(1)

On 29 November 2012, the Council adopted a Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations with Japan on a Free Trade Agreement.

(2)

The negotiations for an Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (‘the Agreement’) were successfully concluded and the Agreement was signed on 17 July 2018.

(3)

(4)

Directive 2007/45/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) provides that prepacked products can only be placed on the Union market if they are prepacked in the nominal quantities listed in section 1 of the Annex to that Directive. For spirit drinks, section 1 of the Annex to Directive 2007/45/EC refers to nine nominal quantities on the interval from 100 ml to 2 000 ml. Those nominal quantities do not include the quantities of 720 ml and 1 800 ml, the nominal quantities in which single distilled shochu produced by pot still is bottled and marketed in Japan.

(5)

(6)

The derogation from Directive 2007/45/EC needs to be introduced by means of an amendment to Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), in order to ensure that single distilled shochu produced by pot still and bottled in Japan can be placed on the market in all Member States simultaneously upon the entry into force of the Agreement.

(7)

Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(8)

To ensure implementation of the Agreement as regards the placing on the Union market of single distilled shochu produced by pot still and bottled in Japan, this Regulation should apply from the date of entry into force of the Agreement,

(1)

The Union may support the efforts of Member States, upon their request, to improve their administrative capacity to implement Union law.

(2)

The Structural Reform Support Programme (‘the Programme’) was established with the objective of strengthening the capacity of Member States to prepare and implement administrative and growth-sustaining structural reforms of interest to the Union, including through the provision of assistance for the efficient and effective use of the Union funds. Support under the Programme is provided by the Commission at the request of a Member State, and can cover a wide range of policy areas. Developing resilient economies and a resilient society built on strong economic, social and territorial structures, which allow Member States to efficiently absorb shocks and swiftly recover from them, contributes to economic and social cohesion and unlocks growth potential. Member States should encourage, in accordance with their legal framework, suitable contributions and involvement of national and regional public administration and stakeholders. The implementation of institutional, administrative and growth-sustaining structural reforms, which are important for Member States, and the ownership on the ground of structural reforms of interest to the Union are important tools for achieving such developments.

(3)

Effective communication of the Programme’s actions and activities and of their results at Union, national and regional levels, as appropriate, is essential for raising awareness of the achievements of the Programme, for ensuring visibility and for providing information on its effects on the ground.

(4)

Given that demand for support could exceed the Programme’s funding, the requests should be prioritised, where appropriate, by the Member State concerned during the request for support procedure. In that context, attention should be paid to requests for support that have links to the European Semester and to policy areas related to cohesion, innovation, employment, and smart and sustainable growth. The Programme should complement other instruments in order to avoid overlaps.

(5)

Given that the Programme does not provide funding to Member States, but only technical support, it does not aim to replace or substitute funding from national budgets.

(6)

Member States have increasingly taken up support under the Programme, beyond the initial expectations. Based on their estimated value, the requests for support received by the Commission during the 2017 cycle have significantly exceeded the available annual allocation. During the 2018 cycle, the estimated value of requests received was five times the financial resources available for that year. Almost all Member States have requested support under the Programme, and the requests have been distributed across all policy areas covered by the Programme.

(7)

Strengthening economic and social cohesion through structural reforms, which benefit the Union and are in accordance with Union principles and values, is crucial to underpin economic resilience as well as successful participation and enhanced real convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union, ensuring the Union’s long-term stability and prosperity. That is equally important for Member States whose currency is not the euro, in their preparation to join the euro area, and for euro-area Member States.

(8)

It is thus appropriate to stress in the general objective of the Programme, within its contribution towards responding to economic and social challenges, that enhancing economic and social cohesion, competitiveness, productivity, sustainable growth, job creation, investment and social inclusion could also contribute to the preparations for future participation in the euro area by those Member States whose currency is not the euro.

(9)

With a view to pursuing the general and specific objectives and within the eligible actions to be financed by the Programme, it should be indicated that actions and activities of the Programme should also be able to support reforms that may help Member States in their preparation to join the euro area, while respecting the principle of equal treatment of all Member States.

(10)

In order to meet the growing demand for support from Member States, and in view of the need to support the implementation of structural reforms of interest to the Union, including in Member States whose currency is not the euro, in their preparation to join the euro area, the financial allocation for the Programme should be increased to a sufficient level that allows the Union to provide support, which meets the needs of the requesting Member States and which is used in accordance with sound financial management. That increase should not adversely affect the other priorities of cohesion policy. Moreover, Member States should not be obliged to transfer their national and regional allocations from European Structural and Investment Funds.

(11)

In order to provide quality support with the least possible delay, the Commission should be able to use part of the financial envelope also to cover the cost of activities supporting the Programme, such as expenses related to quality control and monitoring, and evaluation of projects on the ground. Those activities are important to ensure the efficiency of project implementation.

