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Document 62015CN0021

Case C-21/15 P: Appeal brought on 19 January 2015 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 7 November 2014 in Case T-399/11 Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission

OJ C 81, 9.3.2015, p. 11–11 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

9.3.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 81/11

Appeal brought on 19 January 2015 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 7 November 2014 in Case T-399/11 Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission

(Case C-21/15 P)

(2015/C 081/14)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal, B. Stromsky, C. Urraca Caviedes and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Banco Santander, S.A. and Santusa Holding, S.L.

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

—

refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union; and

—

reserve the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The General Court erred in law by incorrectly interpreting Article 107(1) TFEU and, in particular, the concept of selectivity of State aid contained in that article.

That single ground of appeal consists of two parts, which derive from the aforementioned error of law:

—

in the first place, the General Court erred by requiring, in order to demonstrate that a measure is selective, the identification of a category of undertakings with specific and inherent characteristics (identifiable ex ante); and

—

in the second place, the General Court incorrectly interpreted the concept of selectivity by making an artificial distinction between aid to the export of goods and aid to the export of capital.
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