any such option should strongly take into account the specific scope and purpose of the different structural funds set out in the Treaties, in particular their territorial and place-based dimension. Harmonisation of rules across the funds under a single framework should be the main priority, irrespective of the number of funds, on the condition that such harmonisation does not harm the multi-level governance of the future cohesion policy;

28.

reiterates, therefore, the CoR proposal to establish a single strategic framework defining the main scope and goals for the post-2027 period: this ‘European partnership pact’ should build on previous initiatives, such as the Common Strategic Framework, and ensure coherence and directionality in the implementation of the policy; emphasises that, within the meaning of a Common Strategic Framework, it is essential that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) be planned and implemented at the same regional level as the Structural Funds so that the funding architecture is consistent and policy intervention in rural areas is integrated;

29.

stresses, however, that the current fragmentation of funding instruments remains an obstacle to effective spending (by increasing administrative complexity, hindering coordination, reducing strategic coherence and creating inefficiencies); is of the view, for instance, that the Just Transition Fund would best serve its scope as a top-up to the ERDF and the ESF to avoid duplications and overlaps in its implementation; acknowledges, however, that it is essential to maintain the specific focus of and the same or increased financial allocation as the JTF. If this challenge is addressed, then a top-up approach can provide comprehensive support to regions undergoing significant transitions, contributing to their economic and social resilience;

30.

opposes the creation of new EU sectoral funds with no clear additionality or complementarity in regards to existing instruments; regrets in this regard that in the section of the European Commission political guidelines there is no reference to the role and contribution of cohesion policy but rather announcement of a further new Competitiveness Fund in the new Commission’s guidelines; while welcoming the motives behind the Competitiveness Fund, underlines that any such new funds could bring additional bureaucracy and hamper the effects of cohesion policy due to their spatially blind nature; stresses that in order to maintain the integrity and impact of cohesion policy, it is crucial to balance the introduction of new initiatives with the need for integrated, coherent and streamlined approaches that effectively address regional disparities and promote balanced development across the EU;

31.

underlines that the budget of future cohesion policy should be designed in such a way that the prospective enlargement to new Member States by the end of the 2028-2034 period does not create any financial disruption;

32.

calls for restoring the principle of additionality into the regulation to stem the increasing use of cohesion policy to make up for Member States’ underfinancing of their EU territories;

Delivery mechanism and multilevel governance

33.

can imagine shifting cohesion policy towards a more performance-based model under certain circumstances and for specific policy areas, in that it can bring simplification and more efficiency, but warns that taking this approach is neither a panacea nor a one-size-fits-all solution for all policy areas and, to complement it, additional measures are needed to reduce the complexity of cohesion policy;

34.

is of the view that a performance-oriented model would bring added value only on the condition that it brings simplification and that managing authorities enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy over its application, including retaining the possibility to opt for cost-based models, where appropriate. In addition, all targets defined through performance-based mechanisms should be place-sensitive, if applicable;

35.

stresses that the performance-based model cannot be considered a one-size-fits-all solution to all cohesion policy implementing issues as it could be exploited effectively for some types of interventions or objectives and at the same time be a suboptimal instrument for others, which further reinforces the case of a flexible application in the post-2027 period;

36.

strongly advocates that the shared-management model, multi-level governance and the partnership principle remain the guiding principles of cohesion policy post-2027, as referred to in CoR opinion on engaging LRAs in the preparation of the Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes (3), in that the successful implementation of cohesion policy depends critically on the knowledge and involvement of local and regional authorities for ensuring that these initiatives are relevant, effective and sustainable. Their local knowledge, stakeholder connections and compliance with EU regulations make them invaluable partners in the development process;

37.

recalls that the principle of subsidiarity is one of the main building blocks of the EU project and should be duly respected in the implementation of funds, especially in relation to the competences of local and regional authorities in accordance with Article 5 TEU; notes that protecting subsidiarity in cohesion policy ensures that decisions are made as close to the citizens as possible, respecting local autonomy, improving policy relevance and effectiveness, enhancing accountability and fostering efficient use of resources;

38.

is convinced that the current system allowing for different forms of programmes (regional, interregional, national, multi-fund, etc.) and roles in their management (managing authorities, intermediate bodies, etc.) is best placed to suit the Member States’ different institutional settings while one-size-fits-all solutions, such as in the case of a single national plan, would be far less efficient;

39.

opposes, therefore, any direct or indirect measure of centralisation within cohesion policy and stands ready to explore any legal means, especially under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and article 263 of the TFEU, to block any attempt in this direction; advocates to establish more legal guarantees in the post-2027 framework to ensure greater decentralisation and the comprehensive involvement of local and regional authorities in decision-making processes;

40.

reiterates that LRAs are key partners in cohesion policy due to their local knowledge, implementation capabilities, ability to foster local engagement and alignment with the principles of multi-level governance. Their involvement ensures that cohesion policy is effective, relevant and responsive to the needs of diverse regions, contributing to the overall success of regional development efforts;

41.

calls for the creation of a specific enabling condition based on the partnership principle, requiring the adoption of national plans with explicit commitments to involving local and regional authorities in the design and implementation of cohesion policy; urges the European Commission to provide annual reports to the Committee of the Regions on the progress of fulfilling this condition;

42.

stresses the paramount importance of place–based approaches in cohesion policy and the need for tailor-made, integrated instruments (such as urban - peri-urban cooperation, integrated urban development and community–led local development) for boosting acceptance of the policy approach in the regions, in the interests of bringing Europe closer to its grass roots; emphasises that local and regional needs should be the starting point and basis for such a place-based approach, and suggests examining the extent to which specific legal frameworks are appropriate for these particular requirements;

European economic governance and reforms

43.