(12)

Regulation (EU) 2017/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) should therefore be amended accordingly.

(13)

In order to allow for the prompt application of the measures provided for in this Regulation, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(1)

The promotion of the harmonious, sustainable and inclusive development of the internal market as an area in which goods, persons, services and capital can freely and safely circulate is one of the priorities of the Union.

(2)

The reintroduction of illicit proceeds into the economy and the diversion of money to finance illicit activities create distortions and unfair competitive disadvantages for law-abiding citizens and companies, and are therefore a threat to the functioning of the internal market. Moreover, those practices foster criminal and terrorist activities which endanger the security of citizens of the Union. Accordingly, the Union has taken action to protect itself.

(3)

One of the main pillars of the action taken by the Union was Council Directive 91/308/EEC (3), which laid down a series of measures and obligations on financial institutions, legal persons and certain professions as regards, inter alia, transparency and record-keeping, as well as ‘know-your-customer’ provisions, and laid down an obligation to report suspicious transactions to national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). FIUs were established as hubs to assess such transactions, interact with their counterparts in other countries and, where required, contact judicial authorities. Directive 91/308/EEC has since been amended and replaced by successive measures. The provisions for the prevention of money laundering are currently laid down in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4).

(4)

In light of the risk that the application of Directive 91/308/EEC would lead to an increase in cash movements for illicit purposes, which could pose a threat to the financial system and the internal market, that Directive was complemented by Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). That Regulation aims to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing by laying down a system of controls applicable to natural persons who enter or leave the Union carrying amounts of cash or bearer-negotiable instruments equal to or greater than EUR 10 000 or its equivalent in other currencies. The term ‘entering or leaving the Union’ should be defined by reference to the territory of the Union as defined in Article 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in order to ensure that this Regulation has the broadest possible scope of application and that no areas would be exempt from its application and present opportunities to circumvent applicable controls.

(5)

Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 implemented within the Community the international standards on combating money laundering and terrorist financing developed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

(6)

The FATF, established at the G7 summit held in Paris in 1989, is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes the effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. Several Member States are members of the FATF or are represented in the FATF through regional bodies. The Union is represented in the FATF by the Commission and has committed itself to the effective implementation of the FATF’s recommendations. FATF Recommendation 32 on cash couriers specifies that measures should be in place with regard to adequate controls on cross-border movements of cash.

(7)

Directive (EU) 2015/849 identifies and describes a number of criminal activities the proceeds of which might be subject to money laundering or might be used for terrorist financing. The proceeds of those criminal activities are often transported across the external borders of the Union for the purpose of being laundered or used for terrorist financing. This Regulation should take that into account and lay down a system of rules that, in addition to contributing to the prevention of money laundering, and especially predicate offences such as tax crimes as defined in national law, and terrorist financing as such, facilitate the prevention, detection, and investigation of the criminal activities defined in Directive (EU) 2015/849.

(8)

Advances have been made regarding insights into the mechanisms used for transferring illicitly acquired value across borders. As a result, the FATF recommendations have been updated, Directive (EU) 2015/849 has introduced changes to the Union’s legal framework and new best practices have been developed. In light of those developments and on the basis of the evaluation of existing Union legislation, Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 needs to be amended. However, considering the extensive nature of the amendments that would be required, Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 should be repealed and replaced with a new Regulation.

(9)

This Regulation does not affect the ability of Member States to provide, under their national law, for additional national controls on movements of cash within the Union, provided that those controls are in accordance with the Union’s fundamental freedoms, in particular Articles 63 and 65 TFEU.

(10)

A set of rules at Union level which would allow comparable controls on cash within the Union would greatly facilitate efforts to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

(11)

This Regulation does not concern measures taken by the Union or Member States under Article 66 TFEU to restrict movements of capital that cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic and monetary union or under Articles 143 and 144 TFEU as a result of a sudden crisis in the balance of payments.

(12)

Considering their presence at the external borders of the Union, their expertise in carrying out controls on passengers and freight crossing the external borders and their experience gained in the application of Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005, customs authorities should continue to act as the competent authorities for the purposes of this Regulation. At the same time, Member States should continue to be able also to designate other national authorities present at the external borders to act as competent authorities. Member States should continue to provide adequate training for the staff of customs authorities and other national authorities for the carrying out of those controls, including on cash-based money laundering.

