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Document 92002E001126
WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02 by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union.
WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02 by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union.
WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02 by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union.
OJ C 52E, 6.3.2003, pp. 38–39
(ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)
WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02 by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union.
Official Journal 052 E , 06/03/2003 P. 0038 - 0039
WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02 by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission (18 April 2002) Subject: Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union The Commission recently presented a draft regulation on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle industry(1). One of the aims is to align vehicle prices excluding taxes. Traders in a number of sectors in Luxembourg have complained that their European suppliers (based outside the Grand Duchy) are charging wholesale prices excluding tax much higher than those asked of traders in other Member States. A number of traders are obliged to purchase in particular countries and are unable to buy in other countries where the same goods are cheaper. It even happens that products are distributed throughout Europe from only one country and importers fix different prices in different Member States. What does the Commission plan to do about these accusations, by analogy with the motor vehicle proposal mentioned above? Might not these practices be considered contrary to the principles of free movement of goods in the single market and freedom of competition and to Article 81(1)(a) of the EC Treaty, which bans practices that directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions? Is the Commission prepared to take legislative or other action to resolve this problem? (1) OJ C 67, 16.3.2002, p. 2. Reply given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission (28 May 2002) With regard to competition rules, the motor vehicle distribution sector is at present governed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements which expires on 30 September 2002(1). The proposal for a new regulation on motor vehicle distribution, adopted by the Commission on 5 February 2002, aims to create the market conditions needed to increase competition in the sales and after-sales markets. The general approach of this proposal is based on the Commission's new policy for the assessment of vertical restraints, as set out in the recent Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices(2), and the related Guidelines(3). This general regulation sets out the competition rules applicable to all distribution sectors except motor vehicles, where the above-mentioned proposal provides for a stricter regime. This general regulation is based on a more economic approach, and Article 4(d) does not cover the restriction of cross-supplies between distributors within a selective distribution system, including between distributors operating at different levels of trade. Such a system prohibits manufacturers from limiting the supply of retail distributors from independent importers that have not been assigned to them. By the same token, manufacturers may not prevent independent importers from selling to the same retail distributors if they so desire. However, in the cases in Luxembourg referred to, there is insufficient evidence of the type of distribution envisaged to be able to ascertain whether or not the behaviour mentioned is likely to constitute an infringement. If evidence of anti-competitive behaviour were brought to the Commission's attention, it would definitely examine it in order to establish whether there were grounds to launch the necessary infringement procedures to put a stop to such behaviour. (1) OJ L 145, 29.6.1995. (2) OJ L 336, 29.12.1999. (3) Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ C 291, 13.10.2000.