acknowledges the rationale behind further integration of cohesion policy into the European Semester and believes this perspective could be partially realised by expanding the existing focus of country reports on territorial trends and making the impact of reforms on territorial equity a horizontal criterion in country-specific recommendations;

44.

stresses, however, that while cohesion policy is designed to address regional and local needs, with a strong emphasis on customising interventions to specific local contexts, the European Semester, on the other hand, operates at a national level, focusing on economic governance and structural reforms;

45.

is of the view that a very prudent approach should be followed in linking cohesion policy funding to structural reforms as, often, these structural reforms are not implemented at the level of the authorities implementing cohesion policy; welcomes the suggestion in the 9th Cohesion Report to use the instrument of enabling conditions for this purpose and to check how the link between investments and reforms could be more efficient, but stresses that this option is viable only if the chosen reforms have a direct pertinence to territorial challenges and their negotiation is conducted in full respect of the partnership principle;

46.

reiterates, however, the CoR’s strong call against using a ‘carrot and stick’ approach in linking cohesion policy with European economic governance, which entails at the very least the discontinuation of macroeconomic conditionality;

47.

stresses that the Stability and Growth Pact should in no instance constrain the access to cohesion policy funds and therefore welcomes the revised economic governance framework’s exclusion of co-financing of EU programmes from the definition of net expenditure, which reinforces the coherence of EU policies while facilitating the implementation of EU funds, not least those under cohesion policy;

Programming and territorial perspective

48.

notes that implementing delays are often the result of lengthy budgetary, legislative and programming negotiations as well as regulatory complexity and invites the Commission to outline a viable plan with the Council of the EU and the European Parliament to avoid this risk in the run-up to the post-27 period. Options such as decoupling the budgetary aspects of the regulation or allowing for a partial roll-over of existing programmes into the new period could be explored, thereby providing predictability for managing authorities;

49.

recognises that, in the past, regions have proven that, thanks to well-established structures and procedures, they also respond to socio-economic crises in a tailor-made, flexible manner and are thus able to boost the resilience of the EU; nevertheless, stresses that cohesion policy is not a crisis mitigation instrument and, to avoid it coming under pressure to do so, calls for establishing an adequate dedicated mechanism within the MFF to face shocks;

50.

highlights that further simplification could be applied to the programming and implementation of cohesion policy, targeting beneficiaries, managing and audit authorities, as also underlined by the Fit for Future Platform opinions Evaluation of the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the Just Transition Fund and Evaluation of the European Social Fund+ which were adopted in October 2024 (4), developing for instance ‘confidence contracts’ with programmes that are already well functioning to reduce the level of audits and controls and the requirements related to reporting, financing, monitoring and auditing, and believes it is imperative to introduce tangible simplification measures for the benefit of the so far neglected side of beneficiaries;

51.

notes that the Committee of the Regions has already called for extending the scope of the Just Transition Fund 2021-2027 to include other sectors in transition; also notes that the transition of the current regions under the Just Transition Fund has not been completed and that they will continue to need differentiated support in the future; calls, in this regard, for a just transition to become an essential part of a reformed cohesion policy that focuses on anticipating change, supporting those regions facing the transformation of the most strategic, energy-intensive, greenhouse gas-emitting and labour-intensive industries, including those related to the transformation of the automotive and component supply industries;

52.

remains firmly convinced that European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) is the epitome of European added value and should be strengthened in the future. ETC is the main tool for European integration and solidarity. ETC fosters a sense of European unity by promoting collaboration among regions from different EU Member States, reinforcing the concept of a shared European space. It also contributes to the development of a cross-border European citizenship, where people from different regions work together and build relationships beyond national boundaries. In this respect its future budget should be increased to represent no less than 8 % of the total amount of the cohesion policy budget in the next programming period; recalls, in this regard, the particular importance of cross-border cooperation and that its budget should be at least doubled in the next programming period with a more flexible thematic concentration, as border regions account for 40 % of the EU’s territory and 30 % of Europe’s population live in border regions;

53.

emphasises that smart specialisation strategies have become a dominant policy framework at regional level and can play an even bigger role in the future as territorial delivery mechanisms for Europe’s industrial transition objectives. It is proposed that, in addition to the necessary budget allocated to the Interregional Innovation Investments Instrument, a percentage of the resources from the regional ERDF programmes could be used to implement smart specialisation strategies in the framework of interregional investment projects in order to strengthen industrial value chains to address the problem of regions stuck in development traps and the implementation of interregional projects and partnerships;

54.

points out that the outermost regions are external borders of the EU; stresses the importance of Interreg D programmes and of cooperation between the outermost regions and neighbouring third countries, in order to strengthen their regional integration as well as the EU’s external action and presence in the geographical areas in which the outermost regions are located, and emphasises the need to make progress in devising specific development strategies for outermost regions and neighbouring third countries;

55.

underlines the role of cohesion policy in supporting territories beset by severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as rural areas and areas affected by industrial transition, as well as outermost regions, northern sparsely populated areas, islands, cross-border and mountain regions. By providing targeted financial assistance, supporting economic diversification, addressing social and demographic issues and promoting sustainable development, cohesion policy helps these regions overcome disadvantages and achieve more balanced and inclusive growth;

56.

stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; given the impact of the current geopolitical context on the external border regions calls for cohesion policy to also take into account this reality;

57.

stresses that the specific challenges inherent in outermost regions should also be given particular attention as per Article 349 TFEU, and that for these regions the issues of territorial accessibility, transport and connectivity are closely intertwined and should be dealt in tandem with cohesion policy objectives.

Brussels, 21 November 2024.

The President

of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO


(1)   https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf.

(2)   https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en.

(3)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Effectively engaging local and regional authorities in the preparation of the Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes for the 2021-2027 period (OJ C 61, 4.2.2022, p. 15).

(4)   https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/285/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)


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