(13)

One of the key concepts used in this Regulation is that of ‘cash’, which should be defined as comprising four categories: currency, bearer-negotiable instruments, commodities used as highly-liquid stores of value and certain types of prepaid cards. Given their characteristics, certain bearer-negotiable instruments, commodities used as highly-liquid stores of value, and prepaid cards which are not linked to a bank account and which can store an amount of money which is difficult to detect are likely to be used in place of currency as an anonymous means of transferring value across the external borders in a manner that is not traceable using the classic system of supervision by the public authorities. This Regulation should, therefore, lay down the essential components of the definition of ‘cash’, while at the same time enabling the Commission to amend the non-essential components of this Regulation in response to the attempts by criminals and their associates to circumvent a measure which controls only one type of highly-liquid store of value by bringing another type across the external borders. If evidence of such behaviour on a considerable scale is detected, it is essential that measures be taken swiftly to remedy the situation. Despite the high level of risk posed by virtual currencies, as evidenced in the Commission’s report of 26 June 2017 on the assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities, customs authorities do not have competence to monitor them.

(14)

Bearer-negotiable instruments enable the physical holder to claim a payment of a financial amount without being registered or mentioned by name. They can be easily used to transfer considerable amounts of value and present salient similarities with currency in terms of liquidity, anonymity and risks for abuse.

(15)

Commodities used as highly-liquid stores of value present a high ratio between their value and their volume, for which an easily accessible international trading market exists, allowing them to be converted into currency while incurring only modest transaction costs. Such commodities are mostly presented in a standardised way that allows for quick verification of their value.

(16)

Prepaid cards are non-nominal cards that store or provide access to a monetary value or funds which can be used for payment transactions, for acquiring goods or services or for redemption of currency. They are not linked to a bank account. Prepaid cards encompass anonymous prepaid cards as referred to in the Directive (EU) 2015/849. They are widely used for a variety of legitimate purposes and some of those instruments also present a clear social interest. Such prepaid cards are easily transferrable and can be used to transfer considerable value across the external borders. It is therefore necessary to include prepaid cards in the definition of cash, in particular if they can be bought without customer due diligence procedures. This will allow for the possibility to extend the controls to certain types of prepaid cards, taking into account the available technology, if justified by the evidence, provided that such controls are extended with due regard to proportionality and practical enforceability.

(17)

For the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, an obligation to declare cash should be imposed on natural persons entering or leaving the Union. In order not to restrict free movement unduly or overburden citizens and authorities with administrative formalities, the obligation should be subject to a threshold of EUR 10 000. It should apply to carriers carrying such amounts on their person, in their luggage or in the means of transport in which they cross the external borders. They should be required to make the cash available to the competent authorities for control and, if necessary, to present it to those authorities. The definition of ‘carrier’ should be understood as excluding those carriers who undertake the professional conveyance of goods or people.

(18)

As regards movements of unaccompanied cash, for example cash entering or leaving the Union in postal packages, courier shipments, unaccompanied luggage or containerised cargo, the competent authorities should have the power to require the sender or the recipient, or a representative thereof, to make a disclosure declaration, systematically or on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with national procedures. Such disclosure should cover a number of elements, which are not covered by the usual documentation submitted to customs, such as shipping documents and customs declarations. Such elements are the origin, destination, economic provenance and intended use of the cash. The obligation to disclose unaccompanied cash should be subject to a threshold identical to that for cash carried by carriers.

(19)

A number of standardised data elements regarding the movement of cash such as the personal details of the declarant, the owner or the recipient, the economic provenance and the intended use of the cash, should be recorded in order to achieve the objectives of this Regulation. In particular, it is necessary that the declarant, the owner or the recipient provide their personal details as contained in their identification documents, in order to reduce to a minimum the risk of errors regarding their identities and the delays due to the possible subsequent need for verification.

(20)

As regards the obligation to declare accompanied cash and the obligation to disclose unaccompanied cash, competent authorities should be empowered to carry out all requisite controls on persons, their luggage, the means of transport used to cross the external borders and any unaccompanied consignment or receptacle crossing that border which may contain cash, or a means of transport carrying them. In the event of failure to comply with those obligations, the competent authorities should compose an ex officio declaration for subsequent transmission of the relevant information to other authorities.

(21)

In order to ensure their uniform application by competent authorities, controls should be based primarily on a risk analysis, with the purpose of identifying and evaluating the risks and developing the necessary countermeasures.

(22)

The establishment of a common risk management framework should not prevent competent authorities from performing random checks or spontaneous controls whenever they deem necessary.

(23)

Where they detect amounts of cash below the threshold but there are indications that the cash might be linked to criminal activity as covered by this Regulation, the competent authorities should be able to record, in the case of accompanied cash, information about the carrier, the owner and, where available, the intended recipient of the cash, including full name, contact details, details concerning the nature and the amount or value of the cash, its economic provenance and intended use.

(24)

In the case of unaccompanied cash, competent authorities should be able to record information on the declarant, the owner, the sender, and the recipient or intended recipient of the cash, including full name, contact details, details concerning the nature and the amount or value of the cash, its economic provenance and intended use.

(25)

That information should be passed on to the FIU of the Member State in question, which should ensure that the FIU transmit any relevant information spontaneously or upon request to the FIUs of the other Member States. Those units are designated as the hub elements in the fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing who receive and process information from various sources such as financial institutions and analyse that information in order to determine if there are grounds for further investigation that may not be apparent to the competent authorities who collect the declarations and perform controls under this Regulation. To guarantee the effective flow of information, FIUs should all be connected to the Customs Information System (the ‘CIS’) established by Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 (6) and the data produced or exchanged by competent authorities and FIUs should be compatible and comparable.

(26)

Recognising the importance for the successful follow-up of this Regulation of having an effective exchange of information between the relevant authorities, including FIUs within the legal framework covering those entities, and the need to strengthen the cooperation between FIUs within the Union, the Commission should assess by 1 June 2019 the possibility of establishing a common mechanism to fight money laundering and terrorist financing.

(27)

The detection of sub-threshold amounts of cash in situations where there are indications of criminal activity is highly relevant in this context. Consequently, it should also be possible to share information relating to sub-threshold amounts with the competent authorities in other Member States if there are indications of criminal activity.

(28)

Considering that the movements of cash that are subject to controls under this Regulation take place across the external borders, and given the difficulty of acting once the cash has left the point of entry or exit and the associated risk if even small amounts are used illicitly, the competent authorities should be able to detain cash temporarily in certain circumstances, subject to checks and balances: first, where the obligation to declare or to disclose cash has not been met and, second, where there are indications of criminal activity, irrespective of the amount or whether the cash is accompanied or unaccompanied. In view of the nature of such temporary detention and the impact that it might have on the freedom of movement and the right to property, the period of detention should be limited to the absolute minimum time that other competent authorities require to determine whether there are grounds for further intervention, such as investigations or seizure of the cash based on other legal instruments. A decision to detain cash temporarily under this Regulation should be accompanied by a statement of reasons and should adequately describe the specific factors that have given rise to the action. It should be possible to extend the period of temporary detention of the cash in specific and duly assessed cases, for instance when competent authorities encounter difficulties in obtaining information on a potential criminal activity, inter alia, when communication with a third country is required, when documents have to be translated or when it is difficult to identify and contact the sender or the recipient in the case of unaccompanied cash. If, at the end of the period of detention, no decision concerning further intervention is taken or if the competent authority decides that there are no grounds to further detain the cash, it should immediately be released, depending on the situation, to the person from whom the cash was temporarily detained, the carrier or the owner.

(29)

In order to raise awareness about this Regulation, Member States should, in cooperation with the Commission, develop appropriate materials regarding the obligation to declare or disclose cash.

(30)

It is essential that the competent authorities that collect information pursuant to this Regulation transmit it in a timely manner to the national FIU in order to enable it to further analyse and compare the information with other data as provided for in Directive (EU) 2015/849.

(31)

For the purpose of this Regulation, where the competent authorities register a failure to declare or disclose cash or where there are indications of criminal activity, they should promptly share that information with competent authorities of other Member States through appropriate channels. Such exchange of data would be proportionate considering that persons who have breached the obligation to declare or disclose cash and who have been apprehended in one Member State would be likely to select another Member State of entry or exit where the competent authorities would have no knowledge of their earlier breach. The exchange of such information should be mandatory in order to ensure that this Regulation is applied consistently across the Member States. Where there are indications that the cash is related to criminal activity which could adversely affect the financial interests of the Union, that information should also be made available to the Commission, to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as established by Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (7) by the Member States participating in enhanced cooperation pursuant to that Regulation and to Europol as established by Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8). In order to achieve the objectives of this Regulation of preventing and deterring the circumvention of the obligation to declare or disclose cash, anonymised risk information and risk analysis results should also mandatorily be exchanged between Member States and with the Commission, in accordance with standards to be set out in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this Regulation.

(32)

It should be possible to exchange information between a competent authority of a Member State or the Commission and the authorities of a third country provided that there are appropriate safeguards. Such exchange should only be permissible where relevant national and Union provisions on fundamental rights and the transfer of personal data are complied with, following authorisation by the authorities which originally obtained the information. The Commission should be informed of any occurrence of information exchange with third countries pursuant to this Regulation and should report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council.

(33)

Given the nature of the information collected and the legitimate expectations of carriers and declarants that their personal data and information regarding the value of cash that they have brought into or taken out of the Union will be treated confidentially, the competent authorities should provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that agents who require access to the information respect professional secrecy, and adequately protect such information against unauthorised access, use or communication. Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation or national law, particularly in the context of legal proceedings, such information should not be disclosed without the permission of the authority which obtained it.

The processing of data under this Regulation may also cover personal data and should be carried out in accordance with Union law. Member States and the Commission should process personal data only in a manner compatible with the purposes of this Regulation. Any collection, disclosure, transmission, communication and other processing of personal data within the scope of this Regulation should be subject to the requirements of Regulations (EC) No 45/2001 (9) and (EU) 2016/679 (10) of the European Parliament and of the Council. The processing of personal data for the purposes of this Regulation should also respect the fundamental right to respect for private and family life recognised by Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, as well as the right to respect for private and family life, and the right to the protection of personal data recognised, respectively, by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’).

(34)

For the purposes of the analysis carried out by the FIUs and in order to enable authorities in other Member States to control and enforce the obligation to declare cash, particularly with respect to persons who have previously breached that obligation, it is necessary that the data contained in declarations made under this Regulation are stored for a sufficiently long period. In order for the FIU to effectively carry out their analysis and for the competent authorities to control and effectively enforce the obligation to declare or disclose cash, the period for the retention of data contained in declarations made under this Regulation should not exceed five years with a possible further extension, after a thorough assessment of the necessity and proportionality of such further retention, which should not exceed three additional years.

(35)

In order to encourage compliance and deter circumvention, Member States should introduce penalties for non-compliance with the obligations to declare or disclose cash. Those penalties should apply only to the failure to declare or disclose cash under this Regulation and should not take into account the potential criminal activity associated with the cash, which may be the object of further investigation and measures that fall outside the scope of this Regulation. Those penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and should not go beyond what is required to encourage compliance. Penalties introduced by Member States should have an equivalent deterrent effect across the Union on the infringement of this Regulation.

(36)

While most Member States already use a harmonised declaration form, the EU Cash Declaration Form (EU-CDF), on a voluntary basis, in order to ensure the uniform application of controls and the efficient processing, transmission and analysis by competent authorities of the declarations, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt the templates for the declaration form and the disclosure form, to determine the criteria for a common risk management framework, to establish the technical rules for the exchange of information and the template for the form to be used for the transmission of information, and to establish the rules and the format to be used for the provision of statistical information to the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11).

(37)

In order to improve the current situation in which there is limited access to statistical information and there are only some indications available on the extent of cash being smuggled across the Union’s external borders by criminals, more effective cooperation via information exchange between competent authorities and with the Commission should be introduced. To guarantee that this exchange of information is effective and efficient, the Commission should review whether the system established fulfils the purpose or whether there are obstacles to the timely and direct exchange of information. Furthermore, the Commission should publish statistical information on its website.

(38)

In order to be able to quickly take account of future modifications of international standards such as standards established by the FATF or to address the circumvention of this Regulation through reliance on commodities used as highly-liquid stores of value or reliance on prepaid cards, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to Annex I to this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (12). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(39)

Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of the transnational scale of money laundering and terrorist financing, and the specificities of the internal market and its fundamental freedoms, which can only be fully implemented by ensuring that no excessively disparate treatment based on national legislation is imposed on cash crossing the external borders of the Union, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(40)

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in Article 6 TEU and reflected in the Charter, in particular Title II thereof.

(41)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001,

(1)

Money laundering and the related financing of terrorism and organised crime remain significant problems at Union level, thus damaging the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector and threatening the internal market and the internal security of the Union. In order to tackle those problems and to complement and reinforce the application of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), this Directive aims to combat money laundering by means of criminal law, enabling more efficient and swifter cross-border cooperation between competent authorities.

(2)

Measures adopted solely at national or even at Union level, without taking into account international coordination and cooperation, would have very limited effect. The measures adopted by the Union to combat money laundering should therefore be compatible with, and at least as stringent as, other actions undertaken in international fora.

(3)

Union action should continue to take particular account of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and instruments of other international organisations and bodies active in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The relevant Union legal acts should, where appropriate, be further aligned with the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation adopted by the FATF in February 2012 (the ‘revised FATF Recommendations’). As a signatory to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, the Union should transpose the requirements of that Convention into its legal order.

(4)

Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA (3) lays down requirements with regard to the criminalisation of money laundering. However, that Framework Decision is not comprehensive enough and the current criminalisation of money laundering is not sufficiently coherent to effectively combat money laundering across the Union and results in enforcement gaps and in obstacles to cooperation between the competent authorities in different Member States.

(5)

The definition of criminal activities which constitute predicate offences for money laundering should be sufficiently uniform in all Member States. Member States should ensure that all offences that are punishable by a term of imprisonment as set out in this Directive are considered predicate offences for money laundering. Moreover, to the extent that the application of those penalty thresholds does not already do so, Member States should include a range of offences within each of the categories of offences listed in this Directive. In that case, Member States should be able to decide how to delimit the range of offences within each category. Where a category of offences, such as terrorism or environmental offences, includes offences set out in legal acts of the Union, this Directive should refer to those legal acts. Member States should, however, consider any offence set out in those legal acts as constituting a predicate offence for money laundering. Any kind of punishable involvement in the commission of a predicate offence as criminalised in accordance with national law should also be considered as a criminal activity for the purposes of this Directive. In cases where Union law allows Member States to provide for sanctions other than criminal sanctions, this Directive should not require Member States to classify the offences in those cases as predicate offences for the purposes of this Directive.

(6)

The use of virtual currencies presents new risks and challenges from the perspective of combating money laundering. Member States should ensure that those risks are addressed appropriately.

(7)

Due to the impact of money laundering offences committed by public office holders on the public sphere and on the integrity of public institutions, Member States should be able to consider including more severe penalties for public office holders in their national frameworks in accordance with their legal traditions.

(8)

Tax crimes relating to direct and indirect taxes should be covered by the definition of criminal activity, in line with the revised FATF Recommendations. Given that different tax crimes in each Member State can constitute a criminal activity punishable by the sanctions referred to in this Directive, the definitions of tax crimes might diverge in national law. The aim of this Directive, however, is not to harmonise the definitions of tax crimes in national law.

(9)

In criminal proceedings regarding money laundering, Member States should assist each other in the widest possible way and ensure that information is exchanged in an effective and timely manner in accordance with national law and the existing Union legal framework. Differences between the definitions of predicate offences in national law should not hinder international cooperation in criminal proceedings regarding money laundering. Cooperation with third countries should be intensified, in particular by encouraging and supporting the establishment of effective measures and mechanisms to combat money laundering and by ensuring better international cooperation in this field.

(10)

This Directive does not apply to money laundering involving property derived from criminal offences affecting the Union’s financial interests, which is subject to specific rules as laid down in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4). This is without prejudice to the possibility for Member States to transpose this Directive and Directive (EU) 2017/1371 by means of a single comprehensive framework at national level. In accordance with Article 325(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Member States are to take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests.

(11)

Member States should ensure that certain types of money laundering activities are also punishable when committed by the perpetrator of the criminal activity that generated the property (‘self-laundering’). In such cases, where, the money laundering activity does not simply amount to the mere possession or use of property, but also involves the transfer, conversion, concealment or disguise of property and results in further damage than that already caused by the criminal activity, for instance by putting the property derived from criminal activity into circulation and, by doing so, concealing its unlawful origin, that money laundering activity should be punishable.

(12)

In order for criminal law measures to be effective against money laundering, a conviction should be possible without it being necessary to establish precisely which criminal activity generated the property, or for there to be a prior or simultaneous conviction for that criminal activity, while taking into account all relevant circumstances and evidence. It should be possible for Member States, in line with their national legal systems, to ensure this by means other than legislation. Prosecutions for money laundering should also not be impeded by the fact that the criminal activity was committed in another Member State or in a third country, subject to the conditions set out in this Directive.

(13)

This Directive aims to criminalise money laundering when it is committed intentionally and with the knowledge that the property was derived from criminal activity. In that context, this Directive should not distinguish between situations where property has been derived directly from criminal activity and situations where it has been derived indirectly from criminal activity, in line with the broad definition of ‘proceeds’ as laid down in Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). In each case, when considering whether the property is derived from criminal activity and whether the person knew that, the specific circumstances of the case should be taken into account, such as the fact that the value of the property is disproportionate to the lawful income of the accused person and that the criminal activity and acquisition of property occurred within the same time frame. Intention and knowledge can be inferred from objective, factual circumstances. As this Directive provides for minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of money laundering, Member States are free to adopt or maintain more stringent criminal law rules in that area. Member States should be able, for example, to provide that money laundering committed recklessly or by serious negligence constitutes a criminal offence. References in this Directive to money laundering committed by negligence should be understood as such for Member States that criminalise such conduct.

(14)

In order to deter money laundering throughout the Union, Member States should ensure that it is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least four years. That obligation is without prejudice to the individualisation and application of penalties and the execution of sentences in accordance with the concrete circumstances in each individual case. Member States should also provide for additional sanctions or measures, such as fines, temporary or permanent exclusion from access to public funding, including tender procedures, grants and concessions, temporary disqualifications from the practice of commercial activities or temporary bans on running for elected or public office. That obligation is without prejudice to the discretion of the judge or the court to decide whether to impose additional sanctions or measures or not, taking into account all the circumstances of the particular case.

(15)

While there is no obligation to increase sentences, Member States should ensure that the judge or the court is able to take the aggravating circumstances set out in this Directive into account when sentencing offenders. It remains within the discretion of the judge or the court to determine whether to increase the sentence due to the specific aggravating circumstances, taking into account all the facts of the particular case. Member States should not be obliged to provide for aggravating circumstances where national law provides for the criminal offences laid down in Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA (6) or for offences committed by natural persons acting as obliged entities in the exercise of their professional activities to be punishable as separate criminal offences and this may lead to more severe sanctions.

(16)

The freezing and confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime remove the financial incentives which drive crime. Directive 2014/42/EU lays down minimum rules on the freezing and confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in criminal matters. That Directive also requires the Commission to report to the European Parliament and to the Council on its implementation and make adequate proposals if necessary. Member States should, as a minimum, ensure the freezing and confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in all cases provided for in Directive 2014/42/EU. Member States should also strongly consider enabling confiscation in all cases where it is not possible to initiate or conclude criminal proceedings, including in cases where the offender has died. As requested by the European Parliament and the Council in the statement accompanying Directive 2014/42/EU, the Commission will submit a report analysing the feasibility and possible benefits of introducing further common rules on the confiscation of property deriving from activities of a criminal nature, including in the absence of a conviction of a specific person or persons for those activities. Such analysis will take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States.

(17)

Given the mobility of perpetrators and proceeds stemming from criminal activities, as well as the complex cross-border investigations required to combat money laundering, all Member States should establish their jurisdiction in order to enable the competent authorities to investigate and prosecute such activities. Member States should thereby ensure that their jurisdiction includes situations where an offence is committed by means of information and communication technology from their territory, whether such technology is based on their territory or not.

(18)

Under Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA (7) and Council Decision 2002/187/JHA (8), the competent authorities of two or more Member States conducting parallel criminal proceedings in respect of the same facts involving the same person are, with the assistance of Eurojust, to enter into direct consultations with one another, in particular to ensure that all offences covered by this Directive are prosecuted.

(19)

To ensure the successful investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences, those responsible for investigating or prosecuting such offences should have the possibility to make use of effective investigative tools such as those which are used in combating organised crime or other serious crimes. It should thereby be ensured that sufficient personnel and targeted training, resources and up-to-date technological capacity are available. The use of such tools, in accordance with national law, should be targeted and take into account the principle of proportionality and the nature and seriousness of the offences under investigation and should respect the right to the protection of personal data.

(20)

This Directive replaces certain provisions of Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA for the Member States bound by this Directive.

(21)

This Directive respects the principles recognised by Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), respects fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised, in particular, by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including those set out in Titles II, III, V and VI thereof which encompass, inter alia, the right to respect for private and family life and the right to protection of personal data, the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, covering also the requirement of precision, clarity and foreseeability in criminal law, the presumption of innocence, as well as the rights of suspects and accused persons to have access to a lawyer, the right not to incriminate oneself and the right to a fair trial. This Directive has to be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles, taking also into account the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other human rights obligations under international law.

(22)

Since the objective of this Directive, namely to subject money laundering in all Member States to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of this Directive, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

(23)

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, and without prejudice to Article 4 of that Protocol, the United Kingdom and Ireland are not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and are not bound by it or subject to its application.

(24)

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA continues to be binding upon and applicable to Denmark,

(1)

Council Decision 2003/17/EC (3) provides that, under certain conditions, field inspections carried out on certain seed-producing crops in the listed third countries are to be considered equivalent to field inspections carried out in accordance with Union law and that, under certain conditions, the seed of certain species of fodder plants, cereal, beet, and oil and fibre plants produced in those countries is to be considered equivalent to seed produced in accordance with Union law.

(2)

The Federative Republic of Brazil (‘Brazil’) has submitted a request to the Commission to grant equivalence to its system of field inspections of fodder plant seed-producing crops and cereal seed-producing crops, and to fodder plant seed and cereal seed produced and certified in Brazil.

(3)

The Commission examined the relevant legislation of Brazil, and, based on an audit carried out in 2016 concerning the system of official controls and of certification of fodder plant and cereal seed in Brazil, and its equivalence with Union requirements, published its findings in a report entitled ‘Final report of an audit carried out in Brazil from 11 April 2016 to 19 April 2016 in order to evaluate the system of official controls and certification of seed and its equivalence with European Union requirements’.

(4)

Following the audit, it has been concluded that field inspections of seed-producing crops, sampling, testing and official post-controls of fodder plant and cereal seed are carried out appropriately, and satisfy the conditions set out in Annex II to Decision 2003/17/EC and the respective requirements set out in Council Directives 66/401/EEC (4) and 66/402/EEC (5). Moreover, it has been concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in Brazil are competent and operate appropriately.

(5)

The Republic of Moldova has submitted a request to the Commission to grant equivalence to its system of field inspections of cereal seed-producing crops, vegetable seed-producing crops and oil and fibre plant seed-producing crops and to cereal seed, vegetable seed and oil and fibre plant seed produced and certified in the Republic of Moldova.

(6)

The Commission examined the relevant legislation of the Republic of Moldova, and, based on an audit carried out in 2016 concerning the system of official controls and of certification of cereal, vegetable and oil and fibre plant seed in the Republic of Moldova, and its equivalence with Union requirements, published its findings in a report entitled ‘Final report of an audit carried out in the Republic of Moldova from 14 June to 21 June 2016 in order to evaluate the system of official controls and certification of seed and their equivalence with European Union requirements’.

(7)

Following the audit, it has been concluded that field inspections of seed-producing crops, sampling, testing and official post-controls of cereal, vegetable and oil and fibre plant seed are carried out appropriately, and satisfy the conditions set out in Annex II to Decision 2003/17/EC and the respective requirements set out in Council Directives 66/402/EEC, 2002/55/EC (6) and 2002/57/EC (7). Moreover, it has been concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in the Republic of Moldova are competent and operate appropriately.

(8)

Therefore it is appropriate to grant equivalence as regards field inspections carried out in respect of fodder plant seed-producing crops and cereal seed-producing crops in Brazil, and as regards fodder plant seed and cereal seed produced in Brazil and officially certified by its authorities.

(9)

It is also appropriate to grant equivalence as regards field inspections carried out in respect of cereal seed-producing crops, vegetable seed-producing crops and oil and fibre plant seed-producing crops in the Republic of Moldova, and as regards cereal seed, vegetable seed and oil and fibre plant seed produced in the Republic of Moldova and officially certified by its authorities.

(10)

There is a demand in the Union to import vegetable seed from third countries including the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, Decision 2003/17/EC should cover officially certified vegetable seed as referred to in Directive 2002/55/EC in order to address the demand for those seeds originating in the Republic of Moldova, as well as in other third countries in the future.

(11)

Taking into consideration the applicable rules of the International Seed Testing Association (ISTA), it is appropriate that the third country concerned provide an official statement that the seed has been sampled and tested in accordance with the provisions set out in the ISTA International Rules for Seed Testing (‘ISTA Rules’) with regard to Orange International Seed Lot Certificates, and that the seed lots be accompanied by such a certificate.

(12)

In view of the expiry of the ‘Derogatory experiment on seed sampling and seed analysis’ set out in Annex V(A) to the Decision adopted by the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on 28 September 2000 on the OECD Schemes for the Varietal Certification of Seed Moving in International Trade, any reference to that experiment should be deleted.

(13)

Any reference to Croatia as a third country should be deleted, in view of its accession to the Union in 2013.

(14)

Decision 2003/17/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) aims to provide support for workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation, as a result of a continuation of the global financial and economic crisis, or as a result of a new global financial and economic crisis, and to assist them with their reintegration into the labour market.

(2)

The EGF is not to exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 150 million (2011 prices), as laid down in Article 12 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 (3).

(3)

On 23 February 2018, the Netherlands submitted an application to mobilise the EGF, in respect of redundancies in 20 enterprises operating in the Financial services sector in the following regions: Friesland, Drenthe and Overijssel in the Netherlands. It was supplemented by additional information provided in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013. That application complies with the requirements for determining a financial contribution from the EGF as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013.

(4)

The EGF should, therefore, be mobilised in order to provide a financial contribution of EUR 1 192 500 in respect of the application submitted by the Netherlands.

(5)

In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the EGF, this decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

‘(b)

paragraph 4 shall be amended as follows:’,

‘(b)

point 4 shall be amended as follows:’.

‘(d)

the surname, first name and address of the natural person or the name and address of the company/other organisation, referred to in Article 9(4)(f);’,

‘(d)

the surname, first name and address of the natural person or the name and address of the company/other organisation, referred to in point (4)(f) of Article 9;’.

‘12.

the cases in which the data referred to in Article 9(6) could factually not be provided, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 8(5);

13.

the cases in which the data referred to in Article 9(6) was not required to be provided for legal reasons, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 8(5);

14.

the cases in which a person who could factually not provide the data referred to in Article 9(6) was refused a visa, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 8(5).’,

‘12.

the cases in which the data referred to in point (6) of Article 9 could factually not be provided, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 8(5);

13.

the cases in which the data referred to in point (6) of Article 9 was not required to be provided for legal reasons, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 8 (5);

14.

the cases in which a person who could factually not provide the data referred to in point (6) of Article 9 was refused a visa, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 8(5).’.

‘(a)

the status information and the data taken from the application form, referred to in Article 9(2) and (4);’,

‘(a)

the status information and the data taken from the application form, referred to in points (2) and (4) of Article 9;’.

‘(b)

the data taken from the application form, referred to in Article 9(4)(a), (b) and (c);’,

‘(b)

the data taken from the application form, referred to in point (4)(a), (b) and (c) of Article 9;’.

‘(e)

the data referred to in Article 9(4)(a) and (b) of the linked application file(s) on the spouse and children.’,

‘(e)

the data referred to in point (4)(a) and (b) of Article 9 of the linked application file(s) on the spouse and children.’.